Hello and welcome to the seventh session of the seminar, the name of Carnap Southpaw with Reza Nagaristani. Please Reza, take it away again. Thank you so much. Hello everyone and happy new year. uh so um um our friend enda has uh sent us his presentation um which was on the uh car naps uh between um the role of corner between the project of of Enlightenment, the legacy of Enlightenment, legacy of Romanticism, that essentially rereads Carnap's
philosophy, beginning from early writings to the more mature writings as a certain kind of genealogical critique or genealogical philosophy. And he distinguishes, ultimately, his genealogical, Carnap's genealogical project from that of Nietzsche. I would ask Enda to give us like two minutes of the, basically, of the entire encapsulation of his paper. And then I actually give some feedback.
And then we start. Yeah, sure. I mean, I would qualify that because I didn't really want to set out with the objective of showing that the Aufbau was a genealogy. Rather, I kind of was just bringing this into it as a kind of intellectual exercise. And I think ultimately, my feeling about it is that rather than being a genealogical project as such, or in, I mean, it is to a certain degree, maybe on a very sort of weird understanding of that, but it, you know, I don't think that Carnap is a genealogical philosopher in the same vein as, yeah, like Nietzsche or Foucault or somebody like that. But I think what was really interesting to look at in doing that research was the fact that, yeah,
in the earlier writings of Carnap and also in places in the Aufbau, he references Nietzsche quite explicitly. And I think it's, you know, with respect to his suspicion in the Aufbau, he's referencing Nietzsche's suspicion about the kind of subject predicate, like development within language. And this is kind of like a genealogical sort of suspicion. And I think that this kind of, in a way, motivates the necessity claims that the prevailing logic or natural language tends to have. And basically my thesis from this was in thinking about that influence that Miche has over Karnap
and trying to bring that together with the radical, political aspect that we've been reading in, like, I guess that we've been considering in this class, but also that Kairos puts forward. The idea was that maybe what Karnak is up to is not necessarily a matter of undermining the concepts, but producing constitutional systems or constructional systems in a way that is genealogically tractable, and which also takes its leave from that critical undermining. undermining so that that ground is in a sense cleared in the way that Nietzsche talks about his exercises as a kind of ground clearing and this kind of forms the platform upon which
we can start to think about constitutional systems as a kind of you know like in like a radical political context as something that can yeah like replace what is taken to be necessary So it's kind of like a delegitimization in a sense. Right, right. That's a magnificent point. Yeah. I mean, have you considered that, okay, maybe not enough, but as we move forward, I mean, in the next seminar, the spring-summer seminar, which is the continuation of this one, we will talk about this at Lent. But have you considered that this whole idea of that essentially a project of Carnap converges upon
engineering new concepts. Regardless of the concepts we have, not regardless, not as a neutral project that we can simply come with new engineer new concepts rather this is like this is the project can be encapsulated the project of engineering new concepts that we can engineer new concepts in a spite of what is given to us the kind of concept sets or family of concepts that are given to us, as so long as we understand that the process is precisely in virtue of the concepts
that are given to us. So this is almost, you know, it's obviously a modernist move. And Nietzsche has that too, right? With regard to transvaluation of all values, right? that we can come with values, but these values is not that as if they were created ex nihilo. They are created in a spite of what we had, but also in virtue of what we had. And this is actually why genealogical is interesting in this respect, because in order to avoid the genetic fallacy,
what's going on in genealogical critique is not a debunking or kind of disproof of what it's trying to undermine, but rather a denigration of its kind of valence, its normative valence. And so the kind of this is not to say that therefore the concepts that we have can be undermined, but we can have a kind of suspicion or like we can trace their pedigree in a certain sense. That was kind of a connection I was drawing. Yes, yes. Yes, definitely so. Yes. So my thing here, I just highlighted a few things. These are just like petty complaints and questions. One second.
You know, the point of the connection of Carnap with, or rejection of historicism is not clear really in Carnap. Historicism in what sense? Obviously, you know, anything that this course has shown that he is, in fact, perhaps different than Wittgenstein. He's, in fact, situated within the broad historical problems inherited through Kant. So that historicity, I think that if you are going to turn this into
a um i say you should explain it in what context really because otherwise um you know many people many people actually this is this is the problem i uh saw a friend of mine uh someone asked on twitter uh that you know um basically so uh is there any good uh technological philosophy of technology that is not just you know run-of-the-mill stuff and a friend of mine answered that look the project of analytical philosophy started as purely logical project and didn't and it was completely against the kind of phenomenological or hossele and heideggerian yeah i mean that's
just really doesn't make sense to me. In fact, as we have shown, the epistemological side of this project, as an epistemological logical project, is coming from Poincare, Dingler, basically Hans Weihinger, and Hosserl, none of which you can actually say they are into logicism, the project of logicism. So I think that this, you need, this is, I think this is, one needs to be very careful when trying to triangulate the genesis of analytic philosophy
as opposed to that of continental. Me personally, I don't believe in such distinctions, really, I mean, even genealogically, even from a historical perspective. I absolutely do not believe. Yes, in academic institutionalized, such structures can be entrenched, but from a historical philosophy, no, they have ever been the case. And I don't see why people actually believe in such things. But that's me. But yes, that's what I was going to say, that you need to kind of contextualize this ahistorical. In what sense? The question of methodology, the question of basically the primary ground
of basically of philosophy, of a new philosophy, logic or epistemology or so on and so forth, whatever. Yeah, that needs a little bit of clarification. Then, this is when you are basically bringing Mormon, that passage, evidence for Nietzsche's early influence can be found in the manuscript Fumkeas Zeweld, that Carnap himself considered as a nucleus of afbau right i mean i don't want to say this but let me say this i actually find these kinds of lines of um escarly uh investigation more like pop journalism
they're just like trivial to me look just because i look i read uh basically i don't know um Aristotle. I started actually philosophy with Aristotle, to be honest with you. And it actually make an influence on me. Right. I mean, this is this whole thing. It is just a bad scholarly job. people say that, look, Deleuze actually, you know, early on was really interested in this whole idea of hermetic tradition or occult tradition. And then there are books being written trying to
explain away the entire project of A Thousand Glatoes or Anti-Oedipus by this hermetic underground contradictions like as if no no that's just bad scali book look this doesn't mean anything yeah we can investigate it we can investigate it but we cannot simply say that oh just because then this is actually a significant topic what i think that you are doing here is a good way to handle this look and that of course you have to make this caveat that saying that look just because this is, he had goddamn Nietzsche on his better stand, doesn't mean that Nietzsche actually influenced his philosophy
in any sense. Well, regardless of the fact, we can create a systematic comparative study between Nietzsche's accounts of transvaluation and Carnap's accounts of enlightenment, conceptual enlightenment and then we will see how much the comparison fair and how what we gain from it that will be you know a genuine honest droge I don't like god droge mother of all abomination honest droge project yeah like I say with that one I mean I was more interested to actually get my hand on
on the original kind of text and I couldn't find it, you know, and I can't speak German, so... Actually, it is available. I will find it for you. I have read it, but it's just like, really, like, you know, just like this kind of offhand comments about Nietzsche. I mean, that doesn't really translate into the goddamn influence. Maybe, yeah, maybe not. I mean, I think the fact that he also comes up in the text of the Elfbau maybe lends a little bit more credence to it, but I think... Yes, but the thing is that, again, I mean, this is not how philosophers, philosophers origins or influences should be actually understood. You see,
See, it is one thing to read other philosophers and understand the kind of problems that is at hand, such that we can respond to them properly within our own philosophical framework. work. And it's a different thing. That's this one is basically this is one that we are talking about here. And the other one, which we call actual influence is when an entire system of thought becomes the very trigger for philosophical mobilizations towards something else. Kant,
transcendental idealism versus rational metaphysics of Christian Wolf. That's an influence. And Kant was fundamentally influenced by these sets of problems that haunted him. Yeah, for sure. I mean, like I said, I think mostly that was just kind of hedging so that it didn't look like I was coming completely out of nowhere. But this isn't really like an exit. No, no, no, absolutely. You don't need to apologize. It's look, as I mentioned, the whole the whole actually the whole comparative study is solid. And but it needs it needs to be taken further.
that's that's the that's my my uh point that it is absolutely solid and it's actually something that i find it really interesting something that hasn't been hardly talked about um particularly in this idea of you know that there are two modernist figures two iconoclasts of philosophy and they are using the same overall themes but with different methods and different conclusions of course because to be honest with you this is the whole point that i wanted to discuss that methodology sometimes trumps premises you might have the
the same premises. But in so far as you are using different methodologies, different consequences will be yielded. You reach different consequences, different landscapes of philosophy. And this is something that Karna, distinguishes Karna from many other people who had similar kind of sets premises. Yeah, I think I agree with that a lot. I find that with armed with this reading of Carnap, it makes him a much more interesting and emancipatory figure. And I think that was, you know, even coming into this class, something that I had not, you know, not really being someone
that was familiar with Carnap except via the Frankfurt School kind of takedowns or whatever, and the general sort of level critiques. I think that that's kind of what I'm trying to also establish here is how can we read the constructive aspect of this as partly entailing that critical project, but having certain virtues above and beyond the kind of genealogical kind of undermining projects. That's the kind of longstanding problem is that that suspicion itself can gain a lot of traction and gain a lot of ground, but where does pedigree tracing or kind of Parisia or whatever you want to call it, where does it get you? You just have that grey science that Foucault talks about
without it kind of something to follow up on. And I think this, you know, I think what Karnap's doing can be interpreted in that light as providing something of an answer to that question. Right, right. Maybe this is like a very kind of heretical sort of interpretation, but you know, it's that's kind of what I think I'm finding quite interesting about the whole reading of Karnap that we're doing. Right. I had just a thought, kind of a really half-baked question for you. Before I actually put it together, I forgot it because I had to
concentrate on what you were talking. Okay. Jesus Christ, this sun is just horrendous. my apologies um so any um any question uh for ender any uh discussion that you would like to have at this point uh i just wanted to ask a question of methodology uh which is like more of a broader question Is a constitutional theory or constructional theory that Carnap's doing in this, like a continuation of the Neo-Kantian transcendental method?
Or is it something that's meant to be quite distinct from that method? Because I know, say, if you're talking about genealogy critique, someone like Foucault, in a lot of ways, is continuing that kind of transcendental method. um is it for who me or uh either and you are you are going to answer this so i didn't quite catch all of the question my internet's a bit patchy at the moment so so the question was is a constitutional theory or constructional theory uh that kind of sternum your file, like a continuation of the transcendental method? I can't really say.
It's something that I feel like is a bigger question than what I'm asking and also one that would probably require more knowledge of Karnat than I have. I don't think that the genealogical method is an attempt to do anything. I think, if anything, Nietzschean genealogical method is a critique of transcendental thinking in and of itself, or at least can be interpreted as an attempt to undermine transcendental thinking to some degree. I don't know. Maybe not. I'm not sure about Nietzsche, but I always thought Foucault was somewhat of a transcendentalist.
I might be wrong on that. I'm not really... Well, Foucault is a rationalist. Foucault is a social rationalist, of course. So social rationalist in the sense that he believes in a certain kind of genealogical project, right? In the realm of the socios. But he also is a rationalist, ultimately, because he believes in a certain kind of rational method, right? I would say that this is actually one of the things that Endo needs to talk about. That down the line, of course, that yes, that I would say that Carnap
Maybe not so much in Aufbau, even though it is, but as he moves forward with his project of philosophy, both Carnap and Nietzsche are actually critics of transcendental philosophy, but for completely different reasons. Nietzsche finds what you might call to be he finds the flaw in the metaphysical scope of this program, whereas Carnap finds the
real flaw in its methodological bootstrapping or its methodological systematicity. and as he tries to show throughout his philosophical life this flaw in myelological systematicity in transcendental philosophy does actually translate into a flaw in the entire scope of transcendental philosophy You get a little bit hints of it in Aufbau, but the real critique actually starts, implicit
critique starts from logical syntax or attempt at the unpublished essay attempt at metal logic and but in earnest from logical syntax. Gabriel, with regard to Carnap and basically Nietzsche's possible position, critical positions with regard to transcendental philosophy, anything you might add? I'm unfortunately not at all familiar with Nietzsche. It's something that I've been meaning to catch up on. And all my familiarity, my little familiarity, comes from the works Enda has mentioned,
something like Mormon reading, in the terms of Mormon, the pseudo-Nietzschean and the will to order in the early Kahnap. But with regards to transcendental logic, and the question of James. TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY or transcendental logic? Sorry, transcendental philosophy. Sorry, I was kind of skipping ahead a little bit. Sorry. Yes. I'd say there is, first, I believe we have to agree with Kahnap in the end of the Elf book where he says that the constitution theory agrees among other things with a transcendental idealism in some aspects but of course and precisely but it's not it doesn't seem so
much as a continuation of the transcendent of transcendental philosophy in general and And so far as the work, as I was writing down on the chat, the work of transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic conceived, because even transcendental logic conceived, not exactly in Kantian terms, but in neo Kantian terms, there's something like Kassire and Nato had in mind. uh but the lot the work let us say the task of both of this of the transcendental method i say is done through formal logic and in so far as formal logic is conceived as
conceived as relating to language even even in their alpha where the notion the conception of logic is still very much a Fregean one and hasn't been developed to the extent that it will be later developed in the logical syntax and with the logical pluralism and all of that. Even in the the alphabet there is a I like I think it's appropriate to say a materialization of the transcendental in so far as the transcendental is brought through formal through its being it's being being substituted for by formal logic the
transcendental is brought to the level of concrete language of a a certain sense, a material sphere. It is taken, it's brought down, let us say, from the level of transcendental psychology, whatever transcendental psychology may be, which is of course not exactly something that is very clear, at least in my opinion, in the Neokonten tradition. If it's some platonic idealist, if it's following who's so infant or early for knowledge if it's something like a generic subject uh so sorry i kind of forgot what it was uh so yeah i believe in so insofar as so far as
it's brought down to the level of language it's very it's there is this significant criticism of transcendental philosophy especially when later karnap develops logical plural pluralism because it it means it means that there is no there is no there is no there is no strong necessity and any particular configuration of the transit of the trend of our trend of transcendent of the sphere of transcendental listen of what would be referred as the synthetic priori there is no strong necessity in the sense that it's relativized to language as in for example in the early Heishenbaha already
so in the sense I believe it's a critique as Reza was saying of transcendental philosophy Of course, this doesn't mean that it doesn't agree with several pre-schisms transcendental philosophy makes of classical empiricism, which I believe is the most important inheritance. logical positivism and constitution theory has gains from the Kantian tradition as in the pages of the alphabet we've already read
that knowledge must be of logical forms so that's why only I was that's all I'm going to say I'm sorry for the breaks and for the stuttering. No, no, no. Magnificent. Excellent. Yes. I mean, generally, in agreement with you, the thing is that this is obvious, particularly this whole idea of the infinite ocean, right? Mormon, Stivao, the Ancarus idea of a metaphor of the infinite ocean that comes in Carnap's work. So the idea, what is it actually? Logic cannot be thought or cannot be thought in the first
instant in terms of Kantian intuition. That is one of the most important things. And that's actually one of the flaws of transcendental logic that is built within transcendental philosophy of Kant. And to untether, unyoke logic from intuition, that's a different story. essentially we are trying to rethink the structure of experience then. Not only the structure of logic, its potentialities as an infinite unbound ocean, but also rethinking
the structure of experience. That's one. Second point, I would say that... Now, let's actually become switch our sides from Carnapur Cant. I love Peter Wolff in right think about what can't a new can't could have said it in response to car nap well of course can't actually can put drill massive amount of holes into carlabs
of Baal. The idea that first one of the things I would say is a functionalist standpoint of mind as the organ of a structuration. So in the constitution system, so essentially Kant, New Kant, would say that, okay, Carnap had his upper hand with regard to logic. I didn't even know what goddamn logic is. My idea of logic was goddamn Aristotelian syllogism. I'm not going to touch this topic. It's beyond my pay grade, right? This is what New Kant would say. But I'm actually
going to catch Carnap on issues of the constitution or derivation system, right? How am I going to catch him is that this whole idea of relations between properties, first order properties, already basically has implicit, what you might call to be assumptions within the philosophy of mind. So Carnap and Nelson Goodman both talk about a red dot that's being
registered in a visual field, right? Kant's transcendental aesthetics completely annihilates this kind of thesis by saying that there is no such a thing as an abstract red dot ever. So abstract red dot doesn't mean anything. In fact, it's impo-, it's, it's pure impossibility from the, the purview of the transcendence psychology, the, the conditional possibility of having a mind in a, in a Kantian parlance. It would say that in order for you to have
red mental state of redness attributed to a certain kind of object, you need to have relations with other aspects of such objects, some of which are direct perceptions, some of them are indirect perceptions meaning what are they for example think about um you in order for you to have a red you need to have a cube for you to have a cube you need to have edges for you need to have edges you need to have surfaces you need to have vertices you need to have texture so on so forth
So essentially, then redness, the idea of redness or red dot becomes way too abstract for it to actually be part of a genuine constitution system. precisely because the mental estate with regard to this elementary experience is already in fundamental relation with regard to other mental estates, with regard to other aspects of an object, thing to which red is being applied. Edge, threshold, texture, surface, edge, so on and so forth. And that is part of the transcendental aesthetics.
That any mental state, a particular mental state, not particular as being ascribed to a particular agent, but as if like red, red or this such cannot be abstracted away from other kinds of mental states, precisely because it can only be understood as part of the manifold. As part of the manifold. A manifold that can be ascribed to an object. That's part of transcendental aesthetics, the organization of the intuitives into a manifold, like edge, threshold, so on and so forth. And we get this in actually Husserl perception. Well, of course, Husserl is less Kantian than Kant.
And I'm not going to talk about Osserles that much. But nevertheless, this is something that comes true, that if you are going to deal with this kind of problem in philosophy of mind, what is the elementary experience of a red dot? Can it be even abstracted into the elementary experience of red dot as such? Kant would say no. Okay, I think that we went a little bit too further into these kinds of stuff. Let's have a break. Yes, yes, please. Yeah, you opened the Pandora's box for me.
What about, you know, you said that, you know, the transcendental aesthetic, you know, will conceive of the impossibility of some sort of abstract red dotness. Yes. What about Sellers' metalinguistic, what Brandom calls it, expressivism, he borrows from Carnap that says the redness and that kind of red dotness is just some sort of of an extension of a class of metalinguistic sources or some sort of linguistic types that we... Yes, okay, we can talk about them as linguistic types, but you see, the thing is that with these people, actually, they get a little bit greedy.
They want to get a little bit of subrosa epistemology out of metalinguistic terms, right? If it is like a metalinguistic, it's fine. But you see, when you are actually driving certain kind of epistemological valence out of this, they just not really. It's a little bit of a dodgy move. And they do that. They do that. I think that we should catch them. I think it's a safe move. Sorry, my apologies. It's a safe move. It can be a lot of problems. Yeah, it's a The meta-linguistic one.
Yeah, it's a I wouldn't say that it's a safe move. I would say that it is you know, it's a dodgy safe move, right? It's like dodging a bullet, right? Okay, so Yes, actually, yes, actually, this is this is actually really so. Gabriel. Latest my apologies, as I said, I cannot read this deal with you sign my eyes, bad eyesight, all of this stuff, but look at. Gabriel said something. just now. Yes, so this is actually, this needs to be actually accounted for here.
You know, when we are talking about red dots, red dot actually has a spatial characteristics, but these are primitive, especially in the Kantian sense. They are not of the spatial concept or spatial notions, right? Because otherwise, then what are we doing with the constitution system. Constitution system should, you know, be derivation system par excellence. So we have a space and time, but this space and time are more like stamps, right? In a very rudimentary sense. At this point, with regard to red dots, we absolutely don't have in a Carnap system spatial notions or spatial concepts. That's something really important. So we can't
smuggle spatial notions to the elementary experience of a red dot moving at this point, whether we are Kantian, Carnapian, or so on and so forth. Anyway, let's have a break and come back in five minutes. Thank you.
Is everyone here? Okay, then. So, with regard, so we are going to talk about basically what we were supposed to finish last session, namely Goodman's critique. of Carnap. As I will talk about, I think that Goodman's critique, while bringing some of the problems to the forefront, I would say that there are fundamentally the acceptance
of these criticisms levied by Goodman against Carnap's of Vau, I say that I wouldn't say they are unfounded, but I would say that their popularity as canonical criticism has something to do with the fact that the more formal aspects of Aufbau is hardly being studied by analytic philosophers. Goodman being one of those people who take the job of studying these formal aspects
and come up with this criticism, but that doesn't make Goodman's criticism as strong as it sounds like. This strength, this popularity of Goodman's critique, as I mentioned, has something to do do with people's lack of understanding or lack of reading of the more technical formal aspects of our file. So regardless of this, I'm going to talk a little bit about where
the problem actually starts. So the problem, so remember that the constitution systems, you can, you have a choice of constitution system, right? You can choose among constitution systems. There is already a certain kind of, certain kind, not any sort of pluralism, a certain kind of pluralism going on here. But what's, there is something common among all sorts of constitution systems. and that's the method it's a methodology the method of quasi-analysis that is invariant among all constitution systems so what is the method of quasi-analysis how is it being formulated and why
in being formulated in such and such way, it lead to certain kind of criticisms as exemplified by Nelson Goodman. So So, as I mentioned, regardless of the constitution or their chosen, quasi-analysis is invariant. problem of quasi or the method of quasi-analysis is invariant. Carnap conceives of the basis of any
constitution system as consisting of one or more relations holding over a domain of primitive elements. The basis elements have no primitive qualities. That's really important. They have no primitive qualities. That's the relations, that is the relations are not supplemented by primitive property descriptions. Indeed, the qualities that hold of the basis elements are among the things that must be constitutionally defined. So Cardam needs to devise a general method of constituting properties from relation descriptions, right?
and the thing is that relations don't have quality that's that's actually a really interesting thing here uh the the idea that basically the method of quasi-analysis ultimately in a kind of a very oblique way a very ingenuous way actually i I would say, an oblique way, tries to say that the constitution system should not start from quality. It should start from relations, or relation descriptions
which do not have qualities ascribed to them. So the qualities of the basis elements, McCartan needs to devise a general method of constituting properties from relation descriptions. His solution is a procedure he calls quasi-analysis. The point of quasi-analysis is to allow the construction of properties of individual basis elements from the relations that hold among those elements. So formally, the procedure of quasi-analysis is an extension of the method of abstraction
as used by Whitehead and Russell in the work on the foundations of mathematics. The most famous use of their method of abstraction, henceforth called analysis, is as part of a logicist definition of natural numbers. Here, consider a sentence. The earth has exactly one moon. logicists worried that meaning could legitimately be assigned to such a sentence. Roughly, the idea was to think of such sentence as expressing the claim that the predicate
is moon of the air is satisfied by exactly one object. That is, that the class of objects satisfying the predicate is a one-membered class. This in turn helps the logistic accounts of number claims only in so far as the notion of one-membered class can be explicated without a primitive notion of one. I mean, this requires a little bit of familiarity with set theoretic notions here. You know, we can actually, so we have two sets of A and B.
We don't need to have the notion of one, primitive notion of one. All we need is to define either of these sets, A and B. All we need is the notion of one member class that in that basically lead us to have the notion of bijective function between the members of two sets. So imagine that we have members, not just one. We have multiple members for each set.
So set A has like this amount of, let's say, three members. Set B has three members. We are not, we don't need to talk about sets at this point in terms of the notion of, the primitive notion of three, right? We can talk about it actually in terms of three-membered class sets. Insofar, and of course, we can actually make a relation between set A and set B,
insofar as the member of each set can bijectively, i.e. one-to-one mapping, can be mapped to another member of the other set. So this is where the method of abstraction comes in. The idea is that a primitive relation of equinumerosity, and equinumerosity is exactly what I mentioned right now in terms of set theoretical understanding that, you know, it's kind of a bijective mapping, one-to-one mapping between members of two or more sets. one-to-one, one-to-one mapping.
This is where the method of abstraction comes in. The idea is that a primitive relation of equinumerosity can be brought in to aid the definition of the number of a class. Consider a relation of equinumerosity for classes or sets which holds just in case there is a function that maps each element of one class unto exactly one member of the other. The notion of the one-to-one function can itself be understood in terms of the existence of a relation and the existence and uniqueness of the relata of that relation. Thus, it can be expressed in wholly logical terms.
This will do the trick for the logicist. Equinumerosity is a logical notion that either obtains or fails to obtain between any two classes. So the method of abstraction now allows particular equivalence classes of the relation of equinumerosity to be formed. example we can define the class zero as a class of all classes equinumerous with empty set the empty sentence is itself can be defined is definable as the class of all things not identical with themselves that is the extension of the predicate not identical with itself one can
then be defined as the class of all classes of equinumerous with zero, since zero turns out to be simply the class containing only the empty set. The meaning of that sentence that I mentioned earlier on is then given by the following sentence, you know, that sentence, the earth has exactly one moon or the earth has one moon can be can be given by such a sentence the extension of is a moon of the earth is an element of one the crucial notion for carnapp if not for the particular purposes of the logistics in this case is that we have a property
of an object, in this case a class, defined from a relation over such objects. In this case, the relation of equinumerosity between classes. The extension of this to the empirical realm is clear. To take the particular example of Carnap's elementary experiences or ERLABs, we want, for example, to be able to claim elementary experiences, ERLAB subscript 22 has a red dot in a particular point of the visual field. The idea is to try to construct from the basic relation among the elementary experiences, the classes of the heirlooms that have a red spot on that point of the visual field.
The meaning of this sentence is then that heirloom 22 is an element of the class of such heirlooms, elementary experiences. Carnap has no other way to make sense of any property ascription to the heirloom since they are understood by the primitive and thus without property somehow independent of constitution project itself. Now Carnap calls such constructed properties quasi-properties and the process by which they are constituted quasi-analysis. So, but this was a kind of introduction as quasi-analysis. But what is the import of quasi-analysis
in the projects of of BAUF? For the first time, Carnap used the term quasi-analysis in an unpublished manuscript of 1923. It had the programmatic title of quasi-analysis, a method to order non-homogeneous sets by means of the theory of relations. So the version of quasi-analysis elaborated in this paper contains formal refinements that
do not appear in the Aufbau version. how in this paper, this unpublished essay, uh, quasi-analysis is being defined by Carnap. Suppose there is given a set of elements and for each element the specification to which it is similar, we aim at a description of the sets which only uses this information but ascribes to these elements quasi-components or quasi-properties in such a way that it is possible to deal with each element separately using only the quasi-properties without reference to other elements.
So as this definition makes it clear, the method of quasi-analysis does not depend on consideration of gestalt theory or elementary experiences. It is a purely formal method at the bottom. The description of quasi-properties is not arbitrary, but has to take into account the underlying similarity structure of the domain of objects that undergo a quasi-analysis. analysis, right? Like elementary perceptions, percepts of red dots and stuff. In quasi-analysis, Carter proposed
the following four requirements for quasi-properties of the elements of non-homogeneous set that is to say a set whose elements are not all similar to each other now let me actually share this screen with you um I apologize, this sounds really annoying.
While I'm trying to share the screen, any questions, anything? Sorry, I couldn't hear. Yeah, I was thinking about the fact, you know, the term that Karnap uses description. So it's just, you know, purely linguistic, lexicological matter maybe, but I think it could be problematic in many ways. You know, I was reading a few days ago, I was reading a few chapters from Rorty's book, you know, Irony, Contingency and Solidarity, and he was using
the term re-description, re-description, re-description many times. Description, description you mean? Description, yeah. And he was using re-description as the idea that, you know, we should adopt new vocabularies, new frameworks, new conceptual schemes to, that's the hallmark of philosophical progress. So I was thinking the idea of description that Carnap uses came to my mind. I thought that maybe it's not the right term here that Carnap uses, you know, because he's not describing anything, you know, it's not an is in the classical philosophical distance. It's an odd distinction, for example. It's not an is. He's not describing the well as it is, for example. Yeah, but describing in a very elementary sense. Yes, I think there's an English translation. I don't know exactly the German. Yes, right, right, right.
Exactly. That was what I was thinking. I don't know German yet, so I was thinking. Yeah, no, I don't think I don't. Right. Because descriptions, yes. That's why you can't say, you know, Karnath maybe is a representationalist because of descriptions, maybe. But maybe he does not mean description at all. Right. Yes. The use of description in Karnath in the Alfa Ball, I believe, of course, again, like Heza, I don't know the term that it's used in English, but in the original German. but at least the english translation it appears to me that the use of description in this translation follows follows it's the same as the as it when it's used to in the context of russell's theory of definite descriptions it's not it's it's it has more to
do i believe with simply it is a i believe it's a more technical use of the term of the term it's not not meant to it is not meant in the sense of representation but in of to describe if something in the sense of capturing some resemblance but but simply in the in the sense of isolating an uh a set theoretic as a set theoretical element element Yes, that's a good point. Yes, that's a good point. Yes, yes, yes. One second. For some reason, my apologies to cut you off. For some reason, I don't have electricity to my computer. It's just solid. It's not charging.
Okay, yes. Okay, now we have it. But this song, my apologies, I shouldn't be in this room. It's okay. So let M be a non-homogeneous set. Can you see, by the way, the share the screen. Let m be a non-homogeneous set, a set q whose elements are called quasi-properties or quasi-components of the elements of m provides a quasi-analysis of m if and only if the following requirements are satisfied by for all elements of m c1
if two elements of m are similar they share at least one quasi property q member of a small q member of uh cap set capital set q condition two if two elements of m are not similar, they do not share any quasi-property Q, small Q being member of capital Q. Condition 3. If two elements, A and B of M, are similar to exactly the same elements, they have the same quasi-properties. Condition 4. There is no proper subset Q prime of Q such that elements of Q prime
satisfy condition one, condition two, and condition three for elements of N. No. My apologies. Okay. if you guys be so generous to give me two minutes to rectify this sun in my eyes problem my apologies
Hmm. Can you see me? instead of the share screen yeah? Yes. Okay, thank you so much. So, so, as Karnab observed in this unpublished paper, you know, quasi-analysis and method, these axioms are consistent and independent of each other. In our bio C3, namely if two elements Since A and B of M are similar to exactly the same element, they have the same quasi-properties. And C4, there is no property subset of Q prime of Q such that the elements of Q prime satisfy C1, C2, C3 for all elements of M are dropped.
and only C1 and C2. If two elements, namely if two elements of M are similar, they share at least one quasi-property Q member of Q, C2, if two elements of M are not similar, they do not share any quasi-property Q member of set Q, are considered to be characteristic for the quasi-analysis of the first kind. They may be considered as almost analytic requirements for a reasonable relation between similarity and common properties. Okay, now let's concentrate on the lesser known requirements C3 and C4, as I mentioned
what they are. The condition C4 shows that the construction of a quasi-analysis for a non-homogeneous set M obeys a kind of Ocom's razor, according to which superfluous quasi-properties should not be admitted. More precisely, this can be spelled out as follows. Assume that we have found for m a set of q asterisks of quasi properties for m which satisfies c1 c3 condition c4 tells us that in order to obtain an honest quasi analysis we have to find a minimal subset
Q being a subset of Q asterisk, which still satisfies C1, C3. In other words, in order to satisfy C4, we have to replace Q asterisk by a subset Q, Q as capital Q, set of Q, that still satisfies C1, C3, but does not contain any unnecessary element. To use Nelson Goodman's terminology, C4, which was there is no proper subset of Q prime of Q, such as the elements of Q prime satisfies C1, C2, C3
for all elements of M, is used to exclude unfavorable circumstances in which one quasi-property always appears accompanied by another one. Thereby, good man's so-called difficulty of constant companionship or imperfect community can be avoided. The formally most interesting condition is C3. If two elements of A and B of M are similar to exactly the same elements, they have the same quasi-properties.
Intuitively speaking, it requires that a property distribution should not make a difference where relational similarity does not. I.e., if two elements have the same similarity neighborhood, they should have the same quasi-properties. As it turns out, C3 has a lot of interesting variants, some of which we are going to talk about later on. Now.
One of the things is that with regard to this idea of quasi-analysis, everyone, all majority of criticism have been levied in the account of quasi-analysis as exclusively depicted and portrayed in our bow, right? And majority of such accounts end up to be extremely simplified version of quasi-analysis based on the axioms C1 and C2, as I mentioned. But almost hardly any critic has dealt with axioms C3 and C4 to say nothing about the
tasks formulating new interesting axioms. Even though axiom C3 is natural and intuitively appealing, none of Carnap's critics ever came close to something like it. One aim of what I am going to talk about is to fill this lacuna by introducing some new axioms of type C3, which help distinguish between good and not so good quasi-analytical representations. Conceptually, the quasi-analytical method of the constitution of properties or quasi-properties can be understood as a combination of two fundamental ideas. One, the fundamental thesis
of extensional logic, according to which properties of individuals may be identified with the classes of individuals that possess those properties to the bundle theory of individuals, according to which individuals are or are represented by bundles of properties. Now these ideas determine the general formal of a quasi-analytical representation. Think about this. Denote the set of non-empty subset of s by p of s p opening parenthesis s closing parenthesis according to one a property identified with an element one meaning that the fundamental thesis of extension logic according
to which properties of individuals may be identified with the classes of individuals that possess those properties. Now denote the set of non-empty set subsets, subsets of s by p of s. According to one, a property is identified with an element of p of s consisting of all elements of s that have this property. According to two, namely the bundle theory of individuals, according to which individuals are bundles of properties. An individual X of S can be identified with some set of subsets of Q of S, namely those that extensionally represent the property of X.
Then the quasi-analytical approach can be characterized as the study of the maps of the following kind, right? This is the map. ! Very apologies. Has a, could you, after the class, could you share this text of yours on quasi-analysis
on the Google Classroom? Sure, sure. Okay, how about this? Next session, the thing is that it's just basically a bunch of really scattered notes here and there. Some plagiarized, some not. Put together, all together. So formulas are not written well and stuff. So how about next week or the week after that, I will share it with everyone. Yes. This is what I usually I wanted to actually share this thing before the class, but then I thought that, okay, let me actually think about some of this stuff a little bit more carefully, add a little bit of extra comments for the sake of streamlining, then I will do that.
my apologies um so this is this is the map you know r s as a premise and the consequence uh basically yields uh p of p of s being the case and r of x being equal to opening bracket q and x being member of q and q being a member of p capital s right now
Here Q is a property of X being member of S, interpreted extensionally as a set of individuals having that property. According to the bundle theory approach, which was number two if you remember, x may be represented by r of x, r open parenthesis, x close parenthesis. A representation of r of type 2.2 is called a set theoretical quasi-analysis. Since the quasi-properties are sets, often it is
expedient to consider an apparently larger class of mappings generalizing here with regard to the map that I just showed you, right, with regard to the Bondale theory, R.S. implying P of P of S, R of X, so on and so forth. So it is expedient to consider an apparently larger class of mapping generalization. So the kind of mapping that I showed you, we are going to, we can afford to generalize it. By replacing P of S by some set Q,
in the sense that I have been talking about, whose elements are to be called quasi-properties. Then a generalized quasi-analysis, quasi-analytical approach can be characterized as the study of maps of the following kind. What is this following kind? R, a small r, colon such that S, maps onto P of Q, P open parenthesis, capital Q, set of Q, close parenthesis. Now, this is the generalization
from which I think that we can talk about quasi-analysis in a far more robust way, avoiding the pitfalls uh usually attributed to quasi-analysis in off-bowl by way of c1 and c2 so c1 and c2 are usually um the kind of axiomal conditions which are uh used in order to criticize a kind of quasi-analysis in Afbaho. But we showed that we can actually do an alternative version of quasi-analysis
that is already in place in Afbaho by way of C3 and C4, create a map of quasi-analysis and then generalize this map such that it can contain more varieties. Now, this is something that I would like to talk about either a little bit more about this next session or in the next seminar. are. That what is really the consequence of this generalization of quasi-analysis in in Aufbau and how in a specific ways it can evade the sort of criticism that is being
levied against the quasi-analysis method as portrayed in of Powell. Now before that, let me get back a little bit to C1 and C2, the critique that has been put forward by the likes of Goodman and the method of quasi-analysis. One second, my apologies.
There's a quote early on, Reza, where Karnap says, quasi-analysis is a synthesis which wears the linguistic garb of an analysis and i'm not sure if this is 100 to do with what you're talking about but i was just wondering what he meant uh exactly exactly by that because it's in seems quite important to what you're saying uh in that specific part it's on page 121 of what i'm reading uh yes it's just let me um let me just find it one second what was it page number it's 121 it's in italics
sorry one second so many tabs windows and stuff open here I can't even um oh okay okay it's uh 74 i think yes section 74 yeah yeah yeah so you see um So it means that, you know, basically it's just like simple as that, you know, properties
that the basis elements are eventually can be said to have are not analyzed from complex basis elements, but are a logical construction from these elements, classes of elements, which are, you know, derived from basic relations given at the starting point of that system. So analysis, quasi-analysis are formally identical procedures for CARNAP.
This simply means that for Karnab, quasi-analysis, so okay, how about this? While analysis about inferring constituents which are at first unknown from other data, right? On the other hand, is not a process by which one infers properties of complex... So basically,
you can think about this. Analysis starts with a process by which one infers properties of complex objects from relations among them. That's like pure analysis, right? Now, quasi-analysis, on the other hand, is a process of constituting quasi-constituent or quasi-qualities or indivisible unities, indivisible unities. That's the whole idea of synthesis, indivisible unities. So quasi-analysis is essentially synthesis in the linguistic garb of an analysis, in the sense that
that we are not going with analysis par excellence in the sense of inferring constituents, which are at first unknown from other data, from a relation description, for example, you know, as Carnap says it. But the idea that we can constitute or construct quasi-constituents or quasi-qualities from relation descriptions holding over property-less points or indivisible unities. That's basically what he means. And by linguistic garb, he simply means that
linguistic and illogical sense, linguistics. So essentially it is not analysis in a pure sense, but analysis in the sense that working through this linguistic framework, logical framework, already exposes us to a certain kind of of indivisible unities, you know, or property less points. And that's what he calls synthesis in the linguistic garb of an analysis. I know that other people, I remember that I have come
upon this sentence in different places and different people have different interpretations, But for me, I think that he's simply trying to talk about the method of quasi-analysis as emphasizing on why is it called quasi, on the quasi side, rather than analysis. And the quasi here is really that the basically the relation descriptions holding over indivisible unities within a link logical linguistic framework
already as as any sort of way that we can can create a semblance of a true analysis, because that's all we have really. But is there anyone who can come up with a different interpretation of this synthesis and linguistic garb of analysis? Well, I think my explanation would be, I believe, perhaps more simplistic, so I don't know if it's
as satisfying but well first it is as as you've already pointed out the ellipses are not complex objects they are they are made up made up of several elements and something like as something like the tradition the traditional picture of of experience as in this in a tradition of sense data for example you don't have prior to prior and logically independent of any of the set of this of any of the ellipse
or the set of ellipse any any property like the color red or having having a certain a certain point so on the contrary these some the these no this notion instead of building up being building up a particular momentary experiences experience out of out of the several prior several prior notions or what would be traditional analysis arriving at these at this disel elements from a the word in English escapes me right now but of this
there are a couple of Brazilians here. Any translations for this? So something like... Sorry? Clarify maybe? Finding smaller parts within something. Finding smaller parts within something. you do not you do not so you do not go from complex from from a complex starting point to a individual individual objective objective but on the contrary you out of out of individual objective out of individual object objects based based objects through the relations
you define thus creating an object which is in a certain way more logically complex, which are logically more complex in the sense that the object form, to use the term that the kind of to use this in the alphabet, at least in the translation, in that any object in the constitution system is defined in terms of the basic objects. So in the sense it is a synthesis of these objects
because they are being built up, But it has the verbal garb of an analysis in the sense that theoretically, the objects that we reach after the Constitution, after defining it, would intuitively be prior, let I'll say, in the sense that they are contained. And even if formally in the system, they aren't defined as being parts of the elementary experiences, they are in a sense.
I'm afraid I'm repeating myself. So it's fine. No, no, no. This is actually quite. No, no, no. Really, thank you so much, Gabriel. This is fantastic. This is something. So OK. So isn't it the whole point that essentially quasi-analysis, There is a formal identity, what you might call, between analysis and quasi-analysis. But the thing is that analysis has an epistemological characteristic, proper analysis, right? So in proper analysis, as Carnap himself says it, we are concerned not with property, less points, or indivisible unities, but rather with objects that have various constituents or characteristics, right?
But then, so he, precisely because of going to relations, to the domain framework of relations, and hence quasi-analysis, these characteristics basically are being fabricated so to speak by in fact you know,
a-qualitative relations. Because this is the whole point, that quasi-analysis is not really an epistemological one. It doesn't lack the epistemological side of proper analysis. But it tries to fabricated try to synthesize it out of property less points a qualitative relation and these indivisible unities Gabriel? Or anyone?
Someone made a comment on the chat that seems quite specific. I can read to the class if you... Yes, that would be magnificent. So it's from Bob or B.O.B. I don't know. Maybe perhaps the rapper is here. No, I don't like this. Analyzability is part of the problem here. For analysis, as a scientific procedure, there is a limit, which beyond that, it must become quasi-analysis.
For example, from out of psychological ellipse, there is no way to really analyze the relation of similarity. But quasi-analysis... Based on using... using based on using the notion of class becomes a linguistic constructive basic elements that you can view from objects that you could that you couldn't by using career analysis that is the linguistic guard well you won't quasi the thing is the the basic relation of similarity of resemblance of similarity cannot isn't isn't constructed from quasi-analysis it is taken as a primitive and then in the in the last in the last chapter it's try try to bootstrap it but fails but uh so yeah there is a there is an assessment which should the which notion of notion
of similarity or resemble similarity uh it is it's it's not quite it's not reached you don't you don't reach it by quasi-analysis you you use it to quasi-analyze other stuff which is as kind of says in the alpha well the the fundamental the most fundamental the most fundamental uh notion in the constitution system is the basic relation not the basic object so the fundamental the fundamental of the constitution system is the basic relation of resemblance of similarity which from from which it is constructed but outside of outside of that i'd say i'd say what i'd agree with bob it is it is a it is the main point is analyzability
Yeah, I would, no, I wouldn't say unanalyzability. I don't think that unanalyzability is really basically Carnap's concern. It doesn't want to actually go with analysis for him to solve, to basically resolve the problem of unanalyzability here. I'd say that my interpretation here is that you know this idea of synthesis in the linguistic garb of an analysis is simply about what i mentioned earlier that the properties that the basis elements are eventually said to have
are not in fact analyzed from complex basis elements but are logical constructions from these elements, classes of the elements derived from basic relations given at the start of system. So synthesis here, as I mentioned, I think is refers to logical construction, which is the very point of quasi-analysis, as opposed to analysis as the epistemological
way of basically analyzing to basically qualitative points or properties with characteristics. So essentially, the fact that quasi-analysis begins with a qualitative points and properties means that it can only do the same thing that analysis does by way of a logical construction,
Because what it doesn't have is that it doesn't instantly assume that we can do analyze basically these kinds of second order properties to first order properties or relations which are already suffused or imbued with characteristics or qualities, which makes this idea of quasi-analysis more on the side of the logical dimension of of Pao rather than its epistemological one, because analysis, proper analysis
in true sense is on the epistemological side, whereas quasi-analysis is logical construction, par excellence. How about this? We are going to have next presentation on this very topic, on the quasi-analysis, synthesis in a linguistic thingy. And whoever actually tries to tackle this problem
would be great. And we will hear from that person next session. I think that's a good one. That's a good problem. Anyone, any volunteer here? Why are you looking at me?
I asked any volunteer here. If there is no volunteer, then there would be a victim. It's either volunteer or victim. the brave carnappian to undertake that so oliver i would really prefer to um to write instead of Okay. If that's okay.
Sure, sure. Absolutely. Yes. Raphael? I'm not going to answer it, but repeat the question. So what are you... So essentially, this idea of synthesis, what was the exact code? Synthesis in the linguistic garb of an analysis, right? So what is exactly synthesis in the linguistic garb here with regard to the difference between analysis proper and quasi-analysis? Well, I'm not sure I know how to answer that, but one thing I am thinking through this discussion, two things.
one this would be useful stuff to have a hard copy of in some in some form of your your list of what you put on screen and and you know your other your other axioms but with respect to with respect to extensionality I mean it seems to me like what something extension logic you mean or extension semantics. Right. The one thing that Carnap is trying to do is give some sort of account of how we can get certain kinds of classifications of things
that match our intentional with an S, right? Like red properties, real properties, right, to get some categories that match without ever invoking any, you know, for lack of a better word, phenomenal properties, like saying, oh, those things are red, right? Instead saying, oh, you know, here are sets and these things stand in relation to these things in these ways and uh that gives us our classifications that turn out to be co-extensional right with some of the categories that we might have thought that we you know we needed anyway and i i wonder how much of this i mean is maybe this is just obvious is is this one way of trying
to get around like the most kind of obvious the first objection to some kind of phenomenalism or the myth of the given where, oh, there's, you know, these things have qualities, right? The elementary experiences have qualities, your red dot or whatever. Carnot's method of analysis is a way to try to kind of avoid what would later be called the myth of the given in that sense, right? Yeah, obviously, yes. yeah so no i mean i'm not i don't think i'm saying anything anything deep i'm just kind of checking uh definitely yeah so there's there's kind of so much um but of course for for for this
is the the thing however with uh basically um corner so that that makes it a little bit more radical or probably i don't know more radical far more radical than sellers so for sellers he has a is a kantian hang-up right on the epistemological project and you know which shows throughout his lectures on camps and or pre-kantian themes right but what for karnath yes he has that kind of concern too that you know relations should be a qualitative right shouldn't have quality and so on so forth but the more important thing is that this is this concern of carna is actually
the side effect of a more primary concern of his which is the idea of constituting science actually constituting scientific statements. And so he wants to show that there is the constitution of or the derivation system for arriving at a scientific statement cannot be entirely thought in terms of epistemological concerns or epistemic givens.
But it should actually, we should bring the entire project and basically base it on the logical reconstruction. And that logical reconstruction for him is uh the antidote antidote to the given in in in various forms yeah of course of course of course there are obviously you know we know that the method of the given always leers its head from where you expected the least. There are different ways of falling into the trap of the myth.
So the only other two things that I would say, kind of one on each side, is that is it first it seems in some ways that that and I don't know the entire Goodman but the sections that that we read and skimmed and his critique it seems like what Goodman is is good at is telling you oh here's why the exact account that Carnap gave doesn't quite work here's counter examples it's a very analytic I I think I can say from experience it's a very analytic dude kind of thing to do right yes but i understand whether i don't really see whether goodman does much to say oh and the project is impossible uh or the motivations of the project no it doesn't no no
it doesn't it doesn't look i mean the entire point of the structure of appearance is in line with Carnarv's. He cannot challenge, radically challenge the project of Aufbau because otherwise it would undermine his own project. That's one. He can only challenge the methodology. But then that's the whole point. What I was trying to say, that the criticism that he levies against Alfao's methods of quasi-analysis are in, mostly are in terms of C1 and C2 axioms. But we can actually do a better job by generalizing C3 and C4 axioms of the quasi-analysis method
to create a generalized map where basically Goodman's criticism might, might, might be shown to be a kind of quabble over extremely petty particularities. Yeah, I mean, I think there are particularities that matter to Carnap too, and that otherwise he wouldn't have tried to provide detailed accounts, but yes, they only do. But the thing is that precisely because the nature of these particularities obviously are subsumed within a very generalized
method. You see, this is the whole point. You see, I'm using a method, and this method can backfire in particular cases, right? This doesn't mean that the method is faulty. It means that if you sufficiently generalize or sufficiently calibrate the method, such flaws might go away. And that's basically majority of the new readings of Carnaps of Pao in defense of Pao against Goodman try to say that, look, the method of quasi-analysis is a generalized method.
and you can actually it has sufficient malleability to be rescued to be applied particularly to Goodman's example and still works and Goodman simply tries to um get an over particularized version of this methodology which is not really a good idea uh this is this is a thing uh as i mentioned earlier on in the session methodology is a really an important factor in any sort of philosophy But there are two pathologies that come with it or come side by side with it.
One, people who think that they can simply have certain kinds of a scope or philosophical, basically, commitments without resolving the methodological questions at hand. Absolutely not. We are seeing this incarnate. Second, kind of like certain kind of analytic philosophers who think that basically showing flaws, specific flaws in the system of methods
specific sets of methods will reveal the weakness of a certain kind of philosophical framework. No. The thing is that the system of method is not like this. System of method is very much like Peirce's idea. Not like a deductive chain, but like a cable. where basically the cable is being woven by these slender, you know, wires, copper, iron, gold, so on and so forth, so slender. So within the system of metal, which is the cable itself, the failure of one
wiring doesn't lead to short-circuiting of the whole system. It's just like when they say that, look, an argument is as great as its weakest chain. That's just like the shittiest way of thinking about philosophy. It's like a classical way. We can actually find a methodological alternative of this bad metaphor too. People who say that, you know, an antique philosopher who say that, you know, if you have found a hole within the system of methodology, then just this whole project failed. No. Method, system of methodology is very different from the scope and from, you know, these kinds of ontological metaphysical commitments. And that's what Carnapst tries to do here.
Carnapst tries to reinvent a new philosophy by putting the emphasis on the method. And here, the method of reconstruction or order of derivation, method of derivation, quasi-analysis. And that's the true revolution. you can't simply say that i have found this flaw in the order in this system of methods and hence the whole project is a failure no what you have to do first is to show that is the system of method is reducible to the specific case that you made against it
Goodman doesn't do that. And that's his flaw. Goodman already assumes that the entire method of quasi analysis is reducible to the very example particularization of method that he's putting forward. Meaning that he just doesn't understand what is at stake with regard to the revolution of logical method that Connor is putting forward. Risa, Gabriel agreed to craft the presentation
for the next session. Gabriel? Yeah, we were talking on the chat. Didn't Gabriel actually presented one thing already? No. In fact, I'm not even, I'm just auditing. So I thought of what I wouldn't be presenting. For some reason, I always thought that you had presented something. No, I just talked too much. Sorry. I didn't want to be rude to say that. That would be lovely. Thank you so much, Gabriel. So any questions?
Any? Next session. Okay, how about this? Look, we didn't manage to get into the specifics of the Goodman criticism. One of the best papers that I have in mind to read about this, I mean, obviously, the one that Casio presented last session was magnificent, but something more nitty gritty, right? Read this. Anyone who is going to, I can send it to everyone, but if you want to send it. It's called New Life for Carnaps of Bao by
LightGap. Is it? My dear German friend L-E-I-T G-E-B Is it LightGap? I suppose so. Yeah. So it's a really good one. But of course it again comes back to this whole idea of uh good manian critique as a bible right but nevertheless this is really good it's actually uh clearly uh uh details good man's critique um i know that um cassio talked about it and you have probably already read about it um
But there are many details that are actually not being usually brought up in such discussions. This is one of those essays that is quite generous and quite vigilant about those details, which are usually missing in the Goodman's critique of Appao. Yes, thank you so much. Yes, yes, thank you. Just one more thing. I think that most of the people will start turning their essays or videos or those things now. I will create a folder and send it on that email thread.
Sure. And look, if you are not sending me essays, one week from after the class, then maybe you don't want to be my friend on Twitter. As I mentioned, people who have presented already, you don't need to write essays. If you want it, you want to do it, do it. But that's not a requirement. essentially, as I mentioned, you don't even need to write an essay. You can easily, if you don't want to, you can just simply record yourself seven to ten minutes talking about a specific problem.
And then, as I mentioned, when you are sending it to me, tell me. So I have to make a grade first. I will do the grading. Then comes the feedback. If you want my feedback, sometimes I'm not really good at feedback, giving feedback. I'm not good at giving feedback, meaning that I don't give good feedback. If you actually are fine with that, say that I want your feedback, but have this in mind, that it might not be a good feedback. But I actually love this class.
I mean, we had really good presentations so far, really fantastic discussions. Excellent, excellent. looking forward to the next semester for any of you who are going to take it. So, my dear friend, I think it's time for you to go so I can actually have a little bit of time for myself. But on a serious note, did you read... Oh, my apologies. Did you read Friedman's essay on Carnap that I mentioned last session?
It was... Was it New Life for Carnap? No, sorry, Carnap's Earth Reconsidered? Was that the one? Yes, that's the one. That's the one. So if someone, Rafael is on Sci-Hub, if someone can send it to everyone, that would be magnificent. If not, I can send it to everyone. Okay. I can send it on the email. I'll have to send things to everybody. Thank you so much, Rafael. Thank you. Thank you very much. Okay. uh also next class uh i think it would be better if we stayed over 30 minutes as you discussed i'm
gonna thank you so we start we start 11 uh we will have like extra 20 minutes maximum 30 minutes thanks to rafael to accept to go through this torture for us like the true christ um So we will have a little bit of more time next session to kind of wrap up what we have been discussing. Cool. Thank you so much, everyone. Thank you all. Thank you. Love you and wish you a great year. Love you. Ciao. See you. See you.