The Vicious Transparency of Time (Session 8)

Hello and welcome to the eighth session of the seminar, the wishes transparency of time, instructed by Reza Nighuristani. Reza, please take it away. Thank you, Nika. Hello, everyone, and thank you. This is our last session. As I said, you are going to have an informal meeting by way of news center discord. I don't know, probably in January. We can decide what would be the best time for you all. But yes, so today's last session, I'm going to talk about, you know, continuing some of

that theme that last session I made. I remember I was talking about imagination, forgetting, and the relation with, you know, time consciousness. and I move toward the consciousness of the other, right? As essentially another manifestation of the problem of time consciousness. One that ends so-called transcendental solipsis problem. And I'm going to talk about this today. Then we will open it to discussions.

And then, I don't know, I don't know how to start, though. I mean, is there any sort of, because this is the last session, clarifications that you would like me to do about any sort of stuff that we have been talking about. And Elaine, I saw your unforgiving comment on Discord. Thank you so much. I will talk about it. I will talk about it a little bit. But thank you so much for being on Discord, by the way. I had no idea you were on Discord. Maria, yes, please.

I wanted to ask whether we could identify unconscious in the case of Husserl with fantasies, reveries, and this kind of things, or those are different still? No, well, yes, reveries are essentially a species of fantasmas, right? In fact, reveries are actually kind of like pure in their essence of their fantasies, precisely because they have this sort of immersion in the complete absence of the positiveness of the object, right?

When we reverie about, you know, a great flying elephant or a feathered serpent, right, as a form of reverie, we actually... that sort of fantasy, that sort of reverie, transitively carries the full consciousness, albeit on the background, on the background, the full consciousness of the absence of thus and so, right, landscape. So they are reveries are different from myth, but also they are different from hallucinations and delusions.

But nevertheless, they are truly within the ambits of what I call the laws of parallelism between perception and imagination. their their greatest thing uh is one uh that there is a headless temporality about all such daydreamings and reveries in the sense that i mentioned uh and i actually haven't uh this is not my term, headless temporalization. That's the Warren's term. And Hosselle's actually, as I cited that passage from Hosselle. So one, that headless temporalization,

headless precisely because it has no present thing in it, right? It's like it's all, it's like its own time, right? When we are actually daydreaming, it's like as if it is its own time. We are not pretending, either positively or negatively, that this is actually an object out there presented to us by way of senses, right? It is a purely authentic presentation within that sort of mode of temporalization. And hence, it's just that its authenticity is not about fulfillment

in the perceptual sort of way, but has been constructed elaborately around the absence of dispositedness. and hence it's quite can be fundamentally systematic as i mentioned that that ultimately these sorts of uh phantasmata by virtue of the by virtue of the sort of temporalization under which they operate have something in common with logical forms because you can cast them onto reality.

They can subsume various sort of contents, which is not completely arbitrary. When we are daydreaming, it's not haphazard daydreaming or haphazard dreaming, right? it is actually quite motivated in a sense as a semblance of systematicity. It's just that it's systematicity. It's not that of perception or the perceptual ego. It is actually bereft. I wouldn't call it bereft. habits of perceptual ego are progressively are being suspended in daydreaming.

Lane, yes, it is difficult to unlearn things you have grown into. Yes, but isn't it the whole task of intellect, the greatest unlearning, right? The philosophy, if it is worth anything, it should be an organome of unlearning, right? I think that that was the most humble, you know, thesis that, or idea, the philosophy built itself around, you know, the greatest form of unlearning, you see it in Plato, you see it in Parmenides, you see it in Proclus, onwards, that it is actually quite idle,

but not only idle, but also dangerous, to feel acclimatized, not only with appearances, but also with ideas. Hence, if, as I said, if there is actually a philosophy worthy of its name, it should be absolutely a form of a skepticism, but not as a way out, merely as a way in. as a way in, in the sense that skepticism begins to unravel a given order of things and hence pave the road for possible unlearning.

This is not a new idea. I mean, isn't it Seneca and the Stoics and the Cynics? The freedom is not freedom from slavery, but unlearning of the slavery, right? there is a certain sort of idea among the cynics, particularly anarchists, who was from the Eschatian tribes, becoming a Greek citizen, who peddled this idea to the Greeks. And to the Greeks, it's actually quite a very revolutionary idea that we are born

in one way or another to servitude. The freedom is literally the unlearning of being a servant. Every fool is a slave and only a wise man is free. This is a stoic paradox. Yeah, I mean, cynics particularly, I would say that far more vehement about this sort of idea than the Stoics, because the Stoics, at least in the canon of Stoicism, the unlearning is something as if we know the means of unlearning, right?

whereas cynicism is actually in the ancient form is development of methods of unlearning right without assuming that we have adopted or learned a method of unlearning Yes, Juan. Juan, I think you raised your hand. I think you're muted.

yes okay yes um following the idea you you had about the logic um you can say that the logic is a formal formalismos i don't know because you say Why phantasmata is a logical form? They, I wouldn't call them that they are logical forms, but I would say that for two reasons, at least in Hossel, they share something fundamental

with the generation of logical forms. One in Hossel, as I mentioned earlier, in the earlier session, is something called the fundamental type. The fundamental type is a presupposition for both imagination, fantasies, and logic, in the sense that there is an assumption that everything that can be imagined or perceived is imagined from precisely because it is being imagined or perceived from a unitary spatiotemporal horizon. Now the consequence of the fundamental type assumption is that

this sort of thought then allows for untethering the formal apparatus giving it its own autonomy such that it can be recast and recast again against the furniture of the world, right? Like, as I said, in logic, that would be literally the formalism thesis, right? The formalism in the sense that what is formalism actually for logic? for formal logic it is that it implies as katarina dutilneweis has uh talked about it it implies that

we are uh assuming a very special uh sort of you know position for for these sort of forms logical forms that they can be de-semantified first and foremost they can be disconnected or or decoupled, decoupled from their content, from in the frequencies from their reference, but that decoupling also means that they can be recoupled back again and apply to other sorts of contents, hence re-semanification. That you can actually use formal apparatus in different sort of contexts.

And that is the power of logic. So that's, I think, the first one, the fundamental type. And the other one that they do share, without blaring the lines between imagination and formalism in the logical sense, would be the sort of self-temporalizing mode of consciousness under which they are operating. an eminent object attains self-transcendizing or self-transcending vector.

Okay, then I think he's speaking about the formal logic, that is another thing, but about what you say, a phantasmata as a logical form. But is it... Akin to the logical forms, yes. Yes. This is not maybe reflexivity. The logic is not reflexivity. It belongs to a species of reflexivity. Yes. It belongs to that sort of a species. Yes.

because remember in that diagram that I, you know, put on the screen, that would be, you know, reclaiming sense in the Freedian sense, right? And sense requires a semblance of reflexivity. But then reflexivity is contrary to the intuition? Yes.

Well, that would be essentially, that's now it becomes far more interesting precisely because under the dominion minion of categorial intuition, right, then you would be able to renegotiate the forms, right, logical forms, in the sense that you can create a different system of forms with different sorts of coherences. I'm not talking about consistency, coherences. Essentially, you can give rise to a different form of logic. Right? And that is actually, that is the beauty of the constructionist

thesis, right? As you know, put forward by the by either intuitionism a la Brower or the intuitionistic logic a la hating. Thank you very much. but it is really important that we should understand that what happens in in in the domain of formal logic has nothing to do the sort of intuitions that we are talking about as i mentioned and i think that was a response to flip it last time that is really important to note and

highlight the fact that the founding act of intuition here is not empirical. Because objects of logics are not intuited objects of experience, precisely because they are founded in perpetuity, whereas mere experiential intuitions, tomorrow today i'm looking at this red rose and say oh this is a great one oh actually i'm talking about this not a rose i need to always have a flower here when i'm looking at this today i would say that oh well you know this has this sort of intuition

And then tomorrow, by virtue of its empirical intuition, my encounter will with it change. Right. Whereas in the case of the logical constructs, they ought to be in perpetuity within their own system. foundation the act of founding is systematically understood in perpetuity no machines yes this is way wow this is beautiful

That is essentially what Plato might call beauty, right? Particularly in, I mean, not in Republic, not in his earlier dialogues, but the so-called the lecture on the good, right? Which is part of the unwritten doctrine, the school of Platonism. Apparently, by all accounts, Plato comes for the first time ever and talks as Plato, as himself, right? He's giving a public lecture to the people of Athens. Everyone is becoming disappointed because the beginning of this line

is that the good is the one, and one is a number. then he starts to construct an idea of beauty by way of basically logical forms literally as we call it today they want Plato to talk something about democracy freedom and that sort of what later Plato calls the vulgar vagaries that he himself has engaged and entertained in the books of Republic. Thoughts?

Does anyone else have a question? Okay. Lane, one of the things that I have a little bit of problem is that, look, I don't think that the idea of either proving rationality or the unconscious, either in materialist or

Husserlian sense, shouldn't be actually called proving. We are not proving, they are not proving anything, right? I mean, it's impossible to prove within the organon of philosophy anything, really. I think knowing Jacques Bouverie quite well, I think Jacques Bouverie simply is trying to show that, look, and this is the same, basically, I would say that the same sentiment that Wittgenstein had about Freud. Wittgenstein absolutely thought that Freud is a genius. the thing is that look when you are creating a philosophical system

right the point of origin is always you know kind of undecided so to speak or decided in a very ambiguous sort of way but at the very least When you are creating a system of claims and theses, you are essentially beholden to the coherency, not consistency, coherency, the internal coherency of the certain system of claims that you have made.

And I think that Freud is completely responsible for the incoherency of his own system, because what he is trying to do, and I wouldn't actually, this is not by any means defending the naturalization, the naturalizing vector against psychoanalysis. but I think we have to address that sort of issue that the way that Freud's formulate his, you know, psychoanalytic thesis, he wants to turn it, he wants, as I mentioned, he wants to go against one philosophy that not, this is not a philosophical thesis, right, has nothing to do

with philosophy whatsoever, but also it is purely scientific. I don't think that Freud ever actually relinquished the sort of ambitions he had from the get-go in his early essay, the method of, you know, scientific psychology. I think that he retained them sub rosa, under the hood, so to speak. And ultimately, you know, if you are making scientific claims, then you should be beholden to scientific analysis, I think. If he had done it as a philosophy call, or even

in what Paul Ricoeur has talked about, the hermeneutic analysis of the consciousness, he wouldn't have been charged with pseudoscience you see ultimately this we cannot prove or disprove anything in any sort of field we can only prove and disprove a class of problems which are of thus and so types, right? Metaphysical problems, for example, can be resolved or refuted on their own types, right?

Scientific problems and so on and so forth, even rational problems, right? I think that the real disappointment with Freud was that he created a certain sort of willful ambiguity about the project itself, such that the method wanted to be scientific, but it wasn't. Now, you might go and say, well, you know, it is a scientific in the kind of Althusserian sense of science, right? But then that would be, you know, materialism, you know, in the Althusserian sense of systematization of causes. But then Freud

doesn't really help you on that side either. Precisely, Freud actually wants to talk about reasons, but he talks about causes, which are actually not causes, there are reasons. However, I think that the greatest, you know, I think I actually take side with Wittgenstein's idea about Freud that the greatest achievement of Freud is the introduction of a class of

phenomena appearances so to speak. Hitherto uninvestigated. That would be the class of unconscious phenomena. That is absolutely a magnificent sort of achievement. I just don't think that Freud wasn't helpful with the cause, with his own discovery, right? And yes, absolutely, I completely agree with you that, yes, I think that, you know, that, oh, well, you know, everyone is Freudian. No, actually, I agree with you that, yeah, the, what you might call

to be the dominating movement today is just neuroscience, behavioralism, and that sort of stuff, jazz. It's just that they are not interesting, you know, from, you know, with regard to the Freud's discoveries, just are trying to resolve a problem that is not actually Freud's problem, right? Main point of discovery. but that is a different sort of I think criticism that I think should be the criticism of essentially the sort of naturalizing tendencies blind naturalizing tendencies that goes both in

the domain of psychology psychoanalysis phenomenology so on so forth uh should we have a five minutes break and then come i will read lecture a little bit and then we open it to discussion and stuff okay

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Sorry.

It's so cold here. Another thing that I was thinking, Freud talks about, particularly with regard to the dominion of the unconscious, talks a lot about causes. As I said, he doesn't want to say reasons, he wants to say causes, because that gives semblance of this, of psychoanalysis being scientific, but he really does actually talks about reasons at the end of the day. However, if we admit that, yes, he does actually in fact talk

about causes, his way of talking about causation is not actually scientific. It is what is called metaphysic causality. You see, the most interesting about causality or causation in a scientific sense in any sorts. I'm not talking about exact sciences or physical sciences. I'm just talking about really like causality. It is not really, there are two criteria for talk of causes, right?

One, of course, that every sort of talk of causation should be able to coherently say not how a cause is related to its effect or a subsequent or a consequent, but rather build a network of causal connections. Number one, building a network of causal connections, which to build such a network, you require a certain sort of criteria of logical coherency.

And of course, also methodological consistency to essentially carve out this network of connections, causal network of connections. Number one. Number two, you need to actually articulate that for a specific sets or class of causes creating so-and-so, a specific source of effects, you should be able to systematize types of causes

such that within the regime of typification of causes, there would not be causes which not belong to the sort of types that you are trying to ascribe to those sort of effects. Freud actually fails on both sides, but nevertheless he retains still a sort of causal thesis about repression and unconscious and so on and so forth. That's why I'm saying that his version is actually more in tandem with what we today in philosophy call metaphysical doctrine of causation.

Metaphysical doctrine of causation essentially is that there is a causal connection between thus and so phenomena and factors. It's just that the network of causal connections is not articulated. Because, like, literally, we can't talk about the talk of causation as a scientific discourse without the articulation of the causal network itself and how it holds together. Please go on, Clay. well i think my critique with the text is that it starts criticizing freud by

calling the unconscious this animistic belief and i think that's basically not what it's not freud's conception of the unconscious but it is a reductionist reading of a certain passage of freud's writing yes yes no i completely agree no i really just generally didn't put that sort of pages uh to to criticize freud i just wanted to highlight what homunculus fallacy actually is right uh no absolutely i i think that yes i mean uh no i mean the book uh jacques bouverie's uh is a fundamentally i mean was sorry he passed away it was a fundamental philosopher

right, what in France they call it a rare bird, right, he had always an attachment with the continentals, with Badiou, with all that Lacan, and all of that, but also he had a very sort of very analytic sort of mindedness, but yes, I completely, yes, I would say that yes, if we take that passage as a critique of Freud, it just doesn't hold any fucking water, right? It's not actually a good critique or an interesting one, in fact, because there are actually quite other numerous passages by Freud that is not animistic, right, in that sort of homunculus

fallacy uh yeah no no i i agree with that with that sentiment yes and i think um like the general by general would place hustle and freud so close to each other in a way is because i think that both have this claim that Freud has the claim of the drives, of the unconscious drives, where we really have to think them as some motor driving our system, while Husserl also has the instincts which actually work quite similar to the drives in Freud.

So, and in both cases, there is no coherent claim of why they are the basic starting point. Okay, yes, I completely understand. But as I said, you see, the starting point, I think, the way we might not actually decide, you know, about the starting point. But nevertheless, as I mentioned, you can only work within the system that is given to you and look at the coherency, internal coherency of the sort of claims within that system. And I think that Husserl literally does not want to introduce consciousness as anything other than conscious.

Consciousness, right? As the operation of consciousness itself. Because that would require a lot of metaphysical massaging and lubrication, right? Whereas Freud wants to claim certain sort of scientific in the late 19th century sciences to give the unconscious semblance of certain sort of what you might call to be phenomena, which are responsible for the sort of phenomena that we experience, right? But they are not phenomenal really. There are kind of causes according to Freud, right? From early, he thinks

about this in terms of biologism and psychophysicism, but then it changes his mind. It is really important that I think that that gesture actually, yes, I would lead to this sort of idea that yes, Husserl actually in his own system is far better and more coherent than Freud. Husserl never actually tries to posit anything outside of consciousness. Because if you posit something outside of consciousness as the engine of consciousness, then you better be able to either do real

scientific work that well of course was i mean freud doesn't want to that because it would be just pure biologists or psychophysicism of his time or else you need to actually deploy a massive load of metaphysical bloatware to back up your claims Hossel doesn't want to do that. Hossel actually wants to bracket metaphysics. So yes, of course, I know that's, you know, ultimately from an objective perspective, we can't say that what Hossel does

or what he decides on how to make that system or how Freud makes that decision, you know, you know, one is correct and the other is not, but ultimately it's a matter of system construction, right? And obviously a system, as I said, you know, sometimes I really genuinely think that Ocon was right. A system that requires less explanation, less unicorns to talk about consciousness is a better system. Because it has an internal coherency.

That internal coherency cannot be attained within the Freud system. It can actually be attained within Hosell's system. Quite right. Precisely because he doesn't step Outside of consciousness, the unconscious is not actually a sort of materially substrate working against consciousness. It's just consciousness working against itself in various sort of phase of renewals. Okay. Can I ask again?

Sure. Because in this text we've read this consciousness and unconsciousness. It is that Hosell uses the instincts at something that is um the cause for an action that is motivations motivation motivation um of self-preservation um but as an example then how it is um how it is um kind of changed by

consciousness. In an example, the example used is that we don't eat anything, but we eat something specific. And I think that a claim like this... That would be very early Hossel, though. I mean, Hossel actually quite specific about the laws of motivation. You see, Hossel wants to say that, look, that there is a mode of or manner of which is the intertwinement of the constituted and the constituting, operating under the rubric of inner time consciousness, that makes subjectivity, right?

Makes consciousness. And this consciousness, however, is unconscious at a specific moment, of its own origin right but that is how consciousness actually works paradoxically right by renewing itself by splitting itself in numberable times right I don't think that you should read too much into that passage, early passage by Hosselle as a teleological thesis, because Hosselle really does not mean that.

and he is actually quite very steadfast against those sort of interpretation, even though he does not fully relinquish his, you know, alliance with Aristotle. I just, I don't think that the laws of motivation don't work like that as a mere, you know, final causes, right? in the Aristotelian sense, or even a materialist sense. It's just that inner time consciousness and how it motivates the renewal of consciousness

and its splitting, internal splitting, is just this. It's a matter of givenness. And hence, the ultimate, you know, a slogan, which is the title of this course, the vicious transparency of time consciousness is ultimately an extreme opacity to itself precisely because it's viciously transparent he doesn't want to claim that sort of you know metaphysical ideas that why i do that why i did do this by like in Freud or materialist sense or any sort of metaphysical sense actually.

He wants to actually introduce subjectivity consciousness as driven by a form of recognition of itself which is at once you know, the engine of it, but also from another sort of side, if you look at it, is a moment of withholding, withholding, right? Withholding consciousness. can you um repeat please this idea about about um opacity in spain's opacity or not

because it's the the issue the trans the transparent vision yeah yes that would that would be my today's lecture i will i will definitely do it i will definitely do it uh should I actually start and read a lecture? Yeah? Okay, if you don't mind. So, I mean really the most important thing is thinking about, you know, So at this point in our seminar would be the so-called transcendental constitution of the other.

Precisely because it somehow motivates the question of how to assess or negotiate the relationship between primordial transcendence of the other and the primordial transcendence of original time consciousness, which is on the basis of which transcendence as such, namely the transcendence of the world, including the lives of others, and my own self-transcendence and self-reference, is grounded.

In oneself, time consciousness is open in what you might call to be a novel form of transcendence. it wants the main issue with you know Husserl is that he wants to rescue transcendence from transcendental solipsism. He really thinks of Kant does not actually eject himself from what you might call to be transcendental solipsism, a variation of what you might call to be Descartes' main challenge.

Solipsism, particularly of its transcendental kind, remains unchallenged, uninvestigated for quite a while. you know, to put an end to transcendence and solubitism, you should actually introduce a system whereby the other becomes actually the problem of consciousness, of the origin, genesis, and constitution, of consciousness, rather than, you know, belatedly introducing the other,

and make sure that everything will be taken care of the labor of the other, right, in the order of self-consciousness. No. If there is other, according to a cell, and transcendental otherness, this otherness should ultimately be at the origin of self-apprehension. The representation of the other should be the origin or at least share with that origin

a moment that contributes to what we call consciousness, self-consciousness, right? So, time consciousness is opened in a radical form of transcendence in an Auxerlian way. the original transcendence within immanence, within the retentional and potential dimensions of my self-temporalization, and the transcendence within the immanence of the other, finds then a rather promising phenomenological comparison with the intersection of far

four retentions and four pretensions, which according to the Warrens is bereft, however, of a living present. Translate this to the presentation, right? Tether to a positiveness. Now, I mentioned this, that inner time consciousness, by virtue of how it's configured, you know, originally, you know, impressions, retentions, far retentions, protentions, and far protentions,

is essentially a seed of doubt in the Cartesian sort of way. However, this doubt can be understood in terms of how retentions and protections intertwine. What Hosea tries to do here, as I mentioned, a skepticism in, is to introduce doubt in the very problem of consciousness. This doubt, however, is not determination of consciousness, but it's a very engine.

And this is this doubt that actually works against various, what you might call it to be Waldorf, you know, ways of formulating transcendental ideanism. So the phenomenological argument of transcendental idealism casts in the form of a refutation, then in Husserl's sense, of transcendental solipsism.

It critically depends on Husserl's analysis of time consciousness and the constitution of the other as a semblance of an alter ego. Actually, alter ego is not really a good word. It's a mirroring. You see? So consciousness has this sort of headless temporalization, ultimately an imminent object becoming self-transcending right

bereft of every sort of reference in its pure form to a moment of presence or presenting or presenting, right? That would be perceptual habit. That would be just what you might call the perceptual ego is, right? But that is not really the human. That is not the intelligence. That is not sapience. Sapience is actually a form of self-transcendizing eminence, right? Gives birth to its own consciousness. as a moment of eruptions.

What Hossel wants to actually perform here is to say that this very sort of configuration has something to do fundamentally with the configuration of probabilities at the most basic level, between retentions and pretensions, but also down the line between remembrances and anticipations. And then, ultimately, between the past as the history

and the unfolding of this history for the sort of intelligences we are. Yet, the relation within these two poles from the get-go, either between retention and pretension, you know, remembrances and anticipation and so on and so forth, have always taken the form of doubt. Doubt, here, is a fundamental concept. Doubt is essentially a relationship

between two modes of self-apprehension. at various scales of probability, right, and anticipations and so on and so forth. In the sense that doubt unfolds as the engine, as a lubricant of consciousness, unfolds the sort of scenario whereby we are able to empty or deplete certain sort of assumptions

about ourselves and amplify certain sort of assumptions about ourselves in the name of the other. So doubt probabilistically understood across its various levels of time consciousness is really the intrusion of the other into the consciousness. Before I move forward, thoughts. Any questions?

okay Okay. So in Hossel's sense, time and the other mirrors the question of how to construe the constitution of absence without undermining the phenomenological principle of original evidence as a foundation of any and all constitution. In both instances, the challenge consists in

how the present is open to the irreducible givenness of the not now. The problems, so-called problems of time consciousness and the other in this sort of way, provoke a fundamental questioning of the manner of being, in a certain sense, of transcendental subjectivity from different angles that converge on its transcendental prerogative as the origin of the world itself. Yet, how can we reconcile the claim, according to Osserl, the intrinsically

first being the being that precedes and bears every worldly objectivity, its transcendental intersubjectivity, with again the other Husserlian claim that my consciousness constitutes itself in another or in an absolute and thus primary sense as original time consciousness, which is a form of consciousness my own or the other so the real puzzle here

is that for some wants to introduce the vicious transparency of time right into the order of consciousness without assuming any sort of metaphysical status for this manner of consciousness right as a manner of consciousness precisely because that is what consciousness is made of. Not the world, consciousness. The consciousness is responsible to engage in the act of worlding and reworlding, right? So then the puzzle becomes quite serious.

If this is the manner of givenness by virtue of which consciousness works, that how can we ever postulate other people, other species, or other human beings operate under the same sort of universal manner of givenness, which is the intertwinement of the constituted and the constituting internal time consciousness. Wouldn't be the case that if we entertain that sort of idea that we are essentially

kind of making a certain sort of move toward metaphysics of subjectivity. We do share something amongst us precisely because It is a metaphysical hypothesis, right? But if it is really us, not the things that thinks in us, but it is really us, our consciousness, then we wouldn't be able to actually say that, look, other sorts of intelligences have the same sort of inner time consciousness by virtue of which they come to the recognition of ourselves and others.

and the world so this is a fundamental puzzle for ourselves you know the constitution of the other is the ultimate highlighting of the problem of time consciousness and time itself you can either say and give up the realm of metaphysics and metaphysical claims and say that well yes there is a universalism of certain sort of laws or modes of givenness by virtue of which we can actually recognize one another

or you can instead of universalizing it you can localize it and then synthesize it localizing it in the sense that first you say that look every consciousness is consciousness by time inner time consciousness but that does not actually lead to the claim that by virtue of sharing this commonality that we can come to recognize one another. Right? So the problem of consciousness becomes first and foremost the problem of solipsism.

but then how to diagonalize the problem of solipsism by way of problem of time without a smuggling in a great dose of good old-fashioned metaphysical opium to glue everything back together but some doesn't want to do that but some wants to say that look yes all forms of consciousness if they are consciousness they are essentially driven as as in motivation by a by a form of internal or inner time consciousness

but just because of this commonality does not mean that we can ever actually come and recognize one another as another human being or even as another he wants to actually show that the problem of consciousness from the get-go from the very beginning was merely the problem of other. That the problem of inner time consciousness is truly understood, is a problem of others, other worlds, unconscious,

as the alienation of consciousness, positive and negatively, and so on and so forth. It's just that inner time consciousness, as I mentioned, has as its constitutive factor the greatest doubt.

Doubt as the engine of consciousness is ultimately responsible. Doubt not in a negative sense, doubt in a positive sense, amplification and depletion, right, of objectivity is responsible for the recognition of the other. Yes, Lika.

uh i wanted to quote something from brandon uh because uh i think i understand what you say as actually an implicit uh critique of brandon uh well he says that self-consciousness is a social achievement. Yes, with that I'll agree. And then he says, it's a normative status, that is a social status, not something that happens between one's ears, but an achievement that happens

between members of a community. And with this claim, I'm not an expert on Brandon. I haven't read his books, But I always feel that for him, the you that he is talking about, that it serves as some kind of condition that is already given and by which we can make our assertions, justifications and so on. It seems that it is immediate. Yes, yes. Unfortunately, that's just bad Hegelianism, I would say. This is not Hegelianism. It's not Hegelianism.

I said bad Hegelianism is actually, you know. Yeah, it's a weak, weak Hegelianism, right? It's a weak Hegelianism. And Brandon is absolutely a weak philosopher, right? In the old fashion of the march through the history, right? Oh, great. I love it. But it's, you see, obviously what Brandon wants to talk about And this is actually, not actually Brandoian, this is a very Pipinian sense of how self-consciousness works, as at the level of the concretization, right? Now, the problem here is something quite actually very, very specific.

You see, so yes, good, you know, at social members, we recognize one another and, you know, this and that. And the you, the other, is somehow smuggled in within the level of concreteness as an abstract datum. That cannot be questioned. Yes. And unfortunately, there is a name for this. It's called fucking neoliberalism. Right. I love Brandon, though. I absolutely do. He's probably one of the most majestic philosophers

in our puny times. But yes, that is actually a very, very serious sort of problem with any sort of, not Brandom's idea of normativity, but rather with the Brandom's idea of self-consciousness as a concrete matter, right, as a social edifice. It has already assumed an abstract datum for it to be concrete. Then how can concretization happen, right? Because the engine of concretization is the engine of doubt, literally. There is no certainty for the other. The other, as Husserl always said it,

is at the tip of my tongue. It's just that it can never be uttered, Right? Not because that thing is an alterity like Levinas says, but it's just because I haven't actually determined what my consciousness is. My consciousness is a pure form of opacity, is a special form of darkness. Yeah, I agree. Give me two minutes.

I have to do a little bit of a stirring of the stew and soup and stuff and I will come back. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

So. So. So there is a reason that, you know, Husserl wants to actually introduce the problem of inner time consciousness as also the problem of the recognition of the other as the other

and not as an ego, right? As a disturbance. um maria if you can actually um i will i will uh but i just want to just um go a little bit on this and then yeah we can open it up um so yeah what was i saying um So the problem starts with this idea that, you know, so first and foremost, introduces, right,

absolute time consciousness as a continuous self differentiation. one that differentiates itself in a twofold manner along the lines of double intentionality of retentional consciousness and sort of retention double, you know, intentionality of imagination or phantasmata. As a differentiation from itself in terms of the transcendence of constituted time objects, vis-a-vis, you know, constituting imminent consciousness, and as a differentiation of itself

in terms of the transcendence of absolute time constituting consciousness, vis-a-vis constituted imminent consciousness. Rodolphe Bernhardt, I mentioned him a couple of times, and particularly his essay on Freud and of self. So absolute time consciousness retains itself and is retained. Azrael Berner mentions it, is a felicitous insight and in this manner differentiates itself from itself. The non-coincidence

of the retention of consciousness of the immediate past with the consciousness of the now structures, that is to say the non-coincidence of consciousness with itself insofar as the experience and the constituted immanent content of consciousness does not coincide with the constituting and experiencing consciousness. This is what Husserl says, absolute time constituting consciousness does not itself appear as constituted. There is just a distance or difference between the constituted imminent temporality of consciousness and the constituting consciousness. And this self-transcendence,

According to Osel, within consciousness itself is grounded in the double structure of retentional consciousness, crosswise and lengthwise. This self-transcendence does not succumb to the vicissitudes of what Osel early on had called reflection theory. precisely because the sense in which consciousness has differentiated and thus distanced itself from itself does not imply a distance between an object and a subject you see it is really interesting that Hoselle's

by virtue of trying to reformulate the problem of the recognition of the other, and the other as a constitutive, originary constitutive moment in the consciousness of ourselves, individually and solipsistically, does not translate in any sort of way to a relation between subject and object. The problem of the other is not that of objectification. That is a French bullshit that so many people have been talking about. The other is essentially a self-constituted

self-distancing of consciousness, individual consciousness with itself and of itself. The other, think about that metaphor, remember, that I mentioned of the problem of internal time consciousness? As a train, you are a passenger. It's not good to call a train Orient Express anymore.

We call it, I don't know, Prometheus Express, whatever. So you are on Prometheus Express. And then as the train moves at a constant speed, you see these sceneries from this window. That is what you might call to be a kind of self-distancing that differentiates itself from the world. but most importantly it only differentiates itself from the world by virtue of differentiating itself from the train as such, right? You are a passenger riding this great train, Prometheus Express.

But there is another angle to this puzzle. The problem of consciousness is just that you're also the train itself, accelerating at a constant speed. Right? You're both the passenger and the train. That one rides self-differentiation. That one initiates self-differentiation. and the problem of other is it literally should be understood within this sort of allegory it is not as if the other is an object or a product of an objectification right it's literally

a problem of how from what angle you look at consciousness your own subjectivity as a mere freeloader passenger or as prometheus train itself So, yet the self-transcendence does not succumb to the, as I mentioned, to the vicissitudes of what Hosell calls in earlier works, reflection theory.

Precisely because the sense in which consciousness has differentiated and thus distanced itself from itself does not imply a distance between an object and a subject. A direct consequence of this phenomenological insight or a state of argumentation is that absolute time consciousness in its constituting expression is itself not in time. in the manner in which it is, in the manner in which its imminent noetic acts and sensual contents are temporally constituted. Absolute time consciousness possesses another form of

temporality that, to be sure, remains unexplored in the span of the entire works of Hosselle until the very late lectures, right? And when it is being introduced, Hossels call it, introduce this under the concept of life itself or the form of life as opposed to consciousness, mere consciousness. Put it differently, the tension between the poles of retention and original presentation in Hosell's early analysis of time consciousness constituted an original difference, a temporal

splitting, so to speak. This original self-differentiation of time consciousness becomes shifted from Bernou manuscripts on words to a tension between retention and pretension, such that the original presentation is caught in between what he calls at the edge of time, at the edge, the colliding streams of retentions and pretensions. This tension between depresentification of retention modification and the fulfillment of pretension then can be taken as a tension between life and consciousness. This tension is given

in the life of consciousness. A consciousness is alienated with its own life Have you noticed that you're never actually ever going to entertain, experience the unity of your own consciousness? Because your consciousness is being ever renewed. consciousness as the object of consciousness as the object of its reflection is mere contingency a facticity so to speak

it erupts and sinks back in the river of lethal only to come back as this now consciousness what we sell wants to talk about is that the ultimate enigma of time or inner time consciousness should be understood in the tension between life and consciousness encapsulated within the life of consciousness itself. That the life of consciousness retains a very special form of darkness

or opacity or transparency if you will. To various moments that constitute what you might call the ordinary consciousness. It is only when the other is brought to this life as an object of doubt about my own self, hence an axe against the solipsistic panorama of the ego, that this life can be systematized truly as a life and not this life, not this life that I have thought is mine.

Thoughts before I move forward? While you are thinking, let me do one more round of investigating this. I'm coming, I'm coming, Maria, I'm coming. I wanted to ask you about the text on the Discord. Is it too far from our topic because it is about unconscious of void? I don't know. I mean, can you elaborate a little bit? As the person who wrote this text, I didn't understand who it was. He said that people

accuse Freud of making unconscious this other against which we build our consciousness. But I think this is a misunderstanding of Freud because in Freud, unconscious is just a valve operated by trauma and trauma is already a structure in consciousness so uh in this case freud and husserl are exactly the same they think that i wouldn't call them they are the same to be honest with you i think that they are actually trying to look at the life of consciousness from different angles right uh the whole point is that the life of consciousness is not given to consciousness. The consciousness can never actually in its own solipsistic sphere have

an access to its own life. That's the whole problem. Right? And now that lack of access can be the source of Prometheanism, right? Or source of massive amount of angst and repression. Now, if you think about from this perspective, yes, Husserl and Freud come together at this very particular moment, which is the investigation of the life of consciousness. Understanding that the life and consciousness are not the same. just because you are a dust and soul conscious creature

does not mean that you have an access to the life of consciousness and just because you have come to life does not mean that you are a conscious being right that's a very sort of horrific scenario I mean I know that schopenhauer might have a wet dream about this but for wrong sort of reasons one sec

Thank you. Thank you.

Sorry. So ultimately, you know, this tension that I was talking about between depresentification of retentional modification and the fulfillment of pretension can be taken, as I mentioned, between life and consciousness. The life of consciousness as an event of its self-temporalization occludes itself within its own accomplishment as consciousness. The concept of life

or rather the stress on the life of consciousness increases in the later works of Husserl, right, particularly from Bernal manuscript onwards, words highly highlighted in C manuscripts, so-called C manuscripts. Absolute time consciousness in these later works does not coincide with itself, and is thus not simultaneous with itself. Yet, the constituent consciousness and the constitutive consciousness are at the same time

precisely as non-coinciding as they have always been, much like the original difference between retentional modification and original presentation. now here you can we can you know entertain ourselves insight about the life of consciousness as a fundamental phenomenological discovery about the fact that consciousness eludes and escapes itself as an event

of original constitution. Imagine, this is like, you know, when philosophy becomes sci-fi, right? Achieves a certain sort of path to awe. imagine that consciousness in the tradition of Cartesian meditations, right, is a prison, right, a jailhouse an individual

consciousness, right, we are talking about individual consciousnesses but what if that the fact that you have this sort of consciousness it means that you have already broken the jail you have conducted the maximum escape right it's just that you are in a certain sort of as uh you know um pre-socratics were talking about in a state of forgetfulness right where you cannot see whether you i have actually

broken from the jail or I am in the jail. The reason that I actually mentioned this is precisely because it's a very, you know, kind of a vulgar motif in today's sci-fi. You know, someone who is in simulation, someone who has broken from the simulation and now understand that I am in simulation. Right? I don't know how many of you have watched this new TV series 1899. Which is magnificent. I mean, yeah, I mean, it's kind of European, which is not my sort of sci-fi, but it's still superb.

And yes, there is actually a fundamental reference to Plato. that the problem of escape from consciousness is for you to be able to recode or reconstitute appearances not only about the world and objects around you but about your own self the appearance the phenomena of consciousness ought to be recorded such that you can actually garner a semblance

of attitude about the sort of prison you are. But that also means that you have escaped from the prison in a certain sort of way. Right? This is what people usually don't get it about the Plato's allegory of the cave and they try to turn it into some sort of like oh this and that bad Plato fascist Plato is that Plato actually has a very fundamental idea that look, how can anyone or how can we as philosophers even entertain someone

leaving the cave of human condition? The fact that we can even entertain that idea that someone unchains itself and coming to light that is actually the problem of consciousness as this sort of double-edged problem of time constitution and being constituted whereby you have to hypothesize that these are appearances right then you have to again hypothesize that

does and so appearances can be changed and if appearances can be changed then it means that consciousness is a stable it's just that its mode of reflection is what is particularly about its own life that is really the prison there isn't what what i want to say that appearances contrary to so many vulgar interpretations of Plato's cave are not actually the culprits of the human prison.

It's just a mode of reflection about how we are seeing dozens of appearances. appearances in Plato fundamentally are the only ways that you can actually get out of the human cave. They're your only resources. The jail is a mode of apprehension or a presentation of appearances to which you are accustomed,

to which you are habituated, right? And Plato's game is actually a game of unlearning. Unlearning the meaning of appearances, their essences, and their phenomenological thresholds. So absolute time consciousness does not coincide with itself and is thus not simultaneous with itself. and yet the constituting consciousness and the constituted consciousness are at the same time

in quotes precisely as non-coinciding as an as much like the original difference between retention modification and original presentation so what we have been actually trying to you know trace throughout all of this sort of debates and discussions is that absolute time consciousness is an impossible puzzle, like an impossible object. But it is possible by virtue of its existence.

It hides itself within its own self-temporalization. Believe it or not, the greatest travesty about time is that it hides in plain sight. It ceases to be time. Right? So contrary to Husserl's early conception of the imminence of consciousness as defined by coincidence of being and perception, an analysis of time consciousness reveals the scene in which consciousness constitutes itself

as the greatest opacity or if you wish the greatest most vicious form of transparency its being is prior to its own perception but this consequence must be parsed in its transcendental significance the sense of prior is emphatically here not one of succession as if the event of consciousness even living in its lived experiences was before or earlier the event of consciousness has lived is prior to consciousness in the sense of mere vicious transparency of its nature,

of its opacity. There is at least two senses in which this constitution of opacity can be understood as the covering over its own constitutional accomplishment, as an origin and as the unanticipated renewal of its own self-constitution despite its own self-anticipation. as i said consciousness by virtue of this sort of opacity has a very strange sort of technology

it erupts out of a sudden as a contingency of its own consciousness right it's not the contingency of the world it's the contingency of its own self-temporalization it becomes a nude right reawakens itself and through this series of renewals, right? It begins to see itself from a highly, what you might call to be distant

or distanced form of encounter. It sees itself as an origin that is very much like the origin of the other, always at the tip of my tongue, but eternally withheld and withdrawn. This totality is never given to itself. the fact that the totality of consciousness is never given to itself as its life is the greatest bane, but also the greatest bliss of consciousness.

It motivates consciousness to ever doubt and question its own origin. Thank you. Up to the discussion.

So there is, in a very sort of non-orthodox sort of way that consciousness can only be consciousness by virtue of adopting a view from no one. First and foremost by way of forms and phantasmata because they are called the views from no one precisely because are not of

presenting. They have no association whatsoever with the positiveness of an object in now. Right? There are four retentions and four pretensions domain. That's one. And the second, by way of always being enervated, being galvanized by the sheer opacity of its own origin. Finally, the unconscious finds a positive meaning and significance in the life of consciousness.

And not merely repressing. Those of you who have turned off your camera, I think it's time to turn your cameras. This is the last session, for fuck's sake. Reza, I had a question. what was the last thing you said before after the galvanized thing the the opacity that the opacity of the life of consciousness the point of origin is precisely why consciousness

is becoming consciousness right is a certain sort of doubt constitutive to the engine of consciousness right yes so i have i have a i think i don't know if i got this wrong but when you were talking about consciousness as being alienated from its own life um you alienation i don't mean it in negative sense though here essentially yes But I mean, if not, I'm not sure, because this is a question of value for me, at least,

in the sense of negative or positive. I'm not sure if that's the way to put it. In what way would you put first this bit of alienation? Alienation in the sense of, as I mentioned, distancing from and distancing of, which is constituted of the consciousness itself right because otherwise consciousness wouldn't be able to be conscious of anything yeah let alone the nature of itself the life of itself yeah so i i understood i understood that correctly so then the other bit is you i think you mentioned I'm not sure about this. The other as disrupting this state of alienation.

I'm not sure if that's the way you put it. No, no, no. I didn't say that it's disrupting. I said that the other, you see, time has this sort of way to curse intelligence and bestow bliss upon it, right? Parmeni's poem on nature, right? this 101 Parmenidian or no Parmenidian thesis that without, you know, going into the block universe sort of theses that people do associate with Parmenidian philosophy, is that nature of time consciousness is always already the nature of the other,

only in the form of abstraction, not concretized. That consciousness can only be consciousness in so far as being constituted by the other, but only at the level of abstraction, at the level of time consciousness of itself. This is a disturbance precisely because it introduces doubt to who I am. Right? Not as if it disturbs the alienation. It disturbs the order of solipsism. That consciousness, by definition, if it is really, truly consciousness, cannot be solipsistic, either transcendentally or otherwise. it can be solipsistic at a concrete level right like at a historical moment we think that oh well

you know uh yeah but but at the abstract level it all of its semblances of egotistic solipsism laid bare as nothing but an illusion of perception, right, according to a cell. So then I know my questions are kind of basic, but I'm trying to get to somewhere without, I don't know, I step in on myself. So then Lika wrote something about this, but how would you then maybe refresh a thing or two about the other? Because I'm now more confused

about the nature of the other. I mean, the other is, Hossel at the very least in his later works introduces the other as the converse image of the headless temporality, right? So it is a kind of what it tries to, you know, headless temporalization is the time or self-transcending temporalization of phantasmata, of an imagination, right? In the sense that imagination does not have a positedness, right? And hence, when we are actually daydreaming or having a reverie about

a unicorn or a flying elephant or a serpent, it is not as if we are actually thinking that there is an elephant out there hovering before us. This notion of absence is constituted to our consciousness, right? Husserl wants to say that, look, the other is the mirror image, not the same, the mirror image of this sort of absence that is constitutive to the noetic acts. It's just that it's a mirror converse image. It's on the other side, right?

and hence whereas you could always talk about imagination in abstract forms precisely because it's a mirror image the other you can not merely explain the other by the very abstract forms of phantasmata it is not a phantasm it is really the mirror image of the opacity of the life of your own consciousness okay so then when I was and I think now this is a misconception but when I was

the first time you talked about this alienation from a life from consciousness life, only life. The first thing that came to mind and this is by the way the way I usually sort of come to certain kind of reflections is by personal or at least psychological experience and I literally like have this remembrance of not being able to like this vicious transparency of consciousness and time consciousness or whatever when whenever it is for me at least in purely a psychological sense

purely on experience maybe it differs radically from others but it comes to me as something incomplete. Not incomplete, but maybe like whenever one tries to talk about or tries to ground this self-consciousness, for me becomes a vicious circle in which you try to explain something that cannot be explained otherwise without this occlusion. But I think that you're pointing to the other as a sort of condition in which this self occlusion, self occluding can happen because this is again psychological or just like main experience.

It seems to me to be somewhat impossible to talk about self-consciousness or to to absolutely engage with the idea of self-consciousness without delving or resorting to a vicious circle that can lead i don't know if madness but at least to a deeply uh sense deep deep sense of of um not being able to share a certain accomplishment yes frustration yes well i

mean hossel wants to actually say something like that right hossel wants to say that if you actually conduct the inquiry to the other and also to the nature of the life of consciousness merely by natural attitudes which he called psychologism. Psychologists being one of them but not just one the other so in fact even natural sciences according to oneself right. If you are actually conducting this sort of inquiry merely through that lens angst and frustration is the only way essentially you will be fundamentally nihilism ultimately would be crop up in that sort of

inquiry right but Hossel wants to say that look there is actually a healthy way a method by way of which we try to step by step in little tiny pieces, walk back from our psychological assumptions. And that's what is called Roquefragm, right? Questioning back to a certain sort of suspension of these natural attitudes. And in that moment, the question of the other and the opacity of the life of consciousness would not actually lead to madness, but the

renewal in the most concrete sense of the human. is fundamental. I think that's why I call it Prometheus Express, right? It is a very fundamental sort of insight, very platonic at the end of the day. But yes, absolutely, madness, if you actually go with that sort of stuff, of absolutely madness is an inevitability. And by that I don't mean good madness like batalla, French madness, I mean real madness. Yes, do you have like, I mean,

I still haven't found that bit of unrenewable. Do you have like a, the text or like the- Yes, yes, I do. Yes, I do, I do. I really, did you actually, Look at that Roloff-Bernet text that I mentioned. I can actually put it on Discord. Yeah, that was helpful. It's on the structure of angst. In, you know, in basically the fact that, yeah, without questioning back as a method, Angst and madness and nihilism absolutely is the ultimate consequence. Yeah, Rolf Berner is actually a very, very fantastic person working on this, you know,

question. I will upload it to this quote. Okay, thank you. Absolutely. Michael? uh maybe this is a basic question but i don't want to have any misunderstandings um so i wanted to ask like when we're talking about the cage so to speak uh being already broken um it's the like it's the emptiness or the headlessness the of temporality that is that like the already the cage is broken in that sense like that you can like have other kind of directednesses or imagine uh other kind of uh being directed differently

essentially yeah yes i mean look i mean i think that there is a certain sort of if you really look at it for too long there is a component of what you might call to be a teleological discourse right that consciousness cannot be consciousness unless the cage has already been broken and you are just like buffooning around in the cage pretending you are caged right I think that yes that component is there

I just I think that with this sort of stuff about final causality and final causation and teleological discourse I think they should be they should be investigated according to their own scales and their own problems. Majority of these sorts of teleological, so-called teleological ideas are not actually teleologicals, either in Freud or in Husserl, actually. But some might be.

I mean, that's something up to investigation, and I haven't really truly investigated the amount of telec, right, discourse that goes into this. Because there is already an implication that you look, that there is an inevitability to the fact of consciousness. I don't know. Yeah, I mean, you can't actually ask these from a teleological person, right? Like even Nick Land, right? And I generally think Nick has actually a good grasp about some of the more subtle points on teleological discourse.

Well, ultimately, if you are beholden to the teleological discourse, you are tempted to explain this stuff teleologically. I think it's actually always best to start from a point of skepticism with regard to teleology. And yes, with regard to Osserl, absolutely, there is a telecomponent to it. what he calls the manner of givenness, right? That would be inner time consciousness, right? There's a certain sort of manner of givenness that once that virus, that DNA, that helix, intertwinement of constituting,

is being introduced to whatever, a stone, a rock, a galaxy, a human being, initiates a certain sort of unfoldings. But that's a little bit, you know, we need to be very careful with that sort of, you know, it's a very topsy-turvy, I would say. I don't want to dismiss it outright, though. As I said, you know, telec discourse is usually just like bad metaphysics discourse. It's just a lazy answering

to a question that could be humbly and modestly answered with great care. Wherever I actually see telec discourse, I see goddamn laziness. Intellectual sloth. so we have one more questions uh oh Oh, Lika, would you be able to send everyone an email?

So anyone who is required, I mean, or wants to, some people are required to actually write an essay for this class. Some of you want to just write something so I can actually make a comment and talk to you about it. I mean, that's all fine. essays absolutely should be under 1,000. I do not read any sort of text above 1,000 word mark, precisely because it's good for my mental health, and it's good for you to hone out your intellectual skills. If you cannot make an argument in 1,000 words, probably you can't

actually make it in 10 000 words so usually the deadline for those essays is two weeks from that moment two weeks yes two weeks yes yes yes we are we are you know it's christmas we need to be a little bit generous you know time and so on so forth it's good for christ and so two weeks yes two weeks okay so till the end of this year yes okay okay all right sure and you can uh i think that i would really appreciate if you actually make a very

sharp polemic, right, about anything within the ambit of the stuff that we have been talking about. I can see that Lane already has an idea of how to launch the greatest polemic. And so, as so many of you, I would absolutely, would cherish, you know, any sort of essay. essay, I will usually either make comments on the PDF or record some comments and make an audio or offer to talk to you personally about the paper.

I kind of lost that last bit about your comments because we have like two weeks and since the following week is like Christmas. Two weeks would be the deadline for, you know, turning the 1000 word essay polemic. And then I either, you know, make comments on the PDF or make an audio voice recording my comments if it requires a lot of comments. or offer you, you know, basically 30 minutes, you know, face-to-face talk on Skype about the paper itself.

Are you going to put all the audios or videos of the client class in YouTube? that uh you mean about the papers 90 videos of the class and that is unfortunately up to new center usually new center only puts the first one but uh juan if you are actually taking my class most probably you already have a membership you can simply ask lika or rafael at the news center and then they will send you the links but i don't think that news center does actually make uh you know the entire seminars available because you know obviously uh

i have any i have i have any i i need only the last two questions sure sure lika uh i can i can I can actually talk to Raphael but Liko would you be able to. If you have access send. I have I have I'll send it. Okay. Superb. So. Nothing. Maybe it would be a good idea to discuss our polemics if we have one.

I mean, there are so many polemics here. I mean, obviously. I mean, really, I generally, for me, philosophy is not about always polemics. It's not always I don't understand philosophy negatively, but I think that polemics sharpen your skills, right? It's something that is truly an astonishing moment of philosophical life. And always, to me, the greatest philosophers engage with polemics in order to provide a positive thesis. I have, of course, a very specific example in my mind.

You already know that. Ray-Bresier. Diego, you have anything to say? No, no. When you were talking about the difference between life and consciousness i just remember hans blumenberg book life of the world and life time of the world and time of life yes yes it's pretty good um development of whose are

latest investigations about the difference and that is a kind of good reference if someone that's a that's a good one yes would you be put it on the chat box uh so people can actually uh if they want download it and read it yes sure and i was also thinking about how this this self um alienation of consciousness is operating in from its own structure i mean consciousness is not just um i mean consciousness is reflective as hirschel said and that reflective

nature of consciousness implies that it is always self alienating itself and for the sake of taking itself as an object i i mean this kind of yes objectivation not objectificate objectivating itself yes absolutely so i mean uh um that there is a um i have seen these passages or commentaries on late particularly c manuscript that um that there is actually a certain sort of i don't know consensus

that for hostel consciousness is only actually ever going to become conscious of its life by these sporadic distanced distanced moments of reflection this distancing is essentially you know the fragmentation of consciousness right and i try to actually talk a little bit about this in terms of how for example now today in the in the realm of technology, we usually do actually reflect about various moments, constitutive moments,

genetic moments of our consciousness by way of models, right? But obviously, that is always going to be an incomplete story, right? But nevertheless, it is a fundamentally actually a very sort of frightening moments in the life of consciousness, but also exciting one. I mean, think about this in terms of how AI models are actually moments of reflection in the constitutive sense. Okay, my dear friends.

So this was our last session. It was absolutely majestic to have you and talk to you. We'll see each other in January unofficially and informally through Discord for one last session. if Lika is so generous to host us, for an hour 30 minutes, such that we can actually talk, you know, and reflect about what we have discussed and what would be, you know, other sort of venues to investigate these sort of problems. Ciao.

Thank you very much. And have a great year. Love you all. Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you, Reza. Love you. Bye-bye.