Hello and welcome to the eighth session of the Enigma of Karnapps Outbound with Reza Nagelistani. Reza please take it away. Thank you so much. Thank you everyone for the fantastic contribution, questions and taking this course. course. So this is our last session. We're going to kind of summarize some of the main thought pieces and trends and streams of inquiry that we have been pursuing, encapsulate them, And if possible, kind of, you know, either give an assessment of the whole project of
BAU, or at the very least, ending it with a certain kind of a series of problematizations, which would then open this seminar to the next one, which is a sequel to this one, mainly meaning more mature works of Karn, starting with attempt at methodologic and logical syntax of language. So did we have a presentation set for today? Yeah, we have Gabriel. Yes, yes. Our dear friend.
Okay, so that's a start, yes. Okay, so yeah, I volunteer myself perhaps, quite unfortunately volunteer myself to try to make sense of the idea of quasi-analysis as synthesis, as what it means for quasi-analysis to be synthesis in the garb of analysis. So I, well, it won't be anything special, but I made a quick presentation in order to, in order to, well, go over some things. I won't, I'll probably skip some slides because I don't think we need to recap, go into a
a lot of details while recapitulating what exactly is quasi-analysis, but basically my, oh, I'll divide my presentation in two parts, let us say. One, in what sense quasi-analysis is analogous to analysis, and this is a very simple one, it's a, at least my position will be that the analogy is in the formal procedure in this in the almost in the fact that they in so far as the so far as only the formal procedure is is of importance analysis and cross analysis are fundamentally the same
or virtually the same but the this will be the first part the presentation the second part will be in what's in what sense does then seeing as the formal procedures are virtually the same in what sense can we talk about of a difference of a difference and i'll argue that it's simply the difference with regards to the role of constitution theory of synthesis and analysis which is which is briefly touched on by Kahnep in section 74. So with that I'll I guess I'll start it's nothing fancy it's just some bullet points to guide
myself so i don't stutter and don't go off on tangents so i'll share a uh brief generic powerpoint presentation if at any point uh okay uh can you guys see it see it Yes, yes. It's not in presenter's mode, but we can see the lights and everything. Oh, uh. It would be fantastic. Now this is fantastic. Yeah, perfect. So, uh, just a second. Can you hear a lot of background noise? Like when I, when I turn this.
And what about now? No, I can't hear anything. because otherwise I'll have to turn off the fan and it's uh no no no don't worry I I think no no just okay don't worry it becomes too loud please tell me sure don't worry thank you so much uh so I'll I first I had some slides on what exactly is quasenalysis but I'll but I'll basically skip them I'll just read a brief passage from the from the section we've already read which is which is basically kind of stating stating that constituted question analysis is a procedure that leads from the basic elements to quasi objects which by quasi
objects he means sets and relation relation extensions as he calls them which we don't really need to get into why he differentiates them it's simply it's a matter is simply a a consequence of the fact that Carnot adopts type theory and the type theory with functions as the basic notion, not sets as the basic notion, which is actually quite, which we are not that used to nowadays, but it's quite enjoyable. So, and basically, and then I would go over Mormon's points that has a pointed out last week, but I'll skip over all of that and then just state the question, the question that will guide us in this first part of the presentation.
Which is, what exactly is the analogy between quasi-analysis as the constitution on the basis of a set of elementary objects, of quasi-objects, and analysis proper? Well, first there is a sense which they which they allow us both both quasi-analysis and analysis allow us to and lead lead us to properties or in the case of quasi-analysis quasi-properties which which by revealing, let us say, using a some, a metaphor, reveal, reveal a structure at
for, at which on the basic level is not able, is not, is at least not very clear or not obvious, not apparent, which we can, which can, which we can use to track complex behavior and insofar as we can track complex behavior we can act on it so but in order to exactly understand this analogy i will i'll go to how carnet defines and defines analysis which is not as which though of course related to to the traditional notion of analysis from which we can already find in in in the cards rules this is a
slightly modified it's a bit idiosyncratic i'll first present it present the condoms definition i'll briefly go over some preliminary preliminary of notions in a partially formal formal way and and then follow up with Carnap's example, example that he provides in the alpha ball, so that hopefully we can apply, we can, sorry, we can apply the formal procedure that has been sketched in the next slide to the example. So fundamentally, Carnap defines analysis
as a procedure in which we are concerned with objects which have several constituents or characteristics, properties, which will be the end result of an investigation which, based on certain data provided, will allow will allow us to to infer the properties and in this case infer is basically to construct to construct formally uh i don't know if it i don't know if that that is clear i'm of course i'm trying to to not not to take too much of our of our time today so i'll briefly i'll briefly go
over to a to the formal part this isn't exactly analysis and so because i'll i'll start i'll start from the from the proper properties but it will be able to allow us to define certain certain notions that will be appealed to in incarnate's example so So presuming that we are given a domain of objects, so a set, all of which are presumed to have at least one property. And of course, some may find this idea weird that we have to presume that objects have properties. But if we remember that out that the elf that the
alpha ball is a if we use the non Carnapian formulation that Mormon providers provides us and that has a used last class, the alpha ball had is in a way committed to a bundle theory of individuals where individuals are, if not, if they aren't ontologically just a bundle of properties, they are at least we at least have access to them or define them, describe them, let's say, in the constitution of scientific objects through properties, through relational properties, if we adopt the stronger thesis of the alpha.
all so given this given such a domain of objects all of which have at least one property we can define a relation which I hear symbolized by this by the symbol which I have I just realized I don't know how to what is called in English I only know I only know I only know the the name it's name in Portuguese so I call it to a relation from a relation from from from the domain to its to itself such that X is X relates okay I believe someone has made has been so okay till the thanks
So X to the Y, if and only if there is a property P such that both X and Y have P. Given such a domain of objects, which we presume to have properties, it is quite simple to define the relation to the. Thus defined, it is quite clear that tilde is reflexive. Because if X has a property P, then we can, per the definition of tilde, we can say that X tilde X, which is in formal terms,
it means to say that tilde is reflexive relation. Similarly, insofar as the relation doesn't really care about the order of the related, the relation is symmetric. If x has property P and y has property P, then x to the y and y to the x state the same fact, but let us say it informally. So it's the relation tilde is both reflexive and symmetric. This in the terminology adopted by Carnap, which is not so common anymore,
means to say that tilde is a similarity relation. Similar similarity relation is any relation which is both reflexive and symmetric. So on the basis of the domain D of objects with such properties and a relation tilde, we can define the notion which will be fundamental to both analysis and quasi-analysis of similarity circles. Here I basically, I translated Mormon, 2009 definition of similarity circles. of similarity circles, I translated it in informal terms. So a similarity circle is a set, a set of objects,
a set of objects in this domain. So we can say that similarity circle is a subset of the domain. All of the elements of which satisfy the following conditions. In the similarity circle, all elements of a similarity circle are similar to each other. In the sense that for all X and Y in a similarity circle C, X to the Y. And most more important, very importantly, the subset C of DNA, the similarity circle is the maximum subset of similar elements. That means that if a element of the domain is similar to any of the objects in the similarity circle, it is already in the similarity circle.
So formally this is stated thus, for all objects in the domain, for all Z in the domain of objects, if Z to the X, that is, if Z is similar to X, for any X, for any and all X and C, then Z is in C. That means that, if that means if any object in domain is similar to the objects is in similarity circle it is already an element of the similarity circle does the provided with this with this notion the notion of a similarity relation in the similarity circle which hopefully has been at least made somewhat clear uh we can we can go to to kind of example which is of color and in fact goes back to
to the helm the carnivist doctor dissertation and it's quite simple i'll i'll be brief with it i won't read it all but it's basically if we have a if we have a domain of objects of colored objects and we assume that all all the proper all of the properties which are of interest to us at least in this in this case is are the properties of color we can define we can define a relation a relation of color kinship which will fulfill the the requirement the requirements of a similarity relation because
insofar insofar as an object an object is red or an object has a color c whatever this is similar to itself if we define similarity as the relation of having the same color and if object a has the same color as object b object b has the same color as object a so a is similar to b and b similar to a which means that the relation of color kinship as how as which is high which is how Karnoff calls it is a similarity relation provided with such a similarity relation and a domain of objects, we can then find similarity circles,
which in this case will be the subsets of the domain, which contain all elements which have at least one of the call, all elements whose color is, well, and that's the thing, just precisely what classifies this as analysis in Carnap's sense. We weren't told what the color was. If we go back to Carnap's example, we are provided just with a pair list, which would be equivalent to provided a relation extension.
From this relation extension, we can define, even if we don't know exactly what is the color, what is the color of the objects? We are provided with material sufficient for us to establish a, what nowadays we would call a structured set. A structured set. Sorry, I had to turn on the fan because it's getting really hot in here. So as Karnam says, all we have is a pair list. We know only the extension of the relation of color kinship. We are told all pairs for which this relation holds when we are not told which color these two things have in common.
I'll read it from the slide here just to to avoid prolonging myself more than more than needed. Applying the framework defined in the previous slide to the example provided by Kahnep, the relation of color kinship characterizes a similarity relation in the domain of colored objects on the basis of which similarity circles can be defined such that so long as certain unfavorable conditions are met, these unfavorable conditions are the conditions that Goodman will bring up in his criticism of quasi-analysis, for any color there will be a similarity circle whose elements are all the objects which have that color. an object can have more than one color but if it has if at least one of its colors is the
is the color c1 let us say it will be a it would be an element of the similarity circle which which is constituted by all the objects which have the color c1 generally if we go beyond our example if a parallelist is given whose relation extension signifies agreement in at least one constituent then the procedure of proper analysis consists in establishing the similarity circle associated with the relation extension classes which are formed in this way are then assigned to their elements as constituents so if we go back to the definition of analysis we infer we will be able to infer this constituents on the basis of other data, in this case a pair list.
Furnished with this account of the procedure of analysis, we can make sense of what exactly means by quasi-analysis being analogous to analysis. And it is quite simple. It is the fact that the formal procedure of quest analysis is the same. It is simply that the data from which we start is not retrospectively understood as that of sharing the same property, But that, but simply as a relation between two unanalyzable units. Carnic example is a quite an interesting one, which is the example of
of the constitution of component chords, component tones, sorry, from a relation between chords. Here, chords is understood as any set, which may be a new terraset of notes, let's say, played together. From a relation of tone kinship between chords understood as a uniform totality, which is how Karnam describes them, we can using a, if we are provided
with a relation... Oh, I just noticed that Franklin asked that if all similarities relation, if it's right to say that all equivalence relations are similar relations but all similar relations do not do not have do not have to be equivalence relations yes this is correct connex points out an equivalence relation is a similar to relation which is uh transitive sorry sorry about that but anyway provided with a with a pair list so a relation extension between between objects which are taken to be unanalyzable units we can despite their supposed their
presumed unanalyzability we can go on to define similarity circles which will which will function in exactly the same way as the color classes in the example of color. So let's just read this brief portion of the example. Let us now assume that we have not been given any qualitative characterization, but only a pair list of the chords which one can hear, for example, in a piano. That is to say, a pair lists on the basis of tone kinship. Since this relation extension is reflexive and symmetrical, we can apply the procedure of quasi-analysis to it. On the basis of the given pair list,
that is on the basis of the list of pairs which are akin in tone, we determine the similarity circles. This similarity circle is standing exact formal analogy to the color classes of the early example of proper analysis. With the aid of this analogy, one can easily convince himself that they are identical with the above mentioned chord classes, which would be the chord classes if we were to, which with the classes of all chords, which coincide in a constituent tone. If we presume that constituent tones are provided, are available to us before the procedure of quasi-analysis. Thus for each constituent tone in the language of acoustics, whether or not it occurs among the chords in isolation,
we obtain such as quasi-analytic similarity circle. Now we assign to each chord those similarity circles to which it belongs as quasi constituents. That is to each chord, we can treat each chord as being an element of the class which constitutes the similarity circle. And since, for example, the chord C, E, G which I'm always horrible with this formulation that it's what, the ring. Yeah, you people which are musicians can understand that. C, E, G is an element of similarity circles, is an element of similarity circles C, E and G.
And thus we assign C, E and G as quasi-constituents. If we then go back and compare these two examples, we notice quite clear that insofar they are formal procedures quasi-analysis and analysis don't differ at all and it is my and it is my claim that it is in this sense which which quasi-analysis wears the garb of analysis the difference the difference in which the difference which would be the answer to the to the question of what exactly makes quasi-analysis synthesis and not analysis is the
It's the role that quasi-analysis has with regards to constitution theory. I believe I won't mention it here, but I believe my my explanation, let us say, is equivalent to Thomas Thomas Mormon and Joel Proust. Response to Goodman's criticism of quasi analysis. The fundamental difference. between the roles of analysis and quasi-analysis
does not appear in the form of procedures. If we take analysis to be like kind of suggests that it is, as the inferring of constituents from a previous set of other data, The main difference is that analysis presupposes as already given the properties which we will eventually reach. reach. And if we go back to the formal framework, formal
framework that was previously defined, the similarity circles of analysis, the similarity relation which allow us to define similar circles and the process of analysis is best understood as the relation of sharing a property, of having a property in common. So this property is already presupposed as available to the scientist that is analyzed, to the science or to the philosopher that is analyzing something. In section 74, I believe this is what comes in,
kind of means when he says that to analyze something means to trace back the procedure of construction from the object itself to those elements which are required for this construction and saying that analysis presupposes synthesis because insofar as the constitution system, insofar as the possibility of building up the constitution system is the condition of the possibility of intersubjectivity of meaningful concepts. And in so far as the constitution system
is the synthesizing out of basic elements more complex ones. And that analysis can only be done on the basis of an already available, let us say, system of concepts. all objects to paraphrase the the the passage that is quoted on our screen all objects of the constitution system which all the at least all the objects which are the basic objects are synthetic entities constituted on the basis on the basis of
of the relation between the basic objects. And this is precisely to go back to Mormon, to Mormon, this is precisely the sensing in which Mormon says that the constitution theory is a generalization of synthetic geometry. What is synthetic geometry? Synthetic geometry is simply the study of geometry on the basis of procedures of constructions of all its elements in terms of basic primitive terms and not on the basis as is done in analytic geometry of a previously given set of coordinates.
Quasi-analysis as a formal procedure is maybe identical to analysis. but its role is fundamental in building up the very system which analysis presupposes in the sense that analyzing a concept is is precising, is investigating the relations which a concept exhibits in the total system of concepts, which is another term for the
constitution system, which is a term that retrospectively Carnap will apply to the project of the alphabet. well. So I'm Gabriel your audio stopped. Is it only with me or are you guys also experiencing that okay yeah i think he got disconnected i'll try to contact him
i think we can um um ask gabriel to just share uh the rest of it with us um and we go to the question and answers at this point okay Gabriel hi did I sorry when did I when did my connection fall Yeah, Reza was talking that like maybe we... I mean, if... No, I mean, if Gabriel wants to kind of, you know, give the last sentences, the last punchline,
I think that there are so many punchlines in this. But if he wants to just wrap it up very quickly in a couple of minutes. And Gabriel, would you be kind enough to send us this wonderful PowerPoint and the text that you have written? Yes. So I'm not entirely sure at which point the feed stopped, but it's basically that. Well, I was writing this stuff. It was the, when you were talking about basically quasi-analysis, it's not about analyzing the concept, but kind of a recalibration of the concepts according to the, you know, the sort of relations the concept already displays. I think that at that point, after that, I think it started to, you got caught up.
So, okay, basically, I believe that, I won't need the presentation for this anymore, I'll send them, but basically I believe the point is that analysis, insofar as it is the investigation of the of the real of the relation between concepts in an already provided system and an already provided conceptual system a total system of concepts presupposes those those con those concepts and insofar as constitution theory and so far as the and so far as the of the objective of constitution theory and the
building up of a constitution system is demonstrating is providing a concrete proof of the availability of such an intersubjective system as of the type that would then allow analysis, the constitutional system is fundamentally a synthetic object or made up of synthetic objects. And quasi-analysis, and insofar as quasi-analysis... Or a synthetic structure. A synthetic structure. synthetic structure in the sense of in the sense of a structure which which is
com which is stepwise constructed by building building objects from from one another from constructing objects from one another yes okay and in so far as quite in so far as quasi-analysis is the building up of these objects quasi-analysis is synthesis even if the formal procedure of quasi-analysis is it is fundamentally fundamentally indistinct from the procedure of analysis. The difference is how the procedure relates to the constitution system. Analysis relates to the constitution system as the investigation of an already provided constitution system.
what quasi-analysis is the building up of such a system itself. So yeah, that's it. I believe that would be the punchline. Magnificent. Look, most probably I'm going to plagiarize a lot of this for my next book. No problem. Feel free to. really great fantastic i mean the amount of time that you spend on this i'm sure that is quite um striking uh really good really great so i'm going to start i mean uh my apologies uh can i can i actually start the quest first round of um barrage of the questions and then you
get in line and shoot at him. So just one thing. First, I mean, I remember really early on, you said that the reason that, in a sense, we can say that there is an equivalence, it's quasi-analysis and analysis, and that comes down to formal procedure. But do you think that formal procedure itself a la frigge is enough or you need precisely intrasystematicity like formal procedure being assimilated to intrasystematicity of a construction system because otherwise carna would be just a glorified frigate right it was just would be the formal procedure
but the intrasystematicity is what makes it car up Well, perhaps I stated it a bit too strongly, but I believe when I mentioned that the formal procedure is basically equivalent, it's simply that this formal strategy of reaching as the end point of the procedure, certain classes which can be taken as the form as the formal formal substituents as kind of says of of properties or in the case of quasi-analysis quasi-properties quasi-properties yes the the procedure as a as a as a basically as a little schema in the
in the most the most simple sense of the term not in the philosophical sense of the term but But the formal procedure as a step by step, step by step recipe, let us say, to reach a result is equivalent. Yes, yes. So, I mean, formal procedure in a very minimalist sense that basically can be plugged into ultimately the whole idea of inter-systematization. Yes, yes, basically. It's the formal procedure as that which will, you send through an input, which will be a perilous, and as a result, you have certain set theoretic or type theoretic entities, which will be formal substituents, which will be formal reconstructions of properties, of quasi-properties.
But of course, insofar as the philosophical importance or the constitution theoretic importance of the procedure is fundamentally different. Precisely because quasi-analysis is the application of the formal strategy to reach, to first build up concepts and not simply... And not simply as a, we've already been provided with a system and we use the analysis to exhibit certain interesting properties.
I believe in the sense which Mormon in the notes, it's the single note present in Thomas Mormon paper uh synthetic geometry and the alpha ball yes yes i have read it has a note where he where where he criticizes another paper another paper in the in the book which argues that gestalt theory yes yes yes you're the one talking about that edited by hentika it's i think it's edited by hentika let me see i think i i think i have it open here let's say it's i believe by hentika has also a paper in this in this yes yes but it's may mayor i don't know oh mayor okay okay okay yes
yes okay okay there are two actually books one actually is being edited by antica the other one and tika has actually an essay yes so yes mayor uh will argue that that gestalt gestalt psychology is fundamental for for the alpha and mormon will argue that no that is not in fact and i believe and i believe we can use his criticism to to point out this if quasi-analysis was fundamentally against a a procedure of gestalt psychology it would in many ways it would be almost equivalent in importance it would have it would have almost the same importance as an as analysis in the sense that the gestalt psychology would would show us how to how to reach
In fact, more. Yes, absolutely. I would say that Gestalt theory can only be understood as an influential point, but not the method that Carnap employs here. Yes, absolutely. Would you be able to write down the name of the book for anyone who wants to look at it? So then, while I'm going to actually... So second question, while you are doing this, this is not really a question, but how much are you familiar? So, you know, Rossellian type theory is quite dodgy in its nature for people who aren't familiar with this. But this is something to entertain, not for you to answer right now or any person. How
much do you think that, for example, moving toward a certain kind of other kind of theory of types like Per Martin Loft, you know, particularly in his paper, analytic and synthetic judgments in type theory. How much do you think that it can add or enrich the methodology of Carnap here? That's something to think about as a basically research project kind of thing. Because Rossellian type theory is precisely, it's quite actually impoverished in its expressiveness and its enrichment of looking at the relations. I mean, obviously it's Per-Martin-Hoff, basically theory of types, then homotopy type theory,
all sorts of these kinds of ways of enrichment of theory of types, which probably it would be great if someone at some point writes actually how adopting such new frameworks would possibly Enrich the constitution system, right? So, yeah, we talked about the relationship structure, constitution, sorry, the machine can only be made under. Yeah, so one of the things that really I thought
was great here. When you said that it's not about analyzing the concept, but kind of recalibrating the sort of relations the concepts already exhibit, namely that the project begins with systematic ambiguation of objects come concepts. But that already put us on the most controversial, but also the most, you know, galaxy brain point of Carnap's that objects and concepts are the same. That's, which means he's not endorsing a reification or a hypothesization project.
But a functionalization of the object. Functionalization of the object. And that is really the best. It's a beautiful passage. And precisely, I think that this is the encapsulation of the entire of Pau from which it is being built. Precisely because if you think about it, and I'm going to talk about it more after we hear the questions. precisely because this idea of the distinction between object and concepts is the linchpin of the so-called difference between analytic and content of philosophy, if you think about it. Well, I'd say at least good analytic philosophy because unfortunately there's quite a lot of... Yes, yes, of course. I mean, there's a shift philosophy.
We don't talk about shift philosophy in this class. Yes, yes, definitely. So, and finally, so that's one, finally, the relation. So, so look, so we have this kind of new, basically, new synthetic structure, core constitution system, right? what would be for you the relation between epistemology and logic namely the epistemological logical project of off bow within this construction system if there would be any ultimately within the sin idea of syntheticness i believe this is a this is especially hard for me to for me to answer because i'm actually quite
quite fond of the abandonment of epistemology by the later Karna. And I believe that insofar as it is productive to experiment with different logics to see how the different logical frameworks would result in different constitution systems, and the fact that these different constitution systems would be very much all of interest to us. Epistemology will eventually lose its place for Khanhannap. But if I were to try to answer what exactly connects,
what exactly makes the alpha ball, as Khanhannap understood in the time he wrote it, a epistemological logical system is that because in the time he is a he's still a a universalist with regards to logic in the sense that a well not in the sense that of course logic is a universal science as of Friggen-Russell, but simply has the sense that logic is a universal medium, and there is only one correct logic for the kind of the alpha ball, which is precisely the position he will later abandon.
insofar as there's only one possible logic there is a if we apply if we if given a given a a choice of basic objects and basic and basic relations there is only one single result available, which can be, well, insofar as the constitution system isn't underdetermined by experience, as all theory is undetermined. Okay, okay. Insofar as it isn't.
So because of this uniqueness of a single logic, Carnap can't... What Carnap does is something which he would later call absolutizing this logic, or at least the application of this logic to the development out of psychologically primitive elements, like the Erlebes. I have a question for you. Computer concepts are. So this is what makes epistemology in the alphabet.
Sorry, but just to finish. I see. No, no, no. Really great answer. Absolute creation of logic. Really great answer. A question for you. So at the end of the day, now, look, So if the oneness of logic in Aufbau, how does it fare against the multiplicity of constitution systems? Well, of course, there will be different, even in the Aufbau, there are already multiple systems possible, of course, yes. But then how much of this commits you to the epistemological project? So yeah, what commits, I believe what, no, I believe the idea of a constitution theory can be made separate of epistemology. What is epistemological?
But the base, physical objects, phenomenalistic ones, or so on and so forth. Only a constitution system. That choice is already not logical really, I think. Yes, no, but yes, it's precisely the choice of basis which makes it epistemological in the sense that only a constitution system based on a phenomenal basis. Right, right, right. So you would say then, for example, the multiplicity of constitution system, even though it sounds good on the paper, and you can compare it to something like the principle of tolerance of later mature carnal, it's actually not really a good idea. Because precisely because that multiplicity somehow arise from the choice of base.
Yes, it's a multiplicity on base, and not a multiplicity of logic, Which is not a bad idea, but it's not a bad idea. It's very it's very interesting in it. And in a sense, it's a embryo of the principle of tolerance in the sense of Carnap's own Right, right. Intellectual development, but it is much less powerful of an idea. OK, so magnificent, magnificent. Yes. Because insofar as Carnap is concerned, only one system, only one constitution. His system has a epistemological value, the constitution system based on on the on auto-psychological. And it's precisely because it kind of abandons the project of epistemology, which, for example, he will in the preface to the Alphabau he writes in the 60s, he will
decide to say that he would choose a completely different basis, a much less austere basis which he would appeal to to physical objects and the and prop and something like secondary yes it's because he abandons the projects of epistemology and adopts a purely logical or purely a project which belongs purely to the logic of science as a as his most pure form of philosophy the organ of a structuration the organ of a structure as conceptually engineering it in its most grand grand form which is magnificent yes really good okay um
Oh, by the way, to Franklin, the tilde used I got from Mormons new work to quasi-analysis because that particular slide was basically a simplification of a passage in Mormon's text. Oh, okay. I used his choice of symbology. Yeah, it doesn't matter to me. Somebody else in the chat, I think, associated the symbol with something else. And I think that's why a question was raised. But I accept your usage. No problem. Just to make it because, yes, it's usually associated
with equivalence relations. And in a way, one of the main difficulties in the first part of the constitution system, which is presented by Kahn at the end of Vau, is how to build up an equivalence relation from a similarity relation which is not transitive. which will be the first major technical achievement in the constitution system. Because eventually we want to create equivalence relations and equivalence classes, which is the reselling strategy, which Kahanepp adopts and will generalize to pretty much everything else.
And then I noticed also, Gabriel comes back, Arman asked some question here somewhere, I can't see it now. Where is it? Something about. Something about class and science.
I can't find it now if someone finds Arman's original question. No, I mean, you, Arman, you can ask it. Dear our moderator, would you be able to let Arman actually say it orally without typing it? It's the last session, of course. Thank you, Rafael. I'm going to speak. If anyone, any other of the participants.
Yes, any attendees, just like it. No problem. I think he's rejoining us now. Oh, okay. He's rejoined as a panelist. Do you guys hear me? Yes. It's a little bit slow to hear you. Move your laptop. Yes. The quality of internet. Yes, let me go out and come back. No, no, no, this is good. This is good. This is already good. This is already good. Yes, it's already good. Armand, go on now.
Hello, guys. Do you guys hear me? Yes. Yeah, I hear you. Yeah, perfect. Sorry to take a long time to just connect. Okay, that was a perfect presentation. I learned a lot. Thank you very much. But I have two questions, basically. One, I think the whole point of the garb is a very simple point, not that you put it differently. But that mentioned that quite aside. Sorry, I have one question. You mentioned that quasi-analysis is the synthesis through which we reach a set of concepts
that then we start the process of analyzing for analysis, if I understand you correctly. So basically the function of quasi-analysis is synthesis. That may be so, but the problem is here that In the Erleps, exactly where the Gestalt theory is influenced, has influenced Karnab in this case, if I understand this correctly, in Erleps, it is already a stream of experience. And what quasi-analysis does with the pair of lists, an analysis of the Erleps, that is a slice of a stream of consciousness, the slice of a slice in the moment of time.
and it is not already conceptualized. So we need to basically build actually epistemologically from the classes and from the base of a linguistic guard to come to exactly what you said about the point of the, starting of the process of analysis. So I think it's synthesis, yes, it is possible that it is the function of this synthesis. maybe it can be a dangerous idea, I think, because the whole point is nothing. There's anything in it. Arman, you are getting cut off. It's possible that the function of it is innocent as the end.
Sorry. OK. Arman? Yeah, you got cut off, but I think I got understood. So let me see if I understood the question. I'll kind of reformulate it, and you tell me if I understood it correctly. And so far as class analysis is used to .. It's the second time I tried to use this Portuguese word English to what so insofar insofar insofar as we we use quasi-analysis to find within the the
different elements and and the relation quasi-analysis to refer to quasi-analysis as synthesis is problematic. Would that be the main point? Yes, that would be the main point. Yes. Well, I believe there are a couple of points to the main. one is very much what Mormon answers in relation to Maya I very much concede that it is this particular application
of this particular application of the procedure of quasi-analysis to the case of actually unanalyzable, to this case of something like this holistic object to find something like elements within them that very much gives it, that also gives it the appearance of analysis beyond the simple effect of the equivalence in the formal steps used. But nonetheless, the quest analysis
can be applied to other goals and other types of objects. And in these other applications, I believe this point loses a bit of its force, which is precisely... And quasi-analysis, as considered by Kana, though we can stipulate that it was first conceived precisely to solve the problem of creating concepts, creating concepts which speak of parts of Ehelebs, which we presume to be holistic.
holistic units. Though that may be, though that may have been the use which Karhanap had first developed quasi-analysis for, even in Karhanap, quasi-analysis is understood to be the basis of any constitution system, even constitution systems of something like, of something like what he suggests in the second preface where the basic objects would be the basic objects would be the objects of intersubjective experience which would be spatially spatially temporarily located objects and the relations would be something like color similarities
and form and stuff and stuff like that which even if this constitution system had its basis objects which in other contexts we would recognize as analyzable within the method of constitution theory quasi-analysis would still be the fundamental process of of generating new objects. And because of this role of generating new objects, of course, it's important to remind that we are not talking about the psychological generation of concepts,
but a rational reconstruction of the creation of concepts. So within any constitution system, quasi-analysis would be the process used to generate the higher level of objects or concepts, which are the same thing. So in the sense which is synthesis. Even if in the particular case of the system provided in the alpha ball, it is used to something which very much looks like analysis. any any more any feedback yes sure Franklin Franklin yes please go yeah I was just interested
because the I mean there's not much of a question here but I was interested that the that the the the music theory paragraph came up. And I've been reading that. I might just do this for my own paper, try to work out. What seems missing from there is he doesn't, I'd like to know if any, Gabriel or you, or anyone thinks that Carnap has a way of capturing, and he says this stuff about C, E, and G, major triad, right? and what that chord has in common with other chords that also contain one of those notes. So that's a nice example of quasi-analysis.
But he doesn't say anything about what would be, we would also wanna capture what kind of, for us, speaking with the vulgar, phenomenal or qualitative similarity, all major triads have in common, assuming the well-tempered scale and octave identity and all that. So, you know, C, E, and G, and A flat, C, and E flat, right? You know, they're going to have, I mean, what we call chord quality, right, in music theory. Yeah, in that case, that would be a further, a higher level object of a constitution system,
because it depends on further theoretical objects. And of course, psychological ones, intersubjectively psychological ones. Yes, heterosychological. Heterosychological, yes, heterosychological. Yeah, well, why would that be heterosychological in a way that sort of recognizing pitch similarity wouldn't be? I'm not talking about like, oh, we associate major chords with happy. I just mean the, you know, like this set of vibrations, we're able to, we're able to hear that, oh, that's the same type of chord, right? Once we're onto the system at all.
I don't, I don't necessarily, I mean, that makes sense that it would be like a next level, but it seemed so obvious to me that that would, I mean, I, I kind of want to look at that more carefully and like, okay, what do I think of Carnap's music theory? Is he getting this much right? Because, I mean, he sort of doesn't, well, anyway, I want to look at that more. Yeah. If what different major chords have in common depends on on stuff like uh particular vibration patterns that would that would depend on on on an investigation
of particular of of of the particular particular particular vibrations which would depend at least at least on something like having already constituted uh objects like strings or or or any other object of being able to vibrate that we could look at. So in a sense, it would depend on a series of objects in the world in a way that something like this, the qualitative similarity, which is which is barely even qualitative in the sense that it's actually not qualitative in the
sense that we are only provided with a extension with the extension relation sure sure right i i i i realized like that's the questions that arise here and this is something that uh you we can we can think about it carnapp's idea of uh causality which were carnapp's at this point is kind of an arbitrary talk, right? Precisely because we later see the thing that he's actually thinking about is the empirical induction, you know, the logical induction actually, not the human form of induction but the logical empirical, logical empiricist account of induction. Now, so think about this, for example for a theory of vibration you know sound traveling through a medium right
wave traveling to a medium so this is obviously require a certain kind of understanding of what it means for a theory of sound to emerge in the first place. Right. And for that, you need to have a certain kind of counterfactuals in place. Counterfactual scenarios wherein sound actually moves to a different kind of medium than the one we are talking about. And the counterfactual robustness ultimately would lead us to say
that this is like the R theory of sound or wave traveling, audio wave traveling through a medium. So how much, this is my point, how much, and this is a question not just for Gabriel, for everyone, how much the constitution system can allow us to think about the counterfactual scenario? Does it have a room for a counterfactual scenario and essentially a counterfactually robust accounts? Of relations, particularly causal relations. On a higher levels. well that depends that depends on how we can how we conceive of a
of counterfactual if we conceive of counterfactual as as i think our understanding of counterfactual implication as something like david lewis david lewis uh david lewis uh basically or nelson goodman certain kinds of uh worlds or rather than what you might call to be constitution systems that might be there, but precisely because we are disconnected from them. But nevertheless, we can use these mobilizes kind of counterfactual scenarios, namely process of world building in good man, in order to basically talk about the very thing that we are talking about in this particular system of facts.
Yeah, I definitely wouldn't know how to try to think how we could fit with the picture of constitution systems, the seller's idea of subject, like counterfactuals as basically a reflection on top of material implications. So that would... But these reflections on material, yes, you know, that's a good one. But think about Brandon, right? The match example. The match example is a good one. I actually went a little bit overboard with this in intelligence and spirit.
So think about this. So how are you going to create a theory of lighting a match? right you know a child concept having intelligence of low degrees theory of lighting a match so if the match head is wet uh you know it's not going to happen right then second if the stick is wet and match is dry the match head is dry it will lit but it doesn't burn the stick right But then, so we have this kind of counterfactual scenarios. Then we say that, okay, that's a safety match, a modern match, a modern match, take it to the vacuum. What will happen?
According to the kind of certain kind of counterfactuals that we have with regard to wetness, dryness, oxygen, and the oxidizing agents within the match head, all of this combined, what happens uh when we try to light a modern match uh which considering that is all dry, all dry, the stick and the head all dry in a vacuum. What will happen? So the kind of counterfactual scenario, and of course, you know, people would say that it doesn't actually basically light up. It wouldn't
be lit, right? But actually it would be lit, precisely because the match head has an oxidizing agent. That is enough to ignite the match head, but not burn the stick. So that kind of counterfactual scenarios, can we actually make them within the constitution system to basically a lot a stegmuller or Joseph Sneed give a thoroughgoing systematic structure and dynamics not just a structure but dynamics of scientific theories because if you don't have
counterfactuals you only have a structure in a very kind of in a sense. I'm sorry, Ressa. Please, please go on. Wasn't this like the problem of the verificationist principle that is found in constitutional theory? There are casual logical relations that are robust, but whenever this counterfactual example that was brought upon by Goodman comes along, I mean, the casual logical relations are robust, but the conclusion is false.
So I think that was like the, I don't know, you might correct me, like you know more about Carnap, but I think that the Constitution theory would not allow the option of counterfactuals in the sense that it always has to, like the logical casual relations have to always be verified. they cannot be verified in the future. Like they cannot be verified on the context, on a possible context. Yeah, there is a certain kind of, even though I hate that word nowadays, even though I defended it at some point, it doesn't have time for your abductive whimsicality, right? You know, like Percy and abductive counterfactualism.
Yes, I think that is the case. But is there a possibility actually to rectify or what? No, I'm not going to say that is there a possibility to rectify. I would say that is there a necessity for a constitution system to recognize counterfactuals? Number one, number one question. Probably Gabriel would say no, knowing him being such a total carnapp Stan man. uh number second question would be that if the answer is yes what kind of rectification or corrections should actually go into basically um um this into into the constitution system
for it to recognize anything resembling a counterfactual system my apologies i have to get yeah so um meanwhile sorry no sorry i'm just question number one i think seem appears to me to be able to could be rephrased as something like what exactly is the relation between a total system of concepts which is how kind of comes to refer to something like a constitution system and the dynamics that
constitute the dynamics yeah essentially the difference between essentially we can in philosophy of science we usually understand this problem between a structure core and dynamicity of that structure. I was thinking about the idea of the contrafactual as convergent on not just the Aufbau but the quasi-analytical specifically could, I mean, given the, I was thinking about the etymological as a clue for connection, given that the quasi means as if so, so the Bahangerian
Heron. Yeah, fictionalization. Yes. Yeah. Thinking about the quasi-analytical as more in the direction of fictionalism would would make it easier to think of it as a counterfactual procedure maybe. That's actually a really nice point. Anyone? I mean of course, look. If quasi-analysis is translated, well, Carnot, insofar as quasi-analysis is the procedure through which we step from rely, we go up the ladder of the constitution system, but analysis translated to the idealist language, which it kind of
objective idealist language, objective idealist language, not simply an idealist language. No, of course, the idealist language as provided by Kahnap in the alphabet. Yes, yes. Objective and concepts are the same. But in honor this kind of caveat it's a he referred he refers to the idealist language as a language of fictional constructions so quasi-analysis interpreted in ideal of course which of course we can question to what to what extent Carnap would accept such a such interpretation such as translation but analysis translated to the language of idealism or the or however whatever
weird idealism is the translator which kind of the the hypothetical translator in the in kind of in the fourth part of the alpha well question analysis is fundamentally a transformed into a process of fictional constructions. And so, yeah, I don't know how to answer your question, but that may be of interest to you, as well as some early papers, like where Karnap tries to understand, explicitly tries to understand stuff like space, time, and causality, in the term in the explicitly fictionalist by hindered term
any response to this no I was just thinking about the well of course the quasi analytical but the use of quasi in general throughout the aufbau I mean extended to the in the beginning I mean the first the first part of the aufbau that could reaffirm this hypothesis or this connection would be the first discussion of the the quasi object which he he does um he well he calls it a a fictional utility um so so i mean it's i i would so yes yes of course he's i i mean i i try to make this point that he he's under influence of wikinger
But the thing is that to what extent, you know, his idea of quasi-analysis and constitutions, systematic inter-inter-systematic relations view of construction, namely constitution system can answer the problems of fictional modelings, or as if arguments in a way in a sense. Then I think that it wouldn't be, at the very least, in this particular war of Mao, he wouldn't address all of those problems. Even though he is
completely influenced by them, he knows them. I don't think that he, look, as I mentioned, anything resembling a David Lewis counterfactual, I don't think that the constitution system can respond to that. Can I interject here, please? Absolutely, absolutely. Yeah, what about, you know, as you talked about Brandon, what about going brandomian, some sort of brandomian, for example, you know, a few, for example, if you make a counterfactually subjectively robust claim you are not making a model realist claim but for example no no more realists absolutely not model model realist model realist uh you know more than realism but modality
is some sort of there are more structures logic model logic be my god that that is that is the thing without the realist bits of it yeah yeah exactly exactly but brandon would say for example Brandon would say, you know, deontic normative vocabulary is some sort of pragmatic meta-vocabulary that allows you to do what you have to do in order to say, to claim counterfactual dependency claims, for example. So I think if you model logic to Afba, for example, to sound like Brandon's deontic normative vocabulary. It will help you to make counterfactual claims without
making a realist claim about counterfactual things or state of affairs. Yes, I mean, to be honest with you, actually, this is already the point of Goodman before, far before Brandon, that you are not supposed, actually, to make realist claims about counterfactuals. That would basically expose you to a lot of dodgy, shady, philosophical realms that we kids shouldn't exercise at home. You know, that's the whole point of Goodman. And precisely because, you see, why do you think Goodman is calling himself a realist? Right. And he's quite a disciple of Karna.
on so many of this stuff, while being also emphasizing on the counterfactual part of, precisely because he actually understands what Carnap's means by objectivity. It's not about reality. It's about the constitution system. The constitution system, um goodman thinks that we can enrich the constitution system possibly by adding modal logic to it injecting model logic to it and that creates a far better castle than the one that
Off-Bow gives us. Off-Bow promises us to give us like, you know, Champs-Élysées, basically the citadel, the Argue of Bam, you know, one of the greatest buildings, all of these great buildings, but it just doesn't at the end of the day, even though it is, the promise is absolutely superb. But the thing is that, so you have to do something with the architectonics. And the architectonics, I think that this is what I want to talk about at LEND next seminar. Why is that not the choice of logic is, yes, the choice of logic is important.
but the use of logic is even more important and the thing is that kana thinks that the use of logic for a specific domain of logic is also set but it is not and paraconsistent logic model logic shows us that these are, they can be different uses of one framework of logic. And that makes logic logic, really. That unbounds its revolutionary imports. But Carnap initiates this revolution by, as Gabrielle was talking about, resting
the project of logic or logical structuration from the mundane deranged Kantian basically backgrounds of it. the word Durang was used here for a specific propaganda purposes. So my dearest friends, may I actually start to kind of like, you know, just,
so you don't say that Reza didn't actually teach us anything. I start to read and say a little bit of stuff and then, you know, we go from there. Is it possible? Okay. My apologies. Let me find my essay and text. So, let me, my apologies, my real apologies, sorry.
Okay, so remember section five of our Bible. Carnap says, since we always use the word object in its widest sense, it follows that to every concept there belongs one and only one object, its object. Thus, we will say that even general concepts have their objects. It makes no logical difference whether a given sign denotes the concept or the object, or whether a sentence holds for objects or concepts.
We can actually go even further and state boldly that the object and its concepts are one and the same. It's a mick drop at this point. We're going out. And you know that people are familiar with the history of philosophy. It's such a move. It's the most controversial one. You are not going to, you are not supposed to make such a move unless and until you have practiced philosophy in public and in private at the same time. Otherwise, it is advised to novice philosophers to only practice at home, to make such claims.
But gonna make such a claim. And look, we would say that this is actually Carnap against Ray Brazier, right? Objects and concepts. So Ray comes from those people. So essentially, both Carnap and Ray Ray are moving toward the same problem, but from fundamentally different directions, and I don't think that they are going to find each other. I think the Carnacs will win this game. Why? Precisely because if you have read Objects and Concepts in the Speculative Turn, it's
a magnificent, magnificent essay by Ray Brzezier, is Critique of Latour, that basically it goes to, it goes, it starts actually from a very conventional, but not perhaps for contemporary continental philosophers, a very conventional analytic philosophy move that the confusion or or the fusion of the concepts and objects will result in hypostasization, reification. One of the worst sins any philosopher can commit, right? You should be a stone to death virtually for doing this.
And of course, Ray goes full assault on Latour and his ilk. including object-oriented ontology and philosophy and stuff to make this point. So imagine in a hypothetical universe in the Agora, in the virtual Agora, the simulation Agora philosophy, Dr. Ray Bresier meets Dr. Rodolphe Carnap, where Rodolphe would say that objects and concepts are the same. What would be the reaction here? What would be the consequence,
the end game of the debate. Given the fact that Carnap is coming from a different direction than Ray, he's not coming from an epistemological perspective like Ray, you know, kind of a kind of like this antiquated Kantian idea that concepts and objects cannot be confused on epistemological grounds, it comes from a revolutionized philosophy, the hip philosophy. That they cannot be confused according to logical grounds. Meaning that
when we say that objects and concepts are the same, we are not committing ourselves to hypostasization or substantializations of concepts, but completely the reverse. What we are doing here is the functionalization of reality par excellence, functionalization in in a specific sense that I'm going to talk about, what Gabriel was talking about with regard to type theory. But of course, we said that, you know, that kind of type theory might, can be actually updated. So two fundamental sense of a kind of
ailiotic doctrine. This is precisely because this is ailiotic doctrine, ultimately. But Eliottic doctrine always wins. Why? Thinking and being are the same. People say that, well, you are actually fusing thinking and being. That is just a misunderstanding of the logical principle that goes into the equivalence between thinking and being. People want to interpret this at a lower Platonic level, meaning at a level of scatia or something like that, kind of sensory epistemological stuff. But if you actually understand the meaning of a structure, if you commit to the very idea of a structure par excellence as a logical edifice,
then you see that thinking and being are the same. But that does not commit you to fusing ontologically the two. Right? Insofar as to be is to be the value of a variable, a variable, a variable, a variable, closed on a closed, not closed. I forgot. I forgot the term. term. We are not free and not free variable. It's fundamentally related with the application of concepts and concepts or functions. So in the sense to be is fundamentally intertwined with. Absolutely. Absolutely. And of course there are ways people trying to distort this by way of,
you know, bullshit, no Kantianism, transcendental co-constitution, all of this stuff, you know, phenomenological thesis. But this is really a very, I would say this is a high point of idealism. An idealism that is no longer that kind of idealism people have been associating with this misguided idea of Plato or this and that, objective idealism. And essentially what he's trying to do this uh Carnap at this point is exercise objective idealism to show that the to show that objective idealism uh hinges upon the new role the re new revolutionary role of logic
and that new revolutionary role without which everything else becomes pseudo object becomes to the problem if it cannot basically bring this into the systematization of philosophy. So, um, one related question, sorry. Yes, yes, yes. My apologies, my apologies. yeah you know i'm not sure if my observation is correct or not but you know afbao seems to me to be a little bit you know post quine and more than quite himself yes that is a good point
because you know i i haven't read later a lot but you know from brandon my coin you know that they usually criticize dear del i think you got you got caught up for one second you said that uh i i heard from many people that yeah yeah yeah yeah quite uh quite unbranded you know they many times they criticize carnapp as making you know a division but uh cement semantic epistemic division of labor you know the difference between theory and language theory and language meaning and belief but you know more post-crimine than the later karma because he does not make any difference
between concept and object or scheme and content sense or reference meaning or belief you know all of it comes as a package for him so i think i don't know as a context a context sensitive package context sensitive package you know he doesn't have uh it doesn't have time for for making indiscriminatory divisions every division yes so i can only be made within that logical structuration exactly exactly so i think you know coins uh two dogmas of empiricism applies more to later carnap than early carnap yes yes i think it's kind of i think it's possible yes i think it's possible to safely at a kind of but i believe what what that shows is precisely what warren gold
farm uh says that it's not that kind of kind of uh is wrong in moving to semantics but it is unfortunate that kind of moved to semantics precisely because insofar as kind of understand semantics as a kind of those semantics in a apparently referentialist referentialist sense in a referentialist way uh Carnap's way of way of way of talking about these things in his later works becomes becomes almost indistinguishable from those who, for example, substantiate concepts,
hypothesize concepts through the use of semantics of denotation semantics. Notation semantics, yes, absolutely. So in the sense, insofar as the early the early current, though I believe the high point will always be the logical syntax, but insofar as Insofar as the alphabet is closer to the synthetic Carnap than the semantic Carnap, I believe that's why we have this impression that the early Carnap is clearly less subject to the later criticisms. It's precisely because he is far away from the semantics.
But I believe we can save Carnap semantics. Of course, I'll be the arc defender of Karn up here. But I believe even when he is using the notation semantics, he doesn't fall prey to these arguments. But only if we understand the semantics and all semantics, just like synthetic and pragmatic method language, are tools which are which do not some represent some some sort of right semantic reality but are it's are itself tools for us to understand the the structure and the the relations within our language our language our language our language or linguistic behavior let us say yes like very
much Jaroslav Pettigreen's conception of semantics, which is close to this, I believe. Magnificent, magnificent. One second, my dear friends, I have one second, give me two minutes, I have to basically attend to something urgent. I will come back in two minutes, my apologies. Okay. Thank you.
continue a little bit before you finally open it to final round of questions and discussions. So with that passage that I read, you know, these claims that Kata makes in the fifth section of logical structure of the world seem to be quite surprising coming from someone whose work comes in the straight line of Frigge and Russell's logical analysis, right? So there is no logical distinction on which the fathers of both symbolic logic and analytic
philosophy have put more stress than the clear-cut, what you might call to be distinction or division between objects and concepts. Most of their logical but also ontological and epistemological theses rely on precisely this distinction between objects and concepts. Furthermore, such a distinction is one of the main issues at a stake in the separation of analytic philosophy from other philosophical schools, particularly continental philosophy. Yeah. But as we see, as we have seen in this seminar and we will see in the next, in the sequel,
in the forthcoming course seminar on Carnap, an important part of Carnap's own work actually consisted of questioning such a distinction rather than abiding by it. He did so, first of all, he did so from Frigge and Rawson's own extensionist stance. Then reconsidering this instance itself, he did so by developing intentionalist positions. Now let's backtrack a little bit and talk about, you know, what Carnaby is actually trying to do here
with regard to, you know, disturbing systematically, but not whimsically, systematically disturbing the distinction, the canonical distinction between object and concept or objects and concepts. First of all, Carnapy stands on the straight line that runs from Frigge and Russell, at least in of Powell. Within this genealogy, moving from Rossell and Frigge to Carnac, and from Carnac
to quine what does it mean to say that the object not only what does it mean but what has as its consequences saying that object the object and its concepts are one and the same right So this claim, as we have been talking about, is made in Aufbau. Karab tries to extend Frieger and Russell's logicism by showing that not only arithmetic,
as Frieger claimed, or even the whole body of mathematics as Russell claimed, But the whole rational structure of science, including empirical sciences, is or can be entirely grounded on logic. Contrary to Kant's critique of pure reason CPR, there is no need of synthetic a priori principles in mathematics and no need of such principles in the rational structure of empirical sciences either. Dr. Nadeem G. Under own logical, i.e. analytical principles can do the whole job of rational organization of knowledge. Dr. Nadeem G. For the empirical sciences, this would mean that all the information comes from the empirical data,
while their rational treatment confines itself to reformulating these data in different ways and to drawing conclusions from them without adding any new content. That's really important, without adding new content. There's one of the main issues here. I mean, one of the main, what you might call to be moves here. Unlike Kant's synthetic a priori principles we're supposed to do. So Kant's synthetic a priori is additive. Whereas this is neutral. You know, we don't need any new content.
We can simply do this by way of the new revolutionary status of logic. This, as we know it, is probably the cornerstone or the linchpin of logical empiricism. Now, in Afbaw, Carnap tries to establish the plausibility of this view by showing that the whole of science can be built or rebuilt in such a way that all its objects and concepts, all the ones that appear in any source of statements
attributed to it, can be characterized on the ground of elementary empirical objects and relations through purely logical means. Subjective, meaning auto-psychological, entities such as sensations or colors, objective entities such as atoms, molecules, cells, organs, organisms, organelles, heterosexual sorry heterosexual heterophysical or heterocyc heterophysical uh psychological entities such as belief desire fears or hopes or even cultural entities such as social groups or values all can be defined ultimately as um basically logical complexes
and these logical complexes are made of similarity relations between elementary experiences. Furthermore, we can say that such complexes will exist if these similarity relations actually do occur. and they will in turn satisfy some new concepts and relations. For example, think of a complex like an atom of hydrogen, right? So we can say that it can be
ultimately linked to an atom of oxygen if some further relations actually occur between the corresponding complexes of elementary relations, right? So even though it doesn't develop such a project in all its details, which would of course require much scientific information, as well as logical work that would still be much bigger than the principle Mathematica in its entirety, logical structure of the world, sketches the procedure for such a logical reconstruction of the objects and concepts of the first levels of science, while it only suggests the broad outline of the extension
of this undertaking to all other levels. The main idea is that all scientific objects will, according to Russell's theory of types, but probably to higher forms of theory of types, can be built as high-order objects which are characterized as predicate, as predicative or relational classes of lower-level objects. For example, molecules as sets of relations between atoms, right? Eventually, all scientific objects would use,
or eventually, I would say that eventually all scientific objects can be understood as some logical objects based on similarity relations satisfied by elementary experiences or air labs. So as Afbalk claims, ultimately, such a project would amount to a constitution theory like the ones Mach, Natur, Poser, or Minon had considered and attempted.
with yet the very interesting specificity that the constitution of higher order objects on the grounds of lower objects will here be purely logical and not require any synthetic a priori principle unlike such phenomenological or nookantian or mainanian basically sorts of systems. So, as for the basic objects of the system, Carnap does not want to start from simple sensations such as sensation of redness as Mach does, you know, just one single sensation
of a red dot. Taking into account the works on experience of James Husserl and Gestalt theorists, Carnap actually believes that simple sensations themselves are not immediate parts of the flow of experience, but only result from some kind of abstraction on it. And what is that abstraction? The labor of a structuration, right? The relations, the structuring, the synthetic structure. though they seem to be elements of these basic experiences sensations should rather be considered
as logical complexes of experiences right and this is why Carnap names quasi-analysis the process of building simple sensations on elementary experiences by a logical construction For example, in case of my immediate experience, would include blue circular spots not yet identified as such. It would satisfy similarity relations with blue triangular spots, blue square spots, blue hexagonal spots, as well as with red circular spots, yellow circular spots, green singular spots, etc.
And of course, blue square spots will also endorse similarity relations with blue triangular spots, blue hexagonal spots, but they will not with yellow circular spots or green singular spots. So much so that from the flow of experience will emerge some equivalence classes or sets of equivalence classes on the ground of the relation of similarity. The simple sensation of redness can thus be characterized as one of these equivalent classes.
A, for example, is blue if and only if it is a member of the equivalence class ABCDE, i.e. it is such that ASB, ASC, ASD, ASE, BSC, BSD, BSE, CST, CSE, and DSE. Being equivalence classes, sensations are objects of a logical type, which is higher than the elementary experiences. They are built upon, or for that matter, abstracted from, right?
Therefore, talking about sensation is just a very economic, philo-economical way, philosophical and economical way of saying, of talking about elementary experiences. According to Russell's axiom of reducibility then, and Carnap's thesis of extensionality, all that is said about the former, all the statements which have the former as arguments satisfying high order concepts and relations can be reformulated so as to bear on the latter, i.e. in rather complex statements which have
the latter as arguments satisfying similarity relationships. And what is true sensation is also true of all objects of science, according to this schema. They all belong to increasingly higher logical types and all that is said of them can be said in less economic way of lower type objects. All proper scientific statements are mere abbreviation phrases for complex sets of similarity relations between elementary experiences at this point.
questions anything before i move forward i suppose i have a quick one um uh sort of just to track back two weeks ago when we we were talking about the legacy of the Marburg school for this development in Carnap's thinking, would he be taking a similar view to this as, and I mean, I'm not super familiar with it, but I've just been reading a little bit recently,
somebody like Helmholtz, who is, I guess. Helmholtz is not actually Neokantian par excellence. It's a different sense of the Marburg school of North Warp and Cohen. But yes, please go on. I'm speaking through Kassaros, so I guess that's like kind of where I'm coming from. But in the idea that these kind of fundamental experiences of a general sort are somehow like they're not kind of innate, but they're kind of, yeah, sort of, kind of, like, I think he kind of goes with, like,
because he's kind of bringing in psychology into this as well. And maybe that this is like an illegitimate move as far as, or something that Carnap is completely unwilling to do. But I think, as I understand it, Helmholtz will bring kind of psychology into this, the kind of like virtuous circle or something to try and explain how, like elementary experiences can be constructed like how does he put it not innately but sort of like by way of kind of associations or something like this at an unconscious level? Yes, but the thing is that it's actually interesting to for example compare
They're Helmholtz with Poincaré, you know, as opposed to Hugo Dingler, who is a conventionalist. And these three are usually associated on these kind of subjects. But you see Helmholtz is a dynamic thinker, like Poincaré. I would say that I hope that Delsha is not going to have basically a smile right now, thinking that he has been basically, his faith in activism has been confirmed, and now he's giving credence. But yes, essentially, they are the ancestors
of this whole idea of dynamic theory, which we can see today, like Valera, a complexity. the dynamic theories of embodiment in activism and stuff. But the thing is that Carnap would say that, look, the other, the kind of phenomenological or basically what you would call probably expired Kantian moves that you are making are not to my interest really. That would be Carnap's thing. Because essentially, Carnap really is understanding Kant thoroughly.
He just doesn't want to be Kantian. That's the whole point. And that's what makes him Carnap. Because Carnap is trying to answer the same question that Kant tries to answer. but not by the same kind of philosophical system or set up the same concerns that Kant and his progenitors had or his descendants had but by fundamentally finding the role the single role of logic as the key here, as a synthetic glue, and without which nothing actually holds together. And that I think that is what makes Carnap truly
the cant of 20th century. you know, outcanting Kant. And by virtue of that, answering to certain kind of problems that wouldn't even arise for Kant's schema of transcendental idealism. That's quite a loss, you know, for philosophy. Look, a change in how we conceive the systematicity of philosophy, namely the relations between objects and concepts, can result in giving rise to a new system of philosophization or philosophizing about the world.
And that's the major contribution of every revolutionary phase of philosophy. And Conop, I think, really contributes this. Of course, some of his, you know, moves can be argued against, can be challenged, but we should recognize him precisely because of that. Because because he doesn't give, I mean, look, I'm sure that Karnam would say that, yes. I mean, when we are talking about, for example, Helmholtz, you know, energy principles and all of this stuff, yeah, they're all good, they're good. But they don't actually, they are not really constitutive to how we make science.
There are ways of discovery. The ways of discovery are very different from the structuration of science as such. So this would come back to the thing where he's not really trying to talk about natural languages, but just the formal possibility of language. Yes. Look, the thing is that it becomes so obvious in logical syntax of language that Karnak doesn't have an enmity. Why? I mean, he's a psychopath. He doesn't have an enmity towards syntax of natural language. Why should he? What he actually, it's not just his interest.
He would say that, look, the most important thing is about the logical structure of language. And the logical structure of language, if we understand it, It doesn't exclude the semantic realm. The semantic realm is a side effect of the logical structure. And the enrichment of semantics, broadly understood, would be the consequences of the enrichment of the formal structure of language itself. I know you are going to hate this, but I...
I am sure I will. I couldn't help but, you know, observe some, yeah, some kind of fundamental similarities between Rorty on the one hand and Carnap's Abba on the other. You know, when, you know, Rorty is famous for attacking representationalism based on the idea that you know how an objective world quote unquote can have an authority on our normative rational language for example he he makes the same kind of move that you know there's nothing called a world or an external world that can have an irrational authority based on the myth of the given for example that this kind of you don't have a representational
mirroring of the world because the very idea of representation is normative. Therefore, a non-normative world cannot have a normative authority on our rational structures. So I think Carnap is saying exactly the same thing. There is no non-logical authority on our logical structures. Our logical structures determine everything. I wouldn't say that they don't determine. I mean, the word determine here. no no this is a quite actually dangerous word that basically people who are against carna use this to squeeze little about carna you know ultimately but that word determine i would say that needs to be understood carefully what is the determine you constant you can say constraint const okay
constraint or a structuration so constraint causally or structurally so not from a logical perspective. I mean these are so essentially this is I think that this this I think that many of these wars are being actually fought on the side of objective idealism, transcendental idealism, realism, transcendental realism, all of this stuff comes to a certain kinds of what kind of say explicanda you know in exact concepts and that way basically if we actually turn them into their explicata, explicatums, we would then be able to actually see that, look,
our positions that we so cherished so far might actually be quite fragile, but also we might actually be on the other side. Iranians can be on the side of the Iraqis, you know, at the end of the day. I have a question. Absolutely. Yeah, I'm wondering if Carnap is based in the first for his conceptography about trying to make a russi in nature, like based in Leibniz differential calculus. Absolutely. No, this, this, I wanted to actually talk about this. I hope that I can talk about about absolutely something that didn't actually come out
among all of this presentation is that Carnap actually makes a reference to Leibniz with regard to the constitution system. Leibniz is the model. But so what Carnap should do in order to be a mere Leibnizian? again. So the Constitutional system could be like a differential calculus for Carnap? Like, no, no, no, no. I wouldn't say that it's about the idea of differential calculus. I would say it's about the system upon which Leibniz differential calculus is being built. Right. And that's that's the issue here that, yes, you see.
So when we are thinking about Leibniz's system of differential calculus, obviously, it's based on a certain kind of set of premises with regard to idea of relationality and the dynamicity of basically triangulating relations with regard to ever-changing relations that are happening in the system. And that's basically what differential calculus is. basically finding changing variables relations with regard to other changing variable relations online in real time. So obviously this actually is really the whole point of a constitution system with regard to relationality.
So yes, meaning, and of course I will defend this, that constitution system, as formulated by Karna, is not purely Freedian because otherwise it would be too static of a system. It is actually, as Karna hints at it a couple of times, is quite Leibnizian, meaning that it's dynamic. logic is now being ascended to the realm of dynamicity and not mere static structure that certain kind of relations index or cover uh if i can briefly read us one single sentence
of the alphabet page eight of the translation we are using sure the application of the theory of relations to the formulation of a constructional system is closely related to Leibniz's idea of a characteristic universalis and of a scientific generatis. It's in section number, section three, page eight of the PDF. And I believe there are a couple of other references to Leibniz, but I don't remember where they are. Yes, yes. I mean, I mean, I know that in his letters he actually talks multiple times about Leibniz. Yes, Mathesis Universalis is, I mean, well, of course, you know, some people might say that, look, Mathesis Universalis is really a traditional paradigm
of enlightenment since Renaissance, right? And Carnap simply adopts Mathesis Universalis precisely because this is the most canonical tool by way of which you can understand the logic of enlightenment but i don't think that is really the case i need to get some water i'm coming back
Remember that today we have 20 to 30 minutes thanks to Rafael's generosity extra timing. But please, if you have something to do, don't worry. You can just basically quit the class anytime you want. So in order to move from the discussion that we had with regard to objects and concepts, the role of this whole idea of object and concepts in reshaping or shaping a new theory
of representation, a systematic theory of representation. How many of you have thought about the similarities between Carnap's accounts of constitution system as basically put forward in Aufbau with regard to Wittgenstein and later Sellars picture theory. Picture theory of language for Wittgenstein and picturing for Sellars. Yeah, definitely the former I was thinking a lot about that as kind of a frame of reference just
because I was more familiar with it, but yeah, I would be interested to hear about. I guess like, because it just seems like the logical picture that Wittgenstein lays out in the tractatus is, you know in in in ways it's kind of there's a similarity here with with the kind of um abstraction and the attempt to uh build a kind of science of pure relations and in a sense through language um yes yes you know it's the the fact of the picturing itself that you know is uh well actually yeah i'm not really sure on that one so so yeah i mean look one of the things is that so I think that there is I mean there is a so so there is an implicit assumption already
right in in Cardiff and probably in Wittgenstein and Sellars that there there is an indelible role for systematic representation in science. Without the systematic representation, there wouldn't be science, right? So how are we going to go around and talk about this? By virtue of what resources, by virtue of what methods, so on and so forth. So that is really the question here that arise in early 20th century among, you know, the early philosophers,
who I would say are in the nebulous zone between continental and analytic, where no one has Lamborghini or Ferrari, but everyone actually uses, you know, the vehicle of the people, probably Pekan in Iran, Ford in America, or something like that. Shittiest cars. So, one thing I should start with is that representation is entirely conventional in this early times.
It's a conventionalist thesis for the majority of these philosophers. Representation is entirely conventional in the sense that only when we intend something to represent something else does it do so. But such representation is possible because of the fact that everything is like every other thing in many ways. And the fact that we can establish rules restricting the aspects we pay attention in the representation to that picture, the restricted aspects then in the objects we intend to represent,
meaning that representation actually begins from a negative thesis. We can actually represent anything according to anything else. You know, there are so many, no matter how much you are trying to say otherwise, we can always say that we can actually, everything is like every other thing, and we can represent one thing according to so many other things. So representation begins from a certain kind of cynical. I mean, in a common sensical, not a cynical sense, from a cynical or negative position that the ground for representation is actually not a specific target to be represented,
but the lack of such target. and if we are actually going to make represent we have to create certain kind of restrictions so a represented object is a restricted object by rule of restrictions is that clear sorry can i ask a question yes yes yes what is the difference here exactly here what is the difference between him and Kant? Kant. But you would say that it would be a very complex situation.
Well, you see, OK, the rules of restrictions. Yusuf Kaurnav, Yes, of course, this whole idea of representation is fundamentally canteen as I mentioned that we are essentially corner begins in the framework of canteen is or no canteen is. Yusuf Kaurnav, But the thing is that look, that is why how kind of actually the source gets the soldiers dissociated or distinguish himself from this kind of legacy of canteen is a window canteen is. Yusuf Kaurnav, In this case. What are the rules of restrictions for Kant and what are the rules of restriction for Carnap?
The rules of restrictions in Kant are essentially part of the transcendental deduction schema, meaning that they are epistemological in nature, ultimately, rooted in experiential. Exactly. Whereas for Carnap they are not. Yeah? where are the rooted for Carnap? In Alfa, where are the rooted for Carnap? Because in Alfa, if I remember correctly, I read that part a very long time ago. In Alfa, he doesn't believe in causation. He says that- Yeah, he doesn't. He's just arbitrary. Yes, yes, absolutely. Yeah, of course. Yes, yes, yes. It's arbitrary. It's the violation. He talks about- Yes.
So when he talks about causation, is actually in its LSL, is a logical syntax of language. And there is purely Kantian. It's purely a priori synthetic. Yes, but Kantianism on the surface, precisely because, look, the goals, as I mentioned, this is like this look. I mean, this is like, for example, think about Hegel and Plato. I mean, essentially, they are chief arch idealists, right? both of them. But of course, and they are actually committing to the same kinds of principles, but precisely because of the way that they mobilize their methods and the way of systematization of
ideas, ultimately, just because they arrived at the same conclusions doesn't make them friends, does it? no true true no by the way i just for for fun facts um i don't know how many of you know about this but we have people from Iraq and Iran on this very sacred class. Arman and I are from Iran and Delshan is from Erbil, Iraq.
knowing about the history that has gone to our countries this is quite a feat of enlightenment it's like the olympics of mines or something yes and i think that deltia is actually legata a fucking hospital are you are you in office yeah i'm in office my god almighty don't you have a life just go to your home yeah yeah definitely i should neglect carnal yes okay my dear friends okay uh let me let me continue uh
So that was something that I wanted to talk about representation, right? So practically speaking, my apologies. Practically speaking, one can say that what makes the picture theory of representation possible is our ability to recognize similarities and differences among things in the world. These things being intentionally situated to one another,
of course by us, in such a way that similar but different things are taken to represent one another. This brings us to Cardampe and is of Pao. In order to attempt a rational reconstruction of the concepts of all fields of knowledge on the basis of concepts that refer to the immediately given as basically cited in Avbau, Carnap uses only one basic concept according to himself, namely a certain relation between elementary experiences, i.e. recollection of
similarity. He then later adds to this a relation of temporal precedence, but the relation of similarity remains primary in his construction or constitution. A key passage is the following, where Carnap says, logistics, symbolic logic, has been advanced by Russell and Whitehead to the point where it provides a theory of relations which allows almost all problems of the pure theory of ordering to be treated without great difficulty. The present study is an attempt to apply the theory of relations to the task of analyzing reality. Clearly, this wouldn't be
possible if the symbols of logic could not be exactly coordinated to the objects in the world, right? That is, anything about which is a statement can be made. Thus, among objects, we count not only things, but also properties and classes, relations, in the extension and intention, states and events, what is actual as well as what is not, meaning counterfactual. And then this is actually from Carnap, by the way. So Carnap already has an understanding of control of counterfactuals. In effect, then Carnap's goal is to construct a logical symbol
system in which a correlate can be constructed for any possible object that is for anything about which a statement can be made oh that's a little bit of devilish move here do things exist someone might ask Rodolphe. Rodolphe would say that this is the shittiest question that I've ever heard in my life. It's so confused that I cannot even talk about this. For Rodolphe, the real question is that do we have a thing language
that span and cover over the objects of a certain kind of domain covered by that language. So in that sense, Karnap, you might say, not going to be a global deflationarist with regard to the question of realism, but regardless, a deflationary nonetheless. a deflationary philosopher nonetheless. Before I move forward, any interjection, anything? Why not global? Anything? Anything?
I was, I got quite curious with your last comment. Why not? Why not global? Insofar as to, for something to exist is to is to is for it to be found within like in principle within the constitution system and such and and such basically any any object of science for exists exist then it can't no no no you can't do that in afbou you can do it with later carna but not in afbou Because in Aufbau, you're essentially have a certain kind of commitment to observational statements in the constitution system, the phenomenalistic basis.
That does not actually commit you to that kind of global deflationarism that's usually associated with, you know, set theoretical linguistic in a deflationary sense. I think that Carnap in Afbao most probably would not take side with global deflationary. Global deflationary asks you more, basically, stuff than a local deflationary, precisely because it wouldn't allow you to even move toward certain kind of thing that the basis
of a constitution can be based on observational sentences. But of course, I'm completely wrong. I don't know. Of course, I don't know. Think about this. I mean, look, McDowell, Brandon, Hugh Price, three people ranging over this whole idea of deflationarism right what would be the the differences between the three uh brandon would be a local uh look like anti-representationalist or local deflationist
but but he's not i i wouldn't say that um he's a global deflationarist he's not a global deflation yeah because yeah because you know his idea of a reliable responsive dispositions for example some sort of tracking the environment tracking the environment yes no matter how much simplistic it is it still commits you to certain kinds of things that does not commit you or be in the opposition to the full commitment to the global deflationary thesis yes absolutely so yeah i just love that if everyone was this you know differential responsiveness
The thesis, magnificent thesis, is, well, we say that the key, the, the, basically the, the crappiest master key ever invented in the history of philosophy. Look, I am a, I am a Brandomian person. I actually hate right-wing Szilardzians. I would actually put them on summary execution or congruent courts. But nevertheless, that is just a little bit too much. Yeah. So MacDowell calls this reliable responsive dispositions of Brandon. He says, not observation, but observations from
Bob. Yeah, observations. No, I mean, look, MacDowell, Well, McDowell, look, I mean, I, okay, okay. I have nothing to say. Look, this is like a family business fight. I have no beef in this. I have my own beef in other kinds of circles, but thank you very much. I don't want to get involved into this McDowell random debate, really. It's not good for my soul. So let's go. So as I mentioned, in effect, Carnap's goal
is to construct a logical symbol system in which a correlate can be constructed for any possible object. That is, for anything about which a statement can be made. If this sounds somewhat circular, because there is a tendency to take the limitations of a logical system as a definitive of what can be stated, perhaps it is. Although, Carnap does use an empirical meaning criterion to determine what can be said. So the point is this. However they interpret the system, Carnap and other philosophers take limits of what a logical system can represent by picturing or modeling objects with respect to shared logical structure as limiting what can be said.
And this shows how primary the notion of representation is based on likeness really is, or similarity really is, logically understood. It is notorious that according to Carnap's construction, meaningful statements cannot be made about metaphysical matters. one might say that this result is not very conclusive because it depends on adherence to empirical meaning criterion. We need not get into that issue. What is important here is that metaphysical statements are not meaningless for Carnap as such. They're not meaningless as such for Carnap
just because he's a logical empiricist but because he believes that the answer to the question what are metaphysical statements what are metaphysical statements about is he would say nothing fucking at all Nobody has shown Carnap to his satisfaction that metaphysical statements are about something. That's the whole point from which Aufbau tries to ascend.
if metaphysical statements were about something, Carnac would be the first to insist that the symbolic expression of these statements could be constructed and that they would have, right, and they would have, sorry, I scrobed it wrongly. and Jesus this is what you have to with this my apologies
I scrolled it suddenly and lost my sentence okay So if metaphysical statements were about something, Karna would be the first to insist that the symbolic expressions of these statements could be constructed and then they would be correlate objects.
We need not to judge whether or not metaphysical statements are meaningful in the sense of having real objects in kind of broad sense as it correlates in the sense of having real objects in the Carnap's sense, what we can basically go for is to highlight Carnap's principle, that if there is nothing like a proposed representation for it to represent, that proposed representation is not really a representation. Metaphysical statements
Then Carnap would say Are pseudo statements Spell out God As a definite description And you will find that God is not a representation Not because there is no God But because it makes no sense to say either that God does Or that God does not exist only through successful reduction of a complex symbol or demarcation to elementary symbols that refer to basic relations among primary elements, be they experiences, sense data, material body, so on and so forth, does one assure oneself that the complex symbol actually refers
to something in the world. And that complex symbol refers because the elementary symbols from which it is constructed are interrelated in the same way are the elements of the object to which it refers. That what is the same between complex symbol when reduced to simple symbols and complex and higher level objects are sets of relations indicated by Carnap when he says that the objects on higher levels are not constructed by mere summation, they are logical complexes. We shall distinguish between a whole and a logical complex, between a gestalt and a logical complex.
and that's the whole is composed of its elements. They are its part. An independent logical complex does not have this relation to its elements like a gestalt, like a whole, but rather it is characterized by the fact that all the statements about it can be transformed into statements about its elements. Thank you. Dear friends and foes,
I don't think that there are foes, there are only good friends here. probably we have 10 minutes max and we are already basically enslaving our good friend Raphael on extra time but so be it just a quick question Reza did you say Karnat was a deflationist about truth um because I know there was a definition in the uh chat but would he be a deflationist about truth like uh deflation is about truth okay well of course you know
Plato cannot have the same account of truth as Cardinal has right obviously not but I'd say that look if you are going to really making a kind of Thesis, which is not quite historical. I say that, yes, they do actually converge. It is, I mean, look, the analogy of the divided line in Plato, right? it's a kind of a constitution system. What is it then if it's not a constitution system? Essentially we have so the divine line if those people have forgotten what it is in Republic and
in Philippus. So you get a line and you segmentize this to four segments. The first segment is the confusion of senses representing uh what in the in the allegory of the cave represents the shadows on the wall the confusion of senses then the other one would be the confu would be basically the the vision of of an of a natural object of natural objects like seeing a bottle of water seeing a flower, right? A kind of perceptual bracketing, so to speak. This is the second bracket, third bracket, what we call mathematicals, meaning that mathematical is not in the in today's
sense, actually in more far more profound sense that models, models, that mathematics doesn't simply have a certain kind of pure abstract role, but mathematics ultimately is mathematics by virtue of its epistemological valence, by its modeling capacities. So the realm of the mathematical third segment. And then last one, ideas, forms, the view from nowhere and nowhere. Logic by excellence, if you might say it.
So the thing is that when we look into this analogy of the divine line in Plato, we see that you don't have any access to the shadows on the wall of the human cave namely the confusion of senses, if you don't have a certain kind of principle for the unification of a natural object, perceptual bracketing, you know, salience and so to speak, a gestalt, right? But you don't have a gestalt if you don't have a certain kind of mathematics. and you don't have mathematics if you don't have logics.
So essentially, the thing is that the analogy of the divide line is the analogy of epistemology according to pure logic of ideas, of ideas, that at every rudimentary state, the Stalin phenomenon is being constituted by higher order classificatory systems up to the idea that logic being the constitutional system as such its role is a key to the constitution system meaning that ideas
forms in Platonic forms do constitute anything else, but according to a multi-level constitution system. So that, of course, look, this is actually not, it's not a joke. This is actually the view of Plato, particularly in his more mature works like Philebus and Theatetus. and I would say that this actually yes fundamentally create a certain kind of subrosa
or underground relationships philosophical relationships with incarnate Hegel and Plato something that should be explored I've actually got another question if that's right, related to related to Hegel because you mentioned before in a past seminar about two philosophers speaking so let's phrase it like that say if Hegel and Karnat were to talk, would they especially like Carnap of the logical structure of the world would they have a lot to
agree on? No, I would say that they actually would have less to agree than if Carnap had a conversation with Plato I would say that as even as someone who has written a book on Hegel, right? I would say that, no, I think that Carnap is far more sophisticated than Hegel when it comes to the contemporary issues of philosophy and science. Hegel wouldn't even understand the sheer complexity of these problems
that Carnap is putting forward. Of course, there are always Hegelians who say that Hegel already basically came up with everything that philosophy could ever come up. He gave us the universal formula. But then what the fuck are you doing if you are Hegelians? Are you doing philosophy? This is like the chaos of Hegelianism, that Hegelians think that they have already came up with a master key. But that's just like ridiculous. And that's really the downside of Hegelianism. But really on a systematic level, I would say that Hegel literally cannot answer some of this question
precisely because no matter how much Neuahegelians argue, Hegel didn't understand the meaning of formal logic, the significance, the revolutionary significance of formal logic for a new philosophy. Karna did. Karna, be my God. Hegel is no longer my friend. Thank you very much. Reza you call yourself a Platonist I think yeah on Facebook on your bio you have a remote Platonist no I mean for me it's like the the the one
who started all of this and for that this person should be recognized as really a cherished person I was actually thinking maybe when you talked about idios you know that the idea that mathematics mathematical modeling has an astemic value in terms of modeling I was thinking maybe you don't mean idios your idios has to be some sort of stellarism idios you know within the scope of psychological nominalism the idea that you know i mean there are two levels and two levels actually i mean there is this magnificent book i really recommend if you are going to actually read about plato in
contemporary terms with regard to carnapp with regard to sellers with regard to other kinds of stuff that we have been talking about one name rosemary desjardins two books rational enterprise which is a commentary on the ectetus and the second book this might not be actually available i have i have scanned it myself i can send it to you it's called plato on the good the commentary on philippus uh this these are two major works on uh Plato's scholarship with regard to basically sellers
carna basically the whole basically of you know uh rendering understanding Plato in contemporary terms. And I would say that, no, I think that Plato wouldn't have any sort of epistemological commitment as privileged over the logical ones. So my dear friends, any more, anything before we
say goodbye? Can I just ask you to elaborate on one thing about the relationship to Hegel? Do you think that the reason that Hegel doesn't get what formal logic can do, I mean, people will say that it's partially historical, right? That it's just that he's writing before Frege, none of this stuff has come out yet. He didn't have it to play with. Not that he would have been a logician or something, but he wouldn't have been able to dismiss its capabilities as easily. But in the preface to the phenomenology, he does talk pretty explicitly about just his disdain for
kind of mathematization, right? I mean, maybe he's probably thinking of live dits and so on. The kind of mechanization, mechanization of logic, mechanization of logic. Yeah. So, so, you know, do you, do you think that Hegel can have a little bit of the like, oh, well, he didn't know what we know now, or is it? No, I don't think so. No, no, no. To be honest with you, as a, as a Gail, you know, would say that, look, the whole idea of science of logic is really complex. It's really great on the side of formal logic. But the fact that basically Hegel, you know, puts formal logic on a very kind of a low esteem, precisely because he just doesn't understand the significance
of formalization. So this is, I've talked to Perseans and stuff. They say that, look, you know, basically logic comes from the world, from our interaction with the world. And simply what we have actually only accomplished is to formalize what has already been the case within the interaction of us with the world. But that's just not understanding the meaning of logic, as Cardop would say, because the formalization of logic has a fundamental significance, meaning that it's mechanizable, meaning that it can be turned
into an engine of a construction system. And that is the revolution here, the revolution that Konaps initiates on top of Friede and Russell, and particularly in addendum, rather than in mere following of these two thinkers. And to be honest with you, this, the fact that formalization of logic becomes the revolution, the means of revolution, is quite, we can't even think about it right now.
Why? precisely because the first thing that it does, it starts to interfere with that experiential, epistemological view of philosophy that Kant thought would be the paradigm of modern philosophy. And Carnap gives us something else. I think that these are the kind of stuff that people should think about it, but particularly in the light of the advances that have been made within the realm of logic in the past one or two or three decades.
What logic means is not the same thing that Fige had in mind or Aristotle or perhaps even Carnap but actually Carnap created a platform for us to understand logic more broadly than ever and that is truly revolutionary and we are having been we have been going to that kind of direction the idea of understanding not logic but logics is not merely diversification of methods of doing logic. The shift from logic to logics
creates reverberations within our ontological systems and not merely methodological ones. dear friends i think it's time can i ask about the uh well sending papers to you which uh yes uh so um okay um rafael my dear friend would you be able so some people uh presented their uh you know uh their papers during the sessions, right?
I think that I remember everyone, but just in case, would you be able to list them? Yeah, I'm writing on that spreadsheet, you know, the spreadsheet with the course and the press. Yeah, and like there is a second tab and you can check there. I also sent an email to like everybody. Where is the spreadsheet, by the way, Rafael? I don't think I have access to it, that spreadsheet. Let me check. I will, uh, anyway, I'll invite you again and then you can look at it. Superb. So essentially anyone who didn't present, um, can write an essay or record a presentation, whichever you prefer, send it to me.
i will do the grading first then if you are willing if you actually like it tell me up front we can make like 10 to 15 minutes where i actually we can schedule a call i will give you a brief feedback and that will be it we send directly to you or upload it somewhere? Rafael, I think Rafael knows the whole thing. You guys can send to Reza and put me in copy and then I will make sure that everything that you sent gets archived and then everybody can access it later. I think it gets more organized this way.
Great, thanks. So just put me on copy and I'll take care of it. By the way, as I mentioned, so, I mean, we have had really great papers, presentations. Those of you have presented already, would you be kind enough to basically upload your PowerPoints? That would be magnificent. I mean, Casio, I mean, so many people have done this already. Any person who can basically upload these kinds of stuff, if they have a copy of it, that would be most appreciated.
Let me see. Actually, I think that Maria also gave a presentation. Right? Maria did give a presentation. Yeah, yeah. It was superb. It was a superb one. Yeah, I remember that. Thank you. I was so unsure about whether it would be even on point. Whether it would be... No, no, no. It was magnificent. No, no, no. It was superb. It was absolutely superb. No, if you don't, please don't feel too make. I know that everyone basically is kind of like busy these days. If you don't have the PowerPoint, forget about it.
But if you have it, it would be magnificent for us to have it as well. Okay, my dear friends. I'm now getting a little bit tired of you. En masse. Thanks. It was a great class. I hope you have a little bit, you get a little bit something out of this class. And yes, there will be a sequel to this. I've been told that it would be with less amount of students, right? Hopefully I will see you.