Hello and welcome to the seventh session of Kant's Circle of Revenge. I'm going to pass the mic to Reza. Okay, thank you everyone. So, as I said last session, we are going to talk about transcendental logic and this different distinction that Kant makes between different forms of logic you know general particular applied pure so on so forth and then we move to transcendental analytics before then if you have any question whether with regard to what we talked about at that
session or today's reading material feel free to ask I asked a question last week on that. Okay, Artem, Chagi, Maria, Stanley. Okay, I have a question about last week after seeing the recording. So when you were talking about
like this sort of nested hierarchy of awarenesses, it seems like the building blocks are- Nested hierarchy of faculties. Awareness is only awareness one and awareness two. Oh, okay, so impressions, that theme work. Awareness one is what you might call to be representations or impressions, representation as rudimentary, pure, basically what you might call to be sensations as organized by space and time. Yeah. Forms of intuition. And the other one is what you might call to be awareness two. Awareness too is essentially an act of judgment.
But are the, like, is awareness too... It's like seeing as. Is it radically different from direct impression? Because it seems to me that reproduction is the impression of impression. So the building blocks you have working with are just impressions and the direct sensory cause. Or is there something, is reproduction radically different from impression? Okay, so impressions, reproduction, anticipations all belong to awareness one in their pure forms, okay?
in their pure forms they absolutely all of them whether impression or even production and reproduction is simply an impression of an object when the object is no longer present an anticipation is you know obviously a kind of a anticipatory model whereby reproductions impressions are brought into service of action of an intelligence or an organism's in the environment. So all of these three, what we might call to be de facto, temporally ordered impressions are part of awareness one.
Awareness two is not that it is a radically different, yes, in a sense it is radically different, but also it originates from these. But nevertheless, such impressions or reproductions or anticipations, we just, now we call them just sense impressions, temporally and spatially ordered. Such impressions ought to undergo different levels of unity or levels of integration organized by a higher faculties in order to finally reach awareness too. Awareness too is essentially a piece of judgment, is a perception.
Perceptions, there's no perception as sense impression. All of our perceptions are perceptual judgments, or takings, something as something else. So when we are saying this is a red book, we are dealing with subject predicates. We are talking about logical forms. We are talking about the concept of a book and the concept of a read, which stands in relation to other concepts, so on and so forth, in the sense that to arrive at a perceptual judgment we should have a minimum requirement of how to know how to use and apply concepts. And concepts, the thing that makes them radically different from Awareness I is that concepts
are not perspectival. Concepts are not imagistic. Whereas at the level of Awareness I, you remember that we see of an object, its surface, its color side. It's always a spatiotemporal forms of intuition or space and time as representation are, on the level of awareness, one, are perspectival. It's only from the perspective of a subject, of a low-grade or rudimentary subject, that things appear as such and such, but only perspectively, pure perspectively.
on the other hand are not perspectival and that's but why is that they are not perspectival well because they span over many concepts and non-perspectival of them is really a token or an expression of them being objective objective in the sense that they are not reducible to a particular experience of a particular subject situated in space and time. Thanks.
Absolutely. So, understanding belongs to the subject. Obviously, a subject needs to perform the function of understanding. But the thing is that Hickens never talks about this idea that whether understanding is as specific to particular subjects or to the principle of a perceptive subjectivity. Two different things. A particular subject is always situated.
A perceptive subjectivity is a principle of subject constitution. Understanding belongs to a perceptive subjectivity or a perceptive subject as a principle. And as later Hegel shows, it is true and true and subjective in that regard. So like the existence, so it's purely because I'm just going back to like understanding how from so future like the future tense a tensed time is not generated through impressions there
no no no they are absolutely conceptual they are purely logical constructs they have been instantiated they have been instantiated by certain rudimentary forms of a spatio-temporal representation at the level of awareness one but for something to be instantiated in something rudimentary doesn't mean that it is simply the over extension of that rudimentary thing they have something more and that's the logical instruction which is absent at the level of that rudimentary awareness because Because you see the whole idea that the tense of verbs have or endowed with du jour logical
connections between them, between subject and predicates, so on and so forth. But all of those pure perspectival, especially temporal situationality at the level of awareness one is de facto. De facto, meaning that it is causally instantiated. Causally instantiated doesn't mean that it has a logical structure. Of course, you know, certain concepts, certain forms of thought are embedded or embodied in causal structures, but this doesn't mean that they are exactly the de facto ones. No, their structure is fundamentally different. In fact,
they have a structure they have exclusive structure whereas the de facto ones don't have really a an explicit structure a structure is something that as we talked about structure is something that you can't have it unless you reach the level of understanding because if you say so then there is such a thing as a structure beneath the level of understanding then that would be just the myth of the given you know a world already bestows or imparts its own structure on the receiver end the subject that is receptive to the app to being affected in
such and such way by intervention of you know objects outside of it that would be the myth of the given the structure is essentially function of understanding and reason. And tense verbs are structured explicitly, but the other ones, those impression, reproduction, anticipation, are not structured in a technical sense, philosophical sense. They have been organized by forms of intuition, but they don't have explicit structure, because the structure is something logical, it's conceptual. It's not something that you can find it at some rudimentary, fundamental level of how the subject interacts with the world because that brings us back to the
whole idea of empiricism that Kant wants to diverge from. Just one more thing, so this idea of like a structure but there are arguments made for there being like a structure within the world, embedded in the world and if I'm to understand this correctly, that's like a right-wing Solaresian position. Not all of the right-wing Salarsians say that, but yes, some do. But the whole idea is that, again, this comes back, they don't say that there is a structure in the board already. What they do is exactly what Salars says, but the way they interpret it is different. So they say that norms are embodied in
causes, or for example, such and such higher faculties are embedded or embodied by such and such lower physical you know causal capacities now this brings the whole idea of this two-faced norm and cause schema now depending on how you you interpret this that our causal instantiation are sufficient for conceptual basically activities or not leads to the Szilardzian right-wing versus left-wing Szilardzianism it's the whole idea of sufficiency and none of
them would say I don't think that any of them would say something that there is actually a structure already in the world which we inherit simply through sensations, as if world imprints its own structure on our senses. No, none of them would say that. What they say is that at the level of causal instantiation, and by that they mean nervous system, So they say that causal instantiations, for the most part, are sufficient for conceptual activities. Right-wing Salarzyansin. Left-wing Salarzyanism, no, there is no such a thing as sufficiency.
That would lead to, I mean, they have different kinds again. There are different spectrums on the right-wing Solaresian, right-wing Solaresian, and different degrees on left-wing Solaresians. Brandom is something of a modest left-wing Solaresian. MacDowell is a more extreme one. Jay Rosenberg is a modest right-wing Solaresian. Ruth Milliken is a very staunch one. And it really depends on how they interpret this idea of sufficiency, of causal instantiation being sufficient for conceptual activities. But I don't think that any of them would say something that the world, there is already
a structure in the world and the world simply transfers its structure to our senses through this form of causal interaction between the organism or the rudimentary subject and the world because that would lead basically to something that they all agree that will lead to myth of the gift which is the large main thesis thanks absolutely Okay. Okay.
So, the idea is that starting with this chapter on transcendental logic can mix two key divisions corresponding to two aspects of our being sensorily passive subjects or intelligences. This is so-called the doctrine of two sources.
idea that all of our cognitive achievements, and so in particular our experience of the natural world, emerge from the conjoined exercise of two complementary faculties. reception of representations at this point we can call them receptivity of impressions so again in order to avoid any further confusion when I'm saying when can't you have seen that can't talks about in this chapter talks about representation receptivity to representation so it's not that but also
we talked about that these are not really representation because if they were representations and why the fuck we are doing critical philosophy in the first place so the best way to think about them is just like that we put seeing one seeing two corresponding to awareness one awareness two you can think of representation representation two and representation now even more confusing so represented what calls what can calls here representation is representation simply in impressions by impressions I mean the whole idea of impressions reproductions anticipations sensory impressions in the most general sense so these are representations then we have also representation one so we
have also representation rep what is representation representation to is not what you might call to be a particular representation of a particular item in the moon, an image model. seeing this side of the cube seeing this pink side of the ice cube then to some higher faculties I adumbrate in a Hosserlian sense I adumbrate that's precisely because I have under you know different situations I have seen but
also I have the concept of a cube, I see of a particular form of cube that is color through and through, so on and so forth. So this image model, this image model is essentially a little bit less perspectival, but it is essentially perspectival. It again deals with color, sides, rudimentary shapes, but without any form of higher order spatial temporal connections between these different facets of the objects. So this image model is what we call to be representation two. It is still more on the
side of senses. Then we have representation three, which is probably not even good to call it, representation. These are conceptual representings. I see it as a book. I see it as a pink ice cube, so on and so forth. So no longer a perspectival at this point. They are purely transcendental entities. So, and you know, Brandon and many of the people, particularly on the left, in Slarzianism, for good reasons, they say that we should not even call them representations.
Precisely because calling them representations, you prioritize, again, sensorial materiality of these concepts over their form, over their inferential relations. Well, the reason there are concepts, these representations of conceptual representings, like a pink ice cube, is precisely because they stand first and foremost in inferential relations among themselves. So it's best to not call them representations anymore. nevertheless we can think about them at three levels of represent representation one more sensory no conceptual component representation to low-grade concepts
again more sensory and representation three mostly conceptual in friendship So, as I said, all of the cognitive achievements are the products of conjoined exercise of two complementary faculties. What Kant calls the receptivity or reception of representations, namely representation one, issuing intuitions through which objects are given. and then the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations
in parenthesis a spontaneity of concepts through which objects are no longer given but are thought. Of course you know if we went to be extremely nitpicky we would say that the very way that we distinguish numerically distinguished three forms of representation, we should also make corresponding numerical distinction for the word object in this passage. Because the whole idea is that there is no such a thing as object at the level of senses. Okay? Object constitution is the whole idea of transcendence of philosophy. So we can say object 1, object 2, object 3, corresponding to representation 1, representation
2, and representation 3. Well, we don't go that way. But you get, basically, what Kant tries to relate here. The given object is object 1. Object thought is object 3. Disconnected facets of objects yet to be organized and integrated into a singular representation is what you might call to be object two. Any questions? Any? I just want to say, I've only given.
Oops, sorry. Go ahead, Charles. I was just going to say, just for clarification, object 1 would be an unrepresented representing? Representation 1. Representation 1. Yes, given object. Given in sense, it is at the level of sense impressions. Or what Ken calls representation. Here, we'll correspond to what we said is representation 1. And that's what Sellers calls unrepresented representing. Unrepresented representing, yes. OK, OK. I think so, yes, yeah. But this representing has no form.
It has form. That's form, forms of space and time. Transcendental aesthetic. So you wouldn't be able to say that the thing, there wouldn't be, you could speculate about the form of the thing in itself that would be underneath this. No, you can't, no, you can't. In Kant you can't do this. You see, object is not thing in itself. Object is a giganist sound. A gegeneishland is essentially a phenomenal constitution. It's an abnormal nature. But only like in the understanding, as a pragmatic, part of like a pragmatic process,
we would have to speculate about the thing in itself for there to be a process of like a theoretical revision. yet you see two things a speculation if it means thinking thing in itself yes but if it means in Canton vocabulary knowing the thing in itself then no speculation it means thinking yes yes but knowing it no because knowing means that essentially in can't the gap between phenomena and no no no no will be overcome and hence there is an a priori then that would basically what you see what the result of this would be the result of it retroactively nullifies
the entire project of Kant's critical philosophy you mean the capacity to know to know the thing in itself yes because it bridges the gap between phenomenon and if there is no gap between phenomena and no-man-ul in Kantian philosophy, even in the future, then it retroactively nullifies what we set out to initiate, really. It retroactively nullifies. It's like Braziarian extinction, the thought of extinction. It's retroactively nullifies the idea of vitality thought as vitality and in fact
create a gap a division you know a golf between thinking and being within but not only that we think thinking and living and essentially that's from him for for Ray at least that's essentially the the gesture from which philosophy became so you get similar also in cans the the whole idea that we can't know the things in itself retroactively creates a division between between
appearances and things in themselves, between knowledge and thinking. So this is a kind of a gesture that I have seen so many philosophers have embarked on. And you can see it, you posit something in the future. You say that it's impossible, or it's possible. And then And that very gesture, at some Archimedean point, retroactively justifies its own premise. It creates an initiation, a gesticulation that allows you to make certain kinds of moves.
Object 1 is Proto-Gegeneshtan. Yes, but the last one that Cam uses here the word Gegeneshtan. By that it simply means a flux of sensations or materials through which you can organize the appearance. an object down the line Well as we said, you know without without the proper distinction that paragraph is right for Misunderstanding because you know the whole idea that the giganish on you need to have categories of giganish done a sensible object you need to have perceptual judgments, but you don't need to also have critical judgments to be capable of
You know setting apart illusions From objectivity none of which exists at the level of the so-called given object, referred to here by Kant. Yeah, this is giving me a huge headache, that aspect of Kant. You see, there is a reason that analytic philosophers are great at making these subscripts. You see, continental philosophy, for the most part, is built in this idea of lumping as much as you can together in a most indiscriminatory way.
One of the great things, one of the virtues of analytic philosophy is that you call, for example, talk about intuition. You know, there are so many different senses of intuition, even in Kant. You need to always numerically distinguish them, make it kind of analytic table of contents, what these things each mean, and then you go on doing these kinds of things. Of course, content of philosophy come up with these super ambitious thoughts precisely because for the majority, not always, I mean I shouldn't reductively talk here, But nevertheless, you can see the traces of it, quite rampant, that the very fact that they arrive at these fundamental speculative insights is because you have put together so much bullshit together in the first place.
You didn't make the proper distinctions. you can overextend one conclusion to another. Stanley, voice your objection. I don't have an objection. That was just a response to Artem calling it the potato book. The potato book. Yeah, I think this, like the emphasis on how this whole critical framework is constructed
retrospectively is is for me the most useful like it helps me to avoid the the apparent falling into worrying about the problems of like how intuitions are given and this sort of thing. Yes, yeah, yeah, no. Well, I mean, isn't it the whole idea that philosophy and science are essentially a species of their own history? In fact, they are the only things that they have history and not the nature. And it's only through their history, you know, engagement with their history,
that only retrospectively you come to such and such. You are in fact justified to make such and such statement you know and there is as philosophy and in the whole idea of critical philosophy starting with Kant needs to be understood as as this moment where philosophy starts to take the idea of thinking in retrospective very seriously the reason only retrospectively realizes conditions of its realization or his power of knowing res when you say power of knowing is that a Daniel Macbeth uses that yes yes
But that's Higgles things that Daniel Mike that's the . OK. Yes, . Yeah. So with this division that I mentioned, We can see that essentially a new hierarchy again, or new sets of divisions start to emerge once we look at the level, once we start to think about our receptivity, ourselves at
the level of receptivity to sensations. So as I said, you get representation one and representation three, object one, object three. Now we call receptivity of our mind to receive representations in so far as it's affected in some way sensibility. That was the original point in previous sessions. Then on the other hand, the faculty for bringing forth representations or the spontaneity of cognition, what's called the spontaneity of cognition, is understanding.
Now transcendental logic tries to connect these two layers together, the level of sensibility and the level of understanding, level of representation one and representation three, object one and object three. before moving to transcendental logic, it's perhaps useful to follow Kant's own exegesis on different forms or types of logic. As I have mentioned a number of times, Kant hardly
knew anything about logic. The majority of stuff that he talks about, logic, particularly his ideas of the difference between the whole idea that general formal logic can only be understood as an organon if it is putative or illusory, or the whole idea that's, you know, this hard distinction between form and content in logic, these are just absolutely, you know,
philosophically feeble ideas that have been famously criticized by whole tradition from post-Kantians to Hegelians, and later on being fundamentally debunked by the rise of analytic philosophy developments in formal logic, in mathematical logic, in computational logic, so on and so forth. Nevertheless, so, Kent tells us that logic can concern either the general use or particular use of understanding. Now each of these two divisions can also have additional divisions. They can either be pure
or applied. Now in today's lexicon what we call applied logic is really particular or specialized logic. So what we call applied logic is, remember what I just said, the first division in logic is between general and particular. Then each of these two can have, can be either applied or pure. What we call applied today in logic is really particular logic, a specialized logic. What canned means by applied is entirely something else which we are going to look at. So general logic is essentially
a all-purpose or context-insensitive, context-independent or topic-neutral logic, according to Kent. that I'm saying is according to Kent. None of them are mine. So general logic, according to Kent, contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place at all. Now, on the other hand, the logic of a particular or specialized use of the understanding concerns
with the rules, that's Kean's citation, the rules for correctly thinking about a certain kind of objects, rules of correctly thinking about certain kinds of objects. So we are, so better way to understand, general logic doesn't have objects, it's just about the pure laws of thoughts. Frigge's du Morgan laws of thoughts are on the side of general logic. Now, a specialized logic is when you add two criteria to it.
Object or material content and how to apply that law correctly, context sensitivity, to to that particular kind of object. So this is called a specialized or particular logic. Any questions? So particular logic would be like with Vandaloy, that would be like, just for example, like the landmark in Target would be the particular logic. Yes, you might say yes, yes. But I will, yes, but Dar, you can even,
go more and I will tell make some examples of how you can think even more broader categories of particular logic now so what are the two criteria that you mentioned again? objects and rules of correct application in a given context a certain kind of object application of the object that does make sense so
and that's why in today's lexicon that's what we call applied logic but But what Kant calls applied logic is an entirely different thing. So now for Kant, logic becomes general. I mean general logic becomes pure and formal. or any kind of logic becomes pure and formal, whether it's particular or general,
when it only pertains to relations among concepts. And the sort of relations that Kant understands at his time are these rudimentary Aristotelian relations. between concepts like subordination coordination so on and so forth independently of the content of those concepts independently of the concept of the content of those concepts so you see that from here onwards can't mix
a move that is quite in tandem with the long tradition of Aristotelian logic, past two scholasticism, a hard distinction between form and content. He thinks that if a logic simply pertains to relations among concepts, it means that it is contentless or has no concern for content of those concepts. Or that, or alternatively worse, that there is such a thing as content, formless content. You see, this is one of those things
that Kant is being criticized by modern logic and modern logicians. Usually, those people who say that, well, if you're a formalist, it means that you have no regard for content, their own claim can be twisted backward. So you mean that there is such a thing as formless content, and what the fuck is it? What is a formless content? Now that's how you get them, because it relapses back to the critical, pre-logical idea that in fact you can have something called formless content. What is formless content if not pure sensations?
So as I said, this kind of division that Kant reiterates in Kritika Pew Reason is essentially coming from a long tradition of Aristotelian logic that lies at the base of the logistic logic, which for Kant is you know the idea of pure general logic laws of thoughts absolutely disconcerned or disinterested in the content of those thoughts
Now, in contrast to pure general logic, we can also talk about applied logic in this way. It is essentially what you might call to be applied logic, a branch or a strain of empirical psychology. So what is empirical psychology? It's really about how we do actually reason in an ordinary or scientific basis, actual
way of reasoning. So when we are talking about actual way of reasoning, then we deal with things like cognitive attention, cognitive biases, hindrances, consequences, implicit errors, cause of those errors, conditions of doubt, reservations, convictions, well-placed convictions, not so well-placed convictions, so on and so forth. So essentially what you might call applied logic is more on the side of empirical psychology in today's cognitive science in a Kantian way of formulating this.
Now again, in response to Chaghi, from this perspective, we can think of applied logic along the lines of our specific contingent and evolutionarily constituted ways or performance of logic or reasoning or inferences. It is essentially in this sense applied logic is a normative theory of our logical competences, normative theory of logical competences. Questions? By the way, maybe we should have some five minutes rest and then come back.
That sounds good. We can take a break there. Any questions before we go for a break? I think I've got some stuff kind of kicking around about Hegel's critique of Kant's deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding but that can probably wait okay sorry after after I read some parts of this I will actually read some of the stuff a good part of a Hegel's critique of Kant's logic see if it those
those excerpts and extra commentaries answer if not then you know okay question Okay, great. Yeah. Okay, see you guys in five minutes. Sounds good. See you then. Okay. Thank you.
you Reza are there other types of solarzeans just interested in like not really no I mean there are as I said there are diverse degrees of how they interpret cellars even in their own camps but no I mean essentially cellars the whole idea of cellars you get normativism with
naturalistic terms so or naturalism with normative with normative term the thing is that based on the priorities of norm versus causes or causes versus norm, you get essentially two different camps. And within those camps, again, you get more modest normativists, the ones who are quite staunch about concepts like McDowell or staunch about causes, Millikan is a good example tell your semantics or or even you on a site or then you get you know less more modest ones like Jay Rosenberg essentially you know you can't
have too much wiggling around when already you have as Salars has done you have already done two fundamental things that one there is no such a thing as inherent structure in the world if it is we can't appeal to it in explaining our knowledge of the world that's the myth of the given or the myth of the categorical given gets our category on given that the categorical structure of the world is essentially the function of our concepts of conceptual activities Now, how you interpret these conceptual activities come about, how they are being instantiated, how they are embodied, then things go either way.
So essentially all of Szilardzian's, all of Szilardzian's philosophy and the heritage of Szilardzian philosophy starts with at least different versions of the myth of the given, against the myth of the given in different forms. Sellars himself launched a kind of massive assault on the legacy of empiricism, from its naive forms to even more sophisticated ones, to show that rationalism and realism are faces of the same coin. Empiricism doesn't have anything to say. Then the whole idea that understanding what concepts are and how they are being instantiated
within organisms like us. Again, these are, you see that these kinds of, even though they might look separated or disconnected, once you see them in overarching scope of this project, you see that there are like these constraints upon constraints. So you can only move so much after you have affirmed the fundamentals of Szilardzian philosophy. You either end up in a naturalization with normativist twist, or you end up in the camp of normativity with a naturalistic term.
Both essentially can be traced back to Kant and Hegel with different accents, with different points of emphasis. You can say that right-wing Szilardzians are more on the side of the Kantian interpretation of cognitive science, whereas the left-wing Szilardzians are more Hegelian. this is sort of like saying it's like leaning more towards empiricism or leaning more towards rationalism within the critical project one more time one more time is this is it like saying leaning more towards rationalism within
the critical project or leaning more towards empiricism or no they are essentially both of a rationalistic agenda is the idea that whether you think that reason should be understood as an ability or faculty hence then you have to account for its evolutionary instantiation or you would say that talking about evolution is essentially a metaphysical dogma. If not done in the proper way of prioritizing the forms of our reasoning, which are not in a Kantian way distinguished
from their content, move to Art Hegel. Because for Hegel there is no such a hard distinction in different form and content. Or concepts and reality. Reality is the concept. That's the whole idea that the word dust bag with, the notion of Kantian concept with capital C is different from Kant's idea of concepts as a conceptual entity over which faculties perform operations. This the whole question of the formless content seems like it's the problem of a priori intuitions
for Kant but Kant might say rather than it being the problem of formless content Kant would say that a priori intuitions are the problem of contentless form. Yes. yes the given space and time yes yes definitely yes and then you see that actually a middle ground between these two is what's early really early works of was so particularly that work that I mentioned is a very many of you wants to really look to this and I really do think that transcendental logic might appear as simple but the kind of moves that can't makes in this very short
section are extremely pivotal for his entire project so if you want to concentrate more on this section what serons transcendental and formal logic is absolutely necessary work is it a translation of Finlay oh I had no idea let me let me let me see huh interesting oh the one one one second sorry no the one that I have is
Dorian Cairns, something like that. D-O-R-I-O-N space C-A-I-R-N-S. That's the translation I've been reading. And it's published by some publisher in Hague I also have this one yeah well have it in PDF form yeah yeah I am allergic to physical books I don't buy them
It put me to sleep. Except when there's no other alternative. No, there's no other alternative. I mean, I've like browsed this Hustel text, but I mean, it's pretty dense and quite long. quite long so I was wondering if there are any particular sections. There's like a historical bit on Kant that's like, it's like, yes, that's the book. But the thing is that yes, he explicitly starts talking about Kant at the end when he talks,
moves to transcendence and logic. But the thing is that the first chapter, which I think which I think is the best chapter on formal logic and the threats of psychology is essentially a very tongue-in-cheek critique of Kent and it's quite devastating Joseon before he became what later known as Heidegger was actually quite a a fantastic philosopher later or cell is the one that they don't sell is essentially either I mean I do this was several posts writing that infamous essay on the crisis of modern European sciences when he became on tight you
know science and kind of this wishy-washy phenomenologies but before Before then, it was just a force to be recognized. I was gonna ask, I mean, this is a slightly trivial question maybe. Which of the post-Selasian philosophers is finding most useful, do you think? The brand of more? I think Brandon is is great however you see the problem with random is that making explicit you know that's the book for which is famous why I think is most rigorous systematic exciting
and multi-dimensional book is between saying and doings it's essentially is something of a gem in like modern history of philosophy the thing with Brandon is that Brandon has two floods and what three flaws at least one is quietest in the sense that quietest in a very very comprehensive sense of the word quieted is a metaphysical quietest is a political quietest is a neoliberal quiet is so on so forth. Did you say something about Habermas here too, at some point? Yes, yes, so basically, you know, the thing is that, you know, obviously, you know, comparing
Habermas with Brandom would be cruelty against Brandom. I mean, Brandon has far more sophisticated philosophy of reason than Habermas. Habermas' idea of reason is just some wishy-washy, reactionary, post-New Frankfurt school. But I mean, Brandon at least gets the idea of what rational activity is, what reason is. But nevertheless, what converges him upon Habermas' project are precisely the way how they approach the connection between rationalism and politics proper.
In the sense that you always get in Brandon as a sign of him being a liberal, a very smart liberal. always better to have a smart liberal than a stupid Marxist. The thing is that what leads Brandon to this Habermasian quagmire is precisely because they both think that reason, of course their conceptions of reasons are fundamentally different, Habermas and Brandon, but they think that reason, however they interpret it, is sufficient for political change and political change. what you might call to be a robust politics. Of course reason is not sufficient for political
change. Reason is necessary, but necessity doesn't mean or imply sufficiency. We yet to achieve a rational politics that is robust, that is technically scientifically literate, but also aimed at kind of leftist egalitarian ideals. So yes, so I think from a political standpoint, Brandome and Habermas, with some caveats, working on the same spectrum. And there is a reason that, even though Brandome knows that Habermas's idea of reason is quite vague and wishy-washy, he championized Habermas in some certain texts.
So that's one, you know, the quietest aspect, which ultimately once you over inflate this, it's actually quietest aspect for a rationalist is when you think that reason is sufficient for political change. That's when you get the quietest attitude. And Brandon is, you know, quite on that, you know the spectrum so the second one I would say more technical aspects of his idea of material incompatibility or the idea of semantic incompatibility the idea of how how what you might call to be a alien determinate negation differentiating red from green so on and
and so forth, the relation between concepts. I think that's another one that's technical. And the third one, which at least for me led to kind of divergence from this aspect of random, is this idea of sociality of reason, which of course can be connected back to that very idea of quietness approach, The idea that reason is sufficient for political change. And so far as reason is a social activity, hence it can also be implemented socially, with no question asked. Now, I think there is a massive amount of gerrymandering in this idea of sociality of reason,
that Brandon never really pays enough attention to. There is a difference between sociality as a substantive domain in the Marxist sense, and sociality as a formal condition. Reason only has sociality as a formal condition. The extent by which reason as a formally social activity is connected to material social or sociality as substantive domain is yet to be determined. It can neither be dismissed nor can be said that they are basically the same thing that Brandon does. So this brings back, so if you distinguish the sociality of reason as a formal condition,
as a substantive condition, then ultimately I think inevitably leads you to a different fundamental study of rational activities than Brandon. still in line with random but I think goes a little bit more in depth in the sense that then it is perhaps we can't talk about language as a medium of community social communication for rational activity anymore or we can point to more fundamental processes fundamental logical computational processes there are entangled within the structure of all languages whether national languages or formal languages and that's again that then again becomes
a very technical you know critique of random but I think these three I would say are the you know the kind of Achilles heel of random brandonian philosophy and but among all of the post salarzy and I think random and rules and modest left-wing modest right-wing are the most brilliant readers of Selvus and the people built on him quite in surprising ways. What would you see as being the... who or what presents an alternative to this what you previously called inflated idea of intersubjectivity that Brandon and on
on some readings Hegel have, you know, like properly social intersubjectivity as a condition of reason as opposed to merely formal. Who do you think presents the, like the merely formal? I don't think anyone, any philosopher at this point. You know why there is a reason for it. You know, of course the substantive dimension is really what you might call to be the domain par excellence of Marxist politics, of Marxist thinkers, right? But the thing is that with Marxist, traditional Marxist thinkers and dialectical materialism is that the whole idea that they want to only have
a substantive dimension, and they don't believe that there is such a thing as a formal condition of sociality, of reason, which led them, lead them to these basically what you might call to be critical theory, ultimately. People like Jameson, who think that reason is something pathological, who think that reason, everything that's basically all forms of rational activities are subsumed by the mode of capitalist relation, capitalist production that have already encroached upon substantive social relations. And so far as there is no such thing as a formal dimension of reason distinct from substantive
reason, then the entire edifice of reason is capitalism masquerading as rationality. A quite, you know, cliche line of reasoning that is repeated over and over by critical theorists. Now, I mean, I'd be interested. hear your good sorry I'm aware that I feel like I've hijacked no door but I'm I mean I'm aware of the I'd be interested to hear your critique at the Frankfurt School because I'm not sure they they as some level acknowledge like a the relative autonomy of thought yes but you see relative autonomy of thought
is not relative autonomy or absolute autonomy of reason as a formal edifice. Thinking is a vague thing. Plato was very careful about this already. Yes, of course, because you see, because if you even don't acknowledge the relative autonomy of thinking, then whatever you say about diagnosing what is wrong in the system of capitalism is essentially pissing in the theoretical whirlwind. It's unintelligible. How do you diagnose such and such pathological parameters? Obviously for that to be initiated, there should be a relative autonomy to thinking. But the kind of thinking that they believe is what you might call to be the critical
thinking in the very post-Frank-40 idea of the critique rather than the critical philosophy as such. which is on a very peculiar reading of Marx. Yes, Marx, I think, was responsible for it, but I don't think we should blame Marx on this peculiar form of reading. You see that it's precisely coming from Frankfurt School, but not only Frankfurt School, from people like Kammet, from Italians, from French readings of Marx and the history of philosophy. So, So yes, no they do, no absolutely, if they don't then there is no way that we can say
that capitalism is a corrupt system. Because saying capitalism is a bad, is a normative claim, is a piece of judgment, right? So which means that you have already have occupied a vantage point in the domain of thought to diagnose what is wrong about the system. Obviously, if they don't want to get rid of it, because if they get rid of this as well, and some Marxists do get rid of it, but not Frank for the school, then it's just pure unintelligibility. It's just, you might say that capitalism is a god, Nick Land. It would be vulgar in a very traditional sense.
Yes, a boring and despicable way, yes. Yes, but there is essentially, when it comes to thought, thought is one of those things, like reason, that is essentially you need to distinguish it. What do you mean by thinking? What do you mean by autonomous thinking? at what level that's when you need to drill harder and harder into their into their theories to see whether they hold up to this so-called autonomy of thought or actually what they say undermines it totally okay sorry I just I don't know I just got excited because this is sort of closer to my wheelhouse
than most of the other stuff that's going on. Well, I think that the recent work of Ray has, you know, not essentially the Szilardzian ones or Brandomian, Ray's Szilardzian mostly, I'm more Brandomian. I think not Szilardzian works of Ray, but the recent works that he has on Hegel and Marx, a kind of trying, attempting to answer your question with regard to substantive formal dimensions. Is this the relevant for politics? Yes. Dialectics between suspicion and trust.
Well, there are two ones. the one on time and Jameson there is one on time and Jameson there is one on Hegel I have I have a few if you want I can I can send them to you yeah yeah that would be excellent I mean I wish I could do his upcoming course but I don't I mean you see all philosophers philosophy is not a black and white thing thinking takes time and today you think that this topic is exciting this philosophy is top-notch I'm going to follow it
tomorrow morning you might wake up and say that oh shit I have done the worst things in my life Again, retrospectively, philosophy is only retrospectively mature. The same thing about all of us, including Ray. I think Ray is moving in a very right direction with regard to this whole idea of reason and philosophy. But then I think Pete and I have much closer alliance on this issue. us to be required to fundamentally and sufficiently address the lack of sufficiency of reason for addressing the substantive dimension of sociality and
what and how we can build on this idea of minimum rationality to make those changes at the level of substantive sociality then we need to first and foremost take the very idea of reason as a formal condition very very seriously and we need to be prepared for the kind of conclusions that may lead us to and those conclusions might not be very pleasant for jaded humanism precisely because they lead to some, what you might call to be obnoxious forms of inhumanist functionalism.
And that's, I think, these are all parts of the same project. They need to be taken seriously. You can see it in today's idea of Marxism. Why do you think that Marxists, not all Marxists, let's not, I mean Marxists in the critical theory comes into philosophy, and again, that's not everyone, but as I have always said, exceptions are not good excuses to save the feeble masses. Exceptions are always human shields to protect the stupidity. But we are philosophers, we need to translate the sheet.
So why do you think that Marxists today, with caveats and exceptions, are so basically against this idea of computation, algorithm, formalism, mathematics, I don't know, scientific enterprise, technoscience, so on and so forth. Yes, of course they have capitalist application, but so what? If you can't really distinguish application from the idea and also distinguish different levels of application, then they are not in the business of the critique. The very fact that, you know, obviously human history is going massive amount of change,
and if you are really not paying attention to these vectors of change, then they are not, you are not by any means historically conscious. Because historical consciousness, which is the tenet of Marxism, comes with attention, full attention to what is going on and familiarity, scientific familiarity with the topics of your age, of your epoch. Yeah, I think I'm, oh sorry. No, no, no, continue. No, I'm just gonna finish this off, but I mean, I think I feel this like problem very acutely in that I'm simultaneously kind of getting an education
in a very traditional Marxism whilst being conscious of this whole. Yeah, no, I think the only move, the only viable direction moving forward is rather than becoming a kind of Landian reactionary reactionary to the idea of Marxism, striving to be preserving all of the Marxist ideals while also embracing these historical moments, understanding what they are and how you can exploit them. Because that is really the idea of Marxism, exploitation of the moments of history as
opportunities so I wanted to quickly ask sorry if I'm guarding it but in terms of Kant what I want to ask before was we're talking about like trying to understand where illusions come from and to kind of distinguish them so I was thinking when in the prolegomena and in critique of pure reason he goes into more deal about that says that there is like nature, some angel or devil bestowed this kind of mode of synthesizing upon us, and hence like this is the world that we just have, this is our sort of like contingent production.
It seems very kind of difficult to understand the differentiation between empirical illusions versus the transcendental ones. One thing is to say that the things that are presented to us are not things in themselves. They're just representations constituted by our mind. The other thing is to say that the stance that naive cognitive science goes into, oh, like, you know, the brain showed us that the world is an illusion, but the brain is part of the world, but we're going to ignore that. So it seems that even in as far as concepts are concerned, it's possible to somehow be put into a illusory relation in terms of them.
So is there that does Kant propose some kind of understanding of how to like Would it be possible in a Kantian framework to justify the fact that not just the empirical illusion, but our minds Perception the categories almost like can change or does he ignore that fact? That's absolutely fantastic, but I don't know question really super question yes I completely understand I think so can't I have mentioned this in different way a couple of times that yes that's the reason that Kent is at the same time a very radical philosopher very conservative can't so let's say that you
know the way that we think about the world or ultimately the product of our contingent constitution right and then we shouldn't think about other kinds of beings or worlds that might be fall outside of our contingent cognition contingently constituted cognition now it is conservative thesis and it's also radical thesis why is it radical thesis precisely because if it is taken in in modest doses, in modest doses, small doses. It is absolutely true. We can't just go and talk about this superintelligence, this connected post-human, as David Rodin calls it, and speculate
about it. That's just negative theology. That's the dogmatic metaphysics. That's reverting back to a square one where we came from. So in a small doses is a radical one, precisely because it's in tandem with the gesture of the transcendental term or critical philosophy. But there is a sinister thing here. And again, this also needs to be taken very very carefully, in fact more carefully than the first one. once we say that we have such and such contingent constitution, we are the creatures of this particular world, then it means that the very faculties,
the very way that we take our universal laws of thoughts to be, might in fact be in one way or another, if not the byproducts, but at least somehow contaminated by our own contingent history. What is the conclusion of this? Isn't the whole idea of Kantian philosophy and the whole critical philosophy renewing the link between human experience and reality, arriving at new facts of reality and arriving at new facts of experience, right?
Renewing your link with reality, going beyond what appears to be the preneal gesture of philosophy. But if, even if, our representations, our conceptual systems, our so-called universal laws of thoughts are somewhat contaminated by our contingent history, by our contingent constitution then it means that we are imprisoned within an upriori limited scope of access to reality the limit of which has been prescribed in advance
by our own contingent history so how can we really break apart from this circle of this vicious circle because it is a vicious circle. That's, I think, that's... Kant doesn't want to deal with this question. Kant doesn't, and that's when you get the conservative Kant. Now, the idea is that... this is something that I have been thinking on and my answer to it is not going by any means convincing plausible or even satisfactory but I'm simply reiterating what briefly reiterating what
at this very moment I think and I because really I really this is exactly what I basically focus of my thinking right now. So, there are different kinds of ways to address these problems. Embracing the radical Kant, but also embracing the conservative Kant. One, the idea that the way that we talk about the world is not by way of our ordinary talks. Arriving at new facts of reality is not essentially derived from how we ordinary think and talk about the world. It is a product
of theory construction, specifically scientific theories. Scientific theories are not overextension of our ordinary talks about things and world, insofar as they are not overextension of our natural languages, of our ordinary representation of systems. So there is a level that we need to look into the construction, the paradigm of construction of scientific, construction of scientific theories. See how they are constructed, what exactly their structure and what their dynamic is. Scientific theories are made by languages, just like all forms of thoughts, all forms
of cognition about the world. But they are not just made of any form of language. They are not made of ordinary natural languages. They are made of formal languages. They have a systematicity, and that systematicity also needs to be addressed. So when we are coming, arriving at a new fact about our own experience or the world in which we inhabit, we only arrive it by weos, a systematicity which we call scientific theories. It is not as if we arrive at this fact by making one statement, by one claim. No, by way of a theory. And what is really a theory?
A theory is what you might call to be a triple, a well-ordered set of at least three components. structure denoted by letter S, language and logoi or ratiocinating activities denoted by the letter L, and universe of data provided not by the world but by racialinating activities, namely L, which we call U, U as universe of discourse, universe of data.
So a theory is essentially not a statement, not a simple claim in the way that we say it in the framework of our natural manifest language. But it's essentially a product of how logical structures, rational activities, and universe of data hang together, what Salars called the definition of philosophy. how things in the broadest possible sense hang together in the broadest possible sense.
This is what a theory is. So in theory, you have the opportunity to mitigate those illusions and cognitive biases, precisely because it's a matter of relations, how things hang together in a systematic way that you can see that there are in fact illusions, that there are in fact biases. Whereas when I simply say that, well, this is just a pen, a bent object inside a glass of water, that's a statement. Of course, that's right with cognitive bias. Because it's a statement,
is posed inside the framework of natural language, it is implicitly corresponds kind of one-to-one relation between a proposition and a fact, and also it is derived ultimately from experience, even though it is subject to a priori laws. But within theory, we are essentially working with a different kind of framework. There is no such a thing as an atomic statement or claim having a corresponding fact of its own. No, it's about how these statements hang together within the context of the theory that yield
the fact. Also, it is outside of the domain of natural language. language it's artificial language so and so forth and ultimately it is not about one's experience one's perceptual judgment it is really the escalation of the a priori dimension of thinking the inter subjectivity of a scientific community but even in that domain yes there are cognitive biases but the but But what kind of cognitive biases that can be detected in fact, precisely because, as I mentioned, a scientific theory is about the systematicity or the coherence of not
one statement, two statements, but all the statements and how they hang together according to the context of that very theory. And of course, everything needs to have being, data needs to be supported. Mathematics needs, mathematical sciences needs to structure that data. So there is a different level of complexity. But yes, at that level, of course, we have also cognitive biases. A good scientist who pointed out to one of the most fundamental biases in the level of, the level of scientific theories was Boltzmann in his lectures in gas theories the last section but the very fact that they realized that there is a bias was
through the idea of via the medium of scientific theory rather than natural language so this is this is I think it's not a matter of black and white things It's the idea that one, yes, scientific theories are very different from the kind of ordinary cognitive biases to which all of us in one way or another are bound. They have also their own cognitive biases. But the kind of cognitive biases that can be revised, that can be in fact detected over time. And so far as... A little bit about Joseph Fink's interpretation of Boltzmann. I watched those lectures and I was just wondering what your take was on that. if it fits into what you're saying.
So the whole idea that Boltzmann very briefly thought that, Boltzmann is famous for making one of the greatest contributions in the history of modern physics, bridging the gap between a statistical account of entropy and thermal entropy. So why is that this is important outside of physics? Well, because at the end of the day, it is the idea of bridging macroscopic behaviors or macroscopic universe of physics
with observable, experienceable world of physics, what you call the macroscopic universe of physics, bridging the gap between that which cannot be observed and that which can be observed and is observable. The idea is that entropy, the second law, has different interpretations. Second law usually in canonical school texts are understood as the idea of positive production of entropy across the arrow of time.
That as the time moves from past to the future, so does entropy. But there is also a different interpretation of second law of thermodynamics. I don't want to go to that point. Wolfsman's idea was that, okay, so at the level of macroscopic physics, namely observable, experienceable, subjectively experienceable phenomena, appearances, it appears that the the universe moves toward positive production or increase of entropy along the arrow of time. The time is asymmetric, moving from past to the future.
But then, according to the microscopic principle of physics, this macroscopic experience of phenomena seems to be paradoxical. Why? Because at the level of mechanical laws of physics, there is no such a thing as time asymmetry. There is no such a thing as irreversible phenomena. When you open at the level of observation, when you open a bottle filled with gas, that colored gas escapes the bottle, never comes back, irreversible. But at the level of mechanical laws of physics, there is no such thing as presupposed asymmetry
or irreversibility of a phenomenon and how we experience it. So Boltzmann's idea was how to commensurate and bridge the gap between what I observe the level of physical phenomenon, namely time asymmetry, and what is at stake at the level of microscopic laws of physics, namely time symmetry or reversibility. So Boltzmann essentially started to create, working on Maxwell's probability distribution, on this and by way of some complex procedures, it demonstrated that no matter what kind of
statistical distribution a molecule has at the initial stage of the system, the probability distribution always converged toward minimization of a negative quantity called h. Once he arrived at this conclusion, he could prove that this minimization of negative quantity H corresponds to the positive entropic production at the level of observable phenomena. Meaning that no matter what kind, no matter how the molecule takes a momentum and its position and velocity, at the initial stage of a microphysical system, after the time
passes, it exhibits at the level of microphysics or observable phenomena what we have already observed, that entropy increases with time in one direction only, irreversibility of microscopical phenomena. But then after he thought and also he encountered a number of critiques by his friends and other people, he came to this conclusion that this is fundamentally a form of what you might call, well Artem was saying that it's kind of like a scientific
inquiry is still made within the exact framework of theoretical sciences but nonetheless contaminated by cognitive and observational experiential biases of the subject. All I can say is that the very fact that a molecule at the end, so there is a fundamental thesis that undergirds the entire Boltzmann's doctrine. It's called the molecular chaos, or hypothesis of molecular collision. This idea that at degree zero, which is usually considered to be the initial state of physical
system, you take a particle, a molecule, an atom, to be free of all influences because nothing has happened to it yet, hence the initial state of the system, degree zero. So according... And then you think that doesn't exist either, that whole idea of equilibrium, it has to be presupposed in order to... Well, no, it's not equilibrium yet. It is simply a formal condition. But you see, it's a statistical condition in fact. So it goes like this, that a particle hasn't collided with any other particle yet. Hence, its velocity and momentum should not be correlated or changed because it hasn't
collided with another particle yet at degree zero initial state of the statistical description of the system. Now this very fundamental insight through which Boltzmann tried to show that there is in fact that the laws of mechanics proper can be reconciled with how we observe irreversible phenomena was in fact a cognitive bias. How so? Because the whole idea that a particle, an atom, a molecule, that has not collided yet with another particle is uncorrelated in terms of velocity and momentum is already an experiential
bias that a scientist has inadvertently, unwittingly, smuggled from the level of macroscopic observable phenomena of physics to the level of microscopic mechanical laws of physics where observable descriptions or experiential descriptions have no room or place whatsoever. The idea is that the very fact that we say a particle that hasn't collided yet with other particles is momentum and velocity hasn't changed is already reliant on this idea of time asymmetry. And we know that time asymmetry
only and only belongs to the level of microscopic observable physics, but not microscopic physics. So it does not have a place at that level. You cannot assume that. And Boltzmann's idea was that it changed the arrow of time from future to the past instead of past and future. And then you see, according to that, and if you were trying to conclude the same thing, You see that even if the particle has not collided yet with other particles, in fact, velocity and momentum can be changed, retroactive causality. So this is the whole thing, that even if, even if when we say that, you know, at the
level of theoretical scientific constructions, we are less disposed to these kinds of experiential cognitive biases but nevertheless we do mistakes and scientists but nevertheless we can we can for the most part again no prior limit on the extent of which we can detect these we can't and that's basically what i said you know reasoning and discovery takes time it's not that just because something is rife with bias in a scientific theory means that's the whole paradigm of scientific the theory construction is a sham. And then that has huge implications because it violates the second law of thermodynamics
and then that sort of just like causes like collateral problems just throughout science. Yes, I mean that's why the revolution initiated by Boltzmann is likened to a time bomb. The fallout of which science has not witnessed yet. I was just going to ask, isn't that Boltzmann's criticism essentially skeptical rather than putting forth a positive notion? No, Boltzmann skepticism is not human because Boltzmann, you see Boltzmann is essentially the first scientist who puts forward a modern way of doing sciences.
It diverges from Marx's psychologist and phenomenalistic term in idea of approaching scientific theories. He is someone who thinks about the idea of scientific theories and how they correlate with our observational data in terms of a hierarchy, a very controlled hierarchy. They are at least, at least, comprised of three layers. Unobserved hypothetical entities equations of differential calculus and observable phenomena and the whole idea is that when you are working in this hierarchy you can't at
your whim move back and forth and over a stretching the conclusion reached at at one level and over stretching or over extending them to another level. So essentially Boltzmann's own skepticism of his own project is that then he suddenly realizes that he has furtively smuggled an assumption that only belongs to one level to another level. The idea of time asymmetry that only belongs at the level of observable phenomena, to the level of mechanical statistical laws of physics where no such assumptions should be helped and you don't see that as a like a restating of human induction
problem yes it is no it is it is yes absolutely no it is a few meant by induction problem yes yes absolutely it is so he yes both one is essentially radicalization of humans induction problem in physics yeah Could we perhaps return to the transcendental logic? Yes. I just want to get to the threefold synthesis at the very end. In order for me to, so we are 2010, how about moving like 40 minutes and then we go on with
our life. Let me, okay, in order to that I need to have some few words. Let me, let me just one second, give me a one minute break and I will come back. Okay, sure. Thank you.
logic, what makes a logic pure and formal is that the logic should only concern with relations among concepts. As I mentioned subordination, coordination, the arts, and so on, right and work. And in contrast, applied logic is about the way we actually do embark on reasoning. So transcendental logic, so in a sense pure general logic, as Kant would say in citation from Kant, abstracts from all content of cognition, that is, from any relation of it to the objects,
and considers only the logical form in relation of cognitions to one another, i.e. the form of thinking in general. Now transcendental logic, in this sense, precisely because of the synthetic up primary thing, that is the whole thesis of critic of pure reason, is not on the side of pure general logic. Transcendental logic is what you might say is a species of pure, specialized or particular logic. A quote from Kant's A62B87.
We isolate the understanding, as we did above, with sensibility in the transcendental aesthetic, and elevate from our cognition merely the part of our thought that has its origin solely in the understanding. a use of this pure cognition, however, depends on this as its condition, that objects are given to us in intuition, to which it can be applied. Again, object and application. Correct application, that is. For without intuition, all of our cognition would lack objects, and therefore remain completely empty. So, in a sense, transcendental logic is then pertains to the most general principles of our thinking about objects
gegenstand experienced in space and time. Kant thinks just as there are a priori constraints on humanly possible intuitions of objects, That is, we can only experience particular items in the world as spatiotemporally located. There are also a priori constraints on humanly possible conceptions of experienced objects.
What does that mean? It means that we necessarily represent such objects as causally interactive substances. So in a sense then, what Kant called transcendental logic can be usefully thought for the time being as a logical extension of the projects of metaphysics or logical tradition of metathletics.
So we had the first two one, general and particular, then we had pure and applied. And we had pure Each general, either general or particular could be pure, either pure or applied. Now Kant introduces two more divisions here with regard to logic. So when it comes to a logical theory, it can be either analytic or it can be dialectical. What Kant means by analytic, it is essentially what you might call to be concerns with relevant
rules for construction of correct thinking. For relevant underlined construction of correct underlined thinking. This is called, it calls analytic. So the qualitative critical part, the complementary part to analytic is what Kant calls dialectic. So this is not a Hegelian dialectic, this is not a Platoian dialectic, this is not Marxian
dialectic, it's a Kantian dialectic, it's a fundamentally different species of dialectic. is a dialectic in a cognitive sciences. How so? Because the idea of dialectic or the critique of dialectic is supposed to reveal to us illusions that arise from either misapplication of logic to objects or over speculative or overambitious,
what sometimes Ken calls a speculative enthusiasm. A speculative enthusiastic use of general and pure logic and thinking that it actually you can simply manipulate general pure logic and construct these rules of thinking but that has anything to do and you can applied indiscriminatory to all forms of objects. So the first division of Kant's transcendental logic is then transcendental analytic, then the second is transcendental dialectic.
First one is about general forms of concepts which is structure or experience of objects, and so presupposes that those objects are given to us in sensible intuition, the latter, the transcendental analytic that is, pertains to dialectical illusions, as Kant would say it, which emerge when we fail to observe these restrictions and surrender, as Kant would say, the very enticing and seductive temptation to make use of these pure cognitions of the understanding and principles and by themselves and even beyond all bounds of experience. Or again, he says about the transcendental dialectical illusions, he says,
judging without distinction about objects that are not given to us, which perhaps indeed could not be given to us in any way. A. 63 B. 87 to 88. So, this was a very brief discussion on transcendental logic and its divisions. Now, let's do a kind of a comparative study of Hegel's critique of Kant's transcendental logic and some commentators on Hegel and Kant. And then read a little bit of Kant himself in critical pure reason.
So any questions? Could you give an example of a dialectic illusion? illusion is much why say so okay dialectic illusion or transcendent dialectics you can or critical dialectics two different things connected I mean essentially two aspects of the same projects so critical critical the
critique of dialectic to transcendent dialectic you can see it in today's cognitive science for example critique of projects of formal logic some of the stuff in an activist cognitive sciences or even think about the Scott Baker a good example like he's I mean he's not by any means critical transcendental this person. But nevertheless, the project is about this, in a more extreme sense. That's all of this logical mathematical stuff are essentially, when we are talking about them,
there is no useful constraints about their application. And if there is a constraint about their application, we don't know them. Hence, they are illusory through and through. Okay? You can find better ones among the side of, as I mentioned, like inactivists, but also more in line with the traditional project of logic. Those who think that logical formalism, and not formality, logical formalism, at some level should respond to our experience.
Cellars. Ray. Because if it does not respond to our experience at some level, then it's entirely arbitrary. It's kind of an illusory realm of arbitrariness of logical manipulation. I would say that both of these scams, no matter how different they are, they are coming from a fundamental misunderstanding of what actually logic is and what formalism is. I'm not going to go to that end right now. wait a little bit on this front.
Are these criticisms technically psychologistic criticisms? Not essentially. No, not essentially. Some psychologistic, some representational, and the whole idea, as I said, the most radical of all of them, misunderstanding what logic is. And how the whole idea that I said earlier, always they say that when you are talking about formalism, it means that it's form independent of content. But does that mean that are you really talking about the formless content? This is the myth of the formless content.
And it ultimately comes with this very handed by Kant lineage of philosophers who think The distinction between form and content or object and thought, I don't know, pure form of logic and material constraints is a hard distinction. No, there is no such a hard distinction. If there is a hard distinction, it leads to a two-way form of skepticism, not against
just pure logic, but also about you who try to advance some sorts of constraints on the form of logic. Just as Sellars does and Wittgenstein, I mean Sellars of course, you know, his theory of picturing and metaphysics of sensation is essentially a refinement of Wittgenstein's theory of linguistic theory of picture of linguistic pictures so yes all of these were in in one way or another can be traced back to can't can't's fundamental I think not essentially a negative thing because you know you're
all philosophers creatures of our time fundamental and familiarity with the concept of logic a very superficial understanding of it so are you saying I mean if I'm getting this right that you sort of disagree with when sellers posits that there's a being that isn't a being for thought Yes, absolutely. Yes. All beings being for thought. So you see, OK, maybe I should start with Kant
and then read the commenters. That would be less confusing. Let me highlight some stuff here. So my god, I have highlighted the entire page. So there is discrimination as well I should read. OK. There are some different colored bookmarks. OK. He says, A57, he says the difference between the transcendental and the empirical therefore belongs only to the critique of cognitions and does not concern their relations to their object." Have that one. I assume that orange is more important than blue. So there is a yellow, orange, and blue.
I think orange is probably more important than blue. So the orange one, again, A57. It says, such a science, he talks about logic here, such a science which would determine the origin, the domain, and the objective validity of such cognitions would have to be called transcendental logic, since it has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason. But solely, no, it doesn't underline this, but you can underline, but solely, insofar as they are related to objects a priori and not, as in the case of general logic to empirical as well as pure incognitions of reason without distinction.
Now again, he comes up with some really utterly philosophically feeble gibberish in 859 when he talks about truth. It's, you know, the triviality of this passage, I mean, it's so trivial that it looks great. But it's just trivial. Now, a general... A59. A59, yes. It says, now, a general criterion of truth would be that which was valid of all cognitions
without any distinction among their objects. But it is clear that since with such a criterion, one abstract... So basically, just to give you a clue what he's actually talking about, so this whole thing is about truth. He bold underline, emphasizes this question. What is truth? A58. And then he says, the nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed. but one demands to know what is the general uncertain criterion of the truth of any cognition. Now, okay, let me get my... Wash my hands here because, I mean, it seems that, you see, here you get this idea that everything
that Kant really always wants to talk about is how thoughts are related to sensations by way of intuition the manifold of intuition he thinks that when we are talking he has first of all he comes up with the most parochial concept of truth he really thinks that truth is a correspondence between thought and object and a gigan start and hence you can't have pure luck pure general logic without intuition because that would be just logical caprice okay
so but that's just absolutely trivial there are different criterions of truth First of all, truth is not representational. Here he is trying to demote the status of truth to the idea of representation, namely correspondence between thinking and the object. Isn't it representation? If it isn't, then what is it? The second thing is that if you don't have criteria of what it is true to say something in the domain of concepts, how can you in fact talk about the relation between thought and an object?
Just by virtue of what you said before about the function of understanding. So it seems that Kant's, as we have noticed this session, Kant's this habit of being very subtle most of the time, but sometimes also being this kind of archetype of a continental philosopher, putting every conception of truth under one idea and then trying to use it against this or that forms of thinking. No, there are different kinds of truth, there are different gradients of truth. In fact, you cannot have
objectivity of truth as related to external world without the criteria of of objectivization, namely the correct application of concepts, how concepts inferentially stand in relation to one another. But then that would be the the domain of pure and general logic which Kant wants to demote here and and instead promote the idea of transcendental logic. He then continues, it is already a great and necessary proof of cleverness or insight,
now it gets a little bit overcritical and overexcited, or insight to know what one should reasonably ask, for if the question is absurd in itself and demands unnecessary answer, then besides the embarrassment of the one who proposes it, it also has the disadvantage of misleading the incautious listener into absurd answers and presenting the ridiculous sight, as the ancients said, of one person milking a bully goat while the other holds a sieve underneath. So, in the context of this idea of what is truth, then he says,
now a general criterion of truth would be that which was valid of all cognitions without any distinction among their objects. But it is clear that since with such a criterion one abstracts from all contents of cognition in relation to its object, or you can here think about it as a material in the logic sense, like a material inference, not material or content. Then it says, yet truth concerns precisely this content. it would be completely impossible and absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognition, and thus it is clear that a sufficient and yet at the same time general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided.
Since above, we have called the content of the cognition its matter. One must therefore say that no general sign of the truth of the matter of cognition can be demanded, because it is self-contradictory. The amount of gerrymandering, the amount of manipulation, vicious manipulation in this very paragraph is unparalleled in the entire critique of pure reason. We are going only, it is so gerrymandered that we can only unpack the level of gerrymandering throughout the next courses.
Then, he says at B85, general logic analyzes the entire formal business of the understanding and reason into its elements and presents these as principles of all logical assessments of our cognition. This part of logic can therefore be called an analytic and is on the very account at least the negative touchstone of truth. Since one must before all else examine and evaluate by means of these rules the form of all cognition before investigating its content in order to find out whether with regard to the object it contains
positive truth, sorry, before investigating its content in order to find out whether with regard to object it contains positive truth. But since the mere form of cognition, however well it may agree with logical laws, is far from sufficing to constitute the material objective truth of the cognition, nobody can dare to judge of objects and to assert anything about them merely with logic without having drawn an antecedently well-founded information about them from outside of logic in order... Now, that's a really important one. It says, nobody can dare to judge of objects and to assert anything about them merely with
logic. If you notice the iterations of the word merely in this very section, you can see that everything is merely this. And it's just a massive amount of... He's trying to this kind of like a strong and formal logic, basically. Merely with logic without having drawn antecedently, well-founded information about them from outside of logic. But how can we come about a well-founded antecedent information without logic? That is exactly what I was about to add!
And then, in order subsequently, nearly again, to investigate its use and connection in coherent hold according to logical laws, or better solely, as synonym to merely, to examine them according to such laws. And then he arrives at his mere conclusion. He says, nevertheless, there is something so seductive in the possession of an apparent art for giving all of our cognitions the form of understanding, even though with regard to their content one may yet be very empty and poor.
That this general logic, which is merely a canon for judging, has been used as if it were an organon, a tool, to arrive at a certain form of cognition. what he means by organon, has been used as if it were an organon for the actual production of at least the semblance of objective assertions, and thus in fact it has thereby been misused. Now general logic as a putative organon is called dialectic. So before I start the commentaries and Hegel's critique of this, any questions?
Can you talk a little bit about to what coherence theories? I guess the question is, how does truth function in these coherence theories of logic? and upon what do they derive the sense of their statements? You see, coherentism is not a theory of logic. Coherentism is a theory of epistemology or concept formation. But when we are in the business of pure and general logic, our truth only pertains to the correct application of the syntactic forms,
forms, their rules, and following correctly their implications. That's one definition of truth. Now, there is another definition of truth, the epistemological truth. How a theory, a scientific theory, a coherent scientific theory, what do we mean by a coherent scientific theory? the very idea that I mentioned to you, truth as hypothesis or hypothesis. Truths are not black and white. The only truth that you can identify first hand is the truth of thought, of ideas, its form in a very Platonic sense, in a logical sense. The coherent idea of truth
is the idea that the kind of truth that I posit with regard to the world are postulates, are hypotheses. What you might call them, and use Nicholas Rescher's terminology, are truth candidates, truth candidates, presumptive truths. So you create a network of these truth candidates within the framework of a logically-laden scientific theory or theory as such. When you see how these presumptive truth or truth candidates cohere within the framework
of your logically, mathematically structured theory, do they have inconsistencies? Do they have logical inconsistencies, but also do they have material inconsistencies? In the sense that once you put them, integrate them together at different levels, do they still support the observational data, or the observational data repudates them? That's the coherence truth. The coherent truth is an epistemological truth. The truth, but the epistemological truth, you can't have epistemological truth without
the idea of truth in pure and general logic. And that's why you can see that the very idea of the kind of truth that Kant seeks to attain, the truth between cognition and object, cannot do away without taking as seriously as possible the truth at the level of pure and formal thinking. The right applications of the syntactic forms and their rules and following in the most consistent way their implications. everything else comes afterward.
In fact, to postulate a notion of truth between cognition and object prior to this concept of truth would lead again to dogmatic metaphysics in one way or another. Are you saying that for you, pure general logic would be this syntactic, for following syntactic rules and following them to their conclusions yes now of course this is this requires a far more detailed discussion of what we mean by syntax for syntactic form there are different forms of syntax you know uh descriptive syntax logical syntax at least
what i mean is logical syntax rather than descriptive syntax but also it means the idea that the idea that where does the content come from? Where does the idea of logical content, conceptual content come from? It's not coming out of the blue. No, does it come from sensations? Because then that would be a very, very bad move. Why? Because it either leads to the idea of the myth of the given, that there is a logical structure within sensations, or worse, a metaphysical Rossellian idea of logic, that there is a correspondence between logical forms and logic
and facts of reality. A correspondence, I said. A one-to-one correspondence. Both of them are fundamentally bad moves. So yes, I think you need, Christian, you need to wait for my response to write on this whole point. But yeah, just to make it a little bit clear, or to make you more confused, I thought that comment was useful. So does it make sense even to talk about incommensurable or contradictory systems of logic? Yes, yes. And then...
Nothing commends you about, nothing commends you about, what you might say is a rival, rival systems of logic, or competing systems of logic, not essentially incompatible. What you might say, the difference is in particular forms of logic and toward more generalized logic, more generalized forms of thought. or thought determinations. At the level of epistemological theory construction is when we can talk about incompatible elements. Newton versus Ptolemaic system.
I didn't say Copernican versus Tlemonic, because in fact Copernicus system is only a rectification of the Tlemonic system, whereas Neutone is absolutely incompatible with the Tlemonic system. Well, I mean, I guess maybe part of the problem is how these fundamental breaks would take place then what's the malogy in epistemology right yes well in epistemology I mean that's it's a really really I mean you know this question sounds simple but it is absolutely it's basically you know there is such a thing
as philosophy of science and it's huge massive domain beer that I'll be can continent of philosophy combined? Just to answer this question. One of the ... Okay, I have ... Okay, one ... Let's start with this essay by Adolf Grunbaum. Is simplicity indicative of truth? It answers some of these questions and the kind of misinterpretations arise with the idea of incompatibility between theories and science and how to resolve incompatibilities. Yeah, so start with that and then we will talk about this because I think if I try to
somehow weasel out some sort of response, it won't be good. It won't be good. Okay, sounds good. I mean I guess the thing is that like it strikes me as such a like a crucial component of the whole critical enterprise is absolutely yes I mean now you see that this is a gesture of philosophy of science you know scientists content of philosophers always put philosophy of science down no it's just you know philosophy of science is there as you know as someone in what you call in the Hegelian sense is the self-consciousness of science. Science
doesn't have self-consciousness of science. Some do but most don't. Boltzmann did, Einstein did, Newton did, but today is science zero. I mean look at these people who come in the name of science talk about the most bullshit evolutionary myth of the given a stop on public TV with that guy grass and what is it and I'll a little grass and talk at what's that I think I'm significant to remember anyway so these people come like someone like Richard Dawkins like someone who really needs to be arrested not because he's atheist I am an atheist
but someone who in the name of atheism makes the most absurd claims about science and humanity yes yes that's it that's it so these people I mean they okay so that what I was watching event just is ending so I'm not going to talk more about Kent I know that you all have headaches but these people come to this interview and Tyson with the kind of a smug anti intellectual which is the very definition of American anti intellectual is bulgar in every fucking possible sense so he comes and he says something that you know when I want to
die I want to you know you know I don't believe in religion I don't believe in death I only believe in science but when I want to die I want to you know dust my ashes so another person Richard Dawkins who tries to and he's like a flatterer of utmost despicable degree and he comes and he has this conversation with Tyson and he tries to top up Tyson's idea when he's dead. He says that, no, Tyson, when I want to die, I want to go to Earth, so my energy goes back to flowers. Utter double face bomb. If this is today's definition of science and how a scientist thinks about moral
responsibility about what is right and what should be done. Science needs to be annihilated and we should scratch from degree zero. I mean, these are the kind of moralism that religion, a Brahmic religion, appears to be more mature than these kinds of new atheists. They think that they are on the side of science. They have not yet investigated the very implicit ideological assumptions that they think that
science can ever be divested or wrested from the organuna of philosophy, or the organuna of thinking, in the most general sense. And if you really think, if someone really thinks that science can be wrested, yes, science gives conclusions to us that philosophy never gives, but this doesn't mean that science is a fully autonomous division. No, science and philosophy are parallel universes that are in contact, always impurcated. And if you really think that science can, to such an extent, be arrested from philosophy of science or philosophy in general, then you are in business of the shadiest forms
of moralism and the shadiest forms of political, ideologically saturated science, which is hallmark of unfortunately American science at this point just absolute petty dogmatists yes yeah absolutely yes dogmatist hand-waving moralism which is worse than Abrahamic religion to be honest with you and you know I'm an atheist I have quite you know a dagger and sword against Abrahamic religion but but this is a different kind of story no I mean there is a reason that these new atheism movement in science really brings the shoddest
assumptions that critical philosophy crushed them into pieces at the beginning of 19th century So do you have an answer to that question that is better substantiated? What to do with your body when you die? Who fucking cares? Do whatever you... Actually the only viable solution to all of these... I donate my body, organ donation, use whatever you can use. Get rid of it in the most optimal way that is good for your civilization.
That's it. Just get on with it. We are not supposed to waste our time with these kinds of stuff. Philosophy is the organ of thinking. My thinking is about those who are alive and those who are yet to come. The rest don't matter. The dead don't matter. Well, before we answer the question and make fools of ourselves to future generations, maybe I should end the broadcast. Yes. All right. Thanks, everyone.