Hello and welcome to the eighth session of Theory and Object with Reza Negrestani. I'm going to pass the mic off to him now. Thank you very much Theo. Thanks everyone. So today we will continue the work of Karna. I made somehow an introduction on the logical structure of the world in a previous session. Today I will develop on it and we will see some of the problems but also some of the possibilities that come out of this world, the Carnapian world.
hopefully this session we should be able to completely cover the main ideas of Carnap in off-bowl and next session I would say the next 30 or 4 minutes we will just briefly look at the possibilities that come out of the Carnapian world in his later works particularly logical syntax of language and the concept of explication and then we can move toward fundamental new territory as I promise
you that we are going to look at the so-called face-up between deductivism and inductivism Popper's insistence on deductivist method and Carnap's insistence on inductivist, by that he does not mean a human observational induction, but a logic, what he calls an inductive logic in which our observations are caught up and logically reformatted or reformulated so if you have any brief question with here then however if you
don't have brief questions you have like more substantial questions please do wait until I go over the materials Anything, anyone? Lana, you weren't there last session. No, but I listened to the lecture. Yes, so do you have any questions? well I had some but maybe it's a bit too well just one of them oh I was particularly interesting but
it's I don't know if it's related if it's connected to car now but very often you talk when you were talking about MP and MPP and M, you were mentioning, you would sometimes use the word mapping. And I wonder... Mapping? Yeah. Yes. Like mapping. Decemorphism. Yeah. Yes. And I wonder in which sense are you using this word? Are you using it in some very specific mathematical sense or is it just a kind of blues? uh um i would say that uh it can be both uh surely carnapp uh or stegmuller's ideas of mapping was uh entirely couch in set theoretical terms okay
but also very loose in the sense that it's essentially a transformation or deformation between two different classes or categories or concepts or models so on and so forth however when i do talk about mapping i still try to retain the generalization or the general connotation of the word mapping but also uh with regard to that generalization uh try to come try to have in mind something more like categories theoretical mapping between two categories.
In the sense that in category theory you know you have categories, mathematical categories and these categories of course have objects. They can be roughly translated with some caveats to sets and its members. And of course the mapping is how such categories with their objects are going to be translated to other categories with other objects. Depending on the kind of mapping that we are talking about, obviously we are required to understand the kind of operation that this morphism or arrow or flash canotes or denotes. Yeah, I see.
Thank you. Although I'm really interested in- For example, isomorphism, Esmigliana. You see, the idea of isomorphism, isomorphism for many people still I have noticed that like sometimes I talk, like cellars particularly uses the word isomorphism a lot in the works. last corner when I talk to in a content of philosophers you know young students they think isomorphism the world means something very specifically they are still think about the world isomorphism in a very ordinary sense of natural language in the sense of isomorphism means that there are two identical
almost identical categories and their objects and they simply can be transformed back and forth okay but isomorphism in set theory and in category theory is not exactly this isomorphism is simply a translation of one map to another map after it has gone through some specific or explicitly constrained variables. These variables can be functions, I don't know, the domain, so on and so forth so the idea for example isomorphism does not mean two things are being identical it
simply means a transformation map a translation walter benjamin's idea of translation is what we call an isomorphic map you see when we translate an original work of course the translation has something more or something less but nevertheless it captures the essence of relationships that were obtained in the original work is still in the translated version One question that I had was in the second preface, you know, he mentions that, you know,
you didn't have to begin with, you know, like the axiomatization of sense data. And that, you know, there is, in fact, multiple ways to begin. You could begin with axiomatizing. Let me interrupt you on this so you do not sow seeds of confusion in this class. The point is that we do not axiomatize sense data. We axiomatize the logical relationships and statements which can be isomorphic to sense data. Sense data cannot axiomatize. It's just sense data. It's an experiential element.
Okay, sure. That dot, you cannot axiomatize it. It's just you can axiomatize it if you associate with it a symbol, a dot for example, in a piece of paper. And of course, in order to axiomatize it, that dot requires certain kinds of relationship, formal relationships with other symbols on your piece of paper and that's how you axiomatize it. Okay yeah absolutely. My question still applies though is is that you could also begin with another axiomatization. For example physical axiomatization which corresponds to observations which need not whatsoever be attached
to a psychological subject. And so, you know, I noticed, and then I also, like, I noticed him talk a little bit about the heteropsychology. You know, so I went over and I read a little bit there, and I feel like there might be some analogy here, because, you know, in both cases, it's how does the axiomatization of some other set of symbols in some other observatory apparatus extrinsic to our own psychological apparatus like how do we bridge these these multiple things and and how do we treat these different
Well, okay, write this question, make sure to give it to me next session, precisely because this is essentially the project of Karnak after the failure of logical empiricism. This is what Karnak calls explication. Okay, okay. so maybe let me let me if those people who had you know difficulty understanding what Christian is questioning is that okay let's say that for any observation that we have we can make in language
and this language is a formal language it's not an ordinary natural language okay like I I work in engineering I have a formal language of my own. Spitlana works in physics, some of you works in music, some of you in art, so on and so forth. So we have a language by which we investigate the elements of our field. Of course, Carnap thinks that such ordinary languages whereby we think and talk about the elements of our own field, whether it is empirical or not, can be captured by an idea of a formal language, calculus.
calculus in the sense that all you have are meaningless symbols standing in such and such formation rules and transformation rules with regard to one another like a diagram like purse diagram like when you make a diagram you should always be consistent this arrow if you made this arrow and you want to make an inverse arrow the head of the arrow should be exactly the same otherwise it would be a different thing it would it would mean something else so the consistency of symbols the coherency of symbols in terms of how they stand in relation with one another is the
constituent of the formal language so with that said Christian essentially asking me that if we are having different empirical resources or different elements broadly understood as the seeds of our own field, whatever we are working on, architecture, literature, philosophy, science, so on and so forth, then how can we extend our languages to one another? a good metaphor for it is think of a star trek or a locomotive you have these handles different
handles each of these handles actually do a specific function on a specific gear or each of these button on the star trek board does do something very specific one you know adds the fuel to the propulsive engine the other one makes a teleport the other one such and such so how can we see them coherently as organic elements of the same organic whole how can we connect these languages what do we need in order to connect such languages in philosophy of science you can think about the same thing
You are a biologist, you are a chemist, you are a physicist, you are a mathematician, engineer, so on and so forth. Obviously you have different fields of specialized languages which can be formalized coherently. But then if we do believe in something as science, as this convergent horizon, then how can we conceive, imagine, or develop a language that can accommodate all such languages and make the connection between them explicit and explicated? So, I mean, one of the things I'm thinking too is, you know, with his dissolution of philosophy,
kind of dissolution of philosophy and the death of epistemology and metaphysics, it's almost like he's replacing them with this highly pure form of philosophy, which he sees as logical syntax. Yes. And then you're also talking about this Rube Goldberg machine with all these different parts, but that machine, which is composed of these various languages, I'm imagining this machine also having these different parts as functions of philosophy, too, and it just some science for that matter yeah it just seems like it seems like we'd have to have some sort of organizing principle what is the function of this machine absolutely the whole idea of this organizing principle in the
sense that it not only organizes them as part of one whole but also shows that there is in fact an evolution in terms of rational thinking or for that matter science is happening is to allow us to arrive at a new language what he calls a metalanguage or metal logic where all these various compartments tools tool sets uh so on and so forth can be envisioned as part of the same hierarchy almost like these nested hierarchy that you have diversifications
but they are essentially are the subclass of something higher something even more fundamental So, this is actually a very, very, these are, we are, I have promised to Justin to not go off tangent in this class while we are, let's just do this for once. I think this is a really important idea. You see, now you see the import of Karna. know exactly what this import is is that the idea that there is such a thing as an enlightenment we have believed in it that there is such a thing as the copernican imperative in which
you can say the course of science modern science and it starts from the galilean mathematization of the universe and that led to the copernican revolution the copernican revolution was dislodged by a more generalized revolution the keplerian revolution and that's by newtonian revolution and that's by einsteinian the same thing within if you want to think about it with regard to lamarck in genetics mandel and darwin darwin is the ultimate generalization so with that sense this idea of enlightenment or scientific rational enlightenment gives us a true vision
of ourselves in the world. That our concepts once autonomously approached give us a unified vision of ourselves in a unified world no matter how diverse we are as subject and no matter how many multiple universes there may be so this is the idea of the enlightenment the core idea of enlightenment incarnate wants to essentially re-envision philosophy but particularly philosophy We have science in this vein. But of course, the reality is far more messy
than what we think it is. In the sense that our concepts are usually local. I mentioned to you, for example, the concept of hardness that we have is not something that can be applied across the board. Of course, the concept of hardness for a metal beam or this piece of wood once we investigated we see that this concept is actually local in the sense that on the surface of a metal beam we have one concept of hardness when we go to the molecular level or crystal black crystal crystallographic level we see another concept of hardness when we go to the
nano millimeter of this metal beam then there is another concept of hardness so with such diverging concepts and the language developed to capture such concepts how can we see as if we are doing the bid of the project of enlightenment that we are arriving at a unified scientific vision of ourselves in the world so like Carnap would say instead of saying there is like a truth of hardness let's just investigate the consequences of that definition as we
proceed further Carnap would say two things Carnap would say, Carnap is essentially, was a child of pragmatism, of Wittgensteinian pragmatism. However, he became extremely critical of pragmatism. He would say that you, it's like an engineer, you need two sorts of concepts and two senses of the project of scientific enlightenment. The first sense is the messy reality and diversifying experiences and their corresponding local concepts. Hardness one, hardness two, hardness three, applied to different scale lengths of a metal
beam. However, you also need a global concept, something like elasticity. The whole point is to bring these local concepts and global concepts together, the messy reality to logical ideas. Logic, linguistic constructivism, formal linguistic constructivism and nationalism. Idealism and realism. And that's essentially the core tenet Carnap's project, commensurations of the poles by which we see ourselves in the world.
And what is this, if not the ultimate ambition of science, but also philosophy? Reza, I have a small question, if you don't mind. Absolutely. I know we've talked about this in some way before, but I was wondering, since you've mentioned the Project of Enlightenment and so on, there is, of course, a very obvious kind of interpretation of Carnap that directly relates him to correlationist viewpoints, especially kind of logic to the classical legacy.
I just wanted to ask, especially since, and you talked about syntax, the Carnapian syntax being this kind of a hidden semantics, but I mean, even people who work very closely with him, like famously Russell, have kind of doubted his semantical relation, especially since his kind of pluralistic syntax allows for such various ununifiable almost forms. of formal languages. So I just wanted to hear your opinion of how, do you think that the early Carnapian project can in any way be interpreted uncorrelationistically?
Sorry if that's kind of... Absolutely, absolutely. I think so. I think so. First of all, you see, the idea is that requires theory and theory requires language my language I do not mean our national languages so whenever I say language think of it generally as a calculus the thing is that kind of tries to show and he later on actually sees the flaws of his project without abandoning all of its facets it is famous that Connacht gets sick I can't remember exact things at the end of 1930s gets
sick he has a fever for multiple with weeks and he starts to think about what he has done and he says in his diaries in his letters actually that at the peak of the fever I started to see everything clear that Russell's project essentially the reason that his correlations is not because it's correlation is in the what you might call to be what we understand today as correlations and by way of may assume but precisely because for Wittgenstein
and Russell the function of logic the function of language generally is speaking always subordinated to a representational or a correlation is mapping in the sense that for example for Russell thinks that laws of thinking are essentially the laws of the world where we've got a sign is more subtle in the sense that the function of language is essentially a representation of function. Carnap sees them now clearly
that the idea of logical syntax of language where we general we try to generalize language and also diversify linguistic or symbolic relationships primarily divorced from such concerns already is a different kind of thing, is a different beast altogether. It's essentially a function of language. You see, from this perspective, Carnap actually tries to explicitize what Selar's already called the myth of the given, I mean, a few years later.
In the sense that as I mentioned, that the world does not tell anything to us about what it is, how it functions, how it behaves, what we are in it, so on and so forth. It's essentially what we call the world is something that can only be talked about within broadest possible of logical relationships among its primitive entities. These relationships, however, are not representation of relationships. They are linguistic and logical relationships or mathematical for that sense.
And in order for us to take the idea of reality that is in excess of mind, namely anti-correlationism, we should also take the idea of a language that is in excess of all representational constraints in the sense that language does not need to be understood in terms of a word naming something in the actual universe. The names are simply symbols, meaningless symbols. As long as we have tried to diversify the relationships between such symbols,
then we can possibly, in code in Italy, we can possibly arrive at a new vision of reality of universe where in fact we can see that the structure of world is in excess of the structure of thinking however we cannot do this without this logical constructivism this linguistic constructivism or what they call the pure syntax. Otherwise we simply fall in the trap of either our experiential intuitions about the world
or psychological states about how we see the world. Well, of course, reality always betrays psychology. Are you going to talk more about local and global concepts? Yes, yes, absolutely. Yes, yes, yes. Okay, so I will wait. Yes. However, just in order for us to somehow have a better grasp of these ideas,
so as we can see how we are progressing, rather than simply groping in the dark, let me just give you a very intuitive example a local concept think this scruffy dog or a baby playing in the tub with a rubber duck right this rubber duck goes back and forth in the top as the baby pushes it and pulls it back so the baby has a global concept of how this rubber duck should behave
in the world but this world is just simply a top okay It does not have turbulent behaviors, chaotic behaviors, so on and so forth. So this rubber duck is what you might call to be the navigation of this rubber duck back and forth in the tub is what you might call to be a local concept. However put this rubber duck in a river, see what happens. In a river you have undertones, you have turbulent behaviors, you have chaotic trajectories.
There is no such a thing as this global behavior indexed by a concept of navigation back and forth where you are fully in hold of the rubber duck. So local concepts are what you might call to be concepts that are almost pragmatically heuristics in the sense that they, with regard to reality, in the sense that the reality is not something like a unified thing but it is constituted of many other sectors. we do something to this universe our practice takes different courses of
evolution precisely because as I mentioned reality you can imagine it as this multi-level structure extremely diverse different sectors maps territories so on and so forth so with that sense the local concept is what you might call to be a concept that can only pragmatically and heuristically respond to a very very specific sector of reality and not other sectors a A global concept, on the other hand, is what you might call to be a unified concept over
a universal, homogeneous concept of reality, like the bathtub, rubber duck in the bathtub. matter how you are moving it it is still more or less comes back to you or more or less so in a sort of sorry so in a sort of no worries um i mean this is making me think back to the class last year we talked about Husserl's idea of adumbration. No, no, no. Husserl adumbration you said?
Yeah, but let me clarify myself. Okay, okay. So, you know, it seems like a big thing about this global concept is that it is able to explain the movement in the bathtub. But it's also able to explain the movement in the river, in the ocean, or wherever. And so that this global concept is, in a sort of analytic fashion, is able to prescribe the ways that we employ this global concept, explain different behaviors of this homogeneous concept of reality. Is that correct? Yes, yes, yes, yes.
but however you are flash forwarding at this point in the movie let us let us take our time without you flash forwarding I'm not about that but yes so the local concept you might think of it as this rubber duck I think of this diagram so you have a straight line and suddenly this straight line takes all twists and turns and they're not just one there are many many many ones so we have the concept of navigation of the rubber dog in the back top this is the global concept once we reach into these twists and turns which are many of them then we are in the
the domain of the local concept is this clear yes it's with Lana is this clear or do you have any I thought that while we are remaining in the realm of pasta we cannot help but remain in realm of local but now you're saying you're saying it's at some point becomes also global uh yes this is the whole idea of carna without without actually talking about our next session it's essentially that kind of thinks that you see you can think of this via two metaphors david andre carlos has talked
about this in terms of two metaphors. So the rubber duck swimming in the bathtub back and forth seamlessly, you know, is what you might call to be the ideal of an engineer or an idealist scientist, okay? Whereas the other one where we are having rubber duck going through these turbulent flows, making all twists, it might actually drown, it might not drown, it might drown and then suddenly surface. These are what the metaphor for this is, Andre Karras calls it, the way of the drifter. Because once you are in the local sectors of reality, you see that you will drift away.
There is no way that you can ever come back to that unified global concept, to that bathtub, to that rubber paradigm in the bathtub. So it's a difference between engineer and drifter. Now Carnap's believes in his later work that essentially the course of science is something more like a dialectic between the engineer and the drifter, between the global concept and the local concept. Without the global concept, we can never understand what we actually do when we do it.
So, I mean, I think... Now the local concepts, we are simply in the realm of pure solipsistical idealism. We are simply thinking that the universe is simply a projection of ourselves, like a bathtub where the rubber duck moves seamlessly back and forth, no matter what. Are you saying that through this dialectic we are able to, I mean, okay fluid dynamics is really complicated, but hypothetically we would be able to potentially extract global
concepts that pertain to the... so the whole point of part is that once we see the local global concepts in terms of a dialectics which he calls explication and we will talk about this fully then we are capable of not only arriving at new local concepts but also new global concepts which can fundamentally change the course of the history of science and philosophy in the sense that we can arrive at new local behaviors of the universe, new sectors of reality, new local concepts, hitherto unknown to us.
shall we have a break by the way that's after the break let me start we are we are we are you know I know that is my fault I I think genuinely philosophy needs to be done in conversation mode but I don't want to go say that Reza did not read anything of the material let's let's have a break and then we will come back and I will read you some stuff, talk about Carnap, and then we can pick up the questions and so on and so forth. Sounds good. How about a seven minute break? Seven minute break is always good.
At this point, I just don't believe it. I'm trying to get a glass of vodka and a cigarette. Exactly. I don't believe these times anymore. They're always like half the length. Yeah, it's like underfactual times, Christian. You are a philosopher. You shouldn't take this idea of measurement so serious. You are living underfactual. Thank you. Bye-bye. Thank you.
Is Meredith still there? I can't see her. She actually asked a very good question. Yes, absolutely. That's how I think Ellie sees model and the market, or what you might call to be probability and price in terms of local global concepts.
Have you guys, any of you read the recent essay Ellie wrote for Urbanomic called Mogorov? It's really good. I mean, this guy is genius. I thought that it was a fantastic, superb essay. Other than being very attentive to the subtleties of the Kolmogorov paradigm of information theory, he literally tried to map this onto how he interprets the market, the trading market.
Can you give us a link? Absolutely, absolutely. Thank you. That's fascinating. Kolmogorov is one of those heretic logicians who went completely insane during the last time of the years. You hear a lot of stories about him here, about how he would just describe nonsense of the blackboards and stuff like that, but he would be still tolerated in MCU because of Kolmogorov. Let me tell you, when I was in the school, I was a fanboy of Kolmogorov. What? I read everything that I could put my dirty pot about Kolmogorov.
Basically, you know that Kolmogorov, actually there are these gossips in Kolmogorov, which I think that they might be actually, but that's sad, of course, you know, as I said that we are just human, we do make mistakes. Kolmogorov, you know, was persecuted by the communist regime. He was gay, of course. The thing is that they pressured him to testify against his teacher. You should read, I will send you some books. But basically Kolmogorov testified against his teacher and he said that he's,
so basically he had a teacher who was one of the greatest minds of Russian, you know, mathematics, logics. computer science early on and he had to testify against him telling him that you know this guy is like plagiarizing doing subversive activities doing all sorts of nasty stuff in university because you know he thought he's beyond the law but But recent documents, actually I read very recently, recent documents show that Kolmogorov was always a fan of his teacher and he was literally forced by KGB to testify against
him. Kolmogorov was one of the greatest fun people, literally one of the greatest. I mean, Russians have their own wacky ways. I love them. Yeah, they're kindred of Iranians, I think. Iranians, unfortunately, haven't had that many great logicians. But yes, the wackiness barometer is almost the same, I guess. Yes. I've been trying to dig up. He's supposed to have written some essays about studying poetry of mathematics.
And while I don't really believe in this direction, I was really curious because Kolmogorov wouldn't do something nonsensical, right? So I was curious what exactly was his idea. But I only found some things by his friends. Well, I told you, Valentin, that the thing about Kolmogorov, because many of his essays, letters, and correspondences are not published in English. They only have his overall idea of, you know, what he was up to. But literally in the Western world, you know, no one knows anything about his real projects. He was absolutely one of the greatest minds ever lived.
So will you send us a link to his... or at least give us a... Yes, yes, okay, as soon as we finish this, I will send you a few articles I have, some gossip columns and stuff about Kolorov's life during the Soviets. the Soviets. Okay, thanks. That was fascinating. Thank you. Kolmogorov was essentially what you might call to be, you see, that's why I told you on Facebook that early philosophers, I mean by that early I do not mean like medieval,
I mean early 20th century, the mathematician scientists were essentially in conversation with philosophy. In the sense that, unlike someone like Knight-Grace and Tyson or all of these new age scientists, they wanted to show philosophy that it does not have the final world but also our scientific conclusions can be in fact philosophically veridicated verified and and kolmogorov to the end of his life abided by this paradigm he he lived a fundamentally parallel universe between philosophy
mathematics, logics, and computer science. One second, let me actually give you the name. I think no one has already sent the link to the essay on urbanomic.com. No, no, no. Okay, that's great, but I want to...
Sorry, one second. This is the name of his teacher that he had to testify against. Okay, so I talked briefly about the epistemological project of biological structure of the world.
And I talked about how he envisioned it via a constituational system. I briefly also introduced what he meant by a constituational system. So in Afbaw we are presented with an epistemically ordered constituational system that is meant to show that all scientific concepts can be constituted from an experiential basis and that no metaphysical concepts can be so constituted.
And of course I mentioned that within this framework, in opposition to many commentators on the work of Carnap, Carnap was not influenced as a matter of fact by a strict empiricism. logical empiricism of Karna at least but also Reichenbach I would say is not conforming to a strict empiricism in the way that we've lost typically have learned it it is something fundamentally different it is what you might call to
be a partial attempt at commensier rating rationalism with empiricism logic language and mathematics with observation And of course, the name of this project for Carnap, along with many of his comrades in Vienna Circle, was Logical Empiricism. It is a view Carnap himself endorses in his retrospective intellectual autobiography.
If you want to look at it, it's page 16 to 19. And that formed the basis of the Avbap, where he calls it a call to arms of the Vienna Circle. The primary responsibility for this account of Aufbau must however rest with Quine, both in the sense that Carnap began to be suspicious of this project but also as I mentioned moved forward toward new possibilities. Quine has found occasion to discuss the projects of the book with the same frequency in its career.
Indeed, perhaps the two most influential documents of the Quinean reorientation of epistemology, his paper, Two Dogmas of Empiricism. And, you know, I'm sorry that we are not having time to discuss this paper, but I absolutely recommend you to read this. This is considered to be one of the greatest philosophical essays written in the 20th century. and epistemology naturalized are motivated in large parts by lessons Quine asks us to take from what he regards as the epistemological failure
of Carnap's project in logical structure of world. The following two statements from these essays by Quine express the essence of the received view, the global received view among many philosophers of Baal, accepted today by most philosophers. Of course, I've already indicated that such views, if not mistaken, but they are somehow misleading, precisely because Carnap was a very heterogeneous rhizomatic thinker in the sense that he's like a philosopher who envisions different worldviews, makes
bets about them, continues one of these bets. Once he fails, then a new bet on a different hypothesis connected to the old one should be initiated right so karnap believes a radical reductionism conceived now with the statements as units set itself the task of a specifying a sense datum language and showing how to translate the rest of significant discourse the statement by a statement into it thus what we introduced
in the singular sessions as the statement view. Carnap embarked on this project in the . The language which Carnap adopted as his starting point was not a sense datum language, however, in narrowest conceivable sense, for it included also the notations of logic up through higher set theory. Carnap's starting point is very parsimonious, however, in its extra logical or sensory part, in a series of constructions in which he exploits resources of modern logic with much ingenuity.
Carnap succeeds in defining a wide array of important additional sensory concepts, which, but for his constructions, one would not have dreamed were definable on so a slender a base. He was the first empiricist who not content with asserting the reducibility of science in terms of immediate experience took serious steps toward carrying out the reduction. And by that, we do not mean a greedy reduction of the kind that we've seen among naturalist
philosophers and neuroscientists inclined philosophers today, but a logical reduction. What then could have motivated Carnap's heroic efforts on the conceptual side of epistemology when hope of certainty on the doctrinal side was abundant? There were two good reasons still. One was that such constructions could be expected to elicit and clarify the sensory evidence for science. The other reason was that such constructions would deepen our understanding of our discourse
about the world, particularly the scientific discourse. Even apart from questions of evidence, it would make all cognitive discourse as clear as observation terms and logic. And I must regretfully add said theory to quote Carnac. So therefore, on a received view, Carnac is seen as taking his epistemological inspiration from a strict empiricism. We begin with an epistemologically privileged language of sensation and seeks to exploit the resources of modern logic to make good on empiricism
longest standing promissory note that this language is conceptually rich enough to capture all of scientific knowledge. The project extends our understanding of the world by simultaneously clarifying what we are saying when we engage in theoretical discourse and indicating what the empirical evidence is or must be for such claims to be true early on of course russell
and his project of Mathematica Principia was extremely influential on Carnap in the sense that for Russell as I mentioned you get to fundamentally claims which somehow at least on the surface when you look at them and that's how Karnap looks at them later on at the surface
they look as if they are commensurate with such Carnapian vision or logical empiricism in general. But as you look deeper into them, you see that they are in fact completely erroneous. So what are these two quotes? Any person can give me some indication as what these two rossilian claims that set in motion early carnapp's work might be well if of course um there's of course the reduction of mathematics to pure logic
which helped uh at least how karis and awody kind of tried to show this help the this kind of de-universalization of mathematical propositions without their reference to actually anything abstract and non-reducible. Superb. So the first one addressed more coherently that ever I could elaborate it. So what is the second one? Would it be type rationality? So non-recursivity? Can you elaborate on this a little bit? Simply, it was probably a stupid remark,
but in terms of the fact that via Cantor's and Russell's paradox. Russell has been, I think, at that point of time, trying to construct a type, sort of mathematical operations via which there is a very strict foundational hierarchy of knowledge and mathematical principles rather than any one that can be self-referential. This is, this was actually to Carnap, you know, before he actually heard Goodell's lecture, this was not a problem. The first point that you made is essentially what you might call
to be the logic so there were two rossalian uh claims uh that's cropped up in early works of carna and carna later on became fundamentally suspicious of them so one let's open a bracket we called it the logical claim of Russell according to the logical claim of Russell is one as Artem said we have the reducibility of all mathematical relationships to those of logics or mathematical propositions those of logic
so one you see here i am using the word logic singularly carnap later in his later works sees that the only way to get out of this rosselian nightmare is by understanding a plural logic logics and that's That's really, you know, make him to go with his idea of language as a generalized calculator,
as a pure syntax. So under this bracket, which we call logical claim of Russell, you get artems, the reducibility of math to logic. Then, also another Russellian claim, which is called what? Logical laws of thought correspond to those laws of the universe. Essentially, logic has an implicit metaphysical correlation with the world. In essence, as I just mentioned, logical laws are the laws of the universe.
So this is the first claim of Rossi, which influenced early karma, and he became, of course, very suspicious of them. The second one is, as far as I remember, being proposed by Russell in two of his main works, in three of his main works. The knowledge of external world, world and our knowledge of it, and analysis of mind. this claim is what you might call to be a basic empiricist claim in their strict sense of
empiricism and what is that in the sentence that Russell thinks that sense data in a one-to-one relationship can be transformed to logical statements. Once we have such logical statements, then we can do, obtain relationships between such associations and thus coherently talk about the associations of our empirical observations, quote sensations. in analysis of mind russell talks about this problem
under a very notorious paradox in the history of philosophy called five minutes ago paradox please do read it it's it's actually quite twisted i mean if you are interested in sci-fi literature you should read it it said okay i might have a memory but literally having a memory doesn't entitle me to remember what was the world, what the world was five minutes ago. Literally, usually we think that we don't have a knowledge of the future,
but Russell's five minute ego paradox is about that. Just as we do not know about the future, We do not know about the past. This is called Five Metastical Paradox. It's in analysis of mind. All these books are actually for free at this point. You can easily find it. So the other iterations of this claim, as I mentioned, are being cited in our knowledge of world and our knowledge of it and the knowledge of external world. Where basically again Russell tries to somehow show that sensations give us a knowledge about the world.
And we know that by sensation, Russell still follows a Kantian definition. Sensation in Kant's philosophy means to be affected by the items in the external world. What we call sensations, what you might call to be the affect of the external world upon our neurological sensors. And according to Russell, such sensations do in fact yield a knowledge, a rudimentary knowledge of the world, from which we can reconstruct the world or conceptualize about
it. However, when you look into these three works by Russell, where he talks about such ideas, you notice that there is something extremely wrong, extremely under investigated. The way that Russell thinks that this sensation can in fact yield the knowledge of the world is because he thinks that there is an association between such sensations. You see, if you have a sensation of a red dot as an item of the universe on your visual
field, you wouldn't be able to, according to Russell and even other empiricists, to yield an empirical knowledge a rudimentary empirical knowledge it doesn't tell us anything just because we see these elliptical gray and blue dots on the window in a rainy day we cannot say that it is raining outside you need to have such sensational affects or sensations with regard to other kinds of sensations
this is a pinnacle of classical empiricism by the way in the sense that they will tell us that you know you have this duttish elliptical blue white gray against the surface and then from that we can conclude that there is some sort of water work going outside. Either someone is, you know, splashing water on the window or it's raining outside.
And Russell thought that the reason that empiricism is important is precisely because it yields associations. associations between matter-of-fact empirical evidences observational rudimentary observational evidences and of course combined with the function of memory we can say that yes there is a rain outside it's raining outside or someone is like splashing water on the window so from from Russellian view the idea of sensation as rudimentary atomic facts
empirical facts which undergird our beliefs about the world are entirely based on associations of of such and such empirical facts with such and such or does and so empirical facts precisely because we have through our memories so on and so forth we have learned that you know uh non-conceptually of course we we cannot talk about concept because otherwise we are in the domain of rationalism we We are simply in the domain of empiricism. So we see these duttish elliptical shapes of such and such colors.
It is only I identify them as rain drops or water drops precisely because I can associate them with other kinds of empirical observations held in my memory. however a problem arises here i do not uh those of you who are interested i talk a few pages as a critique of russell in intelligence and spirit that associations fundamentally are incapable of giving us what the thing is
even on the most at the most rudimentary level just because there is this elliptical you know dots of water of gray and blue is on the window I wouldn't be able to say that is raining outside according to Russell we can do by way of associations by which he means associations between memory episodes by that we do not mean episodical memories because
episodical memories of conceptual through and through we are simply talking about what you might call to be a robotic memory just memory itself as a tape recorder without any intervention of conceptual regimes i don't think that any of such things are possible and of course carnapp also became fundamentally skeptical of such scenarios. Is this clear or do I need to, I mean, please do ask if you have questions on this regard. I guess I would, my first question would just be
if there is a conceptual register, how is that not robotic? like memory is robotic, I guess, at this point. Now you're catching me. When I said robotic, I simply do not mean a full-fledged Westworld robot. You know, I simply meant robotic. I don't see that. It's mechanical. It's simply what you might call to be a mechanical association. Nothing else, nothing more. Like on a tape recorder, a tape recorder that is sensitive to light, register traces of some signs on this tape, okay, according to its sensitivity to light.
Now, after giving sufficient time, it is capable of making some associations between dozens so established traces recorded on the tape that's all I meant robotic okay let's forget about about talk about mechanical because when we are talking a robot at least in our today's world we are thinking about about robots like Isaac Asimov or Westworld, where they not only have such mechanical infrastructure like the ways that we do according to our neurological substrate, but also they are furnished
with a language. They are concept-using. They are capable of expliciting and also deriving such associations only by way of conceptual judgments. I just like, I guess on a psychological level, just come to identify with your language, like how could you, you know, how are you able to kind of, I don't know, be reflexive about that, I guess seems to be a problem. about the concept in films are you trying to ask me that
okay that we might be a version to robots where we not only have such memory based associations but we have also language but then how we as robots and we humans are nothing but robots by by the way. If we are robots, then how can we actually talk about language? How do not can see it as essentially a mechanical instrument? Is this what you are trying to ask? Something like that? Yeah, yeah. Just how are you able to kind of separate from the language you're using in order so that you're able to reflect on it?
Well, the thing is that this is essentially what you might call to be the question of a Turing computer. You see, a Turing computer also is a tape recorder. Okay? We do not need to think about it as digits being inscribed on this infinite tape we can simply see it as an infinite tape of photographic negatives well where there are lights light sensitivity and once they encounter with the world like in the old Kodak you know or any
old camera where you have this almost infinite tape and this infinite tape has each cell and each cell records the light as it comes through the lens now of course we are all that but we are something more but not we are not something more in the sense that we are something like unnatural or supernatural in the sense that this is essentially the idea of tiering the idea of turing is that okay there are these traces registers on each of these photo cells each frame of this raw camera tape as it rolls and you take shots
and then what you might call to be language is an extra CPU put into this camera where it can according to some fundamentally different element namely symbols and not traces there are no longer traces registers on tape according to symbol it can timestamp them it can give them some metadata location space time so on so forth and where we have this metadata about these traces registers on the tape what you might call to be
language is essentially a language of the metadata where we are capable of by way of this whole universe of connections so it's within the domain of symbols to extract the metadata of each frame of the phone say that what this trace is and how it is in fact connected to other data So, I mean, what you're kind of saying here is, you know, where, say, a lot of Kantian terminology can come in.
Like, for example, like the idea of the unity of transcendental perception, where that unites even if you have, you know, fundamentally incommensurate languages which are being used to structure experience and put metadata on experience, they're held together thereby. And then sort of what you were saying was kind of along the lines of how the reproductive imagination works through that time stamping, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And so what I'm kind of then inclined to think is that there are some actually truly general and universal statements which are almost infinitely metalinguistic insofar as they
are able to situate the types of judgments and metadata being associated with these judgments in relationship to an apperceptive subject. Yes, yes. Essentially, of course Kant understood what unity of our perception is. Unity of our perception is essentially what you might call to be a way, you see, in old empiricism, and of course Carnap and the entire philosophy of science today are against it, save for some, what we call it. deviant philosophers i don't want to talk about them however the idea is that
so you see again coming back to our old camera tape so the camera rolls this tape and every time that we do a flash we click the camera light comes through the lens and registers as some traces according to Kant versus Hume we cannot even make such associations to make such associations in time so as we arrive at the picture of reality as a photo of reality we need to have some
unified agent behind the camera you do not need to think it as a person you in fact can think it about as a program there is a symbol manipulator it's a computer program it's axiomatic it's logical and it is capable of making such associations to say that frame one when i saw this you know man moving is exactly the same man who touched for example the wall as in terms of such memory associations on the table this is what can calls the basic unity of a perception the person who ate the hot
dog was a person who ate the bun the dog the ketchup and so on so forth so yes this is absolutely needs to be operated however there should be something else more operated even more fundamental than the unity of the perception and that's what i would call the linguistic brain in the carnappian sense not natural language but a medium where you can according to Karna think about the relationships between patterns obtained on this role of film
and those relationships that you are capable of obtaining by virtue of having something more than just simple observations. and these are simply symbols the collection of such symbols by which we can obtain the traces and associations between the observations registered on the film is what's called a language please do ask I know that these are a little bit arcane and stuff so if if you
have a question please please do ask could you see that one more time please yes which which part Jovan um with regards to the symbols um yeah like i i was trying to keep up after the transcendental unity of a perception and how it's more it's more uh it's a predecessor to it was more fundamental than it and how sim like what do symbols do what are symbols so you see according to earliest earliest carnappin view which is called the statement view which is the kernel of the logical empiricism with something have something like that imagine one of these super tech cameras where the camera actually
is programmed by some sort of I don't know some sort of shitty job or something like that nevertheless you have a program okay then so when you take pictures of of the world every second or every whatever moment of course the traces of light are registered on the film Now, how do you think that a camera, an advanced camera can put these pictures together so
as it constructs the panoramic picture of the world? Of course it needs not just the traces, registers on the film, but it requires a program, and this program is called language, a generalized language, in the sense that it associates with every pattern a symbol, every symbol with other symbols, and it is capable of, according to some mathematical or logical criteria to stitch such pictures together. So then you see the world as a unified world.
Otherwise, even the world of empiricism, if you were in fact, I would say that if you were in fact living in a human empirical world i would be i would say that you will never see yourself nor the world precisely because the world becomes fleeting so as you it's simply through the associations of such frames according to some logical symbolic designation by made by this advanced camera that we can associate such pictures and then we can make
a panoramic picture of the universe so this is why i would call the difference between a strict empiricism and a rationalist empiricism a la carna so um when you say generalized language no I mean what I'm thinking then and this is kind of like part of your answer to Chaggy's is that it tries to introduce some perhaps, maybe not, but like infinitely generalizable metalinguistic tools
that are able to interface with potentially, you know, incommensurate language, you know, can do things like emphasize on the project of explicitation. Absolutely. is like right now our cameras are capable capable of stitching together i mean think of your iphone or an android phone so you take pictures of different angles of the room and it's somehow for some miraculous reason all mashed up together okay but not so perfectly still imagine that this
is the reason that this has happened is not because that these traces are being registered and it was it could simply be associated with other frame pictures that you have taken where it requires a kind of program, an algorithm. Now you can think of meta-languages, if we call this algorithm language, you think, you can think about Carnapian meta-language as this series of nested languages where they can refine our picture of the world, the panoramic picture of the world. and that's how you can
introduce certain programmatic mechanisms of reflexivity of self-skepticism etc etc yes any more? any more? I have a question I don't know I'm just trying to understand what you are saying here and I cannot help but but think into using metaphor of maybe some layers thinking of hierarchy of different layers because now we have some traces like physical traces then this Russell we have like some kind of layer of association like mechanic robotic association then
you mentioned Kant which needs some kind of unified agent but then you said there is something more on the top like it has something to do with symbols and but now this picture doesn't make much sense to me because it seems like depending which point of view you take like if you take Carnapian or I don't know if you share the same crime point of view then there is no such a thing like this layer of mechanic association it's rather like maybe a product of work of that thing that was on the top like linguistic framework or I don't know if if you could just like and
help me to clear up this mess sure I actually think that you you know when I when we use metaphors of course metaphors are always what you might call to be suboptimal and I think that you pointed out to the suboptimality of my metaphor let's start with this A single camera, old camera, but provided with new programmed algorithms to stitch these pictures frames together, cannot exactly do this.
You need at least a few cameras. cameras what I would call subjective perspectives a streams of experience in a Carnapian sense each one of them has a different traits of an object in the world however the reason they can stitch together a unified picture of an object in the universe is precisely because they are equipped with the same kind or type of language or program
or algorithm or calculus now you see associations empirical associations contra contra Russell don't give us any information about how such associations can be put together because how such associations or frames can be put together is a set not two things one it is essentially belongs to one single perspective one single lens of the
camera but also it requires multiple perspectivality of different cameras imagine a satellite moving around the planet how can we talk about take a picture of a of air of the earth as a non-plat universe well this is not going to happen as long as in some way such satellites taking image of the planet for one satellite does not have a medium
to associate such pictures at a higher order because each picture which only registers one section one sector of the of the picture of the earth and of course it looks like flat so how are we going to glue them together this group gluing is what I would call her carna objectivity this glue requires something more than simple associations empirical associations is requires a medium by which you can in a snare capture the empirical frames that you have registered
in a wider system and of course if we can expand such a system then we might fundamentally see a different picture of the earth I do not know if this yet another metaphor responds to your boundary but please do tell me if it didn't so I can build on it it does I think it I think it's helpful for me too but I just this whole idea of like just kind of going back to stegmuller and And this idea of like intended application of a concept,
it just, it seems sort of you able to reprogram the human brain so that it's able to navigate new local environments. I mean, let's say from a sensing perspective. You won't be able to, Chagis. And the only way that you can do it is by way of invention of new technoscientific instruments. And precisely because of that, as Carnap, so as Cohen mentioned, and the idea that we cannot even imagine the course of the evolution of human sciences
or human visions of the world to which we belong, without prostheses, technological prostheses that allow us to gain more traction upon the world. We are just limited beings. We have only one, literally one of the most parochial visual fields and sensors. But But nevertheless, this is how that... That's what Steve Mueller said about Karnak. ...the prosthesis, instruments, microscope, telescope, so on and so forth, satellites, become fundamentally ingrained within the history of science.
And that's why I say that any person, any scientist who simply dismiss with such instruments, such prosthesis doesn't really understand what science is. You see, essentially what you want to have is both an expanded version of language, the medium of conceptualization, of how to elaborate the associations between such pictures of the world and then you want ever more fine-grained pictures of the world more specific pictures of the world and this cannot happen by virtue of human naked
eye or our tactile auditory system so on so forth we need to have technical instruments science without technical science is just a myth I literally think many many philosophers of science particularly french tradition would actually laugh at this idea but i would be absolutely uh you know willing to defend this idea it's just it's just not going to happen literally if you think that humans can simply achieve even though they have the greatest conceptual edifices the greatest conceptual constructs by which they can associate such frames
but as long as you do not have ever more fine-grained observational uh frameworks which you can somehow tie up to your language then you you will never arrive at a better picture of the world I mean look at Hubble's telescope. Look at hopefully it's going to be constructed soon James Webb Space Telescope. These are prosthesis of ourselves. Technology is a prosthesis of ourselves scientifically speaking. it gives us pictures which we could not register by our simple experiential
structure but I do get the sense though that it seems like Carnap's trying to replace I can this is kind of what I was getting out with my question philosophical investigation with this logical apparatus as a means to modifying the human itself not just yes well the whole point is that once you conjoin this expanding domain of language and logic and this expanding domain of technical scientific prosthesis then the vision of yourself as a human in the world will fundamentally change and thus the self-conception of yourself as a human living in the world
a self-conception is always a seed for self transformation Reza, can I just ask something? I'm not following everything, but Karnap doesn't mention technological instruments. Is that used? No, no, no, absolutely. Karnap doesn't. Karnap doesn't. Right, right. So that's a limitation that you're saying. Yes, yes, yes. I think that... there's this paradigm yeah you kind of actually kind of I would say that he points to the most important thing in the sense that okay we have these registers of light or traces on our film in the camera but the way that we can
put together such association so as we can come up with a picture of the landscape which we call the world requires something more than mere empirical associations a lot of Russell it requires a new linguistic invention and more general language which can elaborate and makes explicit the implicit associations between such traces and frames that have been registered on your film tape or your photo tape. Could you say a little bit more about Carnap's, you were sort of emphasizing
this earlier, the importance of logical reduction for Carnap, because I don't when I hear you talk about that, it seems like Kant's famous for his aesthetics and his ethics, but in the class we took with you previously, we were just focusing on the CPR, and it seems like that there's a logical reduction, a strain of logical reduction in Kant too, and I'm just interested in what Carnap's reason for doing that is, and I'd like to hear more about what what you think about his the logical reduction well you see in the idea of logical reduction for car nap goes through different phases in the early phase of car nap logical reduction is what you might call to be very much in
tandem with Wittgenstein and Russell in the sense that logic has to abide by the the empirical evidences that we obtain from the book, through experience, what he calls, Earl Levin, or elementary experiences. So this is the early version. The second version is what you might call to be off-bound, logical structure of the book, where Carnap thinks, that logical observations by themselves, I mean, sorry, naked observations or empirical observations by themselves do not give us a picture of its structure.
We need to have something more, a logical language, specifically defined. In the third phase Carnap thinks that yes, empirical observations are important but the The most important point is to create more comprehensive, general, logical and linguistic structures whereby we can index the associations between our partial experiential pictures of the
world glue them together according to new principles and thus it reinvents the human with a new world. So you see, the whole course of Karna begins essentially with what you might call to be the history of philosophy since enlightenment. Observing the universe. Thinking how we can glue our partial pictures of the universe together, but then also invent new glues crazy glues or mediums or programs or languages so as we can
stitch together our individual partial experiential pictures of the world in a better way so as we we can fundamentally come up with a new vision of the universe in which we live. but then sorry but then like um it seems like difference like philosophical difference has to be thought seriously in order for...
I mean, it is this crazy glue. I mean, I'm not saying that, you know, Deleuze has... I mean, he's trying at it, but I don't think he's succeeded or anything, but that seems to be the point of philosophical difference and perhaps ontology. I don't know. Yes. You see, Carnap addresses this issue, I would say even more fundamentally than Deleuze and Lyotard in different precisely because what we are talking about is come something like Lyotard's different where you have differences of the human subjects create different pictures of the world but also not only that different
languages, different senses of the world in a logical sense. So this is why that Carnap invents a term called the principle of tolerance. In the sense that how can we retain the pluralism, the diversifying logics of our encounters with the world but also looking at the world as if it was begotten by a unified logic or unified language of experience of course carnapp really doesn't go well too much into this
idea but the commentaries by Andrew Karras, Steve Laudy and Lorenz Ponto shed light as how we can in fact try to you know piece together this kind of what you might call to be rhizomatic view with this kind of a global homogeneous view it's in the sense that as i mentioned to you even when it comes to the choice of language if we say that the choice of language is ultimately responsible for how we see things in the universe then we notice that beneath our ordinary language
there are some fundamental logical principles or processes computational processes from which many logics of the world come forth now to do this we should both understand the diversity and also this what you might call the foundation of logic or language in the sense that we do in fact share whether we want it or not whether by naturalistic causes by evolution or by logical by common
logical evolution we do share vocabularies of logic and language and in that sense we do have common logical processes and this is what you might called to be the Carnapian vision. Really, shall we keep on asking questions, or you want to say something before the end? Please, please. I don't think that I'm in any position to say something anymore. OK, then I have three quick questions.
uh card up is his project about some collective kind of enterprise or also about some individual kind of like can we use kind of uh philosophy to talk about like how individuals are developing language or then could you talk about patterns perhaps because i don't know much my apologies who part patterns pardon it's not who it's what it's hard my pronunciation is bad i will write it oh patterns pattern yes because i'm familiar a little bit with this notion and maybe it
can be connected to the notion of association you see from an empirical perspective let's start with the patterns and then i will talk your car nap and hell with it i'm going to uh write the notes i wrote for you for the next session for the end of carl obsession reading today so you you get an idea of what exactly this car napping project is about but with regard to the pattern you see with regard to the projects of empiricism if empiricism is about the idea that observations or sensations themselves can tell us something
about the universe then in order for us to see ourselves in the universe as unified wholes part of the relationships, then we should be capable of associating at a very rudimentary level between such partial pictures or observations or empirical sensations. So this is what you might call to be patterned by way of association, empirical association. now rationalists i mean the the ultimate battle between rationalists and empiricists is about the idea that empiricists cannot derive such patterns about the world
from these associations from simply experiential or empirical associations like these frames registers on these cells of this tape recorder or film in order for us to derive association so as to glue or stitch together a picture of the world we need to have something more rationalists believe that we need to have something conceptual now of course this conceptual thing can be interpreted as a theory it can be interpreted as logic can be interpreted as
mathematics can be interpreted as uh you know some other uh logical computational mathematical processes but nevertheless the whole emphasis about the concept and something external to the evidence or observation or trace has been registered on your field on your tape the whole point is that of course I take with Russians obviously precisely because I think that associations at the level of the empirical traces on a tape can never
actually give you any insight about the pattern wouldn't be even able to recognize the pattern however here a question a really difficult question arises if we take concepts as essentially a property of human beings namely sapiens then what about other animals obviously a cat sees a pattern i mean i hope that you all have cats because i will be friendly if you don't have cats you have noticed that cats are quite actually
smart in a in a conceptual sense in the sense that they are capable of predicting with utmost accuracy the position of the prey they will come and want food a certain time of the morning they want to be petted a certain time of night so on so forth so there are patterns but i would say these are de facto patterns as a matter of empirical traces we humans not only have as i we are both you we are both animals a lot are we and we are also conceptual agents we not only have de facto empirical patterns which are put together
in our memory and neurological system but also we are capable of by virtue of our conceptual structures namely language and logics and other so on and so forth we are capable of deriving new associations between these basic patterns between these basic associational patterns and that's why we are having something like random calls impulse control we might be hungry but we might also want to finish a treatise or magnum opus in philosophy of science
in such situation we say to have with hunger and impulses and we just do so this association with patterns is not only normative descriptive idea of universe that we can diversify our vision of the universe by virtue of having something more but also gives us normative status axiological status in the sense that we can arrive at new tasks and duties something that is fundamentally missing among sentience they do have it but fundamentally in a rudimentary sense could you maybe liberate a relationship between patterns and concepts
patterns and concepts yes so essentially patterns for an empiricist are simple associations like uh there is there is a term and i would like you to search it on internet it's called a colludic face Let me type this for you. I don't know if it is the exact same as the link, but hopefully you can find it. So Wolfgang Richard's sermon in 19th century, he came up with the idea
that our sensations come in a flux they don't come in discrete packages it's not as if i have first the sensation of red then brown then wood then so on and so forth all of them come at the same time and then there is another collection that comes after it Now, how can I make patterns within such encounter, sensational encounter with the world? Sermon thought about a concept called a collusive phase, which was an extremely important concept
for Russell, at least in the analysis of mine. In the sense that a colludic phase is something like this. So I have the impression of a red dot flying in the air. Then I have the impression of a brown dot. Then I have an impression of a white dot. association within simple sensational or empirical impressions is only possible by way of memory in the sense that i will be able to if i was a simple rudimentary robot or human or sentient i will be
able to associate them by way of such pattern such paradigm what I have remembered back then and now is faded what I remember right now and what I might remember according to my anticipation of what has occurred in the past and the present in the future so this is called a colludic phase I could phase it's the idea that sensations have a numerical association spread in a space and time so first I see like imagine like you see some
objects then you turn your face away and then as you turn your face away you see another object what you saw time T was crisp at time to when you were started to change your orientation of head that became faded now what you have in point three when you are looking at a new object is a faded memory of the previous object and now you see a new object and that object can go through the same scenario if we see the entire as sensational
encounters of ourselves with the world we can see that we can do in fact associate the sensations of how we navigate the world and encounters items with the world in the world within such associations a rudimentary associations i.e non-conceptual and by virtue of that we can associate things that are happening in terms of the past present and the future less remember Sorry, more remembered, less remembered, and more forgotten. Again, more remembered, less remembered, and more forgotten.
So essentially such associations are constituted by our memory. And Russell talks about this quite extensively in Analysis of Mind under the rubric of Five met Agro-Paradems. So these are what you might call to be empirical associations. But empirical associations, I would say that don't exactly are what you might call to be conceptual objective judgments. They are simply statistical associations derived from the structure of our own particular memory.
So the difference between conceptual pattern and pattern by association is that pattern by conceptual judgment tries to elaborate something more to give us something more in addition to such mere statistical probability ridden associations which we can not only us but the dog and cat any any sentience in this universe can in one way or another obtain patterns as a matter of conceptual judgments are objective invariants are not
perspectival you see associations are always perspectival in the sense that it is all about me seeing how things are fading in time and space and then I make such associations between them but a real objective pattern or an objective invariant is a perspectival it's non-perspectival in the sense that i am talking to you i'm talking to theo i'm talking to chadis to joven cepide peter so on and so forth and we all talk about each other what we have seen and then we noticed that there is something that holds up that is preserved
among all of our such assertions about what we have just encountered. So this is a judgment. This is an intersubjective, co-objective judgment. Whereas pattern by association is purely egotistical and perspectival. person in a very rudimentary sense. I feel like this is probably sort of like the prosthetic elements, but then there's also the fact that these are arrived at through the process of explication and other things. This seems to be like where, you know, in later Carnap, how he would situate the axiomatic
is that these various things are sort of like analytical axioms, you know, they're analytic, that then serve as like the basis or foundation for further stitching, further gluing, etc., etc. Yes. Yes, absolutely. Okay. This was, I'm going to call it an absolute dud, but nevertheless, we talked about so many other things other than the course. Howard don't worry, we are going to have make-up sessions. Howard, one thing before we leave today's session, I understand that
you know, when I was in class, when I was young, I was shy to ask my teachers questions because my questions were about something, like the meaning of the word. I literally didn't know what this fucking word even means. So I would say that if I ask this question, I might look like a total moron in front of the class. However, these are actually important questions. However, again, if you really need some kind of friendly rundown in the sense that we do not even talk about such technical terms, but literally everything in terms of metaphor,
intuitive images, so on and so forth, please do contact me. We can always have 40 minutes, one hour of Skype and go over the course. This course is not about something that should give you a view of a new view of the world, but it should gradually put you in the right course. And to get on the right course you need always, we are just people, we always need collaborations and conversation. So anytime, I mean absolutely do not think that you are, I know that you are thoughtful
and considerate and you think that I'm busy but anytime that you feel that actually there is something there is a moment that you are hitting the wall just send me an email we will have a Skype and by the way I noticed that I I'm very sorry I hardly check my email at new center I should be notice that a few of you had already sent me an email but this is my personal email you can always tell me and we can go over these materials and whatever else that you might have in mind
I actually don't feel like this class was a dud. I feel like it actually... I mean, it might not have been exactly what was planned, but I feel like it's... It was absolutely in the opposite direction that I planned. And I hold you responsible for it. This is not my fault. Did you say this is our last class on Carnap? Is this the last class, or we have one more on Carnap? Oh, we have at least one more on Carnap. Carnap is the ultimate.
No, no, don't worry. Actually, I will attack Carnap next session in the sense that I want to, exactly what I want to do next session is that if you are agreeing with this, let's, you know, all of us just go through this, the so-called academic course where nobody's allowed to make a question or make a peep. And then I will start and talk about Carnap's exact project. and then I will show that how his project early project is put into this array by Nelson Goodman
and coin oh I have a quick question you mentioned early in the lecture a reference to quite the most important paper dogmas of empiricism three dogmas of empiricism yes Eduardo I would say that the best I mean you know okay okay I do not want you to to read something that is extremely technical, I just want you to read something that actually
encapsulates the projects of Karna within both the projects of philosophy and in particular philosophy of science. I would say that read the introduction and the first chapter of this book. Let me get the title, my apologies. You can of course get it from Libgen.
Well, please, by the way, I noticed that Peter and Joven, I'm really, really sorry, I mentioned that I'm not really good with email handling, different emails. I noticed today when I actually logged in, I noticed that you had emailed me. But let's do a Skype. And please, I really implore you if you have something that,
I understand this is not a regular content of philosophy course. So we have questions, many confusions, so on and so forth. So let's talk. I mean, don't be considerate. Just send me an email, we'll do a Skype. Yes, introduction in the first chapter. It's to my opinion, in my opinion, it's the best work ever done on CARNA. And Reza, I'm a little behind on the Aufbau reading.
Which chapter did you suggest? I tackled the prefaces in the intro. there's chapter of no no no that was it that was it I mean either you read so simply I wanted to ask you every one of you to read you know the introduction to see get kind of a glimpse of what he's about to start however I don't think any of the chapters actually would be useful in connection with other chapters. Either you are going to read the entire book or you are simply following the course. And I really do recommend Auffalo, it's a majestic work, it's truly fundamentally exciting.