Plato, a Reality Game in Four Levels (Session 9)

Hello and welcome to the ninth session of Play-Doh, a reality game in four levels. I'm going to pass the mic off to the instructor, Reza Negrestani. Thanks everyone. Okay, so Theodore has sent me a couple of questions. I want to answer them. But also we will, Hunter said, you know, what about Philibus? I will talk a little bit about Philibus. and if we have time we get back you know to to Parmenides that will be today's session there will be one more session after this unfortunately the raid wasn't able to attend you know our class for family problems nevertheless we will

continue and before getting into you know the discussion let's hear if you have any questions comments observations so far since you know even if we haven't really had any extensive detailed reading of playton unless we have you know gone over many of themes that are enduring in Plato's work from early to the later work. So let's hear if anyone has some comments or questions. I do have a completely unrelated to Plato question.

Well, it's not completely, but pretty far out. I was wondering if we could just get a reading list for evolutionary theory from you. A reading list for what? For evolutionary theory and... Evolutionary theory? You mean Darwinian theory? Yeah, more... I want to hear Reza's crack at Darwinian theory, I guess. I think, you know, when it comes to Darwin, It's like, you know, it's a kind of a, what you might call to be a kind of phenomenon

of the age. So, you know, it can be quite fictitious at some point and just verging on some sorts of, you know, absolutely unwarranted claims. But I genuinely think that people like Dennett or, you know, Estefan Jay Gould have actually done great works on the idea of what Darwinianism is about. But I will, okay, I will come up with something with a reading list. But why did you bring this up? So let's get back to the original, your thoughts.

Well, I think it's like actually sort of a hot topic. Yeah, sure. I mean, Darwin is truly, I don't think it's the most dangerous idea as Danes says, but it is truly a dangerous idea. Yeah, and I think it's more dangerous if people have a bad knowledge of perhaps a good set of ideas. Yeah, I mean, I think one of the things is that, you know, okay, let's just talk about

this, bring this back to this whole idea of mind and the Platonic tradition handed over in philosophy. It's the idea that I mentioned this a few times, that's, you know, what we really require in order to talk about mind is one, the logical idea of mind, in terms of what it does, which Plato talks about it, in terms of rendering things intelligible, or in Hegelian terms you might call it the idea of mind as a unifying point, as a structuring factor.

And the other one is the idea of a conception of reality or an idea of reality that is radically other to mind, that is purely objective. Now, of course, Plato does not believe in this radical alienness of reality, because for, just hold on this point and I will get back to it. But for Hegel, he believes this. He believes that reality is, I mean, a concept of mind that doesn't have a philosophy of

nature is not really a concept of mind. So concept of mind... And vice versa. Sorry? Yes. So basically concept of mind consists of two ideas. The logical idea of what the mind is, when I say what the mind is, I do not mean it mind as a thing, but mind in terms of what it does, the functional picture of mind. So logical idea of mind and the idea of nature, which is properly understood, is the objective study of philosophy of nature and science of nature.

So this is basically how Darwinianism can, in fact, be brought back into the philosophy of mind. But the thing is that, so this is where I wanted to say, that the concept of nature is essential for the concept of mind is not nature, what you might call it in the sense of pure material reality. It's concept of nature that is capable of giving rise to something that is purely unnatural

as well as giving rise to the natural. By purely unnatural, I mean formal autonomy of thinking, formal autonomy of thinking. So Sellars concedes to this point, for example, when he talks about mind, him being a person who believes in the ultimate triumph of the scientific image, right? But he believes that if the kind of concept of nature or the idea of nature, ultimately we need to look to search for is a concept of nature that allows both for the formal autonomy of thinking, the functional autonomy of reason, and pure material reality.

So bringing Darwinism to this equation, unfortunately Darwinism has been aligned with a naive brand of naturalization. You see, when in philosophy of science or philosophy of nature, people talk usually about naturalization. They mean simply, for example, naturalizing reason. It means that simply explaining what reason formally does in terms of its material explainance, whether they are biological, neurological, physical, chemical, so on and so forth.

But this is not really what naturalization is in philosophy of nature. Naturalization is essentially meaning to explain something according to an idea of nature that allow a two-way path from nature to unnatural, from nature to reason, and from reason back to nature. So this requires obviously reining in some of the wild Darwinian claims that everything can be naturalized in that sense, because that naturalization is a philosophical dogma.

It's not even scientific, it's a philosophical dogma in accordance with the concept of nature that is questionable to begin with, precisely because it's a restricted concept of nature. So people who are naturalizing in that sense, they think that the concept, the idea of nature that they put forward is unrestricted, but in fact they're restricted because the idea of nature should be capable of going in both ways rather than just one way. So this one that I want to make this comment about, that obviously Darwinianism should play a role in it, but this role needs to be carefully monitored.

Otherwise, it leads to a philosophical, a metaphysical, dogmatic metaphysical claim about the concept of nature or the idea of nature. Right. yeah one of the i mean one of the things that i see like happening frequently is people talking rather than talking about evolution in terms of selection for traits and environments people use it to talk about discrimination against certain traits yeah so and you have say that say that against you so um you have people talk rather than talking about selection for traits in environments you have people talking about discrimination for traits in environments and so it leads to like really heinous forms of bigotry um

and yeah the forms of bigotry will be in my book Yeah, so I'm I was just talking with some friends about it yesterday and yeah and also you see when it comes to Darwinianism I mean let's make an example you you were in the conversation with Pete's Nick and I I think Nick is essentially what you might call to be a dogmatic Darwinian in a sense that he is Nick Land yes Nick Land in a sense that he you see Darwinianism is essentially a problem of

scale in the sense that its focus is biology. Darwin comes and abolishes the ideal concept of life in favor of biology. So the idea of life that is ideal in previous philosophies is rendered obsolete by Darwin. It's life, what you call life, and with the kind of characteristics that you identified it with, this is just biology. And he tries to show how this biology moves back and forth, towards complexification

or toward the physical thing. So it's essentially on the scale of the biological systems. Now the thing is that the Darwinians today, they try to get rid of this scale problem and extend the claims of Darwin, in fact, to the level of fundamental physics, like Nick, that the does this. The universe makes itself, no, fucking there is no such a thing as, all the, you want to talk about this kind of, you know, physical laws, at the level of mechanical laws, everything is reversible. In fact, you don't have anything like irreversibility. Physical mechanics doesn't allow for asymmetry,

doesn't allow for time asymmetry, for complexification, for irreversible processes, or positive entropy production, okay? Everything at the level of mechanical loss is reversible. And this is, I think, this is when you illicitly move some truly revolutionary ideas from one scale to another, and that then becomes extremely problematic. And essentially not only physics, but you see that Nick Land, people like Nick Land, not only try to explain physical universe in terms of Darwinian laws, but also extend

Darwin upward, namely to the social domain. So you get essentially social Darwinism. Yeah, it seems like that, especially if you can't extract selection from discrimination, then that is like a big... Yeah, every selection is based on parameter space. Physics also has selection criteria, but what is basically these selections are carried out under a specific parameter spaces belonging to the length of scale of that selection criteria, of those interactions. So biological interactions, the kind of selections that they undergo, is fundamentally different from this kind of selections of, for example, physical entities,

you know, in terms of studied by physics on their core. Cool. Yeah, if you have... Sure, absolutely. That'd be great. Absolutely. Okay, questions, more questions, more thoughts. It seems like there's been kind of a renaissance of interest in Darwin lately in continental philosophy, like with Elizabeth Gross, for example, and more generally a renaissance of interest in the history and philosophy of science and continental philosophy because continental philosophers used to be like, well, we go by history and literature and all of that,

and science is the domain of the analytics, with people like Bruno Latour and Michael Ceres in continental philosophy per se. there's really been a Renaissance of interest in science it seems like yes yeah definitely I think so but this is a again I think it's not I would say that it's you know this kind of shift is not essentially the continental philosophy has started to recognize the kind of legitimacy of hard sciences or that it has been trying

to acquaint itself with philosophy of science, I would say that this is more in line with two things. One is that philosophy has started to become humble in terms of its empirical claims and recognize the privilege of science in making empirical claims. But also there is this resurgence, I mean this is what you are saying, coincide with the resurgence of continental philosophy looking back at the origins of philosophy, particularly certain key phases, what you might call German idealism, Espinoza, these kinds of figures,

who are essentially philosophers of mind. Philosophers of mind. I think that's just fantastic that continental philosophy is looking to those sort of origin moments. I think that's a really terrific development. Yes, I mean, the thing is that philosophy, as I mentioned a couple of times, philosophy I think one of the best things is that it never closes a circle of its revenge it always goes back and it starts to question of its own origin and no other discipline you can see that does that with the rigor of philosophy right yeah that's one that's one of the things that that sort of drew me to um to philosophy because when I was in college I started out as

a psychology major and one of the things that turned me off eventually turned me off about psychology is that um the way psychologists are so adverse to um to using you know to sort of applying their own discipline to itself like they think they think the idea is just ludicrous and i don't know i i don't know i don't know if i want that's that's not able to be sort of self self-reflexive or self-reflective. Yes. I mean, science, you see, the same thing about science. Science was like this until what you might call the early decades of 20th century. The philosophers or scientists were not some people who were just making discoveries

and inventions and coming up with new ideas in empirical sciences, but they were, in fact, explaining why is that this phenomena is happening according to the idea of science and really the best scientists when you see I mean people like Boltzmann like Einstein like you know Poincare these are by no means just scientists they are absolutely philosophy minded scientists and that's I think you're totally right about science without philosophy is just sort of an arm of neoliberalism. Yes. Okay, Hunter, Maria, Chagis, any person, any Plato-related question?

Nothing? I mean, I'm so curious to hear you talk more about Plato in relationship to time, temporality. Oh. I thought a little bit, but to kind of dovetail it with the Darwin question, I guess. like, you know, like from a platonic perspective, like the good in relationship to time or like, and, and how, and then, I mean, but I'm also kind of interested. So if, if time is,

if we're sort of going with a hard nosed view that, physical and maybe even biological levels is symmetrical does it only arise in sort of the functional picture of the mind or like what's the relationship between mind and time sorry sure i think plato uh And also like singularities, like can there be a singularity? Okay. Questions of like the cosmic statesman perhaps. Sorry? The cosmic statesman like that Salars brings up.

Well, you see, yes, I mean, the thing is that, so okay, we know that the good is essentially a form, and in later works of Plato it is the only form, the form of forms. Forms are timeless, they are outside of time. They are what you might call to be general thoughts that are not reducible to particular circumstances. Now one of the ways that the Platonic account of time can be constructed is by the way that

by fusing Parmenidius' account of time and Pythagorean account of time. So Parmenidian account of time is that time is a dimension of reality in which nothing exists, in which nothing exists. And this is the ultimate account of time. This is what you might call to be the being of time. And this is famous that Parmenides in his poem on nature makes this quite clear that this account of eternal, it's an eternal now in which no soul exists, nothing changes,

is no being in it, precisely because this is being itself. So this is what is usually called the closed loop account of time, Parmenides, and when people talk about closed loop accounts of time, Parmenidesian accounts of time, they usually see it as leading to paradoxes. But there are good arguments that all of these paradoxes attributed to Parmenidian account of time are because we apply our own temporal view to this closed-loop account of time. So it's basically making illicit moves between our own temporal accounts and the reality

of time according to Parmenides. So Plato has this, this Parmenetian account of time is essentially what you might call to be the time of forms, which is timeless from a temporal standpoint. It's unchanging, it's general. Nothing exists in it because it doesn't hold any processes inside it. But there is also a Pythagorean account of time that Plato fuses this with the Parmenetian one. And this is what you might call to be the temporality of the soul, the temporality of

mind. And how this Pythagorean and the Parmenidian account of time are being integrated in Plato is through the doctrine of forms. So forms, quoforms, are timeless. What we saw in the doctrine of forms, sensible materials but also mathematical idealities participate in forms, participate in forms, in timeless, changeless forms. Now this participation is what Plato calls

the temporality of the soul. A better way to formulate this is that you might say that, okay, if the forms are general thoughts, like the idea of justice, like the idea of beauty, knowledge, good, so on and so forth, First, temporal thoughts are essentially thoughts whose origin are synthetic, namely they are derived from sensibility. Because any thought that is being derived from sensibility is temporal. so far as what is sensible means that it is exposed to the successive impingements of

objects in the world. That's what sensibility is. So it instantly opens up a dimension of temporality. So this becomes then the platonic account of time, that's ultimately the reality of time is timeless. But the mind that participates in this reality to contemplate it is temporal, because the nature of contemplation, the nature of the soul takes time, is temporal. And this is where the idea of the good in relation to time comes to the picture.

The good itself is timeless, is a general idea. But contemplation on the good, on the concept of the good, or the idea of the good, is essentially a temporal unfolding. And this temporal unfolding, what Plato calls the soul, which is in today's vocabulary, is simply mind. Mind cannot be anything other in terms of how it works, how it functions, cannot be

anything but temporal, in so far as it requires synthetic dimensions. It derives from sensibility. Sensibilities are events extended in time, in a temporal sense. Now, this also brings There is obvious question that mind, in terms of what it does, is temporal. But the concept of mind, the concept of mind, the concept of soul itself, or you might call it in Platonic terms, the idea of the mind is timeless.

So the idea of mind is timeless, according to Plato, but how mind crafts itself according to this idea, and it's the only mind, according to Plato, that can craft itself according to this idea, so how it crafts itself according to this idea is essentially a temporal dimension. So you get the good and participating in good. The good is timeless. The good what you might call to be the idea of mind, mind itself. And then you get the craft of the mind according to its own idea, which is temporal, which

might you call to be what Plato calls eudaimonia. Good life of mind and Agathon. Agatom is timeless, is the good. So then do asymmetrical material processes, mechanics and evolution, have any meaningful role in explaining time? I mean, of course, if Plato would have been alive, he would have said no to this. But even regardless of what Plato might

be thinking about this question, I think even from a physical, purely physical standpoint, thermodynamic, and this has only recently become a controversy in physics, a resurgence of this problem, there is no indication, real solid indication, that thermodynamics or processes can in fact give us any indication about the asymmetric or the temporal anistropy of time. Precisely because this is based on a claim made by Boltzmann in his earlier work, that he was capable of uniting the thermal entropy, the thermal account of entropy,

the second law of thermodynamics, and the statistical account of entropy. Because a statistical account of entropy belongs to mechanical laws in which everything is reversible. There is no time asymmetry. There is no temporal direction. There is no flow. So this is based on this claim that Boltzmann was able to unify thermal entropy, thermal thermodynamics and statistical thermodynamics, statistical entropy. But the thing is that Boltzmann was in fact never capable of doing this. In fact, all of his later work are novel solutions that dissolve the problem rather than solving it, solving the problem of unifying thermal and statistical account of entropy.

And there are, as I mentioned, there is a good resurgence in physics in the past decade or so, less than a decade, that people have brought up this question that so many of the assumptions in physics are based on this unfounded idea that we can in fact talk about the nature of time asymmetry in terms of the laws of thermodynamics or the nature of irreversible processes. But that would beg the question that, as Boltzmann had argued in his lectures on gas theory, that begs the question that what is to be explained is the nature of irreversible processes or the second law of thermodynamics in terms of time asymmetry.

Not that the time asymmetry be explained in terms of second law of thermodynamics or irreversible processes. So just I want to make this and are really fantastic, you know, obviously has massive implications in terms of how we think about time, not only the objective account of time, but also the phenomenological account of time. Yeah, yeah, it does seem like a very significant topic or like a, like your decision about time the serious ethical political implications yeah I mean you know once you just the very final lunch you know let's not be Nostradamus but I do think

at some point this becomes very clear as can't would have had already you know concluded that experience temporality is transcendental the idea or put it bluntly is just not real and once we because so many of our concepts of agency of freedom and stuff are bound to this idea of temporality okay moving from past to present or future, future to present to past, whatever. Once we give up, we totally give up the idea of temporality in this sense, as an illusion, as a psychological illusion, then that requires a fundamental reconceptualization of the notion

of the agency, the notion of consciousness, the notion of freedom, so on and so forth. So then the good can't... Let's see, I'm trying to like formulate the question. So like, if there are no singularities, like the good doesn't have any kind of ineluctable quality to it. Like there aren't social singularities, they're not being pulled towards anything

kind of... I think you see good, Plato if you might say it, as I mentioned, the good allows you to actually, if we really want to be nitpicky about what the good does, is that it does allow for singularity, precisely because you see, we talked about this idea that the good allows you to overcome any any state of affairs concerning the soul or the mind that appears to be the completed totality of what there is namely being okay if it allows this it means that it creates singularities to go beyond

on these state of affairs. Because what is exactly the nature of singularity? Singularity allows you to overcome certain totality of the system which appears to be simply everything that it can do or simply the truth of the state of affairs. So I think the good allows, you know, in that concept, but not singularity in a kind of like a materialistic sense, it allows singularities of mind. And that's essentially, I think, doesn't, Plato wouldn't really be against this, against

this idea of singularity as something that permits the mind to overcome the illusion of completed the state of affairs. Would it be legitimate to articulate that in terms of positive feedback? Can you elaborate on this a little bit? the idea of like i say something like nick land's idea of like a long range positive feedback loop that is um you know whatever drawing capitalism towards uh no i don't think that's you know uh

we can't we can't talk about the idea of mind and things of because you see what is exactly mind mind Mind is not essentially, not everything that mind does can be reduced to this kind of idea of a positive feedback loop or reinforcing mechanisms. Mind is essentially what you might call to be self-consciousness in the presence of objective reality. Okay? The idea of the mind never changes, it's timeless. Its function, what it does and how it expands itself and how it overcomes the state of affairs,

changes. And how it changes is that it changes in the presence of an intelligible world. So if there is a new intelligibility in the world, and that can only be achieved by the function of mind comes into the picture, there is a possibility that also the function of mind changes and its view of the state of affairs. This is what Plato wants to make this clear, that you cannot have the idea of intelligence without its necessary pull, intelligibility. By intelligibility it means objective intelligibility, something that is outside of anything that

you might call the domain of intelligence. I don't think that this kapula of intelligence and objective intelligibility or objective reality can be easily translated to the idea of positive feedback loops through which intelligence constantly singularizes itself and overcome itself. I think this is a very, very, I think, serious problem because it says that intelligence can only be intelligence in the presence of objective reality. That's it. Objective reality is not something, it's objective precisely because it's not being governed

by the laws of the laws that regulate intelligence. you might call to be reality puts constraints on intelligence and only once intelligence makes these constraints of reality upon itself intelligible, that it becomes truly intelligence, becomes capable of overcoming its own constraints, its own limitations. Okay, thanks. Do you think, in a sense, with mind, there's sort of, in a sense, kind of part of what self-consciousness is, is a sort of an affirmation of presence in the environment that you're in at a given time?

like a yes, I am here, like this sort of acknowledgement of your awareness of something or presence somewhere or that kind of thing. I don't think that Plato would be able to talk about self-consciousness in this sense, but let's, for example, let's go to the philosopher of self-consciousness, Hegel. Hegel, I think Hegel is quite adamant about this. So self-consciousness is not consciousness, first of all. The consciousness can be empirical, whereas self-consciousness, according to Hegel, is not empirical. It essentially belongs to the order of conception, self-conception. It's a conceptual order. You take yourself to be something, even though that taking yourself to be something might

vastly differ from what you really are. But nevertheless, it's a conceptual order. So it begins, the self-consciousness, the seed of self-consciousness is what Egor calls self-relatedness. Self-relatedness is when you treat yourself, you take yourself as the object of your own understanding. So it almost, it's like this kind of epistemological schizophrenia where self becomes the object of its own understanding. Okay? Sort of like the kind of the Cartesian kind of thing of like... No, no, no, not Cartesian by any means. This is essentially the self. This is, Hegel says that the first contact with reality inside self-consciousness

is contact with the self. So self-relatedness means that self treats itself as the object among other objects. So this is its first contact with objective reality. It treats itself as an object among other objects. Okay? That creates a, what you might call to be an opportunity for completion of self-consciousness. So self-consciousness for Hegel, it starts with this formal dimension, which yes, we We can talk about presence and now, how I am related to myself now, how I take myself

to be at the present moment. But Hegel says that this is the rudimentary, the embryonic stage of self-consciousness, and it's essentially something that needs to be overcome. So self-consciousness for Hegel is not something that is a completed state of affairs when it comes to the mind. It's not something that is given to the mind in advance. It's a project, it's a matter of practical achievement precisely because self, once self relate to itself as an object of understanding, meaning that it is an object now among other

intelligible objects, this opens the path to regard or treat objective reality and hence objects external to the self as again part of my own self-consciousness so the intelligibility of reality for Hegel and external objects ultimately need to be incorporated into the intelligibility of myself. And that's the goal of self-consciousness, or ego, not as an empirical self-introspection, but as a conceptual and practical project.

Is this mind treating itself as an object, isn't that the same as the demiurge in later. Yes, yeah, yeah. Is it time? I have a quick question. Sure, go Mario, and after that we'll have a smoking break. Yeah, I'm interested in, like, it seems like the mind can participate in, like, a myriad forms or things can participate but like can you can you talk about like participation like mind participation in god or like mind participation in timelessness or like like

like participation in because because I think very early on you mentioned there's there's like a Tupin Kim school and they talk about um how like a human can become a god through participation in the porn because even God is subordinating to the good. Yes, you see, this is the subject of Philebus. Philebus, there is this part that Socrates finally says something that mind is akin to the good itself. And there is a reason for this. You see, what is exactly the good?

the good what you might call the principal measure of all things okay so the subject of philebus is the good for man for the human what is the good for human the good for human is to have a mixture of all the reality of all pleasures of mind of all pleasures of which is you know sensible pleasure you know, natural pleasures, mathematical pleasures, knowledge, so on and so forth, okay? So Plato, in, I think it's the middle section of Philobos, that he shows that if this is the case, and

If mind is the only thing that is capable of making this, measuring this mixture, what is good for it, then mind is akin to the good and hence beyond God. By mind, at this point in Plato's Philibus, he completely means human mind, not the mind of the divine. It means a temporal mind, temporal soul. So we will get to this after the break in this part of Philippus, but one of the greatest things about Philippus is that he makes this thesis that intelligence or an active mind

is akin to the good, and hence beyond all principles, everything else, even God himself, the Divine. And that's really why I think Philebus is quite revolutionary in this. And one of the greatest, I think, book written on Philebus is Donald Davidson's commentary on Philebus, which is absolutely astonishing, particularly his last chapter, The Analysis of mind. The famous Donald Davidson.

minded no I generally we shouldn't we should completely abolish the distinction between content and analytic it's only philosophy you know philosophy for the sake of philosophy and every other can any kind of inclination to any camp whatsoever it's ultimately pigeon-holing the ambitions of philosophy. Okay, let's have a cigarette and then come back. Sounds good. See you in 10 minutes. Sure. I'm resenting you for it. My friend took my rolling papers for my tobacco. End of the world.

It really feels like that. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. regarding your question there is there is actually a long chapter in the book about exactly what you were asking about thermodynamics and the stuff that I talk about both mind and stuff so I can send you a draft version of it

Can I get a copy of that too? I think you have it. Is that the one that you presented at AGI? Yeah. Oh, okay, cool. Yeah, but it's just a more comprehensive version. Okay, cool. The essay that briefly touches upon Boltzmann. Sorry? The essay that briefly touches upon Boltzmann. Yeah, it's actually Wolfsman's arguments in lecture on gas theory. Yeah, there's this really...

I haven't read the full book yet, but I just started going through the Inhuman by Leotard. and the first essay that can thought go on without a body it sounds like he's talking about like um an overcoming of neg entropy or an overcoming of entropy through the complexification of matter in mechanical processes as like a development of some sort of artificial intelligence leotard's essay in new neumann yeah yeah yeah an unbelievable essay that's so so amazing let's I don't think that, you see, Leotard's idea of complexification is essentially, comes back to the idea of irreversible process. First, I think it would be, I think, you know, again, in line with the physicalistic theory,

it would be mistake to understand general intelligence as simply complexification of material processes. This is because complexification is essentially tied to the idea of irreversible processes. Hence, entrenchments of structural constraints that once are accumulated, they create a structural complexity. Sure, I mean there are irreversible processes, but this whole idea that I think the more I have been reading, I think this idea that first as I mentioned, general intelligence

I don't think that can simply be thought in terms of complexification, okay? But also, nature of irreversible processes, at least the way that they are defined in physics, I think there are really big holes, philosophical holes in it, simply on the basis of the assumptions of what these irreversible processes are and how they are defined. I think Boltzmann is the first person who both grounds the philosophical and scientific foundations of complexed sciences, but also challenges them.

And the kind of challenge that he poses are absolutely devastating, are truly, this is what's Hugh Price calls Boltzmann time bomb. And once it becomes detonated, it can absolutely overthrow huge parts of complexity sciences as simply dogmatic metaphysics. Because as I mentioned, really a huge part of complexity sciences are based on this idea of irreversible processes, and irreversible processes, essentially, the irreversibility of some processes is something that is tied to the concept of microstate.

The microstate, you can think about it in terms of observable set of microstates or physical states responsible for them. So it's essentially about observe. So you see the problem is like this. So this is essentially it starts with Boltzmann, Maxwell and Gibbs in physics. So when in physics we see an irreversible process, like for example an ice melting, a fully inflated ball starts to deflate, that's an observable property, hence absolutely

tied to the local notion of the observer. It doesn't have pure objectivity. It's observer dependent. So what they want to do is that, so at the level of observation, all events appear to have a temporal flow. Time moves in one direction, okay? And in which irreversible processes can be observed, whether toward complexification or toward chaos. But at the level of microstate or the level of observability is not really purely physical.

Because at the level of pure physics, namely the mechanical laws of physics, everything is supposed to be reversible. Mechanical laws of physics are reversible. There is no time asymmetric quality about them. So Boltzmann, Gibbs and Maxwell, and this basically becomes only the project of Boltzmann, try to show that... So they want to unify the reversibility of mechanical laws with the irreversibility of processes at the level of observation. show that once this unification is achieved, the observation of irreversible processes

having thus and so characteristics is in fact objective to this process of unification. That in fact shows that regardless of how physical systems evolve at the level of microstates, It has these kinds of irreversible characteristics at the level of observation. But as I mentioned, Boltzmann never achieved this goal, really. Boltzmann never achieved this goal. And in fact, his famous cosmological hypothesis is a novel solution that tries to bypass the problem rather than solving it. hypothesis is basically Boltzmann idea. Any of you know anything about Boltzmann's brains

or invasion of Boltzmann brains? So Boltzmann came with this idea that time asymmetry, how we see that there is a temporal flow is essentially an outcome of something called entropic gradient or thermodynamic gradient, meaning that the way an observer sees how the process unfolds in time is purely dependent on the local gradient of entropy of the region that observer occupies.

And when it comes to local entropy gradient, there can be numerous local entropy gradients, different observed conceptions of time. And this is the whole idea that there's this thought experiment that can be posed in the framework of the cosmological hypothesis, that imagine there are some inhabitants of a universe that are occupying a specific entropic gradient in the universe and there is us you know we also occupy a region defined by a specific entropic

gradient now imagine that the inhabitants of that universe and these universes are, you know, have been separated by ions of time. They throw a stone into our universe, okay? We never see this stone as incoming into our universe, but has always been existing, precisely because our concept, because, because, so our conception of time is moving from past past to the future, but for a different inhabitant of a different local entropic gradient, that

vectorial unfolding of temporality can be from future to the past. So a stone that is thrown from that universe into our universe appears to be here, and The same when we throw, for example, a signal or a stone into the other universe. So events no longer appear as unfolding from past to the present, but as always being here. It's like imagine that there are two alien worlds, one is sending a spaceship to the other one. We never see this arrival of the aliens because it has always been in the environment to begin with according to our conception of time according to how events unfold in time

and I think that Dan Simmons book Hyperion is about this is it yeah there's that there's like one special planet in the universe where time unfolds in reverse okay yeah well yeah this is this is basically and and they set up a church around that planet and they they worship its ruler interesting what is it Hyperion Hyperion okay yeah it's a it's a sci-fi book from the 80s but yeah this is exactly cosmological hypothesis and the thing about cosmological hypothesis once you imagine universe in terms of

local entropy gradients that condition observers with highly local representations of time or temporality. It allows for something else, which is the scary thing, it's called the Boltzmann brain. It allows for a conception of entropy that's...so according to the traditional thermal theory of thermodynamics, entropy always increases. There's a positive production of entropy. But according to this theory, the cosmological hypothesis, entropy can be reversed

on very highly improbable regions of space and time, which means that this high probability doesn't mean impossibility, nor a priori logical impossibility. It means that it will happen over a very, very long time, which means that what we call mind or observer, and we think it has been a product of a course of evolution, by purely a statistical chance, can be resurrected, even if it has died, in a very, very remote

a space and time. It's like God's resurrection, but with a thermodynamic twist. So that's what they call Boltzmann zombies or Boltzmann babies or Boltzmann brains. So our universe might have a happy ending after all. No, there is not. So basically, if you check, there is this. I was looking at this paper and some of the stuff about the accelerating equation for gravitation.

And then I came on this Wikipedia page, and I genuinely encourage you to look at it. And it's the timeline of the end of the universe. So basically any kind of scenario that you pick, yeah, there might be some sort of twist at some point that gives you the impression, oh, this is going to be okay, happy ending. But nevertheless, it's going to take a darker turn afterwards. Well, there's a lot of paranoia around both membranes, right? Yes. Because that already implies that in fact, we mind ourselves in Boltzmann brains. Right, yeah, it's like people want to prove that they either are or are not a Boltzmann brain.

Yes, but as I mentioned, Boltzmann brain is a hypothesis, first of all, it's not a theory. And of course, it was devised to find a solution for the problem of thermodynamics, thermal thermodynamics. But Joseph Lochemitz, who was a friend of Goldsman and a fantastic philosopher and scientist, he gave a really devastating critique of cosmological hypotheses, showing that it's simply a novel hypothesis that dissolves the problem rather than solving it. Hence, it is just a pseudo-problem.

and so if in this approach we're outlawing uh sort of considering the time of complexity as real it's really a matter of like the elements of temporality as it unfolds in relation to the good are basically the hegelian ones right it's like it's just reason understanding and intuition and their reason you see for Hegel reason is not essentially temporal it's particularly a speculative reason it's timeless it what you might call to be the view from nowhere understanding

intuition yes but you see in Kant reason can't can't never understand what reason is. He introduces reason as a faculty, equal footing with understanding. And understanding we know that it has its roots in sensory intuition. But Hegel shows, Hegel essentially overcomes Kant in conservatism in the sense that he shows that reason is not understanding and it's not a faculty. And this when becomes that Hegel's idea of absolute spirit is the A spirit that had overcome, that has unified with this idea of the timeless, of the absolute, of the eternal.

So there is, I think, a gap between Kant's understanding of how mind or spirit evolve, mind evolves, and Hegel's idea of a spirit's relation to time, which is closer to Plato. Well, I just want to give a time check because we're coming up at 12.15 and I think… Okay, let's start Philibus. So there is this, I'm trying to write this essay, I'm full of this, this is just like

some bunch of notes. So as I mentioned, that's the most enduring thought in Plato's work is the idea of the good. It's something that from his earliest works to his latest works has a prominent place. And it's the only idea that Plato never gave up and in fact became more cryptic by each work, more significant and more fundamental. And Philebus and Phido and Timos represent three most cryptic, but also they give the

most fundamental significance to the idea of the good. So Timos is about the idea of good as the principle of craftsmanship, the miurgic craftsmanship. Fido is about good as the principle of intelligibility and Philebus is good as the principle of intelligence. in the last instance by intelligence I mean it active mind or self-conscious

mind a mind that is capable of reflecting on its own condition of possibility he introduces this concept of mind as akin the good itself ultimately it is the good itself. In Philippus, but this is not really the main theme of Philippus, even though in Philippus the idea of the good for man is introduced, and there are also talks about what the good is in the first place, but It has a different kind of project in mind.

And this project, what you might say, is far more ambitious than anything presented in previous works, including Republic. This is the idea that Plato wants to show that the good is the restoration of the principle of mind and cosmos by extension. So this is where Plato, for the first time, explicitly brings the idea of art into the

equation. By art, I do not mean the contemporary, what we call, understand art. but as craftsmanship, what Plato might call the cosmological indication of craftsmanship, construction of mind, mind constructing itself according to its concept. And through this construction it can restore the order of things, the order of the universe, the order of cosmos. And this order of cosmos is what Plato called the good, the principle, the prime principle. So basically this discussion unfolds from section 23b to 32b in Philippus.

It's a so-called fourfold distinction argument. Where Plato says that there are four classes in the universe, the unlimited, the limit, a mixture of these two, and the cause of the mixture. Socrates says in these sections that all things that exist in the universe can be categorized into one of these four divisions.

But ultimately, the good is the cause of the mixture between to Peros and to Apairo, the limit and the unlimited. And everything else after this discussion rests on this fourfold distinction and the introduction good as the cause of the mixture where it is showing that the cause of the mixture which is the good mixture by mixture you can think about in the idea of the dialectical sense of dialectic in terms of like purely

the platonic idea of dialectic, that this idea of mixture is crucial for intelligibility of the world, but also having a happy life, a satisfying life. Because if there is no mixture of Peros and Apeiron, limiting and unlimiting, there is no objectivity. The very fact that we can constitute an object is by way of limiting and unlimiting. Can I interrupt you really quick? Sure. When you said the platonic sense of dialectic, do you mean in the sense like that Desjardins talking about like picking up rocks that are like rocks to build a wall? Kind of like she goes back to, I forget which text it was,

but that's sort of the etymology of dialectic that she developed in one of her footnotes. Yes, but also the idea that dialectics ultimately for Plato is, yeah, I mean that is the whole metaphor of Walt, is the idea that thought is not about connecting things together because intelligible reality cannot arise simply through integration, but also separation, and hence separation requires the distinction between being and non-being, right? So thought makes the universe intelligible by connecting, by integrating and separating.

So you need to have rocks that are in separation from one another. Put them together. first so you have to first in order to create a wall you can just come up with the idea of what you might call to be the the undialectical idea of a wall what What you require is a process of separation, having some rocks, and these rocks are intelligible precisely because they have been separated according to their own ideas or their own concepts. That's not a good rock, and that's a good rock.

Yes, and then you are capable of, according to some measure, put them back together. So this is the idea of restoration. So the wall, when you say that I make a wall, you are in fact restoring the idea of the wall by making the proper distinction between rocks according to their own ideas. So this basically becomes the idea of a mixture. A mixture requires a measure. Plato says that the good is the source, is the cause of the mixture in these passages,

23b to 32b. But then he goes on to show that mind is in fact that very agent or system that allows you to create or craft such a perfect measure, to separate and combine everything according into its own measure, which then leads to this conclusion, the pinnacle of the discussion, where Socrates suggests that mind is akin to the good itself.

So this is also considered to be one of the most difficult, notoriously difficult sections in the entire work of Plato, even more difficult than Parmenides. So a good way to read the syllabus, and particularly this section, which is the key to the entire book, is by reading it in conjunction with Timaos. Thomas Timaos is essentially a book about the composition of the universe in relation to

forms. And syllabus is about restoration of the universe to its original best nature, the good itself. So let me first make a very brief introduction to some of these concepts or platonic jargons are present in filibus and then go on and talk about this fourfold distinction and how

filibus tries to formulate the process of the good as the restoration of the universe restoration and we're going back to the cause of the mixture of the group so In order to find a place for the forms among the four classes of all things, toperus, to apyrin, the mixture, and the cause of the mixture, the first step that needs to be taken is to clarify the precise meaning of what Plato calls all beings that presently exist

in the universe. So, which is the beginning of this whole section about the doctrine of restoration. All beings that presently exist in the universe. So in this sentence we have the word none which is now, topan which is all, and also

So to, ta, unta, which is basically existing. Now, the conjunction of these phrases presents the object of the classification that Socrates introduces in order to judge which of pleasure or knowledge will win the second prize of the human good. So after the good, what else is ... so, you know, the first prize is a striving for the

good. The second one is that it requires, so if we say that there is a striving of the good, how can we, how can we strive for the good? Under which mode of living? Is it going to be the life of pure pleasures or is it going to be the life of pure knowledge? okay mind as being bound to the realm of the pure sensible or mind as bound to

the realm of pure thought which of course as I mentioned the ultimate conclusion is that none, it's a mixture. Good life is a life of a mixture of pure thinking and pure sensible. And the only thing that can give the measure of this mixture and mixing the sensible and, you know, pure knowledge of pure ideas is the mind itself hence mind is the cause of happiness reflection on the conditions

of the possibility and activities of the mind is ultimately the project of of crafting a good life in the broadest possible sense. So, the first phrase, NUN, which is now, in Greek it means both present moment and the present time generally. Now, but also Plato, the way that Plato wants to talk about now is not now in the sense

of what you might call to be a now of experience. doesn't want to reduce now as now of experience as a unit of experience like everything that I experience essentially unfolds in the now he wants to also posit a new definition of this now and that's called the eternal now so the The word now in Plato is ambiguous. It's at the same time means now in the sense of experiential subject, how we experience

events unfolding in now, basically what is future becoming present and what is present becoming past and what is past becoming remote past, that tiny temporal index in which all of our experiences are concentrated. this is one and the other one is eternal law no which is the time index for forms

and another one As I mentioned, it's the word all, all beings that presently exist in the universe. All, or to pan, it's according to some of the scholars of Plato like Lido and Scott, Japan means either all, the whole or the universe. Now but according to the kind of discussion that later follows from this phrase, it seems

that Plato when he says all in this phrase he means basically all of the material reality, of the sensible objects the sensible world but there is also another occasion where the phrase to pan is also applied to forms maybe all of being rather than just material reality the being of force. So there is this ambiguity in this phrase and the words it's composed

of that whether this phrase really is talking about the sensible world, existent objects or to the complete universe of being in the forms. So as I mentioned, in order to understand the problematic passage in Philebus, it's very helpful to read this dialogue in comparison with other dialogues, especially Timos.

Many Plato commentators have noticed a similarity between two of Plato's later dialogues, Philebus and Timos. Specifically, one of the main themes of both dialogues is Plato's account on becoming, or Genesis. Plato's so-called two-worlds theory is generally presented in the following manner. Plato holds that in a sense there are two separate realms or that there are two very different kinds of things, ordinary physical objects and the forms. The Divine Line in Republic, for example, draws distinction. The intelligible world always remains the same without going through any change, but

the perceivable world is always changing, its content coming to be and ceasing to exist. The Middle Dialogues, for example, like Fido and Republic, introduce the intelligible world, which exists without any change. Now, it's time for Plato to turn his philosophical focus to another part of his metaphysics in Philippus, the sensible world and the genesis within it. Nevertheless, the instances of becoming that Plato is concerned with in those two dialogues are not treated in the same fashion. On the one hand, the team-outs is about the becoming of the universe, but on the other hand, Philip deals with the question of how the things that were created in a good state

have this integrated to the bad state and how we can restore them to the original good state. Okay? So, most of all, in order to explain what I mean by restoration, it's important to understand that's Philippus, Philippus sections, particularly if you want to read 31c to 32b. In this passage Socrates says that pleasure arises in the process of restoration toward its nature, natural state. And this original state is as in this case of health a nature of being

harmonious. The harmony in living creatures is, he says, not being disrupted. In other words, when something is well proportioned it's considered to be harmonious. Therefore the original nature to which everything should be restored is the nature of proportion. And And pleasure is a product from the process of such general return toward natural estate of things. And this nature, physis or ursia, is according to Socrates, good and beautiful. And this is how at the end of the Philippus, measure is the first rank and the wealth proportion is the second rank of the human goods.

But before moving forward, when Plato here wants to talk about the natural state of things, he does not want to talk about what we call nature. It's not like today's philosopher who says, going back to the natural harmonious state of things. Because we saw that for Plato, nature is essentially the nature of forms. Nature made intelligible by forms, not nature as what you might call to be pure sensible material reality.

So essentially the trajectory of Philippus goes like this. So we know that the soul essentially inhabits in a, what you might call to be, in a mixed state of affairs. It's neither purely formal as belonging to the idea nor purely sensible. It's a mixture of both.

But Plato had already come up with this idea that being of the soul, even though it is a mixture, being itself is not a mixture. Being itself is not a mixture and that's being of forms. So, Philippus tries to create this recipe for the soul, how to restore being as or being of the good. Can I ask a question? What went wrong with Philebus?

I think what went wrong with Philebus, I think it's the idea that, as I mentioned very briefly, It's the ambivalence that Plato really never says that when he tries to talk about, when I mentioned that famous phrase where the whole thing starts, all beings that presently exist in the universe, and their mission to restore the good, is that it doesn't, it's very ambivalent whether Plato is really talking about the restoration, a process of restoration, that

is according to principles of sensibility, or is according to the principles of form, or according to the mixture of both. Plato is quite vague about this because of the ambivalence and the different uses of these words that he employs in the work in order to construct his argument. But we really don't know that when Plato talks about a good life for man, does he really talk about a good life in the ordinary sense, or does he talk about a good life in a purely formal sense, in the sense

the life of mind, the life of mind, rather than the life of physical, materially constituted subjects? I think, and this is just purely on the ground of comparing Philippus with other later works, And I think Plato wants to show that the life of mind, in its purely formal dimension, is

essentially the ultimate goal of the satisfying life of materially constituted subjects. But I don't think that Plato ever makes this clear in Philebus. It's only that you can come up with these if you start to relate Philebus with Timaeus and Phaider. I think Philebus is really the most mature word, but it's also considered to be one of the most ambiguous words. Well, what about the problem of evil as presented in the Philebus itself? Like why was the harmony disrupted in the first place?

Why isn't everything already in tune with the forms? Okay, so the idea is that Plato, the idea of restoration, And that's why I want to talk about the idea of restoration is in fact the idea of construction, like that wall that we were talking about. When you construct a wall, you are in fact restoring its intelligibility by separating and integrating those stones. So as I mentioned, this idea of restoration needs to be really carefully defined, because

otherwise it relapses on that Christian myth, as you say, that in fact there was an evil in the beginning, and then we have to restore it back, okay? But this is not really Plato wants to put forward. The idea of restoration is the idea of construction, is the idea of constructing the good, okay? This is very, I think, important that from this point, the sensible plays an absolutely important role. It is not evil anymore. It's not, unlike Republic, it is not illusory. It's not something that we should just give up.

And that's why, the reason why Plato gives sensibility such an important role in Philippus is because he wants to show that the good is the mixture, is the cause of the mixture. And you can't have the mixture without both sensibility and the form. Hence, sensibility, rather than being something that needs to be cast away, is something that needs to be recognized. pleasures need to be recognized as playing an absolutely indispensable role in this process of restoration. So this is really important, I think, to make sure that the idea of restoration, as I mentioned, is not restoration in the religious sense or in what you might call

to be returned to the state of affairs from which we have been alienated. Okay? It's the idea of constructing it according to its own concept, the concept of the good, the idea of the good. And hence, restoring everything in this concept. Exactly like that wall. Well, according to this allegory, when we're constructing a wall, we're restoring its intelligibility. The intelligibility of it can be said to be restored in the process of separating and

integrating rocks, different rocks according to different measures of separation and integration, according to the good that each of these rocks are playing a role in. So this is, I think, one of the, as I mentioned, obviously there is a reason that Plato has been hijacked by Christianity and by organized religion. And this is actually one of those texts that is responsible for it, and precisely because of this ambiguity, okay, in defining the idea of harmony and the idea of restoration of

harmony. But I don't think that, you know, a closer look on Philippus, particularly in comparison with other later wars, Timon and Fido, that we cannot reduce the idea of restoration to return to a simple beginning from which we had as complex or mixtures were alienated. No, Plato wants in fact to say that mixture is the only path to the good. Mixture is the only path to the good rather than the simplex, the idea of the simplex good or harmony.

Any question? So with his remarks, Plato's grand project is fundamentally, in fact, anti-Christian.

If you want to, of course, there are complexities in how different pieces on Christianity are defined, but it is definitely, it's not Christian, precisely because Plato thinks that man, and this is really a fundamental thesis of Timos, that man was created to be as good as possible, and in fact his realization in the universe was an instance of pure good. This is part of Timos. It's not something that that there was some sort of state of affairs, everything was fine until human came into

the being and everything was fucked up afterwards and now we have to overcome the human in favor of some harmonious nature or some universal state of affairs. Plato starts with the beginning that man, the man that was realized, the human was realized, was realized to be as good as possible. In fact, even in the most rudimentary state of its realization, even when it is in cave, it is pure good, because it has the potency of being good there is nothing bad about it even with this chained to the sensible okay

because because Plato in Philippus tries to show that how you can use the sensible to play a role in your emancipation in restoration of the good a restoration that is a construction according to the idea of the good. So no original sin in Plato. The inception of man, the inception of the human, is the first inception of the idea of the good. This makes Plato quite a Promethean thinker.

In fact, if there is, you know, if, so the idea is that ultimately as I mentioned in Philippus he wants, he will argue that mind, by that he has already clarified that by mind he means human mind rather than divine mind mind is the good itself but it is only when it is capable of constructing itself to be the cause of all measures to to provide mixed life for itself this is mixed life for itself

questions I mean it seems so much to me like I'm reading some Confucianism right now but it seems so much like whole idea of like focus and field that the one isn't this transcendent thing but it actually exists like in the process of human existence and human relation yes yes absolutely Absolutely, yes. And this is why I was saying that the majority of the interpretation of Plato are focused on the middle period, the Republic, or early or to the middle period, Republic being the main focus. And in Republic, as I mentioned, every of those transcendent

features of the one that are presented in Republic are later being abandoned. in the later works, in Fido, in Timos, in Philebus. Yeah, absolutely. The one is no longer transcendent. And this is, as I mentioned, that, you know, I think that, so one of the things in Republic, Plato wants to defend Socrates against the charge of impiety, okay? But it seems that Plato gives a much more severe defense of impiety in later works against gods, against divinity,

by simply bringing the idea of the One from its transcendent dimension, present in the public to the realm of what you say the souls, the minds, human minds. As a process that takes shape, unfolds itself through its constituents who believe in it and act according to it and construct according to it.

So the affirmation of the mixed life as the good, so that's like the rejection of degrees of reality and is is there like a more mixed but is there like a degree of mixedness yes and this degree of mixedness requires a measure yeah yes to your first question yes that also can be extended to be a an arguments against the degrees of reality yes there is no ranking anymore okay there is a

ranking but a ranking that requires a measure of mixture according to time according to time temporal time so this measure so there is there is always a better mixture there is always more proportion that's mixture and this measure can only be supplied by the mind itself. Essentially, as I mentioned, that mind in the later sections of Philebus, so we know that There are four folds, to pair us, to apparent, to mix, and to measure.

Sorry, the cause of measure. The cause of mixture. Mixture requires measuring. In later sections of Philebus, Socrates equates mind with the cause of mixture, while in the earlier sections of Philebus, the cause of the mixture itself was equated with the good. that famous passage that mind is akin to the good mind is a good itself because that's the only because this is the whole idea that the mixture requires measuring the process of separation and

integration separation and integration is the process of restoration is the process of restoration as a construction, exactly like building a wall. Building a wall, you construct a wall according to rocks which have been measured, which have been separated and integrated according to accurate measures. And in doing so, you restore the intelligibility of the idea of a wall. So it's kind of like in Ascesis, this whole discipline through philosophy, you separate

the more noble parts of the soul from the sensibility, but then the whole idea is to sort of reintegrate them after purifying them. Yes. And that's exactly what Platonic dialectics is. Dialectics is essentially, in Theaetatutsi, identified as a process called composteros, separation and integration, to peros and to apyron, limiting and delimiting. And the things that in Theaetatutsis are introduced as the chief vehicles for carrying out this process are logic and language. our logic and language.

And mixture is kind of a weird term to use here, because if it's construction, if it's a more deliberate construction, mixture can apply like a homogeneity. Yeah, you see, when we are talking about mixture, as I mentioned, that in Philebus, he's famous that he introduces this whole idea of the good as a recipe. You see, Hasselhar's famous idea that the good is a recipe of making a cake. So making a cake is a mixture, mixture of ingredients, right? Theoretical, sensibilities, pleasure, and so on and so forth. And this mixture needs to be accurate. I'm sure that all of you have made a cake. Making cake is not just throwing the stuff together, right?

needs to be followed a step by step in proportions and rankings and you know putting according to some measure some ingredients at some point and some other ingredients some other right otherwise you will end up with something else so So in like a recipe- Just add water to that. So you definitely haven't made cake then. It's pre-mixed. Pre-mixed. Another mind has mixed it. Well, yeah, this is actually quite an interesting thing that Plato says that in this whole idea

of recipe, some of the ingredients are not just raw ingredients, they might be products, final products of something else, and in fact becoming, becoming, and the soul itself are the final products of their own thing. So the thing is that in Philebus, and that's really like one of those cryptic parts of it that the mind is introduced at the same time as a craftsman but also as an ingredient in its own recipe of crafts. In recipes it's like the structure, the structure is in the steps taken.

Not only the steps but also in... Like the way that chemically... Yes, in proportions, in ratios, in the time steps, and ultimately, ultimately, internal and external purpose of the recipe. Internal and external purpose of the recipe. Internal purpose of the recipe of making a cake is to say that I am making this recipe to make a cake. I'm following this recipe to make a cake, this is an internal purpose. The external, which for Plato is also very important, the external, for example, purpose of recipe for making a cake is to feed someone, right?

The good only works, the purpose of it, if it is actually create more good in lives of people in the life of mind. Is the internal purpose like intentionality? Not essentially, no. I think we can't really talk about internal purpose in terms of intentionality. I think this internal purpose is what Plato might call to be, there's a word for it, it's

called nisus, tendency or striving. It's what you might call to be the pure object of striving. So the object of striving of the recipe for making a cake is making a cake, is a strive to make a cake, and the best possible cake. So this is not really an intentionality, at least in the sense that intentionality is today being discussed, but it's a tendency. And yes, when it comes to tendency, there is in fact a teleological component to the internal purpose of every recipe. there is a goal

there is a goal and there is also a tendency in this goal, what Plato calls anisus yeah, kind of like it almost reminds me of this idea of like the paradox of spontaneity how you know, like there's two different ways of understanding spontaneity and creativity so could you maybe like talk a little bit about that like creativity in Plato and spontaneity? I need to think about it. I can kind of like grasp this on the surface. I can see. So it's like, let me just go absolutely vulgar.

It's really the idea of the chicken and the egg. Which one is the product of which? It's the idea that, essentially, the idea that Plato wants to come up with the idea that there is a final product that is also the principle of productivity. And the principle of productivity requires more and more productivity, more creativity

to participate in this idea, to participate in the idea of creation as such or creativity as such. But whenever, as I mentioned, whenever according to the principle of the book, whenever mind the riches with this idea that I have arrived at the final product of the recipe, that's when Plato would say it's an illusion, it's a fleeting. So there is, I need to think about this, but there is this, yes, there is this at the same time Plato wants to hold in the idea of ultimate product, ultimate creativity, which is the good but also the good as the principle of pure productivity and creativity that can never be

foreclosed, that can never be brought to a halt. So one aspect of the parts that are mixed is a propensity to construct certain particular ends to bring them to fruition, but the movement of the good is not reducible to the propensity of a mixed life to create the particular ends, but there's a larger striving for it, as you

said. Yes, and that comes back to the external purpose. The intelligibility of the external purpose. That it always needs to be, you know, the external purpose of the recipe for the good is the good itself. To go forward and forward. And the good itself is the good for, in Philippus, is introduced as the good for the human. So whatever end that you come up with that recipe for a cake, you know, is good, you know, in terms of the internal purpose.

But ultimately cake needs to be shared with friends and be eaten, okay? So it serves another, a different level of purpose. And this level of purpose is something that needs to be intelligible. So, without this level intelligibility of the external purpose, it's very in fact possible that adhering to the internal purpose of the recipe leads to what you might call to be achieved totalities, like this cake is good in itself detached from its intelligibility in a broader context.

So Plato wants at the same time to conform to the concrete particularities of the life of the human, address them, but also he wants to re-address these particularities in a broader context, which are the formal dimensions, the ideas of justice, duties and so on and so forth. And the problem becomes that how to mix these, all of these together, how to bring the intentional, sorry, the internal end of the project of the good with the external purpose.

of a good life. External purpose of the good life should never be reduced to a good life for someone, but the form of the good life itself that can be shared among everyone. and plato wants to say that the only good life that can conform to such a requirement is the life of mind that's the life of the human mind and that sort of inherently includes a vector of expansion of the good yes yes absolutely

In terms of becoming more free or expansion of modes of power or destruction of seemingly necessary absolutes? Yes, which is basically what ultimately the good itself is, the idea of the good. And that brings back the whole idea of construction in this sense, then becomes the idea of restoration, restoration of the intelligibility of idea of the good. Yeah, and that's kind of, I mean, I think it kind of, what I was trying to articulate earlier about being creative and spontaneous,

these are terms that we normally associate with like a transcendent being like a god, But in becoming godlike through platonic dialectic, we're able to sort of be creative and in a way harmonize things to make human life better. So like in Confucianism, it'll be like bringing existing things that are in that exist, like not making something that doesn't exist come into being, but use like the stokea, like the existing letters or existing words to bring a greater significance to life. and that's a process of creativity but it's not this sort of um i don't know like roger ames describes how we think of creativity as something we want to relegate it to the artistic realm like we would never say that your accountant is creative or you know something like that but

if we try to give it like a positive connotation where creativity is this god-like process and spontaneity becomes a way that we can sort of become more godlike Okay, interesting. No, I think Plato, you know, from Philebus and Phido, he, this process of creativity, emphatically in Philebus, this process of creativity is only reserved for the human mind and not God. And that's why I said that, you know, ultimately Plato is not, it could be charged for impiety. Precisely. Like we said, you're creative, oh that's so cute, you're a creative artist, but you

can't be creative in any sort of practical way, you know what I mean? Yes, yeah, but that's basically, that's the idea that, you know, Plato is not by any means wants to, I mean the idea of the creativity that he puts forward is essentially dialectical, It's a creativity, okay let's put it this way, it's a creativity of mind in an intelligible world. It's creativity of intelligence in accordance with that which is intelligible. And only in so far as you can expand the horizon of the intelligible, you can maintain the creativity of intelligence. So there is this kapula of intelligence and intelligible, which set aside Platonic idea

of craftsmanship, creativity, the neurologic principle from so many other creativity for the sake of creativity. Essentially creativity of intelligence is always constrained and bound to the intelligible. but so by that account like as far as art is concerned it would still like basically still any successful art would be good because it expands the horizon of sensibility or something you can think of

or can legitimately think of Plato as moralizing about what art is bad as long as experimenting with inputs and outputs and different kinds of ends the thing is that art gives you as you say for example if you look at that kind of dimension of art making. If you see essentially the recipe of the good you need to be capable of feeding it more ingredients as well. And these ingredients are not just theoretical intelligibilities but also practical and axiological intelligibilities. And yes, you can say that simply by virtue that art gives you new sensible material ingredients to expand the horizon

of human experience, that also plays a definite role in the process of the good, in the recipe of the good. I think I have to go. Yeah, I think we've stayed a little bit after, actually. I just noticed that. Yeah. Well, thank you so much again, Reza, and I guess... Okay, there is one more session and I will go detail this fourfold illustration on filibus, which is quite, you know, a little bit notorious for its difficulty and that will be it. Sounds great. All right. Thanks everyone. Thank you.

Bye.