Hello and welcome to the 13th session of Theory and Object with Reza Negrestani. I'm going to pass the mic down now. Thank you very much, CEO, and thanks everyone. So today we will continue and kind of wrap up the discussion that we started in the previous session with regard to the idea of explanation in philosophy of science to the extent that we talked about that both the idea of natural law and the idea of explanation and its whole family or class of you know synonyms that can be brought under it like causality, causation,
and explanation, counterfactuals, modality, so on and so forth. We try to wrap this discussion up. Also, if you don't mind, for the next four make-up sessions, I promised you, we will, if you don't mind, we conclude them in two hours instead of two hour and 30 minutes. because unfortunately I have to go somewhere in the next few weeks on Sundays. So with that said, let's hear if you have questions. If not, then I will start continuing our discussion with regard to pneumological laws.
One question, it was spawned by the Greenbound, but I will couch it in different terms since we're not there yet. There's this whole question of essentially facts versus whether, and they just sort of recap the facts into different frameworks, linguistic inter-translatability, versus whether or not the different framework to necessitate a different framework to be able to, a different framework of being able to originate at the facts which are explained by such a framework to begin with. Yes, so you should understand at least logical positivist Carnap rather than the late Carnap.
The thing is that, of course, you should understand, does anyone know anything about Quine's indeterminability of translation principle? Anyone who can somehow summarize it for me? Theo, Peter, Crickets, Valentin. So this is really… Go on, go on. This is from the Two Dogmas essay.
Yes. Yeah, I read it, but I just can't think of it. You know, objection, but of course it has ramifications. You see, essentially coming from a Phrygian position in the sense that senses don't coincide with reference. Like, the sense of, for example, Socrates being a gadfly and Socrates being the gadfly as a sense of gadfly of Athens and Socrates as a wise man.
How can these senses be brought to coincide with the reference which is Socrates, the philosopher? Now in the term of translation, also based on the same kind of principle, since when I utter the word red, and you also utter the word red, how do we know that these reds are the same thing? They converge upon the same reference. So, this of course becomes actually the bugbear of philosophy of language, but also philosophy of science.
In the sense of how, as Christian was saying, how do we know, for example, when we work with different formal frameworks, we are actually referring or broadly speaking talking about the same kind of stuff the same furniture is of the world of course by talking you can easily replace the word talk with the word a structure how do we know that we are structuring the same kind of stuff because even though they might have some sort of correspondence
nevertheless they each of these frameworks each for each of these senses would only cover like maps only part of your landscape that you are trying to cover. Like imagine that I am working with for example a different you know kind of cartographic principles to come up with the map of the Earth. You work with another cartographic principle. Now we know that the cartographic principles essentially the ones that you use to map the globe, each of them actually lose some information and distort
some information. So you can think of these as also patchworks. Yes, patchworks can imbricate, overlap but each of these patchworks these patchwork maps for you to cartograph or map the terrain cover bunch of information that might not be in fact a relevant class of information for another patchwork or another map or the train. So this is what you might call to be the kernel of the indeterminability of translation. Now of course with Carnap, at least late Carnap in response to such objection would say that yes,
Yes, this is the whole point. We absolutely need to have such patchworks that cover a range, different range of terrains. Two tasks are ahead of us. One, making as many as patchwork maps as we can, namely form of frameworks. And two, be capable of integrating them, put the patchworks together like a puzzle, like a jigsaw puzzle, so as to create a holistic picture. And of course, Andrew Karras, as I mentioned to you, compared this idea with a kind of
levers, different switches in a train engine landscape as long as you bring these switches into coordination. So this is for Carnap is essentially yes Carnap would completely agree with this idea but he doesn't see it as an impediment. He actually thinks that this is precisely why we should develop of different formal frameworks. One thought that I had here is that, I mean, it's the Duhin versus Foncare discussion that sort of spawned this.
But... ...dedicated upon, as I mentioned, classical Fregean duality between sense and reference. and reference in the sense that they cannot be commensurate with one another. Different senses mean different things whereas the reference is a kind of an invariance. Now with the rise of computer science, theoretical computer science, with the rise of new formal logics, we now have a rather good grasp of this duality between sense and reference in the sense that sense and reference, senses and reference are not different things, they are not incommensurable,
it's just that reference is nothing but the invariance that holds among different senses of a word. Or in this case a formal framework. It's just that, of course, this Neokuinian philosopher then would object that, okay, I agree with this, but then it requires a different kind of regress argument, and it does lead to a regress argument. In the sense that, okay, you say that reference is nothing but the invariance of senses.
Like we are talking about the same kind of stuff in external world. In order for us to commensurate our different partial pictures of the phenomenon which we are apparently talking about, then you need to have different principles of integration, different principles by which these multi-balance or multiple senses can be seen as retaining a referential invariance beneath them.
But of course the Nookwainian would say that this also in so far as predicated on a kind of a theory that tries to extract invariances from the senses and you can, you may have many many theories of how to derive referential invariances from different senses. And then you are back in a square one. The only way that it can be answered is by resorting to some sort of product foundation
as being exhibited today in theoretical computer science and logic. In the sense that, okay, you say that we have different senses. And these senses, what connects them together, these partial pictures of the world, linguistic partial pictures of the world, what connects them is what we actually call a reference in a Phrygian sense. And of course, to be capable of seeing them as connected so as to extract the referential invariants that holds among all of these senses you need to have a theory of integration a theory of invariance sense invariance you know homotopy type theory
you know is a good example there are many many other kind of logical computational theories informal framework but then as I mentioned Quinean would say that also such theories can be subordinated or subjected to the same kind of indeterminability of translation in so far as you can have so many of such things but then your choice of extracting in referential invariances among different senses without a coherent criteria of selection among such theories would be entirely arbitrary. Now again, an antiquarian would reply that we can go to the proto-foundations, that we
We can indeed see that behind all of such logical principles that allow us to extract a reference from multiple senses, there are some undergirding logical or computational processes. Once we go to the realm of foundations, this problem is spontaneously solved. But then, no Godelian can come to this argument and say that, well, either you are mistaking proto-foundation with the ultimate foundation, which then you are making a fundamental logical
mistake, or there can be so many proto-foundations, metalogics, metalogics of sense of reference. And in that case, then you need again principles for moving from one metal logic, one Prutu foundation to another Prutu foundation. And so this whole discussion I'm just trying to say that it's still an open question and by no means closed or concluded. I feel like it's most likely something possible at the limit and can only sort of try for certain set. Yes, even Grunbaum and even Quine understand that this does not really pose
a fundamental danger to the progress of science or philosophy for that matter. Precisely because the indeterminability of translation, or for that matter the variational range of multiple senses as opposed to reference are essentially context sensitive in the sense that yes within a very narrow domain we can control these parameters but if you want to really apply to everything then there come an exact revenge on you. Are you like just sort of some just being kind of like practical about it and be like oh, we can have some tentative metal logic that allows us to at least put some sense into these different ways.
Yes, yes, absolutely. No, I mean, that's essentially Carnap's idea that, yes, the move to the metal logic, or what he calls attempt at metal logic, is essentially a solution to this problem. but however you should understand an attempt at meta-logic is not by any means something that can be understood as a universal solution. It can only be applied in, you know, humble, modest contexts of problems. Any thoughts? Valentin, you have been so silent. I know that there are some thoughts are brewing
in your head. No, I'm sorry. Theo? It's too hot here to do anything. It's too hot, yes. very very hot here as well yes yes well I hope they kills all the humans on the planet okay so any any any thoughts well I don't exactly understand how it wouldn't threaten the progress of science no because you see the progress of
science we already got rid of this old idea of a kind of uniform progress of science science is essentially a what you might call to be a kind of patchwork mapping system or partial pictures of the world and partial pictures of the world can actually in their own partiality can be approached like that but this also means that we don't have a kind of universal methodology yes probably or maybe never to you know cohere such partial pictures in a kind of
a unified model of everything and that's that's really I would say is the whole conclusion of this problematic but if you're saying that you know we essentially have a partial picture model of how science proceeds. I don't... We have a series of partial pictures and the only reason that these partial pictures are successful is because they are not just about translatability. Their translatability of the different senses to one another are being constrained by additional parameters that define the very partiality of that picture.
However, such parameters don't hold for another partial picture. We cannot simply pretend as if what we have achieved in this partial picture can be applied so easily to other partial picture. But don't you think that there's some need for a general notion of distinguishing science from non-science in order for it to have any authority to be honest with you this is is a bugbear but the way that I think about it essentially that science is the only discipline
that does not have a global picture it is only a partial partial pictures of the world that would be an in fact the very criteria that sets apart scientific endeavor from non-scientific or pseudoscientific endeavors including I would say even philosophy. Then I feel like that I mean I'm just you know I'm pouring gasoline on what you're saying but. No I know I know you actually. Yes, yes. You're not just adding gasoline. You're also adding toxic fumes here. Go on. I mean, if that's your, you know, what I would call your general notion of science,
then you're just amplifying the problem of indeterminacy of translation. And then at that point it seems like relativism and naive realism have- I don't think that relativism, you should understand that relativism comes in different kinds of way. Yes, of course, the partial picture portrait of science is relativistic, but not in a relativistic sense that usually is being derided by philosophers. It's essentially something like Goodman's relativism, Nelson Goodman's relativism, in the sense that it is not relativism of truth
or methodological procedures or criteria of coherency which of course can be dependent on your partial picture. It is rather the relativism that each of these partial pictures of the world require different parameters and the parameters by which such partial pictures can be put together can fundamentally different from the others. However, they are undergirding general methodological principles for in fact constitute such partial pictures of the world. You have to use logic, you have to have logical coherence, you have to have a kind of whatever
you are trying to do you have some sort of criteria of minimum criteria and by that I I do not mean a maximalist, a minimal criteria of truth versus falsity within your logical system through which you approach such criteria of coherency and partial pictures. You should understand that postmodern relativism essentially wants to dismiss any form of methodological systematicity. yeah I mean as far as I understand it that type of relativism I don't exactly see how it would be something that could be addressed methodologically or even talked about coherently but
how so well of course you are working in logical systems yeah no no I mean I think the type of relativism that you're calling postmodern relativism yes yes yes yeah absolutely I agree yes yes and so you that you would say also that say progress in science just is so local progress where you know you might look how come global I would say local come global yeah yeah well but like global and something of like a local sense insofar as it like it's such general global methodological principles creates a proto foundations for yes out of systems
and then it's essentially I really think that the best we have at this point and it's not by any means what you might call to be the the the sufficient explanation for the progress of scientific enterprise I would say Carnapian paradigm of explication is far more robust and far more adequate than any other alternative that we have at this point sure it's not great but then remember what can told you you are just limited beings You are not beings endowed with intellectual intuition.
You call it as scepticism with regard to the progress of science miscalculates and is is disproportional to the amount of problem at hand. Just because there are some problems in the way that we understand the progress of science doesn't mean that science doesn't progress. That requires fundamental skepticism. And in fact such a skepticism has its own implicit assumptions.
Just can I say something in... Absolutely, Peter. Yes. To Theo as I was doing some of the Grunban readings, I came across his... Oh, what a book. What a book. Like verifiability as the... Why they don't stand up. I think the reason that Grunbaum's attack is so vicious on the entire edifice of psychoanalysis is precisely unlike Popper, he does not see as you said the disparity between science
and pseudoscience or non-science as a big issue. Which means that he takes psychoanalysis as in fact a scientific method, but a scientific method should always be responsive to its own criteria of systematicity set initially. And he shows that in fact psychoanalysis fundamentally fails to fulfill such criteria of systematicity and it has itself set for its own enterprise. I mean the whole Talley argument is basically this.
The Talley argument, the famous Talley argument in that book is this. But also if you go to, I think, chapter four, I can't remember, I read it a very long time ago, where he criticised Paul Ricker, interpretationist. He also has different kinds of objections in mind rather than just to tell your argument. It's a great book. Any of you who want to see someone really takes down on psychoanalysis, this is it. This is absolutely a pyrotechnic work of philosophy so what is the argument exactly the argument let me
actually as I said I mean I have read this book I don't know nine years ago or something like that let me just go telly arguments Google it and I will give you... so the discussion in a propositional logic goes as follows. So you have a set of premises in the psychoanalytic tradition. Only psychoanalytic interpretation and treatment can yield correct insight into the unconscious causes of a patient neurosis. Premise two,
Only the patient's correct insight into the unconscious causes of the patient's neurosis can cause a durable cure of this neurosis. Now using simple logic, these premises can be reduced to the following form. 1. If not psychoanalytic interpretation, then not correct the insight. 2. If not correct insight, then not durable cure. these premises can be further reduced and a conclusion can be drawn. Two, if cure then insight. One, if insight then psychoanalysis. The result would be three, if cure then psychoanalysis.
Now this conclusion is what Grunbaum calls necessary condition thesis or Freud's master psychoanalytic proposition. Psychoanalysis is necessary for a durable cure of psychoneurosis. Psychoneurosis is a mental disorder caused by repressed infantile experiences, for example in the case of Freud and Ferenzi, the consequence of NCT, necessary condition thesis, can be deduced as follows. Three, if cure, then psychoanalysis. Four, not psychoanalysis. Five, the conclusion, not cure.
So the necessary condition thesis could potentially be falsified if a durable cure of psychoneurology occurred in the absence of psychoanalysis. For example, if another form of therapy or simple suggestion or a spontaneous remission were shown durably to cure psychoanalysis. The weakness of Freudian or psychoanalytic tally argument is that as Freud admits, patients are subject to suggestions, namely transference. Transference affects all clinical data therefore all clinical data are suspect including the insight that supposedly intervene between psychoanalytic procedures and the
psychoanalytic cure I'm not very convinced I gotta say like how so you You need to come up with an argument. Okay, yeah, I will. Well, two things. Claims, we'll set up in between the reducibility of a master thesis to logical propositions and logical propositions of such thesis or logical feature of such thesis. These are entirely fundamentally different. Grunbaum does not really expect Freud to abide by pure logic.
He simply tries to actually show the course of Freudian through your pathic thesis of psychoanalysis can in fact, like all arguments that we can ever make, can be reduced to a simple proposition of logic. And by virtue of its own logic in fact, rather than logic as such it can be shown to be a weak thesis rather than a master thesis that's the point i think there's a there's if i can put it this way a logical problem with setting it up as pure logic or a metal logic he doesn't want to do that he absolutely doesn't want to do that all he tries to do that is just simply takes the the thesis of freud's and lay them on in a
logical by that I draw mean some sorts of experience experts logic simply as a top tally argument and that's why it's a kind of a tally a tally argument it puts them in a tally like in a ledger you should to see that whether okay so Freud says something like this he had such presupposition premises and such conclusions. Do they actually cohere or do they not? His idea of logical, basically, objection is absolutely not any kind of as if he has expected Freud to understand logic. No, he simply tries to reveal the logic behind Freud's thesis,
rather than subjecting it to logical principles. But I think there's sort of a forced naivety like in that move. No, why? Why there is forced naivety? Everything that we start, the point of defense of Freud actually would be a bait for Popper in the sense that Popper would say that, okay, if we say something like that, then what about conspiracy theory? Conspiracy theories also have the same kind of logic, have the same kind of recalcitrance toward logical change. It's not the same kind, though. Also, the proper view of science is just too limited, essentially.
But psychoanalysis is a different kind of science. So there are some, and I guess the most salient feature is that it's... There is a correspondence with empirical data that what distinguishes their notion of science from, for example, when Sebastian Rohn or even Kant or Hegel talk about the science of logic, science of the perceptive subject, so on and so forth. Yes, no, I understand. That's why I still like Freud and I'm a big fan of him. However, you should understand that Freud absolutely presents his psychoanalysis not merely as
a philosophical science. In fact, Freud is fundamentally against that idea. He tries to advance it as if it was on par with empirical sciences. Yeah, I mean, I want to let other people talk, but one last thing, I guess, I would just argue that it's not solely the prerogative. ...theor is not the one who makes the science of the subject, then what? Theology? No, no. I mean, anthropology and ethnography is a way, it's an empirical practice, but it's also a kind of data that's much more complex in terms of the way that ethnologists...
Yes, sure, sure. But you should understand that, unlike philosophy, I really, really suggest you to read two works by Scott Ochoa. He's also an anthropologist. and he gives a critique how much of the data that anthropology takes as its own premises are being actually gerrymandered by virtue of simply bridging concepts with other concepts simply flattening the distinctions between conceptual differences and that's really I do think I mean there is a reason that anthropology yes I mean we can't talk about trying to apologies such
objections but we need to realize why is it anthropology is no longer understood as a science maybe for philosophers content of philosophers or anthropologists what from an empirical scientist perspective absolutely anthropology no longer makes sense with science their models are we she actually their concepts are completely conflated and their data is experientially biased. So if that is, and that's why I was saying that yes, I understand the merits of these disciplines, they can be different, but as it currently stands, I don't think that we
We can call them science as such because if we do that, if all of these experiential biases are in place, if the conceptual compilations are in place, if you don't have exact models of the phenomenon at hand that you are trying to elaborate and analyze, then what would be the difference of these disciplines with scholastic theology? Well, I mean, there is empirical data, just a different kind of data. Yes, but what are the criteria? I mean, when you look at, you know, anthropological works being done today, and Scott Atron gives a fantastic, actually, analysis of many,
what you might call to be master thesis of anthropological analyses in 20th century and 21st century. he shows that these data are actually being derived by entirely arbitrary you know criteria I think that's why you cannot just go and extract data simply because you stumbled across it and you thought okay that might be important well if this is important many things other things might be important the foot the footprint of a primate that you see you might actually attribute it to a sasquatch so reza can i ask you a question in relation to this or do you if it's okay if you
want to move on is the difference between psyche and cerebrum essentially the as what Adam said the science of the subject but this inability of science to fundamentally address such questions comes from two directions and that would be response to your question one the worst scenario let me first give the bad news first that maybe maybe be such topics are actually pseudo-problems and many scientists actually think like that I'm not saying that they are right I'm simply proposing what they think too that science does
not have the adequate resources to tackle with such problems at this point a la Selaar's scientific picture of man in the world but we cannot put any our prior limits on the progress or the coverage of science scientific enterprise. I will add a number three to this list that maybe there should be a middle ground between the two, that yes the subjects that anthropology, psychoanalysis are trying to
cover are a special kind, qualitatively a special kind of subject matters. They are far removed from the kind of subject matters that exact sciences try to deal with. However, when it comes to the methodological principles, methodological systematicity by which you try to extract data, then there ought to be a common armamentarium of methods. When you look into anthropology, when you look into psychoanalysis, a state today, how do they actually get these data?
When you actually read the papers that are hailed by other anthropologists or psychoanalysis as revolutionary you notice that they don't even hold up against the 101 data collection biases memo that these are these are all actually you know range of problems that need to be addressed rather than be swept under the natural sciences their practices and their criteria of science because of the objections that Theo made in the previous sessions, we shouldn't overinflate the sociological picture of Cohen's idea of
science. But the whole idea of science is that science is a very tight community, not in the sense that it's incestuous among scientists, but the scientists are held by some basic standards on which they have agreed upon and of course they can be revised when anomalies emerge. And until then, even if you are a scientist and you do not make your assumption explicit, there are in fact other scientists using the same tools that you have used who will object to you that, oh, by the way, this stuff that you are talking is bullshit. just gerrymandering here whereas in anthropology I mean I used to go to
anthropology department back in the day and sit in their classes because I really liked it and then I really wanted to be an anthropologist and then I I noticed that it's literally the way that they try to commensurate their ideas are fundamentally based on arbitrary from a modern scientific standard of methodological systematicity, are fundamentally arbitrary. Not all of them, not all of them, absolutely, there are always exceptions but we should we should actually realize that these are problems these problems of course doesn't mean that because of these problems we should
get rid of psychoanalysis or anthropology well we should address them can I argue with you for a couple minutes more absolutely absolutely so you What really annoys me about this kind of argument is that there are people who think they know logic and then all they do is try to catch other people on record instead of trying to understand what exactly is going on. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... and the consequences that Freud himself has made,
try to show that they don't in fact at the level of the argument, philosophical or theoretical argument, they don't hold up. Simple as that. Yes, absolutely. The whole idea of the human bias or cognitive informal biases, not formal biases, informal biases, is that just because we have bought into some consequence or some premises doesn't mean that we are going to buy into the consequence of those premises. or the premises, yes, absolutely, yeah, yeah, absolutely. So this is one. Another one, the thing is that Freud is quite explicitly philosophical actually. Many people think that Freud was an anti-philosophical figure,
but no, if you read the early works of Freud, you absolutely see that he's in fact coming from this rejectory of modern philosophy and by that i mean can't in a sense the psychoanalytic principles can be understood something more or less akin more or less akin to kant's idea of categories as those which organize our psychological experiences this is all fine and good but of course you can then think about the idea of the psychoanalytic
procedure in a Freudian sense but even more so frenzy because first of all you should understand that Freud really is not the one who came up with these ideas in the first place he came up with the idea of the a priori psychoanalytic principles but the details of the system were laid out by Sandro Frenzy, his friend. I really would love you to, those of you who are interested, read the three volume of the conversation between Freud and Frenzy before they actually separated their path. So the specificity of the psychoanalysis which you mentioned that it should pertain to individual psyches is something more like Kant's transcendental logic.
In the sense it is about the right application of psychoanalytic a priori laws or theses, master theses, into individual psyches. is also good and nice, otherwise you can't even talk about any individual experience or individual psyche. However, what is actually I would say become problematic at least in Freud is that the way as you said, the way that the individual psyche is being treated
requires certain kinds of symptoms. These are what you might call to be pseudo-empirical data. I mean symptoms are essentially pseudo-empirical data, they are not empirical data as such in the modern understanding of what we mean by empirical data. However, one of the points that Grunbaum brings in his critique of psychoanalysis is that the methods by which such pseudo-empirical data or symptoms are being derived, put together into a model upon which psychoanalytical principles can be applied are fundamentally arbitrary
And actually you get the sense when you read Freud, when he talks to his different patients. Yes, this doesn't mean that the methodological principles should be inflexible or applied across the board, but they should have some common standards. Literally Freud does not have any such common standards in deriving the symptoms. He uses the word intersubjectivity a lot actually because you know that it was a buzzword at that time. But any person who uses the word intersubjectivity in order to somehow justify that this patient
requires a very specific tailored method fundamentally different from the other method that I use for another patient it's not in the business of either philosophy or science so why are we talking about it as if it was theory or philosophy well we can talk it about science version 3 I don't know whether it is good or bad but it simply cannot be talked in terms of science or in terms of philosophy because both of these procedures actually require some commonality in terms of the method of the methods by which we derive data.
I think I can give the machine learning version of psychoanalytic method which should be actually on a priori status. Now the thing is that that's what makes them theoretical. So my way of defining psychoanalysis, like in statistical way, of the hysterical symptoms abide by the inductive statistical method. Now the thing is that, as I will after a break, I will talk about that in fact we can show not only in Freudian psychoanalysis but also
in exact sciences inductive statistical methods suffer from the problem of insufficiency of explanation in so far as there that there could be many other factors or hidden estates to use a dynamic system example hidden estate that could rise to such repetitions but why is that we are going with a class of symptoms and not others that are hidden to us now this is this is exactly basically hempel's
critique of early inductivism and Freud's theory is essentially an inductivist sense yes it has deductive component by virtue of the what you said psychoanalytic paradigm rather than law but nevertheless these repetitions which you find beneath hysteria episodes of hysteria are essentially a statistical inductive models but then when it comes to this that is called inductive model then you might say that well just because every time that I build this house with such windows wacky windows the
the ceiling drops. And I would say that then I noticed that these wacky windows might be actually the ones who are not supporting and the ceiling collapses. Well what about the hidden states? The asymmetry in our explanations where we can know where basically there might be other kinds of stuff happening and only by virtue of human bias we associate the causal link between the wacky picture frame or window frame and the fall of the ceiling. There can be any of such numerous such factors. So that's the whole point. That's really I would say
that this is exactly the point that I would say that Freudian psychoanalysis, no matter how much I love it, both as a fictional theory and a kind of genealogical theory, materialist theory, it actually suffers from quite severe explanatory paradigms. The whole link between symptoms and hysteria or trauma in hysteria are fundamentally arbitrary because you could easily go on and say that well maybe I actually at some point in my life I actually fell on
ground and then I saw as I was falling in a slow motion that there is a scene of this patch of red in front of my eye. But then Freud would say that no no no this is not how your trauma was caused, your hysteria was caused. It's because you for example saw your mom menstruating or something like that. But these are just so arbitrary! These are absolutely asymmetrical explanatory patterns. Look Reza, I think you missed the knowledge that the subject which undergoes treatment
does not arise at the knowledge of you know some kind of hidden reasons. The The actual knowledge here arrives at the knowledge of hearing. Tell the difference between different variations of what subject produces. But it's not about difference, it's about repetition. If you are repeatedly produced same and same and same and same. this is exactly like you say that just because every time that my knee hit this table this glass fell over okay well maybe it wasn't my knee maybe because there was an earthquake that's an arbitrary decision of the causal causal
factors and that's really why call a scientific idea of explanations and important and I don't think that in psychoanalysis such stuff are not being addressed I mean imagine like every minute you have a some sort of tremor for some reason in the ground but also every time that my knee hit this glass and it might actually correspond or coincide with the sequence of the tremors every time that my knee goes and hit this table this glass falls over and the liquid falls out of it then how how do I actually know that why is that it
is not actually my knee that is making this glass fall over is the tremor in the ground you know this these are actually quite serious problems the idea of explanatory asymmetry and arbitrariness, what Hempel calls nomological irrelevancies. Nomological irrelevancies plague psychoanalysis. Can I hop in if Fernlos Felenthin wants to say something else? Sure. I think I have a few answers, but it's going to take too long. well let's let's hear Theo and then we go have a break let us some steam and
then come back to the war yeah and maybe I maybe my question might put the conversation in different light I don't know I'm just curious to hear rather than doing a comparison of psychoanalysis and science a comparison from Reza of a philosophy and science if science is this discipline that the adherence to science and the practitioners of science have agreed upon concepts and principles from which they methodologically operate how do you see that happening or not happening in philosophy well to me philosophy and
And that's, I might afraid, that's, you are now pigeon-holing me to finally give you my extremely narrow sense of philosophy. That's why, ultimately, I take side with Plato and Hegel. Philosophy is not about empirical phenomena, it's not about the appearances, it's about the science of the concept, what you can do with the concept. in the broadest possible sense. For me empirical data as a philosopher mean a lot, but this is not the task of the philosopher. The task of the philosopher is to expand the territory of the concept or Plato's Logoi.
That's all philosophers do. then it seems like rationality or reason is troubled at least because it's unable to point to its foundations without avoiding being rational but what do you mean by foundation if you are trying to say that the foundations of reasons are in fact empirical then they are you are basically making the sin of the myth of the given yeah no my I guess my understanding is that
that reason as a methodology itself doesn't allow itself to easily give reasons for why it operates. Because as soon as reason gives the reason... Operates in what sense? Operate in what sense? Operate with regard to what? You know, the operation of reason is essentially a kind of axiomatic or formal bootstrapping. at least since the time of Plato, more so with Hegel. It is when operation, when reason, we think reason is subordinate in some sort of purported fundament,
that this idea becomes a little bit shady. But then the objection to the very idea that reasons should operate in subordination to something else, I would say, is the epitome of dogmatism. So then what in your mind is the concept? The concept of logical relations in the broadest possible sense. Of course, this does not really address the question of how logic can gain traction upon the furniture of the world, but that's an entirely different issue.
And that's why philosophy cannot simply survive in its own sphere of conceptualization. It should actually synchronize itself with science, with computer science, with exact science, with empirical science, with cognitive science, and so on and so forth. But that's an entirely different question than to define the task of philosophy. Can we please go and have some smoke? Sure. Let's take a five-minute break. Adam has been eating, and I'm just so hungry at this point.
I have a quick question that is totally irrelevant. No, I'm not hearing your question. I need to have my secrets, or I will get temperamental at this point. All right. Should we do a seven-minute break? Sure. Yes, absolutely. Thank you. Thank you.
Sometimes you are, but not all the time. The whole point is that reason is not responsible to give explanation, typically in the form of natural law. Reason is constitutive in the understanding of a Kantian idea of constitution or Carnapian constitution. It only constitutes what we mean by law. does not give it a priority you see that's a whole world of difference between reasoning a reason actually give us laws or regularities and reason being
constitutive of them precisely because if you say that reason is not constitutive of them then what is constitutive of what then you are falling into human trap. Simply the empirical impressions become constitutive of themselves, which then the myth of the given wears its head. I think then it seems like there's a kind of fork in the road where, and I might be exaggerating it, but then at least within Kant as far as I understand him right now, reason is actually incapable of talking about the world altogether.
altogether absolutely and then reason absolutely reason is can't actually makes his point very very clear reason is disinterested right disinterested and what happens in the furniture of the world because this is not what reason is about reason is constitutive of how we actually see the world as a structured unity. It seems like that odds with how science sees itself. And I feel like, you know, Kant essentially sees, and I think rightly,
that if metaphysics isn't possible, mathematics isn't possible, science isn't possible. Well, I will say that metaphysics is not possible. I think that Hegel's critique of Kant is fundamentally momentous at this point. And this is why I have been trying to somehow synthesize Kant with Hegel, precisely because I think Kant is essentially a conservative thinker at the end of the day. It just doesn't understand the import of reason, the structure and powers of mind. And sellers really actually get to the nitty-gritty of this problem. okay you say that yes there is a difference between reason actually tells
us what it is and doing this stuff without the reason in the Kantian Hegelian sense I would definitely go for the former rather than the latter because the latter is just bunch of wishy-washy speculative armchair enthusiasm or vagaries yes of course we have to naturalize reason what naturalization is quite very slippery a slope a concept of nature that does not allow for reason to have logical autonomy is not really a good concept of nature. It's
just an empirical, a whitewash of empirical biases of the human kind. Naturalization means that we should have a concept of nature in which we are allowed to both move upstream who are the space of reasons and downstream from the space of reason to the space of causes or natural factors. And really, yes, if in that case I'm absolutely pro-naturalization of everything including reason and language. I thought that reason forecloses itself. I guess that's why I see solipsism as such a large problem for rationalism.
Why do you think that reason is not amenable to the idea of naturalization with the understanding of the nature that I have mentioned? well if you're describing it as a type of bootstrapping it's never able to simply just say this was the reason for my reason in it what do you mean this is not a reason well this is reason it has nothing to do with Leibnizian sufficient reason. That's basically some sort of, I would say, weasley move made
by Meirassu in After Affinity, that he tries to conflate the idea of reason with Leibnizian sufficient reason. But that's not what reason is. Reason is simple logical relations. Can you actually name one thing one thing that you can talk about without logical consequences or logical relations broadly understood including the concept of nature or even empirical observational data La la la. Go on, Theo.
Don't let me to. I'm just simply trying to challenge you. My task here is to challenge you guys. Yeah, no. It's not about objecting to you. It's just trying to stimulate your mind. yeah i mean i'm just processing too but um i i guess i i'm you know having a little bit of difficulty seeing how i think i guess i'm trying to i can see i after all these years that we have been
friends, I see that sometimes, very very rarely however, you make an impermissible bridge between the concept of reason as simply logical relations, logical coherency in the broadest possible sense and not in any canonical understanding of coherency and reason in a Leibnizian sense in the sense that for example we say in a Leibnizian sense that there is a reason that I am poor there is a reason that I am a stupid
well there might be a reason but that's not really what reason is that's just naturalism whitewashed under the name of reason. I would say Miyasu absolutely belongs to the latter category. He just doesn't understand the idea of reason. He really doesn't. Every conclusion that he derives is just based on this stupid leibnizian theological understanding of reason which by the way at in the last instance teleological are stotelian well you should
understand that in fact may assume alliance unlike buddy who is not with plato but what Aristotle, the godfather of teleology. How do you define logical relation? You see, logical relations is essentially a source, of course we can go to the history philosophy and see logical relations in different veins at different times, but for me is essentially what you might call to be a Carnapian view of logical relations as put forward in logical syntax of language. Essentially that at
the base of the concept of a structure, and a structure can of course be understood equally as the word intelligible because simply intelligibility is a byproduct of a structuration it is not something that is given us by world by something that is being constituted in the cantine sense by the mind the turn it starts with the idea of symbol design namely syntax what is syntax essentially syntax is what you might call to be the grammar of transforming
one symbol to another symbol a collection of transformation rules that are obtained within a class of symbols they can be anything they can be pictures they can be sound bites they can be anything virtually you can even imagine and these transformation rules once embedded within a multi-agent system within a intersubjectivist framework then they take semantic values. When I say oh, you say oh, in reference to the symbols that we have been exchanging
within our conversation. This is essentially a computationalist interactionist view of semantics, that semantic values are nothing distinct from syntactic symbols, it's just that they are in fact syntax in context sensitive and interactionist framework. And this semantic values, or what you might call to be the exchange value of syntactic symbols allow us to further refine the transformation rules obtained between our symbols the symbols
we use in order to encode the furnitures of the world we can have so many syntactic framework And by virtue of that, we can have so many semantic values for logical relations within such symbols. This is all I need. How do we define the context sensitivity of certain syntaxes? For example, I made an example in the previous session with regard to how we have a match.
The stick is made of wood, the match head is made of oxidizing agent and so forth. For us to in fact talk about what causes what, what explains what, we're required to move across different contexts. might be counterfactual scenarios that if I take this match and rub it against a frictional system a frictional surface in the earth atmosphere it will ignite however if the entire match is wet nothing will ignite but then if I take the same match into the vacuum where there
is no oxygen and I rub it against friction surface, the match head, because of the oxidizing agent in it, will ignite but the matchstick won't burn. So this gives us what Brandom calls a range of counterfactual robustness, which are essentially modal parameters upon what causes what, what explains what. However in the realm of for example intersubjective dialogue or dialogical linguistic activities, context sensitivity can mean even more kinds of things, it can be even broader.
For example, I use the word red and by that word you see, you should understand, in the philosophy language words don't mean anything. First of all, words don't mean anything, only assertions mean something. Words are just symbols, basically a concatenation of symbols. You can make like a predator when he goes into his wristwatch and puts his stuff and there are some glyphs come up. Let's say that that's the word red. So that's the word red. And this word red can function differently in different contexts.
the word red might be associated with a red patch, namely roses in the garden. However, it can also be associated with the name of a person. It can also be associated with simply a quote that is fundamentally meaningless. That's the context sensitivity. And context sensitivity, the problem, The problem of context sensitivity cannot be solved unless we move from the subjectivist view of language into intersubjectivist, namely interactionist view of language. The only way that contexts do emerge and we can resolve the contextual problem is when
we have conversation, when we have a dialogue. I understand that the word or the symbol red that I use has the same functional normative value for me as it has for you. I noticed you have an interesting role reversal as things goes on in this.
for example purely like syntactical meaning are essentially compressed information we no longer need to unpack what we mean by red once we have agreed upon it the symbol red whatever shape it has we just move on and we think as if we simply meant this compressed encapsulation. So you see this is actually a point that has been brought up by a few philosophers recently that meaning or concepts with the understanding of concepts actually do deal
with meaning or semantic values are two-ways compressions between interlocutors and by virtue of that we can do so many stuff with concepts that we couldn't otherwise do with simple syntactic symbols um um maybe i had a question that's kind of it is tangential to this
I don't know about this. So in, you know, theories of rationalism, theories of linguistic or inferentialist, of meaning, where meaning is not no longer understood as simply the signification of the world, of a word as we understood it, you know, in the old theories. Words don't have meaning. Words only have meaning or namely semantic value in so far as they, these symbols, whatever shape they might have, stand to other kinds in a specific relations to
stand with other kinds of symbols. So, with that said, the theory of explicitation, at least Brandon I would say, is the first one who literally sheds light on what explicitation means. Explicitation in Brandonian sense means two things so when you use the symbol red we can call it also the word red we done the resounding of this word doesn't mean anything it's just a symbol okay this symbol
stands in a forward manner in terms of consequences with certain other kinds of symbols so when you use when you author the word red you are not allowed to use some other symbols or some other words as if they were equivalent to this word so this is what you might call to be the forward view of explicitation however explicitation also has a backward view the reason that you can use a symbol coherently or a bunch of symbols such as the word red is
precisely because you have already implicitly, implicitly, that's the key word, implicitly distinguished it from the use of other kinds of symbols that might differ from it. So the idea of explicitation simply means that when we use a word as a collection of symbols we are committed to two tasks at the same time one making explicit the implicit presuppositions that let us to use the word or the symbol red rather
than the symbol green or blue. One. Two. Once we use the word red or the symbol red, we can no longer use some other kinds of symbols or words such as white, black, purple, so on and so forth. but then we are entitled to the semantic value of such symbols such as colored or when we use the word red we then we are entitled to use the word colored but not the word white this is the task
of explicitation in a sense that you have to bring out the presuppositions that hold between your premises and consequences of using a specific symbol or word or assertion now explication on the other hand is already built on the idea of explicitation it has something more explication simply means that I say the word red when I apply it to a certain
kind of phenomenon that I have seen some observable data like a red patch of roses Okay? However, explication means that the concept of red can be defined, can be refined, refined as we move from the concepts that we use and we have agreed upon to the application of the same concepts to different phenomenon under different kinds of constraints. So another example, hardness.
The hardness of metal beam, the word hardness, hardness. Hardness we can use it like I'm working with a metal beam. At the level of the microscopic what I can actually see as the elasticity of the metal I use the word hardness and this is an agreed upon word or assertion. It means the same thing. However, if I come up with a microscopic instrument that allows me to see the same phenomenon under more refined conditions like at the level of crystallographic structure of the
metal then I still can use the word hardness but the word hardness too doesn't exactly mean what hardness one at the level of microscopic elasticity meant. So for Carnap, explication is simply the refinement of concepts or what you might call to be the scientific conceptual engineering of the concept in a Szilardian sense, where we have to refine are concepts according to new parameters set by reality, set by the furniture of the world.
So, um, uh, explication, uh, uh, explicitation is more in terms of the, um, clarification of the relationship of the differences and consequences, um, but doesn't fundamentally change them it just clarifies the relationship. Clarifies yes, absolutely. Explication could entail some you know modification of the premises. Yes it's essentially carnival action which is basically a task of explicitation. Okay yeah that makes perfect sense. If no one has an immediate question, I was going to ask a follow-up after your definition
of philosophy is, I guess it's a structuralist understanding of philosophy. I didn't say, I'm going to actually say that I actually don't remember it. I won't be held responsible for it. Go on, Theo. How do you see criticism functioning within your own understanding of philosophy? Is criticism still looking for the by what right certain assertions are made?
Yes, I mean, absolutely. The thing is that the word critique, I mean, in a philosophical, technical sense, can mean two things. The first one is simply the conditions of possibility. the Kantian understanding of the critique as in the critique of pure reason, the conditions of possibility of having pure reason. But also critique can mean something like in Cartesian or Humean in the sense that the critique of the pure reason is really what pure reason is not about, determinately. Yes, in a Kantian sense, absolutely this is the case.
I would say as a philosopher I can never actually coherently talk as if it was concluded about the Cartesian-Humian conception of the critique. reason is not about where reason can be so many things and this is a task of cognitive sciences to show us that actually reason can be in fact be model what we understand that reason and the same kind of functions that it plays you know logical the structuration of the world you can be played by so many other alternatives that's to me I'm fine with this principle however I think that the
details of such a picture also it needs to be addressed by way of the idea of Kantian critique conditions of possibility for example like sure how I reason about the stuff in the world can be modeled on a statistical enumeration for a statistical probabilities in a modern sense the Boltzmannian sense but then a different question arises and then you come back again yet to Kant what
are the conditions of possibilities of having in fact a statistical probability and Boltzmann took it very very seriously in fact those people who these days talk about machine learning as if it was just simply some sort of umbrella statistical term without us defining what actually we mean by probability what kind of notion of probability we are endorsing here are absolutely in the business of pretty critical philosophy too in my opinion
so two things before we say goodbye I remember that I the last session I talked about you know So the idea of DN model, SD model and SI model respectively abbreviations for nomological deductive, statistical deductive and inductive statistical models. I also talked at the end that usually the notion of regularity which belongs in the
same family as of causation, explanation, so on and so forth, is based on a concept which in philosophy of science, at least in the Hempel's work, is called gnomic expectability. Like the one that I mentioned that, you know, whenever my knee hits the table, this under such and such conditions with such and such parameters, under such and such laws, the glass falls over and the liquid escapes the glass. Now, here two problems arise which bring to that debate that I had with a couple of you
with regard to psychoanalysis. Two issues arise here. The first issue is what is called gnomic asymmetry or explanatory asymmetries. Another one is called gnomic or explanatory irrelevancies. Now let me, these are what you might call to be counter examples against the classical dN, dS, and IES models of explanation as put forward by Hembell. Now what are explanatory asymmetrics or nomically asymmetrics?
So cast on a wall by calculating the initial conditions of the system plus a law. So what are these? the actual size of the flagpole that casts a shadow on the wall plus laws pertaining to optical diffraction or laws of optics more generally if you have these two then you are
capable of deriving an explanandum from explainants the length of the of the shadow cast on the wall from the length of the flagpole plus some theoretical laws with regard to optics however you can if we consider the length of the actual wooden flagpole and the laws of optics as initial conditions of the system You cannot simply, if you have the length of the shadow, guess what the, or calculate
what the length of the wooden flagpole is or under what laws of optics it behaves. This is usually called explanatory asymmetry. In terms of explanatory asymmetry, we can move from the initial conditions of the system in order to predict what might be the trajectory of the system. we cannot derive the initial behavior of the systems or conditions of the system behaving under a certain kind of law from the actual future state of the system exactly like the
flagpole example this is called what explanatory Another thing as a counter example to our paradigm that we have been talking about is something called gnomic or explanatory, gnomological by that I mean gnomic or explanatory irrelevancies. Okay, a good example of this, which is a classical example that has been put forward so many times. So John is a man, okay?
He takes birth control pills. John is a man, he takes birth control pills. Don't laugh. As he takes birth control pills, he never gets pregnant. You see, this is actually a very, very sound deductive reasoning. Control pill, birth control pill, I take it regularly, I don't get pregnant. But it just simply doesn't apply to John as a man. John is a fucking man. He doesn't need to get the control pill in order to get pregnant because he cannot get
pregnant. This is called what? An explanatory irrelevance. How can we actually set apart explanatory irrelevancies such as this from explanatory or nomological relevancies which actually play significant parts in our causal explanations? I'm not going to talk about any more of this. You are going to actually come up with your own ideas and discuss it next session.
Could you tell us a little bit about why it's important or… You remember? Yeah. In terms of, you see, every time my knee, I have a knee jerk. I'm actually mentally or psychosomatically deficient. So my habit knee jerk, it hits the table under such and such conditions and under such and such laws and the glass falls over and the liquid escapes from the glass okay so my knee jerk is an explanation we fact the escape of the liquid from the glass okay but then
how about that we put a different factor in it actually two different factors that this there is a tremor in the ground it's just that I'm not conscious of it and the accumulative effect of this tremor of which I'm unconscious is actually the real cause of the fall of the of the glass falls and the liquid escapes but then there is that That might be another kind of pseudo cause. Every time that I actually look out into the open and the sunshine comes to my eye, I get
blinded and I have an eject. So which one of these are the explanatory cause of our phenomenon? can you actually distinguish between them is the drama to just to sort of respond to Peters question that in a hyperbolic example that this threatens the entirety of our explanation? Yes, absolutely it does. It does. It absolutely does. Yes. I'm just trying to push you towards epistemological, a skeptical
super asset. It feels... it's not connected. I mean... I mean, they happen as much in psychoanalysis, in philosophy, as in exact sciences. How can we really tell apart from such factors? Should we think on this ourselves or is there a specific... Yes, that's the whole point. Yes, but I think actually this is a far more serious problem The idea You see, you know, I'm sure that
You will the first thing that you are trying to do is putting explanatory factors on top of causation say that well because The reason that my niger explains the fall of the glass and the escape of the liquid is because my niger actually caused the liquid to escape from the glass. But then I would say that, could you please actually tell me what you mean by causation without actually falling into a regressive argument? This is actually a fundamentally serious problem.
It might have just been that God hit the billiard balls and … Yeah, I'm sure. Yeah, yeah. I actually always tell any person who asks me, God did it. God told me to. I mean theology actually had the fucking genius you know the idea that's okay let's just stop talking about this bullshit stuff let's just say God did it for us the best idea of explanation I fundamentally vote for it it's Occam's razor it may yet be true text I mentioned to you it's
Sorry. Okay, this is the title. The author is David Armstrong. It's one of the most classic works of the critical regularity thesis as put forward by Hemphill and other similar people. What is a law of nature?
Remember that the idea of explanation whether in the deductive nomological sense, inductive deductive statistical sense or inductive statistical sense all were hinging on some some semblance of what you might call to be a natural law an idea of an invariance a regularity something that is uniformable and uniform across the board but then with the examples
that I actually made right now then you see that you know you can make so many regularities But then what actually tells you which one should be chosen in your explanatory paradigm and not the others? The same stuff that I've made in my objections to psychoanalysis. But they are as prevalent in psychoanalysis as in exact sciences. Okay, I don't want to hear from you anymore. I have to go.
You need to go. actually a sin to hear about philosophical ramblings on Sunday I'm actually ashamed of you why do you always choose no I mean you guys need to really in the Sundays do something fun well okay I understand that you think philosophy is fun but believe me philosophy is not fun but nevertheless I can go along with your ideas for now however have a great day try to do some fantastic stuff and then we meet next week i have one really stupid question rosa go on so someone sent me this book and it
has your name just because there is a resonator sunny here at time t1 place p1 and there is a resonator sunny at t1 place p1 doesn't mean that they are the same people yeah do you understand the names are so prevalent i i didn't think so either i just had to ask it was a bit more than that there was the circumstantial evidence of you being some of a you being a systems engineer yes yes but no believe me i haven't written on any of such issues if i was had if i had been writing about such issues i wouldn't have been teaching such course
to you guys in the first place by anyway really honor to talk to you next session Adam I think is back from Russia you had a lecture in Russia we move toward the question of time the question of space in the session after and then the last session we'll have some sort of like a roundup of everything that we have discussed. But hopefully next session Adam will be our guest and we'll talk about the question of time in physical sciences. Thanks Rizou.