Hello and welcome to the 12th session of constant circle of revenge and the cast of mic to you guys will never stand away. Thanks too. Thanks everyone. Today we are going to continue the chapter on the schematism, hopefully finish it. You know, I think this is our official last session, right? Yeah, yeah. Yes. So there will be three more sessions. So it's best to, from now on, be a little bit conscious of time. So at least we can cover axioms of intuition, analogies of experience, and those chapters,
which are rather more convoluted and need to be addressed. but hopefully with the chapters and the discussions we have had so far, we should be capable of read the Critique of Pure Reason without getting lost too much, because I think so far the stuff that we have been talking about should give us enough tools to navigate this book. So before moving forward with Eskimata and Principles, any question, any discussion?
Chagis, I saw your question on Google Classroom. That's something that we should, we can't answer it right now until we get to the analogy of experience, because that's part of the analogies of experience chapter, which we will talk about causality and alterations and the whole idea of, with relation to transcendental experience. yeah that sounds good yeah i mean i wasn't so much referring to like the distinction between aristotelian change and kantian change or his idea of substance i was it seemed as if he was suggesting suggesting that there was some
sort of other change or something that can't be accounted for within his system and that's kind of what my question was referring to well yes uh the the whole point of kant is that uh the kind alterations that he talks about or change of state there are different kinds what you might call to be synchronic or diachronic alterations um and so and that's that's why i uh you know i mentioned that we can't really talk about this once we understand the rule of time in principles and also analogies of experience because time and causality play a role in how we can formulate synchronic and diachronic alterations or changes and only one of them are inside
the transcendental experience Any of you, did you read Rosenberg's essay on imagination? I mean, I'm addressing all of you. Yeah, I read it, and I really like how he ended with that question of pain, and how, you know, what does that mean? if I was reading the right essay, I think that's what we were reading, right? Yes, the rule of imagination in Kant, yes. And then he ends with the question of how can his system account for bodily pain?
Yes, I remember that, yes. Yes, I vaguely remember that question. But what do you think, any comment or any question about the rule of imagination? You know, particularly there's those two diagrams that I think are extremely important. You know, one of them, it moves from intuition to understanding. And there is one that, which is incorrect, this one. And the other one that's basically imagination intermediates between, you know, intuition and understanding. It's a difference ultimately between these two diagrams.
I should have it here. Okay, one second. This is really, I think, an important diagram, and it really sheds light on the rule of imagination in Kant and why it is important.
You know, the regular Kantian interpretation is the wrong one, where the manifold of sense, receptivity of the manifestance cause productive imagination to act and productive imagination instead synthesizes basically the material that is given to it with the references always being the manifold of sense.
You see, the whole point of why it is wrong is that this thick red book, this piece of perceptual judgment, has as its reference the manifold of sense, an organized manifold of sense. Now, this is not, this is not basically not quite wrong nor right. Why is not quite wrong? Because I just said organized manifold of sense. We know that organized or integrated is another word for synthesized. As long as we are talking about organized manifold of sense, this should not be utterly
false. But manifold of sense by itself does not imply an act of synthesis, an organization. So the real diagram, the correct diagram is the one left, where the reference of our perceptual taking, perceptual judgment, this thick red book is an image synthesized by productive imagination for the concept of book is thick red book but also at this this
thick red book which has been supplied by the faculty of imagination an image a a singular representation of a particular item, a determinants, a perspectively determinate representation. So this is really important, that the reference of a perceptual judgment is not the manifold of sense, but is a representation or an image that has been synthesized or organized by productive imagination out of the manifold of sense.
So it's like an object one? or uh an object one yes absolutely it's an object one in sense it's a determinate perspective it has determined perspectivality and hence the this object one what you might call to be uh a it's different from object two in the so in so far as
Object two is fully, you know, it has a full inferential conceptual content, whereas object one is more or less an intermediary phase between a manifold of intuition and basically those pure concepts of understanding. So this is really important to understand that object one is where two things happen.
The image, basically some synthesized image model fall under a certain concept or category of understanding and also a certain image or determinate model is supplied for a certain kind of concept. So it's like this, it's the idea that, you know, and that's basically how the topic of schematism in Kant starts. You remember the idea between the difference between general logic and transcendental logic
elaborated by Kant. General logic is the idea that how rules can be used in demonstrative knowledge. qua organon, the Aristotelian sense of organon, in the sense that you apply rules to your pieces of experience. But of course, these rules require criteria of correctness and falsity. So this is how we move to the domain of transcendental logic, where we can inform fact talk about the the criteria of correction of correctness and falsity
with regard to experience with regard to empirical domain so the idea is that pure concepts of understanding can be in a way in themselves can be thought in terms of general logic obviously they need to be constrained by the empirical realm in order for them to be non-arbitrary but also have the criteria of correctness and falsity This is when we enter the domain of transcendental logic.
Within this domain then pure concepts of understanding and manifolds of intuition ought to be intermediated. Insofar as pure concepts of understanding by themselves cannot simply be imposed on the manifold of intuition. That's a problem of arbitrariness. Because how can we say what laws, what rules, what conceptual rules can be applied to what determinate form of experience? This is already, as I will discuss, it already predicts Wittgenstein's rigorous argument.
If we say that rules are by themselves are sufficient for us to apply rules correctly, then this means that we need more rules in order to justify the criteria of correctness of the previous rules. And then those justifying rules require additional justifying rules ad infinitum, the rigorous argument. So pure concepts of understanding cannot be applied within the domain of transcendental logic to manifold of intuition if we are talking about the criteria of correctness and falsity. So far as pure concepts of understanding core rules cannot ground by themselves, by themselves,
this is the most important, by themselves cannot ground the criteria of their correctness. If we say that they do, we fall in the regress argument. We would say that they require broader rules of justifications and those rules of justification what justified their correctness well additional rules additional rules so on so forth regress argument so pure concepts of understanding cannot be applied to manifolds of intuition manifolds of intuition also cannot be brought or subsumed under a certain kind of rule by itself because that would be completely arbitrary how do we know that a certain
What kind of image should be brought under a certain kind of concept or rule? How do we know that the image model of a tree facing me this and that way should fall under the concept of tree and not a car? under the rule or concept of a tree and not a car. So just as pure concepts of understandings or analytics by themselves cannot determine
the criteria of correctness. image models by themselves also cannot determine the criteria of correctness of our specialized judgments or in the domain of transcendental logic. So we need an intermediary form of principle or an intermediary kind of rule that has its foot both in understanding and in sensibility.
This is where eschemism comes through. is essentially what you might say a solution to the problem of correct application and correctness in transcendental logic. Or in another word, the problem of correct judgment or correct justification in relation to transcendental logic or logic as a canon rather than organon
in Kantian terms. So this comes back to that very idea that we were talking about. Logic as a canon versus logic as an organon. Logic as a canon requires the criteria of correctness. But what would be the criteria of correctness within the domain of transcendental logic? How can this be guaranteed? How can we have a criteria of correctness, if any at all? Eschematism tries to answer this problem, insofar as neither pure concepts of understanding
nor image models, which have their, basically their place in manifold of intuition, by themselves can provide us with this criterion of correctness. Give me one minute and I will be back. Sorry. Does anybody have all three volumes of that Peterson book? Does anyone? Because I can't find it. Yeah, I do.
Could you go to the classroom, please? Yeah, sure. I think a couple of them are in the about section already, the two and three. Yeah. Do you want to just put the first one, Stanley? Yeah, yeah, sure. Okay. But they're all in the classroom in the about section. Yeah. Okay, because I've been looking all over. this is like the one book i can't find for some reason this is the diagonalization book yeah i had no clue that like the the two and the three was like even like available digitally i resin has mad wizard skills in finding that so so i'll just post the um the first volume that'd
That'd be great. Yeah, thank you. Might as well just post two and three if you can. I mean, so they're all like right there. Okay. Like whoever looks at the classroom. Sorry. So, any question before I move forward? So this was just a kind of very, very brief introduction to why eschemism?
What is in fact the role of eschemism in critical pure reason? Well, without eschemism there wouldn't be any transcendental deduction, as simple as or transcendental logic. And transcend and schematism is connected with imagination. Nevertheless, as we will see, schemata are not really images. Even though schematism is a function of imagination, schemata are not simply images, namely particular representations. They are, as I said, are intermediary rules that provide
images, that provide concepts with images, with content, with a particular determinate content, the perspectively determined content. I'm going to talk about this so this will be clear. And this is kind of, you're saying perspectively determined content, it kind of reminds me of what you were talking about last week with the differences between the subjective time and objective time. Can you elaborate on this a little bit? Just kind of this idea of the permanence of an object and that is the perspective.
The object itself becomes part of your perspective as something you can relate to as a substance with accidents. Yes, yes, absolutely. Yes, yes. That's actually, that again is part of the analogies of experience. Yes. But yes, but you can also think a more rudimentary aspect of this determined perspectival viewpoints. And that would be just what we were talking about so far, identifying a category of seeings named seeing one. things to which I have perspectival access.
Of course, this perspectival access is phenomenal. And insofar as it is phenomenal, and that would bring what you were just talking about in analogies of experience, brings the idea of time and subsistence of substance, subsistence and persistence of substance which is in so far as time is the formal condition of all phenomena so in a strange we'll get to this you know later today that there is this reason that Kant almost over emphasizes the role of time when he talks about eschemism as opposed to space
you know it's precisely because of this because all perspectival the determined perspectival viewpoints are phenomenal are all phenomenal encounters have as their formal condition time at time which is also transcendentally ideal namely perspectival I was wondering if, because like the schemata help select which models to use and to construct and to synthesize, I was wondering, like, does, it seems like what's interesting about
the schemata is like you said it has its foot in both places so that um uh it it seems like that it plays a role in the selection not just of image models but also in selecting the right concept for that for the particular material causal object that's being investigated yes yes well as i mentioned it really tries to address the criteria of correctness we don't understand the criteria of correctness can neither be concept nor intuition alone. It should be both the concept and intuition
at the same time. The source of this correctness should be both. So obviously, yes, it is what might think of it as a kind of a junction you know as an adjoint a left adjoint and a right adjoint from sensibility to understanding and understanding to sensibility sorry for talking category theory here do you think um So do you think like this kind of category theoretical language is helpful in kind of formalizing? Yes, I do think it is. I mean maybe not category theory as such,
but definitely what you would call to be algebraic geometry, yes. You know, which is category theory, shift logics, topos theory, you know, I mean obviously category theory just like the most rudimentary and kind of a platform for expression of these higher kinds of algebraic geometries. Yes, absolutely, precisely because, you know, one of the, I mean, I'm sure you're familiar are with the perspective of development of, at least, development of category theory and topos theory. People like William Lauver, Saunders-McLane,
and these people obviously were developing tools of category theory and topos theory, not only in relation to problems in mathematics but also in relation to philosophical dilemmas that were plaguing the philosophy of mathematics. One of them is particularly is the dialectics between local and the global, quantities and qualities, the subjective objective polls. Yes absolutely, definitely this is ultimately what you get in the idea of commutativity. The whole idea of commutative
diagrams is this, is the subjective objective pose. Your diagrams should commute. But of course, that is precisely another reason that category theory by itself is not a sufficient tool to model these kinds of philosophies. Yes, it can give you a lot of insights, but also it can mislead you to something precisely because everything in category theory is in one way or another is commutative. The diagrams always commute. But do we really have commutative structures in transcendental philosophy always? I don't think that's the case.
By commutativity I mean the very accurate sense of commutativity. A star B is identical or is equivalent to B star A. Equivalent, this notion of equivalence. among dualities like object a star subject is equivalent to subject a star object I think it is not really we cannot have it in transcendental
philosophy such a generalized commutativity I think the most obvious way that that commutative mathematics isn't sufficient. Just like, imagine trying to model the construction of a cheeseburger. Go on. Operators, you know, it kind of matters what order you stack the items in order to construct a cheeseburger. Yes, yes. Yes, absolutely. Well, yes, but what commutativity can capture ordering? What it can't capture is how can you reverse or inverse deordering? Or basically what it, you see the whole idea of commutativity is about equivalence.
Equivalence as in contrast to equality. Equality is simply a special case of equivalence. So equivalence between classes of relations. when we are talking about equivalence we are talking about a specific class of relations now for example as i said subject the star object can it be said to be equivalent with the class of relations that so subject the star object can it be said to be equivalent the class of relations that object and star subject represent?
Obviously not. The way that object in transcendental philosophy function upon, operates upon the subject, is very different from how subject operates upon the object. The class of relations that these two represents are fundamentally different in the sense that one cannot easily be transformed to another, even though the layerings or relations, the ordering between the subject and object poles are there or can be captured. What is important is really this whole relation
between mirror images, between dualities, between subject and object, phenomenon and nominom. So, okay, yeah, I think I got that. So commutativity is just in the sense of like the basic law of arithmetic, like the commutative law, it's just that. Yes, I mean, of course the commutative law is, I don't think that even arithmetic or logic, I mean, classical logic can really articulate what commutativity is. I think commutativity is really, really important. A great article that I can talk about, it's not about commutativity, but all I can say is that commutativity is about equivalence.
So in order for you to properly appreciate what commutativity is, you need to look into the notion of equivalence in mathematics. This article that I'm going to tell you... hmm
okay it's called um when is one thing equal to some other thing when is one thing equal to some other thing uh yeah who's the um barry barry maser okay it's a really good uh you know um article and really once you understand you know what is exactly this equivalence uh and how commutativity is ultimately about equivalence then you can see that uh definitely the generalized idea of commutativity the commutative relations
and commutativity is always about a structure goes beyond those kinds of rather narrow domains of understanding the concept of commutativity in arithmetic or even in classical logic How do you spell his last name? M-A-Z-U-R So
As I mentioned, the discussion about the schematism is where Kant reminds us again of the classical division of logic into the theories of concepts, judgments, and inferences, which respectively correspond to the division of the higher faculties of cognition into understanding, power of judgment, and reason. All three of which, according to Kant, are understood under the broad designation of
understanding in general. Understanding in this generalized sense means the activity of understanding or simply the domain of activity as in contrast the domain of receptivity, is that of senses. So whenever Kant talks about activity, it means understanding, really, generalized understanding. You are in the business of the transcendental philosophy. When he talks about receptivity, it simply means sensibility. The capacity to be affected
passively by thus and so items in the world. So if you remember, you know, when we were talking about forms of judgment, the propositional forms of judgments are always implicated whenever concepts are in play. The focus of the transcendental deduction
has always been the rule of understanding in that generalized sense of activity, as a faculty of concepts primarily in so far as they function as rules guiding perceptual synthesis. So this brings us to these kinds of implicit role of concepts in Kant's philosophy, which is their predicative rules of concepts, the predicative rules of concepts. In determinative objective judgments about items in nature and especially in synthetic judgments
are priori. I said implicit in so far as this rule has so far been in the background. With Eschematism, this comes to the fore. It is in judgments that concepts, including the pure concepts of understanding, are predicatively applied. analytic principles will consequently be according to Kant from A132 to B171 sorry A132 to slash B171 a canon for the power of judgment that teaches it to
apply to appearances the concepts of the understanding which contain The condition for rules are priority. Correspondingly, the power of judgment is, according to Kant, the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e. of determining whether something stands under a given rule or not. So, as I mentioned in these passages, Kant already anticipates Wittgenstein's regress argument, namely the conclusion that pure general logic cannot by itself
give us any percepts for exercising the power of judgment, that is, any general rules for applying rules to cases, because those rules of correction, those rules of correct application, if we are simply in the business of pure concepts of understanding or rules as such, require further rules, and those rules require further additional rules ad infinitum, hence the regress argument. Now, with respect to transcendental logic, however, the situation is fundamentally different.
Kant says in A. 135, B. 170, 4 to 5, in addition to the rule, or rather the general condition for rules, which is given in the pure concepts of the understanding, it can at the same time indicate a priori the case to which the rules ought to be applied. so you see as i mentioned what is really important you know that remember that the difference between logic as canon and
organon a definition which is precarious at least from my understanding but nevertheless can be justified in one way or another within Kant's system of philosophy insofar as really the idea of logic as a canon is where critical philosophy begins rules by themselves are empty they require intuitive content sensible content and sensible contents by sensible ingredients by themselves are blind they require intellectual ingredients concepts namely so this is the beginning that's the difference between canon
and organo and how misconceived this division might be is really the beginning of critical philosophy critical beginning of critical philosophy because you no longer in the domain of pure logical laws that can be applied at whim nor in the domain of the given sense impressions or sense data, which can tell something about the structure of the world to you, like these
sense impressions which are the telltale heart of mysteries of nature, mysteries of universe. So none of these anymore. And for that, you need to endorse, in Kantian sense, logic as a canon. In the sense that logic as a canon where we are in the business of correct application of rules, not in order for us to move in the domain of correct application of rules, we We should already abandon the domain of pure rules and the domain of pure sensible intuitions.
What we should be interested in is how they interplay. question if you ask question we can have a break and then come back makes break sounds good to me okay good okay five minutes sounds good see you see you
Yes, but not only that, it's also about what you might call to be be determination a priori which rules ought to be applied, and what would be the criterion of their corrections. So two things. One, the determination of what rules, what concepts should we apply, but also the criterion
their correctness, whether how we apply them, what the kind of rules that we apply, concepts we apply, are they their application is, is their application correct or not. So two things. One, a specification of this, of the particular rule that ought or concept, qua concept that ought to be applied. Two, the criterion of its correct application. Can I ask you a question?
Sure. About Kant's theory of concepts. I mean, what do you think? Do you think it's useful? Sorry, my apologies. You got cut off. Whose theory of concepts? Kant's theory of concepts. Oh, Kant's theory of concepts. So as rules for making judgments, I guess. Yes, I think, no, I think, you know, the theory of concept is absolutely, it's concepts with c uh with a small c you know and which cognitive faculties operate yes i think
it's already in the you know in the in the correct direction of course it has shortcomings but but i think the whole idea of concept as a rule is the most fundamental idea in any theory of concept you can't have concepts as any other thing concepts are rules and so you what sort of what are the the direct what the ways you think it counts specific version of this fall fall down what what are the you know what directions do you think a improved theory would move in if that makes sense well this is exactly you You know, two things.
You see, the idea is that when we are talking about rules, what exactly these rules are. You know, obviously Kant is, we can't simply, is Stroman Kant by saying that Kant has in mind these rules versus those rules. It's not a black and white picture. In fact, the very idea of schematism shows that Kant is quite subtle. So other than pure analytical rules or rules quo concepts, you have intermediary rules, rules that determine the criteria of a specification of the application of the concepts, but also
their correct application. And these rules themselves are not pure concepts. These aren't a schemata. So Kant is subtle on these things. So I don't think that Kant falls short on this one. But then what would be the downfall of Kant? It's precisely, I think, on two fronts, at least two fronts. One is the very fact that it seems that Kant, as I have mentioned a number of times, thinks that the rules of logic need to have some constraint given by sensible intuition, provided by sensible intuition. Otherwise, they would be arbitrary, they would be empty in Kantian
sense. I think this is absolutely misguided. And a good critique of this has been given by Uy Peterson but also the giant work of Carnap, the logical syntax of language, which has been written and encapsulated this whole critique which I think is the most serious thing against any form of Kantianism. And by that I mean Sellars, I mean Ray, I mean Peter Wolfendale, so on and so forth, in an essay called From Witgenstein Prison to Unbound Ocean. I think this is really a serious, serious downfall of Kant, in the sense that he thinks
that if rules of logic are treated in themselves without the constraints of sensible intuition, that would lead to pure arbitrariness, namely the delusion or the illusion of logic as an or can write another canon. So this is one. Another one, I would say that this layering between intermediary rules, which are not concepts, and concepts alone is far more complex than Kant puts forward in critical reason.
And I think one of the few people who has worked his entire life on this front is brandon, particularly the more recent brandon in the brandon of between saying and doing. So essentially what you might call to be, it's not that it's downfall of Kant, but pragmatism tries to give, to unbind this Kantian dimension, to show that even if when you think you have concepts as rules and also rules are not pure concepts, but nevertheless are rules and are intermediary, picture can even be more complex than this when we are talking about concepts and rules.
And the kind of attitude that we usually take, rule following uh you know uh rule governed activities so on so forth i think this this is this i think where pragmatism uh i mean at least analytic pragmatism come into the picture so i think these are the two the two dimensions that i think can't it's not that there's downfalls but nevertheless they demarcate the limitations of Kant's doctrinal concepts. So this idea, the rules of logic need to have, need to be constrained by sensible intuition,
is this this is tying back into this critique of psychologism that we talked about more in the yes yes not only critic of psychologism but also but also what you might call to be uh the critique of the hard distinction between form and content and all its ramifications because it seems to me the more i have looked at this and i i'm working on this piece in response to ray's essay on picturing which you know bring some of these issues again the more i have looked
into this issue it seems to me that any person who in one way or another takes side with the hard distinction between form and content in the sense that they say that there is no such a thing as autonomous or pure form because pure form without content is you know arbitrary and usually people who are pro hard distinction that's their argument they never argue on the other side that there is no such a thing as a formless content. So any person I think who says something like that ultimately falls in a new version of the myth of the given. Even Stellaris himself, even I think Ray,
Kant, even I think Pete on this front. And this ultimately comes down to this whole idea of logic as canon or organon. The idea that can we really talk about a sensible intuition or content without form? Is this idea even conceivable without endorsing a variation of the myth of the given? I think Uy Peterson really nails this idea in the second volume. Really fantastic. Go on, sorry.
I didn't mean to interrupt you. No, I interrupted you. I was just going to say, I mean, it seems like Kant would say something like that everything is thought through predicates. Yes. So it's always a predicate, but the subject becomes that thing which no subject is thought for it, like a body. but it's always a predicate though so it is always like the content or the form without both well yes it is it is it is always both it is always both what this what the thing is that you know um this is one of those weasley kantian moves you know he he says that he he really distinguishes these he's subtle on these but then why is that if there is such a thing as there is
always both formal content, you would say that there is such a thing as pure form, namely the illusory idea of logic as an organ or general logic. Why do you think that there is such a thing as pure form? Because saying that there is such a thing as a pure form implies that you believe also in such a thing as pure content. If you believe that there is no such a thing as a hard distinction between form and content, then how can you say that there is such a thing as general logic, as an illusory arbitrary
rules which are purely formal, which belong to the domain of pure form, and no content whatsoever? That's, you see, these are, I think, the more you look into Kant and try to weld these different trajectories of arguments together, you see that some of them don't quite fit together at some point, even though he has already addressed this problem. Two things I think are really damning in Kant's critical pure reason, and they are somehow connected.
One is the principle of unknowability of the transcendental object. We have heard of transcendental object, but we have never seen one. There is no such a thing as transcendental object in Kant. It's simply an as-if argument, as-as-if argument that is proposed on the plane of phenomenal encounters. Phenomenal encounter, anything that belongs to the phenomenal encounters is an as-if argument. That is the limit of our encounter with transcendental object.
In fact, all of this is stuff that we are talking about, schematizing, synthetic upriory, so on and so forth, imagination. They try to bring forward this. This is the one. And before moving forward, let me read you this really excellent passage by John Findlay. He says, we now come to a final point in which Kant's philosophical genius is supremely apparent his use of the unknowability of the transcendental object to explain how we can and do know what we
know regarding the phenomenal realm for since transcendental object can never quote transcendent be directly given to us and since we cannot best have a problematic concept of it which will only enable us to treat it as if existent and as if responsible for the compulsive connective element in our experience, it has to be represented in experience by a number of purely phenomenal criteria whose use is a built-in property of our own subjectivity and which can perfectly do duty for it in an experience like our own. For something can only be as if something else existed
if it involves definite marks which link it logically to what is spoken of in this as if fashion. And since temporal flux and its irredemably suppressive, piecemeal character is the main stigma of our own phenomenal condition, it follows that the criteria which do duty for a nominal presence in experience will all be connected with the piecemeal suppressive character of time. Such is indeed the lesson of the transcendental deduction of the eschemism of the categories and of the analytic of principles, all of which offer us
phenomenal substitutes for the absent but as if presence of a transcendental object we shall deal with these Kantian treatments in later chapters so yes so this is one this the whole idea there is no such a thing as a transcendental object in in Kant you know it's simply an as if and if you are trying to pretend it it is not as if then you are simply making a false move according to on Kant's own uh you know definition of as if arguments and the limitation of as if arguments so this is one another one is this idea that um even though we are in the business of transcendental
philosophy of the a priori it seems that it can't always tries to misrepresent transcendental condition namely a priori in itself with transcendental method namely in relation to sensible intuition so you never really get the idea of transcendental in itself rules in themselves concepts in themselves cognition in itself a priori in itself all you get ever is really transcendental subordinated again in the vein of hume to sensible
intuition. This comes again and again in his definition of logic versus logic as organon versus canon and how he derides logic as organon as illusory. It comes into the interplay between understanding and sensibility in the discussion of a schematism and so on and so forth. Any questions before I move forward? So ischematism determines the correct application of the categories to experience by, it seems
like that by what rule would then confuse what ischematism is trying to do, right? Because the correct application seems to imply a type of rule that's there, that it's meeting. Yes, now Kant's, I think, and that's really, I think, part of the genius of Kant's. He tries to show, you remember that, so, you know, as I mentioned, that reading critical peer reason, you need to think about it always diagrammatically as a hierarchy. sensibility nested within imagination, within intuition, intuition nested within imagination, imagination nested in hierarchy, as it's kind of nested contained hierarchy.
Now, of course, when we are talking about concepts, we are talking about concepts one and concepts two, rules one and rules two, application one and application two. In the sense that are we talking about analytics of the concepts or are we talking about rules for concepts which are not really about rules defining concepts, but how these rules, how these concepts are brought into conjunction
or interplay with sensible materials so you see let me let me try to a little bit make this easier an example from kent a triangle so you remember you know from the math class and euclid's and and the procluse commentary and on elements so you have the concept of triangularity of course the concept of triangularity means that it is not circle the concept of triangular means it's a circle means it's the you know it's
It's basically a closed intersection of three intersecting lines that forms three angles, internal angles. So this is what you might call to be analytics of the concepts. But we have also a different kind of concept quarrel, if you remember. How to construct a triangle, a triangle. a triangle is different from the concept of triangularity namely the analytic of the concept a triangle is always a determinate triangle a right triangle this triangle that triangle so on so forth this concept core rule for construction of a determinate triangle as in contrast
to triangularity as such, namely the pure concept of triangle, is where you get rule one and rule two, concept one and concept two, application one and application two. In fact, it can be shown that the concept of triangularity is empty if it does not have these determinate triangles. Right triangle, you know, this triangle, that triangle, so on and so forth. But it can also be shown that a triangle, a specific determinate triangle,
is meaningless if we don't have the pure concept of triangularity. whose rule is not about really determination of this specific triangularity, but triangularity as in contrast to circularity, triangularity as in contrast to squarity or rectalinearity, so on and so forth. So this is the thing that when we are talking about concepts, even in the realm of concepts, we can talk about... different hierarchies of concepts. This is another great thing about Kant's theory of concepts, that he implies as if we have a hierarchy of rules, a hierarchy of concepts.
Pure concepts are on the top, like the concept of triangularity as such. But then concept of triangularity as such, you have something also the concept of a triangle, to construct, to draw a specific triangle. That rule is also a concept, but a concept that has its foot in sensible intuition. A determinate, perspectively drawn or conceived triangle. Conceived as brought into conception. Is this clear?
If it's not clear, please let me know to clarify on this. The determination of the correct application of category by schemata is similar. What you're saying is it's similar to how apprehension and intuition requires. It doesn't operate alone. when it requires the synthesis of recognition and the concept, it requires the concept in order for it to be apprehended. Yes, yes, absolutely, yes, yes. Sorry, let me close the door and come back.
So, as I mentioned, with respect to transcendental logic as in contrast to the general logic, the situation is quite different. As Kant says in A. 135, B. 174-5, in addition to the rule rather than the general condition for rules which is given in the pure concepts of understanding can at the same time indicate a priori the case to which the rules ought to be applied. Now transcendental logic in this sense is a pure specialized logic as we know it already. It is the general theory of humanly possible
conceptualizations of object given in intuition the analytical principles accordingly begin with an account of the sensible condition according to kent the sensible condition under which alone the pure concepts of understanding can be employed then it moves and engages with those synthetic judgments that flow a priori from pure concepts of understanding under these conditions Now, according to Kant's doctrine of two sources, which we have already talked about in previous sessions, the perceptual experience has two theoretically distinguishable elements or aspects.
One is an image constructed from raw materials of the manifold of sense by understanding in its role as a productive imagination and a propositional indexical taking in which such an appearance is conceived under object concepts. A perceptual experience, a perceptual taking, like this thick red book, therefore combines a sensory presentation with a singular judgment. And the question naturally arises how to such prima facie disparate items can be integrated,
can be unified, can be brought together. That is to say, to understand the unity of a perceptual act, a perceptual taking, we need to understand how its two sources, the a priori and the sensible, can be integrated. Eschemism tries to answer this question, this problem. And so far, eschemism already is a function of imagination. And we said that imagination plays the ultimate role within understanding and sensibility. it we see that schematism is nothing but the more further elaboration on the function of imagination
and its role in transcendental deduction the objectivity of synthetic a priori claims So, in schematism, Kant formulates this question as a problem regarding the homogeneity of concepts and the objects subsumed under them or brought under them. he says in a 136 b 176 in all subsumption of an object under a concept the representations of
the former must be homogeneous so in all subs in all subsumption of an object under concept the representation of the former co-object must be homogeneous with the latter co-concepts i.e. the concept must contain that which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it. In perception we know that the representation of the former co-object are items which are the intuited which is to say images particular representations of an item in the environment
their subsumption under a concept is their intuiting in a perceptual judgment Now, if the individuality of an intuitive item could be understood on Leibniz's model, there would be no problem regarding the homogeneity of the objects given in intuition and the general predicative concepts under which those objects are subsumed in perceptual judgments. From a Leibnizian view, Kant's homogeneity requirement is trivially fulfilled. When the intuitive representation of a determined object takes the form of an infinitely conjunctive
Leibnizian individual concepts, the concept of red, the concept of tree, the concept of thick, the concept of this, and, and, and. So this concept of a thick red big book becomes the conjunction of red, thick, big, and book. Well, we saw that this is absolutely a bunker idea. This is false. The whole idea of this thick big red book is one unified perceptual taking. The conjunction of these desperate, disconnected concepts never yield the concept of thick, red, big book.
So one of the fundamental insights shaping Kant's philosophical story is that our intuition is sensory as we know it and that sensation is not just a confused mode of conceptual thinking it follows however that in particular as Kant says the pure concepts of the understanding in comparison with empirical indeed in general sensible intuitions are entirely unhomogeneous and can never be encountered in any intuition. Now, how is the subsumption of the latter on the former? Does the application of the category to appearances possible?
Since no one would say that the category, for example, causality, could also be intreated through the senses and is contained in the appearance. A, 137 to 8. B, 176 to 7. Answering this question, one requires to step into the domain of schematism. So in order to solve the homogeneity problem, Ken tells us in a schematism chapter that
what we need to solve homogeneity problem is a particular source of mediating representation, of mediating representation. On the face of it, however, the condition that such a transcendental schema would need to satisfy seemed to be mutually incompatible. According to Kant himself, now it is clear, this is citation from Kant A. 137, B. 177, now it is clear that there must be a third thing which must stand in homogeneity with
the category, i.e. concepts, on the one hand and the appearance, i.e. intuitive object, on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating representation must be pure, without anything empirical, and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a representation is a transcendental schema. But we know already that understanding and sensibility are mutually incompatible. So how can these be brought together? The question of logic as a canon, transcendental logic, synthetic upriaries, so on and so forth.
So eschemism tries to resolve this problem of incompatibility. you remember and the answer to this question if you remember is this in is in this whole idea that imagination has one of its foot in understanding and the other in sensibility and so as a schematism now let's see how it goes any any question before I move forward I just have a question that's on the back burner for me. It's in the introduction of the schematism, is Kant just going to reintroduce this harmony that he set out to sort of, or disharmony that he set out to talk about between a subject and an object?
But that's just on the back burner for me. Okay, you need to elaborate this a little bit. I mean, I'm sure that this is going to be a fantastic question. but uh okay maybe you should write it either on the uh sidebar okay because i'm still vague as you know uh no i i understand you know where you are probably trying to go with this but it would be great to see it you know crystal clear okay okay yep and maybe just for a little bit of clarification here i think this is what we're talking about so it's pure and void of all material content like quantity as a category yet it can also be sensible because you can see like seven strawberries and that's a quantity of strawberries yes and also a tally argument
one stroke two is through three stroke it really requires the temporal ordering of the sensibly intuited strokes or lines you see uh that you for you to have the rule of saying that okay i have one stroke then i add a stroke to the right of this stroke so you get two strokes the rule of okay the rule of arriving at five strokes in the number five so first make one stroke then add one stroke to the right of the
first stroke then add another stroke one stroke to right of the previously two two drawn strokes this already requires a bunch of and this is a rule of course it's a schematism a schematic rule but this rule already feeds off of a lot of uh sensible ingredients that are not rudimentary but nevertheless are organized especially temporally just like numbers like just like numbers unity and also the sensible intuition of unity as your tallying yes and and the whole idea of temporal progression first if you remember i'm saying that
first you have this then you have two tally then you have three tally how you move from this first one to the step three requires both temporal ordering and also a spatial order temporal ordering is clear you know first this second third you know there is a linear progression here but Also, you notice what I was just saying. I was saying that add one more stroke to the right of previous two strokes. It's already an especially constrained delimitation of my rule. So you have a spatiotemporal organization
of sensible phenomena. Reza, can I ask something? I think I'm a little behind and I'm not sure if this is I'm getting it all, but would you say that the the the categories are more on the side of the unconscious sort of ordering of of the transit of the sort of transcendental mind whereas the the the schematism and the imagination are more more aligned with consciousness and agency or something am i thinking about that right or this is really an
interesting question this is something actually i have been really trying hard to see if there is an answer for this i can myself uh come up with actually the more i have thought about it in terms of you know so basically i think the best way to say this question answer this formulate this question uh my apologies for bastardizing yours it's it can't would say something like that our categories do categories belong to self-consciousness or do categories to belong to empirical consciousness does as does eschemism belong
to empirical consciousness or does it belong to self-consciousness self-consciousness being the consciousness of an agent a rational agent so empirical consciousness is what you might call to be a fully naturalizable in a modern sense consciousness i think the more i have thought about it it seems a quote it's it's quite the other way around that categories belong to the self-consciousness and eschemism is one that has its roots in empirical consciousness and not fully being on the side of what you might call consciousness which can call
self-consciousness or conceptual consciousness and i think there are a few citations that um defend this position yeah i would say like um like number is the schema of quantity but it's also the concept of number is something you have prior to experiencing the quantity sensitively yes Yes, yes, but also he says... Sorry, I'm trying to find this. Let me, my apologies, let me just log into my...
and their mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay before our eyes only with difficulty. You know, I think this is a real evidence that can seriously think that eschemism has its foot both in the agency, namely understanding categories, or what you might call to be agentical consciousness, and the naturalized side of consciousness,
where things are evolutionary given to us. We do not know why is that we think like this. We eschematize like this and hence the idea that there are mysteries of the soul They are beyond the scope of our consciousness Our simple phenomenal consciousness. I think the way I think oh, sorry, sorry I was gonna say I Think the way that Rosenberg puts it is something like there um so the i think his example is so you know our pure sensible intuition of a book might just be
its its front cover or something so how does how does our perception that there is more to it than that come about which is through you know it's that's a function of the imagination but he says that it might be presented through imagination, but it's not presented as imagined or something like that. It's like we don't consciously think of these things as in our everyday encounters with objects. We don't acknowledge the fact that... It seems that you see the whole idea is that from a modern cognitive, Peter, from a modern cognitive science perspective, you can think of different hierarchies of consciousness.
On the top you have self-consciousness, which is conceptual consciousness, in the sense that a consciousness that is driven by the criteria of conceptual adjudication, conceptual justification, powers of judgments and inferences, and not simple experience, sensible experience. Then you have what you might call to be low-grade conceptual consciousness. Then you might have to say pure empirical consciousness, what you might call to be subpersonal cognitive processes, subpersonal processes. What is usually in cognitive science after Hans Wader can be said global workspace.
space. The concept of global working space I think is really interesting for understanding these non-conceptual consciousness which is what you might call to be concept consciousness but it's not self-consciousness. It's the idea that you see like a sentient being an animal we are animals but we are also concept using concept having animals. Like a sentient is conscious one of its environment of things moving flux of you know in sensory input but this flux of sensory input is entirely what you might call to be a symptom of
so many other pro cognitive or subcognitive or proto-cognitive processes that are going on and of which the sentient is not really aware to of, sorry, aware one of, is not aware one of. An example, like think of us as simple animals, as sentience rather than concept having sapiens. We are entering a new room for the first time. There is something going on, a lot going on in our brain. This is what you might call to be a global workspace. A
global workspace is what you might call to be both the foreground and the background of a theater stage of which we only see the foreground where the actual theater is played. This is what in cognitive science they call it the attention amplified attention space. Consciousness one which is non-conceptual is only attentional work space in the sense that it has some, the reason that we are conscious of such and such items in the world is because in one way or another they fit in our behave, in our, they mediate between our input and
output sensorial, behavioral structure. It is because for example we seek food at that moment that we become attentive, we become aware one or conscious one of the smell of food and not for example like I don't know temperature or this thing is moving, this insect is like crawling along the wall, so on and so forth. So this is the whole idea. There's a conscious one is sub-personal, but it's also completely tethered to the structural
constraint of the sentient. At this level it seems that Kant tries to tell us that the schematism is both something of consciousness two, namely self-consciousness, conceptual consciousness, and something of consciousness one or awareness one, what you might call to be sub-personal, non-introspective, non-reflective consciousness. and this is why um you know there's there's um there would be different rules and different
image models or different qualities of image models for example the figurative versus intellectual image models um yes yeah absolutely yes and then the schemata would has to do with a communication across intuition and understanding at different levels, you know, at a perspectival level or, you know, at a higher level. Yes, actually at a conceptually conscious perspectival level, yes. Yes, yeah, yeah. Yes, but yes, so Peter, yes, I think the whole idea should be reversed. is more on the side, according to Kant's own report, is more on the side of empirical consciousness.
Whereas categories more on the side of intellectual consciousness or conceptual consciousness or what Hegel and Kant call self-consciousness. in so far as Kant thinks that schematism has its roots in the mysteries of the soul that belong to nature. In modern cognitive science, vocabulary you might say sub-personal processes, sub-personal cognitive processes. There is no agency at those levels. And I mean this would seem like maybe a third weakness of Kant that you didn't list
before, it seems, right? I mean, this idea that there's this mystery here. Yes, well, this is... Okay. There is this essay written by my friend Keith Telford for new Glassfeed Research Platform. exactly on this topic. And Keith and I, we have had this discussion and it seems that he interprets it as a weakness, as another symptom of Kantian conservatism. I don't think that it's essentially a weakness. I think simply Kant, what he means by mystery,
simply me he thinks that and this is obviously can be corroborated by by the rest of this citation where it brings the idea of nature into the end with discussion it seems that what he means by mystery is really a naturally given evolutionary faculty or capacity and that's what he mean he said he calls this mystery precisely because what is evolutionary given to us is always a mystery for us we use it well we don't know why is that we are using it that's i think is quite a really radical idea
you see both in a critical sense and a non-critical sense in the critical sense which i'm interested is this idea that we are using a lot of methods of heuristics, a lot of methods of engaging with the world. But what does really guarantee that these methods have any objective criteria of engagement other than the fact that they are evolutionary given to us by nature? But does simply them being evolutionarily given to us by nature, does it make them epistemically
legitimate? No, of course not. So this is, I think, opens in fact a can of worms. Probably Kant didn't want to open this can of worms, but nevertheless it is there. And I think that a more generous reading of Kant really can be moved toward this direction. I don't see, that's why I didn't mention it as a weakness. But Keith and I have been talking about this and it seems that he thinks that it's a weakness. But I, you know, obviously, on this specific topic, I think that, no, Kant is actually radical.
Yeah, I'm glad. Thanks for the clarification. And I think I agree with you because it just would seem like kind of what you were talking about earlier. Like you would just have to formulate another rule to explain something that's immediate. And that's why it is a mystery. Yes, it's a mystery. Yes, absolutely. this is the whole idea that it's a rule, it seems that it's some sort of what you might call to be a method a heuristic method that has been given to us by evolution by natural evolution but this brings us immediately to this he calls it a rule of apprehension yes yes but but more generally speaking i mean think of this and this is actually a good
a form of critique against so much of this bullshit that today is being advanced in name of cognitive science by by inactivists by people like andy clark alva noah so on so forth Let's have a generalized version of this discussion. You say that I have, we are capable of doing such and such cognitive tasks by virtue of having been given or provided with such and such evolutionary cognitive capacities. So evolutionary cognitive capacity X allow me to do Y.
According to Kant, this evolutionary cognitive capacity X is simply a mystery. And I think every way that you can interpret it, this mystery should not be taken as something like mystical or as if Kant tries to whitewash it. No, Kant is a thing. It's very critical here. If you are doing Y using evolutionary capacity X, then what does it really guarantee that what you are doing as X has any objective validity.
Other than by you resorting to this idea that capacity X is given to me by nature, is a mystery of the soul, as Kant would say it. This is I think is really, really actually quite prevalent in analytic cognitive philosophy put forward by people like Putnam, put forward by cognitive scientists like Daniel Donet, also put forward by kind of more of a French continental influence cognitive scientists
like Alvin Noe and you know Andy Clark so on so forth the inactivist side. So this is I think this is a critical line that needs to be sharpened against both of these because what does what does it mean that just because evolution as you have been supplied with an evolutionary capacities what does it really is in this evolutionary capacity that allow you to talk about epistemological or epistemic legitimacy or objective validity in fact resorting to your evolutionary capacity to try to adjudicate your objective validity
or epistemic legitimacy is nothing but an exercise in pure dogmatism uh reza i was gonna ask so this the term are you use is is sub personal or technical term is it because i i understand that dennett uses it i mean is it also a technical term in cognitive psychology yes okay yeah I was also gonna say this seems to sort of open the door for a kind of like an evolutionary argument against kind of
shop and how I picks this up and then it goes through to someone like Alvin Plantinga who kind of there are their argument is that it's more likely than not that are what we um you know our phenomenal experience of the world is very disparate from what actually exists you know the in itself because it's like it's an it's an adaptive trait for like simplification and a kind of is a evolutionary sorry no no no no yes this is this is absolutely true but i would even go one a step further from
this it is not as if that our adaptive capacities evolutionary adaptive capacities are different from the in itself i don't think that we should even bring the in itself into this scenario panorama we should say in fact a more modest but far stronger and far more critical challenge in the sense that our evolutionary adaptive capacities what does it really allow them to be objectively valid even this objective validity might not be commensurable with the thing
in itself but simply at the level of phenomenal experience that's really I think the fucking critical acid that Dennett doesn't realize, that Sellars doesn't realize, that Ray doesn't realize. That's, I think, that needs to be sharpened. That's the fucking escepticism, super acid. The super acid of escepticism is a dilemma for philosophy. As long as philosophy tries to escape from it, it is not philosophy. It's sophistry, as Plato would say it. I don't want to go too off the deep end here but I'm tempted to ask a question around the fact
of roughly along the lines of given some sort of naturalist account of the development of cognition and our evolutionarily afforded abilities but also a skepticism towards their necessity where with being able to gain some sort of epistemic legitimacy and objective validity with respect to cognitive judgments, what does this imply in, say, ethical or practical ramifications?
And the naturalistic realizability of our actions. Could you please elaborate the last part of your question? I got the first part, but the kernel, I thought, was the last part, this whole idea of ethical... Well, yeah, so given that, you know, there is some, you know, tractable reason why our particular faculties were evolutionarily afforded, like, even if it, you know, has its own sort of local specificity for why it was able to be tractable in the first place.
Okay, may I interrupt you on this point? Yes. It is not as if our cognitive faculties are all evolutionary given. I would say that it is, there are these pseudo-naturalized, pseudo-naturalists who say something like that. Dennett, I would say, is a pseudo-naturalist. What is a pseudo-naturalist? So the naturalist, you remember I was saying it in the first few sessions, so the naturalist, naturalization is a two-way street. So the naturalist is the one who always wants to go one way. Naturalization is not simply moving from reasons to causes, but from causes to reasons.
from autonomy of reason to the heteronomy of causes and from heteronomy of causes to absolute autonomy of reasons. Of course, naturalization for now in the way that is conceived in cognitive science, which I think is a travesty, moves in one direction from the absolute autonomy of reasons to absolute autonomy of causes. and then it belongs to this. So I want to make this clear that he's, from this perspective, he's a pseudo-naturalist. Because what is the idea of nature? Because what is naturalization? A naturalization that doesn't have an adequate concept of nature
can't be said to be on the side of naturalization. Naturalization requires an adequate concept of nature in order for it to adequately naturalize processes in both directions. Otherwise, it's not really an idea of nature. Then why the fuck are we talking about nature? Why are we talking about naturalization? It's just a sham. And so naturalization as gaining a sort of objective validity with respect to our cognitions of nature would end up having ramifications towards the direction of like how we then position ourselves with regards to nature. Yes. And the... Yes, and that's the whole idea. That's in so far as
once we understand that naturalization is a two-way street, and there is this what you might call to be a junction or dialectics, back and forth movement between self-consciousness, conceptual self-consciousness, conceptual consciousness, and empirical consciousness in response to Peter, then you would say that our cognitive faculties do not, do begin, do begin with evolutionary given capacities, mostly heuristics. But being, but starting the point of this, starting from this evolutionary given natural
capacities doesn't mean that our cognitive capacities can be reduced to evolutionary given capacities precisely because we do have something called pure logic general logic logic as an organon rather than logic as simple canon logic as the rules of understanding in themselves disconnected from any relation from the sensible content. You see, all of this ultimately come down to this, that fucking
Kantian division between logic as canon and logic as organon. If you are on the side of logic as or as canon if you are even a good kantian like stellars like ray like pete the logical consequence of your position would be denet would be metzinger would be churchland eliminative materialism but if you are on the side of the transcendental itself logic as organon then you know that things are far more complex naturalization is not something that goes in one
way it should also be equally extended in the other way and hence the real question is that how can we talk about objective validity of epistemic legitimacy while we are also biased and negatively limited by evolutionary capacities. I said negatively precisely because these are not positive traits as if Kant tries to show us that these are positive. No, if something is evolutionary given to us it means that it's local and contingent. But then how the fuck something that is local and contingent can play any role in something
that should be universal and global, i.e. transcendental? See, these are real, I think, blind spots in Kantian philosophy and really these needs to be sharpened against these vulgar Kantianists. We talk to be anti-kantia. I think Kant set the right tone. It's not, it's that he doesn't do the job. So, I mean, as mentioned earlier, there's varying hierarchies of schemata,
some that are more, you know, local and contingent, and some other ones that are more critical and conceptual. I wonder, you know, given the the foot in both places nature of the schemata, but also the autonomy of pure logic. If schemata determines the proper way to apply concepts
and intuition. How is logic still autonomous if it's contingent upon a schemata which is able to... It is not. It is not. That's the whole thing. You see, that's the whole idea. Kant So there is such a thing, first of all. let's put it this way there is such a thing as a contrast between transcendental logic and pure logic what you might call to be analytics of cognition and you might call to be an uh to be the synthetics of experience or synthetic of cognition logic on the side of experience and
and logic on the side of intellect. So Kant from, you need both of these, because we are talking about an agent, a subject. If we are talking about a subject, you need to have both. First, I would say, like Hegel, that not every fucking single thing in the world is an agent. And hence we shouldn't treat everything like a subject. In fact, that lead to us delimiting the prospects of what pure cognition can be.
Imagine, this is an example from intelligence and spirit. I've mentioned this to you, a toaster. You see, there is such a thing as a programmable toaster. I'm sure it will come soon. It's already been there. That can make you a better bread far than all these stupid bourgeois, no bourgeois chefs who say that we have had these cultural tastes of best, making best bread, so on and so forth. No. All it needs is a bunch of program axiomatically constructed and give you the best bread. even though it does not have the experience of tasting a good bread. It doesn't need to have the taste of experience of the good bread
to make a fantastic bread. It can do it. So you see, it's on the side of the intellectual, nothing of the sensible. Then you have a great chef who can bake you a great bread simply by virtue of having sensibility. But sensibilities are always contingent, but they're always local. No matter what this chef can give you and cook you, it's always going to be a very arbitrary contingent local bread a parochial bread the machine can has the prospect
or the potential of making you the greatest bread on heaven and earth this is this is the point against Kant this is the point of logic versus a logic that has been tainted by sensibility. But in so far as we are talking about ourselves as humans, and Kant is always specific about this, Kant always wants to talk about us, but not other creatures, not other machines. In so far as us are discursively, sensibly passive, discursively intelligent creatures,
humans, we both have sensible and intellectual poles. Hence, it is important for us to both understand transcendental logic and general logic, to understand how rules function in themselves and how rules function as being constrained by sensible intuition so it's what you're saying that uh so a hypothetical future intelligence might might not have the the dimension of sensibility because obviously the toaster isn't a mind
And I mean, I feel like if we're kind of acting in accordance with this kind of critical post-humanism that you outlined against someone like David Roden's kind of speculative post-humanism, then we're always trying to base our idea of what a future intelligence could look like on our own cognitive capacities. So how do you square those two things? I just don't understand. No, no, no, you are absolutely right. Let me put it this way. I think there isn't, okay, if we are talking about a restricted AI, and by AI I do not mean AGI.
What I mean by AI in a very technical sense, AI is simply a task-oriented intelligence, Whereas AGI is what you might call to be a sapience. Basically a general, every task can be solved. So in terms of AI, we do not need to go with the sensible. And that's really already the case. That's really when you look into machine learning, symbolic AI, that's already the case. So when we are talking about AGI as general, practical, and theoretical tasks, all of them above, then can we really talk about an intelligence that doesn't have sensible components?
I don't think that we can't. That makes much more sense. I don't think that we can't. And hence that's why we need to talk about determinate forms of cognition which are still bound to the sensible intuition, but they are not bound to a particular sensible intuition such as ours, which is evolutionary given according to our natural history. would you say that there are that it's not necessary that there are AIs which aren't AGIs well obviously there is no AGI but there are already AIs oh absolutely and as I mentioned to
you the great race the great race that is yet to come and on which humans are absolutely ignorant is a race between two great elimination, basically human elimination sport. One, algorithm by algorithm, AI shows that what we think as human mind is nothing but simply a conglomeration or a loose integration of algorithmically implementable capacities. pure ai and the other one is a race for agi that agi the future human yes has continuity with the current human but as fuku was says it also carries
the unwavering wager that the face of man will be erased as if it is a portrait drawn on the sand at the edge of the sea. These two races. And I think at this point, a conception of humanity, a conception of politics, a conception of culture, that cannot reconcile or recognize the weight of these two vectors is a conservative, is another form of Abrahamic monotheism. But... Needs to be... I mean, I feel like this is the sense in which it's a properly, like, traumatic...
It is traumatic for the manifest humans, but from the perspective of humanity, either course is the enlightenment. Seneca might says or Plato what says the path toward the form of forms the good in itself that all what i was going to ask is just what are there kind of parochial ais that would um qualify as having sensibility in some sense so like a like a kind of not a toaster but a robot that navigates sure a robot that navigates but even a toaster you see a toaster also is a
sensibility you see you put a bread in a programmable toaster or or coffee bean in a programmable coffee machine it it senses it senses what is sensation receptivity to the effect by items in the world there is no such a thing as mysterious sensation it's just an interaction empirical interaction it does have that and thank you when you have a I mean that's the whole point that a coffee machine even more you know prominent than a toaster a coffee machine can actually reliably give you a better coffee than a better chef than a better
barista who is great in tasting coffee of course let's see you know you should take these parts off I don't want people to listen to this no I actually want to listen to them. No, but I mean, saying, talking about these kinds of things sends paralyzing shivers down the spine of so many people. But what is really the idea of human? What is really the idea of a thinking, rational subject? Of a subject that, according to Plato, is, has its life for truth and the good.
It can be realized in so many formats and if you really think that this is the job of some metabolically driven, you know, basically protein-based life form, that's just parochial, That's feeble-minded, has nothing to do with philosophy. Philosophy's job is to escape from any contingent and locally posited sphere of thinking, because the ambition of philosophy are universal, that local, arbitrary, or contingent. And if you are already taking side with these protein-based carbon life forms, then you
are on the negative. You are not in the business of philosophy. Go do poetry. Go do something else. Okay. I think we need to stop here. We have a little bit more on eschematism. I really want to talk about this is schematism of categories and rule of time. It's a little bit difficult. I don't think that it's, I don't think that I can talk about it, you know, otherwise it will be, it will go to until four.
So let's have it for the next session. We are still having three sessions, you know, as I promised. but nevertheless if you have questions if you have commentaries heckling complaints about my inhuman sentiments feel free to shoot I've got some protein based life advocates to raid the classroom go on I'm just kidding I think Artem did have a question he just sent me through Facebook because his chat window is not
working but maybe it would work better to have that question Artem sent in the classroom and then we can address it later yes but but is there any I don't see anything. Oh, it's on Facebook. Sorry. What is this Facebook thing, by the way, you guys are talking about? I've heard so many times about Facebook. Oh, no. Artem just sent it to me via just like the Facebook Messenger. I can't... Okay, okay. Sorry. Okay. Theo, maybe you should turn off the live. I want to ask you a few questions. Okay. Yes. Sounds good. I'll end it right now. all right thanks everyone absolutely thank you everyone