Cool. Hello and welcome to the sixth session of Carnap's Enigma with Reza Nagelistani. So Reza, please take it away. Thank you, Rafael. Thanks everyone. Sorry for the delay. For some reason, I had to, I restarted a couple of times, it didn't work. I had to delete Zoom and reinstall it and finally work. So let's start. Cassio. Okay, thank you. Hello everyone. I will present today about Nelson Goodman's critique of Aufbau, presented in the structure of appearance. I'll start. In this
presentation, I try to show the main aspects of the critique provided by Nelson Goodman to Carnap's off-ball under the perspective of their constitutional systems dynamics and structure. Taking into account that it is impossible to discuss the whole chapter dedicated to this critique in only 10 minutes, my focus will be directed to what Goodman calls the companionship difficulty and the problem of imperfect community. In the structure of appearance, Nelson Goodman lays out a constitutional system in some respects similar to that of Carnap's off-ball. In chapter 2, section 5, Goodman's attempts to describe Carnap's constitutional system with a strong emphasis on the issues that arise
when we intend to derive quality classes from allabs, the concrete basic units of experience. First, it is important to draw the distinction between what Goodman calls a particularistic and a realistic constitutional system. Both relate to a phenomenalistic approach to experience in an attempt to rationally reconstruct it, but they differ in regards to the decision for which kinds of basic individual units the systems assigns to experience. Very roughly speaking, in a particularistic system, the units selected are concrete qualitative elements, while a realistic system utilizes abstract qualitative elements such as qualia
in order to carry out the process of its concretion. Goodman also takes the Carnapian enterprise as being platonistic, since he emphasizes the importance of a complete calculus of classes where Goodman himself aims at a calculus of individuals. Goodman argues that somehow due to the fact that the process described in section 7th and 71 of the Alfaub is based upon part identity or agreement of Erlebs. that is that it is analogous to quasi-analysis, while the one presented in 72 can be properly called that way.
Thus, the process described in 72 can be taken as more comprehensive than the first, since the part similarity relation encompasses the part identity relation. The name quasi-analysis is due to the impossibility of proper analysis of individual slash atomic elements such as ERLIBS. Following Goodman, in the sessions in which the part identity relation is concerned, the problem of what Carnap calls unfavorable situations arises. arises. Goodman furnishes two main examples, the companionship difficulty and the problem of
imperfect community. These are Carnap's two rules for deriving a color or quality, broadly speaking, class having at first only a pairing list based upon parts agreement. First rule, each class must be such that every pair of members of the class is listed in table 3. Each class, the second rule is each class must be such that nothing that is not a member is paired by table 3 with all the members. That is, each class must be a greatest possible class satisfying rule A. The table mentioned can be understood as any list of pairs that formalizes similarity relations without being necessary that the qualities which constitute these similarities are known.
The aim is to construct these qualities having only the concrete unities and a primitive relation that is sustained between them, described by the pair list. According to Carnap, this procedure will lead to adequate ordering of sense qualities in their respective realms. And for this, there is a series of steps that need to be taken. Some of them were already mentioned here. The constitution of classes that, in satisfying the two rules mentioned above, are derived through the quasi-analysis of Erlebes, on the basis of part similarity relation. Similarity circles are obtained
and there is overlapping between some of them. Then we must verify if these overlapping are essential or accidental. In this way, we can see whether we can take them as an actual quality class, which are derived through a part similarity relation between the Erlebes involved in constituting what we can call an adjacency of similar properties. For example, the letter C coming after B in the alphabet. And then there is the first problem of the companionship difficulty. The critique carried by Goodman is based on the assumption that the totality of one's
experience at a given moment ordinarily embraces a multitude of different qualities. This opens the way for a problem that following Goodman is bypassed by the Aufbau's constitutional system, the companionship difficulty. Goodman makes the point that maybe the rules quoted above doesn't do justice to possible ways of systematizing qualities, since it precludes further analysis of cases, such as when a certain quality always occurs in addition to another. So from Goodman's point of view, an ERLIBS doesn't necessarily have to possess a small number of
qualities in order for a consistent project of analysis of experience to be carried out. And then there is a quote from page 117. The probability is by no means negligible that, for example, a certain shade of blue occurs only in her lips in which another shade just slightly lighter also occurs. And then there is the second problem, the imperfect community. we can take classes divided in communities and non-communities. Classes are communities when every two members of them share some property and non-communities when not every two members of
them share some property. And the communities are divided in perfect and imperfect. They are perfect with when some property is common to all their members and imperfect when no property is common to all their members. The second problem is the possibility of a property class in which the similarities held between the elements doesn't hold for all elements or better put when there is no property common to all objects of the class. One thing that goes unmentioned is that this is precisely a systematic account, that this is just a conjecture that I was thinking,
that this can be seen as a systematic account for what Wittgenstein loosely defines as family resemblance. According to Goodman, this question arises along with the problem of abstraction, that is, to define in terms of the primitive relation of concrete individuals, the conditions under which a set of such individuals have common qualities. qualities. What Goodman misses, according to Thomas Mormon, is the fundamental geometric core of the quasi analytical methods. On this basis, Mormon seems to dismiss the companionship companionship difficulty as a
trivial issue or even a pseudo problem. According to him, Goodman seems to presuppose the existence of a legitimate reality in relation to which the constitutional system is formed, since he points out the necessity of correction criteria that do not stem from the constitutional system itself. This is an important point that calls our attention to the relevance that the concepts of reality acquires in both constitutional systems, whether implicitly or explicitly. In a way or another, Goodman's account is successful in pointing to cases in which extra-systematic assumptions are made.
Mormon's critique, on the other hand, effectively points out to an insufficiency of this treatment due to the fact that it is restricted to the example of color strips, and that the underdetermination that Goodman's, according to Mormon, takes as a flaw is actually a necessary feature for any scientific theory that aims to increase the tractability of objects through a process of abstraction. Besides that, Mormon calls our attention to the possible theological implications that Goodman's critique might bring, because since the criteria of correction does not stem from the constitutional system itself, it presupposes somehow God's intuition.
He also says that the use made by Carnap of Gestalt as a framework for constituting auto-psychological auto-experience, bottom-up, is contingent. What is really important is the possibility of acquiring a geometrical solid basis that permits us to have a systematized account of experience in order to manipulate its parameters and coordinates. That's basically it that I prepared for today. Thank you. Magnificent, Cassio, it's superb. Really magnificent. Excellent, excellent. Superb presentation. Well, I don't think that I can actually bother
you or challenge you with any question. I mean, it went over massive amounts of, you know, approaches, which I, if I try to actually head on deal with right now, people who haven't read Goodman, or precisely because we haven't also worked throughout this whole phenomenalistic approach, namely the radical reduction that Goodman tries to criticize. I think that some people might be left off. So I will actually try to keep my comments until I actually teach
this whole Gutmannian problems. And for that, first we have to, as because last time, last session, we didn't actually manage to say why Zaccard chooses the phenomenalistic approach and what is the background of this phenomenalistic constitution system rather than others because he says that there are others like physical constitution systems as well so why is that he goes for this one in our bottle so i will i will i will just want to uh you know a little bit uh set back uh and take it easy and then once we get the good band then i will challenge you with a couple of
things. But for now, I actually would like you to, and of course, there has been so much talks about this issue. So, Cassio, what is exactly the difference between Carnap's phenomenalistic constitution system, right? And phenomenalism of Mack, exactly. And how do you think that the difference between Carnap's phenomenalistic constitution system, you know, allows him
to express something more over and beyond phenomenalism, traditional phenomenalism? Number one question. Number two question. Precisely through this kind of divergence that Carnap's makes, namely adopting a phenomenalistic constitution system that differs from traditional phenomenalism, how much do you think then it becomes vulnerable. It makes the choice of this particular phenomenalistic constitution system makes Carnap's idea of objectivity vulnerable
in the Goodmanian sense. My apologies if this is a tough question, But you are giving us a superb presentation. I don't have to challenge you with tough questions. Unfortunately, I don't think I would be able to provide an adequate answer to those questions until now. But I think that the advantage of Carnap's approach is to in some way relativize what those basic units might be, because if the choice for the
Gestaltic psychology is local, then the only thing left is some kinds of axiomatics that Mormons tries to point out a relation between points and lines and I don't know any kind of psychological account that might be framed in that way can be successful in provide an account of objectivity in some way I don't know if that's clear I don't know if it's answers but I think that's the only think that I might be able to respond at the moment. Well, the thing is that there is another thing that should be considered, the idea that why is that?
First of all, why is Akarnov actually goes for phenomenons rather than just traditional good old fashion empiricism? That actually explains a lot about what he's trying to do. And why is that? Precisely because the choice of the phenomenalist, phenomenalism, maximalism as the undergirding, you know, inspiration for his phenomenalistic consideration system is precisely because phenomenalism in late 19th century, early 20th century doesn't work with one sensato, but a community of them, right? But a clique,
a clique of them, right? A group of them. So what, so that's, that's actually, that this, this is actually a methodological question at the end, not rather than just merely, you know, a kind of epistemological sense that you can never basically reduce, make a reduction to one single or a set of single sense data, but always a set of them, a community of them, right? A click. So I think this is also a methodological question that plays a role. And the one that you also said. My suggestion for you is that, by the way, those of you who have presented already, you
don't need to write an essay. You know, essay is, yeah, you don't need to write. But if you want to, please do. A thousand words, maximum 1,500. I will come up with the feedback, 10 or 15 minutes, real-time Skype. Casio, how about this? How about you challenge yourself writing an answer to these two questions that I mentioned? So you are already there, but I just want to push you a little bit further into the muddy, basically, waters. Superb.
And yes, again, magnificent, magnificent presentation. So let's just start. If you remember, my apologies for being able to join last week. So I just want to jumpstart your memories a little bit about what's going on and about the whole off-bow thingy. And from that, we pick it up. So if you remember, basically,
We talked about that Afbau essentially is a kind of a form of radical reductionism. Radical not in the sense of greedy reductionism, but radical idea of logical reduction, right? As I mentioned, it is not a Denetian project that everything is just this and that, right? Natural processes. That's just vulgar or car. It's just like it's going to have fucking creeped out of his grave if you know someone like that would have said that i'm a reductionist while karnam also considered himself as a reduction right so essentially his method by which higher level objects and concepts are constituted from basic ones and how the former can be reduced to latter
is by way of what you know is called definition, right? Definition. Where definitions may be explicit and by that kind of means R equals to something, right? R relation of equality, definition of equality. So explicit definition, explicit in that sense is a definitional equality. Now, or definition in use, another form of definition, which include what we call explicit definitions of predicates. For example, for all x and y such that r, and r is the relations,
r of x and y, r open parenthesis, x comma y close parenthesis, there is an equivalence relation, a bidirectional equivalence relation, namely an arrow with both heads, such that ellipsis x, ellipsis y, ellipsis z, so on and so forth, definition of x, y, z whatever, as well as contextual definitions, right? So a constitution system, and that's basically the whole point of the constitution system,
right? So a constitution system is ultimately nothing but an interpreted language with both syntactic and semantic components, even though neither syntax nor semantics are determined in formally precise terms in half-bowl. And our way to, in the way that I mentioned definition with regard, that idea of definition with regard to the idea of constitution system, we can say constitution system is nothing but also a system of definitions, you know. So, and you remember that we said that we can kind of believes that you can actually have different constitution systems, physical
ones, phenomenalistic ones, purely logical ones, so on and so forth. But the thing is that, why is that Carnap actually goes for the phenomenalistic system? Well, that's the question of knowledge, the objectivity of knowledge that he wants to answer one, the unity of all sciences, but also the logical structure of not only experience as a base of all epistemologies, epistemological knowledge, but also as basically the base of all unity of sciences, right? So he wants to basically, the choice of phenomenally system, constitution system is precisely this.
It gives an advantage for him in this particular project of his, to tackle the idea of objectivity of knowledge, the idea of unity of sciences, and basically that's that and the fact that experiences are streams of experiences at the end of the day are what we have in terms of what we know about the world around us right and our place in it. Of course, this view comes heavily under assault by the likes of Quine,
right? That this already presupposes the fact that all of science has something to do with observation or basically the statements, scientific statements, can all be reduced in one way or another to observational statements, right? And then, of course, as I mentioned last session, Carnap takes this critique very seriously. His points of dealing with, it starts with attempts at methodologic, logical syntax of language, and then ultimately logical foundations of probability,
where basically observations, we don't have a state observational statements in science anymore, right? In fact, science can do away with all observational statements. What we have actually is references, logically constructed references to such observational statements. I'm not going to go that way talk about this further on we can this would be the topic of the next seminar for latest play where basically we will pick up some of the themes of our file discuss them and then move them forward with regard to later works more mature works of Carnap so with regard to the
phenomenolithic system, when some high level statement is reduced to one that is solely expressed in terms of primitive expressions, the resulting reduction is only supposed to preserve extension, as I mentioned, namely logical value in the Fregean sense, not sense or intention, intention with s, which is the epistemic value according to Fregean view. So, now as Carter says, different senses may be attached to one and the same formula in one and the same constitution system. For example, sentences in the phenomenalistic constitution system about which
uh a constitution system may be paraphrased in everyday terms in terms of the realistic language and the customary uh and that which is basically customary in the empirical uh sciences or even in terms of fictitious constructive operations which resemble instructions for example in computer programs, right? You know, while such paraphrases of one and the same constitution system expression may differ in sense, they still coincide extensionally in terms of their logical value, right? Or logical value. And their extension is pinned down uniquely by the constitution formula. That
is why Carnap regards the actual language of a constitution system to be a symbolic language of logic itself. The point of assigning different readings to the formula is merely to facilitate the comprehension and examination of the official logical language of the constitution system. that amounts to a pluralism of choices how to interpret and discuss the constitution system at the meta level. And so we should understand that Aufbau actually is not really phenomenalistic at its base, the kind of constitution system that he's talking about in Aufbau. He is actually
approaching the phenomenalistic constitution system already within the meta level, right? As if he had the choice, pluralism of choices, to interpret a generalized constitution system. And this is, this choice that he can, he has made, is at the meta level, right? Just like any sort of constitution system, these choices are made at the level of meta level, right? So the advantage of a phenomenalistic constitution system that Carnarv's developed in most detail in Aufbau is supposed to be that
logical priority relation given by chains of definitions reflects the epistemic priority between the defined concepts and objects. When a relation R has defined the system, say on the basis of P and Q, then this ought to reflect that recognizing that something is R is based on or presupposes recognizing something to be p and recognizing something to be q for instance cultural phenomena such as religion of a society may be ascertained according to Carnap himself true representations emotions thoughts volitions of a religious sort
which occur with the members of the society also documents in the form of writing pictures and buildings are considered about section 55. This is why psychological and physical objects may be viewed as epistemically prior to cultural ones. In turn we can find about heteropsychological phenomena, for example you know phenomena that are occurring in other people such as their emotions, by studying the physical ways in which they get expressed by. So essentially, um, with, with regard to heteropsychological phenomena, like, uh, we are seeing these emotions, uh,
we can only see these emotions as physical behaviors, you know, behaviors emanating from physical entities, right? At the level of hetero, basically psychological one. They, for example, they get expressed by the pitch of a voice, facial expressions, gestures, and the like, right? So this is what you might call to be the syntax of emotions, right? The physical syntax of emotions. In this sense, physical objects may be regarded epistemically prior to hetero-psychological warnings. Finally, the properties and relations of physical objects can be determined by the perceptible indicators, which Carnap takes to be subjective sensory
qualities that one is constantly aware of, but one's own auto-psychological concepts, sorry, auto-psychological conscious estates and processes may be recognized without having to inspect entities of any other kind. So in this sense, one's own sensory experience may may be regarded epistemically prior to physical objects, right? On the logical side, this hierarchy of epistemic priority relations is reconstructed by corresponding hierarchy of definitions in Carnap's phenomenalist constitution system, which is the reason why Carnap believes the system
to be particularly useful for epistemological purposes is this one, is this phenomenalistic system. The Carnac explicit definition of auto-psychological qualities from a given phenomenal similarity relations is described basically in, at length in Avbap. But what we are trying to do here is to, So we know a little bit now about why the choice of the phenomenalistic constitution system, right, that we have been discussing with regard to the epistemological base and those two
problems that I mentioned, unity of science and objectivity. Now, what I am trying, I'm going to do is that, so where does actually the background background of all this, you know, how can actually, where does Karnak come from to go for the phenomenalistic, that basically motivates him to go for the phenomenalistic constitution system in terms of the history of philosophy. So I will start with Carnap's Nookantian background. So this Nookantian background, I will approach it by way of mostly
not actually a Noah Kantian, but someone who was affiliated with Noah Kantianism, right, a philosopher, Hans Weihinger. I will massively influence early Karl Lappen. So I will try to to say that why these epistemological problems that, as posed by Wehinger, became central to the project of Aufbau, particularly his choice of the Phenomenalistic Constitution system. So before moving in that direction, any questions? If not, maybe a bathroom break of some sort.
Okay, let's go five minutes break and then full throttle. Reza, I just quickly wanted to say I'll have to go at 6.15. Don't worry, don't worry, don't worry. My apologies that we started late. Thank you.
Sorry? Which is the due date for the essay? Oh, due date for essays. Okay. Well, what is the last session, right? So I would say a week after the last session, right? A week after the last session, like literally a week after, not two weeks, not three weeks, a week after the last session. But, so you have two choices, you know, either write a thousand word essay, right? Or just, you know, make a video presentation, right?
You don't need to actually write anything, just talk about a specific problem, enough bow, not anything else that and then send and share it with everyone. And you know, so I can grade but also, most importantly, I can schedule in the course of like a month, with all of you 10 to 15 minutes feedback, real time. Okay, great. Thanks. Are we ready?
Okay. So. So remember I started talking about in that in that diagram that I showed you that one of the influences I mean two of the influences of uh we discussed two of the influences of Carnap it was Poincare Dingler and of course Helmholtz as well right so Carnap was always
more akin to basically as a, so early Carnot is truly a Neocantian in a proper sense of Neocantianism, right? So he was, even though as a Neocantian, he was more, he was closer to Poincare, Hugo Dingler, and Helmholtz. Rather than the genuine, you know, Naukantians of the Marburg school, right, like Hermann Cohen and Paul Torque, or Heinrich Rickert, sorry, Rickert, I always mispronounce his name,
who is, by the way, really, I mean, so, okay, let's actually not go, diverge, go off topic. So he's closer to people like Juan Carran and Dingler than the Genu and the Wachantians of Marlowe at school. A central figure for Carnap, you know, with regard to these kind of choices, he makes in Aufbau, you know, constitution system, phenomenalist constitution system, Aufbau as an epistemological, epistemic and logical project, so on and so forth, has something to do with a central figure in the background, in the shadows,
who facilitates between his Carnap's influences from Poincaré and Helmholtz, right, and those of traditional Neokentians. This guy is Hans Weyinger. In addition to Hans Wehinger, there is another figure, Heinrich Rickert, another known Canton philosopher, but mostly Wehinger. I highly recommend these two thinkers, by the way, even outside of, without any sort
of relation with what we are talking about, about Aufbau. These are highly sophisticated thinkers, really magnificent, but quite obscure these days. If you know, I think, well, I know that Wehinger's, one of Wehinger's books, philosophy of as if, has been translated to English, but I don't know about Rickards. But I think that there are some here and there are some translations. So if you can follow these two, it would be fantastic. So what is exactly that these two thinkers, particularly Weihinger, are trying to discuss
or frame, philosophically, that peaks Carnap's interest, philosophical interest? Well, I think there are two questions, two main problems. So we know that Kantian questions motivated much of his earlier work, Carnap's earlier work, particularly to flesh out the relations
between the immediately given, right, and rational ingredients. The immediately given and rational ingredients, right? And we see it also in Aufbau, the idea of the given that we have been talking about and rational components of a constitution system. Between these two, you know, what you would call to be the philosophical conflict between the given, immediately given, and rational component, there comes two fully flinged Naukantian
questions. Number one, how is theoretical natural science possible? How can we get from immediate acquaintance or the given to universal loss? Number one question, right? the condition of possibility of natural science as such. Number two, how, conversely, can the purely theoretical statements of science be applied to or brought to bear on subjective experience?
In other words, how can the rational ingredients or components make contact with the subjective world of sensation? And those of you who are students of Kant know that this second question is precisely the gist of the problem Kant calls eschematization. right the problem of a ski mata am i clear do i need to go over this before i move forward anything could you expand a bit on the on this notion of of the kentian notion of
schemata yes uh so what was exactly uh you know uh a schemata in in in kantian uh parlance right so can't so so essentially remember that that schemata for Kant, even though he's not using that word, was a kind of technique of the rationale, you know, meaning that why is that, for example, we are applying a concept in the right way?
I mean, the condition of possibility of applying a concept in the right way, what does that mean? How can a concept be ever applied to the right sort of things, right? The source, to the right sort of organized intuitions, namely, right? Like, for example, why is that we can apply the concept apple to such and such organized manifolds of intuitions and not others. So this is a top-down question, rather than a bottom-up question. The first one was a bottom-up question that I mentioned, right? This is a top-down question. The question that,
what does actually decide or determine that we can ever apply rational ingredients to organize sensory intuitions? What does decide actually for us to not apply the concept of apple to this? such and such organized manifold of intuition, right? The such is. The thing is that this is, this is, it's actually, so a schematization is, is different than representation in Kantian sense.
So, a schematization, as I said, is a technique of the rational, right, of the rational ingredients, locally applied to certain class of objects and not others, right? This makes a schematization the proper mixed-level method, mixed-level method. So you need to have a certain kind of wherewithals or faculties or capacities to recognize these suchness, namely manifolds of intuitions, right? but also you should have a proper understanding or recognition of concepts but most importantly
what bridges the two the juncture how such and such concept can be applied to such and such manifold that's the question of Eschematization, I think, is one of the most underexplored and one of the most complex and exciting questions that Kant ever puts forward in critique of pure reason. People usually, when we are talking about epistemology, right, like, for example, sellers, always think about the question of epistemology with relation of the bottom-up one, you know,
that the relation between sense data, immediate sense givens, sensory givens, and basically concepts or rational components. Meaning that if we resolve the first question, first Carnapian question, which is influenced by Neukantians, then maybe the second question doesn't arise. Right? But the thing is that the second question is not dependent upon the first question. It's an entirely different question. The whole idea that what does guarantee the right application of the right family of concepts, the right source
of manifolds questions any thoughts nothing gabriel you have been silent today other than wanting to have a bathroom break I don't know. My knowledge of Kant is limited, so I feel quite shy about answering such questions. But to a certain extent, I believe Kahnap's answer would be at least in the Alphabal, where he's still
a proponent of a of a more straightforward for gain conception of logic that what allows what what allows for the application of concepts to to anything really is simply a is probably a it's probably a notion a notion of a notion of well it's conception that the transcendent the transcendental structures are not themselves are not themselves features of a any subject any subjects even in a even in a not
Goyal Kuznicki- empirical and not empirical sense and a transcendental subject sure either in a content or who certainly and quasi empirical really. Goyal Kuznicki- Right, right. Goyal Kuznicki- Yes, that's a good answer right but but, of course, he needs this question, though. Goyal Kuznicki- And probably a different answer because, yes, in the in the broader scope of how you would say something like that, but. Remember that what we are talking about is about the choice of this phenomenalistic constitution system, right? It's choice of constitution system. And this choice is because of his concern about epistemological balance of the project itself.
Hence, through this epistemological, basically, concern, he probably needs to answer this question within traditional or Novocantian tradition of what it means or a concept actually to apply to anything, right? the right sort of things, the right sort of early elementary experiences. But within the broader scope of, of Bauer, as a logical and epistemological project, yes, I think that he can talk about what you said. But I think within the realm of epistemology,
that would, that answer doesn't actually address the question itself. It's kind of like, It's kind of relegate the question to a different level, to a logical one, which is that of the half power and the Freedia dimension of it. But as I mentioned, precisely because it is not merely a logical project, it is also epistemological, I think that he feels that he has to answer this challenge. Well, here it's interesting to note, of course,
that the epistemological projects is probably precise, probably exactly the portion of the alpha ball that eventually it's going to fail precisely because of the ability to answer such a question, to pull itself by its own bootstraps in the last sections of the elf ball. And eventually, we'll be abandoned with Kahnep's transition to the method logic. Yes, yes, absolutely. So in a sense, I believe it's precisely the inability to answer such a question. Yes, yes. OK, that's a good point. Yes. It's gonna emerge from the alpha.
That's a very good point. Yes, thank you so much. Yes. Okay, so let me get back. Sorry, one second. My partner is asking me, I think something, one second. okay so reza i think the shot has a question uh he has his hand up oh they'll you can ask. Do your shot. Yeah, I was going to ask about the schematism question. What I know from about Kant is mostly
from random, so maybe this is a randomized version of Kant. I think in this lecture, German Idealism, he talks about the schematism. He says, you know, the best way to understand schematism as the relationship between you know represent things and represented representatives you know act act an object yes exactly you know the really between thinking and claiming and believing as opposed to claimables believables and thinkables yes he says this relationship is exactly representation the relationship between represented and representing is the representation. So it's the schematism par excellence. I don't know if it's just brand new ones version of Cardinal. Sorry, would you repeat your last
sentence? You got caught up a little bit on my side. Yeah, he says, you know, the relationship between representatives and representing is the representational relationship itself. So it's is the schematism par excellence. So he defines representation of relationship as schematism. So I don't know if it's a randomized version of Kant himself because, you know, Brandon has the, you know, the . Yes. I think it's a little bit too general, but I don't see anything explicitly wrong with it. As long as we are, we are, but of course, this is random. Kids should practice this at home.
You know, applying an act to an object with regard to the schematization, the representing to the represented. Yes, but majority of times that we do try these kinds of stuff at home, we actually confuse an act and object, right? I'm sure that the bearded sage has much more wisdom than us, right, to keep the representings and represented kosher, you know, separate apart from one another. And to that extent, yes, I think that, yes, it's a little bit of generalization, but yes, that's precisely the principle of it, I would say.
But of course, this actually I wanted to, now you are among everyone, all students brought this up. I actually wanted to say that we are actually going to talk about the role of embodiment, right? And embodied techniques, which are not in contrast to rationality, but rather mobilize, what you might call to be the oedipus of rationality, we should look into the mechanisms behind the schematization, into the concept of schematization, because that's where the role of embodiment shines through.
And it's basically, it's bridges or junctures with what we call rationality. Can I ask one more question about Brandon? Sure, sure, sure. You know, Brandon recently uploaded a series of 14 lectures about anti-representationalism. And I'm nearly half through it. But you know, I haven't, where is this? Would you be able to put it online? Yeah, 14 lectures all about anti-representationalism, excellent lectures. I'm nearly halfway through it. You know, he repeatedly, you know, many times and in many places, you know, he says that Carnap's afbau is bedeviled by some versions of representationalism, what sellers call descriptivism.
You know, the idea being, you know, all the segments of, you know, language or our discussive practices are exclusively in the business of describing. And because Carnap, you know, prioritizes logical vocabulary. But that's not true, though, is it? OK, just let me finish. He says he assigns descriptions because he talks about different descriptions and stuff. And he says, you know. Isn't it the whole point of Carnap of Pao is that you want to eliminate descriptions by way of relations? Yeah. He says, that's what he says repeatedly many times. He says, you know, logical vocabulary for Carnap is just descriptive vocabulary. Oh, descriptive vocabulary. Descriptive vocabulary. OK. Yeah, descriptive vocabulary. You know, he says it's wrong.
Logical vocabulary is not just descriptive vocabulary because, you know, sellers and even, you know, Tractarian Wittgenstein, they assign a different role to logic, you know, not all logical functioning or just descriptive functioning. Yeah, yeah. And it seems quite funny to me, you know, because, you know, I'm sure you are well aware, you know, Hugh Price's version of expressivism, He repeatedly, you know, he quotes Carnap as a quintessential example of an expressivist because, you know, in his, you know, it calls Carnap's thesis, you know, that the constitutional structuralism of Carnap, you know, is some sort of inferentialism because, you know, he, Carnap simply puts aside the question of reference.
So he is an inferentialist. But no, Brandom says he's a descriptorist. So I don't know whether, you know. Yeah, well, I am completely, I don't know. With a coin, it's just, you know, Brandom is just repeating coin and cliches about. Cliché, yeah. Well, to be honest with you, I need to check these lectures. But from the sound of it, it seems to be a little bit of doing the cliche move, you know. And Brandon does that once in a while. I mean, all philosophers do. I mean, haven't I so many times with regard to other philosophers? This is just the fun of it. Yeah, but I found it funny because Hugh Price is very explicit about the karma thing.
Yeah, but Hugh Price is also a kind of, my apologies for using this word, he actually wants to latch himself to some sort of, know it's really price is like the very definition of the kind of philosopher that uh he just wants to find an uh a kind of like a famous but less studied witness to back up his stuff right okay in defense of your price sorry i believe he's indeed he's indeed correct at least at least in part he has a he has a it's not a correspondence but it's a an article and a reply article by him
and it's an article by carus and price replies to car to car it's an article upon carus about the relation between uh price prices uh global expressivism and what carus refers as carnapp's global voluntarism and and carcats points out that there are certain differences but i believe i believe even caros himself uh concedes that there are certain certain similarities similarities and with regards with regards to random uh again caros notably caros more than once appears quite uh quite annoyed at brandon precisely because brandon accuses carnapp of falling to the myth
of the given and falling to a denotation a denotation yes not a categorical uh perhaps not a categorical one but an epistemic one i i believe random at least in certain pieces of his writings accuses Carnap of falling to both myths. No I mean just that's just yeah it's Carlos precisely gets really annoyed that he he you know I mean this is one of the greatest things about Carnap though you know it's kind of like the Michel Foucault of analytic philosophy like everyone wants to say something bad about him but also everyone wants to get something good
Michel Foucault is my witness right there. He's right. If you are a rationalist, anti-rationalist, whatever, you want to have Michel Foucault on your side, or whatever wrong reason. The same thing about Karna. Yeah, exactly. Brandon, I think between saying and doing as well as in his expressivism book, both he repeats the same sentence. that Carnot has fallen to the both of the myth of the sensory given and the myth of the analytic given. At the same sentence, he hasn't changed his mind since, I don't know, since last century. That's a good one. That's a good one.
I'm not actually, to be honest with you, where is this being discussed in Hugh Price? I think in his 1998 book as well as 2013 book. Okay. Sorry, sorry, sorry. No, no. I said it's 1998. Would you be able to post the titles here? Yeah, definitely. Thank you so much. I believe the reference to Carnap by price is relatively more recent,
But there are a couple articles on it in his recent more recent collection, which I believe is what is what the shot is referring to. There are there are quite a little quite a few but at least a couple of articles on on kind of by Hugh Price recently and in the I'll post them later birth to articles I mentioned were in the issue of the modest that work that was dedicated to Carnap, Carnap's Metaphilosophy. I'll see, I'll see. I'll post them later at least. But an article by Karus is going global, Carnap's voluntarism and Price's expressivism.
And then Hugh Price answers with Carnap and voluntarism and global expressivism. Reply to Karus. but Superb thank you so much Gabriel I had no idea about this correspondence really zero clue about this I believe it's it's relatively recent at least the at least the move by Price to identify his position as being anticipated by by Kahane of course Karus as the interpreter tries to argue that no there are certain differences and Price has to concede to the kind of scholar that maybe perhaps he's a bit too fanciful.
Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. There are certain parallels. Okay, so moving forward, as I mentioned, so those two questions, have in mind those two questions, the Vikingarian questions that bother Karnak, right, which are basically no Kantian, Kantian crystallized by no Kantianism kind of questions, those two questions,
with regard to the relation between the immediately given and rational ingredients. which then translate to the condition of possibility of basically national sciences and the condition of possibility of purely theoretical statements of science within their epistemological balance, meaning in their relation with subjective experience. That can purely theoretical statements of science
be applied to ultimately to subjective experience or not. So, with these two questions that I mentioned, we can go a little bit further back to, so what is exactly the deal with Wehinger, one of the main influencers of Carnap? So Karnab was strongly influenced in the early 1920s by Hans Weyinger, who made this very idea, this set of questions central to the entire system of epistemological dimension
of of Baal. Hans Weyhenger is known in the English language world by way of his main translated work, the philosophy of as if. He was a Kant scholar and he authored a massive two-volume commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason. It hasn't been translated to English and I haven't actually read it but everyone is saying that it's just like one of the greatest commentaries ever written on Critique of Pure Reason. And he was the founder of Kant's studies in 1906.
Bidinger regarded himself as Kantian and as a disciple of Lange, but called his view idealistic positivism or positivistic idealism. What this name does not capture, but which he himself acknowledged as essential to his philosophy, is its conception of intellectual life subservient to practical ends and thus ultimately human passions. Like Long, Weyhenger was an enthusiastic Darwinian philosopher. Language and thought had evolved
as purposefully operating organic functions, namely survival mechanisms. their products, theories, and concepts are to be understood within the entire economy of the human organism and not as existing primarily for the sake of accurate representation of something external. It was seen by many of the time as an ally of the American pragmatists rather than no Kantians proper. and admitted the resemblance he himself, but had a low opinion of William James
and rejected his theory of truth. Unlike James, Weidinger distinguished between truth and belief. What we believe, he thought, are useful fictions like Kant's ideals. And we believe them for practical reasons. even if we think they may be very, they may be very well false. Byinger's view of what we can actually know to be true or false was radically positivistic in nature. Without fictions, and you can actually read more about his account of fiction, in his translated book, The Philosophy of As If.
Without fictions, he thought we are locked in a chaotic and utterly formless subjectivity of the present moment. And the quality of fictions was to be judged by their usefulness in the conduct of life, right? Not by their truth. Even if some or all of our most useful or robust scientific fiction should happen to be actually true, he thought there is no way we could know them to be so in advance. Right. Because that is not a procedure. That's not a true procedure. that is not kind of that is not the kind of procedure of fiction
uh that can that can be said to be embedded or endemic to fictions with regard to the idea of truth that is not really the this is not a task of fiction So Wehinger's positivistic doctrines influenced Carnap less than the basic frameworks in which he articulated the Kantian questions one and two, the ones that I mentioned. the idealistic conception that Carniv advanced against mysticism seems at least partly derived from Weihinger, more specifically the view expressed in an early set of notes toward
Afbal that all we know directly is the chaos of sensation. This is what also Kant talks about, the conflux. This is actually, but it's not really Kantian in its origin. The chaos of sensations comes actually not from Kant. It is the most platonistic thesis of flocking philosophy. that sensations are the shadows on the walls of the human cave. They are confluence of senses. They don't give us anything, right? That's basically Plato 101. That's not even Kant.
So there is a reason that this idea of chaos of sensations or the conflux of sensations or the confusion of sensations, even though it was mentioned by Kant, but it wasn't actually brought up as a central question with regard to the epistemological project. And with regard to the two questions that I mentioned, not until no Kantianism. This was because in Marburg School, people started to read Kant to Plato. So you get Hermann Koe and Paul Natorb, you know, who are Platonistic Kantians, right,
at the end of the day. So that was basically, they thought that Kant had already crystallized what Plato understood as the bugbear of all epistemologies, of all ways of seeing the world as this versus that, the chaos of sensations. Carnap seems to have thought from the beginning that Weingar's view of what could be gleaned or deduced from this chaos by logical phenomenological reflection or both was too narrow and that more could be achieved by these means. Throughout the early 1920s, accordingly,
Carnap refers to conventions and even scientific theories as fictions in the Weingarian sense. most prominently in a paper that actually carries the word in its title, Three Dimensionality of Space and Causality, An Investigation of the Interrelation of Two Fictions. This paper, written in the summer of 1922, represents the zenith of Weyhinger's influence on Carnac, which carries on to Afbal. It was published, not coincidentally, in the Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical Critiques, which had been founded in 1921 by Weihinger's chief disciple
Raymond Shenert, to provide a forum for a discussion of the as-if kinds of philosophy, namely fictitious, the role of fictions in philosophy. In Afbau itself, one of the four languages in which the construction is described, or constitution system is described, is that of a fictional construction. This is generally being taken to be a Kantian or no Kantian vocabulary, which is approximately right. Specifically, it is Weihinger's language.
As the pragmatic dimension indicates, the fictions are chosen to suit the practical purpose of the construction. right the practicality suitable the practically suitable fictions arise from the purpose of the constitutions as rational reconstructions of the knowledge of objects and at the deeper level a certain fundamental pragmatism pervades carnapp's thought during this period even as we will talk about it in the next seminar with regard to the choice of logic itself, not just as we have been talking about the choice of the constitution system, but the choice of the logic
itself, namely the principle of tolerance. So Whitinger's influence is most obvious in Carnap's way of articulating question one, how is theoretical science is possible, as well as in his first attempt to answer it, the total system of all concepts to be discussed later on, but we have already talked about it a little bit, that the total system of all concepts is a total system of all constitution systems as a mode of interpretation, different modes of interpretations of objects and concepts. Right.
But then, of course, hold this a little bit because this is exactly where Aufbau starts to unravel. Gabrielle was talking a little bit about this with regard to the epistemological project, that the kind of constitution system, even the pluralistic mode that Karnak allows, ultimately erodes the distinction between the logical-linguistic and the experiential, between the rational and the empirical. And to that extent, it falls apart. So Carnap has to
basically pick it up again, but this time no longer through the this the overall system of of bowel, namely as an as a logical and epistemological project but as a methodological project that we can actually make quite clear distinctions between the experiential and the uh the the the log the logical linguistic or the rational the rational ingredients and the given the immediately given through a meta language, through the development of meta language.
And only through this development or attempt at develop developing a meta language, can we actually rescue the good bits of our files project. So that was about the question one. Meanwhile, Weihinger's influence extended also to Carnap's early attempt to confront question two, the question of schematization par excellence that I mentioned. In his doctoral dissertation and first book, A Space, a Contribution to the Study of Science, as other writings during this period, Carnap essentially tackles with this question within
the ambits of synthetic geometry. So while I actually would say that, I mostly agree with Gabrielle that Aufbau cannot fundamentally tackle with the second question, you know, the right kind of application of concept, rational ingredients to immediately censor a givens. I would say that it actually does much more than traditional commentators of how had in
mind. And one of the ways to talk about how much it accomplishes is by way of talking about the central role of synthetic geometry in Carnap's project. This I'm not going to talk about any time soon. Either I will talk about it later in this seminar or in the next seminar, which will be the continuation of this one, because that's a completely different topic. But nevertheless, I wanted just to make this clear that I think still there are so many good bits that we can glean
from Carnap's epistemological project in Aufbau before discarding it for good or declaring it as failed. Right. So this was, so, okay, before I move forward, maybe someone, anyone? Questions and stuff. and a couple of sessions ago we talked a little bit about or i brought up the idea about connecting kind of to to pragmatism and you you mentioned that you would at some point
return to this um well you called it his uh kind of spiff with with pragmatism and i was i was curious when we when we talk about uh vahin just notion of of fictionality and and him as an ally of pragmatism what is it specifically that that if if um kind of adopts the thesis of fictionality from vyinger what is it that makes him uh uh f f f f f of pragmatism i i think that that's essentially uh you see see, for Carnap, at least, for Carnap's version of Weihinger, less than Weihinger himself,
but also for Weihinger, the thing is that they think the early version of pragmatism of William James, right, elides the distinction between truth and fiction as pragma, as pragma. So essentially truth can be simply decomposed into fictitious pragma, right? Whereas Carnival Weinger thinks that this is not possible, you know? It is an enablement, an enablement
for us to think about truth, but different uses, different fictions do not yield any sort of truth. Because if you're looking for truth in fictions, in the technical sense, why did you use this? Then that's just shoddy pragmatism for that. Precisely, it already blurs the difference between fiction and truth or tries to simply reduce truth to the idea of various fictions being used. It's really actually important.
I don't know how much about vihanship, but for Carnap, the idea of truth is very... um attached to verificationism project i will be talking about this actually right i try to talk about this idea of truth and verification me if I do not follow. Yeah. If I can ask a follow up question. Sure, sure, sure. I was just thinking about this. Will the idea of practical fictionality
seem very much related to this book that you talked about it on our last course, the Kasserer's language and myth, where he talks very much about the utility of science as well as myth and the arts and other forms of language. Of course, yes. As practical fictions. Yes, but I mean, this is absolutely, yes, yes. I mean, Kasserer, you know that Kasserer was actually students of Herman Cohen, who also influenced Antweyinger. So they are all coming from the same. You know, Kantianism was actually a fundamentally dominant mindset among German philosophers
during that time frame. And so many people came, and the philosophy came, actually, at least the Carnapian sense, but also Kazirer, also Maurice Shalik, Nuroth, they all came in at one level, from one perspective or another, from this kind of Novocantean background. Yes, but the thing is that you see, Kazirer, however, unlike a continental philosopher of today's breed, doesn't actually, he understands the vitality, the central role of pragma, namely fictions, in doing truth procedures in a Padillausian sense,
you know, in following up with ambitions of philosophy. But it is not as if he reduces truth to simply use of fictions as mobilizers, right? There are two fundamental things for it. The same thing about Carnap, the same thing about Nookanthians, really. So you might say that there are kind of virtuous, virtuous pragmatists in a sense that they do not simply reduce the idea of truth to pragma.
You know, there's a C.I. Lewis in his paper, it's called Logical Positivism and Pragmatism. I think it was published in 1940 or something. He makes, he says, you know, the difference between Karna and me is the fact that Karna is exclusively concentrating on the formal mode of formalization and logicization and mathematicalization of sensory experiences. So he says, the reason I brought CIUS up, because I think it's a philosophical sense to assume that William James is the exemplar of pragmatism, because this idea of truth as something useful in the way of beliefs, something like that. But the difference is more deeper,
I think, that pragmatists usually alike, the formal mode altogether, they don't want formalizations, they don't want... Early pragmatists, early pragmatists, really, early pragmatists, I'd say, say, early pragmatists, I actually think that if we go further toward developments of logic, by way of logical pragmatism, like, you know, ludics, all these kinds of stuff, right, then we see that actually that is that this kind of stuff no longer holds these kinds of beliefs, right? And of course, this is just like, like a double sword, double edged sword that, oh, It's both against that kind of, you know, sloppy American, early American pragmatism,
and also against these kinds of torgid logicism that sometimes wrongly ascribed to Karnap or Vienna Circle, you know, as a whole. Reza, that's a very quick question. I don't know if it will be a quick response though, but could you expand on what you mean by infantile schematism? When did I say infantile schematism? Did I actually say infantile schematism? Yeah, in the blog Thai philosophy. Oh, not in the class.
Yes, I can't remember really. What is it about it? I don't know. Something about alternative experimental ways of passing of the image through concepts and concepts to images? I think I never use actually the word infantile in a negative sense. If I want to use it, I usually use the word adolescent. So if I actually use infantile, it's probably a positive thing, which means that from my, I mean, it's just like a long time ago, probably infantile eschematism is just like this idea that, you know, the very fact, the very fact that the application of rational ingredients
to sensory data is a shady business, should not be taken as something of a setback for a philosopher. Precisely because we can actually work it through as an idea of toy predicates or playing in a Goodmanian sense, world building, right? world making in a good man in a sense meaning that there are ways for us to actually to actually project a wrong concept to a wrong
set of manifolds of intuitions and still get away with it in the principles of world-making. It's not a whimsical thing, but it's just simply that we can think, and that's kind of a wrong application, not the wrong application, a right application of the wrong concept, the wrong sense of sensory givens might be permissible under certain kind of constraints. and that would be a sort of experimenting, right, with the limits of schematic imagination
and question the limits of transcendental structures. think about the idea of group you know the predicate group and its projection or the bleed blue green thereafter green blue thereafter or all of these kinds of you know toy predicates uh so yes i think that ultimately uh you know this kind if we think about the schematization as a technique, as a proper technique of rational, of the rational, then we can actually think that using these kinds of technique, namely, schematization, systematically
does not prevent us from applying in the right sort of way a wrong set of concepts to a wrong sort of manifold of intuitions. Because if you follow through with all of that in the right sense of application, you know, in the consistent form of application, then we can actually see that sometimes it might work. And precisely because it doesn't work in other kinds of times, like in a good man's sense of world making,
precisely this shows that this kind of transcendental world in which we inhabit, namely transcendental structures, has certain kinds of limitations. So at the very least, what it does, it exposes the limitations of the kind of transcendental structures we inhabit. Maybe in terms of sensory processing, productive imagination, pure categories of understanding, so on and so forth. At a higher level, not only just it just doesn't simply function shouldn't be just excluded to exposing the constraints or limitations of the existing transcendental structure,
but should actually give us the possibility of a different world, different set of transcendental structures. And that's the whole point of the world building, right? And would it be correct to assume that the question of the criteria of rightness, of application and schematism bottoms out in the very question of pedagogy, education and learning in some way? Yes, yes, yes. But of course, it also goes beyond that in the sense that there are limits of transcendental
structures which cannot be simply addressed by pedagogy, but require invention of new logics, invention or discovery of the new facts of experience. You see, that's exactly what Carnot tries to do here. The idea of engineering, new metologics, or in this case, in off-bows, new constitution systems, that as long as they behave like constitution systems, they are constitution systems, that already tries to go beyond simple pedology. means that we can actually experience, experiment with new resources of language and logic
such that not only we arrive at new facts of experience which cannot simply be discovered by mere pedagogy but also we do indeed point to the possibility that the change the fundamental radical change in the structure of transcendental resources of an aperceptive subject results for it to have a different experience, a new one, a more expansive one within this kind of project.
So, Essentially, the two questions that I mentioned, can you hear me? Yes, my apologies. So the two questions that I mentioned, what is common between the two?
I mean, what kind of dimension do they belong to in terms of philosophy? Well, they belong to transcendental logic, right? The bottom-up question, the conditional possibility of theory of natural sciences, and the second question, which was a top-down question, application of rational ingredients to immediately givens. So both of questions actually do belong to transcendental logic. This is why, in addition to Weyhenger, Carnap has to take Husserl as an influence, even though Husserl is not hardly being mentioned.
But based on his private conversations, we can say that the influence of Husserl phenomenological project was massive on Carnap. Does anyone know anything about this influence? Well, what's there was influence on Conant in early years leading to off-bowl? I confess that it is perhaps one of the aspects of the Alphaball that I'm most and least knowledgeable,
but where it relates to Husserl, but with regards to the works prior to the Alphaball, I believe most notably is Husserl's influence in the Raum, the Doctor of Disiritation, where in the absence of a of the Rossellian, not Husserlian strategy for constructing the objects of knowledge out of logic.
Carnap needs something to connect logic as a formalism to empirical objects proper. So he introduces in the case of space as a connection, he introduces in order to connect the formal notion of space, the space of geometry understood by then in the very contemporary way of Hilbert and others of this extremely formalized. geometry and between between this so between the space of geometry and the space of in
the space of physics he introduces a note a notion of intuition and intuitive space as a synthetic apriotic form of cognition yes yes but the particular epistemology the particular epistemology he proposes is not so much Kantian as it is for Sallian in the sense that he appeals to intuitions of essence yes it's more on the side of eidetic perception yeah so yes it is the the intuitive space is the minimal the minimal form of space that that remains that remains under variation so precisely so this seems to me the most obvious influence of russo but precisely
this is absent in the alpha but i mean there are authors that i mean there's that the guy that works in the university of porto rico i believe his name is adoc adoc uh where he he has a whole book on on Carnath even later Carnath as Husserlian so but yes yes no I mean even Friedman Friedman I mean like the canonical counter theories on Carnath like Friedman and Richardson and of course later on Sivaudi and Karras talk about Husserlian influences but it is obvious that that even though it is not being mentioned, I mean, probably, I think there is one mention
of Hosell in Afbal or in a footnote or somewhere, something like that. But I mean, it's not really like anything major. But nevertheless, the influence is there, precisely because of true, true, the wrong. Yes. And essentially, this is why I brought up Hosell's idea of transcendental logic. It's transcendental logic as a juncture between the formal and the sensory, right? In the sense of the formal logic project and the phenomenalistic sense that we have been talking about. Yeah, Reza, I think when Hussle distinguishes between the living experience and the dead experience
in this phenomenology, I think that's where Carnap's whole similarity based on remembrance, I think. Yeah, I think it's based on Husserl's recollection. Recollection, remembering the differentiations, I think, abstracted from Husserl's distinction between the living experience, the present experience, and the past experience. Yes, yes, of course. Yes, yes, yes, definitely so. Yes, yes, absolutely. It's, I mean, the kind of pretension discussion that, you know, Osserl talks about. Yes, I mean, there is a huge amount of influence. But of course, you see, I think that there is a strange reason why Carnot actually doesn't talk about Osserl.
He talks about Mach and other phenomenalistic of that time, phenomenistic philosophers of that time. But not all of a certain. I don't know, really. It's not as if he doesn't use all certain ideas. I think there is a certain kind of, you know, by the time of, I mean, this is just a philosophical gossip. It's quite baseless, to be honest with you. But this is my impression that by the time that he wrote Afbao was already associated with a certain kind of circles in European philosophy, namely the goddam continentals or the early continentals.
So he didn't want to actually put his name there. I think this is actually quite an astrological decision. In fact, people have mentioned historians or who were basically contemporaneous with Carnap. Carnap had a habit, unfortunately, to use, you know, to basically reference German philosophers, even though he wasn't actually using them in his books, as long as they could counter the Anglo-Saxon,
Anglophile, basically creed of philosophy. So he wanted, he basically wanted to create this idea that he's entirely coming from this kind of Austro-Germanic philosophy, deep philosophical origin and stands against these kinds of new breed of British idealists, right? I mean, there are these kinds of stuff that are being basically circulated around Carnap's habit of mentioning his influences, right, and not mentioning some others. I don't know about this. It's actually quite a very cynical piece of news, but I wouldn't rule out this precisely because
really I think Husserl played a massive, massive amount of influence in early Carl Knapp's work. And for him to go for some really obscure philosopher and not mentioning Rossell, that's just a little bit, you know, questionable. Not sounding right. But anyway, so coming back to Rossell. By the way, I came 20 minutes late. so we are going to have that if rafael doesn't need to go anywhere we are going to cover those two 20 minutes after 1 30 so it would be 1 50 i think it's fine it's okay okay i'll just make
sure that there is no seminar right after this one but i don't think there is but i'll check Okay. I mean, worst case scenario, if there is, we can start the next session 15 minutes earlier. Okay. So. So as I mentioned, it would be really a mistake to trivialize Carnap's interest in phenomenology during this period. Husserl's approach to eidetic perception could be seen as a component of
transcendental logic or excellence that investigates the laws according to which any possible object of science forms itself into an object to begin with. Any possible object of science itself into an object to begin with. By the way, I highly recommend this is a classic work. You You can't actually start even to work through the issues of the content of philosophy in the 20th century without reading Hosserl's Magnum Opus, formal and transcendental logic.
Magnificent work, highly recommended. So this is basically an excerpt from that. As such, it would be essential pre-logic required for the application of logic in the version of phenomenology presented by Hans Dirich. Jesse, you great German. How is it pronounced? is it d-r-i-e-s-a d-r-i-e-s-c-h is it dirish i think jesse left oh okay so another german here how do you spell it d-r-d-r-i-e
S-C-H Driche Driche I think yeah not that on German but close enough whose work was significant influence both on their own and of in particular phenomenology provided tool for addressing question two the question of schematization how could the purely formal relations of universal completely generated a completely general and completely unambiguous formal geometry applied to something as fluid as a screaming and as subjective as first person a spatial experience unlike the Marburg school
Husserl and Deirisch sorry my I'm not going to learn this name so let me go with the Perigio-English version of it had taken this problem seriously an unlikely shellac they had not simply thrown out their hands and declared that between theory and intuition the bridges are demolished. Husserl's comprehensive program of systematizing subjective experience, particularly as it relates to the foundations of sciences, would naturally have appealed to Karna as a project consistent with his own efforts
to relate a total system of all concepts to subjective experience. To eschematize such a system, Carnap could have regarded Hossel's program for a philosophy as exact science, right? As a program for an overall calculus philosophicus in which the salt for principles of the scientific study of science could be made intuitively explicit, tested for consequences, and justified accordingly. Rossell had offered his program of pure logic
as the basis for a new kind of Mathesis Universalis, with reference to Leibniz and Bolzano. While Kana already regarded Fieger's logic as the main tool of construction, It could not provide the objects or materials on which construction could operate. Hosser's phenomenological inventory of our phenomenal syntax by means of analysis of consciousness could be used as a schematic psychology to schematize in the Kantian sense the purely illogical constructions of formal space
in their applications to physical space. Now, Husserl's radical critique of experimental psychology in philosophy as an exact science did not mean he was anti-experimental. The Gestalt psychologists who were certainly experimental read Husserl's paper as a constructive proposal for experimental psychology, especially regarding the psychological foundations of mental content. It seems Carnap also took Hoselle this way in Avhbav, and particularly in Deruahum. And from his viewpoint, phenomenology had a number of advantages over other schematic psychologies available then.
Well, then, unlike the Marburg school of non-Kantianism, Husserl emphasized the subjectivity of experience. Unlike Maurice Schillick, or the empiricism to which most experimental psychology is stilling is being inclined, Husserl had, by the time of the logical investigations, adopted a Freedian anti-psychologism. in logic and in mathematics. And finally, Husserl showed a greater awareness, even than most pre-gestalt experimental psychologists, of the complexity and the composite character of intuition.
He had learned from the century of empirical research, post-Kant, that this crude traditional category was too vague for most purposes. Intimation of essences is not, in fact, much more precise than Kant's idea of intuition. But Carnap could at least regard it as a stand-in or placeholder. And meanwhile, he was satisfied that as a structural subcomponent of intuition directed only to essences,
it defined a scientifically distinct subcategory of traditional Kantian, basically, intuition. So although it would be wrong to trivialize Carnap interest in phenomenology, his adoption of Hosell's frameworks to choose axioms for intuitive space is somewhat always provisional. And though Carnap did not himself think this is the most interesting part of their round, which led the projects above, he did in 1921 letter to Bertrand Russell accompanying a copy
of the transcript. I think it would be of the most interest to Russell. He says, what might interest you most in the present essay is probably the distinction between formal space and intuitive space as two quite different objects of a science of space. I believe, I have shown here, that although geometry can restrict itself entirely to treating a complex of relations, geometry as a theory of formal space, on the other hand there is also a different geometry, i.e. the theory of intuitive space that cannot fully be derived from logic.
What did Carnap believe that he had shown? It is not the first part of what he claims here, i.e. the geometry can be seen as completely formal. Russell himself had argued long time ago and with white hair in principles and principle mathematical, that geometry was constructible from logic. Carnac must then have believed himself to have shown that there is another geometry, the geometry or theory of intuitive space that cannot fully be derived from formal logic. How had he shown this though? He had started with a subset of Hilbert's axioms, which he said could be taken as describing basically a frame
of ordinary human experience of objects in local space. Depending on the conventions we adopt about the global expansion of these principles, we obtain different metric geometry of constant curvature, Euclidean, Lomachovsky, and Riemannian, so on and so forth. These geometries are arrived at differently from their counterparts in formal space. They are not constructed from basic notions of logic, as formal geometry is. But deduced from intuitive axioms, in a kind of like a Euclidean gesture, right?
Not in a Euclidean system. Euclidean gesture, how Euclide constructs his geometric system from basically intuitive axioms, not formal axioms, because you know the idea of the definitions, which are completely undefined in Euclidean systems, are intuitive axioms or axioms. On the basis of such axioms alone, though we are unable to single out one of the geometries of concept curvature. We can see them as special cases of a higher dimensional structure or of more general projective and topological spaces of three dimensions. And using the results of formal geometry for this special case of intuitive
geometry, we can combine these directions of generalization and arrive at a topological intuitive space of n dimensions the most general structure built from intuitive components the most comprehensive intuitive space which carries within it partly as components and partly as specializations, constraints by means of further basic structures and basic relations, all other possibilities, all other possible intuitive spaces. It may seem a stretch to call
such a space intuitive, but it is the lowest common denominator of spaces that are in fact derived from intuitive axioms. This then is what Carnap meant by saying he had shown there to be another geometry as the theory of intuitive space that cannot fully be derived from formal logic. An application instance of formal geometry could be arrived at by a different axiomatic route and if its axioms codified certain attributes of intuition, the chosen axiomatic geometry could claim to provide a schematization of the formal geometry, which was, this was
actually an answer to the second question for karma so thoughts We still haven't got to Nelson Goodman. I wanted to basically talk about what is actually,
why the phenomenalistic system, constitution system, right? Where does it come from? What are the nagging questions around it, right? And then, next session, it was supposed to be discussed this session, but it will be discussed next session, saying that, okay, all is great and good. So he chooses his phenomenalistic system, right? He He makes a move. So the moment that he chooses the phenomenalistic constitution system, what does he commit himself to? Right? And that would be Goodman's critique.
Is it in a sense that he favors this phenomenalistic phenomenalistic constitution system going going back to Weihinger that it's like it's kind of like what was the phrase again idealist positivism or something like positive idealism and in a way he's like kind of avoiding the whole metaphysical question of like subject in relation to being or vice versa but instead he's choosing the kind of structures of phenomenal experience but then in in doing this he doesn't kind of have an account of you know uh well i mean i don't know how to like proceed on this but but i guess just like not having an account of how
being can influence subject uh you know as a kind of yeah no i don't think that's right actually sorry I think that's... No, no, no, no. I think, no, I, you're, you're, I mean, I love that this is late in the game and you are involuntarily giving me the topic of your next essay, which this is what you are going to write about. It's an occurring theme every week, but I give you a topic and you tell me I've got to write an essay. Yes, yes. No, I think this is something interesting here. But what I was so hmm
crystallize your question in one sentence. So I can actually start to kind of deal with it properly. Because I think that I don't know exactly where I should start here. Sure. So you asked, I mean, I took it to be the case that you were asking in this fork between empiricism and the kind of phenomenal kind of account that's given by Carnap. Carnap chooses the phenomenal account because... No, empiricism and phenomenalistic are the same here. Right. Okay. You know, it's just phenomenalistic approach is a little bit, is a level up. than the traditional empiricism, right? So this is why, and Karnam knows that,
and he wants to also, in addition to that, brings a little bit of Noah-Kantianism by way of Weyhinger and a little bit of phenomenology, named transcendental logic by Bayou Husserl. Yeah, I mean, I think I've lost the thread that I was on a minute ago. Maybe one of the things, yes, one of the things is that this comes back to what Gabriel was talking about. The canonical interpretation of of Baal is that Carnot fails. One of the reasons that he fails, as I mentioned, is precisely because he fundamentally erodes
the distinction between the logical and empirical. Even though he adopts a Hosserlian juncture, because transcendental logic is precisely, is going to be that healthy bridge between the formal and the intuitive, the sensory intuition, right? That's why he adopts Hosserl in early time, for it to be healthy, right? Not just aligning distinction between the formal and the sensory, right? So he adopts a phenomenal logical stance in a kind of a sub-rosa manner. But it seems that it actually doesn't work as he predictably does
in his idea of the constitution system. The question is why, though. So in the, if I can remember this correctly, because I was looking at my notes before, and I'm not sure if this is where it is, but if I'm correct in thinking that this is from the second introduction that he writes subsequently a few years later. He actually makes an interesting remark where he describes his original attempt as being too artificial. And that he, I mean, he, I guess, I guess I was like kind of hung up on what he meant there by artificial. but he says, I should now consider for use as basic elements, not elementary experiences, in spite of the reasons which in view of findings of Gestalt psychology speak for such a choice,
but something similar to Marx elements, e.g. concrete sense data, as for example, a red of a certain type at a visual, certain visual field, place, etc. I mean, I think I'm not sure if this is barking up the wrong tree, but yeah, I mean, sorry, it was the quote before where he says, the procedure that he had appears to be too artificial, and he would use a larger number of basic concepts. What procedure is that that he calls artificio? I think... is it the empirical one traditional empirical one no i think i think it's his his kind of logical
sort of um the procedure of that where he derives the basic relations right oh the basic relation so it's basically what it is so it's part of the question too it's part of the question of of a schematization, right? Because, you know, this is actually a very challenging question, right? It's trying to basically resolve this problem that, now, we can always assume that the concept of apple applies to an apple-shaped object, right? But that's just goddamn artificial in a fake sense, not artificial in a good sense, right? How on earth can we assume such thing, right?
So this is why he actually has to suspend this idea of right kind of application by way of rational ingredients. So remember, the first question actually, what about the sensory givens, the sensory datums, the myth of the given by way of the sensory givens, right? That how natural sciences are possible if ultimately everything bottoms up in this immediate sensory givens, data, Given is not in the sonorism one, data, data, in a Greek sense of the given.
Now the second question is a different version of the myth of the given, actually, when we think about it. What is that? Is that the rational given? we immediately think a certain kind of set or family of concepts can be applied to a set of family resemblances among elementary experiences, right? The problem of a schematization. the fact that we think that this is the case is actually coming from a certain kind of
rational delusion or artificiality of reason in a sense of fakeness you know questionableness so he tries to actually resolve part of his problem by resorting to something like what Gabriel was talking about a bridge between the two a third option namely was really a phenomenological transcendental logic god i am tired of speaking
okay thoughts ideas gossips slanders they'll shot who always has some slanders because apparently i'm very logical and formal yeah actually i wrote the question the chat. You know, I was thinking about, you know, Carnap's extensionalism. Extensionalism in the free-gain sense, right? Logical value. Okay, if you say that,
I have no problem with that. Yes, no, I mean, basically, Carnap says extension, he means Freedian extension, not any sort of extension. So what's the difference between this logical value with intentionalism? What's the difference? Yeah, intentionalism means basically epistemic value. Yeah. Epistemic value. Yes, yes. You know, it's just like, I mean, there's something that I, I mean, I haven't seen it in many places, but sometimes people, when they interpret Karna, they try to read this the extensionalism by way of other kinds of definition of extensionalism. Yeah, I've seen. But no, no, no. That we should be showing. So many philosophers, you know, extensionalism as a differentialism.
I have seen many philosophers do that. Yes, yes, no, no. That's why I'm confused. Yeah, no, no, no. It just simply mean by extensionalism, the very definition of Fouyge's idea of extension versus extension. I mean, intention, sorry, or sense. Edna? Donna? Someone should say something. Hi.
Yes. I wanted to say something, but apparently you're tired of talking. What I wanted to say was, was propose a kind of game which is related to what you were talking about, about the bridge between pure logic, transcendental logic, and then particular What in Kant is very explicit is the kind of understanding that he gives, he takes with himself of time and space from transcendental aesthetics and tries to make sense of this to a deduction.
that if we have time and space already in our empirical intuition then our understanding must have something to give objectivity to this understanding why preach because of my voice somebody wrote preach okay i think i think i think uh our friend has a very preachy voice i like it i can i can listen to him yes i do have i do have an and i um misuse my preach my preaching voice sorry it's a kind of a saruman technique i don't
know if you know saruman but anyway my question was um for understanding and Kant's idea is that because we have an empirical intuition, sorry, empirical imagination, and our empirical imagination is not a dead faculty or unknown to us. So we have things that we call objects in our imagination. Or our imagination synthesized some, as you'd call it, sense data into some objects. But these are not objects, though. You see? No, no, no. This is something that we should take into account. That at this level of empirical imagination, we cannot even ascribe objecthood to anything
that we organize by way of our intuitions, right? But the concept passage is that because, it's actually not on the object, it's on the, is the answer to Hume, I think, that part of his answer to Hume, I think, that why we understand these relations of causality. We understand in our empirical imagination, yes, Hume is right. In our empirical imagination, we have this habituation of things happening necessary after each other. So- But there's also a part of Kant's answer to Hume in the sense that Gabriel was talking about that essentially the cornerstone of Kant's response to Hume
is that Hume actually conflates or allows the distinction between the act and the object, representings and the represented. That was exactly my point. The intuiting and the intuited. Yeah. But Kant's move is here very interesting. But what I'm trying to say is that for him to go past beyond Hume's skepticism, is this, the reason is this, if I understand him correctly, I can actually quote him right. Sure, sure, please. If that would be better. Sure. Do we have time? Yeah, sure, please, please.
Sure. Okay. Sorry. Okay, I cannot find the passage, unfortunately. But anyway, this is, this is, I think it's very famous, and you would recognize it. But his, his reasoning is like this, goes like this. Because, because our empirical imagination is not a dead faculty, is not unknown to us. That is, because things, actually you talked about this I think in the second session, if I remember correctly, that because things just doesn't become something else suddenly without any reason, no? This bottle in front of me suddenly doesn't become an apple,
as you just said. And this is our empirical imagination, no? This is the result of the faculty of empirical imagination because we have because the empirical imagination has this kind of understanding of as if identity or essence he doesn't say identity or essence that is my reading maybe it's very wrong but um somehow it's like a posteriori kripke and posteriori but that's that's that's something else anyway i wanted to say that kant moves here kant moves here is this that because we have empirical imagination and blah blah blah so in our bar it seems like it seems like that what kind of does is something like this passage in come because because this kind of relation can hold without even any be a subject there the given doesn't need to
can you can you can you can you can you repeat that that main point here well main point The last sentence that you put together. Yes, I said that Carnap in Alfa is trying to show that the given doesn't have a subject itself. Given doesn't mean something that a human being or a human subject even has. You can just put aside given a human subject and take a sensor, a machinic sensor there and try to build the pair of similarities and differences. Right. And interestingly, Kant himself actually does talk about this.
And he introduces transcendental logic for going beyond this kind of understanding of cognition that then would depend on the acuteness and the frequency of experiencing or receiving sense data. I don't know if I'm right. I don't know if I'm clear what I'm saying. yeah sure sure go ahead okay so my whole point was this that's that's in that enough far still we have kind of on the side of our empirical uh imagination because this uh this
contention of Kant that because these two are uh definitely related to each other like this we have something that we can understand as causality. But in AFPA, sorry, beyond AFPA, especially in logical syntax, actually what Carnap is trying to do, I think, is systematizing what Kant argues for in transcendental logic. If you put what Kant understand by transcendental logic in in propositional, sorry, not propositional, syntactical form, then you would get the language two, something like the language two. Sure, my point actually is finished.
In logical syntax, he's trying to make sense of the logical, of the transcendental logic. So what I was going to suggest, that in logical syntax, and you talked about this, there no there is no real object there still no then we have no particular logical syntax there is no still there is apparently there is no semantics although from the presupposition there is some kind of object because he have object types you know he has given object types yeah absolutely yes right right exactly like counts like differentiation between mathematical and dynamical in Kant that is not Kantian. It is actually quite different from the Kantian schema. I mean no, I'm not using a schema in the wrong way.
Kantian scenario here. Precisely because the idea of object constitution in Kant is always at some point comes back to intuition, right? Whereas beginning with attempt at method logic, then to logical syntax, this reliance of object constitution on intuition is being suspended for good. Yes, exactly. Exactly. But intuition's... Sorry, sorry. Go ahead. No, no, no. No, I have this habit of going on and on so you may. I was going to make a point precisely the point that Hazard just made though I
believe past the rest I'd say this is this is this is in fact already present in the alpha well at least in how it eventually is published though not not so much in its in its earlier draft where there's precisely a sense of a sense of intuition this is just just like the just like space but yeah i believe and this we could also relate back to the marble influence in carnet the notion of the notions you referred from Kant are very much as as I said based on the notion of on the on the faculty of intuition and this faculty and this is precisely a and this faculty
in a certain way I won't pretend I'm an specialist or very knowledgeable in Mahabouk neocontinism or neocontinism in general but one of the more traditional points in in the historical works on neocontinism and one that Friedman often often brings up is that in the at least in the now in the Mahbub tradition of neocontinism the faculty of intuition loses importance and if it isn't if it isn't entirely abandoned and it's and its role and its role is in some way uh
ceded to the to to the faculty of understanding understanding. And I believe already in the alpha, as it is eventually as it ends up being published in the end, we could agree with Friedman that it is a radicalization of this unimp, of this diminishing importance of a faculty of intuition to the point where there is no longer no longer effect such faculty right or that or that or that or this course if there is such a not a faculty
but a capacity because intuition it can is actually a capacity not a faculty not an active faculty right if even if there is such a capacity this capacity is not a ground yes it can if it if it has it has no epistemological and epistemological uh yes definitely so yes yes yes yes much so and i would like this is it was a magnificent comment gabrielle the thing is that i think that look how How about if Kant would have read these, or was aware of Carnap's moves made in half-bowl,
or perhaps in even logical syntax of language? I wouldn't say that he would balk at them, really. He might just complain once in a while, but he won't balk at them at large. He would love them, actually. Yes, I would say that, you know, this precisely comes back to what Kant has always been talking about, namely that eschemata are not images of the objects, namely representational objects. and only eskimata ground up sensible concepts are pure sensible concepts not images
i mean think about this uh remembering critical periods is that no image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it for it for it would not attain the generality of the concept which makes this valid for all triangles, right or acute, etc. The scheme of a triangle can never exist in anywhere except in thought. That is actually quite something here. But of course, we are reading Kant with a slight uphand here.
We are introducing a little bit of Szilardzian bits here and there, a little bit of Brando interpretation, a little bit of J. Rosenberg there, but probably Kant wouldn't actually meant it in the way that we talk about it today. but that's the beauty of philosophy you know maybe basically read history of philosophy by way of lenses different lenses if i could just sure absolutely i like very much i like your your comment very much it's just and it's precisely for to further uh bring up Friedman and I confess I very much enjoy
Friedman's writing on the off ball and it's superb and it's no content origins and should we actually read a Friedman essay uh next time I mean I just I find they I find they are very very much enjoyable how about reading this cornups of vowry considered i mean i'll be i'll be totally for it uh cornups are far we considered next session as a secondary text so uh friedman has a when whenever he mentions country makes a play a concept uh psychology transcendental psychology he he he has a a interpretive thesis that that i find very
interesting and that the necessity of the postulation of such a capacity of intuition as it as it is done in tradition in the work of of of Kant and not by later no no contents that bring it under the faculty of understanding is due to the lack of to a lacking in Kant's logic in it's not being able due to it being fundamentally logistic and based on a notion of set of concepts as sets and not as concepts as functions
it cannot the word escapes me right now it's not powerful enough to make sense of mathematical reasoning absolutely yes and this makes necessary the postulation of intuition and its forms in such a heavy way let's say presupposing so much of intuition and in and in the sense the advent of frigging logic and if fun and the functional paradigm of the kind of concepts and it's
eventually it's development through logicism with friggin russell allows allows for the by the time of Carnap's the abandoning of the necessity of intuition yes even in the construction of objects themselves and I believe this and this is of course not original this is I believe this is precisely Carter's point that eventually and this would also be the great the great inheritance that Russell leaves to Carnap and Carnap makes much better use of it
than Russell does, is that the strategy of logical constructions allows for Carnap to do with what would be in traditional Kantian standards strictly formal logic the role it allows for for kind of to use logic to do the work of object object constituting objects or yes yes absolutely that would traditionally be left to a if not to a transcendental intuition to a transcendental logic as proposed by cassita and not by casserole yes
yes definitely so this is this exactly this is a point actually i make uh in a very brief uh way in i think chapter seven of intelligence and spirit and that is exactly what i think is the the greatest uh contribution of corner you know in off wow and he picks it up picks it up from there magnificent excellent okay my dear friends i think we should let rafael uh go he has a life just like all of us it's two or three not so much actually ! Less than I would like to, but yeah.
Thank you all. The next session is only in January or we have also on the next week? I think it's only January. No, not next week, but I think that we have one session at the end of December, if I'm not mistaken. Let me see. I'm going to take a look at this. Yes, 30th. I think 30th. wait i'd say i'd say it is very much in kind of in kind of spirit that we completely disregard any religious holidays and very safe i don't think that's i'm sorry i don't i don't think that's accurate my uh my my understanding was that that we're this is the sixth meeting and there were two more on
january 6th and 13th yeah but it's actually that franklin's right like we have are you sure yeah i mean on the spreadsheet the last couple of times that i've the thing is that i think that you i think that you rescheduled the session right so i think it adds to further like one session in january maybe ah so so hmm yeah so okay but but so 23rd is the holiday right we are not going next week we are not going to meet right but the week after that it would be 30th of december right yeah it was already canceled it's been canceled on the schedule the entire time it's not there as well i can double check but it's not there i i don't know i think it's like holiday breaks
or something oh it's new year's eve what it's christmas oh yeah because it's it has only jesus christ almighty okay no it has 31 but still so yeah i think that we meet back in 6th of january do uh yeah 6th of january and then we have a lot of times of january that will be away fortunately from all of you should someone present something on that yes i i look i mean how about this? How about that we stay in contact? Someone presents a video, any volunteer, share it. And we actually, during these two weeks, we just actually go through the email,
feedback going back and forth about the presentation. Who's going to be next, Victor? I can volunteer but I'm going to be in Ireland so it depends on how my internet connection is going yes yes but but you see that I'm an island we had already that kind of excuses I used to use in Iran I'm in Iran I don't have internet Iran is an island right it's just they don't they don't have broadband so um but yeah it should be fine it should be fine send it with birds yeah filming pigeon all right i'll do one okay super super magnificent for uh when exactly would be best because i uh how about how about like uh next friday yeah yeah that should be fine
super magnificent thank you so much thank you so my dear friends uh happy in advance happy christmas happy new year i love you all and take care of yourself love you thank you bye bye bye bye bye um oliver if you can give me back the the access just so i oh yeah it's done