Reason & Time (Session 1)

Okay. It's life. Okay. So, first let's start if anyone has a question. I mean, because we missed one week. Does anyone have any question? Questions? Maybe Joshua will have a question.

About what? I totally missed what I was supposed to have a question about. No, Reza just asked because of the one week delay in the beginning of in the start of the class if anyone has any question that sort of like want to bring up. So, and I was just pulling your leg. Why are you so lazy, Rana? Okay, no questions then. Got it. Okay, so let me share my screen. OK. Again, sorry, I can't see you guys. So in case that you can't hear me, just say something, and I will reconnect my browser.

We talked about, like toward the end of last session, we talked about Szilardzian picturing And we talked that basically the germ of the picture is really the causal mapping between basic or atomic level statements and natural items. So it's basically a structural isomorphism between two natural items. basically object or events in nature and the natural linguistic item. But we also, you know, talked about that the representational import

of this structural isomorphism is neither explicit nor describable. Sorry? Okay. Okay. It's neither entailed nor describable in the basically coherent structure of language. So, and basically the framework of the, the ideal framework of the scientific image can be understood, you know, within that Kantian-Persian, basically elaboration of Copernican revolution

as basically conceptual response, conceptual targeting nature with conceptual systems, and then to test or experience, observe if nature conforms to our conceptual representations. If not, we basically revise and correct our conceptual representations in order to gain explanatory coherence. And in this framework, conceptual system increasingly shaped around pictures quo a matter of factual

truths. And in this fashion, the scientific image basically leaves the radical deficiency of the manifest. Reza, earlier you said the scientific image was not, I believe, observable or mappable in the coherent system. I guess I'm wondering, does that manifest image? Because I would think in the coherentist. No, no, no. I said that the coherentism, yes, no. I mean, I think that we talked about it in terms of the complex interplay between representations

and representational mapping and conceptual functions in the sense that coherentism, there is still coherentism, and that's the autonomy of basically conceptual activities, logical autonomy of conceptual activities of the manifest image. But increasingly, this coherentism is shaped around the matter of factual truths. And we talked about it in terms of assertability of by whom, which basically assertability then become independent on pictures, basically, within the framework of scientific explanation.

This is getting closer to what I was trying to bring up when I asked that long-ass question from you in Sydney when I basically talked about sort of like at the level of representation or transmission, there's something happens to this scientific image that actually makes it come closer to manifest image. I even said, like, why can we call the manifest image scientific non-image? Because at the level of communication or representation or transmission, it has to meet the human again, so it becomes kind of like manifest image. So I think...

Not manifest image. It becomes manifestly intelligible. You see? Yeah, totally. Totally, yeah. Yeah. So basically, this representational mapping that you're talking about is this sort of like becoming intelligible to humans via models, via like technologies that are also shared with the manifest image, at least part of it. Yes, yes. I will talk about this, that basically it also implies sort of subversion of the manifest from within it, which is basically the synoptic image is established not by pushing the limits of manifest,

but taking the scientific image to its ultimate conclusions. And this is what I'm going to talk about. Yes. So can everyone share the screen? Not yet. We were looking at you. It was on shared screen, but then you switched it back to yourself. Oh, OK. One second. Can you see it now? No, not yet. Huh. Not yet. Let me see. What happened here?

But it was on earlier on. Yeah, I know. Can you see it here? It went black. Now it's on, yes. OK. So let's start from the last parts of the previous session. We said that science can picture, and basically scientific framework needs to be understood in terms of its capacity for picturing. We have already a rather clear picture how science's postulational theories regarding

non-observable entities engage in precisely these complex interplays between representational mapping and conceptual functions. Observation and theory that lead not only to more refined pictures but also determine the trajectory of controlled conceptual change of scientific theories along the person insight outlined above, which was, if our observations or tests do not conform to our conceptual representations, then we must modify our conceptual representations in our ongoing quest for explanatory coherence. Even though the conceptual framework of our common sense is built upon atomic level statements

that are causally mapped to the real, i.e. pictures, this framework does not commit us to the picture as such. This was what we talked about in terms of non-relational and non-representational theory of meaning. Since properly conceived pictures belong to the framework of scientific physical theories, in saying X is red, the common sense language neither commit us to the idea that there is such a thing as X nor that X is red as redness is conceived in the common sense framework. As I said, the existence of picture at this level is neither explicitly entailed nor describable

in the resources of common sense language. Both X as a thing and the redness can only be properly conceived within the framework of science through the sophisticated interchanges or interplays between representations at the level of observations and conceptual functions at the level of scientific theory. But in so far as the assertibility of truth in the latter cannot be corroborated without the matter of factual truth of the former, conceptual framework of the theory must be seen as necessarily revisable. And this is, again, in answer to Josh's question, that, in fact, this dependence on pictures

or a matter of factual truth calls for the revision of conceptual frameworks and becomes a warrant for basically explanatory coherence through this constant revision of conceptual representations. In this sense, the refinement of picture as the basis of explanatory coherence coincides with the progressive picture becoming of concepts, where the distinction between theory and observation is increasingly blurred. The aboutness of intentionality is replaced by natural relation of the picture.

And the truth at the level of conceptual function, which was truth in terms of semantic assertibility, is overwritten by the truth of the picture as belonging to the order of the real. What was previously true in the conceptual framework of the earlier theory is only approximately true, but in an explanatory sense, it strictly falls from the counterpart conceptual framework of the new theory built around a more refined picture. Now, this can be clarified via an example. For example, a certain proposition, P, concerning the pressure and temperature of a gas is semantically

assertable or is true from within the perspective of the manifest image, as characterized by the Boyle-Charles Gas Law. From the perspective of our knowledge of the explanatory more successful kinetic molecular theory of gases in the scientific image, however, we can say that P is true with respect to to the manifest image because in fact there is a counterpart proposition P star in scientific image that has proved to be a successor to P. And P star, which is basically that proposition in the scientific framework, is true, i.e. semantically assertable in the framework of the scientific

image. From the same perspective, we can also say that P is only approximately true, but strictly speaking, false. In parallel fashion, we can say from this perspective that the manifest image gases, or mi gases, referred to in P, exist in the sense that there are counterpart references to and characterizations of scientific image gases, si gases. in the counterpart peridication, P star, which is true in the framework of scientific image. Again, however, we say that in a more strict sense,

manifest image gases, MI gases, do not exist as they are concerned within the manifest image. There are, in fact, no such gases. So explanatory coherence entails a conceptual change in the sense of a controlled revision of our conceptual representations according to more adequate pictures of object uniformities. As we discussed in the third session, this marks the intelligibility of thinking as thought's ability to adapt to the intelligibility of the mind independent.

Here, the logical autonomy of conceptual activities plays a key role in the adaptation to the intelligibility of the world as encapsulated in the coherence of scientific explanation. Now, it's important to understand exactly what is this logical autonomy. It's logical autonomy, first of all, not a causal autonomy. But logical autonomy should not be mistaken with a spontaneity or sufficiency. For conceptual activities to be logically autonomous means they should have an inferential semantic coherency, the autonomy of rules.

And more importantly, to be able to correct themselves with regard to matter of factual truths. It is this capacity for self-correction that suggests a stronger sense of autonomy for conceptual activities. So basically, the autonomy, the logical autonomy of conceptual activities has two faces. One, the weak autonomy, which from the perspective of the manifest image looked a strong autonomy. And that was the autonomy of rules, basically, conceptual rules. in French short rules. But there is also a stronger autonomy, and that's autonomy in the sense of the capacity

of conceptual frameworks to adapt to matter of factual truths, to the intelligibility of the real order. And in fact, autonomy needs to be understood as this ability for conceptual activities to adapt, reshape, and correct themselves according to this matter of factual truth. Through the, basically, the circuitous way, which is really autonomy in the sense of coherentism of rules.

This is autonomy as the capacity for, sorry, for conceptual activities to be logically autonomous means they should have an inferential semantic coherency, the autonomy of rules, and more importantly, to be able to correct themselves with regard to matter-of-factual truths. It is this capacity for self-correction that suggests a stronger sense of autonomy for conceptual activities. This is autonomy as the capacity for adapting to the intelligibility of the world whereby thought is distinguished by its ability to repurpose itself. And hence, this repurposing is really what autonomy is in the last instance. For it, by its ability

to repurpose itself, making a difference in itself, basically internal repurposing, in order to have traction on a world whose intelligibility signifies the ideal aim of cognitive inquiry. So even though from the framework of the manifest image, autonomy of conceptual activities is autonomy of rules, from the perspective of the synoptic image and seen from an advantage from the scientific framework, autonomy of conceptual activities is basically the, elaborates

the ideal and adequate aim of cognitive inquiry in the sense of progressive adaptation and repurposing of thoughts on a structure to the intelligibility of the world. The autonomy of the will to think in this sense is sublimated in becoming intelligible of thought through a self-governance that is a necessary condition for its self-correction, and correspondingly self-repurposing in the context of differentially responding to an intelligible world.

Any postulation from inside thought that delimits the prospect of an intelligible world, whether through a fundamental limit posited against understanding, or through an imminent or hyper-transcendental domain posited as the inarticulable or intractable dimension of the world, in effect undermines the very autonomy of thought that adjudicates such postulation in the first place. So basically, this is tantamized to the idea to the idea that if we make a fundamental postulation with regard to limits, and by limits I mean

extrinsic limits, not intrinsic limits, extrinsic limits to knowledge, understanding, but also to the articulation of intelligibility of the world, we are basically undermining our own postulation because we are undermining the autonomy of thought that allows to basically arrive at the intelligibility of this postulation. But more seriously, it sets a vague barrier, I mean this kind of position of extrinsic limit. It sets a vague barrier for the self-correction of thought through which, in its pursuit for

intelligibility, the will to think can break from the radical deficiency of the manifest. In this way, the ontological primacy of manifest is re-inscribed as the fundamental ontology of the unthinkable. This is important. So basically these kinds of postulation concerning positing an extrinsic limit in a twisted way turn the deficiency—basically, they prioritize the resources, the truth of the manifest image,

the apparently self-sufficient truth of the manifest image as a base for arriving at a fundamental ontology of the unthinkable. And unthinkable here is basically the world that cannot be basically, that is at some level is intractable to the articulation of intelligibility but this is a philosophical a slight of hand a limit to the scientific articulation of intelligibility is posited in order to establish an uncharted territory of the real where philosophy can reinstate its speculative superiority over science we

We can see this, like for example, say Measu is a good example, that through this philosophical sleight of hand, we express, we suggest, we insinuate that the structure of the world is intractable at some level because of course we have thought about it from the radical, we have presupposed a radical sufficiency for the manifest. And by doing so we have shown that science cannot really articulate the intelligibility of the world. Hence the

the world. Hence, the uncharted part, the uncharted territory of this world, this order of the real, then becomes basically subject of a speculative philosophy. In other words, proclaims itself as a true science of the real by covertly reestablishing the sufficiency of the manifest, becoming at once disillusioned about the limits of thought the critique launched from inside the manifest and confident in its own speculative thesis regarding the real. So it's kind of like

the pleasure of having the cake and eating it too. At the same time, it's disillusioned about the limits of thought, for example, the limits of scientific inquiry, just because it has actually thought about this from the framework of the manifest, but also it is confident in a speculative traction of philosophy, philosophy, not science, regarding the real. The manifest image must therefore be construed as containing a conception of itself as a group phenomenon, the group mediating between the individual and the intelligible order.

But any attempt to explain this mediation within the framework of the manifest is bound to fail, for the manifest image contains the resources for such an attempt only in the sense that it provides the foundation on which scientific theory can build an explanatory framework. And while conceptual structures of this framework are built on the manifest image, they are not definable within it. Now, this is something I will talk about later at the end of this discussion. But before that, let's move back and talk about the framework of the scientific explanation

and scientific explanatory coherence in terms of refinement of pictures. We discussed that what counts as scientific explanation is the conceptual revision according to more refined pictures of object uniformities and processes. explanatory coherence is regulation of conceptual change by pictures the deepening of explanation is tantamount to the historical reshaping of the manifest image more precisely conceptual activities around pictures and this can

be again discussed in terms of our previous discussions regarding scientific theories, condition of assertibility being based upon the matter of factuality of picturing. This reshaping, or the shift from given conceptual conditions of assertibility to assertibility by matter of facts qua pictures, defines the framework of scientific image. It is in the light of the Kantian-Persian schema of the conceptual change and the historical succession of explanatory ontologies that we can talk about an ideal and adequate scientific image of the world.

A fully adequate scientific image is a regulative ideal which defines our concepts of ideal truth and reality. Here the regulative ideal is a programmatic idea, not an actual point of reference we can directly talk about. Its import is functional in its capacity to reorient, basically thought and also in bigger picture self-conception, in that it projects the ideal commensuration between thought and the intelligible, the former becoming the latter as the intelligible, and that's the intelligibility of things in themselves, molds thinking around itself.

Self-conception then becomes the intelligibility of the self of which it is intelligibly a conception. But this becoming intelligible of self-conception is an absolution. since it heralds the self-transformation of thought around and through the ideal and unconditioned, in a kind of Hegelian sense of the absolute, quote, unconditioned. Since it heralds the self-transformation of thought around and through the ideal and unconditioned intelligibility of things in themselves. The ideal scientific image, hence...

Yes, sorry, I got distracted one second. The scientific image, or basically SI framework, is a projection constructed out of the relationships between predecessor theories and improved successor theories, on which we do have a grip. In effect, we first project as a goal of explanation that the propositions of our own best current yet explanatory imperfect SI theories stand in a parallel relationship to potential improved successor SI theories, scientific image theories.

as P stood to its counterpart P star in the example concerning gases. On this basis, we can form the idea, for example, that what is really true is that gases are only approximately as characterized by proposition P star in our current scientific framework, which is to say that P-star would have a counterpart proposition P-double-star, a successive, basically, a proposition in the next or basically the anticipated scientific framework. in idealist I that plays a relevantly similar role

to the role that PSR plays in the kinetic molecular theory of gases as we know it. The regulative ideal of adequate scientific framework is the general condition of convergence that can be postulated without taking recourse to actually postulating and describing a limit of convergence or a given or a gettable term governing the progression of scientific explanatory framework. So we need to understand this regulative ideal, neither as given nor gettable. And in fact, convergence, as I will just talk about,

in essence is really the, can be postulated by way of observing the inter and intra progression of scientific explanatory frameworks. Since the condition of convergence can be postulated simply by showing that the temporal series of conceptual systems are evolving towards convergence by establishing that pairs of systems grow successively and arbitrarily closer to each other. Within the general condition of convergence, and this is really what convergence is, the degree to which two theories approach one another can be measured by the absolute numerical

magnitude of the correction factors which must be introduced into applications of the strict counterparts of predecessor laws to arrive at the values determined by their successors. Inasmuch as the absolute numerical values of the requisite correction factors become increasingly smaller as we move from successor theories to successor theory, we may say non-metaphorically that theories are approaching each other or converging, which is basically the non-accidental

nature, and that expresses the non-accidental nature of progression, which can be corroborated historically as a discipline projects quantitative measures of its theoretical parameters. But this progression, and we talked about this with John, but this progression is also non-monotonic in this sense, insofar as each explanatory framework operates as a defeaser, basically it renders the previous one defeasible. It shows that the progression is really goes through defeasibility.

But this progression is also non-monotonic insofar as each explanatory framework operates as a diffuser for the predecessor framework and anticipating a successive diffuser for its explanatory coherence. In this manner, the progressive sequence of explanatory frameworks is not monotonically entailed in the iteration of explanation. And we see, and this basically shows, and this is what we argue that, you know, in terms of the strictly false, it approximates the truth of the previous one, but also shows

that it's strictly false. And here the sequence of explanatory progression or explanatory coherence can be also interpreted as the elimination of bijectivity or one-to-one mapping between explanatory frameworks. Here new theories do not provide explanatory accounts of the old laws by entailing their strict counterparts in the successor framework. Rather, it is an analytic consequence of the basic principles of the new framework that

the strict counterparts of the predecessor laws are literally false, for the new principles entail laws which are inconsistent with the strict counterparts of the old laws. Accordingly, theories do not provide a direct explanatory account of their predecessor laws. Rather, they provide an indirect explanatory account of predecessor laws by providing a direct account of the success of those laws. In Salar's own words, to explain empirical laws by explaining why observable things obey to the extent that they do these empirical laws. That is, they explain why individual objects of various kinds and in various circumstances in the observation framework behave in those ways in which it is inductively established that they do behave.

Roughly, it is because a gas is in some sense of is a cloud of molecules which are behaving in certain theoretically defined ways that it obeys the empirical Boyle-Charles law. For example, within the categories of the ideal scientific image or SI framework, I want to basically talk about this in terms of relation of picturing. And this, you know, the explanatory coherence needs to be understood as within the regulative ideals of complete picture or adequate picturing.

if we are going to talk about this or somehow hypothesizing abducing about this how this adequate picturing looks like let's get back to our futuristic anthropoid example and see what would be a shape of robot that works by way of adequate picturing for example within the categories of the ideal scientific image the futuristic anthropoid robot once successfully programmed would be forming pictures that directly map its environment exclusively in the

representational vocabulary of the same microphysical SI, or scientific image framework. Incidentally, nothing in this account of the ideal SI implies that ideal matter-of-factual truth need be conceived as one complete picture existing in simultaneous splendor. The Perse's splendor. The Persish method of projection must enable picturing by observation and inference of any part, but this does not require a single picturing of all parts. And that's compatible with basically that basically adequate picturing is not one picturing of the entire structure of

reality is picturing according to absolute processes, which implies that this does not require single picturing of all parts. Since theoretical science concerns the domain of matter of factual truths, all the cross-framework distinctions concerning truth as assertability will simultaneously be reflected in an underlying causal representationalist dimension of language world correspondence or picturing. The ideal scientific image of the world is conceived as one in which the world would

be pictured or mapped by singular observation statements, which are themselves directly conceptualized in the theoretical terms of some future microphysical theory or unified field theory. And then when we are talking about unified and what also Sellars talks about unified field theory, it is not reductionism. And this is, you know, Szilard is not a reductionist philosopher. The best way to understand this unification is what Giuseppe Longo calls unification without reduction. For example, in terms of biology and biological theory relates, can be unified with physics,

with physical basically system, conceptual frameworks, without being reduced to them. And that's really the scientific framework in this sense then becomes, can only be understood as an extensive stratification of various scientific conceptual frameworks, biology, physics, chemistry, so on and so forth. In Seller's own words, prima facie, it makes just as much sense to speak of basic singular statements in the framework of microphysics as pictures, according to complicated manner

of projection of microphysical objects, as it does to speak of basic singular statements in the observation framework as pictures of the objects and events of the world of perceptible things and events. Thus the scientific realist need only argue that the correct account of concepts and concept formation is compatible with the idea that the language entry role would be played by statements in the language of physical theory. And language theory role was basically from world to language, which was basically could be explained in terms

of perception with the inter-linguistic transitions being conceptual activities or thinking, cognition as the capacity to deploy concepts and basically the language exit was intentional action. So yes, thus the scientific release need only argue that the correct account of concepts and concept formation is compatible with the idea that the language entry rule could be played by statements in the language of physical theory, i.e., that in principle this language

could replace the common sense framework in all its roles, with the result that the idea that scientific theory enables a more adequate picturing of the world could be taken at its face value. Now, I finish this page, and then we can have some questions before moving to the next part. In this context, the initial methodological difference, not ontological one, in this context, the initial methodological difference between the observational and the theoretical collapses, but the overcoming of this methodological difference that we discussed in the second session in terms of scientific realist and empiricist reconstructions of scientific realist and empiricist.

theories points to a broader scenario and that's so basically within the ideal framework the distinction the methodological distinction between observation and theory blurs but this blaring of the observation and theory also implies that the methodological difference between conceptual structure of thinking and the concrete picture of things in themselves recedes in waves upon waves of revision as cognition becomes the prosthesis of the thing in

itself the vocation of thought becomes intelligibly manifest to a Hegelian twist to broaden the unconditioned self experience of the absolute so thoughts thoughts, vocation becomes broadening and deepening the unconditioned self-experience of the absolute. Thinking embedded in the scientific model to extrinsically track the structure and dynamic tendencies of the world is supplanted with thinking as intrinsic cognitive modeling embedded into the structure of reality itself as the expanse of absolute processes.

This is where convergent realism, understood under the rubric of the convergence between the coherentist account of truth and the matter of factual truth, find itself to be the expression of an absolute idealism with a technoscientific momentum. Kant's, this is from Salars, Kant's account implies indeed that certain counterparts of our intuitive representations, namely God's intellectual intuitions, are literally true. But these literal truths can only be indirectly and abstractly represented by finite minds.

And there is an impassable gulf between our Erkanidnisse and divine truth. If, however, we replace the static concept of divine truth with a Persian conception of truth as the ideal outcome of scientific inquiry, the gulf between appearances and things in themselves, though a genuine one, can in principle be bridged. So this is very interesting, and I will talk about this, that the regulative ideal is in fact a functionalist decomposition of intellectual intuition.

Functional decomposition in the sense that we talked about this, that the functionalist decomposition is always a form of desacralization, desanctification. because it decomposes a supposed behavior or activity, here intellectual intuition, it quantifies it, so it quantifies it to qualitatively different activities. It quantifies the totality of intellectual intuition into qualitatively different activities, which are basically explanatory frameworks.

Basically, taking time of discursive reasoning functionally emulates the time becoming of intellectual intuition, which Kant attributes to God. So the nature of this sanctification is that discursive reasoning takes time.

And this timing, this basically decomposition of the time of the intellectual intuition as a given idea to discursive rationality, which is basically understood as taking time of reasoning, is a form of basically a functional desanctification. And this is something that I will talk about later when we are talking about reason and time and self-transformation. But I just wanted to talk about this very briefly.

The synoptic image as the estereopsis of the scientific and manifest images is expressed as a multimodal dialectics between nominalism, naturalism, materialism, naturalism or materialism, realism, and idealism. Or coherent in the way that we talked about idealism understood as coherentism of conceptual functions. where no polarity can be conceived in isolation from the others. The regulative ideal of the unconditioned inquiry, not as an actual or at-hand idea, but as a programmatic orientational cue and a functional idea,

i.e. a functional portrait as a matter of principle being a blueprint of construction and realization, unfolds the ontology of the absolute, qua unconditioned, through dialectical bundles of the following modes of encounter with the world. Now, before we go to the diagram, let's see if anyone has any questions. Yeah, I raise a question with regards to how I've been doing a lot of science studies side of things, and I'm trying to translate. They

use scientific theories as examples for how the scientific image and the manifest image relate to one another. But my question is you often get these you often get incommensurate scientific image, sorry, in commensurate shoot, I will try to better craft that question scientific, okay in commensurate scientific conceptual frameworks yeah, so they're talking about how this robot might have a manifest image that's almost a one to one relationship with the actual molecules, but molecules are a hypothesization that maybe

come to discover that that was just a completely inappropriate framing for what matters. Yes, we talked about that the incommensurability here is really the symptom of not having a next successor theory that enables for them to be unified. But then, so then talking about this robot's near one-to-one relationship feels like the Kantian split between Pneumon and Phenomenon and that gap. I just don't see how he's closing that gap. You see, the gap is, as I said, it's the idea that basically the ideal conceptual framework,

ideal conceptual framework as a hypothetical, programmatic, regulative idea is where conceptual truth or conceptual representation becomes adequate picture. which again means that thinking becomes the intrinsic computational modeling embedded into the structure of thinking itself, a prosthesis of the thing in itself. And this is something that Gabrielle Catherine talks about in terms of an absolutist phenomenology,

in the sense that the absolute processes of things in themselves unfold as basically phenomenological sheaves. which basically scientific theories grow along these sheaves, these phenomenological sheaves, which are the essence of the things in itself, the object. Okay. Reza, can I interject? Sure. It's interesting what you brought up because I've been reading and kind of fascinated by

this document, it's available to everyone and it's like a historical document. It relates to the split between Husserl and Heidegger and it's sort of like footnotes that Husserl wrote on Heidegger's being and time and sort of like annotated his copy and And then later people took it and translated it and re-translated it and then it's all in sort of like a book format. And even though his idea of this, his idea of phenomenology is not as sophisticated and complex as Gabriel's, but you see right there his objection to Heidegger basically stems from the same type of outlook in terms of what constitutes science and what constitutes

sort of like what he calls anthropology masquerading as philosophy, which to him is what Being and Time is all about. It's sort of like what kind of distortion Heidegger does to his own phenomenology. I like being in time, but yes, Leith Hosserl is very much in line with this framework. Yes. Yes, absolutely. He says, mere empirical knowledge, descriptive, classific theory, and inductive is not yet science in full sense. It provides only relative and merely situational truths. Thus, as genuine science strives for absolute and definitive truths that surpass all forms of relativity. In genuine sciences, entities themselves, as they are in themselves, get determined.

What manifests itself in the immediately intuitive world, the world of our pre-scientific experience, is self-evidently a world that is actually in being. But I mean this is where he goes wrong because he kind of like applies this ability to see this phenomenological sheaves to everyone, whereas we know this can only kind of like be applied to like a community of a collective of science. I mean, it becomes, yes, he again re-inscribes it. And this is what Gabriel does, basically, that he takes Husserlian phenomenology to basically a Hegelian absolutist view, that rather than re-inscribing it within the manifest phenomenology, it becomes basically a jurisdiction of the ideal scientific framework.

I can post this document to the... in the classroom if people are interested in. And it's really, I highly suggest listening to both Gabriel's lecture on, I've forgotten the title. I will find it. It's about eidetic variations of objects, and also his essay in a speculative turn collection entitled Outland Empire, which basically he talks about absolute, qua, unconditioned scientific knowledge, and extensively talks about this.

The thing is that, I mean, Gabrielle also believes that, you see, that basically the Hosserlian phenomenology, again, as you say, reinscribes this framework within the manifest. And in doing so, it somehow sutures back the narcissistic wound opened up by modern sciences. And that we cannot posit an extrinsic limit from the manifest resources, whether they are logical or mathematical or conceptually sophisticated, on the progression of basically

explanation as undergirded by empirical truths. And this is, as we talked about, it's really the empirical truth that adjudicates in the first and in the last instance the assertibility of conceptual truth. The problem with Husserl is that he gets too excited about his formulation of intersubjectivity. And through intersubjectivity, he kind of tries to transcend from singular, subjective, phenomenological experience of the world to some sort of higher level phenomenology. phenomenology, but we know that that intersubjectivity can only be sort of like applied to a scientific

community of intersubjective scientific sort of like collective rather than general intersubjective of the whole world. Yeah, yeah, general intersubjective becomes that conceptual, the common sense conceptual framework. And the common sense conceptual framework I mentioned earlier that cannot really break from the insufficiency of the radical insufficiency of the manifest. But depositing an injunction with regard to limits, extrinsic limits, cognitive inquiry from the

manifest, from within the manifest framework is by definition basically again falling back, as I said, into that purported radical sufficiency of the manifest and common conceptual framework, which again is kind of, as I said, is kind of a philosophical sleight of hand, because in doing so, and as you see in Hosserl and the entire basically speculative tradition of philosophy, it is a covert maneuver to show that it is not really the science that can ultimately talk about truth. What philosophy? So philosophy becomes the real science of the real.

And we see this in Meosu, we see this in Husserl, we see this in Heidegger, so on and so forth. Reza, I'm so sorry to interrupt you. I think it's good if you leave and come back because your voice is becoming robotic again. Okay, sure. I'm so sorry. No, no, no. One second. Okay.

Can everyone hear me? That's good. Okay. Yes. So, yes, I was saying that basically that in emphasizing, in positing a critique against the ideal framework of cognitive inquiry or scientific image, philosophy rescues, again, its purported sufficiency, which is really the purported radical sufficiency of the manifest.

And by doing so, it shows that it is not science that can talk about the real in the last instance, but its philosophy. And this is really the gesture of pre-critical philosophy, in fact. Ptolemaic, you know, what, you know, both Measu and Catherine talk about in terms of Ptolemaic counter-revolution. Which, of course, Measu, for Gabriel, you know, again falls into this trap. So people might want to ask some questions.

I actually was kind of thinking about something and I posted some of this a little bit on the sidebar earlier but I'm trying to kind of work through this. Oh please and also someone capture the sidebars. So I suppose micro-level statements regarding explanations of things like RAD are simpler to map onto explanatory coherence of science, but what about macro-level statements, for instance the assertability of something like capitalism? And I'm kind of thinking after, so while Sellers is willing to recognize the autonomy of persons as opposed to a bundle of capacities, can we regard the autonomy of something like normative concepts such as capitalism, pertinent to the scientific image holding its necessary revisability in relation to matter of factual truths.

So I guess when we come up with this… Actually, Sellars talks about it in terms of sensing. You see that while microphysical dimension of sensing cannot be reduced to microphysical ones, nevertheless they are both dimensions of absolute processes. So I guess I'm wondering, you know, perhaps even in the framework of something like, oh, I guess representing, I mean, I guess in art, for instance, like, you know, or a film for that matter, you might have, like, you might make a digital film, right? And so you might decide to transfer that film stock or, like, digital image to, I should

say, to black and white. Now you could describe the certain sort of transfer of that particular physical image quality from one thing to the other in terms of a kind of algorithmic process or a certain sort of mechanistic process, but that's not going to get you at all the kind of conception of the filmmaker which was to reference, like in more normative linguistic terms, a kind of reference to an earlier era of filmmaking. So the kind of scientific explanation of how this is achieved has absolutely nothing to do with a certain sort of conceptual content of the particular representation one is seeing, which happens on the way. The nature. The nature.

Yeah. I think it's better to say that it doesn't supplant the nature of conceptual activity. It revises its content. It does not supplant the nature of conceptual activity. It revises the content of conceptual activity. Yeah, so I guess that sort of explanation might, on that sort of mechanistic level, might have some potential import. It might not have any import into the final product of that kind of artistic production. Yes, yeah, sure. Because especially because when we are talking about these manifest-oriented conceptual activities,

we are specifically emphasizing on the normative dimensions of their conceptual activities. And this normative dimension is logically irreducible. In fact, if you do try to logically reduce it, you are creating what Salar calls causal fallacy. It's important to understand that basically the scientific image does not supplant the nature and the efficacy of conceptual activities and basically their normative resources.

But nevertheless, the normative resources, as I talked about, in order to be intelligible, they need to adapt their content in one way or another to basically this revisionary framework. Well, I guess that gets maybe to another point in terms of this language entry aspect. that if you consider sort of visual representations a kind of language entry and, you know, the kind of language entry is not happening on the level of a reduction to the sort of

model of the material properties of the actual quality of the thing that you're being presented with. Yeah, well, this is because you talked about this too, that is basically, it's because it's mainly based on manifest perceptibles. So, I mean, but then in that sense, like the language entry of art, it's happening in terms of like entering the kind of language game of a kind of sapient intelligence, and it must be able to sort of enter that sort of coherent framework of concepts in order to be able to

maybe either like expand them in some way, and maybe you're getting to a sort of Pierce-ish kind of discussion of what representation, like visual or artistic representation could be doing. Yeah, but I think, I mean, and this is, I mean, My question is, can art do this kind of upgrading of its resources to the scientific image or fundamentally ill-suited for that? And if it is not ill-suited for that, then it means that basically the subject that needs to perceive this kind of upgraded art also needs to be an updated subject, an updated person.

Yeah, I think that's a very important caveat in terms of, you know, establishing a kind of criteria for the reception of this sort of work in terms of having a certain sort of community of people that are working from a kind of revised framework or, you know, the sort of people that can recognize, you know, what is being presented as happening on this particular level or you have to get into the subject kind of more fundamental material level which is extremely more speculative and kind of way up there. The problem is always how are you going to deal with the history of conflations and misrecognitions

that are embedded in the present actual material community that's going to receive this art. And so then the question then becomes, how are you going to sort of like prepare that community to be able to, it's like a chicken and egg problem, and it's like art problem is just like, it's just so deep. And it's just so complex. How are you going to, how are you going to transform? form. Basically my first objection to art is that art comes from such a history of the myth of the given. Art is actually the literal artist, the literal way of proving that the myth of the given is real and exists. So how do you break away from that in the first step

and then how to cultivate this type of social normativity that's going to allow and encourage art to sort of like move towards this type of art that you're talking about Joshua. Well I think you first have to maybe begin to set up kind of first you have to demythologize it and then second you have to work on probably developing this sort of framework of criteria but exactly how that would look and what it would be I don't know yet I mean that's something you have to work towards. Yes, I mean, I think the problem with art needs to be, yeah, well, yes, part of it returns

back to this idea that you need to demythologize it and basically you need to institute, you know, an internal critique, which of course is lacking. But also I think the capacities of art needs to be distinguished along two trajectories. One basically how it can upgrade its own structure and its own resources. But also for me is a more, there is a better side to art and that's really its ability to dramatize concepts, basically to articulate the deracination, the noetic deracination

drift caused by the scientific image. And that's really part of the dramatization of the concept. And that you can only gain that through some sort of, you know, welding between coherent formalism and rigorous psychosis. Basically, that's what good art really usually is. Good experimentalism also is. And that's, then, this part then is more tuned to, you know, popular art, like video games, cinema, so on and so forth, rather than, for example, gallery art. Because its aim is really to infect and attain, to infect popular imagination without becoming populist.

This is, I think, this is one of the, for me, it's one of the, you know, still the good things about art, that it's capacity to infect popular imagination. and I'm rather skeptical of how art can upgrade its nature because as I said it's not just about art but it's also about spectatorship so you need to also change the nature of the spectatorship subject spectator in order to be capable of fundamentally make a change in the structure and the configuration of artistic activities.

See Reza, I completely agree with you. That's what I was trying to bring up to Joshua, right? But even at its sort of like current anthropological configuration, which I kind of like think It's historically rooted in the way Greenberg talked about avant-garde and kitsch, which basically, sort of like the gallery, good gallery-based art, is the art and culture of the elite 1% who resents masses and popular tastes and tries to sort of like support and cultivate a kind of art experience and aesthetics which is only available to themselves away from the masses. there is a way to maybe sort of like use the capacities of art to try to reorient, you know, and dramatize concepts

for the economic elite. But the thing is art in its current configuration is a way of sort of like appealing to the masses in terms of its ideas and claims and universality in a weird way, but then at the same time being only aesthetically available to the 1%. So it comes with a bit of honesty. Well, I object that either art or philosophy mean anything to masses. People don't give a shit about what art is. No, for sure. No, that's what I mean. If art is a little bit more honest that its audience is a particular audience and kind of downgrade its claims of universality and talking about it every day and the world and kind of really try to use its resources

to reorient the subjectivity of the 1%, I think art can do a little bit more. But art is caught in its own sort of like, in its own like double standards, and its own, like it's just, the problems are way deeper than this. I mean, if art's honest about this, then it'll be called elitist, like elitist and it'll be rejected. So art, like MoMA needs... I think this is also... begs the question that who is the elite of art elite of art is not essentially the political or economic elite that can you know make a difference in the world but it's the elite of art elite of art is very different from the elite of the world that can actually we think that for example if art

do what it does currently better and more sufficiently more adequately it can basically gain some sort of you know, oblique traction on the world I think it's also, it begs the question of as I said you know, the elite of art being different from those entities which are in politics and economy yeah, no, I understand this and this is more and I think done Bauer also said something to me once along this line I I have some sympathy for it but I think it's it's not

that easy and it's not really sufficient I think don't mistake the politics of art for politics in general yeah No, that's for sure, but like the elite that we're talking about here, the elite that we're talking about here is sort of like you can think of it as kind of like a combination of like art professionals who are like professionalizing the discourse of art, the collector, the art journalist, the curator and the museum people, you know like judges of different competitions like this and but but but the collector is a big part of that and the collector somehow is overlap with the economic political elite government

officials who put money into art who fund art from taxes you know that's the sort of the stakeholders of the the elite that determines what becomes art what is sufficient as art and if if art can sort of like reorient its resources towards a transformation of sort of like some of the mind of this plethora, you know, not necessarily just a collector or just the sort of like critic and art historian who's got a PhD in a particular branch or, but a combination of them that usually are the sort of like, they form local art mafias and then they also form general global art mafias. And then these concepts. It's a art known. It's like, I mean, you would still have to cultivate, like, I mean, in order to achieve

maybe the kind of transformation of reception of art, you would still have to cultivate a different community of elites that, you know, in its own way might be as susceptible to the sort of economical and cultural sort of elitism that you're talking about from a different angle. No, I completely agree with you. of intellectual elites that's cultivated that could, you know, appreciate it in the particular way. But, I mean, I guess I don't... If you're talking about by moving art out from underneath the sort of thumb of the money class or something like that,

that doesn't really then complete the gesture from then art having effects on the whole of the populace and helping to transform the world in some way. It simply means that you're building a better dialogue within the sort of community itself. Yeah, I absolutely agree. It's almost some sort of, again, form of artistic self-dialogue. And a good example of this, not in terms of art, but a philosopher. Anyone who has watched, you know, Cronenberg's Cosmopolis or read Don DeLillo's book, it's exactly like the philosopher, theorist who is in other console consults basically the broker the the financial broker and we see it's just kind of you know yes it has like you

know kind of an exotic image even an acceleration it's exotic image but ultimately fundamentally it's absurd questions I was just wondering about this idea of functional desanctification.

Functional desanctification, yes. Yeah, I'm really curious about that concept in this context. And, I mean, in the conversation that was just going on, I felt like there was kind of a conflation of social hierarchy with conceptual hierarchy. So that some of the ideas we were discussing in a previous class about complexity and how complexity structures relate to foundational concepts that they're built on, that that could happen in an art context in a completely different way than the social hierarchy is constructed or functioning. Yes, absolutely, yes. We shouldn't, and I think it's really important from like a kind of post-structuralist aspect.

In fact, these two are always conflated, and because the social hierarchy is conflated with the conceptual complexity-laden hierarchy, which is the logic of complexity as such, it creates this kind of negativization and vilification of hierarchy. Basically, all hierarchies are traced back again into that kind of critique of social hierarchy. Yes, no, I think these two are completely different and need to be carefully distinguished. Nevertheless, still, I think we can also articulate a social hierarchy, but it is no longer a

class hierarchy in a sense. A social hierarchy that is functional, basically. And the way that I need to think about this more carefully, but to me, this social hierarchy is more aligned with a division of cognitive labor, is required for basically any kind of long-term rationally scientific project I'm part of that cognitive labor something and something about

I'm I don't know what I'm thinking here. I mean the division of cognitive labor can also be understood in terms of basically the internal sovereignty of different modes of thoughts, literature, politics, art, so on and so forth. And that basically in order for this hierarchy to work, we need to simultaneously

endorse the internal sovereignty of different modes of thought, but also have some sort of basically synthetic mediation between them and that's that's what is important otherwise basically we are falling back into this kind of you know different arrays of conceptual activities working completely you know apart from one another and basically which which basically brings back the idea of you know we kind of again a kind of conflationary cognitive atmosphere but

basically any all modes of thought start to start to you know start to conflate their own internal sovereignty with sufficiency over the structure of the real. And this is, again, something Gabrielle Catherine really excellently puts it, that in order for this to be, for this kind of hierarchy between different modes of thoughts or division of cognitive labor to be able to function properly, the first thing that they need to endorse is that they need to drop and abandon their sufficiency with regard to the structure

of the real. When they drop that sufficiency, is it parallel to creating intersubjective zones? No, basically, because this, we talked about this, that the nature of conceptual activity by itself, by itself, cannot have any traction whatsoever on the structure of the real. And that's what basically scientific picturing is, to show that the complex interplay between conceptual activities and representational mappings as being under the jurisdiction of scientific explanation can get basically to the bottom of this structure.

So the dropping of this, relinquishing these claims, I think is a positive condition, in fact, for synthesization and integration of these modes of thoughts. Yes, it becomes then, you know, inter-community negotiations, but also, you know, kind of not we are not, it also enables a kind of, as I said, a kind of synthetic mediation between, you know, different trajectories of thought, different modes of thought, different divisions of cognitive labor.

And that's for me, I talked this on the classroom page, for me it's more, the task of the philosopher is more in tandem with this, you know, synthetic operator. operator, a synthetic synthesizing and integrating different modes of thought with the understanding that this synthetic integration is very different from basically the analytical penetration into the structure of reality. But nevertheless, it's essential to basically, you know, in establishing that basically,

that condition for synchronization of conceptual activities within the current modes of thought with basically fruits of scientific cognitive inquiry, with achievements of scientific inquiry. Thanks. Welcome. Any more? Any more? I was going to ask if anybody else has a question. Go on. We have a question over here.

Is it possible you can come closer to the microphone? Yeah. She's basically asking a... Earlier it was said that art proves the myth of the given. What is the myth of the given? Oh, I didn't say that art...that was Joshua. Josh, you answer. No, no, no. It was... Oh, that was Mo. That was Mo. Not Josh. Okay, Mo, talk about what's the relation between art and the myth of the given. Hello?

OK, apparently Mo is not here to answer. So basically, I think the way that Mo is approaching this, and also somehow Josh, is the idea that basically... Well, I would say, I mean, personally, I guess the way that I've approached it is, I mean, through, I mean, you see this kind of early in modernism, or at least in kind of American modernism, through somebody like Clement Greenberg, who essentially looks at art and says, you know, after Kant,

the point is to kind of arrive at a sort of categorical description of art's remit, like what it should be doing. And since he considers art to be separate from the kind of intellectual or conceptual labor of philosophy, it has to develop its own sort of field of specialty. And for him, that becomes one of examining the sort of sensuality of things and the kind of perception itself. And so he looks at, like, painting and says, well, painting should just get at pure perception. And what he misses in Kant is this kind of distinction between, oh, I'm not going to remember the German words right offhand, but Kant makes a distinction between kind of experience that has a conceptual dimension and just sort of, like, pure perception.

And the kind of experience that Kant wants to cultivate is experience with a conceptual dimension to it. And this is the kind of experience that Salars later develops, you know, further in saying that we don't have any sort of basic perception without conceptual content. Like, in order for us to be able to understand what it is we're experiencing, we need to have some conceptual concept. Otherwise, we can't even distinguish between basic perceptions, like between colors like red and orange, unless we have a kind of coherent picture under which, like, red and orange are relatives to one another. So when Greenberg sort of, you know, starts moving towards just a kind of experience of pure perception, he loses the entire conceptual dimension of Kant's argument and seems to think that we can get a kind of experience from art that is pure and unmediated without concepts.

But this is, Salars later sort of dismisses as just kind of like patently not the case. so Joshua it will be I know what you're saying is related to the myth of the given it's super related but if you can because the question was about myth of the given then if you can just make the bridge and make what you said relate to the term myth of the given alright because I was going to like talk but my microphone was malfunctioning so it just like I and I was actually trying to say Reza I can't put my feet in my mouth why don't you talk about myth of the given but my microphone wasn't working Josh, you go I will make an addendum at the end let me think here then to go back to so, under the myth of the given

it's this, to go back even further with like maybe kind of the Cartesian tradition and stuff like that the sort of empiricists were trying to figure out how we could have certain sort of like foundational ideas and so under Descartes you have this idea that the surest thing that I know is that I exist. And he sort of drives us from the sort of immediacy of the presentation of the concept and stuff like that. And the empiricists sort of run with this and say that sensations that we have must exist because we just know them, they kind of come into our sort of experience. But they fail to distinguish between, again, the sort of conceptual dimension of these experiences and the sort of perceptual attributes of these

experiences. And because they do this, they forget that kind of, how do I want to put this, like the types of things that experience is, like a perception cannot act as a justification for further knowledge because it doesn't have, it's not propositional in form, it doesn't have the kind of semantic linguistic concept, like form, I should say, necessary to act as justification. So if you're dealing with just pure perception and arguing that perception itself is enough to get you to the level of a concept, then that's kind of the myth of the given. That until you can kind of begin to separate out the sort of conceptual and perceptual

attributes of our experience, you are just simply operating under this myth of the given. So I don't know, that might have skipped a couple steps there, but I'm trying to do this off the top of my head. No, that was good, yes. So basically it's the idea that for example in visual art, again as Josh was saying on the classroom page, that is is primarily invested in the priority of perceptual knowledge and perceptual experience, for example, shapes and colors, which are manifestly perceptible. The manifest perceptible within the myth of

the given is taken as a direct access point to basically to the content of experience and to the content of the intelligibility of the world. And this is really what the myth of the given is. What appears to us is really the case about both ourselves and the world in which we live. And the manifest perceptible or basically perceptual experience is prioritized over

conceptual knowledge. And we see that once we prioritize perceptual experience over conceptual framework, we kind of again get close to that kind of empiricist framework that we criticize in the second session. The empiricist tries to build knowledge simply by resorting to the purported direct access of perceptual experience to the structure of the world. But the perceptual experience is simply comprised of accurate sensible properties, which are constant.

Which are constant, and they themselves are accidental upon, basically, the non-manifest and non-observable processes, which can only be approached by way of conceptual frameworks. Hence, this perceptual experience cannot be seen as a direct access point to the reality of experience. Thank you, Reza.

Okay, let's continue. Oh, sorry. Let me... Can you see the screenshot? No, I just see an and. Yes, no, we see the, let me make you the presenter to everyone and then people will be able to see it. Can you see it now? It should be on everyone's screen, right? Yeah, it's good.

OK, lovely. So we said that the synoptic image as the stereopsis of the scientific and manifest images is expressed as a multimodal dialectics between nominalism, naturalism, or in different terms materialism, realism and idealism, or coherentism of conceptual functions, where no polarity can be conceived in isolation from the others, basically means that we can't conceive realism without idealism, without nominalism,

without naturalism, or we can't conceive naturalism without idealism, so on and so forth. The regulative ideal of the unconditioned inquiry, and that was basically the Persish regulative ideal. The regulative ideal of the unconditioned inquiry, not as an actual or at-hand idea, but as a programmatic orientational cue and a functional idea, i.e. a functional portrait as a matter of principle being a blueprint of construction and realization, unfolds the ontology of the absolute, quo, and condition through dialectical bundles of the following modes of encounter with the world.

This is basically the picture of this intricate dialectics in the synoptic image between different orientations that pass through the scientific and manifest image. And as we said, synoptic image means that we cannot, we can no longer conceive these dialectical poles in isolation from one another. And as I will talk about, But this is where the future philosophical systems, the shape of philosophical systems to come are highlighted as basically intricate interplays between these dialectical poles,

the generative orientations that pass through the manifest and the scientific image, qua the synoptic image, which is basically the, as we talked about, is really the prosthesis of, is the expression of unconditioned inquiry and the prosthesis of the thing in itself. the synoptic naturalism with a normative turn so the synoptic image is at its base

is a naturalism with a normative turn and this is what we discussed in the previous sessions what does naturalism with a normative turn mean the synoptic naturalism with a normative turn is nothing but the encapsulation of various ramifying transversal orientations passing through scientific and manifest frameworks. So, future philosophical systems through which we can talk about robust self-conception are generated by these dialectical interplays between poles.

But similarly, pathologies of self-conception can also be detected as different sequestered expressions of generative polarities in this dialectics. So pathologies of self-conception, pathologies of thought need also to be understood in terms of isolating one dialectical pole from the other ones. Idealism without realism is a skeptical correlationism that inevitably leads to the impasse of the critique, or what following Gabrielle Catherine we can call the preemptive suturing of the narcissistic wound opened up by modern sciences.

We talked about this at its core launching critique against the ideal scientific framework from within the manifest and its conceptual activities. Idealism without materialism is at its worst a road to panpsychist vitalism and at its best the undifferentiated and impotent realism of the idea. Realism without idealism is epistemologically self-defeating direct realism.

But realism, absent both idealism and materialism, is simply what Kant admonishes as speculative enthusiasm. Or in our vocabulary, speculative realism. But realism, so in this fashion, materialism without idealism is also causal naivety and so on. but the combination we see that the you know robust philosophical systems as robust trajectories of self-conception can also be conceived in terms of these generative dialectical interplays

Transcendental idealism adequately combined with realism is transcendental realism. And I highly recommend, in order for you to get a good grasp of what this transcendental realism is about, read Peter Wolfendale's essay on transcendental realism. I will share it on the classroom page. In the same vein, idealism with materialism makes a framework in which inferentialist core of conceptual activities, coherentism. And eliminativism can become a strange bedfellow. So you can have both eliminative materialism and inferentialist conceptualism. once you put idealism and materialism together within this generative framework.

It is in this sense, it is in this generative context, that, for example, the problem of personhood can be addressed and resolved, while the phenomenological model of the discrete self, As neurobiologically situated can be explained away in physical computational terms, self as a social function as tied to normative activities cannot be reduced to physical processes. And in fact, there is no incompatibility between the inexistence of the former and indispensable activities of the latter.

Contrary to exclusivist positions, it is both possible and in fact imperative to fuse the re-engineering implications of the neuroscientific and computational explanation of the former, i.e. the realization of person as an impersonal complex system with the pragmatic intersubjective dimensions of the latter or the realization of person in the context of social abilities and practices. Conception of the self along this generative fusion is in principle a functional blueprint for self-transformation. And again, within this picture, materialism, sorry, materialist idealism, sorry for the

typo, materialist idealism is expressed as the materially constrained idealism. And idealist materialism is articulated as concept-laden materialism. So we can have basically idiosynchronic fusions of these polarities. As we discussed in the previous sessions, there is indeed no logical opposition between these modes of encounter. Reading this dialectical table through logical oppositions results in various logico-epistemic biases. dogma's of self-conception. The oppositions within this dialectical schema should be seen

as real oppositions with generative consequences for conception and transformation. Now, just to explain this difference between real opposition and logical opposition by way of Kant, a good example of logical opposition logical opposition is you know a form of contradiction sorry logical logical opposition is a form of contradiction real opposition the way that can't articulates this can be grasped via a very simple example you see a ship that is sailing on the sea

Its generative trajectories, its sailing course, is produced or generated by the real opposition of winds. Wind is coming from the north, a wind coming from the east. This real opposition needs to be understood as opposition between forces, with forces creating a generative effect and guiding a ship. Or, for example, we can see this in how, for example, a windmill works.

A windmill, the production of the windmill is governed by the interaction between real forces. One wind coming from this direction, another wind is coming from another direction. They turn the windmill, and they turn it into this product of the windmill is the expression of the generative magnitude derived from this real opposition of forces. the spectral shapes of philosophical systems to come become palpable as conceptual transformative ramifications

of this generative dialective occasioned by the regulative ideal as the programmatic projection of the unconditioned Indeed, philosophy's task can be compared to a midas touch upon the absolute, turning every generative orientations, unbound by the regulative ideal of the cognitive inquiry, into puzzles for abducing conceptual transformative opportunities. we cannot know in advance what a specific categorical ontology of the explanatory ideal scientific image would look like, it is incumbent upon the philosopher to attempt to envision

what its most general categorical features would have to be like if certain of our own philosophical perplexities are finally to be rendered capable of resolution. So this was the end of our first module. And I just want to finish this before we go to our final, you know, any kind of question related to this first module. I would like to, and I wish John was here so we could have some discussion about this,

but hopefully we'll make comments on the classroom page. that while I think what is important is to understand that the regulative ideal is a programmatic idea. And this programmatic idea, in order to be functioned properly, should not have an extrinsic limit, with the extrinsic limit being understood as a limit posed from within the resources of the manifest.

Be them the framework of manifest perceptibles or the highly sophisticated resources of logical mathematical conceptualization. For me, diagonalization and the diagonal arguments shouldn't be used against this ideal framework. Because as we talked about, with diagonal logics and diagonal theorems being the products of the sophisticated conceptual manifest resources cannot ultimately determine the empirical truth, the matter of factual truth.

And as we talked about, it is the matter of factual truth that really overrides the truth of conceptual activities. Instead, I think we need to make these sophisticated conceptual postulations more modest. modest and their effectivity is in their modesty in fact and what is the modesty here it's that these logical possible relations is logical frameworks

need to be posited in terms of intra conceptual frameworks rather than interconceptual frameworks. Because if we do that interconceptual frameworks, if we pose it against the ideal aim of cognitive inquiry, we are again making that manifest truth, truth in terms of manifest conceptual activities, again, reinscribes its mastery theory over empirical truth, which we talked about. It's basically the re-inscription of the manifest in the last instance. But if we posit these, for example, the import of things like diagonal theorems within the

intra-conceptual framework, then we see that it is actually effective, works effectively in the sense that the nature of scientific explanation in terms of sequence of explanatory frameworks is in fact a form of diagonalization in the sense that each explanatory framework loses its bijective correspondence with the previous one. And this is basically what diagonalization is, the absence, the elimination of bijectivity. And this gained through the concomitancy of self-reference, self-referentiality, and negation.

A current explanatory framework refers to its adequacy, but at the same time negates its adequacy. And this negation needs to be understood both in how it showed the previous explanatory framework to be false, but also anticipating a successor explanatory framework that allows for explanatory coherence to be established what was it was something else I wanted to talk about in

in this regard. Okay, I can't remember. So let's go to questions and discussions before I, until I remember what I wanted to talk about. Reza, I have a question about the notion of absolute magnitude that you mentioned in the progression of scientific images. If the scientific images are not commensurate with one another as they progress, how does the notion of numeracy or, I mean, yeah, absolute magnitude not revise itself along with the entire...

No, we didn't say that they are not commensurate. We said that the lack of commensuration is seeing the scientific progress within the intraconceptual framework of current explanatory, for example, theory in which we are working. But an Archimedean vantage point shows in fact there is a progress. And in this progress, it really can be articulated in terms of how scientific explanatory frameworks can succeed one another. They can explain one another. And this explanation can also be understood in terms of the extensive stratification of

scientific inquiries, modes of scientific inquiry. But how can you verify that a convergence is occurring? As I said, it's to show that the explanatory relation between frameworks is arbitrarily getting closer to one another. This is basically the condition of convergence. So rather than we hypothesize a term of convergence that we can describe at the end of cognitive

inquiry, we can set the condition of convergence simply by showing that the relation between it is explanatory framework is arbitrary getting closer and this arbitrary getting closer is in fact projected in how the magnitude the numeric magnitude of these explanatory frameworks projected within their theoretical sequence is the magnitude the stratification then? I just... Magnificent is an expression of this basically explanatory progression.

Okay. I just don't see how that will cross to measurability of the sort. Let me just read this part again. One second. I said the regulative ideal of adequate scientific framework is a general condition of convergence that can be postulated without taking recourse to actually postulating and describing the limit of convergence or a given or gettable term governing the progression of scientific

explanatory framework. Since the condition of convergence can be postulated simply by showing that the temporal series of conceptual systems are evolving towards convergence by establishing that pairs of systems grow successively and arbitrarily closer to each other. Within the general condition of convergence, the degree to which two theories, and for example, molecular kinetic theory of gases and the Boyle-Charles theory of gases within the manifest framework. Approach one another can be measured by the absolute numerical magnitude of the correction factors which must be introduced into applications of the strict counterparts of predecessor

laws to arrive at the values determined by their successor. So this introduction of absolute numerical magnitudes is really the function of explanation. In as much as the absolute numerical values of the requisite correction factors become increasingly smaller as we move from successor theory to successor theory, We may say nonmetaphorically that theories are approaching each other, but this progression, as I said, needs to be understood as a nonmonotonic progression. So it's really the correction factor.

It's the magnitude error is the correction of factor. And the correction factor can be established, in fact. The correction factor is really that one scientific theory explains another scientific theory. by approximating its truth but also showing its extremely false. And this, again, this correction factor can be mapped onto the historical conceptual change. For example, we see it from the Euclidean geometry to Riemannian geometry, Riemannian geometry to Cartonian geometry, so on and so forth. forth, or for example, from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics to, you know, higher

order. In fact, we see that this expresses a form of generalization program. The scientific progress understood as a generalization program here. Namely, the unification. Unification not as reduction, but as generalization, in which it allows to express the particularity of this and that scientific theory, but also shows that this particularity can only be explained by recourse to progressive generalization. Thank you.

I have to just chew on that some more over the next week. There is this good book. I mentioned it last week. I don't know if I shared it on the classroom page or not. Oh, I didn't. It was really a large file. You can find it on the internet. The book is Fusing Images by Jay Rosenberg. And Jay Rosenberg is an absolutely astonishing philosopher. It's a really great book. A bit difficult, but it talks extensively about this. Okay, great. Cool. Evan, I have a question for you.

Can you hear me? My question, actually it's a question for everyone, but it basically comes out of the difficulty to hold in mind and conceptualize this model of navigation in science. I wonder if this difficulty to conceptualize what Reza explains comes from the way we're all submerged in the methods of human sciences or like humanities and the way sort of like and the way discourse moves forth in in humanities which is obviously different than the way the way the way these scientific concepts kind of like relate to each other and move forward right I

I think it has a lot to do with that. Go on, go on. Sorry to interrupt you. Go on. I will talk to you. No, no, no. I'm just saying because, you know what I mean? For me, who's been kind of like exposed to a lot of these descriptions, like I see it kind of like, I clearly see what Reza's trying to get at. But then I remember when I used to have such a difficulty conceptualizing it, which was sort of like a few years ago, when I was coming from sort of like more from the sort of like the humanity side. I don't want to make an equation, but like more from like the manifest, the perennial philosophy, manifest image side, right, into these new concepts. It was hard to sort of like, hard to understand its logic, but yeah, so that's all.

You see, I think also it's important to understand the nature of this incommensurability is not intrinsic in commensurability of scientific theories, but simply that in commensurability needs to be understood as competing scientific theories. Competing in what? Competing in explanatory coherence. Which one can be a better explanation of other ones? And this is really, as I said, it's a regulatory ideal in terms of explanatory coherence. competing scientific theories is different from intrinsic income and zero-ability of scientific theories.

I'm thinking here, and I'm not really quite sure how to connect this into the whole conversation, but I guess I'm going to bring it up anyway because it has relevance, but perhaps the difference between accuracy and precision, where one can hit a target accurately, you know, if your target is between 1 and 500, but, I mean, if you want to hit number 1, then that's precise. And so the sort of distinction between the two, so, you know, maybe setting forth a kind of general territory that is accurate, but then various other theories can maybe compete to get more precise within that particular territory, if that makes any particular sense.

Joshua. Yes. Hello? Not hearing anything. Okay, sorry about that. It's like there's a delay for me from like when I click on unmute and mute and it confuses me. I think to some point a precision like it's a matter of like accuracy and then to more precise but at some point these explanations are negative towards the one that they follow but they still explain it. Like they kind of reject it or surpass it, but it's never through anything but explaining

it and including it in the general understanding, right? I'm not sure. I don't follow you. I mean, I'm using this more as a figure, not as like probably a theory. So maybe the theory of relativity doesn't completely reject Newtonian physics, right? But it does reject aspects of it. Well, yeah, I mean, I guess in that sense, like, I mean, Newtonian physics is accurate in describing, you know, gravity, but it's not very precise, like, you know, Einstein. It needs to be understood as a special case, and this is what I said in terms of particularities, and explanatory coherence understood as a generalization program.

That, for example, Euclidean geometry is a special case of Riemannian geometry, and Newtonian physics is a special case of relativity. Oh, yeah. That's what you mean by succeeding generality. Yes, by succeeding generalization in the explanatory frameworks. Yes. Reza, I know there's only 15 minutes left to the class, but your voice is becoming distorted and robotic. If you can just quickly leave and come back, it would help with the quality of our recording.

Yes. Sorry about that. I apologize. Yes, so yes, I mean, as I said, it's really, and And this kind of, this passage from a special cases to general registers at the level of conceptual change, historical conceptual change.

We see that, for example, the concept of measurement is completely becoming different, but different in the sense that it explains its special cases, but also from the perspective of our explanation shows that the previous explanation is strictly false. I think what's especially confusing to me at the moment is the notion of absolute number as a kind of given. No, no, it's not absolute number. We talked about it in terms of absolute numeric, basically magnitudes, correction magnitudes, being the expression of a regulative ideal.

As we said, we cannot directly refer to it, nor we can postulate it as a describable limit. We can establish it via the progression of correction between different explanatory frameworks. So it is neither, as I said, it's neither given nor gettable. We cannot directly talk about it. But on which level does that corrective measurement appear to us?

It does not appear to us as basically as an at-hand horizon, simply as we talked about, as a programmatic idea that needs to be worked on and recognized within the progression of current progression of scientific cognitive inquiry. And this is, of course, barring, as Sellars talks about it humorously, barring any catastrophes. And again, we see that, for example, now this becomes, of course, a wholly different question

that can science continue to progress or find an impasse. But this impasse cannot be, I think the most important thing is that this impasse cannot be posited as a fundamental limit posited from the perspective of the manifest, but should only be determined within the intrinsic limits of scientific progression, from the perspective of the scientific method itself. Otherwise, as I said, we are basically creating an alternative that is ultimately, again, the re-inscription of the sufficiency of the manifest.

What I forgot to talk about, and this is in direct relation to this, is that once we posit an extrinsic limit to this progression, we are essentially employing that there is something ineffable in the structure of reality. Now, this is, I think, a very good maneuver to show that the internal contradiction of these postulated logical theories launched from inside the manifest, the critical, basically, theories, can be brought into contradiction once we take them to their ultimate conclusions.

For example, if a manifest conceptual theory says that there is, in fact, a limit to this progress, a limit to scientific knowledge, and this is an extrinsic limit, then, as I said, it means that there is something, once we take it to its ultimate conclusion, it It means that there is something ineffable or intractable in the very structure of reality. But ineffability is extremely invasive and evasive concept. In so far as if only even a morsel, a molecule of this world is ineffable,

then it means that the entire structure of reality is ineffable. Because ineffability essentially is the ineffability of recognition of exactly which part of reality is ineffable. and hence if we submit to one ineffable thing even if that thing is extremely elusive we are essentially committing to embracing a whole a full-blooded ineffableism and once we endorse ineffableism we are already on our path to a full-blooded mysticism

How would the full ineffability of these lectures... Sorry? How would I endorse the ineffability of these lectures? oh no I was just saying in terms of like the the sequence of scientific images the the successor scientific image would be ineffable that there would be aspects that would be ineffable to the

previous scientific image not ineffable in explainable hmm okay and this is the last loss of bijectivity that I talked about that this in fact it is really an expression of diagonalization but a diagonalization launched from the intra conceptual perspective that each explanatory level is inexplainable in terms of its predecessor explanatory framework because there is no bijectivity or one-to-one mapping between the two.

I keep coming back to the sense of absolute, just that you've dropped that word, the absolute. Unconditioned. Let's understand absolute in quite a precise Hegelian term, unconditioned. Okay. Can you hear me? Yes. Yeah. These are what I'm talking about in terms of limits that the discourse and the methods of humanities put on this type of ideas.

Because it's like the minute you hear the word absolute, you kind of like, like your level goes into red or something happens. But yeah, I'm glad Reza kind of like qualifies, qualifies. But these are the very limits of the humanities discourse in its confrontation with what really actually science is about. not even what scientists do, because what scientists do, as someone said in the sidebar, is far from the idea of science. Yeah, we need to understand it in terms of a historical instantiation of the scientific community, not individual scientists. Last week I also did a shorter paper, presented a shorter paper in Melbourne,

and I talked somehow briefly about these ideas, And then the head of the department had invited me to speak sort of like talked about how big data has completely like changed the way concepts play into sort of like how scientists, basically she was suggesting that like big data is sort of a turn to empiricism. because you're dealing with so much empirical data that it kind of opens up like a contingent field for the scientist. So the scientist, like increasingly, cannot enter the scientific investigation with a priori concept and has to really let where this data takes them, right?

And I didn't know how to respond to it because I didn't want to, first of all, be rude to the person who's invited me to speak. But it was an amazing moment in which a PhD student of physics got up and basically sort of like first of all pointed to the fact that this very ability of science to factor in how large quantities of data, how new type of traction is itself what scientific sort of like method is about which is like be open to revision and progress. But also he talked about the stuff that I was going to say but I didn't want to say out of rudeness that it's impossible to assume that sheer amount of data will just basically

cancel all the concepts and takes over as a new type of empiricism. It was really beautiful interaction between this person coming from humanities and then this young physics student who basically did the work for me. And then he came here and thanked me and all sorts of stuff. Yeah, but this very same, parallel to this conversation, played out over there in the room. I will post also a few other than, again, as I said, a good reference for a far more extensive elaboration on this successive progression of explanatory frameworks in Jay Rosenberg's book Fusing Images.

I will post a couple of essays that I think are really good in clarifying this, you know, context of explanatory coherence and how the regulative ideal is unconditioned, but this unconditionality is not gettable or can be postulated as a given, basically, term, or can be described. And that's why, as I said, ultimately the idea comes that it serves as a programmatic

idea, as a programmatic idea rather than hypothesizing a given term, a given term and kind of a limit for cognitive inquiry. There is one blog post, I should find it, I lost the track of it, that extensively talks about this Szilardian picturing, which is very good. I will try to post that one and I will, if not the whole book of, not the whole Jay Rosenberg's book, I will capture that relevant chapter of it about this successive progression.

Dr. Yeah, that'd be great. Dr. Yeah, sure, absolutely. Dr. Yeah, also, the dynamic of manifest and scientific image—did we discuss this last time? I might have not totally grasped it. Is this related with the complexity system? I mean, the scientific image kind of comes into the manifest image, like Darwin, like Newton, like things that seem obvious to our perceptions of the world. Yes, yes.

From a historical perspective, it is the expression of manifest thinking increasingly adapting to the scientific images, with the scientific image being the expression of the intelligibility of the world as such. But always reluctantly and sort of like a lag. It should be always reluctantly because this is what historical progression should be. It's a reluctance. And this reluctance shouldn't essentially be seen as a negative counter move or resistance,

It's simply a negotiation, an internal negotiation that further cultivates it. No, Reza, what problematizes this lag and the lag that results from reluctance, right? The lag that results from reluctance is like this lag gets politically mobilized. Yes, sure. Yes, absolutely. even further delay and even further sort of like yeah corrupt the possibility of a of a I hate to say natural but more organic adaptation of the scientific by the manifest yes and that's the problem sure and this brings us basically to the whole trajectory of the second module that

rationality is not sufficient it's not sufficient one in the sense that we saw that this insufficiency of reasoning is can be expressed as demands calls for or diffusion of conceptual truth and matter-of-factual truth, and scientific rationality. But also it is insufficient in so far as rationality and robust self-conception doesn't mean adequate translation to self-transformation.

So in order for it to be a transformative vector, an adequate transformative vector, you should have a politics capable of intervening, capable of facilitating this process. which means that bringing into equation resources and forces and elements that are not inside resources of rationality. They are not resources of reason. They are basically, you know, economy, various modes of tactics and strategy, planning on

micro macro levels employment of forces even violence I'm looking forward to that module sure can you hear me yes okay I was gonna say it's 140 and we kind of started like right at 11.05. So we're sort of like even five minutes over time. So if you guys want to like ask one last question from Reza, I think if there's one more round of question

or like one more question or something, otherwise we can maybe sort of like end the class so he can get some rest. Questions from those who have been silent so far. Yeah, like, yeah, totally. Should I put them on spot? No, but it's not my place to... I'm just a technical person. I'm not here to, like, do anything. Giancarlo, maybe the person who just walked behind you has a question. No, I'm kidding. Sorry. Hello? Yes. Yes, go ahead. Okay, sorry. Now my computer just froze on me. No, I have... It's not really so much a question. is more just a plug-in, something people might be interested in, but I did collect some various, like, resources

and made them available at this website, which I'll share on the side, so if anybody wants to perhaps dig into some further stuff around some of these topics, there's some things available there. Superb. Yes, I mean, well, this is as I, and even though I really tried to elaborate some of the main points, obviously it's fundamentally inadequate. So it just, like, should serve you as some sort of creating these points of curiosity to research further.

Otherwise, as I said, this is a much more fundamental, highly debatable area. is frozen. Miguel, do you have any questions? Can you hear me now? Yes. Not really questions. It's very complex, very deep, and I think

usually with your lectures I need to think a lot afterwards in order to put the pieces together. It's not maybe after one session I would be able to engage more in a kind of discussion or so but in this scenario I really appreciate to have time to rethink about and see the diagrams. Maybe it's because my background is from arts, my knowledge of science and some logical structures need to be updated and I need time to be focused.

But it's great. Sometimes it's good to be quiet and focused. Sure. I know why I like that. it's kind of invigorates sense of curiosity oh Giancarlo or Constantinus any questions if there can you hear me okay I just wanted to like could a footnote saying that we're in conversation to hopefully maybe get her to teach a course in our summer programming for the fall 2015. So, yeah, so there could be a chance

that we could study with Gabrielle in the next semester. Excellent. Also, Tony asked if I want to, and I was in conversation with John, Let's arrange one of the sessions of John's sessions so I can be kind of in a conversation with him. I would love to. Yeah, definitely. I know that John has really also good arguments from a different, if not opposite, direction. And that's from the standpoint of diagonal theorems. Yes, definitely. I think I'm going to look into that right away and let you know.

Okay, excellent. If you're available, that would be lovely. Yes, absolutely. So you can hear me, right? Because my microphone says mute, but I'm not mute, and it's confusing. No, we can hear you. So can we stop the broadcast, people? Are we done for today? Sure. Okay, so thanks again, Reza. Thank you very much, everyone. Thank you. Thank you. My final note is that keep the conversation about the makeup class, which will be the fourth one, so we can actually schedule it and let people know when the fourth session of this second module will take place. Thank you very much. Yes, absolutely. Bye-bye. Take care, everyone. Have a great day. Bye.

Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye. Bye.