Hello and welcome to the fourth session of Restructuring Enlightenment from Carnap's Aufbau to Conceptual Re-engineering. I'll hand the mic over to Reza. Thanks everyone. Hello everyone. Okay, so nothing special is going on this session. We're just continuing with the discussion that we had in the previous one. Most probably, you're going to to work. So we talked a little bit about, you know, the idea that the logical syntax of language kind of begins the task of talking about language, a task that was deemed to
be philosophically impossible, at least for Wittgenstein's or Wittgensteinian projects. And then we also talked a little bit about the idea of a structure, logical structure. Structure that is only structured in late Karna, I mean after Aufbau, can only be logical. that's part of, I mentioned that part of this post-epistemological deflationism. That's the phenomenon that used to be of an import for the project of BAU is not put aside.
We only have logical which basically lead to the project of the syntax. Now, today I'm going to talk about a little bit more about another aspect of logical syntax of language, and that's physicalistic languages, something that we have also seen in Offbow. But then his account of physicalistic language changes constantly from off-bow to the transitional essays that he writes and then to logical syntax and from logical syntax to his works on semantics.
So this tale, however, requires us to diverge to two thinkers mostly. Otto Neurath, one of his friends, a left wing, Vienna circle, left logical empiricist, and Bertrand Russell, particularly the knowledge of external world. I will start with Neurath, then I will talk a little bit about Russell. I hope that we will have enough time to wrap up this. But nevertheless, we are a little bit behind. So I will try my best. We keep the
questions to the minimum, to the important ones. And I think that will be it. So looking forward to the presentations. So we actually just have one presentation today because Vincent is unwell so he can't make this. Oh yes, yes, yes. I just saw sorry to hear that. Yes, I think yeah it's just Felipe today. So yeah Felipe I think you can go ahead. Hey there, good morning to most of you. Okay, can you hear me well? I have a lot of construction work right 10 minutes away so I'm sorry for any noise. Don't worry. Okay. The chapter we read by Karo's titled Liberation describes the outcome of Kurt Gödel's impact on Carnap's project of the unity of science.
Such impact perversely implied understanding liberation through creative constraints in order to emancipate knowledge from metaphysical groundedness. This would also imply having to give up any foundationalist stance, either Wittgenstein's pseudo-modesty or even Hilbert's formalist half-freedoms. Inspired by Gödel's warning that an axiomatic approach foreclosed any chance of embedding a metadiscourse in the domain of the empirical, Carnap initiated the search for a metologic. Here, there would be room for Hilbert's incipient structuralism, which would test for consistency, but would also allow for a quote-unquote general theory of linguistic forms.
By this orthogonal move, Garnap suspends meaning from the formalization of language. A bit like standing on one's own toes in flatland. Thus, gaining a view where contour or form is legible, but content remains flat, unabstractable. This is the quote-unquote meaningless Marx approach. So nothing new yet, but we can see that there are rules and systematicity lurking around the corner, eager to unify and clarify knowledge. We can forgive his initial enthusiasm and brutalist conjectures that arithmetic could simply be read off from syntax for free.
Karus does well in remarking slash underlining that Carnap's ambition came from the noble motivation of removing philosophy from the object language and clearing its soundless ocean waters only at the meta language level. which is like drawing a mustache on Wittgenstein portrait in the Vienna circles meeting room, as well as Frege Russell's semantics Latin logicism. We can see how liberation starts by framing empirical truths strictly in the empirical science realm. Strictly formal metalanguage would be the lighthouse beacon for elucidations
with a much more fine-grained capacity than the Aufbau's auto-psychological basis. My parenthesis. It is very important to note, as a critique of metaphysics, this approach is the first disavowal of picturing as constitutive of meaning, a move which, to my mind, allows, for example, Nelson Goodman to explore his ways of world-making, quite well illustrated, in the light shapes experiment he describes in this in his book. So it is interesting to note how in the genesis of the logical syntax delineated as delineated
by Carus, Carnap never dropped his universalist approach with the intent of unifying language, logic, mathematics, and psychology and social science. Also worth noting how such a project may scare individualist libertarian views. In order to achieve it, Carnap had to dissipate content into formal hood. Allow me to say that Gödel, by showing provability was no longer an adequate criterion for tautologousness and hence that provability can remain in flatland any fears of being stripped of one's uniqueness reality truth are unfounded and unnecessary traction for the tasks we have before us with such a tavid prejudice is out of the way
Carnot would in principle be able to quote dispense with existential presupposition as he wished and regarding which he repeatedly asked Godel for counsel a compromise was obtained the introduction of some of some arithmetized assumptions into the meta-language abstract convention skeletal and hygienized in the shape of primitive recursiveness i can't help i can't help but think of plato's bare essentials of mixture and what is slash what is not this is how carnapp removed elucidation from the from its incestuousness with the empirical a sentence implying a formula formula hence sorry a sentence identifying the formula the formula
Hence, the latter's description is empirical, while the parhesia of truth is confined to the analytic realm, where it can be studied before turning into some kind of still underdeveloped praxis. As Carnap says, arithmetized methodological treats not the empirically available configurations, but all possible configurations. Hence, and I'm still quoting, even the assertion that certain sentences, for example, those of Heidegger, are meaningless, can be expressed exact, this is German, by a mythological sentence, unquote.
here Carnap is back to a single language after all and still passionate about the picture theory interpretation of language still binding truth to the auto psychological it was Otto Neurath who helped him endorse physicalism and move away from the phenomenalist school even towards a pragmatist attitude a methodology of pluralist design instead of a descriptive theological architecture as such there is a beautiful move from rational reconstruction to explication that which calibrated the logical project to one of pun intended calibration and transparency uh the former method which assumed it should implicate some kind of uh sorry contrarially
to the former method which assumed it should implicate some kind of even self-acknowledge imperfect purification more than just pass the parsing the world construction as a task of conceptual design or engineering could produce new ways of world making it the world by way of beyond truly understanding it this is how being ceases to be subsumed by thought and instead can via the latter's unshackling from the transcendental and subsequent universalization in meta-language be intersubjectively emancipated. I cannot but stress the practical importance of the understanding, the faculty of the understanding in this regard,
and its liberatory potential from any kind of grounding. Thus, bootstrapping a comment from someone in a conference physics is not like geometry for in it there are no definitions and no axioms Carnap commits to physicalism as the enable as the enabling sorry as enabling the view from nowhere I wonder if such pluralism is not the door opening to probability as world making. This is mere conjecture on my part, I'm sorry. There remains the problem of meaning, though. It seems to me that it was not fortuitous that Carnap heavily invested in
analogies between geometry and language. It is an intuitively captivating picture, but it forecloses a larger interpretation of languages, syntactic and semantic theoretical explicatory capacity as independent from the empirical domain for Carnap in later attempts to disentangle this the question about meaning became a pragmatic one this nomenclature change is historically significant as we'll see that it was through metabolizing Gödel's strictures upon his definition of analyticity and the impossibility of singling out a canonical metalanguage
that Carnap could design the principle of tolerance, thus satisfying finitist, finitist sympathies, as well as Gödel's positive catastrophe of pluralist structuralism, paving the way to what we see as the as if proposals of Elaine Landry and Zalameya's synthetic approach of Takedfoot, two examples. And this is how I ended up my morning before class. Thank you very much. Thank you so much for the time. Excellent, excellent. Thank you, thank you very much. A couple of, I mean, majority of ground that you covered, you're going to talk about it,
so I'm not going to spend too much time on it. But there were some really interesting conjectures, your own conjectures, and I think that that would be a really fantastic ground for discussion, even though it's probably too early for such discussion. You see, the whole idea that, I mean, there is, I'm not sure, maybe Gabrielle knows about this. There was, there is this correspondence between Carnap and Bertrand Russell. It's, I think, Bertrand Russell, Russell is in the 90s, and Carnap is just, has turned to 70-something. I think.
And so Carnap writes him a very affectionate letter. He tells Russell that I don't think that any among all of these books that have works of philosophy that have influenced my trajectory, nothing is at the level of knowledge of the external world, Russell's book. And a few weeks later, Russell actually sends him an equally you know, affectionate letter telling him that, I feel that everything that you have done in philosophy
in terms of precision and clarity and the general trajectory of your thoughts has always been inevitably leading to your theory of probability. That's actually quite a very strong statement coming from Russell, right? So it would be generally, I think, it would be an extremely interesting point of view to think about world making, principle of tolerance, explication, and theory of probability,
all as the consequences of how he basically approaches the structure of logic itself. Obviously, Goodman is a great example, you know, that's what we are dealing with, for example, predicates such as Gru and Bleen with regard to Goodman's idea of inductive observations or inductive logic. I mean, it depends on how you interpret Goodman's work. These predicates, the nature of language is connected to the nature of probability in a much
deeper sense than, for example, you know, the whole idea of a statistical idea of language that Chomsky was talking about. No, it's actually, you see, these predicates are kind of like toy predicates. They're like building blocks of world making, right? Essentially, they are not, what you might call to be anything other than the sort of predicates that we have already like green and blue, but precisely because they are invented at a deeper level of language, they can, they can, they can constitute new sorts of observations, new sorts of observations,
or what you might call to be descriptive descriptive concepts. But that these these descriptive concepts that are you know toy blocks like Groob, Lean, so on and so forth, can only be constructed using that sort of approach to logic of language. You know that that Karnab earlier on works with, and then moves into the direction of inductive logic. In the sense that inductive, inductive statements are no longer
traditional observational statements. When we say that, for example, emerald, T1 is green, emerald, T2 is green, emerald, this emerald at Tn is green, Tn plus is blue, and Tn2 blue, blue, blue. That actually, the majority of people mistake it as if this This is like, I have done it myself. They think that particularly within the framework of inductive logic, they think that these are observations in the human sense, right?
But no, they are not actually observations. There is no, any observe, any, all sorts of observations, you know, ordinary observations with regard to instances of colored emeralds, passes through a logical reference. what Karna tries to do, the same thing that he did with language by, by unbinding it, through looking into its logical structure or metologic. He does the same exact thing with the theory of probability as traditionally understood and the problem of induction. By instead of talking in a human way about the problem of induction or in probability, he
wants to have a kind of meta-framework, a logical probability within which all sorts of probabilities can be talked about coherently. And of course, this brings back that so you have that sort of um this sort of logic allows you for one methodological probability allows you for one to create predicates or inductive probability statements that you couldn't otherwise make in your previous uh framework hence the idea of you know world making potential of it one two um precisely because of this under expansion attempt at generalization of probability by way of a,
by way of looking into the logic of it, logical structure of it, he embarks on the task of explication. In fact, the whole first 10 pages of logical foundations of probability, that's where he begins to talk about explication and he begins his first explication that he puts forward is the explication of the simple concept of probability probability one and probability two and we'll talk about this when we get to that point and so explication world making and then ultimately um the question of uh syntax and semantics in the in the formal sense And then, of course, this brings back all of this, maybe are not fully explicit. It doesn't
make these kinds of connections explicit, but nevertheless, he somehow talked about these in his autobiography and correspondences. He talks about his correspondences with Nelson Goodman. I don't know whether you have that book or not. It's when you can find it, it's basically this. One second. It's the one second. It's the philosophy of Rudolf Karnab by Open Court Publishing.
It's basically a compendium of his correspondences, his diaries, so on and so forth. It's quite actually good. Yes. Yeah. So he talks about that in there. But so, yeah, anyway, I was trying to say that maybe the collections are not explicit, And that's why it's worth to further explore, to see if there is actually a solid systematic connections between these ideas that converges upon this logical probability.
Or is it rather more of a, as you said, as more of a speculation? I don't think that it's actually a speculation. I think there is something there. And obviously this comes back to his final idea, which is a controversial idea of, he proposes the construction of a universal learning machine. A universal learning machine is what you might call to be an extrapolator.
What it does is that those of you who are familiar with the idea of formal induction. formal induction is that you have you have different basically formulas of it the best most concise formula is that an extrapolator a computer which can be just a model yeah or a set of models that can compress the data in the most optimal and the best way, most efficient way, is the
model of your data. Meaning that you have an arbitrary set of data and you want to, these sets of data are what you might call to be hypotheses, right? Hypotheses of some sort. So the best hypothesis in this one is the one that can compress the data the most, compress in the technical computer science sense, not the compression in the sense that Marcus
Hutter and Solomone talk about it. And that would be basically the account of testability. So he wants to talk about these kinds of stuff, which are extremely, you know, when he writes about these, these are absolutely obscure, what do I call it, topics of the time. I mean, the information science, science of informational complexity or algorithmic complexity hasn't reached that level to talk about these topics in a more precise way. So a person,
I mentioned this a number of times, a person who attends his seminars, Raymond Salomonov, who is the father of formal induction, and Salomonov Kolmogorov's notion of measure of complexity, He writes his paper on induction and he actually mentions Carnap's influence. And of course, this whole idea of a universal learning machine is extremely controversial idea in computer science and information theory. but I think that it also happens to be one of the most unexplored topics with regard to the potentials of computers down the road. And this is one of the things that,
look, this is one of those topics where basically people like Leserong jumped the gun by way of Solomanov measure and they say that this sort of probabilistic machine is enough to do whatever we do and far more better and far more vaster. That comes precisely because the idea of universal learning machine is what you might call to be first of all it has it has a bias but empirical bias meaning think about big data the more data
you have, the better. But then you need to have algorithmic machines to parse this data in the Solomanov sense to compress them and then create sets of hypotheses, test these hypotheses by further compressions and testabilities in formally inductive logic. And then among this pool, you can actually decide, you can actually have the most optimal model of the world, observation, whatever you might say. So these are, so I mean there is this whole kind of legacy of Karna that is underexplored.
One with regard to world making, with regard to world making and the other one with regard to his legacy in information theory, basically formal learning. And then obviously all of these with regard to principle of tolerance, explication, and the project of syntax. Yeah, I don't know. I mean, it is, I have thought about it, but not really.
I just want to get the basics of Karnak for now right, in order to, in fact, start to think about these kinds of stuff. But it would be nice that if any of you think about it a little bit more and bring it on as we move toward later sessions, which are on these books on logical probability, to see if there is any more interesting discussion that might arise throughout the course around these topics. But yeah, thank you so much, Felipe. I don't know, does anyone have a answer, any discussion about anything that Felipe said
or what I was just talking about? Yeah, I have a quick question actually with respect to Solomanov. Solomanov says of his kind of algorithmic probability that it's kind of incomplete or it's it's it's in computer. Theoretically, you see, the idea is that it is theoretically incomputable. In fact, theoretically, it's not feasible, but at the level of practical, it's feasible. No, it's the opposite, right? the opposite right it's oh sorry practicality yes okay you see the one of the greatest works on this is tom sterkenberg check it check this out yes it's actually but but that's when you see this
whole idea of computability there are various versions of it in computability so so practical in computability as a level of a strong effectiveness and or at the level of weak effectiveness. These actually have effectivity in terms of computation, the problem of halting problem. So there are two different versions of effectivity or effectiveness with regard to the problem of incompatibility. And majority of people discuss that Solomoneff actually is both practically and theoretically computable at the level of weak effectivity. This is something that Thomas Thurenberg talks about, if you can find his name. And my apologies to interrupt you.
Yeah, please go on. I mean, my question was simply to what extent would Carnap have shared these kinds of, like, I mean, specifically the attitude that Solomanov takes, because it seems like not all of his followers would even agree that it being a feature. He doesn't talk about it at all. I mean, he briefly mentions in a footnote or two the problem of effective computation. But he, I mean, he's not a computer scientist. And probably, you know, he has read these kinds of stuff. But he, for example, he doesn't know that, you know, the concept of effective computation, classically understood, the way that he uses talks about a machine,
an inductive machine can also be explicated further into notion of weak activity and the notion of strong effectivity. Here, I actually found it. One second, I'm going to put this. This gets a little bit technical, but he's an extremely bright philosopher. One sec. uh okay it's called um it's uh it's called potnam's diagonal argument and the impossibility of a universal learning machine
That's one, and the other one is called Solomon of Prediction, an Okam's Eraser. And his name is, I'm going to put it on the sidebar. Thank you. Yeah, he actually, he, Tom, thinks that at both level of weak, at the level of, so he thinks at the level of weak, it's theoretically feasible, practically infeasible. At the
level of a strong, it is both unfeasible. Whereas someone like Marcus Hutter thinks that at the level of a strong, it's strong effectivity, a strong notion of effective computation. It is theoretically feasible, practically unfeasible at the level of weak concept of effective computation. It is feasible at both levels. So there are all sorts of, you know, approaches to this, but this is actually what I really want. I mean, if people who are interested,
said, this is one of the very few, few essays that clearly talks about, in a semi-technical is still understandable to the layman, the difference between weak effectivity, weak effective, weak effective computation and a strong notion of effective computation. It looks like Carnap just uses it in a kind of a flat classical sense of effective computation, which of course, with its relation to the halting problem. Any person?
And Sophie, Maria, Gabriel, Cassia, Sebastian, anyone? This might not be a... So I'm not very familiar with like computational theory and stuff like that. Do you have any pointers on where to start with that, aside from taking a course on it, which is definitely on the menu. Just basic theory. Just basic theory. Basic theory, OK. Basic. I mean, the best one, just read, who's that?
The guy who wrote the book on Articons Reduction of Artificial Copland. Is it Jack Copland? I think it's Jack Copland. Jack Copeland's edited all of Turing essays, published or unpublished with commentary. It's actually an extremely great book. Shows that how magnificent Turing was. It's called... Is it the Turing Guide? No, it's not Turing Guide. No, not that one? Okay, okay. It's called, it's called The Essential Turing by Jack Copeland.
One of the great things about this is that it includes some of the really interesting one that, that, that didn't go through peer review, hence they remain unpublished. of them is this. It's called, I think, Computational Intelligent Machinery. So there are two versions of this. One is actually the one he published and the one that he didn't publish. The one that he didn't publish is absolutely a different essay, but because of their titles, people usually think they are the same. It's where basically he talks about, he has an extremely vietganistanian approach to artificial intelligence here that's training a machine
like a child from pure pleasure and pain systems my way of a connectionist approach it's it's absolutely out of this world really magnificent i also found because i'm also not very familiar with like formal logic a cool introduction to Formal Logic by a collection of like two Dutch philosophers, two logicians, and a linguist, which has been surprisingly very readable. It's been very good. Formal Logic, if anyone wants, I have some, I have some basically recommendation for logic. You know, best thing is just buy books or find the books that they use it for, you know,
from either high school or the first year of college, first year of college, and then move with that. These are absolutely smooth. There is no way to, no jargon, no technical details. But I was thinking about that. I mean, you can think about it. And if you want it, you can tell the organizers I was thinking of including as we move forward with the new center. Every semester I include at least one real simple introduction to basics of, for example, one thing like applied mathematics, like formal logic, like literally like the stuff that are just like, you know, you need to know to do. a little bit of you know calculation or things nothing any fancy no zalamay or she for these
kinds of really blackboard kind of stuff i think everyone concurs that that would be a really uh helpful and and good thing to do okay okay i will i will find someone um to teach it um i mean we can start with formal logic and maybe after that we will have one on set theory someone that basically starts with naive set theory you know the one that you basically learn in high school and then go to you know real set theory okay good so um maybe uh a break if no one has a uh i mean maybe i mean first of all um
in terms of let's not talk about the computation for now in terms of The connections between world making probability, syntax of language, task of explication, principle of tolerance. Any sentiments, any ideas, anything? Wait, anyone? No one? I just wanted to make a short comment about this. I think that, yes, there is a very, in my understanding, there's a very strong, I don't know about word making, I haven't read much of Nelson Goodwin, but I think the idea, the core idea from Afba on, not even about logical syntax, is, as Brussels puts it, the same.
But in the end, in the probability and basically in the second book approach, I don't know if you have you have you seen that? Of course you haven't. You have. But he wrote. There are two, but the one that I'm talking, one is just basically on probability, kind of like an introduction. But the one with one that I'm talking about is the logical foundation of logical probability. I know. But I'm saying even in the second book that he wrote for almost the. correction of a logical foundation of probability. Even in there, this idea is present. And the idea is, as I understand it, I put it in the, I think in the first session I said something about, but I think it is very, the whole problem of what is knowledge then becomes a little
meaningless. The question becomes a little bit meaningless when this, we see the probability function. It doesn't become meaningless. Look, I mean, that's essentially what I think that Gabriel might actually say yes. Because what it does, after Off-Bow, he realizes that those extra chips that you have on the problem of knowledge as this lavish epistemological project should be actually deflated. Those chips were misplaced. idea that you you have you have you have given the idea of knowledge or epistemology philosophy of knowledge and epistemology two different things in my vocabulary you have given them too much
credence too much significance that now after these kinds of uh post-epistemological deflation deflationarism they are still knowledge that doesn't make them meaningless it just takes away that extra bloatedness from which they were always suffering. So it's a, so that's basically that I think it's deflation, it's not meaninglessness. I think that he, he wants to have that kind of deflation without being one of those people like, you know, less wrong kind of people who are saying, oh this is just like simple shuffling and these kinds of stuff, right? That any sort of machine that's shuffles symbols can do everything else.
Oh, sorry. The question of what is knowledge becomes meaningless. Knowledge itself doesn't become meaningless. No, what is, what is knowledge doesn't become, doesn't become meaningless though. It becomes, it's simply the status of this question is being reassigned from the sort of status that it enjoyed earlier on or in traditional Kantian philosophy. In fact, this, this is, now this can actually be something interesting, but this reassignment, this relegation of the status of the question of what is knowledge,
Does late Carl think that it's even interesting question? Gabriel? I think there are a couple of like... Okay, then it becomes a bit of speculation, though, technically I'm supposed to at least be able to bullshit my way through this, through this because it's what i'm supposed to be writing about but uh so but so but i don't i'm not really sure about what i'm what i'm talking about and i believe the question the question becomes insofar as the quite as there is a meaningful question of what is knowledge a question that can
be like that can be answered truthfully or falsely it it becomes a psychological question about about the substratum outside of this outside of this we could we could conceive of something like a an explicit an explication of the of the of the of the concept of the traditional epistemological knowledge of cons tradition of simological concept of knowledge uh very much i think something and very much in the sense of uh haslanger said haslanger i was recently reading her heart yeah it's a i think her positions very much is can can be can be closely uh can be
carl's position can be read i think through through hers it's basically the idea that uh from the the there is no even if we suppose that there is an ordinary language knowledge of conception of knowledge or a meaningful and i think i think that the properly kind of in position position would be that even this there is no there is no beneficial use of the notion of knowledge in ordinary language, and this would be the cause for certain philosophical difficulties like the Getier problem, the Getier problems that would fundamentally use knowledge in multiple ways.
uh but even if there is we need not we need not uh we need not like stick with it for example another another i don't want it to be simply like name dropping but another another uh another interesting interesting way to approach it would be something like randoms in random in his making explicit makes a brief comment that even if what he what he in the book is is defining as knowledge isn't precise which is basically his adaptation of the traditional justified through belief even even if that isn't even if that is cannot cannot by being a bit too
restrictive cannot deal with certain impositions of ordinary language use of the term knowledge, it's still useful in the pragmatic analysis of the space of reasons, of the game of giving and asking for reasons. So I believe, yeah, it's in the sense that the question of the matter, the concept of knowledge can still be used by Carnapha. It's either psychologically, and at that point, it has no epistemological significance because Carnapha is very much a content in the sense that there is no, the question of quick fact, the question of quick fact has no,
epistemological implications he he was he was never he was from the start very anti-psychologist anti-psychologist or it becomes this a matter of of creating a of explicating knowledge of that is of creating a concept of knowledge that would be probably a a a logical in the in the white sense of logic in the sense that we could talk about pragmatics as logic as in the sense of logic of logic of science that would be creating such a creating such a concept that would be useful for analysis but that's what at that point there is no true there is no true concept of knowledge there is simply what what would be what would be useful for the purpose of for the purposes of our
analysis so in the sense so yeah yeah in the sense i would i would agree with with has it's not it's not exactly meaningless but there is no no longer any question of the truth of the true concept of knowledge it doesn't it doesn't have that sort of yeah no accounting significance attached to it yes okay thank you so much i think maria question if there's a people can hang on for another minute uh yeah i would like to ask uh since i have finished the logical syntax of language but but haven't read the theory of probability and have very vague knowledge of the whole subject. I wanted to ask, what place did probability have in syntax?
Because probability is mostly about events, as far as I know. Yeah, well, the thing is that probability, I mean, there are two concepts. It comes back again to the idea that at the beginning of logical foundations of probability, he explicates the concept of probability. So probabilities are no longer, yes, they are referring to events, but not in the traditional sense that I was mentioning, in the traditional sort that people have been talking about, induction, and so on and so forth. So he wants to have a different sort of,
he wants to not have theory of probability, but logical probability, just like he wants, for example, in logical syntax, we have a logic of language that can be systematically studied. So that's logic of probability is what is interested. And that's where the problem of syntax comes back. So that's, but that, we will talk about this, but that's precisely because he has, again, he has already, from the get-go, he tries to explicate the concept of probability to make sure that people don't mistake, don't confuse what he says about, you know, syntax
of probability about the logical, logic and syntax for him in the logical probability are kind of the same. So when he wants to talk about syntax, he wants to actually, readers understand what sorts of explicated concept of probability is on his radar. The same thing that something like Gabrielle was just talking about, it must be most probably would say that, look, we have to explicate the concept of knowledge, the epistemological concept of knowledge, such that then we can talk coherently about, for example, the relation of logical syntax with the question of knowledge, so on and so forth, explicated question, explicated concept
of knowledge, so on and so forth. So yeah, no, syntax is completely attached to probability, but precisely as I mentioned, precisely because he's working with a concept of probability that is no longer classical in a philosophical sense. I mean this is really one of the greatest things that, I mean one of the, I mean everyday life philosophical lesson to be learned from this, majority of the time that we are using concepts, concepts that are central to the philosophical enterprise, we use them in a in a very flat kind of way, we don't have a level, multi-level picture of these concepts
which basically enables us to explicate them, to differentiate various explanatory descriptive levels, various inferential links that belong to different arenas, so on and so forth. This is why, for example, we always find ourselves to basically get into some sort of petty, pedantic discussions about, I don't know, like most trivial but also important questions of philosophy being, I don't know, language, rationality, reason, precisely because, look, because our discussions are not or our arguments or philosophical
thoughts are not used to work in tandem with fleshed out, precisely explicated concepts. In fact, sometimes I really think that this is precisely because some philosophers love to do philosophy, because they can talk bullshit all the fucking time. But that task of explication essentially prevents you from doing those sorts of maneuvers that lead philosophers to become famous, right? By basically attaching arguments to the grand concepts, which are basically the vague unexplicated
concepts. So what Kahnar essentially, what he wants from a philosopher is really an engineer philosopher. That he wants, because that's what engineers always try to do. You know engineers, and of course science, but engineers precisely because they have also the whole restriction, constraint of application. For example, the concept of elasticity. The concept of elasticity engineering is an unexplicated concept. We don't know what elasticity means. It just has some sort of notion, concept of classical elasticity. But the thing is that, so concept of, we talk about concept of elasticity just like we talk about concept of knowledge, precisely because we have to get the ball going. But when it actually comes to the practice of
engineering, there is no such thing as a concept of elasticity. There is something called Young's modulus. Young's modulus is essentially a matrix that allow you to break up the concept of elasticity, and talk about the properties of that what you thought elasticity is at a specific levels of metals, plastics or materials that you are working with. So this is essentially what you might call to be a triangulation system to triangulate concept of elasticity in different local contexts proper to them. I hope that there is no real philosopher amongst us, after I said bad-mouthed philosophers.
jive from the before the break. This is interesting to me that you guys left fingers are very easy to let go of the subject. When subject becomes explicated, you guys are like, no, there's no subject. So we don't have to talk about subject. No, we don't. The exact fate is regarded with knowledge. You guys know. Knowledge is something else. Don't jump the gun. That's just less wrong. Less wrong. there is only body but the thing is that i always ask when some person uh said well what about the question
our body would you be able to tell me what the body is so um apologies Yes, the question of body is just simply, you know, material solid straight for supporting functional roles, but then you wouldn't need to attach
to the question of body, namely, as a level of biology and neurobiology, all the other kinds of metaphysical questions that usually come with the question of the body and philosophy and critical theory. Then if that's why I always tell my friends that look, if you want to get really nitty gritty about the question of body, most probably you need to have them to talk to people like Scott Baker, but are you going to talk to people like that? these kinds of super reductivists, hardcore, Danetian people. So obviously, I mean, with philosophy,
people should always understand that certain kinds of, as I always have said about, but assuming certain sort of positions or accepting a few other premises in conjunction with your premises is never free. It comes with a great consequence. I mean, and think about, I mean, we have so many philosophers who, for example, we have talked about this a number of times, people like uh i'm not i'm not my apology for diverging i'm going to get the thing but people like land people are um saying that oh well you know uh new land is different how did land become
this well i mean he's absolutely not different he had just taken those premises to its ultimate conclusions the premises that he initially endorsed with batai deloo so on so forth and this is something that I have noticed that, I mean, this source of fetishizations of material bodies, so on and so forth, comes with a great cost ultimately. This doesn't render biology as a science of life, you know, politically shady or talk about bodies or embodiment politically shady. No, it doesn't. But we should understand
exactly what are the premises that goes into some sorts of discussions that if left uninvestigated ultimately lead to such positions like land down the road. Go on, Philippe. I was listening to you and thinking still thinking about what Arman said it seemed like we could even use what you were saying about the fetishization of material with regard to the fetishization of knowledge because you know Arman that's what scares me being a left winger about the fetishization
of knowledge, knowledge becomes with that thing with a capital K, which is the accumulation of humankind's endeavors, which is sacralized to a point which benefits no one. Yes, yes, absolutely. I mean, any sort of philosophization of anything, any sort of philosophical concept is a philosophical sin. But nevertheless, fetishization, you see, promotion is different than fetishization. We can promote reason and knowledge without fetishizing them.
To promote them simply means that we know that there is no other way to talk coherently about the problems other than going to the problems of epistemology, the problems of psychology, the problem of logic, the problem of rationality, whether formal or informal. There is no other way to do that. That's a promotion, and promotion is a critical task, meaning that you will end up in a position that you think that those notions of rationality that you used in the past might in fact were carrying uninvestigated unexamined premises,
premises that could lead to other sorts of consequences, unwanted consequences. So this I think that it needs to be taken into account. Fetishization simply means that we, no matter what we are committed to this. No, there is no no matter to what committed to something. If there is a rationality, a robust healthy lean rationality, it should always concern the health of its own self, the health of reason. And what is the health of reason? It's precisely at the point where in a Hegelian twist, you notice that reason, even though it's a, is the greatest
vehicle of a spirit, but it's also, in being the greatest vehicle for the spirit, it is also the greatest restriction and limitation to its own self. Because, epically, temporally, it only knows fractions of what it is or what it can be right and that's moment when reason understand that it is always constrained but a constraint that needs to be resolved by itself it attains self-consciousness concrete self-consciousness
concrete self-consciousness simply means that reason becomes aware of what it cannot do at each and every step of its own development not globally not globally but locally that's the that's the idea of concrete self-consciousness so it's not like say that oh reason can never do that well i mean or the course of rationality can never achieve that sort of thing that those sorts of global ideas of um putting a teleological um blockage against reason i think that are fundamentally metaphysical in nature if we are going to talk about concrete
self-consciousness of rationality, it should always be local temporal constraints of reason to its own age and to its own context of development. And of course, the moment that reason understands or basically realizes in the Hegelian dynamic, it is fraught with flaws, that's the moment that it becomes critical. Not only the critical of its own history, but the history through which has been generated, through which the world around us has been generated. So that's, that's, that's
something that Hegel calls the history of, the, the, the, the critical history of history. And that's the task of reason to fulfill this task. And to fulfill this task, it should abandon all sorts of commitments to the idea that reason is a free floating vehicle. That it comes at no cost, that it is always benevolent, so on and so forth. No, we are not safe then, that's all the point.
But this is, this comes back, did I mention to you about Nurat's allegory, which we are going to talk about a little bit here, or Nurat Buddhist wrapping? Yeah, the idea that, look, always like, so I'm, my apologies again, diversion, but I mean sometimes it needs, we need to kind of get a little bit out of the technicality and just expand it to show that how these kinds of stuff can be applied to more everyday life kind of stuff. think about this. For example,
what was I talking about before, before this? I was talking about Um, oh, no one is rapping. Yes. So no one would strapping. Yes. So majority of friends, for example, tell me that look result. So, um, how, how can we actually make disagreements between everyone to, uh, you know, make, make something good about, uh, this world. uh so well this agreement of everyone is never required and never attainable then they said well you exclude some people i said yes then i said well then you have to develop better
tools of consensus building then they said that well these consensus tools of building uh have a fraud with these kinds of problems so on and so forth so essentially that sort of rhetoric that we see today in critical theory and all across the board of humanities is extremely unhelpful, precisely because I always tell them that, okay then, you don't want any of this. Nevertheless, you are talking about consensus building. Then what are you actually trying to propose? Are you trying to propose the thesis of resignation, that we should just do nothing, They said, no, absolutely, that's not what we mean.
But then I said, what would be your alternative? There is no, then they said, well, we don't have alternative. Then I said, what, how are you actually thinking then if there is no alternative? So all we can ever do is leaving the Nourat boat, meaning that we are supposed to repair this boat, some of those planks are rotten while we are at the open sea. So the only way that you can do that is by stepping on what we call provisionally
or tentatively unrotten, unrotten roots in order to take those planks that are rotten, replace them, step by step. This means that even what we thought that there are basically are the solid planks, might be rotten. But nevertheless, you have to start with the best of, uh, and that's why you need to have metrology, you need to have precision, you need to have all sorts of stuff to, in fact, identify what would be the best in this context of time, during this sort of weather at this stage in our trip, uh, on the voyage, uh, on the
ocean, uh, which of these planks can be considered to be the most solid in order to, uh, do the the rest, replace the one or two of the rotten ones, and then putting your foot on those that you have just changed to replace another one. That's all we can do ever. And that's what Carnap's is also, I mean, not Carnap. The Vienna Circle is coming with this idea that Nourat actually gives to them. That's from the point, first point, I mean, Nourat's manifesto, if, Gabrielle, can you, I mean,
does anyone know the title? I've forgotten always, the name of Nourat's manifesto for Vienna Circle. where basically Vienna Circle people start to say that, yes, that's essentially what we are trying to do. So Otto Neurath is a propagandist of the left, but also great economist and philosopher. And he, yes, I think that's the one. Yes, thank you so much, Gabriel. So he, in this manifesto, he tries to say that even though, even though the, what Vienna
Circle is working on is fundamentally abstract in terms of rational reconstruction of the world, so on and so forth, to have, for it to have any sort of political, economic or the welfare of the human being impact. But nevertheless, he wants to say, to argue that we need essentially this kind of abstract protocol, work on it through division of labor, bring it to a level that can ultimately be introduced to humanities, to engineering, to life sciences, so on and so forth. And of course, he believes that these things take time.
Obviously, they always do take time. So yes, this is essentially one of the main ambitions of the Vienna Circle, particularly socialist wing. So, so let's say, let's start with this, that's a logical syntax of language, as I mentioned, at least has two main concerns. One, talking about language. Two, the problem of physicalistic
languages. So the problem of physicalistic language is, which is being refined in the logical syntax of language, to the correspondences between Otto Neurath, Maurice Shalik, and Karna, particularly Nurat and Karna, has its roots in two things, two related points, two related topics. One is protocol sentences. The idea of protocol sentences in early Vienna not as they're called logical positivists. Protocol sentences are statements about immediate
experience of perception, right, which can be deemed as the grounds of all knowledge we have, right? So that's the Vienna Circle and Karn are trying to see these protocol sentences and by way of the physicalistic languages and how they formulate physicalistic languages. This is something that I'm going to talk about. What the other point is that it comes back to Carnap's conception or broadly Vienna Circles conception but mostly Carnap's conception of the nature of philosophical enterprise, which is given later, formulated later.
In Aufbau, he talks a little bit about this, but the canonical formulation of it is given later than logical syntax of language. It's in his work, Introduction to Semantics. In that work, he says the chief thesis of part five, if split up into two components, was like this. A theoretical philosophy is a logic of science. So this is, this is how he understands the nature of philosophy, theoretical philosophy at this point, after
of and logical syntax. Theoretical philosophy is the logic of science. So logic of science is the syntax of the language of science. Logic of science is a syntax of the language of science. This is, he says this in Introduction to Semantics. Now, it is a terminological question whether to use the term philosophy in a wider sense, including certain empirical problems. If we do so, then it seems that these empirical problems will turn out to be, to belong mostly to pragmatics. Right?
Then we can also think about a different way of understanding this, that we still can add semantics to syntax without not talking about pragmatics in the sense of American pragmatism. And in fact, he mentions this, that when it comes to the sort of concepts and statements we can make, there are pragmatic ones, there are semantic ones,
and there are syntactical ones. The difference between syntactic and semantic is that syntactic for him are primarily early on though, in the early on, it just simply means formal, right? So the thesis ultimately changed the following. The task of philosophy is semiotical analysis. The problems of philosophy concern not the ultimate nature of being, but the semiotical structure of the language of science, including the theoretical part of everyday language. We may distinguish between those problems which deal with the activities of gaining and communicating knowledge and problems of logical analysis. Those of the first kind belong to pragmatics. Those of the second kind to the semantics or syntax
to semantics if designate designator or meanings are taken into consideration to syntax if the analysis is purely formal is purely formal right so it is actually quite interesting that um the sort of the divide between syntax and semantics is not really that ordinary than the way that pragmatics use about the bridge from syntax to semantics.
So with that said, let's get to the New Roth. So it's famous that New Roth early on had already predicted the trajectory of Carnap, Carnap's intellectual development. of flow of course um he he writes to carna and he says this i'd prefer if i i prefer it if you
as a centrist tending towards the left wing would give up the protocol statements without confirmation and the panel of intersubjective and moralizing languages etc and would represent the vienna circle alongside those who have no truck whatsoever with Wittgensteinian metaphysics. Like, essentially, Noorah and Kara agree at this point that the question of the structure, so when it comes to the idea of protocol statements or protocol sentences or Wittgensteinian picturing, that there is that they have some sort of quasi-structure such statements right even though
they're not structured in any sort of grown-up way they have a sort of quasi-structure essentially both neurons and corrupt think that they absolutely don't have a structure and if you actually think that they have even a quasi-structure means that there are in fact the relations, a structure in relations, within such statements which are unexamined or undiscovered. And once they are discovered, it will shed light that you had, in fact, a smuggle bits and pieces of a structure into these protocol statements, a structure that had no place
whatsoever, no rule whatsoever in those sentences, in those protocol sentences, ground sentences. So essentially this is what they are really concerned with early on, as early as 1932, that that when you say that, well, this is the kind of protocol sentence from which we are going to begin, and it doesn't have any sort of developed structure, but has a kind of quasi-structure, that might actually mean, and obviously they say it, that it does until,
unless it's confirmed that it doesn't, that it has undiscovered, unexamined, or implicit structuring relations which don't belong there, right? So this is what it means that you, you should give up the protocol statements without confirmation. So what Murat refers to here was his own campaign against the stance of methodological solipsism, first and foremost, that Cardab had adopted in Of Bawr, the assumption of the epistemic priority of phenomenal over physical object statements.
Right? Against this assumption, which Karnav deemed central from the epistemological point of view, Neurad had filled an explicit argument since at least descriptions about physicalism, descriptions of physicalism. Sophie, would you be able to kind enough to translate this for us and say it in German so we poor immigrants. Where is it? I'm going to... here. It's uberphysikalismus. Besprechung uberphysikalismus. And?
Besprechung und überphysikalismus. I don't see more. No, translation. The translation, ah, sorry. Talking, talk about physicalism. Okay, that was easy. Yeah. Nourad's arguments against methodological solipsism and for physicalism was tied up closely with his argument against the need for Wittgenstein in elucidations.
But where Maurice Schellick opposition to Karna questioned the applicability of the method of rational reconstruction as such, Neurath, why, because Schellick is more Wittgensteinian, and Schellick wants to say that according to the Wittgenstein's philosophy, the project of rational reconstruction is a dead end. Neurat, on the other hand, wants to say that no, Wittgenstein is not the reason, Wittgenstein philosophy is not the reason that the project of reconstruction is flawed, precisely because itself, Wittgenstein's philosophy, as Shellich uses in order to launch an assault on Carnap's
of rational reconstruction is itself fundamentally flawed. So, but where Shellich opposition to Carnap questioned the applicability of the method of rational reconstruction as such, Neurath only challenged its scope and how it was applied. With Carnap, he insisted that rational reconstruction, rational reconstructions don't have the job of making intelligible from the outside. how our cognition and language hooks on to the world, as it were, but only of showing from the inside how sure of irrelevant details the languages of sciences do their job. This is what Nourad says.
He says, the possibility of science must become apparent in science itself. The dispute that has been growing up, brewing up between Nouroth and Karna for quite some time came to head over the question of the content form and the status of protocol statements. statements recording observational evidence in science and serving at checking at checkpoints for theory acceptance or yeah for theory inclusion. According to methodological
solipsism as developed in our file these statements spoke only of relations of of recollected similarity between one individual's experiences. So apparently, in response to Nourad's criticism, Carnap granted a certain kind of primacy to the physicalist language, but retained a separate protocol language for epistemological purposes. Carnap published these ideas in the Unity of Science. I mean, it's a really great little book. It's just, I mean, by that I mean it's like probably 40 pages. Definitely, it's still considered to be early Karna if you want it.
Definitely it's a great little book to read. Only to encounter a reaffirmation of the the opposition from Nourath in protocol statements, that protocol languages separate from the physicalist languages are neither needed nor ready to hand." The quotation that I mentioned from Nourath here with regard to what was that the possibility of science must become apparent in science itself, that's a key here as the, what you would call to be the lynchpin of the arguments between Carnap and Nurad. Now, as it happened after this sort of criticism launched by Nurad against Carnap, Carnap did move
left quickly. At first, in a paper published simultaneously with Nurad's Re-statement of his position in protocol statements. So Karna wrote this essay on protocol statements, outflying even Nurath and what appeared to the latter as the lunatic fringe. Now any, he says, now any concrete statement, even one not reporting observed states of affairs, could be deemed basic and made the checkpoint for the rest, a position which Nura thought endangered empiricism. Then later in Testability and Meaning, this, this is also a great work of Qara.
You won't actually check. These are, these are small, I mean, kind of good for, you know, just really getting the the meat of the transitional Karna, like moving from alphal to logical syntax and later works. So in testability and meaning, Karna settled on a more traditionally physical exposition. Protocol statements employ predicates that specify observable properties in accord with the best physiological psychological account we can find this position was closer to neurons but by no means identical with it the best way to convey their differences to review their arguments
as they stood at the time of Nourot's correspondences with Carnap. Nourot's characterised physicalism as the claim that all the statements of empirical sciences used only as spatiotemporal terms concerning spatiotemporal matters, right? that unified science thus expresses everything in the intersubjective and intersensual language means, of course, that also the protocol sentences are expressed in it. As he put it, he calls it
Neurot principle. Every, this is what he says, every new statement must be compared with the system of the statements and laws up to now. Either it will be integrated or rejected as incorrect if one does not change the whole system. So you see, no rot, no rot, both bootstrapping here again. No ultimate epistemological privilege accrues to protocol statements. Moreover, no simpler or more immediate language is available at all. Neurot's argument to this effect was first recorded in his descriptions of or talks of
physicalism, then repeated in a more or less cryptic form in various essays and lectures from around years 1931 and 1932. For example, he says only one language comes into question from the start and that is the physicalist. One can learn the physicalist language from earlier childhood. If someone makes predictions and wants to check them himself, he must count on changes in the system of his senses. He must use clocks and rulers. In short, the person supposedly in isolation already makes use of intersensual or intersubjective language. The forecaster of
yesterday and the controller of today are, so to speak, two persons. These rationalists are a bunch of fascists. They wanted child uses, rulers, and measurements since the earliest childhood. But anyway. MARIUSZ GASIEWSKI- Is this rationalism or traditionalism? There is. MARIUSZ GASIEWSKI- Yes. But now he also wants to say that actually the last sentence was magnificent, though. The forecaster of yesterday and the controller of today are, so to speak, two persons. That's a majestic sentence. Anyway, let's not bog down with the aesthetics of these kinds of stuff.
So Nurad held that even a solitary thinker requires a system of symbolic representation for the ordering of our experiences over time that is intersubjective and intersensual. Against Carnap's methodological solipsis protocol language, Nourad argued that language must be usable by one individual over time. Phenomenal languages do not come, as he says, do not come into question from the start, for they do not allow for mechanisms whereby the constancy of an individual's language use can be guaranteed, which in turn is required for checking to take place.
Nourad's highly condensed reasoning may be explicated as follows. To begin with, Nourad's physicalistic language includes ordinary talk of physical objects and events, and also even his anti-dualistic understanding of psychology, of psychological episodes understood as a spatiotemporal phenomena. Now, if physicalistic statements like instruments, readings, and need themselves to be translated in order to be meaningful statements into phenomenal terms discreetly related to scientists' experience, then no touchstone at all is available by which
the consensus of his or her language use over time could be actually established. So, in turn, suggested that once on a solipsistic base, there is no preventing solipsism of the present moment. The incoherence that threatens experience conceived of in the solipsistic fashion shows that constancy in the use of an individual over time can be established only by reference to the spatiotemporal determination of physical state of affairs that the language speaks about. Now, if language
use is so controllable, then that language is already intersubjective and by extension, intersensible. So if the protocol language is to be a usable language, it cannot be a phenomenalist language. The tempting line of reasoning from the correctability of the statements about what our common experience is to the conclusion that the evidential basis for science must be sought in language that speaks only of the experience of an individual speaker cannot be then right.
Now, consider now Carnap's position in the unity of sciences, where physicalism means that the physical language, the language of present and future systematic physics, is a universal language in that formal mode of speech means every statement can be translated to it. Material mode of speech, every state of affairs can be expressed in it. Concerning such physical system statements, CARNAP asserts that their verification is based upon protocol statements, which include a statement belonging to the basic protocol or direct record of scientists' experience.
In Carnap's schema, such basic or primitive protocol statements belong to primary protocol languages and exclude all the statements about individual, about, sorry, all statements obtained indirectly, thus postulating a sharp theoretical distinction between the raw material of scientific and investigation. and its overall theoretical organization. Hence, formal mode of speech. The simplest statement in the protocol languages are statements, no justification and serving as foundation for all the remaining statements of science.
Material mode of speech. The simplest statements in the protocol language refer to the given and describe directly given experience or phenomena, that is to say, the simplest states of which knowledge can be, can, can be had. So Karna retained the idea of protocol languages separate from the physical language. And in essence, the approach of melanological solipsism, namely the assumption of the epistemic priority of experience as statements over physical statements generally. Here, however, this epistemic priority did not necessarily mean epistemological phenomenalism.
For now, Carnot left open just what form the protocols had to take. Instead, he has stressed that the intersubjectivity of the physical system language does depend on the possibility that formal mode of speech, an inferential relation of the kind described, holds between a statement P and each of the protocol languages of several persons. mode of speech, the state of affairs expressed by a statement P is verifiable in the manner described by several persons. Right? So the inferential relation invoked in the formal mode of speech
a statement here is that of the deducibility of a statement in the protocol languages of different speakers from the statement P. Significantly, Karna allowed that in science this deducibility be mediated by hypotheses. And so he not only discounted conclusive verifiability as a criterion of cognitive significance in favor of confirmability, readmitting universal statement as meaningful, but he also recognized epistemological holism that governed the acceptance of statements of physical system language. So then Carnap subsequently argued that given even only a relatively liberal version of
verificationism, statements about mental estates are unintelligible unless they refer to a person's behavioral dispositions or bodily estates. Carnap first established that phenomenalistic protocol statements are verifiable and meaningful on the assumption of the inter-translatability of the psychological and physical languages. But then he assumed the standpoint of the phenomenalist opponent, which denies such inter-translatability. And as consequence, he established that in this case, the statements about other minds would be unverifiable and meaningless.
Karnak added, this is from Karnak, the situation is the same with sentences about one's own mind, in fact. Not just another person's mind, but the situation is the same with sentences about one's own mind. And arguing that once we are able to confirm such a statement, we are also able to confirm a statement about the one's bodily estate. Therefore, if the demand for intersubjective intelligibility is taken as axiomatic, there cannot be ineluctably private language. So far, no significant disagreement between Karna and Neuron. What prompted Neuron misgivings, however,
was that separate protocol languages appeared to allow for exemptions from follibilism that govern the scientific system language and introduce a trouble asymmetry, a trouble asymmetric, a troubling asymmetry in justification. So Carnap began to think about this Nouroth's response and Nouroth's reservations about this new formulation. Hence, he asserted that the distinction between sentences about other minds and one's own mind
is indispensable for the epistemological analysis of subjective singular sentences. Here Carnap's distinction between statements in the system language of physics and the protocol statements for that system comes to the fore. A statement about my own mental state can be taken as either, but there still is an epistemological difference. As a system sentence, it may, under certain circumstances, be disavowed, whereas a protocol sentence, being an epistemological point of departure, cannot be rejected. This statement is ambiguous. one could read it as saying that an original protocol statement cannot be rejected but only its translation into a physical system statement.
Or one could read it as saying that such protocol statements cannot be rejected only in the very process of testing being described. For then there are no other protocol statements around by comparison with which it would make sense to reject it. So Nurat opted for the critical reading and was able to discount the exculpatory one for good reason. For him, the very idea of such more or less private protocol languages was objectionable, for it faced an unenviable and entirely avoidable dilemma. Thus, according to Kaurna's statements in the primary protocol languages require translation
into the physical system language to figure in intersubjective scientific practice. And this translation allows for the correctability, apologies, for the scientific evidence statements of scientific practice. Nevertheless, physicalistic discourse must be reduced to the primary language of primitive protocol statements for purposes of justification. This means that the speakers apprehend the meaning of that protocol language, not in terms of its physicalistic interpretation, but directly in terms of its possibly phenomenalistic surface reading. This is why Carter made these languages primary
and why he held that a person could only take their own protocol statements as checking points. Now, if on the other hand, these protocol languages are construed along phenomenalist lines, a speaker's grasp of their meaning would be incorrigible. Disconception retains a sense of privacy vulnerable to the argument Nurath had been pressing along. For Nurath, a speaker's sense of the meaning of the expression of his language is shaped in and by the process of communication. The self-understanding of an individual language user is as problematic
as the understanding of other minds. If, on the other hand, these primary protocol languages are construed as already physicalist, it becomes difficult to see what distinguishes their statements from system statements so as to enable primitive protocols to remain unrevisable. Once part of the system language protocol, once part of the system language, protocol statements can of course be rejected on account of any contradiction, not only with other protocol statements. Unable to tie into scientific practice as we know it, Carnap's protocols remain problematic elucidations, after all.
Neuroth, in a sense, was correct in detecting in Carnap's conception of separate protocol languages vestiges of the atomistic conception of knowledge that the tractatus supported. Carnap eventually, under the weight of all these criticisms, abandoned his insistence on methodological solipsism, even in its weakened sense. And in practice, he dropped the idea of protocol statements outside of the scientific system of language from his entire project of rational reconstruction scientific theories beginning with his answer to Neuron which is called unprotocol statements
yet he added from corner this is not a question this is this is a question not of two mutually inconsistent views but rather two different methods of structuring the language of science which are both possible and legitimate. Karnapir first makes use of the famous principle of tolerance of logical syntax. He says in his answer to Narod, everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that if he wishes to discuss it he must state his method clearly and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical
arguments applied to the question of protocol statements this means that syntactical rules will have to be stated concerning the forms which the protocol sentences may take This issue, so at the end of the day, becomes a pragmatic one of convenience or practicality, not a factual one. Preconception of a supposed epistemic order no longer dictate the answer about the question of the form content and the status of protocol statements. Now, maybe I should stop and I'm going to talk about later, I mean next session, a little bit again
about Noorath and how this change in his attitude toward protocol statements, toward physicalist language that was caused by his correspondence with Nouroth severed his last ties with Rossellian's project, the external world program. But that's, I think, we're running out of time. It would be a mistake to get into that sort of discussion but yeah that will be about it so questions and stuff
some reason i can't know what happened here okay yeah Yeah. Also, how about, because, you know, even though, I mean, the, the, essentially, it's not, we are not actually, we don't want to talk all about Kharna, right? Technical stuff, of political sentences and whatnot. We essentially want to trace this project of restructuring the projects of the re-enlightenment to the legacy of the Vienna Circle, and particularly Karna. So how about this? That next session, we do a little bit of a divergence
from the course of this seminar and what I'm going to teach, which would be Russell and Carnap situation. And instead, we make response with regard to Neurath's manifesto, which is basically tries to kind of formulate. I mean, it's quite a sloppy manifesto, though, I must warn you. But nevertheless, still great as a point of entry to a greater discussion. It tries to readdress the question of enlightenment
by way of the commitments of Vienna Circle, under a banner, but not under the old enlightenment project, but rather under a socialist banner, what they called it, Red Vienna. A snazzy title. So talks, stuff, anyone, please. Shur. Hi. I don't have a proper question, but I was,
and I'm sorry if this is confusing, because maybe not a lot of us are also frequenting Daniel's seminar on abstraction and paranoia. But Carnap's quote, philosophy is the semiotical analysis of science and this whole attitude seems to me that to have left a lot of people traumatized ever since. Oh absolutely. And I couldn't help but think of Gabriel Catrin's text that Danielle gave us to read the study for last week. I don't know if you've read this.
Is it the one that he wrote for Anna's collection? Anna Longwood's collection? No, it's for another book, the speculative realism. Oh, that one. Oh, yeah, I know. Yeah, of course. Yeah, absolutely. Translated by Taylor Rathkems. Yeah. yeah and i was uh curious if uh there's a if the historical consequences uh only have reflected themselves in this specific period we are very much aware of the speculative realism era or uh if the the traction uh or the plain refusal to to follow this this this proposal
of philosophies to semi-ethical analysis of science was immediate. Is there a history of not complying or not liking this anything? Look, I mentioned I think the first or second one that when car-ops get a Twitter handle and tweets away and scaring the shit out of everyone in the humanities, obviously there are the direct consequence of that, right? And this is exactly what happens. And not merely with Vienna Circle, but merely with Kana. Because majority actually of the people in the Vienna Circle have extremely diverse range of topics that they write about. Like,
I mean, Otto Neuer writes about war, economy, socialism, propaganda, the rise of fascism Nazism. Maurice Schellig talks about neoliberalism, new economy, so and so forth. Hans Reichenbach talks about time, talks about poetry. Karnak just, it just doesn't want to get involved in these shady businesses. He actually wants to cut through this. And the thing is that because of this, absolutely from day one, he's being caricaturized as this boogeyman who is just reductivist and empiricists which are absolutely not true. And yeah, absolutely you should understand that a lot of, not only in continental philosophy,
but also even in analytic philosophy, particularly Quine legacy and all that jazz, is coming from the direct consequence of Karna not relenting, scaring the shit out of people on Twitter, so on and so forth. But I would say the defense of Karna that look, I think Karna was always right. That look, even if, of course, we can talk about whether this is actually the task, the job of philosophy, the semi-automical analysis of the logic, of the language, of the language, of philosophy of science, something like that.
Even if we are not essentially agreeing on this yet, but I would say that what is actually, is actually problematic with this one? Is it problematic at the level that it is not right, then you have to say it, why it is not right, and then you have to understand, withstand the challenges of corona, that how what you are talking about is not just a metaphysical nonsense, right? So you have to withstand Carnap's things or else agree that this is
what philosophy ultimately is. Otherwise, basically what you would think of philosophy is just philosophy diluted with a bunch of stuff that have nothing to do with the philosophical enterprise or the philosophical problems. The thing is that my apologies to Gabriel and people like him quite extremely technical, quite really good, but I would say that I think that the real problem with Karnap is that he wants to ask too much precision, too much fidelity, too much fidelity from a philosopher to do philosophy. Whereas people want a little bit of poetry, a little bit of religion,
a little bit of CCR, you are called Trojan for the fun of it, and so on and so forth. But that's not fucking philosophy, is it? I mean, then the important thing is that you will essentially trying to sabotage philosophy from within itself. What I think that kind of really is interesting, thinker is that he wants a very lean philosophical picture, but that leaning philosophy, the picture of philosophy also requires a lot more from the Platonic Hucer to flame the minion properly, right? And not cutting, not, not just not cutting at the, not, not just splintering the bones and
cutting at the joints, but also laying the medium properly. So he wants too much from the enterprise of philosophy. That's his downfall. But that's not because it's wrong. I think that he in fact will show that, okay, if this is what we may call lean picture of philosophy, which can be adopted by humanity, by social science and so on and so forth and become more user friendly, right? More user friendly, less of a boogeyman, but still it might not be satisfying to people who do humanities, but satisfaction is different from rightness or wrongness. Just because you are not satisfied with this, uh, filet mignon and you want to
some marbling in your steak, that doesn't mean a filet mignon is not good, is it? Metaphor of a steak. No, I think that really a lot of, coming back to the idea, I mean not all of it, but quite a lot of it, comes what people want from philosophy really. If you add too much stuff to it people say that oh well this is not philosophy it is poetry right then when you actually try that car up to do the actual systematic job to create a lean backbone for philosophy such that a whole body grows around it people say that oh well this is really reductivist
we are not satisfied well what do you want really the balance is never going to be achievable because that balance is itself predicated on preconceived idea about what philosophy is rather than what philosophy, how philosophy can be reconstructed, can be reconstructed such that it would be an independent discipline, not inferior to science, but on the same footing. That's what Kardach wants from philosophy. A discipline that is on the same footing of science. Not a handmaiden to science, not something greater than science, but on the
same footing. For that, he needs to reconstruct it. He needs to take some of those fat away, even though fat is yummy for everyone. This is also coming back. I had this conversation with my friend, Keith Tillford, like two weeks ago, it was here. We were talking about abductive reasoning and PRRS and all the PRRS, PRRS-ing kind of stuff, pragmatist kind of stuff, that he told me that, look, well, you need to have certain kind of metis or some kind of anomalies to basically make a reason more, to rejuvenating reason, to make it more dynamic, more unpredictable.
I said, no, this is just fine bullshit. This is what Einstein always warned against, that No, you don't actually don't want to mess with scientific method or rational method. Rational method should be accountable. Anything that cannot be put on a ledger about the rational method is not really good, ultimately. In fact, this is, people don't know this story. This is his main difference, disagreement with Goten. People think that, oh, Einstein and Kurt Gödel were friends. Yes, they were friends. He hated him, though. He absolutely hated Gödel. He, apparently, Gödel was chasing him in the U.S., in university,
where Einstein was always wearing pajamas and coming to the class. He was saying that, oh, I have actually found this new theory that actually allows us to make a time machine. Really, I'm not joking. Time machine. So he wanted to talk about his idea of time machine with Einstein. And of course, Einstein knew that this guy is fundamentally out there. He always comes from an extremely unorthodox ways. But Einstein has always been in conversation with unorthodox people, like Jung, Willem Rijck, all of them. He knew that it is bullshit. It is not going to happen. Simple as that. Einstein writes him actually a letter and he tells him that you are setting a bad example for young people.
They think that there is this dry reason and there is this really extravagant, dark sort of reason that only geniuses can use, right? And it's really fantastic. But no, this is not only, there's only fine goddamn dry reason. Everything else is just nonsense. And yes, geniuses use unorthodox techniques, but even those unorthodox techniques can be rationally talked about, if they can't. They are not really anything other than random accidents. This I absolutely love from Einstein. As someone who believes in God, which I truly despise, he has an extremely
humble task for rationality and accountability. And he doesn't want to get overexcited. He talks with everyone. He talks even to Wilhelm Rice about his organ accumulator. But then he goes and does some formulations and says, sorry, sir, it appears to me that there is some heat transfer in your organ box that accounts for that extra energy that you are calling organ. It's just basic thermodynamics. Apologies, please end up. If there's time, I had one question that was maybe going back to something more technical, and it's just for my clarification, but it might be helpful for other people as well.
as well, which was, I guess, just to kind of wrap my head around it, in this debate between Karnap and Noorath, it seems that Karnap is saying that the system statement, like the protocol statements themselves don't have the kind of resources for a corrigibility. Does he ever sort of back down from that view, or is the principle of tolerance simply saying that we can't? No, we can't, yeah. That would be the second one, yeah. And then maybe like a kind of a slightly tangential follow-up, which relates back to the point you were making earlier about continental, well, maybe you didn't say continental philosophy, but we all knew that you meant it in some level. But, you know, like the kind of,
this kind of like critical theory stuff where, you know, there's a constant kind of negation. I mean, I feel like maybe one way that people would push back on that to say that there's more or less a navigational thing, but it's an unsubstantiated navigational principle. So they'll just say, yes, we're doing our critical enterprise, and then we're going to try random things and see what works. And there's no undergirding logic to, in advance, determine what sort of experimentation is valid in body. Okay, if there is navigation, that would be, again, another neurotic example. I mean, navigation is, yeah, I mean, absolutely, that navigational paradigm, I'm all for it. Yes, but the thing is that I have seen that people think that, oh, navigation is like also like fraud with these flaws. So what else do you want? I mean, yeah, absolutely. If navigational paradigm, absolutely.
that's essentially what, I mean, that's, that navigational paradigm is where you can actually do experimentation, the fun of experimentation, but also accountability and assessment, critical assessment of how and why such experiment was posed to begin with, how it was conducted, and how it passed the test or failed, right? So you need to have that kind of thing, but But many people actually don't even want that source of navigation. I mean, really, I mean, the state of critical theory or critical whatever theory, I would say at this point, has really reduced to a to an indeterminate negativity, not a determined
negative, indeterminate negativity, which is ultimately the recipe for the greatest cynical gesture of all humanity, resignation. Right, because I mean, if it's not too glib to read it in this way, I was thinking perhaps like, you know, in postulating like a principle of tolerance, rather than this kind of like just general attitude of like tolerance to whatever people happen to be writing about and are interested in or have made sort of like a cottage industry out of is maybe a way to sort of cut through. Yes, that sort of pluralism. And essentially, this is why I mentioned Noroth manifesto, precisely because he wants to, I mean, obviously, when we are using principle of tolerance
and then we are trying to make a socialist version of it, we are obviously a little bit doing dodgy moves here. Really, I don't think that the links between principle of logical tolerance and the principle of social tyrants is not as clear as we have, right? But nevertheless, yeah, so let's just start with some of these experimentations. Try to be as clear about the concepts we are using and the sort of assumptions that we have on our table or under the table. talk about it instead of being always on the sort of pure indeterminate negativity which is truly
I mean create it has created I mean do you know what it has created it has created uncritical post-humanity that people actually want to talk about potatoes rather than talking about goddamn fucking human beings. Right? That is a shame. That is a stain on philosophy. That is truly a stain on the reputation of philosophy and thinking. That you are actually more interested to talk about potatoes and plants and rocks thinking rather than the future of humanity, future of your children and other generations. I mean, what sort of
really vile mind can come up with such a scheme. You're just a special kind of potatoes. Also racist against Irish people. That's a good one. I love it. The potato famine. These people with their wealth of potatoes, honestly, they just... I think Iman has a question. Sure. We can't hear you. We run out of time? No, we are not out of time, but don't worry, your last question, that's it.
My question is about the North bootstrapping and the whole discussion actually. I understand the analogy, and it's a very interesting analogy. I think what Carnot does is exactly this analogical move, but in a, as you put it, lean or pure logical way, to show that what Noir means, what is the boat. and maybe even deeper or something like that. I know the better predicate for it, but for now I say deeper because for Karna when we have syntax there is no boat on an ocean at all. Although the
the analogy of himself, use this analogy of the ocean of possibilities. What the ocean of possibilities is no more the navigation that we do, the apocalyptic vision of New Rats of 1930s, then doesn't apply to what Carnap sees of about possibilities. I'm not saying that it's liberal and what... But no, no, I understand. No, no, you are completely right. Yeah, at the level of syntax, it would be quite a vague. It's more of a kind of a, you might call it to be a bloated metaphor for something extra syntactical, right? Because at the level of syntax, essentially, that's what you have, you know?
And it doesn't come to this kind of revisionary stance. And at the level of logical tolerance, also, it is ocean not in the same sense of ocean, of Nourad's boat's ocean. Yes, absolutely. No, I completely understand. That's a good point. You're doing some explanation here. Exactly. But in regard to this explanation, may I ask my question? Then if this sea like that, then a solipsis methodological solipsism. I turn French.
Anyway, methodological solipsism. Then would be something like this. If we apply the principle of tolerance to even a methodological solipsism and other people's mind, other minds problem. For example, when I talk about, When I say something like I am sad, something like that, a protocol sentence that Norrith loves but Karnak doesn't care about anymore would be something like an objective, an object, not object, sorry, individuation. Some individuation in my mind about the state of sadness, what I learned to language, what I learned to other people use of sadness, when other people
used it about me. So I have some, some idea of this word called sadness. And I'm also somehow stigmatic about it. I don't see it clearly. But I use it. I say I'm sad. But then when I say, when I want to say Reza is sad, there's completely different matter. Because Karnab sees, when I say I'm sad, there is still an object that I refer to and it's possible for me to refer to. Because somehow, solipsistically, I know it. But you don't know it. When the problem... No, I don't think, no, I think it's completely, it's absolutely runs, runs, runs,
runs to actually a deeper problem, then of course you can come up with a Carnapian version of it, it really runs into the problem of qualia here. That is essentially you are as basically illusions about the qualias you have or you are occupying than any other person, the same way about the language sentences that you think that you have access to, but other people don't, or you have access to those languages because they have been made by other interlocutors and not, and it doesn't, the rules that applies to them don't apply to your private things. No, I don't think, I really don't think that that would, that actually that's even more,
I think a slippery slope because problem of qualia is essentially what tries to to, as Murad would have said, what tries to preserve privatization of immediate perceptions. But not in a regular sense of perception, but by way of deriving a qualia from bunch of estates or episodes that have nothing to do with that qualia whatsoever.
Sure. Because we don't because the qualia doesn't matter. That's what I'm saying. That's as my understanding is that the Carnapian insights is that doesn't matter what the protocol sentences are, As long as you can see you can you can put how the logic applies the mathematical mathematical run the computational logical side of your system nice your the protocol sentences, you may choose as protocol sentences, whatever you want, even we choose the are ayat of Quran or nonsense like that. So you can't really you can't. The protocol sentences, no, no.
I mean, you can, you can. But the thing is that, but then you have to basically, what protocol sentence is that you have to, they need to have a certain refined decomposition, analytical stance, analytical stance for them to count as protocol, basically, statements. You can't mean this is something that I don't think that is possible, though. I mean, you can simply assume that qualia or cue statements, qualia sentences or qualia feelings are private can be taken as protocol sentence. I don't think because they don't they don't they don't have that level of analyticity that Cardinal has in mind.
Sure. But I'm saying that I'm sorry to be argumentative. We can cut it off. I'm not trying to just- Don't worry, don't worry. Say contrarian things. Really, I think it's something interesting here. But anybody else? If anybody else- Sure, any person? Any of your friends? Shut up, go ahead. Gabrielle, Maria, Cassia, Sophie. I just said one more thing about this because I want to I think it's interesting in this matter because say we have okay we have we had the class with Bobak Jason Bobak sorry
I don't remember his last name. But he is Mohaker. Yes. And one of his exercises was to watch a movie about a Brazilian woman, if I remember correctly. And she was schizophrenic and lived in Estamaria, yes. And Estamira. I know that. The trash. Beautiful. So I see Estamira as somebody who, in a principle of tolerance is completely rational. Is a complete, although is, she's somehow not making sense, but you can make sense of it through, through the principle of tolerance.
You can make sense of what she is saying, somehow, somehow say something about her mind actually, about through something completely reasoned and dry. I think there is a possibility for something as- It's rational. You see, there are two things. You are confusing here two things, rational or logical. Right. There is a logic. There is a logic that she's putting forward. Now that there is a certain kind of internal consistency, connectionism, so on and so forth, among all of the kind of- Of course, this is your argument. You're using a metaphor here. and be very careful with the use of your metaphor here. Yes, she's, imagine that she's a logic, a computer,
a kind of a logic generator, a logical model. Yes, it gives, but that doesn't make it rational, right? You see, the whole idea of rationality is not really logical in that, at the level of syntax and consistency of syntax. Rationality requires a little bit something more. This is why Karnab puts, Karnab adds the issue of semantics to the pure syntax. Because if that was the case simply, yes, you could say that, well, these people are rational. Even Hitler would have been rational. Yes, that's, but that would be just. That is not the case, but that is not the case precisely because.
But that's the pragmatic side, right? Because rationality cannot be reduced the question of logical consistency in any sort of consistency what we mean. I don't mean it in a sloppy form of consistency, technical understanding of consistency in logic. But you can't do that. You can't really do that. What is the surplus part of rationality? It's really the question of meaning. It's really the question of meaning. or ethics question of meaning yeah there is when the question of meaning ultimately the question of pragmatics also comes true so there is also the question of verification verification number of levels verification at the level of syntax verification the level of truth
tarski verification and the level of probably pragmatic we never let go of correspondent of truth to be rational. We never let go of truth as correspondence to be rational then. This is what you said. No, no. It has nothing to do with that. No, no, no. We have the concept of truth and verification at different levels. At each level, program of verificationism change. It's nature changes. No, I mean, look, It would be a massive sort of, I would say, misguided stretch to say that if your language,
or let's even be a little bit more, you know, more ambitious and say that if your thoughts have an internal consciousness, it doesn't make you rational. that would be non-Kantian pro-Hegelian, right? No, even Kant would say that absolutely it's not going to happen. Neither Kant nor Hegel would say that this is essentially what is the criterion of rationality. Because you see, first of all, we have formal rationality and then we have informal rationality in philosophy.
So at the level of informal rationality, you have to basically work with truth, meaning, verification, and all sorts of knowledge. You know, how do you know that? What is the case? So on and so forth, right? So at the level of informal rationality, which is POTNAM's kind of thing absolutely this person is not rational at the level of formal rationality it really would be a i would say a mismatched metaphor essentially you are using someone who has thoughts thoughts that are context sensitive that are material the statements about the world
at least in her own mind, to a concept of rationality which is made purely of formal elements. So it's like you have, you have this overextended bloated metaphor and then you want to basically, um, squeeze it into the lean, formal idea of rationality. It would be extremely hard it would be extremely hard to do that what is felipe saying that when i watch 140 years when some would be less confused than others think you see again this is you know this is not the kind of stuff that i don't uh
I'm very suspicious of when we say about truth what sort of explicated concept of truth do we have as I mentioned let's avoid using these words rationality truth and so on so forth in in the in the in the grand sense in the unexplicated sense our task is to explicate to explicate the concept of truth. So what is truth? Can someone tell me what truth is? Are you talking about logical truth? Are we talking about a systemological truth? Are we talking about truth in the verification instance? Are we talking about truth in the Platonistic canonical sense? So then when we say that, oh well, this is like kind of as a mystic connotation that
complicates truth, that appears to be a philosophical statement, but it really doesn't give us too much insight. In fact, I would say such statements usually try to unconsciously, of course, uh they they basically end up making a mess of what we already know the solid grounds the solid the tentative or provisional solid grounds when we say that oh it's complicates for example this kinds of arena these topics i would always go for my uh carnappian revolver
I always think of this whole idea of making something complex or more complicated is not actually enrichment, but disenfranchisement, disabling, tactic. Complexity only is an enrichment once we understand how exactly complexity contributes to something. But the notion of complexity or complicating the issue doesn't mean that it has, it makes the problem wider or richer. It actually distorts the nature of the problem itself. And this is what Carnap wants us to not do it all the time. Yeah, we can do it once in a while,
because you know, you're not all Carnapian sages, but nevertheless, it is important to really pay attention that the concepts that we are using, we should really understand where they are coming from, at what level of the concept we are talking about, what is the categoricity of the concept, what kind of concept of truth we are talking about here, like logical this and that, and also the nature of complication, that it complicates something. Does it complicate it by distorting it? Does it complicate it by enriching it? Does it complicate it by adding, by bringing premises
which we were using but of which we were we of which we were not we were not aware so and so on so forth but nevertheless if we say so we need to designate and clarify elucidate exactly in what sort of way, in what sort of context, with response to what of the issues at hand, the addition of, for example, this complicates the problem of truth, or anything for that matter. This is, again, coming back to my, to my kind of like divergence from certain
breeds of continentalism. I still think of myself as a continental philosopher because otherwise, because analytic philosophers don't want me. So I might as well actually just sit duck in continental philosophy. But nevertheless, this whole idea that we think that complex problems are good ones? Absolutely not. Why complex problems are good ones? So Reza, but why if the complex problems are bad ones and we don't want them and we want lean problems, why do you bang the drum of rationality in that way? As I mentioned that rationality is understood as an engineering of enlightenment project
enterprise. It essentially is task to reveal complexity in the evolution of rational tools itself. Rational tools rather than the complexity of the problems at hand. You want to look, as I mentioned, again, you have to explicate the idea of complexity. I'm talking about the regular ordinary understanding of complexity, not idea of complexity as we talk in complexity sciences. Nobody is actually using the term of complexity. We are using it in the ordinary sense. That is not helping us, precisely because if that is a complex, then you have to somehow create a slicing up to different sectors
such that you would have navigational maps of this problem at different sectors. Like, look, one of, like, think about this, um, uh, how, um, uh, the map of the earth around the globe is being made by putting different sectors that actually touch at each other at very quite, you know, uh, strange angles and stuff, like the way that people make that kind of globe that you get, it always being created that way. Sections, uh, created with asymmetric borders, irregular borders, put together, create that sort of thing that we always think as the globe of the Earth, right?
So the same problem is like this. You are essentially want manageable, navigational manageable, computationally, cognitively manageable and navigational patchwork concepts or patchwork maps to glue together them together and then create something that was then you will say that, well, this is that. This is like what we are saying that is complexity. But you want to always manage your simplicities. You don't want to begin with the question of complex. Complexity is extremely unuser-friendly, computationally hazardous, cognitively hazardous, philosophically hazardous, so on and so forth. You want complexity to grow from philosophical maturation rather than to be the premise of it.
Okay, I think that it's time now. Sorry for going overboard. Thanks Reza. Absolutely. My pleasure. Just a quick question. Is there anything that we should read for next week? Oh, I said the Neurath one, the Neurath manifesto. And also, who's going to present? I have to check, but we should have people lined up. And if not, there's some people that had to kind of switch around. I think it's Dilshad and Maria next week. Okay, that would be magnificent. Thank you, Maria. Thank you, Dilshad, for being the next victim. Love you, everyone.