Restructuring Enlightenment (Session 2)

Hello and welcome to the second session of, what was it called again, restructuring enlightenment from Aufbau to logical, no conceptual engineering, that's the one. We pretend it didn't happen, don't worry. Okay, the recordings are tainted forever. I'll hand it over to Reza and yeah. Hello everyone. I hope that you are feeling great today. So we are going to continue some parts of the first session. The first session is always short. So, you know, that we are always behind. So I'm going to continue with basically the problems that Pao tries to work

with moving toward this idea that what is exactly the major flaws of off-bow. And from there, hopefully, if there is time, maybe not next session, the session after that, we will move toward logical syntax and so on and so forth. It doesn't matter. We are going to handle this. And I think that someone is going to present something today. Yes. Yeah, so Connor is going to present and I'm responding today. Yes, I'm Poulam and there will be a responder as well. Yes. Okay, let's start now. Okay, should I share my screen or something like that?

Sure, absolutely. Okay, do you. um so i summarized the the um who wrote it the carrot caroush wrote this uh article we were supposed to read in the um um what is it called like the history of analytic philosophy over um uh logical syntax so i just i just summarized the article and then i have i had my own couple questions and then i assume um and then we'll have some as well um really nice title though. Thank you. Yeah. The original title is going to be a Burlington Code Factory, but I don't know. But yeah, no, that's pretty picture. Do you need them? I should probably move that out of here.

So yes, this is my presentation. Again, I'm just summarizing the Steve and AW Karas article from Wittgenstein's Prison to the Boundless Ocean, current upstream of logical syntax. Oh, so just a little outline of the movement, at least as Odean Keras portrayed it. It's from his, like, I guess, I don't know if I would describe it, because I don't really know if I have a really good command of the terms, but it's a movement from his, like, tractarianism or, like, logical empiricism to, like, his own, like, a Carnapianism in his own right, if that makes any sense whatsoever. And the movement can be described the general outline. So one more like an off bell, Wittgenstein, like Vienna circle party line kind of synthesis

going down. And then internal problems are revealed. We like, you know, uncover some fault lines within that. And Karnap tries to work through those with like early attempts at like axiomatics kind of similar to Hilbert uh and then out of that spawns like third his third one you know logical syntax the the you know his major accomplishment that for some reason I've never heard of before sorry Carnap um which uh the choice of coats uh um so starting with uh the you know this off about Wittgenstein like foundationalism um the Vienna circle really really liked Wittgenstein. I think I've read a story of them when they first met him. They thought he was insane. And then he talked to them for a while and they're like, we still

disagree with you, but you're pretty all right. But basically what they did with Wittgenstein, his tractatus specifically, was Kyrrhus described it as extending it upwards and downwards. Downwards in the sense where in the tractatus, Wittgenstein says, you know, the only things in the world are states of affairs and these states of affairs are made of atomic facts um isn't i don't think he's very clear within the text about what those are um but you know they can i mean the vienna circle were just like oh okay and this makes sense well you know that means uh you know observation claims perfect works perfectly well and um similarly it gives like a role to logic as derived from these observation claims so uh there's a quote i got it from the caris text again

I forget who it's quoting I think some commentator from the Vienna Circle but basically it's something called the the picture theory of language where all of our you know language like language itself is only meaningful insofar as it's like isomorphic with reality or something like that I'm a little hazy I'm speaking in generalities I'm not very familiar with Wittgenstein um but um there's also an element where they expend you know they extend it upwards towards um mathematics and logic generally um Keras calls it um tautologist tautologicism um where uh like logical truths are like trivially true so like mathematical

truths are truly true and we know them um like by virtue of just simple like experience like somehow there's like a specific structure of the world or something like that and then we you know i don't know again ascertain knowledge through observation or something like that let me pull up the text again but um those were that was the view um enjoyed it um there is some um um pardon me I mean, Carnap differs a little bit from this, but if you've, at least from Offbau, he's pretty similar. I mean, he hits along some similar notes to Wittgenstein, at least with the auto-psychological constitution system where we have these foundational given

that we then do quasi-analysis upon and construct larger structures of thought. So there were like, he revealed some fault lines within it, at least as Kharis portrayed it. So if language has like this isomorphic character, logic similarly, then what do we mean whenever the Vienna Circle or Carnap are saying that metaphysical discourse doesn't make any sense? I mean, it doesn't have any sense, pardon me, sense in like the technical term. um like um i uh in my my my annotation on this article i drew like a little stick figure like saying x is senseless and then x somehow is like saying yes i am um like they're they don't have a

um or at least at the time they didn't really have an explanation of this there's just kind of a fault line and i think um kara says that schlicht was just like okay yeah whatever uh And then Wittgenstein's own solution was actually like to kick the cherry out from under himself. And at the end of the track, he says, like, if you understand my points, then you'll know everything I've just said is senseless. And then he actually retired to become a school teacher for a bit. So some of the solutions. I don't think Carnap wasn't very satisfied with this. And then similarly, oh, I clicked on this again. um and then also um caris notes there's like a um part about like a hume i mean a human problem

causality like has problems with how science works generally like how do we derive scientific laws um from like a finite amount of observation claims which seems like a pretty textbook case of like um the philosophy of science but um apparently that was a very big problem for them according to curse um so what karnap tried to do um to escape these problems was um do as he did before which is like be very eclectic and just grab from everything around him um so this one for this new model he um started to take from tarski and hilbert tarski oh he didn't take from tarski and hilbert specifically um he took a lot of logicians um but he took from like this polish

i think polish american school i think paul tarsky was polish american and then uh hilbert which is a mathematic uh mathematics guy um who at least hilbert's i'm hilbert's the one i'm more familiar with where it was a attempt at reducing um like all euclidean geometry to a set of like axioms um and where um i think i think he said this but i could be confusing him with like uh some of the other quotes from the text where we can only discuss the relations between the axioms and the analytic truths that are generated from it not the axioms themselves. I think I you know as I noted there I think I have a little problem kind of grasping this. I mean it makes sense to me but I don't know the specifics are kind of flowing over my head that might just

be because I'm not the most used to this way of speaking but I really it's been really helpful because you know I always gesture to whatever I my current obsession is I really like how random understand stands like I don't know meta vocabularies where metalogic is or like meta mathematics are like describing the constraints or limits or what you have to do to even be able to perform like Euclidean geometry to begin with which I think is exactly what Hilbert might have been going for um and then this is very it was a good attempt for him really resonated with him because he also drew from um as we talked about before um like neocontianism

and conventionalism uh a la um like wehinger or um point cara um and then his own attempt i forget what the specific text of it was i think it was just a um um like a first draft or something like that where he tried to answer the question before of what is theoretical discourse to even begin with um and he like drew up um like truth tables and then said you know this meaningless this meaningless notation um it really is really just describing the bounds of these truth tables so whenever we are making theoretical discourse what we're really saying is in an imperfect you know way that we're just describing the bounds of of um acceptable logical discourse or what have you. But again, there were some problems. So this was really undergirded by Godel's first

incompleteness theorem, which I was having a lot of problems, like wrapping my head around. It seemed to me to be something along the lines of, we can conceive of like a some logical or mathematical proposition that can be untrue, but also unprovable. And then somehow this had implications for the like inconsistency within like mathematical schemes but again I was having a little bit and I tried to do some research on my own but it was kind of just hitting my head and then bouncing back off so but that was really a nail in the coffin for any sense not any sense any sense in a way but any attempt at trying to work out um try to make keep wittgenstein

or anything like that along um so this led him to um uh in his own autobiography accounts for um there being like a night where he's just like feverish and has like an ecstatic vision of the logical syntax um but he tries to he overcomes um godel's like incompleteness theorem um and I I think I misframed it there it's not really I mean there is a there is the um you know the the um the some tolerance right logical tolerance between logical systems right um but it's not necessarily like a freedom of choice it's more um I don't know I guess it's a freedom of choice we have a we have a all of our logical propositions or no logical axioms we

can choose are like arbitrary and then everything that falls for them is just a trivial analytic truth um so i quoted the the preface there um where he's just outlining from a logical syntax where he's just outlining um what what he thinks is the solution to um the problem like he completely breaks free of any like foundationalism what have you it's not that um logic somehow necessarily really arises from observation. Rather, it's a specific, it's like a choice. It's something we do, we act and put ourselves into. And further, we can describe it through the, you know, the advancements made with Hilbert or Tarski with describing it through like a meta logic in some sense. And then a problem, I was asking myself this, why can we do this? I quoted Sellers there

because it you know you have to quote sellers but um i think um we can do this at least within um carnap's reasoning is um one i think it better describes what logic actually is um it's never it's not like a situation where um i'm not i'm not the most familiar with with um with russell's uh like acquaintance theory or what have you but it seemed to me at least as was portrayed in this article that they, as I said before, seem to be able to think, seem to think that they are able to derive a certain logical form or structure from the world. And then it's then a question of exact representation of the world through this logical structure, which I

think Carnival is saying, well, this is misguided, a little wrongheaded. We can better answer these problems by trying to just saying that, you know, the axioms or postulates that we embrace and then work through, you know, the judgments we make and the entailments that follow are just something we actually do and we specifically choose rather than something like that is like, you know, given to us in any sense. And then a second point, he seems to be saying also that like this is already what's been done to begin with um it's just we've just been conceiving it in a different way um we've always um we're always engaging ourselves within um some certain set of

postulates and working through um like mathematics um we're working through you know um at least for me what some of the best parts of mathematics are whenever we accept some like stringent conditions and then just see how they you know play around and see how they go from there right um so by allowing us or just saying we like this is what we can do um it just opens up this really wide realm of possibility um and that's why i included the quote there um it's not necessarily i took it there that you know he's obviously making a quote about science but it's it's something very similar to what carnapp is asking i mean was carnapp is saying where um the logic of science is not one of like um exact like representations rather it's uh one of um

um i think the logical syntax like says it's it's the replacement of science with the logical science syntax of science or something like that but yeah that's what i got out of it um so here's the summary this that was the whole article that i what i got from it um just an outline uh so uh Karna originally towed the party line in a sense, not necessarily exactly. And then he started a break due to systematic problems. You know, how can we account for theoretical discourse? Also science, you know, science. Like what are scientific theories or laws, pardon me, what are scientific laws, right? And there doesn't seem to be a way to account for at least a scientific law as understood by scientists themselves rather than just like a collection of finite observation claims that we remember in the past

and just apply again um and then so you move to acumenics um he answered a you know meta vocabulary describing the limits of logic um and then it was brought down to incompletion theorems and then i really like this way of framing the last point at least as i understood it this change in logic was less it was it was a movement away from you know veracity or you know representation of logic or the world, which he seemed to think were just like trivial analytic truths. You know, A equals A is just like, oh, that just makes that, you know, that just follows the rules of logic to like an engineering problem. So like, what do we hope to even get out of this set of axioms and rules of inference, et cetera. And then a good way that I remembered it was something like how computer science deals

with like programming languages and they're how they're they're oriented around a specific goal which I mean I guess in that case would be like communicating human intention but each of them are all specifically designed to answer a specific problem and they're all how would I say this they are they're not they're not it's not a question of like oh is this programming language the correct. Just like, no, that doesn't make any sense. It's more like, does this do what I want it to do in the best way possible? Yeah, that is my presentation. Thank you so much. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you very much. Excellent.

a lot too uh too uh with with this article in your presentation um i mean uh we have a response but before that i noticed that gabriel is just where is gabriel by the way he's lurking in the attendees okay let this fine man in please as you wish It's not the kind of person who should learn, you should contribute to the class.

Okay, Gabriel is with us. Hello, sir. I wasn't prepared to appear on camera and I feel like I'm very, I basically just woke up so Yeah, you don't need to explain yourself. I'm very sorry for everyone that has to look at my face right now. Great to have you here. I'm sure that you can, don't worry, you're going to pay us by contributing to the class. Thank you, by the way, for suggesting those extra material.

So my friend, Enda, do you want to make a response? Yeah, sure. It won't be too long. I didn't do any sort of formal presentation. So I'm going to just basically kind of read from my notes. Sure. And yeah, first of all, thanks, Connor. That was really a great presentation and quite thorough as well. So I don't, I think most of my response is kind of questions for the text in general, and less so for your presentation, but maybe one or two things that, you know, my brain was a bit divided doing like the admin stuff and the paying attention to your presentation. so I might have missed some parts of it, but you know from what I got, you know these were some kind

of interesting side questions or ideas that might be relevant to what you were saying. So the first thing is just going back to why is Gödel's first theorem like an objection to the earlier I guess logical positivist or I forget the name that they've given to it now, but you know, this kind of program or tendency of thought. And I guess it's, for me, the way I understood it was that with Godel's first theorem, it's, this shows that there are undecidables for logic. It's not the, I believe it's the second part, which talks about the kind of incompleteness of the system or the inability of the system to incorporate itself. So it's just the kind of, the basic, the first step is like just the basic kind of incompleteness of a logical system.

And so as a consequence of this, it means that there's something that eludes the tractability of empirical description or reduction, leaving the door open still to metaphysics, because there's an incompleteness, then metaphysics can still step in and kind of speculate on what it is that's eluding this kind of construction, constructional system. And so that's why it's like a huge problem for that program, at least as far as I understand it. And then the second thing that was kind of interesting to me was just thinking along the lines of the relationship between early Wittgenstein and the Tractatus and the Vienna School. and this was like a kind of a side issue that came to me when I was doing the reading as well

was I guess thinking along the lines of what the relation is between the notion of object in the Tractatus and the Carnapian Erleb whether it's the object in the picture in the logical picture which is kind of an analog to the Erleb or whether it's the element of the of the logical picture given that the logical picture for Wittgenstein is like a represent a way that we represent facts to ourselves, which is, I guess, fact for Wittgenstein, I guess, like the logical structure as a kind of possibility space. So the reason that I was kind of interested in this question was like, I feel like there could be a metaphysical reading of Wittgenstein in which the object is,

you know, a facet of the world as a kind of time in mind independent sort of thing, or I guess the kind of logical positivist or empiricist kind of reading of Wittgenstein in which the object is an object in thought and then yeah so so I mean yeah I guess like this just kind of bears on the on the very general sort of treatment of objects and like Yeah, so I mean, actually, I'm not super resolved on this point, but maybe in the other in the other sort of questions that I had for the text in general, it will become a little bit more clear. So I guess I had two major questions, but they sort of break down into into little bits.

And so the first question that I had with this text was, you know, is the status of the in the alpha somewhat deprecated as we move to this kind of where it's a kind of gestalt of form or it's a kind of top down rendering. top-down rendering of strings rather than of objects themselves. So I don't know. I was thinking of an analogy here with, again, with Ernie Bittgenstein, who mentions links in a chain. And it seems like the shift is away from the individual components towards the ordering of the links. If I understand correctly, this is what the kind of shift involves. and so like in in Karnap sorry like in in this kind of uh shift to a more top-down um convention-based sort of idea of of the of the logical meta language uh and so yeah I was

kind of wondering what the consequences of this would be for the for the earlier idea of the as the elementary experience is this you know is the elementary experience now um somewhat kind of like is it latent in this kind of order or is that maintained in some sense as we move towards the logical syntax, like the Erleb as kind of object-based, but it just kind of has a different role in some way. And then I guess further whether this meta language that's being described here, whether this is somehow like prior to the elementary experience like is there you know is there a degree of givenness to that meta-language insofar as like he seems to ground it in conventions

um you know is is something more justified than the conventions in order to overcome this threat of of givenness and I guess this is a point that I um I think this this is a point I guess that was kind of like part of the second question that I had. You know, are we so yeah, I guess this was the second question, right? So like he there's a reference to an abandonment of the absolutism that seems to be the kind of motivating choice behind the logical syntax. He wants to get away from needing to find a prior justification. And this is like what what affords us the principle of tolerance. And so it's not really my view that this is the case but I just think an interesting question is whether in in giving up that

absolutism uh there is you know that there there is a giving away of too much such that we can we don't have anything kind of residual to make a decision uh about you know which conventions uh are good and which ones are not and I think I think that that's not really the case but I just wanted to ask it as a probing question I think that Connor sort of addressed this right like there's a there's a sort of well maybe there's there's a practical sense but you know does this then come back uh you know is this then something that the theory itself can give us any sort of resources to decide or does it come back to the the kind of um distinction between the laban and geist sense of philosophy right in which um uh like philosophy can sort of set negative limits

on the conditions under which we can sort of proceed with constructing a language, but doesn't give us any resources to be, to like, you know, generate those languages themselves. Like that's the role of science, sciences and like practices, I guess. I don't know if I've made it necessarily clear what my, what my question is here or what my issues are, but Yeah, if anyone wants to clarify them, I think it's easier to do that discussively than for me to sort of list them out. But yeah, those were kind of my two general questions, like one being about the kind of status of the Urleb in this shift towards the logical syntax. And secondly, you know, whether there is something, whether too much has given up with this abandonment of seeking justification for the original

like I don't know what to call it the original kind of departure I guess the point of departure you know that that he says are ultimately pointless squabbles so yeah that was that would be my sort of yeah that's my response basically thank you so much really great magnificent I mean this is not having a paper and delivering this is magnificent Okay, I have a few things. Gabriel, I'm sure, will have some stuff and he can't just wait to jump in. I think that one of the things that I really want to emphasize here is this legacy on

and science picturing for Vienna Circle and for Selois subsequently. But of course, with a great amount of repair, which I don't think that there are repairs in the sense that I think that whatever the main basics, the main basics of of Witkane science picturing, a lot of question of methodologic and the problem self-reference do in fact plague Célar's theory of picturing. But I don't want to talk about this too much.

Maybe we need to have just like a five minutes break and then we come back. essentially this is what we are going to do. Precisely because unexpectedly a lot of ground today was covered by Connor and maybe we should actually start. So many people don't know what Selar's idea of picturing is. I mean, our chief doctor who's a so-called right wing is going to talk a little bit of Sellars' account of picturing, right? And then it would

be great that any of you, Gabrielle also particularly, to see what is exactly in the interior picturing uh is that doesn't just go away and that's why i think that carna uh you know departure from the idea of earlier is a right one in my idea as as as a matter of factish atomic atomic facts uh atomic facts for which they can be made some observational sentences of this sort of that. And it's,

you know, and how from from self-reflect self-reference point of view, it ultimately runs into some serious problems. So that's one. Two, you know, the relinquishing of that sort of absolutism that you talked about. Then we come back to that, that I think is actually an even more complex issue. But let's do a step by step. First go with the heir lab, with Afghanistan's theory of picturing, Selaar's theory of picturing, see what is exactly in theory of picturing in both senses that rather seems or reeks of metaphysical, basically baloney.

It's that's that's something that we should investigate. Okay, five minutes, sharp, coming back. That was like a trailer for a good movie. I cannot wait for five minutes. Gabriel, would you please? Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Gabriel, is it Lukasiewicz, the Polish logician?

I mean, I confess the whole Polish circle of logicians is not my strong suit, I have very long to knowledge but yeah look as if it looks as a bit so or however it's pronounced is probably one of the like one of the like one of the main names of the one of the main names it was he was quite ahead of thinking like multiple true logics with more than two truth values and and all this stuff. So yeah, it was good. But on Felipe's comments about how task is shadowed, the whole progression, it is quite, it is quite, I'm not sure if it's on this paper. I've read it a couple of times, but it's been some time.

But it's probably in this paper where I would encourage comment that Guido was probably going to write an article. on the whole, on the impossibility of defining analytic proof in the same language, but this paper never came to be, and probably because Tarski had already written it some years before. So I believe it's in this paper, right? Or it kind of, yeah. Did Carnap actually, Carnap did went to Godel's main lecture and that was one of the main points. Yeah, yeah. There is, Carnap I believe, it's one of the first people to receive communication,

like private communication of this result and one of the main, and he apparently incentivized to make it public in the famous Königsberg conference, which is, I mean, it's got to appreciate the honesty of like, yes, please make public this result that basically trashes everything that we've been doing for quite some time. But yeah. So whenever everyone's ready.

Yeah, I think everyone's good. Okay. So, considering with the first question, the question of picturing, stars and pictures. You're going to essentially see, maybe, Gabriel, instead of going backward, we go forward and then we go backward again. Someone, Gabriel or anyone, Brian, any person, Lipe, anyone who can actually, Maria, can, in a sentence or two, say what Wittgenstein's idea of picturing is for everyone else.

So we want to kind of clarify these step by step from Wittgenstein's theory of picturing. Then we go to theory of picturing a la Seller, seeing what it is in common with Wittgenstein and what makes it different. And then we are going to come back, seeing how the critique of Bau can be also applied. I mean, sorry, critique of Bau and its extension, Wittgenstein's theory of picturing can be re-understood. So anyone with Wittgenstein's theory of picturing?

Well, I can try to poorly define it, but as far again, my knowledge is very limited but as far as i'm aware i believe at least insofar as it as it is presented in the tractatus the picture the picture theory of language of meaningful meaning is basically consists of the claim that or well not really a claim because nothing in the tractatus is actually a claim but yeah meaningful uh meaningful meaningful representation that's is the sharing of a structure but

structure is a somerfism between the the the objects and in their relation composing the like the the states of thing states of things in the world and the and the relate and the and this this okay let's reformulating i the objects in the relation and the relation share the same structure with the the elements of language and they relate and and has how they relate to themselves so basically isomorphism and uh loosely in a informal and informal sense of the

the world. Yes. And why it becomes a problem then that to talk about representations in picture theory of language or to talk about meaningful elementary facts right fall basically becomes victim to godel's incompleteness and self-reference problem essentially esteva audi and caris you know there's a

Sure, anyone? I just wanted to add that in Wittgenstein, picturing is necessarily related to the world as if the empirical world or the world out there. What we do in language is picturing the world. The problem arises from this understanding of what is pictured, if I understand correctly, in Wittgenstein's view, because then you cannot talk about language itself, because language itself is nothing in the world that we picture. So if we talk about language itself, we run to a transcendental limit that makes everything that we say in a syntactical way nonsensical. So Wittgenstein's interactive tries to say that anything philosophical about philosophy or anything linguistic about language is nonsense or

Because what we do is picturing, if I understand. OK, yes. And the same thing can be said about representation. Representation in a rudimentary sense, you know, I mean, we should really at this point understand that representation is different from conceptualization. We're talking about representation here when we come talking about theory of picturing. Gabriel, Brian, and Felipe. Yeah, you know, the reading stresses that the picture, Wittgenstein's picture, picturing theory is not cognitive, it's not psychological. So once you start talking about representation and whatnot, you kind of start getting a little closer to, well, cognitivism and psychology, you start wondering, are there some mechanisms of the mind that Wittgenstein, I guess, didn't really want any part of?

if you wanted something that, as the reading said, the Michael Demick quote, I can't remember it now. But yeah, there's a really good Michael Demick quote in there, Demick, that I guess at this point, and I can't think of it, I'm drawing a blank. But yeah, once you start talking about representationalism, you start getting closer to, I guess, what Carnap and the Vienna Circle wanted to do with Wittgenstein in terms of at least the downward sense to bring it back into cognition. Yes, I mean the whole idea of Ehrlichs, the givens and the constitution system, the method of quasi-analysis, right? Method of quasi-analysis shares strongly elements with theory of picturing

Ella Wittgenstein. What is quasi-analysis? People who didn't take the previous seminar, quasi-analysis is that, look, we go to elementary experiences, and these elementary experiences, precisely because they are the basic elements of our constitution system, right, they cannot be further decomposed in terms of meaning they cannot be decomposed into further components. So any sort of component talk that we are going to have about elementary experiences is going to start or be about the relations that these elementary experiences stand with

one another, namely first and foremost, similarity relations. hence the idea of quasi-analysis, rather than analysis par excellence. And yes, and this creates, already creates this whole idea of similarity relations as the starting point, as a main idea of quasi-analysis, has a lot to do with, you know, with, with kind of science theory of picturing, I mean, as the basic points of it. And of course, you can see that this is ultimately a very Kantian idea in terms of, because it's crea- it's basically tries to, it tries to

account for the intuitings, acts of intuitings, intuitings, intuition. You know, we have, when we are talking about intuition in the Kantian sense, we always have an act and object, right? So it always accounts for intuitings, acts of intuitings, by the objects, which are the intuiteds, and the relations that hold amongst them, right? That's just kind of Kant 101, and this is what Steve Aoudi I think rightly sees that that even though Wittgenstein is supposed to be you know kind of anti-Kantian but the theory of picturing ultimately coincides with basic

Kantianism theory of intuition so now we have now Wittgenstein's idea of picturing theory of picturing now let's hear about our chief doctor in house about uh cellars picturing because i know that uh is very good at this hi can you hear me yes sir Yeah, basically, you know, the, we talked about, you know, the Ganeshine's idea of picturing, but the rejection of picture, the Ganeshine on a picture relation in terms of some sort of

represented world, having some sort of rational or normative authority over our representing is rejected ultimately by Karnap and by Sellers and by Davidson, by Quine, by everyone basically but yeah but the the consequence of that is you ultimately lose the world because you know if if the world of facts or represented so uh uh claimables cannot have any kind of normative or rational authority over your conceptual systems therefore you will end up in some sort of Magdolian spinning in the void, in the void of concepts.

Icky! But what Sellers wants to do is that, yeah, to admit this, you know, this basic Carnapian and Kuanian idea that, you know, the wealth or the facts cannot be separated from our conceptual framework or basically you cannot have a concept scheme distinction that Davidson talks about, but at the same time, he wants to regain the world by another method, by a picturing that will not be with Ganeshteyn in that sense, that will not fall prey to the myth of the given, for example. So, but none of these but but but but you see how does it do that so our speech and precisely

the sound feature begins with the given in the Vienna circle and the with kind of sign in sense. So what is actually the non given components of it. interject. Got it. I think there's a very interesting metaphor or analogy that sellers uses that also Wittgenstein uses when talking about picturing, and that's the gramophone analogy. So the gramophone analogy is the reading of the record. Yes, that's just isomorphism. That's just isomorphism. Yes, yes, yes. You can think about the credit card, in fact, or a card key that you use for your hotel, you know, that basically unlocks certain sorts of relations, right?

Yeah, I was going to talk about, you know, in the previous seminar, I was defending ostention propa against karma. So I can say, you know, in some sort of Gibsonian ecological psychology, for example, when affordances of how organisms could have some sort of causal relation to the environment, to the world. In that sense, you know, I think you could defend some sort of picturing without big isomorphism that I'm not about, you know, but then but then that falls under the acts of early corner that any of this vague vocabulary, such as affordances that cannot be decomposed into a proper physical language is metaphysical bullshit. Sorry, because what is mapped is not but earlabs in this sense, what is pictured not

It's not ellipse anymore. What is pictured is the structure of the world. The world is not necessarily the reality here. The world can be anything. When we talk about gramophone, what is recorded is not necessarily something, every time something the same. The picture can be the picture of the structure of a theory, not necessarily a world. You know, and the world, it becomes discipline or ground discipline of the natural language. Nothing more in this sense. The word nothing is nothing. It's just the green discipline of natural language. It is what's natural language pictures. I think this is the way out of given. I don't know. Myth of the given, as I understand it. Well, it is not, I mean, yes, there are parts of it that actually are like that, but it is not entirely like this.

And most, I mean, we should understand that even if that is about language, okay, merely language, then it becomes even more seriously come with a collision, head-on collision with the problem of self-reference. meaning that then how can you actually verify or defend such a statement, picturing the statements within the language, within the language in which you inhabit. No, because you go outside the language isn't the whole point. But that is, but that is, but that is, but that is, but that is, but that is, but, yeah, but.

No, no, no, no, outside of language as chaotic, you go metalinguistic, you go, you go, you have a, you have a. I know, but that is not, but that is not, but that's, you're flash forwarding a lot here. That's not actually, that's a solution that he tries to do that. But in Afpau, we are actually dealing with this problem. yes yes essentially uh we are not going to talk about logical syntax and attempt at metal logic right now we want to hone out what the problem actually consists in gabrielle i can see that you say that something about outrageous right-wing scenarios and

propaganda okay go on now no no okay i'm not i'm put on the spot because the most that was just a throwaway joke and now that i actually sorry now that i'm actually going to speak i'm actually perhaps going to join i'm going to make a heel turn and join and try to defend the at least at least, well, not so much defend this, perhaps point out that, again, my knowledge of sellers is very limited, but sellers' notion of picturing, perhaps, I'm not sure if we can make sense of sellers' notion of picturing without flash-forwarding, because in a way, it seems that precisely

just to avoid the problems that abound within the tradition, the tractarian notion of picturing, sellers attempts to decouple picturing from cement, like from the, as picturing is no longer a foundation of meaning, of semantics, as a cement becomes inferential, and picturing picturing perhaps become become it seems to become something like something as a tool for the evaluation of the of the diachronic progression of of frameworks let us say but but then again this necessarily this necessarily demands that picturing be understood metalinguistic so i'm not

sure that we can make sense of Seller's notion of picturing. Without the other horn of the dilemma. Yeah, without getting into the later stuff, because otherwise we would be just criticizing the Tractarian notion of picturing, which of course we should criticize. essentially that that that chronic idea that how picturing uh uh basically plays a role in uh what you might call to be in the emergence of uh what you might call to be categories uh that would be just a fairly canteen a story well it's again i'm i'm mostly bullshitting my way

through because i have a very limited reading of sellers but i it seems that yes uh the cellars notion of fiction will necessarily met a meta linguistic one and insofar as it's and so far as it it intends to to ground our language in the world like to stop from our language from spinning in the void as the right-wing slurisants would like to claim it necessarily demands a pearson notion of that look the ultimate framework which perhaps we which we could eventually criticize but now we're getting off the topic of the class yes so i'm not sure but yeah so sorry so i'll finish i'll go back to being carnival now and say that so so uh i mean this is a question for all of you so uh

to what extent now we have uh opened the kind of worlds to what extent the problem of self-reference that they see it as a threat that their Vienna Circle sees it as a threat or a challenge to their adoption of Wittgensteinian's picturing can also be a threat for Szilardian picture. Let us not talk about here, I think that at this point As Gabriel would have said, we cannot talk about solarism picturing unless and until we are talking about the flash forward part of it, meaning attempt at metal logic, metal language, so on and so forth.

But let's just take it one step back and think about that. What is exactly in the project, in the challenge of self-reference, the problem of self-reference, that makes one, becomes a bugbear of Wittgensteinian theory of picturing, and do and two, does it have any significance or the same potency of problematization for Sellars theory of picturing? If yes, then what is it exactly at the core of theory of self-reference that renders it problematic for both?

If anyone is not interested in asking, I can try to answer. But I tend to talk a lot, so I wait for somebody else to answer. Everyone here usually talks a lot. I mean, people who don't talk a lot don't actually go to philosophy. So if that's okay. I think the problem with picture and the problem with self-reference, as Russell's puts it, is that when you say all things, the set of all things, or in a general sense, when you use, how do you say, universal quantification, then you go outside of empirical knowledge,

because you cannot say anything about all things. That's basically the empiricist view of it. So if you hold onto this empiricist view, as early Wittgenstein constructors does, the problem becomes that you cannot form law-like statements. But in cellars, I think there is this problem or this difficulty becomes somehow remedied by his actually account of picturing, because in his account of picturing, what is pictured,

as I said before, and as I understand it, it's very alpha-like actually. What is pictured? Is this structure, even in the language, when we picture the world? A structure at what level? A structure at what level? You see, you can't simply say a structure. When we are talking about a structure, remember, the project of Wafbau is a logical structure of the world. This logical structure of the world is not, it's being seeded by a constitution system. It is not the same as the basic element of the constitution system. Essentially, what we are dealing here with picturing are certain kind of rudimentary classes, qualitative relations, so on and so forth,

between elements, elementary experience. Is that picturing or is that pseudo-analysis? That is not exactly a structure in the sense that we are talking about. even within physicalistic language, then we have to explain why we say that this is, we call it a structure, picture, picturing, you know. It's hard to actually, I think this is something, a problem that I have coming across again and again it is hard to say um whether Carnap thinks of this as a structure

whether he thinks of it as what goes into a structuration logical structuration I don't think that it is it's not a platonic sense can you talk can you call it logos in a platonic sense Sorry? In a platonic sense, can you call it logos? No, it is not. No, no, no, no, absolutely. It's not logos. No, it's there. It's no, it is absolutely not logos. It's Iconus. Iconus and it's Iconus and what is the other one? Pistis. So essentially it's, this is very Carnapian thing. I mean, Karnat was extremely anti-Platonist, right, for the most part. But the thing is that when you become anti-Platonist, you most probably are actually doing the work of Plato because Platonists are anti-Platon.

in a very twisted way. The thing is that, look, the whole idea of chaos to the world, you know, our German oracle translated last session, it's about this. So chaos is what you might call to be the iconics in Plato's sense, fleeting shadows on the wall. These are kind of sense that are that basically they have no goddamn structure, literally none, right? The thing is that Plato, however, thinks that the reason that we can actually say that these are shadows on the wall, namely fleeting conflux

of sensation is precisely because we are always seeing them retroactively by way of a unity, the unity of a natural object, meaning relations that stands among these sensory data. And through that, we actually create something else. He tries to then goes on and saying that basically even the unity of the object as this kind of relations among the whole quality relations that hold among sensory data is itself being generated and enabled by something else, by something higher,

higher unity, higher home, that is called logos, namely relations among logical structures. So if the logos is such, as you put it, and in the thesis, if you remember, I'm sure you know that work outside in, but if you remember, so Christ, there's a scene, then the the the thesis says that yes knowledge is true opinion and true opinion is then what I say is what is true in the world I don't remember the English words for Tanao Sob but I'm sorry what I say proportion what I say is basically what is in the world

But the true opinion is that when I say you are, I don't know, you are Reza Nagaristani, if I am true, what I say is true opinion, if indeed you are Reza Nagaristani in the world. So what Socrates says that, okay, if we say only that, then there is no probability of error. One, either you know it or you don't know it. There is no error. But to remedy this problem, Socrates talks about logos, if I understand it, this is correct. And in the end, the formula for knowledge becomes true opinion plus logos. That is, in a Carnapian sense, probability one and probability two. That's my understanding. I know

it is very parochial and for somebody that doesn't have knowledge of historical history of philosophy. But I think it's very, very, very related to each other, because one is true opinion. And true opinion is just the frequency of empirical knowledge in the world. It doesn't have any logos. And logos is the analytic, the logical analytic, as Karna puts. I'm sorry, I'm fast forwarding. So I think there is something, as you put it, very familiar in this, and in the both reports of accounts of Plato in the thesis of knowledge and this problem of the circularity of justified just justification of knowledge because in the end it becomes knowledge is what is

knowledge something if not is what knowledge is what is true knowledge. Socrates is disgusted with himself because at the end they come to this answer and this is a beautiful answer actually. Anyway, I'm going on and on. Sorry. But I think, yes, there's something in that. I probably want to look at some of the stuff. Thank you so much, Armo. I think Felipe also had a question. Yes, please. Nothing special. I really wanted to ask you guys to maybe fall back because I'm feeling a little bit lost. Sure. Absolutely. Absolutely. okay let us know where exactly you felt

that you're losing the thread of the arguments my apologies if we are too much this all sounds lovely but I think I got lost when all of a sudden sellers came up and I didn't I'm not yet familiar with the majority of Seller's work and I think I didn't grasp Gilshad's interpretation of what may be Seller's notion of picturing. So yeah, from that way back in the conversation. I'm sorry if this creates a lot of... Gilshad, would you be able to clarify two sentences max?

This is your chance to champion right-wing Solaresianism. Okay, instead of distinguishes between the space of reasons and the realm of law, he says that in the space of reasons, all the talk of facts, representations, whatever, all of them are where you are already in the space of justification and knowledge and truth. But if you are only concentrated on that, as for example, as Karna does, as Reza does, you will lose the world. But Selah wants to regain the world in another way.

In another word, he wants to have a friction. He wants to have a way that the world could concern us without being a representationalist. If that makes sense. So picturing, you could define, I don't think you should be called a right-wing Szilardian if you just defend picturing. I think picturing is, any pragmatist, for example, without being a right-wing Szilardian could defend picturing without being a right-wing Szilardian. Picturing is, for sellers, just the way to regain the world, for the world to have a constraint, to have a friction with your thought and language, in the sense that your language and thought could not be, should not be some sort of free floating, I don't know, Popperian Third World,

that the world could not have any constraint on it. My, my, my, my retort to this, sorry, no, no, no, please, please, Gabriel, you go, you go, you go, you go. No, just, just to, I was going to attempt a, a, I was going to ask Durshad to, to see if I, and it was quite illuminating for me. I'm also very limited, with very limited knowledge of the notion of picturing. And so I'm trying to, I was going to propose a, like once, and even a perhaps not necessarily simplified one sentence summary. I was going to ask Dusha if it was correct.

perhaps it would also help Philippe, which seems to be in a similar situation as mine. Picturing, Selaars and picturing tries to, having the couple meaning from a, from a, from a, from a zomorphism between the logical structure and the ontic structure, whatever it is. Seller's proposed picturing as a perhaps an isomorphism but an isomorphism between the world and language both understood as causal structures, as like as spatial temporal phenomena,

like literally a correlation between the world and language, not as language, but language as an object within the world itself. And to try to not as a foundation of meaning, but simply as a, like I said, like Dushat said, as a way to perhaps eventually bridge the language as a causal structure and the language as a logical structure. Would this be- Gabriel, how much do you think, and this is a question for all of you. So essentially we have a certain source of minimal syntax at the level of picturing, like this next to that,

you know, kind of pre-conceptual or proto-conceptual sorts of relations among the components of picturing, right? of picturing, right? So one of the, how, when we are talking about this sort of syntax, how can it not be another basically victim of the self-reference? Meaning that how can you verify this sorts of rudimentary relations obtained among picturings without assuming too much about the syntax of language, the problem of self-reference? How can, how can

you verify if you are inhabiting them? Right? The critique of transcendental structure strikes flag here. Gabriel, you want to say something? Oh, no, I wouldn't. I wouldn't dare. I think Connor had a hand. Yeah. Yes. What would be the problem here with just adopting like a fully conventionalist view within this regard here it'd be like the the um i'm not sure if that made any sense i think yeah that would be that would be the carnappian position i'd say at least at least and so as at least at least in the logical set after the methodological the that is i call

it i like to call the methodological revolution which is precisely the abandonment of the absolutism of the alpha it is it is it is simple well like i believe but i believe dilsad would be the one to answer that to answer this one because here's the one that is like but but just to i'm not sure how how far carl of actually takes a conventionalist view uh precisely because uh yeah maybe at the beginning of off or even not enough of basically in the early wars that lead to off Yes, he's purely conventionalist in the technical sense of conventionalism, Hugo Dingler's conventionalism, which was extremely popular back then when he wrote Aufbau. But I'm not sure about

this. No, not in the Aufbau, sorry. Then I wasn't clear. In the Aufbau, I wouldn't call the position in the alpha a position like like a full-fledged conventionalism and yes okay good good i meant i meant after it precisely because in the alpha there is still there is this there is still an attempt to do epistemology i think if i but then the conventionalism that he uses post of wow it is not properly conventionalism either you see why it's not conventionalism because conventionalism is about rules, established rules. Attempt at methodological. Nelson Goodman would have said that this is not really playing under established rules. This is

what actually Karnav wants to do, to show that we don't have essentially... Any of you have read He read Aino Kaila's critique. Critique of? Critique of Alphabau. I've not read itself, but as I understand, he claims that in the Alphabau there is no room for statistical inference and all sorts of... Yeah, the probability, yes. And you see, this is, I think, we are going to talk about this, but it's a really complex one. Eino Kaila was this, I think, Finnish, right? I think Eino is a Finnish name, right? So he was a Finnish philosopher who during the reign of,

fascist reign of non-rationalist Carnapians, provided the critiques of their agenda. It was extremely well taken by the Vienna Circle people. themselves. One of the things it was this idea that Luke, for example, let me just, without going through the probability statistic discussions, which by the way, it's, we are going to talk about it with regard to the foundations of logical probability. But he provided this idea that can be formulated simply like this, that in terms of probability, you think that

you have this sort of experience, but this experience is actually a subset of other probability for having other sorts of experiences. How are you going to account for this philosophically? Right. So the idea of metal language, metal logic was a tool, was a solution or resolution to actually account for diverse source of experiences.

This is quite, I think, in line with the transcendental critique, sorry, with the critique of the established transcendental structures, allocants, meaning that if you are in certain sorts of correlation with the world, if you are inhabiting a certain intuitings, acts of intuitions, then most probably if you don't have an extra layer, a meta level, and he of course defines it in terms of probability, then you most probably can't actually talk

soundly about the sort of statements you produce within that that linguistic or intuiting world or picturing world so on and so forth this is this is something that we will talk about this but if you can actually search a little bit about uh a new kailas it's called logic of neo-positivism right can we have is it that i think the title is a logic of no positivism. Well, I will try to look for it. I've only seen it referenced. I've never seen it like the actual text,

but I will try to look for it and post on chat. I just put it in the chat. I'm pretty sure that this critique was referenced also in the paper we just sent for this class. So it should be like, we can track it down through that. Yes. So there are all these sorts of problems that are plaguing Afbau, but also the anti-Afbau stances. And then coming back, there is another thing. remember we talked about that coming from a tradition that tries to bridge the gap between

Leben and Geist life and spirit life and mind I don't know how many of you were taking my class on the problem of evil and stuff I don't know So I briefly mentioned Ludwig Klegas. Ludwig Klegas was an extremely influential philosopher, right? Highly romantic, highly critical of rationality, meaning not merely on a technical ground, but that on a social, cultural, ethical ground,

he thought that rationality is always leads to basically the source of, you know, kind of questionable ideas, right? Politically, culturally, so on and so forth. So Kligis wrote this book called Mind as the Adversary of Life or Soul. I can't, I mean, consulting with our German Oracle at this point. One second. I think I found it.

Did you find it? Yeah, I found a German it's called Der Geist als Widersache der Seele That sounds very sinister. Go on Sophie. It's also like soul. What did you say is the English one? Soul or life. Like Zoe in Greek. Yes. Yeah. Yes. So, so he basically is like one of the top romantic romanticist philosophers of his age, right? And he tirelessly fights against Novocantians and Vienna Circle, early Vienna Circle, the

seeds of the germs of Vienna Circle. The thing is that we should understand that this is, this is, this is, all of this stuff about picturing come from this very specific historical moment in the history of philosophy. Late 19th century, early 20th century, where basically you should, you shouldn't ever dismiss the political atmosphere, the impact of the political atmosphere on the evolution of the history of philosophy. So the thing is that we should understand one thing. So, Calagas on the

paper sounds like today's post-structuralist. I'm not going to talk about them. Some people also actually take side with the embodied mind and the stuff against rationalism. And essentially, this is the main point that Vienna Circle, during the rise of fascism, saw that all these people were part of this romantic movement that were basically endorsing life over rationality, endorsing soul over spirit, were becoming the fascists of the

New Age. Noorad gave a warning lecture about this. It was too late. So you should understand that when I mentioned that Vienna Circle is fundamentally political at its base, even though it appears to be apolitical, this was a fundamental break away from the irrationalism and romanticism that they saw coming and contributing to the fascist youth before the rise of Hitler. This is really interesting.

You see, I think that Karnap was right. And we are seeing the same kind of stuff today. Of course, Karnap fundamentally, as he became mature and he tried to find new allies, he dropped some of this basically super rationalist mind over soul kind of stuff, but rather start to bridge the two. But he always understood that people who fetishize soul or life over mind or spirit, that creates a situation that unfortunately leads to some extremely shady political agendas

questions and stuff and my apologies i have for some reason been uh drinking water too much i think that i have to have a refreshment but let's first hear some ideas because obviously we want to what we are going to do throughout this course is to make sure that people understand that the idea of enlightenment

is not politically neutral there is no neutrality about the project of enlightenment and so as a project Are you implying that in some way Zeller's picturing in its naturalistic tones are in some way also politically inclined? Maybe I should reformulate what I just said. I actually would say that any source of thinking about your place in the world has some political consequences, maybe not in your time,

but later. And then you can see that who are actually the right-wing Salarsians. I'm not talking about Dilshad. Dilshad is a good friend of us. He's lovely. Look at him. He's handsome, he's a doctor, he helps people. But I'm talking about some other people. Like Ruth Milliken, you know, people who are actually far, basically, feeling great with liberalists, neoliberalists, they think that, you know, this is all good, great, you know, that sort of stuff. Look, I mean, we are not going to talk about

that everyone who endorses some sort of methodological idea will end up burning in some political hell, right? That's just cliche. That's just stupid. But the thing is that think about this. Why is that? Certain kind the strains of thought, if being entertained too much, will lead to certain sorts of shady consequences. Think about Nick Land. He's a good example. Isn't he Deleuzean? Oh, materialism is good. Excess. Oh, magnificent. Materialism, Deleuze, rhizomes and stuff. These are all good.

But then you see that people say that, oh, Nick Land just changed after a while and became something else. No, if you read his thirst for annihilation, you see where this is headed. You see where this is headed. This doesn't mean that it's inevitable. You know, he could be less of an asshole, but unfortunately he became more of an asshole than we could predict. Okay, my apologies. Let's two minutes, three minutes, we come back.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

My sincere apologies. So can I, I know probably everyone's not back yet, but anyway, this is just kind of a a clarificatory thing more than anything else um it's it it feels to me like what you're saying in this previous point was that there's a certain like water tightness to the way in which somebody like Carnap and the logical empiricists will approach philosophy that doesn't allow for this

kind of um you know like you open the door and all the demons rush in and you become a fascist whatever. And I'm just wondering, you know, what is it specifically that is the guarantor of, you know... There is not a guarantor, it's a threshold, it's a threshold problem. I think it's a threshold problem. And the thing is that, you see, pragmatists like John Dewey, Peirce, Brandome and stuff are trying to essentially pragmatism is a certain source of you know kind of philosophy that tries to avoid the the nasty political consequences of separating

spirit from life, right? Theory and practice ultimately. But the thing is that, of course, that also, when you see it, leads to certain kinds of confusion. So Karnoff actually in his later life points out with regard to the, you know, this aligning distinction between theory and practice. And we see it, for example, with Brando and so many people that it created a certain source of respectable liberalism. So this is exactly what was motivating my question, actually, because I always find this like the most like objectionable part of what I read in Brando is this Whiggish

kind of conception of history. Yes. But to be honest with you, I think I have said this before. Right. Did I talk about this Ray Brasier? Yeah. I think so, but maybe, yeah. Yeah, for those people who don't know about this, so Ray had this talk about Brandon hosted by a friend of ours named Nathan Brown. Nathan is a very good guy. He's very left, he's far left. And he hates Brandon and all these kinds of stuff. And so Ray gave his things and Nathan, you know, we know that far leftists are a little bit macho when they are coming with criticism.

So he's coming, bringing the hammer down. This is just bourgeoisie. What are you doing here? And stuff. It's just like extremely hostile. And Ray's just sitting down and he just calmly says that, I think a smart liberal is preferable to a stupid Marxist. And that just like kills it ultimately. And I think, to be honest with you, yes, but we should understand that people like Pippin, Robert Pippen, Brandl are smart liberals. We can learn so much from them, in fact. I'm absolutely not disputing this, but it's just, you know,

Yes, but whatever, unless they remain in the ambit of liberal politics. Absolutely, yes. There is no question about it. The thing is that, however, So you have three choices, most probably. One, a sort of materialist living philosophy that basically Murat warns against that it sounds good on paper, but people who follow it ultimately becomes, they develop an irrationalist impulse. That irrationalist impulse has extremely adverse political consequences. And this was a lesson that they learned from the time in which they

were living, right? The 1930s in Germany. And then there is this kind of what Delschart, thinks that I belong to, you know, the super rational fool King Plato, so on and so forth, which I, I'm not really belong to this camp, but I actually have quite respect for it, philosophical respect for it. I don't think that it can simply be ejected out of the equation. I think that it should be ameliorated, but ameliorated in a sense that it doesn't lead to that sub opera of pragmatism, political

sub opera of pragmatism in the United States. That's basically my philosophical inclination. Yes. um i don't know if this is our topic um but um how would um brandon be considered like um whiggish in a sense because at least as i understand well sorry my mom's a lawyer and she's made it very clear about how to speak to not uh take upon yourself responsibility so instead of saying i assume you say it's to my understanding it's to my understanding that um at least for brandon it's like a qualified wigism if that makes any sense where it's like

um you like um do you like some sort of genie uh the the the metaphor of um or the analogy of uh the common law system where you sorry it just works so well i've been i've been trained my entire life to like uh yeah the wiggishness of brandon is fundamentally conceptual it's not But in the sense that, you know, the idea of conception and transformation, right? So he tries to hone out the core marsh of a spirit, right? By not turning it into some sort of teleological story about the... is basically Brandon doesn't want to tell a story about Geist.

He wants to show what Geist is composed of and by virtue of its essential composition, how it has these sorts of behaviors throughout history and not others. rather than just saying that, oh, you know, you become a, you know, the, the, the, basically the ultimate, uh, uh, points of a spirit is absolute knowledge in the, in the Hegelian sense. He might be, well, but the thing is that he wants to make this point that this whole idea of vacillation or pendulum movement, dialectical movement between conception and transformation,

self-conception and self-transformation, has concrete consequences in thought and in practice. And by virtue of which, he wants to say that the Wiggish story, not Wiggish story, the principle of Wiggish historicity can be recovered, can be recuperated, but not within the grand narrative of the British history. And Reza, what do you make of

Dutil Nevaish has also got this critique of Brandom? In a sense, he seems to hold that those practices or the kind of way in which that can be accessed is something that's already latent within practice. rather than something that has to be, I guess, going back to what we're discussing here, constructed in a way or, I mean, I have to look back over the paper to get the specifics of her argument. Yeah, I think that's an interesting thing. I mean, Brandon seems to, of course, Brandon, in between saying and doing, in making it explicit, he obviously, as a pragmatist,

make this idea that so we have some know what's and some of the know what's are actually composed of know how's, right? Some sort of theoretical vocabularies that we can put forward actually requires certain kinds of practices, right? So it's not going against that kind of stuff. It just, however, is very careful to not saying that every theory or every theoretical plane can be decomposed to practices. Meaning that I think that this comes back again to Plato. is making the classic philosophical move that even though he distinguished episteme from techne,

you know, no what's from no how's, he admits that there is a more complex reciprocation among these two. And I love Katarina's work, but I think that she's jumping the gun. She's a little bit... I don't want to say this, but I think that she's becoming a little bit too cozy with the sorts of of softening real hard issues of philosophy for political agendas that she holds.

This is actually quite clear with her article about Sally Haslanger on ameliorative reason and Carnap. She's super bright, magnificent thinker. But yeah, I just not feeling comfortable when a philosopher or a thinker tries to opportunistically censor a lot of details that goes into these sorts of systems like brandoms, for example. And we know that Brando is just thinking about different angles and then kind of like make sure that her critique fits nicely and neatly to her source of political claim at the end of the road.

No, I don't want this. That's not the task of philosophy. I mean, the task of philosophy is to destabilize our entrenched political ideas rather the other way around. Thoughts, questions before I move forward? We have been diverging a little bit, but that's, I think these are great because precisely they give us a little bit of a, you know, background ideas as what we are dealing with,

with Kana, the shift in his philosophy that coincides with the shift in his politics, or not shift, but rather explicitation and explication of his politics, and ultimately what is the worth of Enlightenment project? Please. Anyone. People who have been silent so far. Sebastian, Cassia, Maria, Zenobio, I mean, Sophie,

Yeah, I have a question. It's kind of maybe, yeah, let's grab it. My apologies, who's talking? Me, Zenobbio. Zenobbio, thank you so much. Do you think Carnap and the Vienna Circle in general is closer to the Enlightenment project within the idea that he starts to construct in the logical syntax of language, this idea of the knowledge being kind of pluralistic and kind of the different logics,

or is instead of it is more further and the alpha value is kind of more closer to the enlightenment because they have a foundational structure. That's a very good question. That's very good question. Please let me know if my reformulation of your question is utterly off. Interrupt me, whatever you want. If I'm not mistaken, you are saying that, so in Auffbau, we have a certain sort of foundationalist project. That foundationalist project is precisely the movement from chaos of sensations to an orderly world, right?

The world. And precisely because of this foundationalist trajectory, this seems to be more in line with the project of enlightenment as we know the project of enlightenment, right? Then there is what you might call to be a methodological, methodological and methodological sort of pluralism that characterizes the later works of Carnap, whereby the principle of tolerance takes the first seat. But precisely because it does not work at the level of foundations,

maybe it is not really quite conducive to the classical idea of enlightenment. I say that, yes. And this is precisely the move from Enlightenment, Enlightenment version one, in the sense of ordering, right, from chaos to order, from chaos to wealth, to an enlightenment where the means of ordering can be reclaimed and negotiated, the principle of tolerance, explication, conceptual engineering, so on and so forth.

That is the new version of enlightenment. Seize the means of ordering the world, re-engineering the structure of the world. I think Cassia has a question. Hi. I have a question about how we can handle with the structure of meta languages in the sense that I think in the metalogic, Carlos wrote about it in the article that we read, that in the metalogic, the solution that Carnap presents is the methods of arithmetization of Godot.

do. But it is seen as a problem after and but the idea of a metalanguage still has a central relevance to the to the rest of Carnap's work to the end. But it seems to present like a practical problem of that Wittgenstein already wrote about that we have to infinitely construct meta-languages and meta-languages to account for the meta-languages below as object language. The method of arithmetization of Goethe is presented as a solution because it kind of collapses

this hierarchy of meta-languages. But after, it's not clear to me how this question of the interrelations between metalanguages is understood by Carnap? Castillo, again, let me try to retell what you said. And I'm merely doing it for myself. Please do interrupt me if I'm talking bullshit. Reza, that's not what I said. Are you saying so? So essentially, the ultimate question is that, OK, we are not actually talking

about whether meta language should be there or not, but rather the problem of meta language itself. That essentially, once you open the door for meta language, you open the door for meta languages, a hierarchy of meta languages. Meaning that so you feel that, oh, shit. I didn't want all of this. The thing is that that's a very good question. Hard to say what Carnac would have talked about this. But I think it's kind of clear that the question of metta language or meta-languages coincides with the question of enlightenment in the sense of

explication, as Carol says, meaning that it's an engineering problem, meaning that you have to move from one level to another constantly, and you have to renormalize, meaning bridge the lower level to the second level of conceptual or metalogic one metalogic two so on so forth and that is the task of enlightenment because there is no ultimate metalanguage the engineering of metalanguages is the very point of enlightenment that i would say by way of metaphor as nelson goodman's critique of witgenstein that where it takes sides with

corner implicitly is a difference between acting within the realm of a game and acting within the realm of play. Game is where your rules are already established. Play is the realm in which you can introduce new rules. That is enlightenment par excellence. Can I add an even more fun analogy to this beautiful analogy? Yes, I thought you are going to hit your head. Oh yes, yes. I don't know how many of the people presence here have played D&D, I'm sure a good percentage of them.

What is D&D? Dungeons and Dragons. Oh yeah, which one? role-playing any any any role-playing game so if you role-play game if you're role-playing a game if you're a bad player you do meta you always do meta you go outside of the game and anybody hits you on the head that you're a bad player and they wouldn't invite you to the game afterwards because you you ruin the game for them because you meta in the game you have all roles that are established by the game master. But when you meta and say to game master, oh, no, you're mistaking. You don't need to roll the dice for this. I have this attribute. You don't need to roll the dice. And no, everybody's on your face that, no, shut up. You're doing meta.

Be on your roll and play the game. So as you said, the doing, the work, or the method of mettaing, do the meta, is the enlightenment, not necessarily any metal, particular metalanguage that can have there's some mystery, mystic power of explanation. No, the move from language to metalanguage and justification of this move is the beauty of enlightenment. For once and an hour, get rid of all the game masters. That's a great one. But hey, I'm going to say that Arman actually stole finally the cup of nerdom from me.

I'm not the ultimate nerd in this room anymore. Please, anyone. I have a question. um when i was reading the the article i was trying to pull back you know see the uh the forest rather than the trees and um i guess just try to get an idea a general sense of the the movements um over over car naps uh well thinking and i was and i was trying to figure out how to pinpoint that exactly and i think the best thing i could muster was in terms of thinking about the picturing theory as foundationalism that justifies statements, you know, by way, as we said, of an isomorphism

between world and language. And then I thought of the meta-logic as a kind of co-presentation in that it justified, again, the game is all about justification, and it justified by way of these, well, just different languages that mutually supported one another. And then I thought of the final move towards, you know, the semantic period, the tolerant period, the, I guess, what will go on to become the conceptual engineering period, the explication period, as just a rejection of justification itself, or maybe not a rejection of it, maybe just not so much of an emphasis on it. And that's how I understood the movements throughout the paper,

and in the big scheme. And I guess what I'm getting at, what I'm wondering, what I'm asking is, you know, can we think of this as a movement from foundationalism to coherentism and then to just less of a focus on justification and for, you know, this explosion of potential and I guess the ocean, right, at the end of the day? Yes, yes. No, absolutely. But the thing is that, Brian, you really think that picture theory of course we have now two picture theories sellers and wittgenstein do you really think the picture theory is foundationalist uh in a in a in a coherent sense uh because usually

when we are saying foundationalism we are committing a certain kind of correlationism Right. But the thing is that, for example, with regard to picture theory, it's that there are certain kinds of correspondences, there are certain source of relations standing amongst such what you might call to be acts of representing or in the realm of language, for which we can probably find an isomorphic relations among

the furniture of the world. Do you really think that this is, I mean, this is, no, I'm not criticizing, I'm just asking this question. Do you really think that this amounts to foundationalism? i think it can be read that way i mean i'm not um i imagine it can be read in a whole bunch of ways i mean i guess and to be carnappian about it uh there's probably quite a bit we can do with the language of picturing theory uh yeah yeah might be um a foundation what is it what is the nature of foundationalism what is exactly the nature of foundationalism my just my experience with reading about it comes from uh philosophy of science and the demarcation problem and thinking

about ultimately how we justify um our statements be they um you know what is the grounds upon which we justify our statements could they be you know in terms of like givenness could they be in terms of some kind of conceptual order or something some kind of preconditions of experience etc etc so that's i mean that's just the way that that i grasp uh the reading and if that's not the you know accurate well i'll be on all years i'd love to uh to hear what you but isn't it the fact that foundationalism is foundational precisely because certain components within the foundation cannot be changed or immutable. Yeah, but then I would, I think that would be true.

But then I would also imagine someone could, somebody who believes in picturing as foundationalism could say something like the picture or the language, let's say, and the world has some kind of immutable shared structure. Doesn't mean that every, that there couldn't be different pictures, but any- Well, of course, part of would say that that's just metaphysical statement that is unwarranted, right? Sure. Is that question for Maria? Sorry, can I just ask a brief, very brief question about the discussion that was going on? That is what we try to answer. Is this the question that we try to answer the last point? I'm not sure. There's quite a few points going around.

No, no, no. Sorry. You just said that foundationalism, in foundationalism, picturing can be read as a foundation as foundationalism because we can see in the world immutable structures that aren't changing. And Reza said that it is the metaphysical presupposition that Carnap would deny, as I understand it correctly. That is also somehow the myth of the given. That is that there is no immutable structure in the world we cannot say that yeah i'm not saying there is one in the world i'm not i understand i'm saying that um this is this is this the answer that the project tries to come up with i don't know if i'm clear sorry i mean i'm not entirely

sure if that's what um car nap was trying to do uh yeah i'm not sure i'm sorry Let's go to Maria for now. Yeah, I was reading Kyrus and he wrote that at some point in history, the understanding of the isomorphism as it would be relevant for this discussion became three words. The first layer was think, then conceptualization, then language. But as far as I understood by William Tractatus and Wittgenstein, he got rid of the conceptualization because for him perfect language meant a concept. But these two questions are might be considered a bit different. An isomorphic concept of a thing, it might be a representation by picture or by

something extra linguistic and Maria, Maria, would you, you got caught off on my end, at your last sentence, would you be able to repeat it? My apologies. Starting from Wittgenstein? Yes, yes, go on. Wittgenstein, as far as I understood from Wittgenstein, he didn't have this layer of concept, because for him perfect language meant perfect concept. But if we depart from Wittgenstein, we see that there might be two different questions. A perfect concept or perfect representation of a thing might be a photo. The photo is not a language. And an isomorphic representation of a thing in the world might be linguistic. So the thing is that meta-language

does not equal conceptualization. So can we say that we may get rid of the concept of this thinking person triangle concept thing and word and why jesus maria what sort of question is that this is actually superbly hard magnificent question okay um There are a lot of things to be unpacked here. I'm not going to do all the work. I'm going to outsource it to the students

and our great thinkers. The first thing is that, obviously, it's not conceptualization. But you see, the idea of attempt at methodologic, right, which is basically before, it's a name of title of an essay before he wrote the logical syntax of language. And methodologic meaning moving from the game to play from the established rules of language to playing. uh with those playing in the sense of introducing new rules that can account for the kind of rules

that we are already using or inhabiting that is not essentially conceptualization but later we will talk about this that amounts it becomes a platform for a philosophical platform or theoretical platform for Carnap later's idea of explication. What is explication? Meaning that we have certain kinds of concepts by virtue of inhabiting a certain source of logical syntax of language or language or excellence or their language most probably, right? So we are talking about the world and our parts

within it using such concepts. So are we going to ever change these concepts such that they cannot be understood as given elements of our ways of addressing our part and the world ourselves within the world obviously for you to do that you need to develop a meta language a different system within which the concepts that you have already admitted as entrenched

concepts of talking about the furniture of the world can be renewed, re-engineered according to a different logical syntax that is more presents, enriched, and ultimately it can include your current concept but also lead to the creation of new concepts you couldn't ever have

if you were only inhabiting the old linguistic realm or conceptualization realm. So that is essentially the points of methodologic, as we will talk about it, conceptual engineering. Not conceptual amelioration, but conceptual engineering. It's not that we are going to refine our existing concepts. Sometimes our concepts just end up, if you squeeze them too much with regard to the furniture of the world, they just get crushed, just like toys. The best way to test a toy is to play with it in the real world.

once it shatters upon the wall of reality, you need a new toy, a better toy. And the same thing can be said about the concepts. So it is not the point that we can always go with this idea of ameliorating, refining our existing concepts. Sometimes we have to engineer new concepts. But how can you engineer new concepts if you are already inhabiting within a structure of syntax, syntax of language, logical syntax, within which only certain sort of concepts can be made and not others.

So this is the whole idea. Some conceptual engineering comes hand in hand with the engineering of metalanguages. I could interject for a second here. David Chalmers has a paper that he published a couple of years ago. It was titled something to the effect of what is conceptual engineering and what should it be? Something like that. And he comes up with this distinction between conceptual re-engineering, which would be like Sally Hasslinger's amelioration projects, and then de novo engineering, which would be the creation of a new concept. And paper doesn't go into immense detail, but it concerns that demarcation or that dualism,

those two options. And it might be useful if anybody's curious. Yes. Thank you so much for bringing it. I have a little bit of a complicated relation with David Chandler's. But there are also great other essays. I will try to find. Actually, there is a magnificent YouTube lecture on this idea that why conceptual engineering requires the attempt at the meta-logic, meaning engineering meta-languages. It's not simply the idea that you are refining concepts, right? But rather,

the idea of to engineer concepts requires engineering or attempt at the methodological or method languages. Is that Kevin Sharp? I don't know. Maybe. It's been a while. So, my dear friend, Estaf Eckling, we are still very, very behind. But no, I think that as long as we can actually clarify some of these main issues before we get into the real nitty-gritty stuff, it's good. It's good.

I still feel a little bit hung up on this question of like, and I'm not really sure what the best way to formulate it is, but whether this kind of, whether Carnap is treating the role of philosophy as not possessing the tools to be able to give justification for, you know, positive, sort of the positive aspect of what these different concepts would be. Rather, he is kind of saying that philosophy does the groundwork of like negating what they shouldn't be in a sense is this like am I off the mark here in this understanding of what it's what what this

metal language is about or no metal language is essentially what you might call to be comes back to the idea that representations statements concepts made within a particular transcendental structure. Canonical Kantian, basically no Kantian. I should actually talk about this. I think probably I have already that even though Karnap basically divorces from many of no Kantian's occupations that he held when writing of Baou with regard to the role of epistemology and so

on and so forth experience and stuff but I think that there are elements of no Kantianism that he does in fact endorse toward the end of his life all the time what is that it's essentially no Kantianist critique of Kantian's transcendental structures that if you are inhabiting certain sort of transcendental structure let's say categories or ways transcendental aesthetics meaning organ the organ the organizing role of representations of space and time how do you actually think that or maybe better question would be can you even imagine a new

experience essentially no can't even try to say that you can't as long as you are inhabiting those certain transcendental structures and language is one of them, right? You can't imagine a new experience. And to do that, you need to change the way we structure experience par excellence. And that comes with the attempt at method logic. The attempt at methodologic ultimately is an attempt at renewing experience, part of the project of enlightenment, new enlightenment.

Whereas the old enlightenment was to make sure that experience becomes critical of itself, how it approaches itself within the world. new enlightenment, ala karna, pos afbhau, is that to create a new experience within which we can actually talk about or criticize the sort of way we were approaching ourselves in the world, but it was not obvious to us

within the ambits of the previous paradigm of experience. This becomes extremely the underlying motif of Carnap's most technical word, logical foundations of probability, when he talks about a machine, an AI that can do that. But I'm not going to flash forward we have flash forward a lot today what do you want to read next please go on bro who what what what what did you say no i said what do you want us to read next

then oh no no you are going to read the same thing because we haven't actually started to talk about it yet. We are not going to, well, of course, if you want to read something in conjunction, I will say, I will send you Sunday another piece only for people who are interested to read it in conjunction with what we have read already. But the most pressing issue is that who is going to be the next victim? We've already got it sorted out. We've got it streamlined. And I think it's Arman is going to present and Felipe is going to respond. This is a very interesting combination.

I just have a question real quick. I didn't see that until the last minute, so I didn't get my name on there. But I was wondering if it was possible, if it's not too much of an inconvenience, if I could go at some point during this month, because on June 7th, I'm going to be driving out to Yellowstone and living there for a while. Absolutely, absolutely. You don't need to. No, no, no. Look, lists are provisionals. We can always change them. Okay, cool. I wasn't sure if it was like, you know, hard in stone or anything. No, no, no. Pretty strong. No, no, no. Yeah, it seems that some have signed up to do both presentations and responses, And I think that's fine, but we should make sure that at least everyone gets to do at least one in class. And then if people have further presentations, maybe there'd be provision to upload it to the Google Classroom or something.

But I think it would be good for everybody to get at least one chance to say something in class. Okay, cool. We'll work out. Do you know how many people are absent today? I don't think many. I think most people. I think Edna was here, but I think she was having internet trouble. Alessandro Bellofiore, Ph.D.: Yeah, I think she's yeah. Alessandro Bellofiore, Ph.D.: Okay, okay. Okay. I hope that everything is fine with her. Alessandro Bellofiore, Ph.D.: Yeah, no, no. Like we only spoke briefly. I think, I think she just was like, yeah. Alessandro Bellofiore, Ph.D.: Okay, no, no, as long as, as long as everyone is fine. It doesn't matter if you're not attending the classroom. This is not a school. Alessandro Bellofiore, Ph.D.: This is torture by pure valenturism. You volunteered to be tortured.

Before I actually go, I actually made a huge mistake last time. I don't know. I always have this sort of stuff when it comes to German names. I remember the last seminar, I actually confused, for some reason, short-circuits in my brain, Otto Neurath with Maurice Schellig. And last session, I actually talked about the work system, which I'm still going to talk about it. I attributed to Theodor Zien, but it's a Heinrich record. Anyway, my apologies for all these sorts of confusions.

Happens a lot. Sophie knows that. Okay. My dear friends, I think it's time for you to go and leave me alone, because I have better things to do. Take it easy, everybody. Love you. Ciao, ciao. Thank you so much for a great conversation, questions, answers, everything. Love you. Ciao, ciao. Bye-bye.