Hello and welcome to the 10th session of Theory and Object with Reza Negrestani. I'm going to pass the mic to him now. Thank you very much, Theo. Thanks everyone. So let's start with where we left off, namely the survey of different theses that have been written with regard and, you know, established with regard to Carnap's project in Afbau. Today I will go over explicit example and one of the most important objections levied
against Carnap's original thesis with regard to the assayment view, namely the correspondence of logical atomic facts or logical atomic sentences and atomic as a matter of factish observations. After that, we will move directly to the controversy between deductivism and inductivism, particularly as being covered between many of the players of philosophy of science, particularly Carnap
and Poker. apologies if i'm not uh you know today coherent i've been a little bit sick lately um so please do apologize if i um get once in a while coherent incoherent um coherence is on my virtue anyway uh let's start before moving forward if you have any brief brief this time is brief in parentheses in quotation marks if you have any brief quotations suggestions comments, etc. And just, you know, don't feel bad because I mentioned brief. Shoot your
questions. Pure silence. That's a little bit sinister and insidious. Someone please. I'm ready to plow forward if other people are. That's good. Let's go forward. Okay.
Okay. So I mentioned that there are two old thesis and one new thesis in, uh, with regard to the project of Aqbaw. Did I go through just brief introduction of what these two old new theses and the new thesis are last session? I think I did, but please do remind me. Okay, forget about it. I will reread them again. So as I mentioned, there are two old theses. with regard to the project of Baal. One, old, every scientific sentence can be translated
via explicit definitions into another sentence that consists solely of logical signs and terms that refer to the given, the datum. Now of course we know what datum is at this point, such that in each of the underlying definitions of the defined expression and the defining expression necessarily have the same extension. And we also talked about extension in Tangent, I think last session, where we talked about Frege idea of you know, extensional view of the reference versus senses of a word.
The second old thesis, every scientific sentence can be translated via explicit definitions into another sentence that is purely a structure, that is to say, consists solely of logical science such that in each of the underlying definitions, defined expression and the defining expression necessarily have the same extension. And then I also mentioned a new thesis, which consists of two parts. Every scientific sentence can be translated to an empirically equivalent one which consists solely of logical mathematical signs and terms that refer to experience such that
translation image expresses a subject invariant constraint on experience so i mentioned with regard to the old theses about of bow by old i mean the kind of established views by which for a very long time logical structure our world has been approached by analytic commentators so while the first interpretation considers the power as a result of applying the new
Two, logical means of Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica, the traditional empiricist phenomenalist program. The second one understands the project of Pao as being influenced by the Neocantian tradition, is that of Cazirer, Ernest Cazirer, which we briefly talked about, and Cazirer was also a student of Hermann Cohen, one of the chief architects of Nookantianism.
being influenced by the Nolcantian tradition and emphasizes its neutrality with respect to all tradition, all traditional epistemological positions, while the intention of the Afbāl, according to its traditional interpretation, is to show how scientific claims may ultimately be reduced to claims about the contents of our immediate subjective experience, the more The more recent interpretation is still the second old interpretation, but, you know, considered to the first one an upgraded version. The most recent interpretation has it that science is ultimately about the structure,
the structure involved of experience, where a structure is supposed to denote something that is intersubjective rather than subjective. Now let us consider the two theses from above in more detail now. In the first thesis, given, the word given, which I mentioned earlier, denotes what is given by experience, that is to say, sense data. In particular, you know, by what Karen called sensible intuition or outer sense.
And I mentioned to you that you can think about the outer sense if you were to upgrade Kantian parlance into some sort of neurobiological, neuroscientific vocabulary, you would say that sense experience is essentially how things in the world, items in the world, affect your neurobiological organization. Haptic sense, auditory signals, so on and so forth. Indeed, for the first of the season, sense experience will be the only form of data. that we are interested in. Scientific reference, scientific, sorry, scientific sentence also
in the first thesis refers to any sentence in a language of any scientific discipline that uses its terms in a clear and nonambiguous way. Now, can someone please put this on the sidebar in a clear and nonambiguous way? A scientific sentence should always be couched in terms of a clear and nonambiguous way. The reason precisely because this caveat will lead us from the work, early work of Karna,
including our bow to the more mature work of Karna, where the idea of replacing the cluttered vague concepts with more explicitly defined concepts becomes the centerpiece Carnap's later project. In the same vein, a translation is to be regarded as a mapping from this set of scientific sentences to itself.
The two theses, accordingly, claim that there are translation mappings of a particular and distinguished kind. One, they are induced by a system of definitions in the way that the scientific sentence A is translated to another scientific sentence, TR of A. TR, open parenthesis, A, parenthesis closed, like a function. If, and only if, the stepwise replacement of the defined terms in A by their defining and ultimately primitive terms yields tr of a, 2.
The corresponding primitive vocabulary conforms to the syntactic restrictions that are explained in the thesis, logical terms and terms that refer to the given in the first case, only logical terms in the second one, c or number three. The transition from a defined expression to its defining one is to preserve extension necessarily, with understanding what extension means after last session. Now Carnap explains in section 50 of the of Baal, which you can check, the translation of sentences
and terms are claimed to preserve what Carnap then called logical value. You see, a logical value is a little bit different from a semantic value. In analytic In analogic philosophy, these two terms are not synonymous but they are connected. What is usually in a colloquial language is called a meaning, in analogic philosophy called a semantic value, a semantic value of a statement according to its inferences and the rules that connected with other sentences or other symbols within a language.
So that would be a semantic value. And semantic usually is connected with pragmatics in the sense that from a pragmatic perspective in the philosophy of language, the meaning of the word is how the word is used in a dialogical setup, in a dialogue between you and me. You see it's almost like a token, a syntactic token, like a sequence of symbols or inscriptions
which if we exchange it over time and we somehow refer it to some specific things, then it takes a meaning, a semantic value. Now, a logical value is a little bit different, precisely because the logical value has all of this stuff, the pragmatic import, so on and so forth. But it is not about representation of something. For example, the meaning of the word red, it ought to refer to red objects, okay? Or represent them.
See the idea of representation props up in the semantic value of a meaning. As for logical value, it's just the idea that red should ultimately stand in explicit structural relations with other words or other statements about other elements. So essentially what you might call to be from this perspective, for us to consider something as red, it is not primary that we associate the red with something that we do actually
see as blue or green and the contrast against such representations. But it is more the case that we say something red in so far that within the system of a language, syntax or formal grammar, the inscription red however you write it, stands in a very explicit logical relation with the inscription blue or green without any representational connotation so in order for you to differentiate red from blue and green in terms of logical value you do not say
actually you shouldn't think about that for example i see a red thing outside and then i see a blue thing and i see green thing and then i contrast these and then i will say that what the meaning of red is no there is no reference in the logical value as opposed to the traditional picture of semantics or semantic value or meaning to external objects in the environment and thus no reference to representation of system is this clear can i move forward or please do if
say something if it's not clear it's it's kind of clear to me is is this but i mean it seems like that would be like to some degree like i think carnage refers to it as like chagi you are getting cut off Is it me or? No, no. Chagis, we can't hear you. I think your signal is up.
Yeah. Maybe type the question. No. That red is up. You can't hear us either. Can you guys? Okay, go on. idea of knowing something intuitively does this have to do with something with Carnap's use of the term convention yes yes can you hear me yes yes yes I I heard you the thing is that Carnap both in the project of off bowel and also later works he does not want to subordinate okay value now to intuitive
representational values allow cans you see for can't for example something or our cellar for that matter for something to be read it should be an index of something that is given to us by sensible intuition okay which means that ultimately the logical connections should be subordinated to a representational platforms the representation layer in the sense that if there is a tiny red dot in my visual field then that's when I can actually say what it is or something ought to be red versus something ought to be green
or blue so it's essentially in a Kantian sense it is subordinated the meat that the word red is subordinated to its correct application to my differential responsiveness, adequate differential responsiveness, to something that has a gradient of the color red in the external environment.
I think we can safe to say that both Chagis and Christian have been kidnapped by Deep The state agent or UFOs. Okay, let's continue for now. Hi, hi, not kidnaps. Extremely exhausted in trying to just preserve every ounce of cognitive ability I have.
Okay, let's continue. So, as I was saying, in the preface of the second edition of the Afbauer, Karnap clarifies his view by pointing out that what he actually demands is the necessary preservation of extension, which is to say the translation image of an expression ought to have the same extension as a translated one by logical rules or by laws of nature. So I mentioned to you that the early project of Karna is fundamentally indebted to a Russellian
of external world program, so-called external world program. And what is the kernel of such project, a salient project? It's in the sense that there is at some basic level when we can say that the laws of thought or laws of logic are in fact isomorphic, I'm not saying the same, isomorphic, namely translatable, the laws of nature. So this second edition, where Carnap talks about it in the second edition to Afbao, actually comes
from a very Russellian perspective. It still bears the influence of Russell and and white hand. Anything? Someone wanted to say something? So would Carnap reject the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction as being too dogmatic? Yes, you see, the thing about Aristotle is a different kind of a story. You see, Aristotle thinks that laws of nature are in fact laws of logic, and laws of logic are still logistic, ultimately.
Carnap and Russell initially in their earlier works, particularly Carnap, thinks the reverse in the sense that laws of thought at some basic level, some very rudimentary layer can be considered to be isomorphic with laws of nature. So, whereas isotin works from nature to logic, Carnap and Russell try to work from logic to nature. yes yes wait
so um in that second preference he is rejecting or distancing himself from the isomorphic proposition I did read it I just can't remember yes you see the thing is that with the with the second edition what he means by a necessary extension is simply isomorphic is a translational map a arrow tra like a function now of course
this function that is not really what you might call to be a furniture of the actual world or nature whereas for our subtle it actually is so Karnap So even though he might sound Aristotelian in the second edition or generally enough, wow, in the sense that he believes in some sort of correspondence between laws of thought or logical connections and natural connections or laws of nature, nevertheless he's absolutely not Aristotelian precisely because he think about such connections logically and only
in terms of logic, a la Russell and Whitehead in Principa Mathematica. In fact, when we go, we get to the deductivism versus inductivism controversy, we notice that literally something that is fundamentally invariant throughout the work of Karna is that he thinks that logic gives us what you might call in a colloquial sense the meaning of reality of nature to talk about being to talk about stuff in the world it's just absorbed there's no reality or
realism in it. The meaning of being, the import of being is predicated fundamentally on the logical structure. Well, of course, logical structure, the connotation of logical structure differs from early works of Karnat to his later works in the sense that in earlier works, is fundamentally Rossellian, in the sense that it's about the correspondence of logical rules to laws of nature at some basic level. Whereas in later works, it is absolutely not. It's all about the primacy of logical connections versus what you might call to be the realm of nature.
It's only to the extent that some atomic observations are being caught up in such logical structures that we can in fact talk about an aspect or feature of nature, reality or being. Yeah, I feel like it's really hard for me to subordinate either logical value to semantic value or the opposite, semantic value to logical value, because they both in some ways seem reliant on each other.
Of course, Karnak is not denying this fact. It's the idea that you see, idea is not against subordination as such in the sense that obviously it's mutually constituted. You can't have one without the other. You know, if you are simply in the domain of logic, then how can you actually talk about the furniture of the world or reality? It's simply that in the later work of Karna, but also even I would say the earlier one like of Pao, is that you can think about the course of the subordination in terms of a
hierarchy. So you have a stage one, a stage two, a stage three, a stage four, a stage five, each have their own constraint of what ought to be subordinated to what phase or stage. Okay? Now the thing is that the Kantian version is literally, we know it, that it flattens all these different layers or stages together in the sense that it either becomes subordination of this to that, logic to intuitive appearances or what Kant calls logic as a canon or the
logic, the unbound picture of logic that Kant borrows from Aristotle but absolutely this not what Carnot talks about, where you can say that sensible intuitions are in fact fundamentally subordinated to logical connections, which he calls logic as an organon. Carnot essentially wants to try to say that yes, this is actually the idea, and this is what we know that Kant called transcendental logic how rules of logic are applied to sensible intuition so we can finally talk about the structure of the world as a reality so Carnap essentially tries to show
that the reason that Kant falls in all these traps is precisely because he has flattened all the layers like in photoshop where you have all these mass layers and proper different properties and you bunch them together at some point and you say that well this is subordinated this or this is subordinated to that this is right this is wrong no karnak tries to show that this idea of subordination first of all is subordination of sensible intuitions to logic but this is not a very straightforward path precisely because such a subordination requires for us to compartmentalize layers different layers of this subordination so we can coherently talk
about at which level these atomic observational sentences are actually being caught up or subordinated to logical connections at which level can we please have a a break before i have a meltdown here and then we'll come back in five minutes that sounds good and then yeah we can uh move forward after that okay good excellent
Hello. Hello, hello. I've returned from my alien abduction. Sorry, I missed who actually was it, Joven? Justin. Oh, Justin. Justin, sorry. I was just going to ask in this sort of moment here with where you just left off, is that basically Carnap's sort of pragmatics where each specific explanandum, or it needs to be like I guess have value guide what explicatum like replaces it and if and then I guess the follow-up of that if that's the case then like how exactly is he avoid this sort of
Cunian relativism and like this sort of the paradigms that yes question yes is absolutely is you see Carnap actually becomes extremely committed to the pragmatist thesis a kind of a pure analytic pragmatism of course we know that people like Brandon and sellers also pragmatists so as first the Carnapian pragmatism is fundamentally different from those in the sense that as I mentioned the rift between Carnap, Sellars, Brandom and Peirce is not about whether they
think that pragmatism is right or wrong, no they are. It's just that Carnap thinks that their pragmatism is what you might call to be a little bit myopic in the sense that they subordinate at a wrong level logical connections to sensible intuition, a la Kant's transcendental logic. Now, so we know that the idea of explication in the later work of Karna literally amounts to this intuitive idea that we should replace vague and loosely defined
concepts couched in terms of a ordinary natural language, a language that has been given to us by way of evolution with more useful, less vague and explicitly defined concepts couched in terms of a constructive language. Of course, as you say, such a move, which is the move of explication of the concepts, and it is roughly corresponds to the move from,
in Selaar's work, from the manifest image to the scientific image, amounts to some sort of relativisms. Precisely because, you see, when we try to replace vague concepts of the ordinary natural language with more useful, explicitly defined concepts of a constructed language, and in so far as there can be many, infinitely many constructed languages, then how can we actually choose such languages as the frameworks of our conceptual explication?
If we say yes to all of them, then we are in the business of relativism. so Karnap believes that this explicatory move should not be understood as relativism but as pluralism pluralism minus or subtracted from relativism in the sense that sure there can be so many constructed languages wherein we can make explicit the vague concepts of our ordinary natural language and become more scientific. But the choice of language for
such an explicatory move essentially needs to be justified practically and theoretically according the framework in which such concepts is triangulated. We want for example, let me make an example. So we have the concept hardness of a metal beam. We also generally have the concept hardness in our natural language. Let's call this language one of hardness one. Language one is our ordinary natural language, a language that is given. It's cluttered, vague.
You know, many relations, you know, are implicit at best. And hardness one is, of course, a concept couch in terms of the ordinary language. So essentially what we want to achieve as in the course of what Carter calls explication is to move from language one of hardness one, language one, parenthesis open, hardness, subscript one parenthesis closed to language two three four etc to of hardness two three four etc
of course here at this particular juncture the only way that we can do this is by way of two things one a theoretical understanding of the choice of language exactly what language fits for example to model a metal beam at a lower scale and hence we use that language and we arrive at for example the concept of hardness two which is more refined more clarified more explicitized concept and hardness one another thing is that he believes that such a choice of language in the
order of exploitation is not entirely theoretical but is also a matter of pragmatic or practical considerations in the sense that so we know that for example engineers heuristically manipulate a metal beam at different levels. They have microscopic instruments to study the structure of a metal beam at the microscopic level which is hardness one, then at the crystallographic structure, then nano levels. So you can say that such heuristic manipulation can also be considered as practical considerations which can be used to inform us what language
should we use so that the threat of this relativistic pluralism of many languages and many concepts be thwarted. So does he ultimately believe that the pragmatic languages are reducible to the scientific language? He does say. The thing, you see, so I'm sure that you know Sellars.
So Sellars believes that there is something called manifest image, what you might call to be a conceptual edifice couched or built upon the given ordinary languages whereby we conceive ourselves in the world we create a picture of ourselves in the world okay that's what cells call scientific language now there is a posterior alternative a later alternative to this manifest image of ourselves in the world which he calls the scientific image and the task of the scientific image to show that many of this stuff that we were in fact talking about the world within the manifest
framework were of the order of appearances and ordinary talks about the world they were not scientific in that sense but they nevertheless thinks that there are certain aspects of the the manifest image, namely conceptualization, reasoning, language use, so on and so forth, are absolutely necessary and cannot be replaced by the scientific image. Now Carnap has a very, very different view of this dynamic between the manifest image and the scientific image than that of Selvus. In the sense that, so the pragmatic image, what you might call to be the manifest image of language.
The constructed artificial formal languages is what you might call to be scientific image of language and our concepts. So Carnot believes that we essentially, something like Szilard, we move from the manifest to the scientific. But it is not as if through the course of this transition from the manifest conception to the scientific conception, manifest image is either left intact in a static way, in a certain way, or it is going to be replaced by the scientific image. Yip Karnap believes that the move from pragmatic to constructed languages, and by the way Karnap
also thinks that constructed language can also be understood pragmatically as languages in use in terms of Wittgenstein. He believes that such a dynamicity between the two is something of a dialectical nature, something of a positive feedback loop whereby the more you actually explicate your ordinary concept couch in terms of your natural language by way of constructed languages the more you can enrich the reality of your manifest image and by virtue of that further expanding the scientific image Hmm.
I understand that, but what I was going to say is like, so that seems to imply that there's, you know, there's absolutely no medium specificity to the pragmatic, the pragmatic language which which makes sense but but I do wonder if you know the only pragmatic is that he takes seriously the idea the language is always a language in use even when he talks about a purely formal artificial language that might have more in common with mathematical structures and words he still believes that can this can be understood as a
language in use a lot of it can assign namely the idea of pragmatics the meaning of the words is precisely their use in the language exchange between multiple agents the only thing is that collapse believes versus Brandon and sellers so imagine like this so imagine word cognitive then a double arrow an arrow with two heads in both directions the the word cognitive, arrow with both heads, and the word normativity. Okay? Now, you can say that Sellars and Brandom are on the side of normativity of the pragmatic languages.
Whereas Klein is on the side of cognitive pole. Okay? Carnap's believes that these are all conservative. In fact, he thinks that the idea of a radical break versus conservatism or normative conservatism is just a pseudo-problem. He believes that you cannot have normativity without cognitivism or cognitivism without normativity in the sense of language, in the sense that you absolutely need to understand both the logical structure and the use of the language. in order for you to understand how you can finally move from your vague concepts
in a manifest image to more refined concepts of a scientific language where even the notion of language can be empirically investigated now what is really the conclusion of this and that's why notice that I'm actually far more Carnapian than Selaresian and the idea is that for Selares move from the manifest image of ourselves in the world to a scientific image of ourselves in the world relies on what you might call to be an aesthetic normative view of reason where reason is more or less stable, the conception of reason is stable
precisely because it is tied to a specific range of languages by which we can conceptualize about the furniture of the world. Whereas in Karna, to the extent that we can fundamentally reconstruct language and make even the structure of language clear, we do not have a stable concept of image. Reason transforms as we transform our languages. Can we, is it possible to move forward to Quine Goodman's sort of objections and keep these in mind, these questions too.
Yes, but they don't actually apply to that because they are precisely about the kind of observational view where we are basically, what I was just talking about is more of a later Karnav, you know, after of BAU and even logical syntax of language where you see the project of Karnav, as I mentioned to you, can be understood at least in three phases. Of course, you know, I'm just caricaturizing this project. what you might call to be the first phase, where he is beholden to Frigge and the projects of empiricism, and he wants to reconcile them. These are earlier works of Karna. Then, what you might call to be a little bit later, like the project of Akbao,
where he tries to, he has retained anti-psychologism of Frigge but also he no longer believes in pure empiricism. So he's what you might call to be a Russellian philosopher actually at this point. He thinks about the external world world and how we can rationally reconstruct it in a very Russellian Whiteheadian sense. Then the third phase comes, starting at the very least from logical syntax of language to its later works. It starts at the very least by this famous note, unpublished, later published, called
attempt at a methodologic, whereby he notices that this whole project of empirical, logical triangulation of empiricism is actually quite parochial and it's not going to happen. It puts all of his efforts to re-understanding logical connections by which observational sentences can be enriched their reality as if they had a reality can be enriched and diversified. This is basically the third phase of Carnap's project.
It's interesting because it kind of reminds me of what you said last week about this being like a prosthesis because if you look at something like Aristotle, wisdom is just knowing what is light meat to help the sick person. That's the extent of the pragmatics. with Carnap it's like it seems like it would require some sort of like non-human prosthetic to investigate yes yes yeah and absolutely I don't think that this is just a metaphor anymore I mean I I've mentioned to you this idea before in previous sessions I can't remember which ones but literally before any person in
philosophy or in even computer science could talk about AI, formal learning, machines, we can think. Carnap had already proposed such theses. Essentially for Carnap, rationality is not human. Rationality can be implemented by any sort of kind of cognitive agent, as long as it abides by this kind of necessary connections between what you might call to be sensory inputs and logical connections, namely a structure, which is basically the question of mind. And of course for Carnap, this is not a very Hegelian problem in the sense that Carnap
thinks in terms of such relations, not in terms of Hegelian dialectical relations. course he has dialectics and he's quite platonic in that sense rather than hegelian but for Karnap you know the the vision of such a machine of such a thinking machine can be entirely couched in terms of probability logical probabilities here maybe valentine uh wants to say something on this as a kind of commentary before I move forward. How many people are being kidnapped by KGB today?
All have ties to Russia. I'm good, Reza. I hope everyone is okay in Russia because everyone is now excited about this win, you know about the discussion car not Russia just winning in the World Cup so what do you think about vertical structure of this one actually I think this is actually you know few and I were thinking about this In New Center, we have fortunately or unfortunately very laxed idea about assignments, essays, so on and so forth.
I do believe that if you don't feel right about something, then you shouldn't because philosophy only comes with passion. But I would say that, okay, let's ignore my feeble moralist, affectivist recipe and let's write actually an essay on these topics, namely the idea that how we can think about the philosophy of science, the projects of CONAP and something like artificial general intelligence, in the sense that a cognitive agent can be renewed, can be actually conceived anew.
We are the stuff that we have been talking about, we have philosophy of science, the structure, logical connections, as I will talk about the question of space and time, and the question of logical probability. now I would think it would be fantastic it would be utterly great and we can I can convince mo peddling to the idea that we can maybe publish some sort of small collection out of this for me personally mandatory say assignments where is the most helpful part of education even though like I tend to
hate them when I'm doing it them no you do not hate them I don't like it like right really thankful that my professors made me write a lot no you don't need to thank me but but to be honest with you I know it for the fact that every assignment is a torture inflicted by the teacher and we in so far as we all hate our teachers we also hate the assignments but let's not think about this let's think about this in terms of some sort of stepping stone for whatever we are trying to actually do I mean each of us have different kinds of projects so it would be actually kind of nice to somehow you
know encapsulate all of this stuff in a very coherent topic whereby we can talk about all this stuff. Yeah, it's interesting. One of the things I've really liked about this is, you know, reading Epictetus is sort of the three topoi in Epictetus. He kind of subordinates logic, but he sees it as, like, the paradigm of the ethical agent. Like, after you've been able to sort of get through the first two topoi, investigating the complexity of logic will help you, you know, make better decisions. there would be some interesting applications to this sort of like newer logic and classical logic. Yes and to be honest with you Chagis I don't want
anyone to go to the great I mean let's not get too way too overambitious because this stuff can go out of hand quite so easily let's not get to paraconsistent logic I mean if you feel right to talk about it please do but I don't advise it Precisely because it's just the idea that is really important. You know, I mentioned Westworld to you guys. Why is that Westworld is fantastic? Precisely because it encapsulates fundamentally philosophical ideas in accessible terms. And yes, I do believe in what Meredith just said. Absolutely. As long as you don't write, you do not actually know what you think.
Writing is like what you might call to be putting your self-consciousness on a paper, externalizing it and finally seeing what you actually think. And let me say this as a writer, most often it is not very pleasant. Okay, let's continue.
So within this framework that I mentioned earlier on, if a sentence A is translated to a sentence TR of A, translation of A, by substituting a defined expression, by its defining expression, and this is exactly what later on, by the way, in Kona is called explication in the sense that we were just talking about. So think about this, I mean I hope that you review our talks today and kind of rethink
about these connections that are being emerging. If a sentence A is translated to a sentence TR of A by substituting a defined expression, defining expression, then defined expression should necessarily have the same extension as the defining one. Consequently, A is to be necessarily materially equivalent to TR of A, translation of A. As far as the translation of sentences is concerned, and this is what Carnap aims at ultimately, the goal is thus more than just the preservation of truth values, rather it is the preservation of truth conditions.
Does anyone know what is actually the difference between truth values and truth conditions in this setup? Like the domain of truth versus whether or not something is true or not? Yes, close enough. That's actually a good kind of accessible, layman-friendly definition.
Yes, truth value is what you might call to be a canonical form of truth, where you have either true or false. Whereas truth conditions allow you to determine truth, veridical truth, a judgment. Okay? Now of course this judgment can be false, but as long as you have truth conditions, you can determine the course of your judgment and whether it falls on falsity or truth. The idea that truth is no longer understood or established in advance. It's not T versus F, truth versus falsity.
Truth condition is essentially what you might call to be truth condition, essentially a pragmatic feature. You see, we can only determine the truth of our statements by having a dialogue with one another, where through this course of the conversation we determine the meaning of red or this is red and afterward we actually converge or diverge, this you know regarding our conversation about what entails for something to be called red and how we should apply the word red in our conversation we don't use the word red you know when i'm talking about a monkey
well of course there are some red monkeys but nevertheless is this clear can I can I go forward So, as I said, as far as the translation of sentences is concerned, and this is what Carnap aims at ultimately, the goal is thus more than just the preservation of truth values, rather it is just the preservation of truth conditions. Indeed, demanding only the preservation of truth values for sentences would seem to be
too weak because any translation function or mapping which maps all true sentences to say for example for all x, x equal to x, namely an extension on relation in a free-game sense and all false sentences, not all x, x equal to x, would meet this criteria. However, in order to set up a translation like this, one would have to know which scientific sentences are true, and which are false, which is certainly beyond human capabilities and which certainly is not presupposed by the Afbau. Indeed, according to the Afbau program, the translation mappings whose existence is claimed by the two theses above should be defined a priori,
before any empirical investigation into the truth or falsity of the scientific hypotheses, even commences. Carnap is well aware of the fact that definitions are normally demanded to preserve sense, or in off-bowel's parlance, what he calls Urquhart's word, rather than truth conditions. But he argues that the preservation of truth conditions is in fact all that is needed for scientific purposes, as opposed to, for example, aesthetic purposes. If translation function is a translation mapping that is based on definitions and which preserves
truth conditions, and if A is translated to TR of A, then Karna holds that A can be replaced by TR of A, namely its isomorphic translation, couch in terms of a logical structure or logical vocabularies, in all scientific contexts without any scientifically significant loss. So, excuse me for a second, I need to go, I will come back in one minute. Don't go anywhere. No problem.
So in short, Carnap's logical structure of world or of Baal may be viewed as consists of at least two parts one the phenomenalistic constitutional construction of construction system or constitution system as we talked about it is described in section 106 to section 155 if you want to write it down so
you can study it, which is nothing but an extensive list of definitions and two, a philosophical meta-theory that analyzes it, justifies and applies this constitution system and compares it to alternative ones. I told earlier on that Carnap is fundamentally pluralistic. I mean the only philosopher that can get close to this kind of radical vision of pluralism is probably in content of philosophy's Laotard in De Ferrand.
And it's actually quite a very interesting thing that an analytic philosopher and a content of philosophers do converge at some point. But of course the conclusions reached by Carnap are fundamentally different from conclusions reached by Lyotard. So, essentially they are both about idea of difference, the principle of tolerance of different languages and systems of conception or constitution systems, pluralistic schema, so on and so forth. As every finite system of definitions, a constitution system presupposes a choice of primitive, i.e.
undefined terms or axioms. 1. The set of interpretation of these terms together with 2. The members of the intended universe of discourse of the system are referred as to the basis of the constitution system in the Akhbap, namely axiomatized elements. While two constitute the basic elements of the system, one gets referred to as its basic properties and relations. We call the corresponding predicates that express the basic properties and relations basic predicates. In the case of the phenomenalistic constitution system of the off-power of the spaces is of course phenomenalistic and it consists of,
within the old theses, basic elements, which is to say elementary experiences, what has been called Erlebs, e-r-l-e-b-s with reference it's actually a word invented by uh there's a shortened word for elements elementary experiences it's a word invented by nelson goodman basic elements elementary experiences or air levels of a given and fixed subject s within a given interval of time so imagine that you are an observer you are looking at some stuff in the world
obviously you have some airless according to carnet and these ellips what you might call to be the most rudimentary observational statements you do not need to in fact to think about these as sentences like as if they have a meaning imagine your brain was just like a tape recorder okay which is sensitive to light and this tape is passing through the interval of times it's time stamp t1 one cell t2 another cell three another cell so on and so forth now you are looking in the environment for example you look at
flower according to how light carries from the object being carried away from the object your tape light sensitive tape you can say that in each cell there is a time stamped a register of how you have been affected by the environment of course the word how here is very tricky you do not know what actually how you have been affected that's why it's called elementary experience It's essentially an empirical register, you know, of how your outer senses have been influenced
by something outside of you. The real howness of it can only be made explicit, defined and elaborated by way of logical structures, by way of a language, or what can called the mind. This is clear. Yeah, it kind of reminds me like in Aristotle when he says like, you know that light meat is good for a sick person, but do you know what light meat is? How do you know what that is? You have to have those elementary, it's like accumulation of experience. Yes, yeah absolutely. basically shows that experience if you want to look at it adolf burren baum in the fundamental
problems of space and time talks about this i can't exactly but you can you can find in the pdf you can exactly remember the pages uh where he actually talks about something like that is essentially what you might what is the humiliation for experience if you were to adopt canteen or aristotelian framework it's the idea that well there is something outside of you well how do you know that there is something outside of you well carna says that we cannot actually say that there is something outside of me just because there are these photographic negatives of light impressions registers at different
timestamps in my computer memory the only way that you can actually talk about this humiliation and understand about the input of it is by how you actually plug this tape into a different level, what you might call to be a language, Plato calls it locus, Carnot calls it language as such, where you can fundamentally make explicit the relations that is obtained between such elementary statements or observational statements, such a negative, photographic negatives. So would that be like running different algorithms against the data?
If by algorithm you mean different languages, yes. But you see, when we use the word algorithm in computer science, essentially the majority of algorithms correspond to a certain kind of range of programs. For example, are we talking about denotational semantics, operational semantics, so on and so forth. Of course, the algorithms fundamentally differ when we change the paradigm of program. But essentially, Carnap's want to think about this even more generally in terms of languages. languages it does not mean programs or algorithms but literally what you might call to be the platform
upon which certain algorithms can be made it's like so you have windows 3 this is what you call language then you make these old apps on top of it and these apps can other afford other kinds of apps or algorithms well windows 3 is what carlap calls the necessary whereas the algorithms are just what you might call to be the stuff or the kind of moves you can you are permitted to execute within such a platform within such a language within such an operating system
two basic relations the membership relation is a member yeah membership sign and the relation er or what as a representative of the word Erlab, elementary experience of recollected similarity. Now I don't want to really go to this length, but let me tell you this, while I'm Carnapian I have actually noticed that the project of
of Akhbal is exactly suffering the same curses that Russell's project of external work is suffering. So essentially, think about this. So we have some logical connections afforded by a language and this language ought not to be a natural language it can be a constructive one then we also have something called air labs elementary experiences like those registrations or indexes of light impressions on a tape recorder which is sensitive to light now how can we allow
Kant's transcendental logic, associate logical connections, couch in terms of a language, the general language, to such pictures, registers on different time steps, on a particular table. However, the problem here is very different from Transcendental Psychology as Kant, because for Kant, it's simply the idea that, well, we cannot just arbitrarily move from domain of logic to domain of sensory intuitions, from the domain of a language to those registrations,
actual registrations of light on a memory table in our brain. problem is that we know that in inside a specific language we have explicit logical connections between symbols that's what called a syntax however what we don't have primar facie is what you might call to be associations between these registers registered impressions of light on different cells of felt or a
negative and so far as we have we do have we we we we do possess the connections between symbols in our linguistic stratosphere what we do not have actually the associations we think the matter-of-factish pictures registers on this tape how can we actually translate one to another commensurate linguistic connections with picturesque connections registered on this infinite
tape here Carnap actually I would say becomes way too resilient you see you can actually read about this problem and of course I actually do talk about this quite extensively in the manuscript but if you want to read Russell you should read analysis of mine a section called five minutes ago five minutes ago it's called five minutes ago paradox the idea essentially comes to this that
okay we have these picturesque impressions each time stamp on a different cell of this photographic negative but how can we actually make an association between them so as we can connect such associations to those associations which are held among the elements of a logical language Russell thinks that in sensation, when we are being affected by external items in the world, naturally we make such associations.
And these associations are ultimately germs of objectivity. They are not objective by themselves, but they can be turned into objective claims or beliefs. about the movie. Like for example, I make this example in my book that for example, you know, you are in a desolate, dreary Connecticut town at the middle of winter, and then you see the tracks of a tire what resembles the tracks of a tire on this one well how can you find out or know actually such tracks have been made
by some serial killer who actually wears shoes with bizarre soles that emulates the tracks of tires or whether it is a spaceship or it is a trace made by a car this is fundamentally from the perspective of sensation rather than understanding is that a statistical association where by virtue of your memory of the previous events and the kind of associations that you have received you then you'd say that well this is actually a track made by a cock.
It might be false but its falsity is not important. It's really the association that is actually quite dogmatic precisely because imagine another creature and an alien who has a different structure of memory and makes other kinds of associations this is not what we can call the germ of an objective fact so Russell goes through this and Russell takes this for granted and so as karma and this is why I would say one of the greatest weakest link not found
it is not really the weakest link is not about association between logical connections and observational empirical statements but it is about the associations between empirical registers or observations at different timestamps, by virtue of which we can fundamentally associate those connections to those of a logical connection. Is that the failure of time, Rizzo? Yes.
Yeah. It's essentially what you might call to be a time illusion. A time illusion. And Kant was really adamant about this. You see, for Kant, you can actually talk about such associations, but only in so far as if you take the idea of time as a perceptual register or representation as transcendentally ideal. By that, it simply means that this time is unreal. It's not real. It's transcendentally ideal. Now Carnap makes a scene here in the sense that he jumps from the transcendental ideality
by which of time, by which such impressions are registered on your tape to the reality of empirical associations. is a fundamentally actually quite a very scary thing from a philosophical perspective. I mean, it's just like fodder for a skeptic like that guy over there, and he knows what I'm talking about, Theo. It seems like the question, too, is, I mean, like when Khan talks about, Khan gives the example of like going to the beach and then he says that somebody drew a triangle in the sand and he says you need to know that you clearly know that's a
rational creature who drew the Euclidean triangle in the sand and I'm saying that in a sense that it seems like Carnap's failure in this sense is not simply of time but of identity I guess of yes well well you should understand that this is the question of time at least the transcendental ideology of time in Kant is not about time really. I mean, sure, also Kant talks about reality of time or absolute time, but time as what you might call to be a form of appearances, a form of intuitions by which you can organize and associate your impressions of an external
world is a different kind of thing and I would say that within that context of a transcendental the ideal time core form of appearance you also deal with the question of identity you also deal with the question of association you also deal with the question of invariance so on so forth Yeah, and I guess one of my biggest questions within these past few sessions is the question of, I guess, the absolute, not in just any absolute given sense, but the absolute found
from the identity or the dialectic that you seem to be espousing in Karnapp. and for a long time I was wondering like where yet like where the question of dynamism comes in and stuff like that and you started talking about it a little today with regards to language with regards to how the normative and the I think you said pragmatic or cognitive the cognitive and normative relationship between languages is in fact not bound to a structure, but needs to be atomized. And in its atomization, we have a lot of... Yes, well, let me tell you that my defense of Carnap
can only go so far in the sense that I can defend his idea of logic and language precisely because I think that is a fundamentally an important thing that a witch Kant absolutely, or even Hegel, were absolutely unaware of. It's a fundamentally important question, but I would say that Kant's once read critically and particularly the forms of intuition, forms of appearance and so on and so forth, or transcendental aesthetics in general, then you see that even the Carnapian paradigm paradigm can actually be entangled with some really, really nasty dilemmas. As long as we leave the question of dynamicity, as you've said, for me it's a question of space and
time, even transcendentally ideally understood. If we leave them intact, if we don't challenge then essentially all of this I would say amounts to dogmatism. So yes, absolutely, that's absolutely a fundamentally important question. I think, I'm not sure though, you should never take my words for granted. But I think I somehow respond to some of these questions with regard to dynamicity and the
necessity of actually engaging with Kant rather than simply adopting a fully Carnapian view in the forthcoming book. It's actually a chapter on Boltzmann. It's called Some Art-Selling News as Delivered by Boltzmann, An Excursion into Time. Awesome. Thank you, Rizal. So, the intended universe and the intended interpretation of the basic terms and the
phenomenalistic constitution system in Dalf-Bowl can be explained extra systematically. An elementary experience or ERLIP of a subject S within an interval of time is a total momentary slice to S stream of experience, i.e. the sum of all visual, auditory, tactile, haptic experiences that s has at a subjectively experienced moment of time, where the moment is assumed to be included in the given interval of time. Like our timestamp tape.
The membership relation is just the standard mathematical relation that holds between the members of a set and the set itself. The underlying set theory of the Aufbau was actually a version of symbol type theory in which the membership symbol was not really primitive but rather contextually eliminable in favor of higher order quantification, existential and universal quantification. However, for our purposes, it is more convenient to consider the set theoretical system of of Paul as a version of modern set theory with a given universe of Ur elements. The Ur elements are just the basic elements as described above, that is to say, elementary
experiences or Erlangs. ER or Erleb is a binary predicate incarnate of bowel that expresses a relation between It is the case that x er y, x in italic, er in italic and y, it is the case that x er y X and Y if and only if X is recollected or remembered in a resilient sense in analysis
of mind by S as being part similar to Y, namely the idea of association that I just mentioned to you. I really do suggest you go over five minutes ago paradox in analysis of mind to understand that essentially the idea of these basic empirical associations between impressions on what you might call to be Ehrlichs or elementary experiences have something to do with memory, with remembering. which are being remembered and things which have been forgotten and things which are still in memory but vaguely associated essentially in the Kantian
sense you might say the relation between past present and future the impressions I had what I have forgotten the impressions that I have now and the impressions that I might arrive at by virtue of my anticipation. So are you saying that there's sort of like this threat to like logical consequence itself here? Sorry Chagis, could you please repeat it? I couldn't hear your... So it's like, I know last week you had mentioned the Akeleuthic phase, and you were using that term... Yes, that's essentially a colluding face. Yes. It's yeah, and then in Greek there's a similar term. It's like to
Akeleuthia, but it basically means just following a logical consequence Yes saying that there is some sort of like degradation Yes, yes, you see Richard Seaman Richard Seaman who basically came with the idea of a colluding face and by the way Russell has used Seaman's term in his work It's not about logical consequence. Actually it is about logical consequence. You see, so it is about associations of sensations, sense one in a Szilardian way, like C1, what you might call to be the sense data, the impressions on the tape. But the thing is that both for the Greek philosophy and for Russell, such statistical associations
are being judged or regarded or considered as logical associations but of course this is what i would call a linguistic whitewash just because i have by virtue of my memory some statistical associations between this impression of the tire on the snow and that impression of a car leaving such a tire in the past this is not really what you might call to be a logical connection it is purely a statistical it's a memory driven it's of the sense one the sense dato and for that matter it's fundamentally wrong to somehow understand it as a logical basic logical association
So, as I said, ER is a binary predicate that expresses a relation between It is the case that x e r y if and only x is recollected, or remembered, by s as being part similar to y. For example, if subject s experiences in x a particular light redespont in the left upper part of her visual field,
field and if a little later S has an elementary experience Y in which she experiences a dark red spot in the left middle part of her visual field, then X and Y have parts that are similar to one another. This is what S is aware of if X stands in the Erlab relation to Y. namely x, e, r, y. We can express this more formally by presupposing, as Carnap does, that every elementary experience can be described by reference to pairwise disjoint quality spaces, which come equipped with distance functions, namely metrics.
Indeed, these quality spaces may be regarded as mathematical entities which get realized or instantiated when S has experience of some sort. And Carnap basis can be explained by exploiting this correspondence to a mathematical instruction. For example, instead of saying that S experiences in X a particular light red spot in the left upper part of your visual field, we may say equivalently that Erlab X realizes a particular point in the light red and left upper region of S's visual quality space. If only this realization or instantiation relation is explained in a way such that the
equivalence between the two statements holds by definition. But of course, as I was just talking about this, this is not holding by definition. It is simply a statistical measure. This is, I don't want to get to this point over and over again, but you can now see what Carnap essentially fails here is what you might call to be what Kant could not even understand to begin with and simply skimmed over it. And what was that? There is no such thing as alien.
Well, of course there are no such thing as aliens in a philosophical sense or anthropological sense. If we say talk about them as if they were real, we had committed pre-critical philosophy. But what if what we call alien might be a different kind of agent, having a different kind of memory structure, whereby the relation between X and Y, X-airlap and Y-airlap, can be fundamentally renegotiated by the structure of the memory of that agent, who does not share the same structure of the memory that we have that goes from past present to the future whereby we can actually make such a stupid almost naively
pre-critical association as if they were real questions because I think this is really important this is this literally bring us to the critic of Carnap within the history of philosophy along Kant. So you're kind of arguing that we should sort of endorse sort of a dissolution of elementary experience in favor of statistics. Am I understanding you correctly? Yes, first of all that elementary and precisely because what does this amount to? It's not that of course the association between these
earlaps x and y red dot and light dot registered on my visual field the association between the two already implies a kind of a statistical association which of course russell takes it as a fucking judgment which is absolutely it's not judgment a judgment requires logical relations it's just a linguistic legerdemain linguistic whitewash over you know near statistical associations that by virtue of our memory structure we arrive at so i would say that the first step we absolutely have to make such a statistical associations exclusive as a statistical associations and not as logical
connections or definitions and then we think about what kind of other structures we can arrive once we have understood such associations statistically and not logically or linguistically for that matter am i giving people's melt that had meltdown please do let me and i will shut up at this point i have a question uh just about um hunting philosophy more than um car nap i think
Peter says yes. Oh, shit. Go on, Theo, go on. And more, this is just to hear your perspective on these problems, I guess. For me, it's not... The Kantian project is pretty... It's not confusing for a lot of reasons, and it's not entirely clear to me what makes dogmatism for Kant impossible. Or has Kant simply given us the tools for taking down dogmatisms? Or is there a way in which criticism or Kant's project altogether has installed a project which operates dogmatically?
And can we actually be Kantians or are we implicitly, by Kant, asked to be more than Kantians? and if we're if we're trapped by the finite structure of Kant's project or if it somehow disables or incapacitates us how or why or some other question form which I can't articulate do we remain Kantian and not pre-Kantian, pre-modern or mythic no I'm having head meltdown thank you so much to you Okay, I would say, and don't take my response as anything definitive, precisely because
I think these are fundamentally, you know, anxiety-inducing and dilemmas that have not been resolved in the history of philosophy. people don't even talk about them really I think can't only achieve what you might call to be the most basic weaponry against dogmatism that's what you might call to be the project of critique in a minimal sense rather than a maximum sense in a sense that the the maximal essence of the project of critique entails all that kind of
metaphysical bloat dogmatic bloat where the can introduces like you know all sorts of and tenomies analogies so on so forth no i would say literally the only thing that can't in Kant's work should be taken and rescued as the primary weapon and the first stepping the stone in a new renewed philosophical critical project is that Kant finally understands the problem that the structure does not come from the world it comes from the mind
you call it reason you call logical connections you call inferences you call language you call it by way of Plato logoi whatever you call it but this is what I would call the gesture the ultimate gesture of the transcendental turn and the move from pre-critical philosophy to critical philosophy from medieval to the modern that i would say absolutely ought to be safeguarded now everything else i would say a stink of dogmatism in kent I'm so sorry for just because I am criticizing Kant doesn't mean that I want some sort of good
old pre-critical dates. No, I just think that Kant for the most part is pre-critical despite to its own thesis. So yes, everything that you said is a genuine question and I don't think that you should expect a stupid philosopher like me to answer such an important question. I think that this is a question that ought to be answered in the history of philosophy and we have just started to somehow recognize these gaps and fissures within what has been sold to us as critical philosophy without somehow having a recourse to the stupid
critical philosophy I guess I'm still struggling with how you know how can we fine dogmatic aspects in Kant and retain criticism without... No, you see there are two different things still. Critique comes in many different shapes in Critique of Pure Reason. The first instance of critique is that how can we actually make a claim about the world is called an objective claim it's the kernel of what can call transcendental deduction okay by objective he does not mean as if we were
supposed to make a true claim about the world but simply a claim the import of which can be renegotiated such claim can be actually be false but we do not know it if it is it not in a specific position within our logical linguistic structure where we can determine actually whether it is false or true yes at some historical point we might actually arrive that it was true for example this obelisk in my garden is red well you might actually in some later age someone else might tell me that no
this is not read it's something yes okay but you need to have this basic platform in order to arrive at such thing and that's I would say is the kernel of the critique what calls what can't calls the projects of transcendental deduction what it means to form an objective claim i.e. a verifiable claim not a verify a verifiable claim about the world this is all good great fantastic superb now the move from transcendental deduction to transcendental psychology which is the conditions of possibility
of having mind to you know analogies antinomies cosmological whatever antinomies so on so forth i think they all have too much extraneous elements it's just that cant would have been the ultimate philosopher if he had you know if he was happy with his minimalist thesis qua transcendental deduction and not going through the idea that well you know uh the structure of world is such and such the structure of reason is such and such the structure
of imagination is such and such these are all i would say are fundamentally renegotiable and so far as, to me at least, Kant does not talk about renegotiability of such factors. He falls back on pre-critical philosophy, not by will, but by virtue of unconscious false moves, inadvertent false moves. I mean, I'd really be curious to hear other people in the classes thoughts on this too,
or if people felt like they understood my question about Kantian philosophy. but it seems like part of the dilemma of Kantian philosophy here, I can, I'll just put my, I wrote it out, so I'll put it in the sidebar. Part of my dilemma about Kantian philosophy is I'm not. No, I don't think we can be, by the way, Kantian. I think we can only be Kantian in the minimalist sense, and that I wouldn't say call it Kantian. Right. So that's one question, one answer. Can we actually be Kantians or are we asked implicitly by Kant to be more than Kantians?
no actually can't does not ask you to be more than cantians can't can't actually by virtue of introducing other stuff to the base plate or the platform of the projects of the critique of modern philosophy completely a save-off the idea that can ever be a philosopher who can challenge Kant for a reason of course. Kant is quite intelligent he understands that two things going beyond Kant as we have seen it in speculative realism in contemporary philosophy
and post-structuralism usually relapses on the worst kind of pre-critical philosophy I mean literally the fucking junk philosophy that should be dispensed as medieval fabulations That's fine. That's fundamentally I take side with Kant on this point. However, Kant just does not realize the importance that if you have come up with a baseline, which is called the transcendental deduction, namely what is required for you to in fact have a very difficult statement about the state of affairs in the world.
By virtue of introducing other elements like forms of intuition, transcendental aesthetics, analogies, cosmological antinomies, so on and so forth, he fundamentally tries to come off as a a kind of Islam. I am the last religion that you should embrace. I'm the last philosophy that you should embrace, and no one. But I would say that it's just fundamentally wrong, precisely because that's when Kant makes the moves that fundamentally can be challenged. Literally talk about this. Okay, you say that time is transcendentally ideal.
Coming back to our tape example, where you can make some sort of impressionistic associations between cell 1, cell 2, cell 3, cell 4 of this recorded tape. the very way that we can actually eject ourselves from this orthodox kantianism is by challenging can to say that well what if there was what if you see what if as if also a slope what if we had a different
structure of memory where we could associate these cells in different kinds of them well can tells you that this is not happening precisely because you are already entering the domain of dogmatism you are speculating too much okay no i would say can't your understanding of logic and mathematical structure or structure in general is fundamentally aristotelial and in fact right now we can tell this to can't post-mortem that we have arrived
at a view of logic, mathematics and computer science where we can fundamentally think about new kinds of models, structures and logical relationships. And by virtue of that, this question is no longer dogmatic but it is a genuine philosophical question. The very fact that you took it as dogmatic precisely because you subscribed you took the history of philosophy too seriously but the history of philosophy is not the history of everything there is such a thing as the history of science logic mathematics so on so forth i i kind of um if sorry i don't want to interrupt anyone if anyone has
wants to interject but i do want to kind of respond to it because it seems like part of the problem to um it's like kentian whiplash now we is that uh what other means of evaluation or evaluation do we have uh to look at methods that are alternative to Kantianism. And so Kant sort of straps us into this. Okay, okay. Let me interrupt you. By Kantianism, do you mean Kant 1 a la transcendental deduction, which I think we all hold it as the most minimal idea
of moving from pre-critical to critical? That's our absolute point. Or you mean Kant 2, namely the introduction of transcendental aesthetics, the introduction of cosmological antinomies, so on and so forth. That I am not going to back up or support. I think that we need to realize that there are two can'ts here, and we shouldn't bunch them together. I'd have to clarify for myself how those are clearly distinct. or how they could operate without each other, perhaps. But for me, I guess the project of finding limits of reason
or where reason operates upon illusion, that the way by which you would go about criticizing Kant is already you're engaging in that type of the kind of dialectic that Kant permits but absolutely and that's why we say Kant 1 not Kant 2. Boltzmann for example engaged with Kantian philosophy on the level of Kant 1. We all think that reason is what allows us to arrive at
veridical judgments about the world. These veridical judgments might be false or true, but nevertheless they are veridical, meaning that they can be assessed over time. 2. The idea that Kant thinks that time, even as transcendentally ideal factor, is something that moves from past to the future, or that actually holds some associations between sensations, or sensible intuitions. That's fundamentally, I would say that Boltzmann crushed it, utterly put an end to this view of Kantianism.
The Boltzmann example for me is harder to... the idea that there could be a way of perceiving causality in a different direction perhaps, like that's the Boltzmann argument, right? The thing about Boltzmann is actually more, I would say, a little bit more subtle in the sense that Boltzmann for the majority of his life thought that well sure you can in fact change the direction of time and come up arrive at different associations but that does not what you might Boltzmann said it's actually quite specific that does not really endanger the Kantian philosophy or the modern philosophy but a friend of his called Joseph
losch emits chain with something called losch emits paradox you can check it on wikipedia and losch emits actually showed that it does actually make a difference so you will have fundamentally different worldviews different kind of species different kind of minded agents and both but took it very quite seriously many people actually associate both by suicide at the end of his life to the idea that he could not resolve this problem and really he was so frustrated that people just don't understand what it means to answer to this problem because it is really the alternate problem already put in cans are they where are they are there aliens out there are there other
kinds of intelligence well can says we can't just speculate about them as if they were real but Boltzmann takes a different course he adopts minimal Kantianism Kant one rational scientific method in the Kantian tradition and And through that, through the mathematical physics, he shows that there is in fact such a thing as a different direction of time. There is in fact such a thing as a different kind of a structure of memory whereby such associations between senses can be fundamentally reconfigured and reformatted.
and that's I would say is why I would call to be the real can't-to where you actually criticize all the dogmatic bloatware that came in projects of critical pure reason Yes, Meredith, I don't think that Carnap ever mentioned this, but from a very, I would say that if he wants to overextend the analogy, yes, yes, precisely because for Carnap, the
question of a structure ultimately is the question of intelligence, precisely because intelligence is nothing but the labor of rendering the world intelligible, namely a structure, what you receive by way of your senses from the world. So yes, Carnap moved to what Steve Aoudi and Andre Karros have called unbound ocean of constructed languages is absolutely I would say from this perspective can be thought about moves to other forms of intelligences but not in the sense that Kant criticize in critical reason in the sense that it was a
speculative armchair speculative move no it was a fruit of taking seriously Kantian idea of veridical judgments the word these veridical judgments come from well they come from logos from language from logical connections then if you can diversify logical connections then actually they show that you can do in fact diversify your notions of what it means to be an aperceptive intelligence. I don't know, like, it's sometimes when I hear this, like, it's really crazy to think
about this like this like asymptotic trajectory from the human mind but I don't know like you know Epictetus says something like you know a man would hang himself if it seemed reasonable or you know like what it seems like it's almost like suicidal in a way and like I feel like you know what's so like as if we've already exhausted the capacity of the human mind itself like we need to evacuate yes yeah well that's why I was recommending you if I do not if I hear that you haven't watched Westworld season 2 I will defend you on Facebook I will eject you from the class you should watch it precisely because that's absolutely about this idea it's the whole idea that yes mind has a
specific parameters and variables in a minimalist sense. To step back from such parameters is to fall back on critical philosophy, medieval sophistry. But, this does not mean that we cannot diversify what we understand as mind, or we should think that mind or minded agent is an exhaustive thing. Allah can't. Yeah, I mean, in this sense, like, I feel almost, I sympathize more with like Diogenes
or Aristotle in the sense that, you know, whatever goes against human nature, you should avoid. And you, I mean, like, you know, sometimes just being, you know, a good teacher or a good father might be all that you're capable of as a human being. And I mean, are you really so good at that, that it's time to hang yourself because it seems reasonable? You know, like. Yes. Yes, yeah, no, we should talk about the stoic side of all of this in a separate Skype discussion and let's do it. But yeah, absolutely, no, I do believe it. And I think that Carnap was fundamentally aware of such difficulties. I mean, as I mentioned, you know, you shouldn't dispense with Carnap as if he was anti-Kantian.
No, he actually came from the Kantian tradition. He knew in and out of the Kantian critique and the critique of Kant. Absolutely, he tried his best to open a fissure, a crack, an outlet out of what you might call to be the Kantian tyranny, the dogmatic tyranny of Kantianism, the bloated Kantianism. And by that, I do not mean the minimalist Kantianism. But however, as I just talked about, and we are almost running out of time, I will actually make the very example, I promise, I promise it will be just 20 minutes, where we actually
discuss what i just talked about in terms of these associations between earlips between elementary experiences where he actually falls in the trap of kantianism precisely because despite being such an insightful philosopher he was too resilient and you know with all due great respect to Russell Russell was not a great philosopher he was a great adventurist even though he didn't want to be called adventurist he actually always wanted to be called oh I'm this analytic oxbridge person who very rigorous no he was just adventurist
and Karna fell for it. Literally there is no reason for us to associate Air Lab X to Air Lab Y according to some purely sense one association sensory rudimentary sensory association because they are not anything beyond rudimentary sensory associations, they absolutely lack any kind of logical or judgmenting or justifiable associations. Any person who says something like that, they do in fact hold together according to some judgment misunderstands the distinction between categorical understanding or critical judgment
and perceptual judgment. Like seeing this pen bent in this glass of water, or vodka for that matter, or the glass is bent, or actually the glass is not bent, it's just an optical illusion. the difference between perceptual judgment by mere associations and critical judgment that allow us to move beyond such rudimentary perceptual associations.
okay before you are you guys i know that this is summer you are more prone to having brain meltdown than usual so let's stop we'll continue by the way i have told mo already that i'm uh giving four free sessions to make sure that we get kind of get close to the rudimentary schedule that we set for this course of course you can feel free to skip
to the sessions. They're free but if you are there, it would be fantastic. Maybe just before we end, we can go over what people should prepare for next week. So I'm really afraid of saying that it's just really bad self-promotion, but I think that actually encapsulates some of the problems that we are trying to do next week. If you can read the text I wrote for Glass Speed, it's called Three Nightmares of the Inductive Mind.
Theo, can you put the link on? Yeah, I'll put it up. Of course I'm not going to repeat that text, but nevertheless that's, I would say, is a kind of an okay base for us to move to the actual controversy between Popper and Carnap, namely deductivism versus inductivism. which is basically what you might call to be the ultimate controversy between logical
connections as such without any reference to empirical observations, a lot proper, and logical connections in reference to empirical observations about karma and how we can derive patterns objective patterns and variances from such patterns that will be the next session but as i mentioned i will i will definitely give you the kind of the rundown of the you know the good man objection to CARNA with regard to
the air lapse the associations between experiences elementary experiences is there any other sort of like a small material for us to read to just get a picture of the debate between Popper and Carnap okay uh again my apologies for suggesting you know the kind of almost vulgar popular references but yes if you actually look at the problem of induction the stanford encyclopedia entry
that i would say is a very great entry actually it suggests a lot about the nature of the problem instead of going trawling through some sort of you know stegmullarian texts no i think that's that's good just understand the basics of the problem great i'll um post those in the classroom for everybody super thanks okay I don't want to hear from you ever again for the next week well we can
have talks over Skype but let's call it a day and just do something fun you shouldn't work on philosophy too much it's not good for brain or the psyche sounds like a good idea yes play some new games absolutely peter by the way um uh let's coordinate something for this week and also sepide uh uh i just emailed you uh uh any person who wants to talk to me uh my apologies to everyone i i was not feeling great i had some a few emergencies i couldn't reply to emails but
let's catch up this week if any of you want to talk to me over skype sounds good rather just uh send me a time absolutely all right thanks everyone i'm gonna end the broadcast