Simulating the World & Remodeling Philosophy (Session 14)

Hello and welcome to the final session now of simulating the world and remodeling philosophy with Reza Nagarsani. Here is your course instructor now. Thank you very much, Theo. Thank you. And thank you everyone for bearing with me throughout these sessions. You know, we have diverged we have you know learned a few things but from my perspective I really didn't manage to deliver what I actually wanted to talk about in full course nevertheless that's that's the point essentially we all we wanted to know

was kind of like an introduction to scientific modeling and models in general. And as always, it is up to you whether you want to research further or not. my task only is to simply instigate. And, you know, I might have failed at instigation, but nevertheless, you know, the thing is that education is always like this. It's always something that is performed by people with limited powers precisely because

there are limited beings. Nevertheless, let's not get sentimental and let's start. So, before I ask you if you have questions, as always, let me just go a little bit into the topics that I promised you for this session. and then we can open it to the questions and these questions can be asked not only about today's topic but the entire course so remember that we concluded the previous session with

a few remarks about why toy models are important. And at the end, we arrived at three principal, what you might call to be factors, which distinguish toy models from regular models. Their paradigm of how possibly explanation from how actually explanation. And if you remember, those paradigms, those factors, were pedagogical factors, modal factors, and heuristic factors.

The toy models, at least in the small sense of the toy model, in the idealistic or idealized sense of the toy model, usually deal with these factors more effectively and efficiently than actual toy models. they allow us to give robust descriptions of the mechanisms involved they allow us to venture out into different heuristic methods and also

So they allow us to create modal scenarios which, from the perspective of the current models couched in the existing theoretical systems, might not be possible. So in that sense toy models, you could think about them as kind of counterfactual models. Counterfactual models not essentially in a modal realist sense, but in the sense of world building. perhaps it is more fruitful to build new worlds to now the existing world through

the worlds that we can or we might be able to build in so far as when we launch a perspective we see the existing world from the worlds which are made crafted models we have a better traction on how this existing world actually works And exactly like what I mentioned earlier on with regard to the Copernican Revolution, sometimes it is not the best idea to simply try to make sense of the world by inhabiting it.

sometimes it's mandatory to launch a satellite into the orbit to make a new world and from the outside perspective look at the workings of the current world in which we inhabit. and by world I do not simply mean earth I mean any kind of world artistic scientific literary musicological so on so forth so today we are going to talk

about a little bit about toy models big toy models my apologies however we cannot go into the details precisely because not only that this topic is very new but also the very idea of big toy model actually comes from a highly highly technical details from computer science, mathematics and logics which are I would say not just difficult but might actually be quite impenetrable

from the perspective of a layman like us. So that's why I'm going to keep it quite rudimentary in a kind of an allegorical metaphorical sense rather than going into much details because to go into the details requires a lot of mathematical knowledge and familiarity with today's state of logic and theoretical computer science so As we learned, toy models in the canonical sense are just simply collapsed models, models

which deliberately remove certain details in order to give more or less a robust account of explanatory mechanisms. Big toy models, however, are more like non-collapsed toy models in the sense that even though they embark upon idealization of details, idealization and simplification of details, nevertheless,

they are capable of, with quite surprising adequacy, express the workings of different theories. For example, so we have toy models of classical mechanics and aurora, you know, the model of the celestial rotation that you see in the museum, so on and so forth. You also have some small toy models of quantum mechanics. The thing is that if you want to think about toy models,

you think about a big toy model as a model of models. a model of models, of a collection of models, in the sense that the big toy model of mechanic, at the very least, tries to incorporate the existing models of classical mechanics and quantum mechanics with sufficient details. details. Essentially, it is still faithful to both quantum mechanics and classical mechanics

rather than being like a third alternative prima facie. Now, I remember I told you that toy models initially came to being through physics. So in physics, when we are talking about a model, we are usually talking about axiomatic models. So essentially, the approach, the classical or the canonical approach in physics is something like this,

that in order for us to create a small toy model of classical mechanics, all we need to incorporate are certain axiomatic namely primitive rudimentary sentences within the theory of classical mechanics which undergird every single classical mechanical system So the small toy model in physics is essentially a form of axiomatic construction.

All you need to make your small toy model is that you should have the axioms of classical or quantum mechanics, namely primitive sentences. by virtue of which a system can be identified as either classical or quantum. Okay? Now the big toy model has a different capacity, has a different feature. it is not really made from pure axiomatization it doesn't purely rely on

the axiomatic primitive sentences of the theory in which the model is is constructed. The goal of the big model is first to retain not only the axiomatic sentences of the theory in which model is constructed but also a sufficient amount of complexity of the particular systems of either classical type or quantum type one two

the goal of the big toy model is not simply integrated it is not merely made to reconcile classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. It has a fundamentally different goal, to retain classical and quantum mechanics axioms and constraints, but also enable us to arrive at different exotic, which means yet unavailable models and theories of physics, fundamental physics.

For example, think about the example I mentioned last time with regard to toy model and AI research. okay so you can think about AI research being driven for the past like almost now 70 years from two externals of an S of an a spectrum symbolic AI basically

logical purely computational manipulations as responsible for giving rise to something akin to a mind, symbolic AI and perceptual processing AI, which we now see it in neural networks, you know, predictive processing paradigm of brain, so on and so forth. so and remember I told you last session that of course from a conceptual

perspective the problem of AI today is a problem of design space that your variables and your design space should be as vast as possible without actually leading to some sort of intractable scenario. It should be as vast as possible. Vast as possible, meaning that it should be accommodated by every kind of model that you have at this point. every kind of theory of mind or intelligence that you have at this point.

So let's say that symbolic AI and perceptual AI or neural AI now demarcate the extrema of the AI design space. Now, this is all good and great. the big twin model starts from this problem it tries to retain this kind of basically continuum with delimited by neural problems and symbolic problems perceptual problems and conceptual or cognitive problems now the thing is that

the toy model does not simply settle or end with this demarcation it tries to put these two extrema, the perceptual, the cognitive, the neural, the symbolic, into some sort of formal interaction, modeling interaction, in which you can, in fact, derive, derive, construct new exotic models of mind from the opposition between the two. And through these exotic models, you might be in fact able to renegotiate,

revise, or modify certain assumptions of the neural processing and certain assumptions of the symbolic processing. This is what you might call to be a big toy model of AI. Questions? I have a question. It was actually in regard to a statement you made last session about how big, you said big toy models are more pernicious than small toy models.

Yes, because... And I think I follow what you mean by that, but I'm also like, I was just thinking about that. Yes, because you see, when you are only working within one theory, like say, for example, neuroperceptual processing, or for example, classical mechanics, you only use certain assumptions which belong to the theory of, for example, perceptual processing or classical mechanics, right? Yeah. You are in a safer position. Whereas in the big toy model, you also have to bring other kinds of assumptions with regard to, for example, symbolic processing or quantum mechanics.

then there are also metatheoretical assumptions as how possibly the theory of classical mechanics and quantum mechanics can actually be reconciled or even put on the same level. so you see the ingression of those metatheoretical assumptions precisely because you have added an extra theoretical component namely the other pole into this scenario requires you to somehow have

hidden assumptions metatheoretical assumptions with regard as how classical mechanics and quantum mechanics can in fact be incorporated into one spectrum. Or how perceptual, neuroperceptual processing and symbolic processing can be dealt with within the same continuum. That is the pernicious aspect. Not in the sense that it's just that basically you are opening yourself up to more assumptions rather than less. Okay. So, yeah, that makes a lot of sense.

Because I was kind of under the... Because some of those hidden assumptions could also yield... Because what I was actually thinking is like in this imaginary large scale toy model that it would somehow create like by synthesizing meta theories, like create a new set of phenomena on its own that is kind of like unstoppable and could yield like wildly varied results. And then I guess maybe it's not as like sci-fi as that. and it's no no it's not it's not as speculative as that yeah yeah yeah it's it's just more that like the meta theoretical has underlying hidden assumptions yes and it's like in the sense of

the mediation between the classical the mediation yeah between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics or for that matter the mediation between perceptual neural processing and symbolic processing requires further assumptions beyond both. Meta-theoretical, essentially. Okay. Any more questions? What's the... I guess I'm just kind of curious why the... I don't know if this is just too speculative, but why is there this need to retain both classical mechanics and quantum mechanics axiomatics?

You see, all of the models of the classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are essentially axiomatic within the framework of their own theories. that the model can be said to be a model of classical mechanics to the extent that it incorporates or rather ratify the axioms, the primitive sentences of the theory of classical mechanics and by virtue of that by virtue of this uh correlation with the axioms or the primitive

sentences of the classical mechanics then it can index certain systems certain physical systems as classical and the same thing about the quantum mechanic model Axioms in the sense that we were talking about in the previous course, simply the primitive sentences of the tear. One second, I need to have some juice. I love that picture.

Thank you. I was initially thinking that you are going to ask that why in fact the victory model should be

demarcated by for example a victory model of fundamental physics should be demarcated by at its extrema by classical and quantum well precisely because that's all we have these are essentially the the most canonical models or theories that we have so essentially the big toy model here is trying to it's exactly like what i have been discussing with regard to nelson goodman thesis of world building remember that what one of the main processes one of the main operations of world building was the order of drivability construction that in deriving

something from the existing worlds we can create new worlds okay now the thing is that you are demarcating your continuum by these two models classical mechanics and quantum mechanics and then you are of course these are in interaction based on certain kinds of assumptions that required that were required for you to put them in the same continuum because they might not actually be part of the same continuum now you have done it so this allows you to create a kind of construction scheme from these two exterments derive other kinds of models exotic models or

exotic theories from the possible sets of interactions between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics and hence through those new models and theories then you can look back at these externals classical and quantum modify them but also add something to them which you couldn't add to them if you were either in the realm of classical mechanics or in the realm of quantum mechanics the same thing about the ai problem

neural processing and symbolic processing yeah i mean that kind of was where i was headed with my question part of it it seems like integrating those two models is already a problem yes yes but the whole thing is that this problem it is not totally arbitrary in the sense that you cannot put for example let's say ptolemaic system with quantum mechanics as the extremum of your big toy model the only reason that you can do that is precisely because

the field of quantum mechanics is constrained by the same problems or constraints which classical mechanics tries to answer but inadequately so then yeah then i guess the question for me becomes uh is there some perspective from which we can look at a big toy model just let's just say that there's a hypothetical big toy model where classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are integrated and it somehow it seems like there would need to be some limit on the big toy model

too we would be able to find that limit as well it's essentially it's essentially the constraints of the continuity between two rival theories in the sense that the dislodging theory so okay classical mechanics tries to answer certain problems and it answers them quite sufficiently in its own domain okay then with the introduction of certain kinds of observational capacities or new data, we see in the Thomas Kuhnian sense, the classical mechanics confronts with persisting anomalies

certain kinds of physical phenomena it cannot really coherently answer to, okay? this is what quinn's idea of the crisis it is not just one single anomaly crisis is set of persisting anomalies that the that that the preceding theory cannot fully answer to okay so then there is a rival theory a succeeding theory like quantum mechanics that answer to these questions, but it also has its own sets of problems or crises, okay? Nevertheless, the continuity is set

by anything that quantum mechanics tries to do is already set by the problems which plagued classical mechanics. In the sense, the quantum mechanics can be said to be a very neat generalization of the problems of the classical mechanics. You can think about this between classical collision, classical particle collision theory, and quantum collision theory. So the thing is set. You see, the principle of molecular chaos holds for both of these two theories.

Essentially, the classical particle mechanics, classical, sorry, classical particle collision theory holds that two particles which have not yet collided, the velocities and the momentums of these particles are not yet correlated meaning that they have not influenced one another they haven't created a product okay so anything that the quantum particle collision theory should deal with is already framed in the sense of this principle.

This is called molecular innocence or basically molecular chaos. It's just an assumption. Innocence as a kind of innocence here, the word innocence here simply means an intuitive assumptions within physical theories. Okay, now the thing is that for quantum mechanics, quantum particle collision, we know that when two particles collide, it is no longer necessary to assume that there will be a product. or if there is a product, it would be the product of particle P1 and particle P2

because one of the particles can actually get annihilated in the course of the collision. So you see, here, it's not just that we are making arbitrary choices. is precisely because theory T1 and theory T2 have a continuity with regard to the frame of reference of the problems of their own theory. Is there, maybe I don't want this question to just continue to do it but it just seems like there is a similarity between

the history of metaphysics and this big toy modeling maybe can you elaborate on this just the history of metaphysics as I understand is the attempt to give some totalizing absolute almost point of reference from which I don't think that big toy model tries to do that big toy models essentially is purely wrap resides within the realm of epistemological inquiry in the sense that the big toy model it starts with this question that's so okay if I see

phenomenon a with such and such epistemological I don't know deductions approaches whatever you might call them and then I see phenomenon B in continuity with phenomenon two with continuity with phenomenon one with such and such epistemological approaches then how is it possible that we are in fact talking about the same phenomenon the trivial question is a trivial

question of epistemology the non-trivial question of epistemology is that what if we try to coordinate the epistemological approaches that we used or employed for phenomenon one and the epistemological approaches that we employed for phenomenon B or two we coordinate them and through this coordination we derive a certain range of new epistemological approaches which can gain insight which can lead us to have new insights into the epistemological workings of A and B but also

reveals new sectors of reality which were otherwise hidden from either the epistemological approach a and epistemological approach B it is essentially what you might call to be critique or deconstruction of the available epistemological tools does this presuppose a model this does this principle distinction between possibility for the ways in which we derive the sectors or the intelligence of the sectors? Yes. Well, first of all, yes, but not in a kind of a Deleuzean sense. I would say more

in line with a kind of epistemological modal way, in the sense that when we are talking about actual actual already has so many modal assumptions for it to be actualized or considered to be an actual essentially but yes the idea of actuality in philosophy at least for hegel an actual for hegel that which is objectively true okay now that which is objectively true is not a totality or it is not a completed totality okay it might have further further scopes than what you realized that this is the case what is so then to do that you have to create

new model scenarios a range of new model scenarios such that these model scenarios can enrich the the very idea of what is true, what is the case, what is actual. So the modality of actuality is in some sense possible by means of its extension, that it could be something else, or what is could be... I see what you're saying, I just don't really know. What is, is always can be something else. What is can be always something else, and what is something else is not under the dominion, under the logical dominion of what is, but is under the dominion of what might be.

And what might be is essentially a modal adventure. and here big toy models the emphasis on the modal scenarios counterfactual so on and so forth here shines through that is essentially tries to within the given range of what is the case of rival theories try to derive new model scenarios that might actually be the case I guess the thing that kind of confuses me is this language about deriving models that

might actually be the case. It just seems like at that point you're... well, I just don't see how the model could ever be the case the model it seems no the models are not ever the case but models when we talked about this models nevertheless are what you might call to be uh idealized and simplified representations of what is the case What is the case in a metaphysical sense has no place in science.

That should be just thrown out of the window. Baby with the bathwater, just get rid of them. That is not what we are talking about. We are talking about simply the fidelity to the theoretical fidelity fidelity to the physical phenomena or target system theoretical fidelity i didn't say phenomenal or some other kinds of metaphysical fidelity these are not in the ambition of science science doesn't want to talk about this stuff and that's why i think that carla you know i love carl he's my hero i love him

you know i i pray to him five times a day but nevertheless i think carlap was completely wrong in the sense that he tried in the first stage of his work to garbage the entire question of metaphysics. No, metaphysics is important. He did realize it. It's just that these questions that we are usually posing with regard to reality, even though they appear to be metaphysical, they are most probably they are actually epistemological they have epistemological hidden assumptions that was the greatest discovery of karnab

that be beneath and behind every great metaphysical question philosophy there are some demons of epistemology lurking and some of these demons are quite shady And we have to look into this. We have to decompose the great metaphysical questions into great epistemological questions. From great epistemological questions, we have to do the great work of the epistemological method, developing new methods of epistemology. epistemology because we cannot change our epistemological question unless we realize

that the metaphysical questions are at the bottom are hidden epistemological questions and hidden epistemological questions cannot be put forward revealed or exposed unless and until we have something called a metal logic of epistemological deduction can i ask you something real quick so absolutely I'm patient in the theory of intelligence and spirit. You say, to make a Carnapian slogan, construction of the world is prior to the constitution

of the object and the knowledge of it. And I understand this by means- I deny it. I didn't wrote it. You didn't wrote that? What? I'm just kidding. No, okay. Go on. Yeah. I feel like fighting over. Isn't this like, are you making Carnap Hegelian or I, because from what you were saying earlier it was... Carnap is not Hegelian actually. Carnap is Husserlian. The sentence that I just read sounds a lot like exactly what you said with regards to... Yes. So essentially, you see, when Carnap's, well, this is, you know, that's why I say that whatever you say, I deny it in the court of law.

Rather I say that in intelligence, no, I didn't say it. I decant. I'm not going to stand for this. but okay let me tell you this that here a problem arises and I think that it has created a lot of confusion and the reason I'm saying that I'm going to deny if you actually get me on Facebook or other kinds of media on this sentence I would say I will deny it precisely because I think that I didn't do any kind of job at explicating in a Carnapian sense what logic is. You see,

so Carnap definitely comes from a Fergian formal logic ancestry in the sense that in our vowel he actually believes that all mathematical statements in a transcendental mathematic sense or transcendental logic can be reduced to logic. Now, that's basically the whole idea of the logical empiricism. However, later on, he has a fundamentally different idea, and that's what I was actually trying to refer to. In the sense that for later Karnak, the idea of logic is not this, what

you might call to be free floating forms that can be simply applied and if we expand them we can expand reality logic now for him almost implicitly in the later works is absolutely i would say the big toy model of the formal logic in the classical sense and transcendental logic in the sense of Kant and Husserl. And everything that virtually we have gone through for the past three or four decades

in theoretical computer science and contemporary logic shows us that logic itself is a species of what you might call to be transcendental procedures. In the sense, let me, okay, now this is getting a little bit shady here. Let me explain this to you. So let me, for example, in Frigate, logical connectives, disjunct, conjunct, so on and so forth, Their meaning is set by the formal procedures, meaning in quotes, namely the question of semantics.

The thing is that with the advance of contemporary logics in a pluralistic sense, we see that these meanings are actually not purely formal in the Freedian sense. they are in fact the products of certain kinds of interactions between certain axiomatic processes or rudimentary processes in a computational sense. The very fact that we can have the meaning of and is precisely because there is this process,

there is that process, interact with one another at a very rudimentary level, and through this interaction, the context of and, the logical operator, and is determined. Now, this is not what Frigge actually was thinking about. And this new view, when I'm saying formal logic, I do not mean Friggean formal logic. I mean formal logic in today's sense. This new view of formal logic is exactly in the same family of transcendental logic, theory of pragmatism in a Brandonian sense,

theory of meaning in a Wittgensteinian sense, and theoretical computer science view of processes. So, yes, I completely agree that the Karnak part is, you know, first of all, let me tell you that I introduced it very late when I was writing the book. so yes absolutely it it will definitely appear to any reader as if i am actually peddling some sorts of phrygian uh formal logic and of course carna was a phrygian as well in the beginning

but this is not what i'm talking about when i'm talking about when i'm talking about formal logic I do not mean it in the formalistic sense of free game. I mean it in the exact sense, the form of a logical statement is always and all the time co-constitutive with the processes and the interaction that goes between them. And of course, this view of the processes and the interaction between them can be naturalized.

But then, that is the whole point, that this naturalization of logic, which is, for me, is like the ultimate utopia, should not be mistaken with the kind of naturalization that is undergoing today, which I would call is purely made of naturalistic fallacies. The kind of naturalistic bloatware, like in terms of Darwinian game theory and revolution, naturalistic evolution, so on and so forth. It's a naturalization par excellence. And I would say that Hegel actually wanted to do the same thing. i'm really happy to hear that you're against most um analytic coinians right now in the naturalistic

i absolutely hate quine i don't want to hear that man's name one more time in my class sorry for No, I'm just kidding. But yes, no, that's why I'm absolutely against Quine. Quine really, literally, I'm actually working on paper on this. Quine, to be honest with you, didn't understand anything about logic. He glorified it. He glorified formal languages. but he really didn't have any knowledge of it and ultimately he's just like a naive materialist to be honest with you he's a great philosopher

when compared to people like Plato, Carnap so on and so forth he's just a naive materialist I mean physicalism is a dead end in not big no physicalism actually can give us a lot of stuff but to glorify physicalism is absolutely a philosophical and scientific dead end i think in my opinion no i agree sorry for their no no absolutely no it's not good this is after all the last session More questions? Anything?

you have to elaborate on this how how do you think that denial of physicalism is tantamon's to denial of objectivism Theo yeah i think well i don't i don't mean it just one apocalyptic at all but it does have that ring um

But I think this kind of limitation on logic or the scope of metaphysics or logical framework seems like well one i pushing philosophy into epistemology seems it's like how do we get rid of those metaphysical questions then it seems like no we are not we are never going to get rid of them we are never going to get rid of them i absolutely agree with hagel any person who tries

to expunge metaphysics is going to be doomed banished to the hell of the most dogmatic forms of metaphysics right essentially the migration toward the epistemological approach is should not be taken as annihilation or termination of metaphysical questions, but rather exploration of metaphysics rather than annihilation of it. Because the moment that you actually think that you have got rid of metaphysics, like

early Karna in Aufbau, then you are in some sort of really deep shit dogmatic metaphysics. Yeah, that's how I understand it too. But then part of why I see the kind of maybe the critique of physicalism as an indication of a problem with objectivity is that now we've shifted the language into well now we're going to negotiate objectivity sort of like let's negotiate what objectivity is right in a way go on how are we going to negotiate um that you know well we'll

let's call this objective you you and i like makes we agree to call certain things objective no not certain things making it make it you're now you are weaseling okay you have to make an example a complete example uh let's say a red dot okay so there's a red dot on the screen below the google hangout you agree that we both see a red dot on the screen and say, that stands so long as we have no party which is intelligible to us which disagrees

with that statement. But then as soon as it seems like we have some party which is intelligible to us and can communicate to us that says there's no red dot there, then it challenges are, no? Absolutely, absolutely. And that might not seem hugely problematic if you think that maybe your interlocutors are always going to be intelligible to you. But if you think that you might have to struggle to find your interlocutors or those people who will help you determine what objectivity is, then it becomes a thorny problem.

How so? If you can't communicate with them, how can it be a thorny problem? it would be a problem but wouldn't be thorny problem right yeah as the communication becomes the uh yes the vector the vector of of designating and refining objectivity and absolutely that that is yes absolutely this is the case big toy models actually try this is the this is the goal of the big toy models So essentially, you are human one, then there is a human two.

Big toy models try to derive a whole bunch of other agents mid-range to fill the continuum between human one and human two views of how they see the red dot. and of course this drivability is quite absolutely necessary you see the word derivability means that you cannot simply plop in or introduce out of blue some sort of speculative human like oh my goodness AGI singularity

a la Nicklan or something like that. These are out of question. The order of derivability means that you are essentially creating a constructive hierarchy constrained by your two exterments, human one and human two, the way that they see these red dots and this is essentially anything any any agent corresponding to this order of derivability you can communicate with it because they are derivable from human one and human two

agent one and agent two and in that sense yes to see the red dot might be in fact not a goddamn red dot either from the perspective of the agent one or agent two, human one, human two we have to introduce new variable observers, agents models, theories such that they either confirm it but most probably they are not going to confirm it. They are actually going to say that this is something else. But to consider it as something else,

there should be a continuum of exchange or information flow between agent 1 and agent 2 and agent 3, agent 4, agent 2, agent N. The order of drivability. And this is the very idea of the big toy model. Objectivity, if we think that objectivity is given to us or is something out there, it's just a pure dogmatic idea. Objectivity is nothing other than an agential criteria. But the thing is that the agential criteria is itself biased, precisely because there can be many, many numerous agents out there with their own observational techniques and models and theories.

And that's why we have to talk about them coherently. So you see, the way that I think about it, the question of big toy model is in fact a tentative answer to Kant's biggest conservative knee-jerk reaction. reason let's not talk about aliens and extraterrestrials because nevertheless we are such and such agents and we cannot talk about them because whenever we talk about them this talk of that which is not known that which is outside of our perception of our agential capacities can be very well to be said

an exercise in vagaries of speculation, armature speculation, so to speak. But that, you know, this is all great and good. But then does this mean that we as such agents, our world is quite restricted to our own modeling observational capacities? Yes, it does. But then, if it does, actually, then how can we actually talk about reality coherently, about the greatest questions of metaphysics? Anything that we are going to talk about is just purely from a Hegelian perspective

is something issued by our egotism, transcendental ego. So that is the whole point of the big toy model, to reinvent and construct new transcendental types for new egos, new observer, new aperceptivations, to integrate them. according to the constraints and capacities that we have. And through that, we might be able to renegotiate, challenge our dogmas

of episteme, observation, sensory processing, so on and so forth, but also come across new sectors of reality, hitherto hidden to us. Okay, maybe here we need to have a five-month break. Sounds good. Secret break. Yes. Well, nothing's gonna break for me. I'm wasting your heads. Yeah, okay.

Okay, see you guys. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. both Theo and Jobin made my job easy. Essentially this was I was basically would be I would have called it the conclusion for the course. Very short. So models try to approach a target

physical phenomenon okay within the resources of a given theory in which they have been constructed then there are models of models okay and then models are models try to basically approach models within the broader scope of the theory in which model one has been constructed So the model two can use additional resources of the set theory in order to look into the first model and give it more details, both theoretical but also in correspondence with an actual physical phenomenon.

Then we talked about toy models, essentially what you might call to be simple counterfactual fictional scenarios. model scenarios which are necessary for us to talk about the range of assumptions that we are employing when we are using a model. And then we saw that the toy models are not just simply what you might call to be underdogs of actual models. They in fact introduce quite a good range of useful capacities which are not given to us by any actual model.

Modal function, heuristic function and pedagogical function. They allow us to migrate from how actually explanation to how possibly explanation. Then big toy models. And big toy models are what you might call to be the critique of orthodox Kantianism, in the sense that if a certain theory is based on certain kinds of observations, certain kinds of conceptual theoretical resources, and to that extent it ranges over a certain

kind of physical phenomena then how can we step or postulate the possibility of expanding not only our theoretical and conceptual resources modeling resources but also expanding the scope of the said physical target phenomenon. A good example of this would be precisely in Transcendental Aesthetics by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason, the question of aliens. you can think of aliens as possible sectors of reality counterfactuals

with regard to what we see conceptually speaking in a Kantian sense what's the what we see here and now given our transcendental resources well in order to move beyond what we see here and now we have to do at least one thing to be capable of creating counterfactual scenarios

multiverses rather than universes multiverses from which we can actually look back at our current transcendental moments here and now and employing this kind of multi multi-verse view of modeling might actually allow us to come across new data new observations in a scientific sense so on so forth and hence the possibility of expanding the sectors of reality to finally see the aliens like you know

how do you spell that cigar-shaped thing, Adam, that came to the solar system? O-a-miu-miu? How do you say it? You know, in the Hawaiian, it simply means scout. You know, that stone, cigar-shaped stone thingy was on the news. Adam, you're mute. Yeah, how do you actually pronounce it? I'm an Iranian, I don't have a goddamn clue as how it's being pronounced.

I think it's just Oumuamua. Oumuamua, okay. So Oumuamua, have you actually read the interview with the guy who said that this most probable is actually an alien artifact? So you know that he is a professor of astronomy, I think at Harvard. I was reading a couple of weeks ago a very detailed interview with him at Horez, you know, the Israeli newspaper. top-notch you should definitely just search harrets and all more and it's top-notch

he he actually you know when people are approaching that uh you know so he he calculated based on the spin and the speed of this celestial body that most probably almost emphatically so this is not a natural object it's an artifact it's an alien artifact you know the aliens are here it's just that you don't see them as aliens it looks like natural to you okay precisely because you don't have the resources to see it as an alien uh and uh then people asking that so you you know this is a fantastic sci-fi scenario how many sci-fi have you read and then he says that i hate sci-fi i don't

want to have anything to do with that this is science you know this is the whole point here we are not in the business of speculative sci-fi yes we love sci-fi and so on so forth but we are in the business of true philosophy. What does it mean to see a natural object as an alien or to see an alien as a natural object? This is the very question of big toy models. certain kinds of approaches that allow us to graduate from our existing models and theories

to fundamentally exotic theories and models by that when I'm saying exotic don't get me wrong I'm not talking about some armchair speculation in the sense that such exotic theories are always and all the time constrained by our existing theories nevertheless in the Nelson Goodmanian sense we can create an order of derivability to construct additional models from these two extrema to create new models of physical phenomena but also more importantly to criticize modify revise

and dig home in the very existing ways of how we see the world in a Kantian sense seeing the world as X. And of course the ultimate sci-fi of this kind of genre is R2C Clark Rendezvous with Rama. Top notch. You know, yeah, sure. Clark is the worst sci-fi writer, like Isaac Asimov. He, from perspective of literature, he absolutely has no position whatsoever.

He doesn't even know how to make a character. But nevertheless, the storyline, the plot of the Roma universe is exactly like that. How can we encounter a new world? That is the problem. without mistaking it as our nature natural or given world well to do that you need to have the so-called exotic derivable models

from the existing models of your old world but are all exotic models you know like equivalent in the sense that if we have like alternative modes of creating a model then why go through the whole hegelian no no not all exotic models are equivalent in what sense are they equivalent i mean i'm asking this in like as a provocation because exotic models that are exotic by means. Let me make an example for you. In the field of theoretical computer science or computational complexity, Adam can help me on this because it's far more knowledgeable.

Let's not even talk about exotic models. Let's just talk about something that we already have, Chomskyian hierarchy, a formal languages. In the vein of Chomsky, so Chomsky grammar, by which he means syntax, formal syntax. So we have hierarchies of different grammars. these grammars correspond with certain kinds of computational automata. Each of them can only compute certain parts, certain kinds of structures and not others.

okay for example uh you know the structure of a rna can be analyzed in terms of this automata computational complexity problem and not others okay now the thing is that the hierarchy actually already suggests that every single hierarchy or level of grammar formal grammar that we have corresponding to computational machines is actually derived from the other they are not the same They, each of them can actually shed light on fundamentally new structures.

They have their own computational complexity problems, their own computational costs, their own computational problems. Adam, go on and say something about this. Bring down the acts of theoretical computer science on this matter. JOHN MUELLER- No, I don't disagree with anything you just said. It's a very sensible summary. No, but just say something here. There's too little to disagree with, I'm afraid. But yeah, I mean, you get a hierarchy of languages, and then you get a corresponding shape of the computational machines that can process them.

And then you can characterize them in very specific formal ways in terms of complexity and things like that. And you get a specific shape of machine to fit with those languages. Like the fixed protocol that's used for financial transactions is modeled by a finite state automata, for example. But yeah. Like for example, you get from context free to regular. Both of them from our perspective, computational capacities are exotic models, are exotic computational models.

Nevertheless, they are not the same. Of course, the regular languages, languages demarcated by universal theory machines. The problems of this level are set by the constraints of lower levels. Nevertheless, they can add something more to it. But also they have higher computation cost. This is the whole point that exotic models are not all the same it's not a kind of free-floating exoticism when we are saying exotic models we are talking simply in terms of the order of derivability the order of derivability is always constrained

entrenched so from certain kinds of entrenched constraints you might think of them as axioms you might think of them as certain kinds of computational problems so on so forth you build on top of them each of these layers are going to give you something more but at a higher cost to be more exotic is to be more costly from a computational perspective adam is this right i hope that i didn't make some bullshit here These are actually quite, you know, to be honest with you, when we think of, you know,

this is what I've always been telling you, that when we are talking about these kinds problem. It is so easy for us as philosophers, as theorists, as artists, as writers, practicing attorneys, so on and so forth, to fall in the trap of, well, you know, exotic means, oh well, anything that is exotic is the same. It's just all exoticism. But no, we are simply talking about what Karnas said. We are working in the realm of explicata. Namely, refined concepts.

Not in terms of explanando. The realm of refineness of the concept is a stepping stone from which we can move forward. Otherwise, we get doubly screwed in a philosophical sense. We get a metaphysical John Quere, but also pure epistemological dementia and Alzheimer. So what do you want to go for?

Do you want to break away from this double bind? Or do you want to actually do the hard work? and this is not against Jovan. Jovan actually proposed a fantastic question. I'm simply making this as a general question to you all, including myself, that to see these problems, we have to do the hard work of refining the concepts. We have to, and this is why I think that I, in disagreement with Theo from the previous seminar, Theo told me that Thomas Kuhn's social idea of science is kind of wishy-washy.

You're right, okay, it's wishy-washy to a great extent. But the thing is that how can you ever, and this is my question to Theo at this point, I'm going to challenge you, right, man. The whole point is that, okay, so we have all these, so let's say that there is this concept of computation. This concept of red, the concept of exotic. And of course, there are many ways that you can actually go on and refine this concept at a small scale to make it not vague and cluttered and not universal in an abstract sense.

how can you actually do this refinement if not to agreement through coordination of a community of speakers such as ours who zoom in on a very specific context They agree upon it and from there they proceed the task of explication or refinement of the concept. Otherwise, anything, I would say, is going to doom, is going to basically end up in your

metaphysical trash bin on your desktop. The social relations which constitute the system of science should be taken seriously, not as substantive social relations in the sense that Marcus tried to tell us, but as simply minimal agential perspectives. For you to refine the concept, you require the hand in a Hegelian sense, the hand of another self-consciousness, another agent in a formal sense.

and only from there we can refine the concepts or we can frame the actual question at hand. Otherwise, we are doomed. There is simply no other way. Either you are going to get kitsch Marxist, as I see it, or you are going to be individualists. And there are so many of them today in the Western world. No, the way of the concept, the way of theorization is always collective. But it's not collective essentially in a political sense.

It is collective in a formal sense. There should be certain kinds of technical formal agreements between a collective of agents or interlocutors in order to decide what is actually the context of the concepts we are talking about. like for example the word exotic the word computation and then from there we can refine this concept step by step anything else i think is a wishy-washy move philosophically politically and intellectually in the broadest possible sense

And then, this is the whole point, that we shouldn't lose the sight of the great picture. Yes, we have to do a great amount of work here and now in terms of refining our concepts, our models. But we should understand the fact that our models can be very well biased by certain kinds of contingent histories, natural and historical. And if they are biased, then

What does it mean to reinvent, to construct, to derive new models, new concepts, such that they can point us to new sectors of reality and theorization, which are hitherto not given to us? Questions, questions, questions.

Some of you have been very very silent, Artemis, Alan, you know, Mikey, Murray, I mean, I can, Justin, don't let me name all of you. I would like to say something. Absolutely. Absolutely. Well, I was thinking of, as you said, that toy models create, I mean, reveal secret elements that already exist but we didn't know them, let's say. And I was wondering, for example, if we say, can we consider language as a model that made

us think of the world in a different way, right? Yes. Okay. Yes. So... Well, we couldn't even in fact see the world without language. You can say that different languages from the spectrum of natural to formal led us to see the world differently. And it wasn't before, so maybe we, I mean that example came in mind of the importance of models and toy models, of the inventions of the possible words that you said. yes yes uh one one thing though i didn't exactly say that

so you see the big toy models or what you might call to be in the realm of for example your example general formal languages computational languages or artificial languages It is not that they only reveal the hidden assumptions of our modeling talks of the world couched in terms of our current pattern of language or modeling, but also they can actually create in the sense of construction the order of drivability new patterns

hypothetical patterns from which we might actually come across new fundamental sectors of reality sectors of reality in the sense that we come across we detect and organize the existing data in a different possible way and that organization of the existing observational data creates a crisis in a scientific colonial sense for previous worldview couched in terms of the previous scientific language or earlier language. And that's how the idea

of this construction of new big toy models is not simply to reveal or expose the cracks inside our own domain of discourse, existing domain of discourse, but also possibly lead us to new domains of discourse about new sectors of reality. Oh, I have a question.

This is something I've been thinking a lot about. Is it, you know, given this current situation we're in, where we seem to be locked within, know not just within sort of like a place of politics but also just a state of universal givenness that we have in the West because you know I think that it's not West don't don't do the best bashing for me I'm not I'm not trying to bash the West for the sake of exoticism I'm just trying it literally the world is in Okay, this is, well, you kind of half answered my question.

Is it possible that there is a place of deviation right now in which we can, what we already have, excavate a hidden place to where we can construct an outside? Because you say the whole world is shit. what I want to know is is there an outside you know because I think that's kind of what we're getting at is how do we reframe an outside you know how do we have a new outside or a new modality or whatever you know like and so this is kind of like I get really fatalistic sometimes because part of me is like

is the whole situation just this you know overblown and out of control or is there some place we can actually look to yes to go through the complete rigor of actually reconstructing what we see as to be an outside you know okay a few remarks I mean these are completely have chewed uh so don't go and tweet about them then reza said that but nevertheless between within all of us in this close circle one

i think that marx was fundamentally uh yeah no no marx mark mark was right but nevertheless you you should understand that Marx had a reaction, allergic reaction to Hegel. You know, when he says that the point is not to conceptualize about the world, but to change it, he's totally wrong. wrong. I mean, I understand the subtleties of Marx in this idea with regard to the movement from the abstract to the concrete.

But I actually do take side with Heidegger. How can you change the goddamn world if you don't have a concept of it? You know, this is the ultimate philosophical problem. Politics, to be honest with you, and maybe, I mean, okay, we cannot go offline or after records online, but let me tell you this. Politics, not all of it, there has been great, great political theorists, political activists, and revolutionaries, so on and so forth. But for a majority of part, this dictum by Marx

has been taken in the most vulgar sense, in the sense that simply if you don't, so let me tell you this. If you don't have a conception of the world, then and it's only the point is to change the world then you goddamn can do any kind of shit in this world but isn't it the whole point that why fascism, communitarianism, outright, white nationalism came to being the lack and absence of a coherent conception of the world

Without the conception of the world, fascism in all its guises is inevitable, inevitable. But conception is an objective task. And that's when philosophy precedes politics, as Socrates had it. to have a conception of the world precedes the whimsical recipes for change. If you have simply the idea of change,

then you are in the business of arbitrary, egotistic, cultish, secretarian, minoritarian, you know, wins. So that's number one. Number two. Sorry. The second idea is that, so, okay, we have a conception of the world. Okay, let's say we are philosophers in a Socratic sense. that we have to abide by a conception of the world, to think about what the world is or can be

before actually going on to change it. Then if this is the case, then we have to create certain kinds of procedures in order to renegotiate our biased dogmatic conceptions, which are merely the fruits of our upbringing, historical trajectory, so on and so forth. us all human beings are always prone

to take concepts as these kinds of encapsulations of the totalities of our histories just like Marxism, capitalism so on and so forth but Marx was actually quite forward with regard to this question that communism is not about here and now, is not an ideal state of affairs, it is that which annihilates and abolishes once and for all in an ongoing process any vestige of what you take as a totality of history in a hegelian sense

the totality of history is the concept with capital c so how can we move beyond the concept in the sense of here and now resources that we have that's when the whole question of the critique starts. And I think that's where in a tangential thread we should also take seriously this question of the big toy model or metatheory in the sense that so we have certain kinds of concepts,

certain kinds of theories to talk about certain kinds of stuff but what if that the way that we are talking about certain kinds of stuff is always beholden to the certain kinds of contingents and arbitrary histories of our own constitution essentially the way of the ego how can you get concretely outside of the dominion of the transcendental ego that is the question so you see the problem of conceptualization in the broadest possible sense from the perspective that you cannot have a picture of the world without concept to the to the idea that you cannot have

have a concept of reality without having other concepts which might actually challenge your current concept is quite counter-revolutionary. I don't see, to be honest with you, any sorts of political movement at this point that actually responds to these fundamental philosophical questions. Oh, I agree. politics at this point I hope that my leftist friends don't burn me at the stake I'm just joking there are so many great leftist friends but the thing is that leftism I'm not even

making anything about right leftism at this point is just simply the cult of the given yeah abolish it once and for all yeah well that's kind of that's kind of what i've been getting at recently uh in a lot of the ways that i've been sort of thinking is yeah of course of course you know now here let me let me let me tell you anarchist friends of mine say that oh yes this is so good totally five thumbs up but then anarchism is even worse than oh yeah you know in the sense that

the whole idea of blow things up just because everything looks like a power relations it's just i would say the most naive infantile metaphysical daydream that you can ever have First of all, power is absolutely necessary. And you have to distinguish between different nodes and relations of power, between different conceptions of power. This whole idea, it's totally adolescent. Oh, yeah. Oh, I agree. To get rid of all power relations that we have, we can start a discourse from there. is absolutely, I would say, pure counter-revolutionary,

both in a political sense and a philosophical sense. Anarchism, you know, I was an anarchist once, but I can say it, and you can tweet it, say that I said it, Anarchism is the most infantile thought ever forced in the womb of philosophy and politics. Anarchism is worse than fascism, in my opinion. I can hear some daggers sharpening here.

But yes, the whole point is this, that this whole course about modeling was not supposed to just about science or philosophy of science, but as a way to see about the task at hand, about the way that we see the world is always and already entrenched in our theoretical resources. Our theoretical resources are also beholden to our transcendental resources. This is all great and good. We have to refine it. We have to do the hard work in this venue. But also, this is not enough. It's not adequate.

We have to rise beyond the status quo. And to rise beyond the status quo means that we have to create new models, new models which can actually challenge our existing models. Thank you.

Questions, questions, otherwise that will be it. By the way how many of you are in my next class? My next class won't be an introduction. It would be something akin to the philosophical cloak and dagger stories. Except that I'm going to wear my daggers on my belt. It would be pure polemical course. What is your next course about?

It's about Nick Land. It's about David Rodin. It's about David Chandler. it's about you're the Kostki and Nick post it's called intellect is called intelligence in the age of intellectual scarcity Question, question. Before we sign off. So what's the goal here? What's the point? Is it sort of a perpetually destabilizing and restabilizing process?

Is there a desire for a, you know, sort of a new, you know, vocality after we've smushed together these sort of, you know, vaguely discontinuous sort of vocalities in our big toy model? Do we not know what the goal is? Well, there are different goals. you know, at a very modest level is just simply to know the furnitures of the world, objective, the goal of science. But I would say that the greatest goal, the overarching, not the greatest, the overarching goal is exactly what you said. And it's something akin to Hegelian sublation

or off-haven, the moment that you think that you have achieved what you might call to be a resolution, let's say that the moment that you have achieved the abolition of slavery, then you are in a bigger trap, in a bigger paradigm of slavery. And essentially the process of rinse and washing should proceed in a very systematic way to ensure that the course of knowledge but also the course of the social change never stifle.

It is as trivial as that. But of course, triviality is not always means that it's not consequential. If we actually took this lesson by heart, we wouldn't be in this goddamn world to begin with. It's the virtue of sort of aggressive humility, or not quite sure how to put it, but yeah. Yes, and the thing is that, you know, I would say that whether you are a scientist, philosopher, politician, a practicing attorney, we should see this progress not simply as a, as what you might call to be a reiteration of the idea in the sense that we were talking about,

but at each and every stage we should equip ourselves with new weapons, with new conings, with new methods until then we are in a hell of pain anything anything before we conclude So there's going to be a lot of yelling in the next class? Is that what I'm hearing? Sorry, sorry. So there's going to be a lot of a lot of axe grinding for the next class?

It will be just axe grinding. Perfect. It will be something akin to Jacobinite terror at the beginning of the French Revolution. your teens shall be erected and heads shall roll. SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 SPEAKER 1 I know that it was not the kind of course that you thought it would be. Nevertheless, we talked about the stuff. I researched more stuff that I didn't know.

You learned some stuff that you didn't know. And I think that is good enough. We shouldn't get too overexcited. I always tell you that philosophical education is not something akin like religious revelation. That is the difference between philosophy and religion. Religion gives you the miracle. Here and now, you get access, private access, to the God himself, to the Sky Daddy. However, philosophy does not give you such consolations. Philosophy actually disappoints you. But it's a disappointment which is born out of curiosity and hard labor.

human spirit so to that extent I think that yes okay this course was not really that kind of course that you thought it is nevertheless it gave you something and I'm sure that I liked behind basically I didn't give you stuff that you wanted to hear but nevertheless it was absolute pleasure to talk to you and I think that the conversations which unfolded were top-notch utterly fantastic and thank you very much for that

Your apologies, not necessary. No, but it's necessary. It's essentially, you see, when philosophers think about, oh, I'm going to put this idea forward. Ideas means nothing. Any idea has to fight against the actual concrete constraints of reality. People coming from different backgrounds, people having different ideas, so on and so forth. And of course, throughout that, the idea can metamorphose, mutate.

So you never get... This is like the saddest story. So you think, so the philosopher promises you a kebab, you know, or a roast. But at the end of the night, you get a bunch of burnt vegetables. This is the story for the lesson of philosophical teaching. thanks for the burnt vegetables thank you all yeah thank you they're good enough for me good excellent love you guys absolutely had super time with you i i to be honest with you i think that this was

I've been, what, like four years or five years teaching at New Center. I think this was the best class that I ever had. I'm going to take all the other final videos from all the other courses just to make sure you never said this. Oh, I'm busted now. How do you say that? Okay, okay, let's not go to that. All right, should I on the broadcast now? Yes, yes. Thank you so much everyone.