The Vicious Transparency of Time (Session 6)

Hello and welcome to the sixth session of the seminar, The Vicious Transparency of Time, instructed by Reza Nighuristani. Reza, the floor is yours. Thank you everyone. I hope you had a great time. So I saw the presentations. Thank you very much, everyone. I mean, I don't have comments, specific comments, but maybe we should actually open

it up to questions and particularly the presenters, Lika, Juan, where's Diego, Diego, and who else make a presentation? Noah. Noah, yes. He's here. Noah, yes. Yes, Noah is here. I mean, if you want to ask me some of, I know that Lika, you had some questions. I can't remember what exactly those questions were. And also, I think that Freya had some questions in her presentation. I can't remember the exact nature of the question. I think something about chronopolitics or something. And Lika, you had some questions. So you can, you know, ask the

questions, or if not, I mean, we open it up to all participants to discuss. But I think that if any of you presenters want to inject some sort of disturbance in the equilibrium of thought that would be much appreciated well yeah I watched the presentation by Noah and what was interesting to me is that it seems that

in Husserl's philosophy he takes those perceptions by fantasy to be um okay uh let me think how to formulate it um there will be perception by fantasy because otherwise there will be perceptions right yeah maybe one question is about um how um We see the difference.

What's the difference between the fantasy in perceptions and fantasy in... How? Mere fantasy. Mere fantasy. Mere fantasy, for example, there are more different presentationalistic, representation, presentation. Yes, presentation, presenting and presentifying or representifying. Well, yes, I'm going to talk about this today because that will be today's topic. You see, I mean, a good example, I think that it needs to be accounted for.

First of all, you know, Husserl earlier on in his early lectures and manuscripts, he had developed a theory of what is usually called image consciousness. What would be the German translation of that, Sophie or Freya? Bildbewusstsein, right? Does it translate to image consciousness? yeah i'd say so okay so image consciousness um i mean dark so image consciousness uh uh is essentially uh influenced by brentano's uh you know theory of imagination right where

you know, imagination is considered to be producing inauthentic objects, inauthentic objects. Inauthentic here simply means in reference to what is called to be inauthentic. Well, referenced obviously to the objects of percepts, right? Perception, perceptual objects. So Husserl later actually completely diverged from the theory of image consciousness, but there are still, you know, residues of image consciousness, even in his theory of phantasmata and fantasial faculties.

one way to understand the difference between perceptual fantasy and mere fantasy is really image consciousness. So in the systematic way that under a super-bought Like, look, you're looking at a painting, right? Let's say something not really obvious, like some... Walter Sickert is one of my favorite painters. I mean, you can check, particularly, you know, the portrait of Jack the Ripper, right?

Jack the Ripper of London. It is actually quite a very dim painting, very thick use of brush strokes. And it appears that we are actually looking into the room and Jack the Ripper is looking out of the room, right? And it's quite dim. So Husserl's idea here is that the image consciousness consists of at least three, what you might call to be, components. One you might call, what he calls,

image thing or image stuff. Simply, what you might call to be, you know, for making an image, it needs to be, etched into some sort of physical object, a thing, a stuff. By that image, we are not simply talking about image, like a painting, but sound, writing, whatever, you know, but Ossel usually actually uses, for example, you know, examples from painting. this is called the image thing the physical uh what you might call to be a template physical uh

springboard into which uh the image sub image object has been etched what is image subject image subject what you might call to be you know, just like portrait of Jack the Ripper and Walter Seekert, you know, a configuration of pigments, brushes, strokes, thus and so, you know, configured and etched onto the canvas, right? This is called the image object. Then there is an image subject. The image subject

is what you might say requires here a fundamental act of fantasying in the sense that we imagine we are looking into a room from with Jack the Ripper looking outside of his bedroom. Not to mention that we are seeing a man. We are seeing a bedroom. but none of this actually has any sort of connection whatsoever with the image thing

but rather is a certain sort of modificatory act a simulation so to speak a fantasial intention that has been attached itself to the image object namely the configurations of brushes stroke, pigments, but also it has something more than mere brush strokes and pigments and all the other composition and so on and so forth. So this is what you might call to be a perceptual fantasy, precisely because there is a fundamental perceptual core

of a quasi-object in the image object. When we are saying quasi-object, obviously it is not Jack the Ripper. Mere configuration or composition of these pigments and brushes doesn't make something a man, a bedroom, or not to mention Jack the Ripper, right? So the image subject, which is the product of the fantasial act, introduces something new to the quasi-perception, using Ossalian terminology, quasi-perception, that has been targeted at the level of the image object.

Now, this is what you might call to be a classical example of a perceptual imagination. Mere fantasy, right? Mere imagination does not require image object. right you don't need any sort of perceptual encounter with something from which you can simulate an imagination but rather is autonomous from the get-go in fact its mode of time as i will talk about is different its mode of consciousness is different

it's a consciousness that transforms itself through the act of fantasying yeah i i remembered what was my question that uh just because we have those perceptual requirements and just because the they are involved in this act of imagining uh where the image consciousness is involved as well. It doesn't mean that by inserting a clear image of Jack the Raper, a photo of him, that we will clarify this initial perception.

I think that those two acts are completely different. And this is what I was suspicious in the presentation, because there was a quote from Brentana, the Brentana's influences that perceptions are genuine presentations, he says, but fantasies are not because fantasies are mediated by relations and concepts. as if he thinks that that perceptual that sensory experience is somehow is prive has some proceeds ontologically proceeds and dominant some primacy yeah right you see uh was still still in the theory of image consciousness thinks within the residues of

Brentonian philosophy. However, the moment that Husserl's by way of phenomenology, and what is phenomenology? Phenomenology, as I mentioned, is a siso rather than a mimo, not a metaphysics in, metaphysics out, but a skepticism, sipo, sorry, a skepticism in, problem out, right? A skepticism mean problem out in the sense that always Husserl in his later reflections of phenomenology says something to the extent that phenomenology is really not merely the study of appearances but the critical investigations of the appearances that seem so entrenched as appearances

right he he really means a certain sort of a skeptical approach to the very idea of something to be counted as an appearance right so uh within this sort of framework of phenomenology he himself has no choice in his midlife other than distinguish imagination from perception. Whereas Brentano's imagination is a still denotes a certain sort of Kantianism where imagination ought to serve perception as a synthetic function.

And if it doesn't, then it is secondary to perception, right, as a natural consequence, and hence called inauthentic. Husserl, by virtue of divorce, not divorce, disconnecting in a certain sort of parallelism or concurrency, disconnecting perception and imagination, sees that imagination has its own authentic objects, except that these authentic objects and the authentic time consciousness is not that of perception. Fria.

Yeah, I was wondering whether it makes sense to situate Maurice Merleau-Ponty at this point into the conversation because I actually, I tried to borrow his book The Eye and the Spirit from the library, but it was already borrowed so I couldn't but I remember that he is also talking about how yeah basically he's trying to make an account for the physical involvement actually in the I don't remember any of his vocabulary but also he's talking about how in painting images are constituted by the painter. He's also talking about the example of Cezanne and he is painting

that mountain from all kinds of perspectives and there's always this mountain which is recognizable as a mountain and but for him the difference to Husserl, as if I remember it right, is that he for him the the involvement of the body is so important and this is also his I think his his extension of uh of hossalian phenomenology and i was just wondering um also in the context of of the difference maybe from um brentana whether it would make sense uh to actually break uh bring meloponti into the picture of the conversation but i don't really remember yes no i mean meloponti uh absolutely yes i mean merleau ponti is uh you know uh a very sort of a specific hossalians i

mean uh we should actually uh know a little bit about the history of wholesale in france right um the thing is that majority i mean uh believe it or not right this is uh i mean uh first of all you know, someone like Carnap, like literally Carnap, like French people hate Carnap, right? Carnap was translated, not translated, published, Afbao was published in France in 1980s. Can you imagine this? And all these sorts of stuff going about Carnap in French philosophy circles, Even though Jacques Bouverie, for example, had translated Aufbau in the 1970s, right?

But it was rejected as a publication. Husserl was not translated in France for quite a while. Essentially, Merleau-Ponty understood Husserl both through German texts and also to very specific commentators of Husserl during that time. And these commentators were usually the commentators that were basically focusing primarily on the earlier and mid-Husserah, right?

Particularly the theory of image consciousness. In fact, Merleau-Ponty's idea of embodiment, right? is not actually being borrowed by Hossel. It's his own philosophical conclusion that if you take these to the utter consequences, complete consequences, sort of Hosselian theories, then the role of embodiment is being highlighted. And of course, this is what we see that in later Hossel happens, the role of embodiment being highlighted. But I want to say that Merleau-Ponty only had access to that very specific phase of Husserlian philosophy, and he developed

majority of this on his own. Husserl literally was unknowing, I mean, he was completely known as a philosopher, right? But his work, you know, the actual content of the work was unknowing until Suzanne Bachelard the daughter of Gaston Bachelard translated Husserl and wrote a book on Husserl right and majority of the French takes on Husserl is by way of after Merleau-Ponty regardless of Merleau-Ponty is based on Suzanne Bachelard's work yes Merleau-Ponty's embodiment I think that yes

I think that it is not really Husserlian sort of embodiment, because for Husserl embodiment is a certain sort of what you might call to be phenomenological delimitation, in the sense that embodiment points out the constraints of of an action or embodiment upon the transcendental edifice or phenomenology at large, right? That look, the way that we see an object is delimitated, demarcated, positively and negatively constrained by how we are embodied.

Whereas for Merleau-Ponty, developing a theory of embodiment somehow in his own way, but of course from the same source, which would be Hoseley in time consciousness, has a more sort of positive connotation. You know, embodiment kind of like an inactivist sort of way that we actually talk about today, either in terms of Valera's theory of inactivism or, I don't know, embodied mind sort of way. I don't think that the embodiment in the sense of Merleau-Ponty is exactly the same sort of embodiment that Husserl is talking about.

But yes, I mean, Merleau-Ponty is actually, really, I mean, what I really generally wanted to say is that Merleau-Ponty should be distinguished as a philosopher. philosopher par excellence in his own right, that even though he's coming from a Husserlian heritage, he is a fundamentally great philosopher, precisely because he worked out some of these conclusions by himself. And particularly, I really genuinely love his works on time. It's quite, first of all, Merleau-Ponty is a very kind of rare bird, as they call it in

France, right? He's poetic, but he's not obscuriantist, right? He doesn't peddle obscure stuff. I really love his prose and his style, but most importantly, we should understand that really Merleau-Ponty is one of the founding fathers of what is called today French epistemology, right, which is I think one of the greatest, probably one of the only saving graces of French philosophy in my opinion. I mean French epistemology is absolutely great, and all the people, Bachelors,

Cunningham and all, you know, Wolliman, all those people, magnificent sort of thinkers. But there have always been, precisely because of the associations, the last strands of pre-Heideggerian philosophy, they've always been kept at bay in mainstream French philosophy, so to speak. People always wanted the jazz of Heidegger. Certain sorts of performative theatrics, so to speak.

Diego, yes. yes hi i'm sorry for my delay time traveling and i had problems finding a wi-fi um but it is just to say that something related to merlot ponty's phenomenology and it is that he the way he understood phenomenology is not purely Horsalian, as you said, because it is mixed with Heideggerian sources, and also it is me, or he adds some flavor from an unknown or almost unknown

biologist and ethologist, Jacob von Uxgul. So his concept of embodiment, or his idea of embodiment, is deeply rooted in Heidegger's idea or what in Heidegger's philosophy is being in the world. Right, right. For Melopincy, it is necessary to think or to be in the world or being in the world means that your body is implied in a net or a net of... Yes, yes. In the world. Yes. In the world. Yes. In the world. Yes.

In the world. Yes. In the world. Yes. Yes. In the world. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. of the world and this is quite interesting because this concept of umboldt was also used by husser inspired by jacob von uxkul but none of them not not husser neither merleau ponty unveiled the source, but it is this idea that our experience of the world is centered

or departs from our body that is here and from here I experience the world like something that is there and that I cannot leave my body to experience the world from any other place rather that is not my own corporality, my own corpo. There is this distinction in phenomenology between corpo and life. Körper is the physical body and life is the body that I live or something. The body that I experience and the body that experienced the world.

And yes, it was just to point that. Yes, no, thank you so much. Yes, absolutely. I mean, yes, Merleau-Ponty, of course, Heidegger, but also, as you mentioned, and I mentioned Valera, right? The lineage of French phenomenology has a component of biologism in it. This is absolutely undeniable. With regard to von Oakeskoll, I mean, we should understand that, look, during the time that these people were working and even probably earlier and later,

people like, you know, I don't know, Fechner, von Oakskull, von Hartmann. There were certain sort of, you know, prevalence of these ideas, right? Majority of philosophers basically using these concepts, but without ever revealing the source precisely because they were so prevalent that everyone's supposed to know where they are coming from, right? It's just like today when we are talking about, look, the archive fossil, we don't talk about Measu, we are just talking about archive fossil, right? I mean, Phoenix Oak School had that sort of dominance, and also Gestalt theory, which is kind of, in a way, related. People weren't

talking about these precisely because they were dogmas, I mean I'm not saying it negatively, dogmas of their generation, like literally they were the most dominant sort of ideas at the background of every sort of field imaginable. just just to mention that for for melopathy to be disposed to or he transforms this this idea that the consciousness is directed towards the object the intentionality that is my body that is directed or it's my body that

yes that is towards the world because it is open to to the world and there is the body is the point when the subject and the object converge or clash. Yes, yes, yes. Very good point. Yes. And it's both things at the same time. The body is subject and object. It is intelligence and it is nature. it is a spontaneity and freedom as it is necessity and so on. Yes, yes. And of course, I mean, one of the things that, I mean, both Freya and Diego,

if you want to see, you know, the kind of like historical consequences of the sorts of embodiments in philosophy, particularly in, you know, philosophy of neuroscience, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of mind, you know, would be a Geoco, Geometry and Cognition group founded by Jean Petitot, Alamberto, Giuseppe Longo, and Jean Petit. It is essentially coming from, you know, sort of Merleau-Ponty heritage, even though they are claiming that they are coming

from a Hossalian heritage. But it cannot be true because of the way that they interpret the idea of embodiment. That is not quite Hossalian, actually. That's fundamentally Merleau-Pontyan. And the Manifesto of Geometry and Cognition is actually quite a very nice piece. You can find it, Google it, it's called GioCo, written by, I think, Jean-Péritot, Longo, and Jean Petit. Mathis, this is a very strange reference.

I haven't heard from Dylan for centuries. well i thought that this would be relevant i haven't i haven't read his uh i know that he has a couple of books uh uh but uh where is this from the scene uh phenomenology of horror okay yes okay is it you wrote for zero books and model up on here yes okay that's i think that's zero books title right i think so yes and highly impressive yes yes yes

yes one I have, I come a little back in the idea about your example about frames into the modern art on the idea of image or image theory by Brentano. And I think this, I think in the classic aesthetic, into the classic aesthetic, not really into the contemporary aesthetics. Because in contemporary aesthetics, for example, in the science, in the modern science,

there are these concepts about constructions of an image. This is one very, very in-term that relates how people, how the scientifics make synthesis or teleology or so. But the contemporary arts, for example, today contemporary artists come in another way from this construction of image. For example, Marcel Duchamp speaks about this example.

example you have today the installations installations of the in us not the installation is is like one glass a glass on the floor that has has broken because you have no one image of the world but you need you need around the the the space there's a space and time i don't know there are more explain explanation about but interesting is that there are not more the possibility the possibility of image into the contemporary art old contemporary artists like in like in the image theories i don't know happen and because say that is have one metaphysic

element i don't know um in this uh scenes uh i think this is very interesting husser theory is very important today for the contemporary art aesthetics also. Yes, yes, I mean I mean, one of the things is that I think that's really, I've been talking to my friends about this, and I think really one of the interesting way that you can actually use Hossel's theory

with regard to, you know, contemporary art and possibly, you know, sort of art is going to unfold by way of, you know, these sorts of, as I mentioned, you know, models, new models of image generation, right, would be through the lens of not the classical image theory, but really in the sense of the parallelism between perception and imagination, where basically imagination has its own function, right? It doesn't serve perception. And if we are talking about this sort of parallelism between perception and imagination,

obviously from my perspective something new comes into the picture in the sense that I tend to always interpret everything according to some sort of computational framework there would be a certain sort of computationalism that is no longer either representationalism or free floating. Precisely because imagine that if imagination and perception are disconnected, then the exchanges between imagination and perception in the Hosselian theory are not synchronic, but rather generally asynchronic.

And this requires a different sort of theory of exchange between imagination and perception. which can no longer be explained by the same, you know, process wall, fundaments, computationally understood, that we have been using it, you know, to talk about, you know, images and imagination and perceptual images and so on and so forth. I think that there are really great sort of works that we can actually incorporate into

this Hosselian sort of theory and also talk about, you know, what is actually going on when we are producing an image in the artistic way without, you know, having a vulgar recourse to old theories and so on and so forth. I think there is, as I mentioned to you, that there is something that of course is not necessarily, and it's just anti-philosopher, but I think it's quite actually very interesting in the sense of, you know, for example, from a computational understanding of what is really happening in this sort of stuff if we separate imagination from perception

and the sort of constructive powers that it permits us it's Stephen Cosselin theory of quasi-pictoriality so coslin when he was i forgot he was in stanford or was he in princeton i can't remember he developed this sort of theory uh where basically you know uh absolutely imagination and perception uh from from a sort of neuroscientific computational way cannot be conflated with one another. But then the problem is that, you know, how then you explain some sort

of things like perceptual imagery and stuff. So he theorized, and there was a huge amount of empirical studies backing this up by way of what he calls a theory of quasi-pictoriality, where basically what imagination takes as its raw material is not actually a perceptual image, but rather the decomposition of the perceptual image into a multiple array of compressed data distributed at different scales. Like, for example, think about, you see a car, right? You have a car, you have a tree, but imagine that from a computational

understanding, you can decompose the image, the perceptual image of a tree into a multiple array of memories with different sort of functions. One only is storing, for example, data about height and depth. Another one, data about texture. Another one, data about another thing. And then And precisely because these are memorial arrays, they can be associated in constructive sort of ways. The perception couldn't do that.

And one of the single functions of imagination is that it has the capacity to recompose these multiple arrays in fundamentally novel ways. Okay, we are getting a little bit ahead of ourselves. It's 11.30. We need, Lika, you need to hold your question. Let's have a six, seven minutes break. I need to get back, do the lecture, and then we open it up to questions again. Okay. Go on, Lika. Go on.

Go on. Okay, go on. I know that you won't be able to sleep tonight if you can ask it. Just a very small question. I'm not sure that we actually have a car or a tree if we are talking about... No, no, not a car. I mean, as I mentioned, you see, when I'm saying car, obviously I'm not making that sort of metaphysical claim that there is actually a car. it, right? Like, that's a perception is a certain sort of fulfillment, right? In a Hossalian way, so that you have a certain sort of what you might call to be a fulfilled encounter with the espiel realm of the object, the absent sides of it, but also with the present sides of it.

we are not calling it a car we call it like in the solaris in a way this metallurgy gray box of thingy so what is being decomposed the decomposed is essentially information that's both about the present side the present aspects or facets of the car but also the full field pretensive aspects of the car right which which happened at the moment of perceptual encounter why off the car if we do not have it we don't know what we see

yet we just see something that is somehow organized that's why yes this formal transcendental account is involved but we we do not know what we see we just see something no no it's it's really not about knowing that would be a very Kantian interpretation of you know transcendental deduction and idea of perception what we are talking about perception is an encounter with does and so synthesizable manifold, right? And there is a moment of fulfillment. Otherwise, you won't

have anything articulable as a car up the levels of conceptual articulation, right? There would be a moment of fulfillment. Otherwise, it wouldn't be a car. at the conceptual propositional level, at the level of perceptual judgment. That's what Hoselle wants to say, that conceptual judgments are actually possible precisely because there is a moment of fulfillment imminent to perceptual encounters, but there can be also moments of frustration or so-called disappointment or absence of fulfillment. And also, there are moments in which perception can never determine of either fulfillment or disappointment.

But nevertheless, with regard to a specific perceptual encounter that are being fulfilled, such as a car thingy, there would be a certain sort of array of what you might call to be data, qualitatively and quantitatively, being compressed in memory about both the present facets and the absent ones, pretensional ones, you know, and these are the ones that are being decomposed. so there isn't uh there can't be uh any uh any fantasy without an object this means yes

yes well there is no fantasy without an object except that the objects of fantasy are not objects of perception. They are fundamentally novelly and productively constructed, authentic in a sense, as opposed to Brentano's that objects of fantasy are in some way inauthentic. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, yeah, yeah. So this means that if we are in a very, very rainy foggy day, we see something in front of us, but we don't know yet what this object is. What we take this object to be is one act of perception, no, not perception, imagination,

where an object of imagination is being uh composed but uh when we will actually uh walk and see that oh this was a car this would be a completely different uh acts of yes and no yes and no because essentially this is what I want to talk about is that ultimately the objects of imagination should be understood within the framework of a different sort of temporalization that we ascribe to the objects of perception.

Within the purview of the fantasial temporalization, that is really the kind of like the Freudian side of Husserl, consciousness is being altered. it's a form of time form of temporalization that changes alters the nature of consciousness itself essentially doubles the consciousness as opposed to the perceptual temporalization where consciousness is always temporally being a stable,

and that's why it has a dozen so encounters with a present, presenting act and its object. But with representifying or presentifying acts of fantasy, consciousness itself becomes doubled. So within the double intentionality of time consciousness, imagination transforms into the double doubleization of the consciousness itself. We are going to talk about this. Seven minutes, no more.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Would you be able to bring the attendees? Let me let them in. Hello sir.

Bring the Sazam streets in. And Kirsten and Ivana and Dania. Either they are not there or they deliberately declined. But I'll try again. I feel really bad. I mean, attendees is just like, you know, when you go to a club or party and you're just like, you know, those poor people who are never being admitted. Always at the door. Actually, Lick asked me if I wanted to be promoted, but my contributions are never substantial, so I declined. Thanks anyway.

You contribute simply by talking in your voice. Your magnificent voice is just the best contribution to the class. yes so uh felipe you see there is there is something here going on so uh again yes and no right uh you know the act of imagination hossel wants to develop this sort of theory at the end uh that yes act of imagination, mere fantasy, has this sort of doubling of the consciousness in the sense that from one perspective, from one slice preview, you would see that this is a disappointment

because there is no Miss Piggy or Hermit Frog and so on and so forth hovering before me. But he also wants to say that from the perspective of the doubled consciousness, and that's what is the constitutive of the act of fantasy, as I will talk about, there is no disappointment. There is no frustration, so to speak, precisely because it is the very authentic object of imagination that is fully fulfilled, quasi-fulfillment, as he talks about.

It's just that when you stop seeing imagination as imagination in the sense of doubling of the consciousness and hence on one side fulfillment in the most authentic sort of way and the other one disappointment, then it creates something called angst in you. almost like Freudian's idea of repression. Because you have implicitly somehow compared the function of imagination as a doubling of the consciousness,

which is quite healthy in its own right, to perceptual ego, to the habits of perceptual ego, where basically there is always either disappointment or fulfillment. This is the idea of conflict. Conflict. yes yes absolutely so yes the positive conflict which is quite healthy is the very idea of what

you might call to be the unconscious understood as a doubling of consciousness right and then there is an unhealthy unconscious where basically the conflict is between habits of perceptual ego and the fantasial ego. And that's where basically, according to Freud, where you enter the nebulous realm of hysteria, where one conflict conflicts with the other sort of conflict.

And then you start to lose the sense of horizon of these two fundamentally distinct consciousness or frameworks of consciousness. hallucinations, delusions, hysterionics, repressions, angst. Yes, Maria. I wanted to ask about your reference that time functions differently in fantasy. do objects present themselves differently? What is their essence in fantasy?

The essence of fantasy is absolutely presentification. You see, Diego said something higher up. Higher up is completely right. However, I think there's a bit of a translation issue here with regard to German English that should be accounted for. So essentially, Husserl wants to say that fantasies are of representations for what he calls present, English translation, presentifications. Perceptions of our present-ing or present-ing.

The reason I think I actually go with this idea put forward in a number of new dictionaries on Hosserl, that perhaps we shouldn't actually to talk about representing at all when it comes to Husserl. Because representing simply means something like Kantian sort of representation, right? Like as if imagination modifies something originally given in presentation. And hence that would be just Brentanian idea of phantasmata as inauthentic objects, right? But Husserl wants to say that no, Strangely enough, imagination presents its own objects.

It's just that they are not the objects of presenting of the perception, and hence, nor of the presentifying nature. Freya, how do you pronounce as if, thus all? Sorry, can you repeat that? The pronunciation of as if in German, is it das oder? Als ob. Als ob. Yeah, with an L. Als ob. Als ob. So, essentially, the nature of this presentification, which is not of Kantian representation, is really as if.

What is as if? It simply means that we are conscious of the fact that the object is absent, permeating through all of our imaginations. And if we are not actually, for one moment, we are not conscious of the as if clause here, then we are actually in the realm of hallucination or delusions. Because if the consciousness of the absence does not permeate the act of fantasying,

then what does guarantee that the act of fantasying be not? a form of hallucination and does it mean that this as if is the essence of fantasies or we cannot speak about the essence in a sense yes it is it is an essence yes but but i understood in the sense that what as if implies here right in the sense that it's a fiction that is conscious of its own fictionalism, right? Kind of like Hans Weihinger, you know, the philosophy of as if, right? That there are

different sorts of fictions, some bad fictions. Bad fictions, Heis Weihinger says that, what he calls bad fiction, is that when a fiction tries to become reality, right? Like as if, you know, a proton, an atom, these are bad fictions, according to Hans Wehinger. But imagine that there is a fiction that is actually fiction by virtue of itself being conscious of its own fictional ethos. Of its somehow paraconsistent rather paradoxical nature.

isn't it all fictions that are consciously fictions are of that nature right novel fiction novels right uh otherwise it would be conspiracy theory right uh conspiracy theories are essentially fictions that try to encroach upon reality. Whereas we have fictions that are fictions by virtue of being fiction, by virtue that there are bundles of premise-consequence relations that are always in conflict. And we always see the conflict that is not really a conflict in a

negative sense. It's a conflict that drives a fiction, that drives a novel, right? And Hans Weyhenjewski wants to say that the nature of as if belongs to the latter category of fictions, what he calls proper fictions, in the sense that there are real fictions by virtue of being consciousness, conscious of themselves as being fiction. Models are fictions in that precise sort of way, like scientific models, right? No one actually in practice of science thinks a model

of, I don't know, elliptical movements of celestial bodies is actually the movement of celestial bodies. It's a model by virtue of being conscious of its own theoretical premises and consequences. All very controlled. Encapsulated in what we call the structure of the model. And then this only allows you to apply the model in this sort of way

if you are applying it to reality rather than in a sort of haphazard way. uh my apologies uh luca you wanted to say something yes i i just wanted to check is this double doubling of consciousness always happening in relation in the act of imagination for sale um i mean i in emergency fantasy or however yes uh i mean from my understanding is that

yes uh but maybe i'm wrong uh i mean this is a big claim uh but i i generally would say yes Yes, to that answer. I mean to that question. Diego? Diego? Just to say that, or to mention that I was saying representation, the German word is when she it can be translated representation or representification as as you said um the idea is that the objects of perception are actually present whereas the objects of image consciousness are

represented uh but not in a kantian sense that's not in the not in the they are brought their absence or or they they bring back something that is not present like a memory that they the simple example is like a memory the memory is an object of consciousness that is not there as something present but it's brought back or bring again yes for consciousness and in a way that it represents makes something present again that there really means that it brings something yes but not as in reproducing it in that sort of content so exactly the reason that i uh look

Diego, I completely understand that. But look, in our class, there is a bunch of Szilardian infidels. Well, so many. So if you are actually doing representation, then that would be a very confusing sort of vocabulary. Yes, but I think that there is a difference indeed or between how imagination i think i mean there is actually a difference between how imagination works and how a fantasy works and is this idea that fantasy does not represent but makes something present

by its own right it's something and by its own time that's exactly but it's something Exactly, but it's something that is not present like a physical or perceptual object. And this is important because it implies also a corporal and spatial dimension. Later Husserl, talking about the Husserl of the second investigations and in the Cartesian meditations, explores the difference between what he calls the immanent sphere of consciousness,

are again a heart sphere and the transcendental sphere of consciousness and there are two two differences or for example uh classical or or an archetypical if we may say mode of consciousness of inmanent consciousness is imagination is imagination and fantasy whereas the perception is a classical example or the example par excellence of transcendental consciousness. Transcendental meaning that is something that is beyond the consciousness but exceeds the body. Something there and the thing is that the objects of perception

are not just temporal different from the objects of imagination and fantasy in a temporal sense, but also in a spatial sense, because the objects of imagination are present there, in front of me, and they are not me. Hovering, hovering, hovering before me, yes. They appear, Husserl says, as a factum. They just appear.

but it just emerges and it does not require me. And that's the reason why it presents itself as something there. Whereas I am here, that perceptual object is there as a presence. Right. I mean, the reason that I actually brought the idea of the model was precisely this. So model is a factum in that sort of fantasial sort of way, as if, as Hans Weyhenger has it. It's that, look, you might say this, of course, you know, you can, of course, have various sort of way

to interpret the valency of how models actually have any sort of traction on furniture of the world, right? On facts in the empirical sort of naive sort of sense. And I don't want to go uh into the that sort of avenue but even someone like uh james lady man right uh james lady man uh there is this interview there is this astronomer astrophysicist uh said that look you know atoms are real right and james lady man being such a scary figure uh

with this Rastafani hair, he starts to chuckle and says, no, no, no, what the fuck are you talking about? There is no real atom, these are representations. By that he doesn't mean representations in the, you know, Kantian sort of way, but really that these are essentially factums belonging to a different area or arena of consciousness, which for the better or worse, at least with regard to the scientific enterprise, we can call them models, right? That essentially models are of this sort of nature that you have been talking about.

and it is what for example like uh you know wehinger or even a hardcore representationalist in uh in that sort of modeling sort of way want to say is that look you can't actually say anything about the facts of observation without the specific facts of models. The facts of models translate to that of as if fantasial acts are constitutive

of the possibilities of how we can have any sort of insight whatsoever about the facts of empirical nature. That's, I think, is a very quite actually opens up a whole new arena for us to investigate that what would be then the ontological status of phantasmata in Hosselian way, as if objects in Hans Weyhenger sense or model scientific models in the contemporary sense. That's why I actually posted that thing on Discord,

you know, the ontological status of essences in Hossel, which is really a great essay. we will come to this. Okay, so I want to just go over some of the stuff that we have been talking about. Can you just add something that came to my mind? The idea that even Husserl makes his comprehension about perceptual consciousness even more complex in the way that he says that the object of perception is not only present, but at the same time, there is an absence

implying it because I just, when I face an object of perception, I only see or perceive a face, a layer, whereas the other faces, the back of the object is absent, is not there. So it has to be represented or bring the parts of the object that I cannot see right here and right now as present must be represented or presentified if the word is possible by image consciousness and by memory

And that is something that Merleau-Ponty saw and read pretty, pretty well. The idea that experience or perceptual experience is not, are dealing not only with presences, but also with absence and obscurities. Yes, yes. No, that's a good point. But however, there should be, I would call, an addendum put forward with regard to the insight that you gave us that however you see even though all perceptions are built upon

a certain sort of what you might call to be a fulfillment in coma. Coma in the sense that, you know, that there is always an absence within an unconscious, in the sense of absence of facets playing within that role. However, Hosselle wants to say that there is a far more radical sort of absence specific to the Fantasial Act It is not absence of a facet, but the consciousness of absence itself, right, that permeates the act from the beginning to the end.

an imagination that does not carry over the consciousness of absence of an object from the beginning to the end in bold actually is not warranted or guaranteed to be an imagination It could be very much a hallucination. So there is a highlighting of the absence, the role of absence in the act of imagination that is far more radical than the role of absence in perception as absent facets.

questions before I start oh by the way uh Filippo you asked something about what was it Hosell and intuitionism right what was it Filippo what was the the the exact nature of that question on this court I was briefly briefly mentioning my interest in in the seminar with regards to some research research I've been doing on intuitionism and Brouwer's account of uh time as uh preceding time is preceding space in in Kant's account of of the intuition but nothing very specific

well any remarks you might have or pointers would be welcome maybe not now at the moment sure sure no I mean I I thought of when I was answering sorry it's Sunlight is in my face. When I was actually, you know, talking to Diego, I thought about this, because there is actually something with regard to this idea of absence. It's also present in the idea of Husserl and its connection to, you know, intuitionism and also intuitionistic logic. These two intuitionism and intuitionistic logic are quite different. They cannot be actually bunched together. With regard to recommendations, yes, there is a work called Husserl and Mathematics,

right? It's a book, very, very good collection of essays. Then there is an essay, if I'm not mistaken, by Richard Tizen. I think the spelling is T-I-E-Z-E-N. About Husserl and Brouwer. Husserl meets Brouwer or something like that. I can't remember the exact title. But obviously, yes, there is a connection between Husserl and Brouwer intuitionism, precisely

because they both put the emphasis on so-called transcendental subjects, right? the mind, the subject, the confirmation, the verification, so to speak, doesn't work without what you may call to be intuition. Not in Kantian sense, in the sense of intuition as a founding act, either categorical intuition or intuition in the Browerian sense. However, I think that we should be mindful of this thing that majority of the sort of connections that have been made to present Husserl

as Browerian or Brower as Husserlian are not actually well founded. They have been done by people like Oscar Becker, right, was a German mathematician, was also a protege of Husserl, and other sort of people overextending some of the assumptions yeah the only connection I'm aware of is not with regard to Brower

being Husserlian because so far I haven't found any mention of Husserl in Brower's writings no no no absolutely they never read each other, right? So the only tissue, the only tissue between them is Oscar Becker, right? Oscar Becker was a student of Brouwer, but also a student of Husserl. And he tried to kind of synthesize Husserl's ideas with that of Brouwer. Oscar Becker, check it out. But yes, no, they never actually encountered, but there have been numerous sort of studies have been written about, you know, the connection of a cell with Breuer. The thing is that with Breuer,

um, yes, on the surface, it appears that intuitionism, which pertains to the idea that you know that mathematical objects cannot be constructed or cannot be verified by some force independent of transcendental subject or transcendental ego right that would be his difference from what you might call to be either Platonist mathematicians in and Platonist mathematicians come in variety sort of ways

but also you know kind of Hilbertians of the time the thing is that if you really think about this, so there would be P, either P or not P, Q, or neither P nor Q, that sort of stuff, you know. And then you run a kind of report by way of Brouwer or a cell on P, not P or Q, or neither P nor Q.

Yeah, when you actually run this sort of scanning, you notice that you can't actually wed Husserl so straightforwardly with Brouwer or otherwise, or the reverse. The reason is something like that. You see, when we say that a mathematical object, look, first, first, actually, before I move, is that intuitability, both for Breuer and Hossel, is another name for fulfillability. right something can be categorically intuited in so far as it can be fulfilled

namely it can be constructed and be verified right objectively there is however a very catch here that distinguishes Breuer from Rossell in Breuer mathematical objects are in perpetuity in what sense not in platonic sense but in the constructive mathematical sense in the sense that fulfillment if an object is being fulfilled intuitively according to the canon of the intuitionism. In perpetuity,

we hold this object to be thus and so. In Osel, there is no such a thing as a perpetuity for the moment of fulfillment. Because look, if you see a table and your perception is being fulfilled that this is thus and so semblance of a table and so on and so forth, two minutes later you might actually notice that it was just a different sort of chair. The fulfillment criteria

namely intuitability in ourselves is not in perpetuity. It can change. Whereas intuitionism, by virtue of its mathematical sort of dimension, objects that are being mathematically fulfilled from an intuitionistic perspective are fulfilled in perpetuity forever that's really bizarre i thought that brower was holding that precisely

uh precisely the opposite against uh hilbert for example still um no no you see hilbert hilbert has a different sort of idea hilbert's idea is that is not really the uh as if bra is a fine artist pro finite processes and hilbert it's kind of infinite sort of stuff. No, they're mathematical objects should be always in perpetuity, right? But just the nature of this perpetuity that's important for them. For Breuer, it's of the intuition, right? Of categorical intuition, the founding acts and the founded that we constructed.

But as for Hilbert, this construction doesn't actually there, right? There is no mathematical objects are not being derived from intuition, but rather from forces independent of all sorts of subjective minded intuitions. But nevertheless, they are both are in perpetuity. Once you actually make an object, like let's say parallel lines, right? The parallel axiom. It is in perpetuity within the system of Euclid, right? Within the system of Euclid. okay thanks the sources of these two how a parallelism is being derived for hilbert

and brauer is different okay so i only have one really quick question then uh could could we say that for example Jean-Yves Girard is more Husserlian than Brouwerian because yeah okay for Girard Euclid's fifth the fossil it stops working when we want to introduce hyperbolic geometry so you can cut it out of of your system no i wouldn't say that any of these actually logicians or philosophers can be at the end of the day be considered to be hossalians

because the nature of the hossalian fulfillment is that the nature of fulfillment is never given in perpetuity right I think that it is so easy for us to you know because Voiselle talks about intuition embodiment so on so forth and these people also talk about intuition and so on so forth but it's just that there are not the same levels or understanding of intuition as founding acts. For yourself,

an intuition, as I mentioned, is essentially an object of doubt in the Cartesian sort of way. doubt in the sense that every intuition can start to fragment in the probabilistic sense but also can start to re-amplify the sense of objectivity whereas in the intuitionistic sense and also Girard or in fact all of that sort of uh intuitionistic flavor mathematics and logics uh once

uh an object is being constructed and attained within that framework of construction in bold it would be an object in perpetuity it is not an object of doubt but an object that can only be reconstructed according to the transition between frameworks of construction such as for example you know we move from the parallelism in the Euclidean sense to Lopachovskian framework of making parallel lines. That's not an object of doubt really.

We don't doubt Euclid's parallel postulate, right? We reconstruct it according, by moving into a different framework of construction thank you so much absolutely jesus christ god almighty it's 12 30. okay okay so So forget about image consciousness. We don't deserve to know anything about image consciousness. We have to escape the image consciousness, go really go to imagination.

Right. So think about this. While image consciousness is based on the conflicted double apprehension of image thing, mentioned with regard to Walter Sickert's Jack the Ripper, as image object, an image object as image subject, the imagination, Husserl however argues that this conflict does not possess the same form of constitution, That is to say the same type of double consciousness.

In contrast to image consciousness, the consciousness of a fantasial image, such as a pink elephant flying before me, right? is not based on the perception of an image thing or an image object. To see an image of a pink elephant flying before me It's not the same to imagine seeing this pink elephant blowing.

In the case of imagination, the relation between the imaginary pink elephant and any perceptual given is disconnected severed in uh Cosell's own word the givenness of an imaginary flying elephant is not based on something that is present. In this sense we do not have an image object. The relation to the present is lacking completely in the appearance of the imaginary pink flying elephant.

As with image consciousness, Husserl also speaks of the imagination as a consciousness of otherness. But the sense of otherness that enters into play in the imagery is of a somehow more radical form. precisely because of the given sense of absence constitutive as the basis of anything that could be said to be present.

right as I said the conscious of absence transitively carries over with anything that could be said to be present still when we imagine something it is present it's just that it is present transitively through and through by consciousness of the absence of the present of an actually pink elephant flying.

So indeed the imaginary is an intuitive consciousness of that which is not present Not, however, in the sense of something that once was present, but in a stronger sense of something that could never be actually present. In that sense, as a form of intentionality, imagination is an objectivating and self-transcending act of pure apprehension. one that intends an intentional object as irreal, but not inauthentic.

As an irreal object, the imaginary flying pink elephant transcends consciousness, Yet its transcendence does not move the same register as perceptual transcendence. In other words, in acts of imagination and phantasing acts, an imaginary object is given to consciousness in and through a self-produced semblance of its perceptual activity. or what Husserl calls quasi-perception. Quasi-perception.

So the idea of quasi here is quite interesting. You know, when we are saying quasi, simply we are talking about quasi-perception, quasi-time, quasi-encounter, right? For us, this idea of quasi simply means that there is a way that we could actually talk about the objects of imagination in analogy with the objects of perception. however precisely because we cannot talk about them coherently

in the sense of objects of perception we call them for the time being quasi sorry i have to give me two minutes i will come back sorry something emergency i just saw it one second i'm coming back Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

So as I was saying, you know, the imaginary or fantasial flying elephant transcends consciousness. However, its transcendence does not move in the same register as perceptual transcendence. in acts of fantasying a fantasial object is given to consciousness in and through a self-produced semblance or so-called similitude now of course this is something that you can study on yourself

I don't want to say that what is exactly the nature of the semblance or similitude. All I can say is that it's definitely not in the sense of Brentano's original associations, what Brentano calls proteorestatist, originary associations. It's a different sort of way, but regardless, yes, so through a self-produced semblance of its own perceptual activity, or what Hoselle calls a quasi-perception.

For example, if I sing a melody, a tune in my head, and in this fashion, imagine hearing a melody, a tune, I don't actually hear the melody yet. I hear. To imagine a melody is to imagine hearing a melody, the act. Much as to imagine a flying elephant is to imagine seeing a flying elephant. In the imagination, the noematic and the noetic components of intentionality are appropriately and respectively modified.

It is as if, underlined, I perceived a flying elephant. On the noetic side, consciousness has undergone what Husserl usually calls a reproductive modification. insofar as consciousness reproduces or replicates its own perceptual activity in a modified form. A modified form. Remember what I said last time that sometimes it actually makes this sort of A slippery move when it talks about modification that you don't know whether when it says about

modificatory, does it mean modification of the content or the modification of the form? With regard to this imagination, it's really the modification of the form. like the difference between presentification representification the way that Diego was talking about and presenting the present scene is really the modification of form beyond and yes there is a whole story about the modification of content which we are not going to talk about right now uh so on the nomadic side the intentional object is modified in terms

of its givenness manner of givenness so to speak and this accounts what you might call to be pure pure fantasy or pure imagination is distinct from imagining of a possibility or wishing a certain state of affairs in which case or cases the imagined or fantasied object is posited as a possible actuality and therefore indexed with the temporal character of a possible Now, when I purely fantasy a flying elephant, I do not imagine this flying elephant as something that I might possibly perceive or would want to possibly perceive.

The character of the as if should not be conflated with the character of the might be, right? I.e. potentiabilities or possibilities in that sort of naive sense. Ultimately, the option of Husserl's suggestive analysis is that imagination is the appearance of appearance. with a double meaning, a double consciousness. Consciousness induces within itself a semblance of its own perceptual activity in a modified form. I create a similitude, a semblance of my

own perceptual activity in imagining that I see a flying elephant. This semblance of perception constitutes the as if component of the imaginary object. The flying elephant appears to me as if it actually appeared to me because in fantasying the flying elephant it is as if i actually perceived a flying elephant when i imagine a flying elephant a pegasus a lama suit whatever i am not seeing an image of flying elephants in my mind instead i

seem to see a flying elephant, when in actual fact I am not actually seeing anything at all, and resembling what it's like to see a perceptual object without actually believing that I am in fact looking at something, the real consciousness, the very insidious sort of way, comes to neutralize itself to the extent that its own simulated or quasi-perception is experienced yet not posited for itself as an actual

factoid experience. Consciousness in this fashion becomes itself a real and comes to experience itself at a distance, according to Ronald Bernet. Transcends itself in encountering itself in its pure imminence. So, accordingly, uncouples imagination from image consciousness in making a distinction between the consciousness of the conflict of image consciousness and the consciousness

of the not present of the imagination. Both forms of double consciousness belong to the genus of re-presentification or presentification as defined and standing against perception or presentification or presenting or presenting. whereas image consciousness is a mediated consciousness that is to say something we can call other something other is being presented in something presently given here and now in front

of me not hovering before me imagination is on the other hand in one sense is a key akin to perceptual consciousness, since its object is directly given without the mediation of so to speak an image or intermediary representation, internal or otherwise. Yet contrary to what Brentano, Brentano's analysis of the imagination as an inauthentic presentation, a phenomenological examination, in the Husserlian vein reveals that the imagination is

actually an authentic presentation in its own right. So we come to the pinnacle of Husserl's central insight that I would carry it over to the next session, but I want to finish this. We still have time. And what is this Cosell's central insight? Well, it is the insight into the discontinuity wedged between imagination and perception. A discontinuity that you can actually say a decoupling for us to understand the problem of time consciousness writ large.

And that hinges on a subtle attentiveness to the fluctuating character of a fantasial object's manner of givenness. when you imagine seeing a flying elephant this imaginary or fantasial appearance as an you know kind of intentional object of consciousness facilitates fluctuates before me hovering before me much as an object under the pulsing illumination of a strobe epilepsy inducing light.

An imaginary object, so to speak, belongs to the God Proteus. It is a protean objects in its manner of givenness. of givenness that is to say not only in the sense that an imaginary object can be transformed somehow by the miracles of imagination into another object such as for example the flying pink elephant turns into a pink lucifer

right but just as importantly in the sense that an imaginary object is unstable in its manner of givenness, hence its protean nature. Thus, fantasial objects lack a sort of stability of perceptual objects, and in this sort of way, possess a different form of objectivity and objectification by virtue of their modified form of temporality and temporalization.

Due to a fantasial object's disconnection, or rather discontinuity, with any source of actual so-called perceptual presence, The imaginary objects cannot be constituted as an individual object in the same sense we ascribe to a perceptual object. It is questionable whether we can, if at all,

even speak of an imaginary object as an individual object, given its temporal form. In what sense, you might ask, Is the imagination of a flying pink elephant imagined today is the same as the imaginary flying pink elephant imagined yesterday or tomorrow? what is really the enigma of imagination here with regard to the enigma of time

is that what Hussain kind of talks about is that the consciousness of others which is constitutive of our self-consciousness, right? You know, in a alien vulgar sort of way. It's always a very sort of vague sort of indexicality and nominalization. I don't want to sell you this sort of crass

sentence that, look, have you ever noticed that when we are calling other, we usually imply others, that would be just too crass, philosophical insight to sell you, right? But there is something actually there. that the consciousness of others or the other, either in Levinasian sense or any sort of other sort of way, is essentially, by its definition, the sort of fauzy objects of fantasing acts,

having its own temporality, where basically it is neither pluralization in the sense that I have seen so many trees in this field, nor of the kind of Kantian way, I see this tree planted this and that way in this field. By virtue of its constitution, the fantasial object, the phantasma, is of a nebulous kind. Its otherness can never be either singular or plural.

Precisely because it's otherness of a consciousness reproducing itself in the act of imagination. So, an imaginary flying elephant as given in a determinate act of consciousness does not by any means occupy a fixed and determinate objective temporal position.

As I said, when I fantasy seeing myself in a field such as in the Alp or in the Zagras while at the same time kind of half listening to, I don't know, a pop music.

The imaginary scene called up or rather evoked or conjured up In my mind, and the dull voice of, you know, of the music that goings on and on in the background, it cannot be placed in any direct temporal relation. which is to say the imaginary object

and the perceptual objects are not simultaneous with one another. Husserl talks about this quite extensively in his later works and lectures. What I would like to say is that, well, of course, this is an insight um into uh you know to what herself might call the constitutive connection between different sense of objective being and different forms of temporality

even though a fantasy a fantasied or fantasial object is given in what we call quasi-time and with that respect cannot be placed in any direct relation, temporal or otherwise, for example, a spatial, causal, so on and so forth, with perceptual objects. Husserl wants to argue in these later works, you know, particularly post-burnout manuscripts, lectures wants to argue that imaginary objects can retrospectively post eventus

be placed in such a relationship an imaginary object can be re-temporalized in a secondary apprehension on the basis of an association, an analogy with a perceptual object. Therefore, in this sort of way, the imaginary or phantasy object then becomes objectified into an image. However, in this sort of secondary apprehension, we can only apprehend the act of imagination as having been present, but not as having once been actually present, as would be the case in, for example, remembering as it were.

When I recall an object as having once been actually perceived as it were. In the case of imagination, the fantasied object was never given as actually present, and therefore its secondary apprehension in the form of an image somehow paradoxically is a reactivation of a past without an assignable present, according to Ossero. Therefore, a problem emerges is that this implies a reactivation, a revitalization, a reawakening of an experience that was never constituted as an actual experience in the first place.

and thus it leads us to this path to this sort of phenomenological eidetic insight that there ought to be an alternative temporality when it comes to imagination as a double consciousness that forces himself to revise his apprehension contents of apprehension you know interpretation of intentionality if interpreted along the lines

of this apprehension schema difference between perception and fantasy would then exclusively reside in different forms of apprehension. Therefore, according to this sort of interpretation, an underpinning non-intentional sensation is itself present as actually lived experience on the basis of which an intentional act of apprehension intends its transcendent object but however then in that case the underlying sensible content would remain neutral now even though Husserl speaks of sensation phantasmata or phantasms as different kinds

of imminent contents you know correlative to perceiving acts or perceptual acts or acts of imagination in both examples in both instances the apprehension of an object as either perceptual or as imaginary is based on a content that itself is present in imminent consciousness. And, you know, Ossal in logical investigation says that the imagination is considered to be an intentional consciousness with an imperfect manner of fulfillment in contrast to the perfect manner of fulfillment of perceptual experience in which the object itself given in flesh and blood.

Hossel's, end quote. But Hossel's account of imagination has shown that the imaginary object is given as quasi-reality, not as inauthentic reality, but a reality of its own, in the temporal sense of not actually something present. in perceptual consciousness our consciousness relates to an object in an intentional manner while also relating to ourselves that is as Rossell says I experience myself as perceiving the tree I experience myself as actually perceiving in the case of imagination if such acts are based on

are some irreal quasi objects, namely phantasmata, in what sense then does consciousness actually experience itself? How are irreal objects of phantasm, so-called phantasmata, are being experience. In this sense, you can say that eminence, because you see both perceptual objects and phantasmata are eminent objects of consciousness, but then in this sense, coming to the distinction between fantasying and perceiving, in this sense, then

eminence cannot actually be interpreted as an indifferent, monotone, gray of real content that is somehow distinguished at the level of acts of intentionality. In fact, it's completely a different sort of way. in a sense that consciousness becomes itself altered, modified, in modifying its own sense of experiencing, which is imminent to the act of fantasy.

in imagining that I am a god my consciousness becomes god right in a certain sort of to overextend this metaphor right imagination is an alteration of consciousness through and through, in which its self-presence becomes altered, its own character as consciousness, as lived experience, becomes renewed, revitalized, reconstituted in a different form

of imminent temporality or self-temporalization which is the characteristics of this new consciousness rather than the old perceptual one. The act is experienced as not actually present. Consciousness is given to itself as not ever present in the way of, in the form of quasi-real. Authentic, but not real. In that sense, imminent sensible content

must already be temporalized along with the specific temporal character of its act of intentionality which is to say fantasy is then constituted as a form of inner time consciousness capable of modifying the nature of time consciousness of itself time consciousness itself and by extension the consciousness of object objectification

and objectivity. Okay. I mean there are oh i forgot about i was supposed to actually present that diagrams about protention talk about them i forgot i forgot sorry i will i will go over that um but yes okay so before we open it so ultimately this comes to this idea that there is a difference

between the sort of consciousness that goes into perception either of disappointment nature or frustration or fulfilling nature right or for that matter, empty intention. From the sort of intentions and consciousness that goes into the act of imagination, fantasy, the difference between the consciousness that I am imagining and the imagined act of consciousness,

what we call the quasi-perception, is internal to time consciousness, or so. This is what Osser calls a doubling of consciousness, or double of consciousness. Consciousness reproduces itself in a modified temporal form, in such a manner that consciousness provokes an internal division, a split, within its own ego. And this is in Hossel's parlance, the imagined objects, for example, an imagined tune is nested

within a quasi perception of an imaginary ego, which in turn is nested in the present ego ad infinitum. that's a lot of mystical shit going on here yeah i mean at a certain moment you think you you you you're grasping it but then it's all confusion in a way well i forgot to read you i mean there is nothing to grasp in the end

of the day it's kind of like yeah yeah well well this is this is this is this is actually you know I I think that there should be a movie called the attack of zombie ideas right this is this from Husserl right this is it says meanwhile the long for clarity beckons us after long labors We think the most glorious results are so near at hand that we have only to stretch our hands forth to grasp them. All difficulties seem to dissolve. Our critical sense mows down contradictions one by one. Till only one last step remains.

We sum up our results. We begin with a self-conscious therefore. And then at once a point of difficulty starts up that gets bigger and bigger. It spreads and spreads into a form of horror and that devours all our arguments and reanimates the contradictions we have just mown down. The corpses all revive and grin at us mockingly. Our struggle and effort have to begin all over again. That is essentially what phenomenology is.

The attack of zombie ideas from outside of time and space. Okay. All ears. We started 15 minutes late, so if Lika is so generous to us, maybe we can go 10 more minutes and then we wrap it up

yes yes sure I'm all ears Bruno, Lane, Delshad Michael Diego I mean all of you my dear friends Rika your highness I don't know

I was thinking about the theories, our theories about the universe, how it is organized, and that nevertheless, they are the only theories. They are being confirmed in the end of the day, some of them. so i don't know what this means that uh this imagination of how how the thing how the physical universe can be organized this imagination is some kind of

for some kind of knowledge as well. It's not a knowledge. It's not a knowledge. Essentially, Husserl wants to talk about that imagination in a certain sort of way, by way of its own specific mode of temporalization and its double consciousness. It's the congenial possibility. of all possibilities of encounters, whether of the third kind with aliens or just with others.

That's actually quite a very radical sort of claim, I would say. And yeah, I think that Freud, based on our last seminar, has that sort of stuff. But it's just Freud wants to somehow distort it and twist it into some sort of, you know, kind of materialist, energetist thesis. It's just like kind of vulgar. yeah yeah yeah in his account if there is no object to our desire to the desire of a child then the child experiences frustration and this is i don't know this is some kind of

um wants to be very specific with the idea of frustration like that frustration for him is that And yeah, it's, you know, precisely because Freud really does not actually, first of all, there is one thing that is common between both Husserl and Freud. And that is coming from Berentano, their common teacher, right? In the sense that the vocabulary, as I mentioned by Jacques Boverice, the vocabularies, the language of the unconscious happens to be the language of consciousness. There is no way around it, right? There is no access to the vocabulary of the unconscious other than the consciousness.

However, Freud wants to turn this into the unconscious, right? As a sort of energetic psychic flux gnawing at the consciousness, whereas Husserl wants to say that no, that in fact the unconscious should be understood extremely productively in the act of imagination, in doubling of the consciousness. The unconscious is nothing but the doubling of consciousness. The consciousness sees itself as a sort of alien, xeno entity in the act of imagination.

And that provides a certain sort of platform for us to actually talk about any sort of possibility about perception and the sort of objectification, objectivity, objects, so on and so forth. and has nothing to do with that there is a dark undercurrent going through us working behind the back of consciousness as employed no the only thing that works behind the back of consciousness is goddamn consciousness yeah so having no object

sorry not so having no no object as i understood uh having no object is uh just a condition that activates a mode of thinking uh another mode of yes uh i wouldn't call it a mode of thinking a mode of noesis you know because thinking saying means a lot of sort of things yeah yeah it's just psychoanalytic vocabulary of this Wilfred Bion, he says that no object is a condition of thinking as he understands it. He goes against Freud there, I think. Yeah, what I wanted to say?

It reminded me, this thinking is a sort of daydreaming and reverious, he says. What is suspicious or just strange, bizarre for me at this point is that we are having this conversation, this whole conversation, because this reverie, this daydreaming, is it really in the scope of philosophy? in philosophy we are just well this is i told you that you know was cell is why i said that you know

wassell is a guy who completes the circle of german idealism right not trump there is a reason for it because wassell wants to for for for many many years and many lineage of philosophy, people want to always talk about objects, right? But Hussabh wants to talk about appearances, not in the sense that analytic philosophy has talked about saving the appearances, right? But rather into the nature of appearances.

So he has a very platonic spirit in that sort of way of understanding that what is it that I actually see thus and so as specters on the wall of human prison? right the fact that you are seeing appearances needs an explanation itself you cannot take it for granted right you need to come with a theory of appearances no matter how cherished and so given they are to you in a sense this is i think that

Dan Zavi Dan Zavi is a little bit of a conservative philosopher I mentioned last session but I think that he is right you see it's not I mean the first thing that you really need to actually understand according to the Sosalian sort of line of inquiry it's not something like Sallar's myth of the given, right? There are certain sort of givens, semantically, epistemologically, or categorically, but rather that what can count as an appearance? By virtue of what?

that in a sense Sellars tries to make a leapfrog in the realm of appearances it doesn't actually say what motivates does not so creatures like us to have appearances in the first place he tries to make ideas about representation picturing and so on and so forth what or so if it was alive we would say well you know for example uh you know uh

uh, cellars as a, uh, being and being known, you know, about the Android with a picturing Android and, you know, scans like a terminator, various slices of, of, of things perspectively and then synthesize them and becoming able to navigate the world uh someone said okay this is all good and great but what does motivate any sort of robot of this sort of nature to have representation like

that's actually quite a very very serious sort of philosophical problem I would say you see you can't simply talk about representation in the vocabulary of representation because that would be begging of the question in the humean sort of way you need to say what motivates us to have representations and presentifications of this sort right i don't and that's why i think that was cell it was alive would have a fit about this whole scientific image of course was was always against this tendency for haphazard naturalization

haphazard underlined naturalization of human intelligence because the question of motivation is there I think that within the scientific image there is still a component of the unconscious not in a Freudian sense but in Brentonian a Brazilian sense the question of motivation nobody knows how the life started to exist the question is that it's not about nobody knows what intelligence is but the fact that you are

making this sort of question you are motivated in a certain sort of way to ask this sort of question why didn't you ask about some other sort of thing like pokemon i don't know you know all sorts of You could ask me any sort of question. Why did you ask me this sort of question, right? You are motivated to ask this question, and that motivation needs to be investigated. And that is the subject of Rockefeller questioning back. But that was also the way in for Heidegger, no? Yeah. as I said you know

it's only a matter of time now and that question of motivation has some vicious or takes some vicious paths as the theological term this kind of answer to the problem of motivation given from who's how is the name of this French philosopher who wrote something as the philosophy of the gift understanding that for phenomenology you mean Marceau Moss yes

I think you mean the American Indian tribes that's Marceau Moss Yes, but there is also this work from Jean-Luc Marion, a French philosopher, who is also a scholar on the CURP. And he exposes the way in which, departing from Husser, but not exactly based on Heidegger and Levinas thought, there is a kind of mystification and theological turning phenomenology in the sense that they understood the motivation of to have representations as

answering to something that is a gift, the gift of sense, the gift of being, and so on, and how it kind of reproduces yes some religious ideas that yeah i mean i need to i need a problem i need to update my you know philosophy uh by reading levinas i have read levinas but i mean systematically uh marion and all these people it's just that I have a certain sort of queasy feeling that when he was using your word gift here, what do you actually mean? It's a little bit cheesy also.

Yes. I don't know. I mean, Husserl tried to be as rational as he could but they pushed him into the sphere of the mystics and and some kind of darkness that is very problematic. Yes, I don't know. Yes, I mean, look, it's not as if I'm against mysticism or religion by any sort of way, but I just think, you know, even though I have criticized Ocon's razor quite, you know throughout my works but i think okans is right look if you actually

have a better explanation then why are you using these sort of excessive flourished sort of vocabulary such as gift such as telus such as this that you know these are they are kind of like, you know, goes against Okan's razor, right? I don't know. I mean, look, I might actually change my idea, but with regard to Heidegger, no, I absolutely, I think that I I should actually do make an engagement. I mean, I don't do Heidegger,

but if I do, I usually put in two words, screw Heidegger. I think that that should be overcome and I should actually start to read him. It's just that I think that the theatrics kind of is off putting to me. Hosselle doesn't have theatrics, absolutely not. And this thing, this dance thing about and around the death and time. Yes, yeah, I mean, she's, yeah, yeah. God.

But I was thinking about the experience of otherness. that taking who serves approach into account, one can say that we never just perceive the other, but we imagine it and we fantasize the other, we basically modify it. And one can say that we make something similar with ourself.

I mean, I think that is actually the proto-Hussellian thesis that, in fact, how we doubling our consciousness, turning our consciousness to another consciousness is actually the constitutive moment, not the entirety of the constitution of otherness, you know, conception of the other. but nevertheless it's a constituent moment for understanding the other and it's in our own doubling of consciousness what we do to ourselves yes okay Diego I'm really sorry but I think we should

take another question okay yeah sure sorry no no no worries love you Diego uh uh maria yeah i i got a bit lost with the last things you were talking about your camera oh no it's that condition you'll have to imagine it um yes so um well i actually wanted to i mean i had this suspicion in the last um session about the, I don't know if that is the right word in English, but the adjudicating, like making a sort of necessary connection between the pretensive moments. I'm sorry,

this is like out of nowhere, but this, you know, when you presented the diagram of impression, retention and pretension, like there was this like index of like E23, E33, E34, et cetera, Sarah, 824. Yeah. And I was thinking that this, why should there should be a correspondence? I mean, I think because now you're presenting this stuff around fantasy motivation. And for me, like there was no necessity, no correspondence between pretension in a specific moment in time. because yeah and and there is actually no correspondence here essentially uh you see

uh would actually would be completely fine to say the model of uh you know elementary model of elementary time consciousness in terms of retention uh originary impression protention is an empty intention, right? He's not going to say that it's actually intention in the full sense, in the sense of fulfillment. It's an empty intention. It's just a model by virtue of its being empty. Empty in the sense that it is not targeting or directed toward a specific object. It's just a certain sort of process

that is constitutive of subjectivity I guess yes but I guess this emptiness then I'm sorry because I I think I'm as confused as most people here but the sort of emptiness and the fact that because I was making like threads like train of braiding around the idea that we discuss also about the time of the world being not there's no necessity for objectivity in constructing anything intersubjective uh and this idea of um now you say you put in you put in this way of empty objects oh empty i'm sorry

I remember the intentionality. I think that this, I mean, I'm not going to make like a big point or whatever, but I think this all sorts of absences of, I don't know if the right word is foundations, but sort of absences of where they are pointing out, whether there is a point into, let's say, perceptual reality. I don't know if that's right. But this sort of absences for me kind of were leading to this conclusion of the session, this fantasies of what?

Sorry, Maria. Yeah, of this last session, like this fantasies form of inner time consciousness capable of modifying because i i was like thinking about like wait there's this there are some sort of um absence and some sort of non-explications about certain points in the hustler's theory of inner time consciousness and even this you mentioned this earlier about uh fiction uh like i don't know if the world's right fiction but fiction as something that is not delusional is fiction that is conscious of itself and that made me think I'll not maybe that's maybe my own wrong interpretation that fiction in this sense is kind of uh tautologically defined because how when how do you then define fiction in some terms if not by

being conscious of itself right so uh i mean in in the in the realm of appearances it becomes very difficult there are a lot to uh cover here i mean fiction here is yes i don't i wouldn't call is being tautologically defined you see when you're talking about tautology you are essentially talking about the consciousness of the form of logic being thus and so tautological right

I would say that fictions are what Husserl might have if he had, of course, actually Husserl has read Hans Weinger. There are three actually footnotes in the entire works of Husserl that shows he has actually read Haltz-Weihenger's philosophy of as if, but I would say that he would say that, look, these are quasi-tautologies in the sense that for a fiction to be a fiction doesn't need for it to be explicitly aware of its tautological form, like logical tautology, right, but the semblance of it, a quasi,

understanding of it. With regard to the question of absence, yes, I think that that's the most important thing in Husserl, Luke, that Husserl actually, I mean, this is like Derrida's theatrics as the philosopher of absence, to glorify Husserl as the philosopher of absence, but no, actually Husserl, wants to talk about absence, not in a sort of glorified absence in the Derridaean deconstructionist or otherwise postmodern sort of way,

but rather that in every act of presentation presentation and its long-range spectrum of presentification, we always deal with an aspect of an absence. And this absence is being worked up, synthesized by consciousness in different sort of way, in a shorter way according to different levels of presentification versus representification. And it's constitutive. It is not as if Husserl wants to create a theory merely by reference to absence in the Derridaian sense.

I think that that needs to be taken into account. The absence of a cell is what you might call to be an implicit constitutive moment which goes into every act of intentionality, Yet, once we become conscious of absence as a constitutive moment, the act of intentionality and thus the nature of consciousness changes.

I think that's rather an in controversial and somehow modest philosophical thesis I I wouldn't say that um sort of absence that Hossel wants to talk about are ontological or in any sense you know can be understood in a kind of ineffable sort of way precisely because absence is a correlative of doubt in the Cartesian sort of sense right

that Hossel is a child of doubt and hence Cartesian meditations that so long as there is a component of absence our methods should also be informed by that absence and hence they should integrate the idea of doubt as integral to the idea of objectivity that literally there is nothing about objectivity that's outside of the purview of doubt depletion or amplification of objectivity. There is nothing I would say in Hossel

that is about the glorification of absence in the way that we see in French philosophy that sort of avenue of Derrida or other people. But Yeah, I guess that, I mean, yeah, it's a very simple, not simple, but as you say, kind of humble point. Metrological modesty is humble, but it's complex, right? obviously yeah it's complex um yeah but i mean i guess that we're going into this sort of fantasy tied to inner time consciousness um by enough necessity but it seems that way

and it puzzles i i think that that's the necessity yes there is a necessity but But I think that, Maria, do you actually understand necessity as sufficiency? Because that is not necessity, right? No, not sufficiency. Necessity. Just simple, mere necessity, not sufficiency. That's the most important thing. Yes. Yes, I do make that sense. That will be coming in Derrida, right? Oh, wow. No. Blanchot or that sort of. I mean, I love all of those people. Our philosophers are my kin, so to speak. No, yes, but yeah, there's sort of,

I don't know if playing necessity because it's still, I still see a lot of, feel a lot of things like, for example, around, I don't remember the word, but this like completion, not frustration, and it's not completion but you have these two words technical words around uh it's sort of imagination being satisfied i don't remember but this like the um i'm sorry i i have literally not haven't pointed out that but there's a specific german word for frustration i i i mean our german speakers fria and sophie are not here um it's actually not it doesn't have the same sort

of connotation that we have it in in english frustration or disappointment it kind of like it's a kind of a neutral sort of way you know it's kind of like lack of fulfillment yeah fulfilling and lack of fulfillment i'm still curious and i don't ask for these solutions right now but i'm still curious about as to what are the the assumptions behind uh fulfilling and disappointment and how it relates about this i mean one one simple example uh fulfillment essentially in in that sense that corsell wants to talk about is like a nature is of nature of the presentive presenting or presenting in the sense that there there ought to be

an actual object when you are talking about something. I mean, actual object, I mean some sort of correlate of the intending act, right? Being present right now. Now, Husserl actually might say that, well, you know, it's actually becoming actually quite a little bit topsy-turvy here. sometimes for example you have a key in your pocket right key card keys and leave it on the table then you go outside of the house and you know reach into your pocket and say

shit where are my keys look it is not as if the keys are irreal that you have lost and you are not having in your pocket it's just that they are not present coextensively with your perception this is degree one of what you might call to be lack of fulfillment and then other there are other sort of higher degrees of lack of fulfillment. But I wanted to make this example so you have at least a certain sort of a scale of fulfillment versus disappointment. So in that example,

there are actually keys. It's just that you left them on the table and you forgot to put them in your pocket. But when you are reaching and say, oh, where are my keys? You know, it's still a lack of fulfillment precisely because the object is not presently presently coextensive with your uh what you might call to be uh proposition uh but there would be other sorts of degrees of higher degrees of lack of fulfillment such as imagination where you don't need to have keys in order to you know ignite you know the car from back to future or chitty chitty bang bang

you could use an imaginary key right okay thanks to use esoteric examples like gdcd bank bank oh i didn't find them esoteric i just accepted as a word thanks i have a small problem here uh the official time has run out uh would it be okay if i'll just stop recording now absolutely so absolutely okay and then uh michael and uh luca can ask quick questions and then