The Vicious Transparency of Time (Session 1)

Hello and welcome to the first session of the seminar The Vicious Transparency of Time Instructed by Reza Nikaristani. Before passing the mic to the instructor, I will read the seminar's description and a short bio of the instructor. So this two-credit seminar is about a single single tentative thesis. Time consciousness is the purest form of the unconscious. Building on the materials provided in Nicaristani's previous seminar titled They Open the Sea, the fragmented legacy of Freud at the dawn of psychoanalysis, this seminar examines time consciousness as the basis of our transcendental phenomenological experience of ourselves in the world.

Through this investigation, the time of experience, in combination with the experience of time, are introduced as peculiar forms of an unconscious operation that habituates us to not only what we take as our unshakable experience, but also an experience that is de facto backdrop against which we take theoretical or practical stances towards our history. that is, assessing the past and orienting towards the future. The seminar is comprised of two parts. First, a philosophical engagement with the transcendental phenomenological aspects of time consciousness. And second, a critique of time consciousness as an unconsciousness of experiential transparency

that through its blind spots and habituating mechanisms can lend itself to some of the most insidious pathologies of history. Rezan Igaristani is a philosopher. He has contributed extensively to journals and anthologies and lectures at numerous international universities and institutes. His current philosophical project is focused on rationalist universalism, beginning with the evolution of the modern system of knowledge and advancing towards contemporary philosophies of rationalism, their procedures, as well as their demands for special forms of human conduct. He is the author of Psychonopidia. His latest book, Intelligence and Spirit, is focused on philosophy of intelligence at the intersections between cognitive sciences, German idealism, and theoretical computer science.

So now, Reza, please take it away. Thank you very much, Aleka. It's very good to have you as a moderator. um hello everyone uh i'm glad uh that you are all here uh my apologies a little bit i've got a cold and um might be a little bit difficult uh uh for me to be you know loud or audible this time. So why this seminar? First, actually, before even going and talking about

the topic of the seminar, I want to give a warning, and I don't usually give this sort of warning, you know, for my classes, for my seminars, people who have taken my seminars in past few years know that I am kind of a free stylist when it comes to lecturing. I do prepare for my classes, but you don't see any sign of preparation in my classes, kind of like buffooning around, so to speak, when I present my classes. And I like that. I think there are different ways of learning philosophy,

so as there are different ways of teaching philosophy. But this class is particularly, this is why I'm giving a warning, is going to be by definition, by its very essence, puzzling. and it has everything to do with the topic at hand, time, right? Not time as a metaphysical idea, not as an ontological one. You're not even going into this sort of discussions. We might, but that is not really a concern. is that the moment that we start to talk about time,

we find ourselves in a bundle of pure confusions and bafflements. That is, as you know, is a preneal problem or puzzle of philosophy, so to speak. understood very eloquently by Parmenides' poem on nature and distilled in its complete terrorizing weight by St. Augustine in confessions. So all I want to say is that any of you who, and I am absolutely fine with this, as I said,

there are different ways of learning philosophies and there are different ways of teaching philosophy. Any of you who are seeking a certain sort of resolution down the line, or a certain sort of streamlining, a structured, streamlined sort of philosophizing for this seminar, maybe this course is not for you. You can entertain it, but I am saying that this is not going to be a streamlined seminar, nor is it going to be canonically coherent, right? given the subject matter. A puzzle that even talking about it

as we move forward becomes ever more puzzling. And this is time, the pre-neal question of philosophy. And as we see, the pre-neal question of all that which is experienced and being thought. With that said, I think of this seminar as as a really navigating a desert where basically we are on ourselves with little or no support,

means of subsistence. But nevertheless, we are beckoned by the nature of this puzzle into this very desert. And all we can do is to, once in a while, As Nima knows, I have given a talk, making a gesture of, you know, kind of like that this is a sign post, this is a station, a quasi-oasis, that we are talking about the question of time. But we know that by the very nature of this oasis being situated in a desert, we have to leave the mirage behind and once more, you know, delve further into the desert of time.

Now, methodologically speaking, this is something to do with a very peculiar form of philosophizing, a skepticism. skepticism is a friend of philosophy truly it is the most cherished way of doing philosophy but Hume understood the weight and the significance of a skepticism for philosophy in contemporary philosophy in contemporary times we have a certain sort of a skepticism

that betrays the ambitions of philosophy hume understood a skepticism as a way in to philosophy for us to be able to find a way out. Right? A skepticism not as a way out in the way that people engage with skepticism these days, but as a way in for us to be able to chart a handful a ways out. And our escepticism that originates from the question of time is absolutely the way

in to the most preneal, entrenched questions of philosophy. So with that said, let's begin with introduction where you can introduce yourself, talking very briefly about your background, why you have taken this class, and then I will start, and this session mostly will be introductory, kind of a flash forward for the rest of sessions to come. So let's begin.

Nima Nishanandar the notion of deserts for one of my projects. And I took this seminar because I feel that time has a very deep connection with the life of the desert and the desert progress and desertification.

And I think this seminar is very valuable for my research. Yeah. Superb. Liko, yes, I noticed that you changed my name. Sorry, I wasn't paying attention to the chat box. Thank you very much, Nemo. Maybe Michael. Well, hello, everybody. My name is Michael, and I'm an undergraduate student from Vancouver, Washington. I'm taking this course because I think time consciousness is very important to philosophy and to everything that I'm interested in, at least. After reading plenty of Plato, I think that time consciousness and this seminar in particular will help me understand a lot more of the work that I've been reading.

Superb. Excellent. Thank you very much. Maria? Hi. In my serious life, I'm a linguist, but other way than that, I write about art, but philosophy of art. I'm contemplating doing a PhD, but before I find myself in a conservative institution, I want to hear about Kant by Reza a little bit more. Thank you so much, Maria. It's nice to have you here again. um lane oh uh i mean i'm going through the rows of the my screen sorry my apologies yeah hi um i'm i've just finished my bachelor thesis um on on standard sequencing so about

We cannot hear you, Elaine. No, I could hear Elaine. Oh, sorry. It was my connection. Okay, sorry. So yeah, I was just finishing this thesis, which was basically about time and nonlinear time in music sequencing. So I thought this is like the perfect seminar to get more into this topic. And yeah, I'm currently unfortunately sitting at a concert when you were play later. So it's might get complicated to talk with the microphone later.

No, no, it's all good. It's all good. The thing is that probably this is the worst sort of seminar that you can take for for project based. research right because it's going to confuse you more and then you start to delve into the problem more and then you actually get distracted with it from the project itself I think that's perfect so I've just finished the bachelor thesis so superb if you want to send me uh any sort of you know material that you have uh would be great I can skim through it yeah sure and also topic wise i think there's a lot like mixture of marxist laruelian analysis of time

at least what i'm trying to do of course we are we are getting into some of this stuff that might be actually useful to you uh when you're talking about brentano or several idea of melodies and an idea of diagram of time like how time consciousness works. Yes, superb, excellent. Luca? Yeah, thank you. Hello, everyone. My name is Luca. I'm a performance artist. I have just finished my MA from Geneva, and I'm very much interested in contingency and, as you said, also laying

Laruelian non-philosophy and somehow I find this seminar super interesting and important in the thinking of how time is situated and is it in human consciousness and therefore also opportunities maybe to refute retrojective experiences of time and step out also of this kind of materialist view maybe excellent excellent excellent you should uh excuse me for one uh you know cardinal sin is that uh i am familiar with uh fernsoe or wells uh philosophy but not in any sort of depth right uh but maybe that that's actually useful uh for this class just like you

know, kind of providing a kind of basic set of problems, you know, through what you might call to be main figures of critical philosophy, and leave you to the task of going through in relation to with, you know, Larwell or Mea Suu for that matter and so on so forth. Yeah, great. Absolutely, thank you. Freya? Yeah, hi, I'm Freya. I'm currently graduating in philosophy and I do a master's in philosophy

in literature at the university of hildesheim in germany and um i'm writing my master thesis on simondon and um like an ecologic ecological reading of simondon and uh i think um what drew me to the seminar was um basically the connection of the um the unconscious uh the um yeah the notion of unconscious in relation to um to time because um for simon doll he places the the subconsciousness in the center of consciousness rather than the unconscious and um because i have done a lot of research into this recently and because uh for simon dog and time

plays a kind of like a more secondary role but it's also really present because it is about individuation, about becoming, I just find this really interesting, I think, the different insights into the connection between time and consciousness. Superb. This is again, well, again, you know, when people say, oh, well, you know, I'm I'm working on a Larwell project, a Simon Dunn project. For me, it's a source of trepidation, precisely because then if I say certain sorts of things, I need not be careful to kind of factor in the insights

of other sorts of projects. Freya, I assume that you are taking in Franziska Einar's class? Yeah, I wanted to, yeah. Yeah, because she is, you know, she's, her thesis was on Kant and technique, right? And she's coming from Sigler and Simon Don. And the connection here, at least for her, is a schematization, right? And the role of time in a schematization. as a techno-industrial sort of thing. And then she connects it. Yeah, definitely,

Francisco would be a magnificent sort of connection with regard to some of the stuff that we are going to cover. Yeah, I had a talk at the Incredible Machines conference and it was also very... She's a very great philosopher. You see, again, I mean, different people doing different sorts of philosophizing. She is always, I have noticed that, at least with the courses that she has taught and also her PhD thesis, that she is not one of those philosophers who's going to skim over details.

She always gets into the nitty-gritty of things, and that's actually quite interesting. Yeah, I'm definitely looking forward to hear that. And I also wanted to say that this is my first ever News Center seminar, so I'm very grateful to the process, but I'm looking forward to it. Thank you so much. um Joe I'm a filmmaker from the Philippines I make experimental films concerned with the intersections of identity and memory time and history technology and the human body in and of moving images The current focus of my work is to explore Filipino violence and terrorism.

So in 2020, the anti-terror law was passed in our country. So this law basically allows the police and the military to red tag anyone as a terrorist. So my work explores this dialectic between my personal identity and with this law imposed one. And I took this seminar to... Because it is impossible to explore Filipino violence and terrorism without exploring our troubled relationship with our history and of time itself.

I see, I see. That's great, magnificent. It would be great if you can, like in terms of cinema, send us some links or materials, you know, of relevance and magnificent. Yeah, sure, sure. On Discord, I'll send it. Excellent. Excellent. Excellent. Thank you so much. Joel? Hi, I'm Joel. I'm a philosophy student from Washington State. I just did my undergrad in philosophy, mostly pragmatism and philosophy of science. I'm hoping to do my PhD next year. I took this class because I'm mostly interested in time. It's been something I'm kind of just

getting started in, but I've been reading about for a couple of years and love listening reading Reza's stuff on time so here I am. Philosophy of science which what are the themes that you are focusing on? A lot of Thomas Kuhn paradigms. That's the main thing I remember. So is it more philosophy of science in the sense of its dynamics of theorization or specific themes situated within philosophy of science? philosophy of science, like, you know, philosophical problems of the space and time, this sort of stuff. Yes, very general era of time. Okay, that's, I mean, that's, yeah, I mean, that's very interesting. One of the things that I have

noticed with philosophers of science, with regard to the question of time, is that, strangely they are either or they are either thinking about you know the arrow of time or the question of time with regard to the dynamics of you know systematic theorization as a characteristic of modern sciences or really talking about the fundamental questions of space and time, which have been bringing up problems of philosophy, but now in terms of science, you know, post-Copernican sciences. And it seems that

they have the habit, at the very least on the surface, of over-extending the conclusions that they have derived from either problems of space and time, scientifically speaking, or problems of time within the dynamics of construction of scientific theories to one another, as if there is an implicit connection between them. You can see this, I would say, very much in a kind of

Kuhn is actually quite an interesting but Kuhn is always has mostly has only been talking about the construction of scientific theories but insofar as he belongs to a kind of a wing of a structural in philosophy of science. You know, Esnit is a good example that usually being, you know, connected with Kuhn. And Esnit projects the way that he sees the question of time within the context

of construction of scientific theories to the questions of space and time, like literally and then you can see on the other side of the spectrum someone like Adolf Grunbaum who has engaged with the question of space and time in philosophy of science quite extensively and then he projects the conclusions derived from this direct engagement with the problem of space and time to the question of the role of time in the construction of scientific theories, which is quite an interesting thing to me. It's puzzling,

actually, that how can they be related? Yes. Noah? Noah. Hey, everyone. I'm Noah, and I studied film and English in college, and I do videography now. But outside of that, I just read like philosophy stuff, mostly on my own. So this is kind of why I'm also taking this so that I can read in a community context. Also interested in like poetry and writing and the transdisciplinary program. a topic that I haven't really tackled much and so um and anytime that I have it's confused me so

it's kind of I'm glad that I'll be uh increasing my confusion through this um if that's what happens and I'm happy to be here anyway yeah that's pretty much it thank you so much and it is magnificent to have you here finally um Bruno Hi everyone. I am Bruno, Curriculum Philosophy Certificate Student. I am Psychoanalist and currently pursuing a Master of Philosophy at the University of São Paulo. My research interests are self-organization of complex and more scholar assistance,

of the sense of the politicalization of politics and psychoanalysis and fear of a language. And I think time is at the center of all this. Superb, superb, excellent. I don't know whether, I mean it might not be actually a good idea, but also it's a good idea because I was heavily criticizing Freud, but only for essentially to lay the groundwork for this particular seminar. If you can look into the past seminar, the Freud one. So essentially, we had to, in a sense, demolish Freud.

now to give him a proper position in the history of philosophy and particularly with regard to the question of the unconsciousness. Diego? Diego. Diego Moreno. Hi, my name is Diego Moreno. I'm writing my PhD thesis on German Idealism, concept of history. And I have some training on phenomenology of space. I wrote my BA and my MA dissertation on cruisals, concept of time or phenomenology of time.

I'm here because I'm familiar with the problem of space and time also, but I want to see what Rezan is going to do with the problem. I really enjoyed your seminars and I'm just curious and happy to be here excellent so uh yes so i need to be very careful about saying what was else said because someone here who knows or several don't worry the the the strange thing about for several is that i mean i don't know how many of of you have read Husserl, right? I mean, going to philosophy, you know who Husserl is

and the sense of the problems that he's putting forward and so on and so forth. But I mean, there are very, very few people who actually know about the nitty-gritty of Husserl, to the extent that it seems that philosophy post Kant is just philosophy, right? And then there is Husserl. It's almost as if like Husserl is some sort of undercurrent cult of philosophy that you are not supposed to touch, right? You are not supposed to look into it because it can abduct you, right? And at the very least, my own experience of reading Husserl was informed by these sorts

of terrors and fears and anxieties. I remember I had read Husserl, but I started reading Husserl in the past eight, nine years, systematically those formidable tones, so to speak, you know. And the experience was like this, that you know, you have a certain sort of nightmare. You go, you're left to your own devices, and you find yourself in your dream that you are in an emporium here an emporium of ideas right and then someone an internal voice says to you that you can steal whatever you like

from this emporium of ideas right and that is for Sarah but then you always have this anxiety that, my God, if I try to steal all these really interesting ideas, then the owner of this emporium might show up and imprison me for life in the dungeon beneath this emporium. And that's exactly like Husserl. You do not know exactly when you should stop until you become Husserlian. Becoming Husserlian philosophy, people who are familiar with this, has a very specific connotation, meaning that you undercut a lot of other philosophy as non-philosophical.

Yes, that was quite my experience and that is the reason why I quit Husserlian studies and and I moved into German idealism. Yes. German romanticism. Yes. Because I was kind of start to mimicking Husserl's style. And then I could not write anything without- A slave to Husserl in the dungeons. Or in terms of- And that was terrible. And I said, OK, that's not for me. Let's start with another thing. Yes, yes. So that absolutely, this is quite a serious problem to serve. Mstislav? Okay.

Hello, my name is Mstislav. I'm PhD in philosophy, currently based in Portugal. My current scientific interests are philosophies of time and pessimism. So from this seminar, I expect to extend my understanding of what I'm studying and just and just currently reading the book of uh leotard the human reflections on time from which i uh begin my exploration of uh metaphysics of pessimism and time in as an intersection and uh um to deepen my understanding of uh khan's metaphysics of time since i seen i suppose i've got it wrong when I have comprehended it from Lund and Eugene Tucker, when they have just been saying that

Kant is afraid of time. And when I have read your syllabus, I have understood that there is more to tell about Kant's metaphysics of time. And one additional personal reason is that my favorite article of yours is Memento Tabere, Reflection on Time Prefection. I have read more elaborated version, Undercover Softness, but my favorite remains this initial version. So I expect too much from this seminar perhaps. Thank you, thank you so much. Thank you. Ellen. Ellen. Hello, my name is Ellen. I'm an art historian, mostly under historical photography.

I'm based in London and I'm doing my PhD at the University of Oxford on Japanese publishing and post-digital publishing as a practice. And this course doesn't have that much to do with my research out of personal interest but my master's dissertation a while ago was kind of trying to figure out a system to talk about the perception of time or time consciousness in photo books or serial images trying to work out how to talk about it from like reading Berkson and Duluth yeah then that might be something that i'm interested in exploring more through the course

yes that's very good mentioning of deluz and bergson uh one of the things also that i have to say about the seminar given that we are talking about time here right we are not talking about causation. We're not talking about some sort of parochial philosophy of problem, but the problem. And in that sense, we had to, by necessity, to bracket in a Hossalian sense to one or two philosophers because there is always the danger of going off tangent for eternity. So it's best to really understand this seminar, as I said, in

a certain sort of a skepticism as a way in digging deeper, such that you can actually dig out a few holes, a few new problems, flesh out a set of new problems in philosophy, And then on your own, hash out and flesh out the relations of these problems with other sorts of philosophers who have talked about time, about the nature of processes and unconsciousness, so on and so forth. So this is, as I said, it would be as an element of disappointment, because we consciously try to not go and talk about other philosophers, but only just two philosophers.

out of economic considerations, which soon will be uncovered that these are not merely economic considerations. But that is a different story. Maria? it is me yeah yes yeah yeah because there were like more than what maria said yeah um hi i'm maria jesus i'm from peru lima peru and um i i have recently graduated in the bachelor's of music composition and the reason why I joined this seminar is because well first of all time music

sound vibrations and other such related words but more precisely I think because I'm very puzzled by intersection of first of all I do not get at all the idea of the conscious and consciousness I have a serious problem with that but I think that will be solved later But second of all, I am very puzzled by the idea of time as a sort of mediation for relations or time as a sort of space. Again, this overlapping often happens. For relationships or communities, I'm interested in that more material, tangible aspect of communities, of bringing different people together in, be it, artistical, experimental spaces.

and although this may seem like a very off tangent to me in I mean this seminar specifically all this theoretical and as you say puzzling place I do find it valuable for at least theorizing or making a different type of approach to building sustainment and communities around sound around vibration around uh relationships of many kinds of many uh possibilities and trying to ground it because i feel like there's a lot of talk about these topics at the moment but they do not seem to be so grounded they seem to be more through here it's real and so i'm looking for sort

of paths not answers uh here so yeah excellent excellent thank you very much uh is it malu yeah it's malu hi uh i'm malu i'm currently on the on a mfa of computational arts and goldsmiths and the reason i joined the seminar is because of the last uh fictioning projects i did um named the nylions which was this uh vampiric sonic entity that feed off rhythm to to mountainous homeostasis. And I did come from this framework of sonic materialism and micrasonics and computer music. And I was kind of pickled with the idea

of music outside time, and if that's even possible. This project is also a sonic, there's a sonic artifact to it, which I programmed within this micrasonic framework. And I'm not expecting much answers, but I think I'm happy to get pickled collectively and not by myself. So yeah. Right, right. No, as I said, I mean, you should completely forego with the idea of getting any answers out of this. Only more confusions the way forward. Thank you so much. Our next, is it Juan?

Yes. Hello everyone. My name is Juan Toro, from Columbia, Latin America. but I am currently reside in Spain. I study philosophy for a few semesters at the University of Vienna. Then I entered a postgraduate program in practical philosophy in Spain. I am painter. I am very interested in transdisciplinary artistic research and media ecology from the current aesthetic epistemological and philosophical perspective.

Yes, I like this position. It's interesting, the aesthetic position about the Husser's theories. I also see Husser as a materialist ethic. Maybe we have more questions. It's very difficult for me to express the question to make. For example, about the anthropologist, or this idea of the real truth in science

by Husser or the idea of sensibility on understanding. Right. Outflow is time to stimulate that life on chemistry. I don't know. It's very interesting for me, the seminar in this way. Thank you very much for the seminar. Thank you so much. Yes. We will get, by necessity, we will touch upon, you know, some of the, essentially, the significance of some of Husserl's insight with regard to science, right? The idea of, you know, the descriptive systematicity.

And which brings back to, you know, things that I mentioned earlier with regard to the history of modern sciences, particularly because Husserl is in a very interesting position, you know, at the beginning of 20th century. So he has a certain sort of, coming from a certain sort of Machian lineage, right? And is obviously the student of Brentano. By the way, Freud is also a student of Brentano.

That is actually an interesting thing that connects Freud and themselves together. And Brentano has massive amounts of correspondences with none other than Ludwig Boltzmann, the father of, real father of modern physics, theoretical physics. And then so, and then there is Boltzmann with Poincaré correspondences, which then goes to Hossel, and then from Hossel goes to Carnap,

So you see that there is a whole back story with regard to the Husserl's influence and philosophical lineage that is being grafted from philosophy into the history of philosophy of science, but also the practice of theoretical sciences. in the early 20th century, which is quite an interesting point. We will try to cover parts, bits and pieces here and there. Benito. Yeah, can you hear me?

I'm Benito, I have a bachelor in philosophy, I live in Naples and my dissertation in my bachelor was on time and memory in the movies of Alain René, mostly through the lens of Bergson, the notion of Duré, and Deleuze for the event and the time of the event. So I'm taking the seminars to have a different view on the subject, maybe. Excellent, excellent. That's a great way of connecting philosophical problems. Excellent,

Thank you. Esen. Hey everyone, I'm Esen. I'm originally from Turkey, now based in Barcelona, where I do my PhD in clinical psychology and virtual reality. So I have a background in filmmaking as well, so I guess time is directly related when it comes to editing process. But now, as I work and try to develop experiments in virtual reality, alternative realities, I guess the suspension of certain perceptive senses and how time is affected by that is a great interest of mine. And I'm looking forward to get confused more. Excellent. Thank you so much.

Paige? Hello. Nice to see you, Reza. My name is Paige. I am an artist exploring different forms of ecological consciousness. And my work has been looking at ritual practices that can reach an unconscious level of how we relate to time, whether that's through deep listening or resonance with like an extreme presence that can recalibrate how we think a future is brought into being and how that helps with how we relate to ecology. I'm looking forward to this seminar. Excellent. I'm going to, for this session, by the way, I'm going to assist from some of that talk that I gave at Ignota Book.

Oh, great. As a premise for the sort of problems that we are essentially dealing with. Looking for it. Edna? Hi, I'm Etna. I'm from Mexico City, but now I'm based in Barcelona. I'm finishing my degree here. These days I'm translating RESA's intelligence and spirit. you mentioned this about you and frege i discovered this in a book called analytic philosophy yeah yeah yes i mean it is quite famous that

that from early to later, Husserl's work, partially at least, was motivated by fear of psychologism and its intrusion into philosophy, right? And of course, Frigge, precisely because of his logicism and his main assault on at least one specific form of psychologism, was fiercely adopted by Husserl. Yeah.

And this is the sort of Husserl that, at least in philosophy of mathematics, which we are not going to go through it that much, if at all, you can see that there is a rift between the early Husserl, when he talks about mathematics, and the later Husserl, whose main concern is to keep the threat of in philosophy of mathematics at bay by way of a recourse to Freakian logicism. Elie Ocel is the sort of Ocel that usually French thinkers of, you know, 20th century have criticized, right?

Right. And for good reasons, mostly. But later, Husserl is quite different, his take on philosophy, precisely because of this influence of Frege on his work. Yeah, what I found interesting is that Frege is very platonic, But I don't know if Horsal is. I don't know. Horsal is. We come back to this. You know, the thing is that, I mean, the idea of Plato, as I have always said, the idea of Plato in different times, different periods of philosophy means different things, right?

There's no unitary Plato. The same way that there is no unitary Socrates. It's a figment of historical philosophical imagination, literally, right? So at the very least, during the time of Wusserl, particularly post-Neo Kantians, and Paul Naturps works on Plato, there was a certain sort of a Platonistic revival. right but under the banner of minimum uh critical philosophy like we can't undo

kant's philosophy literally we can't do that right so we have to take it into account kant's philosophy but also how can we be platonist under the rubric of critical philosophy so that creates a certain sort of tension in Osel that he is absolutely not Kantian. He's more platonic than being Kantian, but he's also not platonic in any sort of originary sense, precisely because he's critical. Yeah, interesting. What? How do you pronounce your name? Is it Kamwangi? Kamwangi.

Kamwangi. Yeah. Hi, hi everybody. I'm Kamwangi from Nairobi, Kenya. My background is on sound and writing. Currently, tackling some sonic structures, sonic imaginative structures through physiology, body and medical learning. Also, tackling African concepts of time through to languages that refer to time. Excellent, excellent, superb. Fantastic. Thank you so much. Dilchat, dear sir.

Hello everyone, hi Reza. Nice to see you again. Absolutely. My name is Dilchat, I'm from Iraq. I think the reason I have applied for the seminar because this year, because of some commitments of my own, I couldn't read philosophy as I used to. So I think it will be a great starting point for me to, as one of the students said, that's a starting way for me to increase my confusion and have bad nightmares again because of philosophy. As if you don't have enough nightmares already. Yeah. Thank you so much, Delshat. It's magnificent to have you here.

Alexander. I think it's Alexander away from a computer. So, Raviv? Raviv seems to be aware. Hey, hey, hey, I'm here. I'm here. Oh, okay. One second. Hi, can you hear me? Yes. Hey, my name is Raviv. I have an undergrad in math and physics. I am currently working, and by currently I mean like literally right now, as a salesman for a beer redistricting company.

So I'm... Ravi, you got disconnected. We can't hear you. Lika, would you be able? Yes, yes. Now you're back. Yes. Okay. Like I was saying, I'm currently working. I basically just have to, like, while I'm listening to this seminar, inventory all the beer that's in this dungeon. And other than that, I don't really have anything that interesting to say.

i've been interested in time since i read post stone and generally just like ways in which theories of time can contribute to serious human action right okay that's a that's a different beast kind of thing that's a different beast which fortunately we are not tackling post stone and time and and hossel and camden time yes i just wanted to raviv you got disconnected again no but i mean the idea of i thought really interesting and also

can you hear me yes yes hello yes we can hear you yeah i um Yeah, I like I was saying, I think the idea of time sensation as being unconscious also gives way to theorizing the unconscious for artificial intelligence and processes that maybe mark time, not as human sensation of time, but maybe time steps and like an algorithm. And I think maybe in a more expansive idea of time and time sensation as producing unconscious experience, maybe it could give us more insight on how artificial intelligence works with

that. And also, I might cut out, but I don't know if anyone has ever heard of like a bodega cat before, but there's this entire family. I just wanted to show you that. Excellent. Cats are philosophy mascots. Superb. Thank you so much, Raviv. Excellent. So is it Zalata? Hi, yeah, that's me, sorry. I had like real bad problems with Wi-Fi. I was just like keeping, disconnecting, connecting again.

I'm Zlatan, I'm based in London. I'm a creative director and performer. I'm doing master's at CSM and I graduated from UCL with History of Art, BA. So I feel like kind of like into critical theory, especially to Delios Bergson. I based my dissertation about queer cinema and kind of like to throw out a bit using some arguments, like toy philosophy. So that's how I kind of like got into your research. Yeah, because originally I'm from Moscow, but I've been based in London for seven years. I've been also really into Benjamin Bratton because he was running cultural center there and all like this in the studies so yeah like I'm really glad that I'm in the seminar because I

really want to kind of like dig in more into the theory so I can use my practice more thoughtfully excellent thank you so much and great to have you here Alexander if you are still there no it seems no i'm sorry oh yes okay i'm not being i'm not able to turn down don't don't worry don't worry no no no no no apologies needed um i think just yeah um yeah maybe uh later i said sure all all good uh no problem at all um

I think that was our introductions. If I have skipped over someone, please let me know. I think, so I'm going to start and I'm going to, you know, read a few passages from Kant, underline some of the problems uh in a kind of a hasty way you know as because it's introductory then read you a few stuff of my own notes and that would be this session right kind of uh like uh at least starting to philosophically

understand what is at stake here, right? And the next session, we have a reading material. It would be great if you can read it. Both Katharina Krauss and Patricia Kitcher, um i have you know i thought that they are good to understand you know the kantian side of the problem of time and then once we acquaint ourselves with these uh kind of like in a basic sort of way with these problems then we can actually get into you know more uh kind of

elaborate uh problems that arise from precisely because of the role of time in not only uh empirical uh in in consciousness uh but also experience as a as as an empirical cognition um before that uh let's have a uh you know five minutes um five to seven minutes uh you know refreshing uh a break and then i will come back and i start uh let's do that okay

excellent Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. I'm ready whenever you are.

Let me get another pack while everyone is showing up. Thank you.

So, So yes, so I mentioned that with regard to the question of time, and this is more of

of a philosophical interest for me, a philosophical choice. I actually think that Hume, and not just a question of time, but any sort of question, philosophical question, that seems to be operating on two fundamental levels, right? in in the sense that there are certain sort of philosophical questions that it seems that we are any sort of other sort of philosophical questions that we are addressing and we are trying to engage with we have to go and talk through

these sort of philosophical questions and question of time is like that we are talking about experience we have to go through the question of time when we are talking about the question of motivation we have to go through the question of time right so it seems that the consciousness of the engagement with philosophy other philosophical philosophical questions are predicated upon the consciousness of us implicitly or explicitly engaging with a class of primordial or preneal philosophical questions. So that's the first horn of the dilemma. And then also it happens that these questions,

these topics or thematics have a certain sort of eminent status in philosophy. You are first doing the transcendental inquiry through them, but also in a very oblique way, assuming an imminent position for this question. The question of time is one of them. Now, Hume's is famous for a very healthy approach to these questions. precisely because they seem this sort of questions seem to be operating on two different parallel

levels the connections between them is not quite apparent we cannot simply philosophize as we do do. We have to become very skeptical of this sort of thematics, you know, precisely because they are at once assumed the role of constituting and the constituted, right? The constitute certain sorts of topics, but also it is as if that whenever we are questioning other things,

we have assumed a position of dealing with these questions from the perspective of the constituted. And you know, it is quite fascinating that whenever we are dealing with this sort of quandaries that something philosophically is both constituting and the constituted we tend to fall back on parochial forms of philosophical consciousness at the background of which a vast ocean

of the unconscious motivations bubble right And if not, we are simply doing question-begging forms of philosophizing. As if we are already engaged in a certain sort of regress with the nature of philosophical questions. So Hume's blade, perhaps metaphor of blade is not correct.

So not to be confused with Ockham's blade. Hume's needle is to burst the bubble of inflation of philosophical topics. This is Hume's version of a skepticism, not as a way out, as today's people falsely attribute that position to Hume, but as a way in. Burst the bubble with a great piercing arrow of a skepticism, such that you can see what the problem is that you are trying to get out of.

Right? We are going to work in this tradition of philosophizing. A skepticism as a way in for us to at the very least formulate the sort of problems that we are striving to resolve. Also, in tandem with this sort of general methodology of philosophizing about time, I want to say that this whole seminar is kind of mangled between two positions, as provided by Kant and Husserl.

Each of these positions are not really Kantian or Husserlian, you know, in the sense that they reflect the philosophers who held these positions, but rather there are the repercussions of certain sort of philosophical position-taking, so philosophical assuming of certain sort of premises and how to move forward with these premises. With regard to the question of times, these two position-takings, as captured by Kant and Husserl are specific. Two projects, and this seminar is, as I said,

at the intersection of these two projects, which are absolutely in clash with one another. One, the Husserlian project, making time appear, Kant's project. Time is essentially underlined invisible. The role of time, the key role of time in experience, in empirical cognition, and perhaps all cognitions,

And as we are moving forward, all that which can be thought, not only in relation to things, but also in relation to other sort of thoughts, are posited against the backdrop of time. And Kant believes that there is time's role in all of this should always essentially be invisible. For such roles to play anything at all. To do, for empirical cognition to be thus and so, for consciousness, transcendental perception to be thus and so.

time should essentially be invisibly, should be invisible, right? This is not a metaphysical, actually, thesis about time. It demarcates a certain quality about time-driven philosophical questions that is intrinsic to the pragmatic role of faculties, abilities, capacities, so on and so forth. So time in the invisibility of time from the perspective of transcendental philosophy of Kant

is not really a thesis about the nature of time as a metaphysical subject, but rather this invisibility is there pragmatically to make things happen the way transcendental philosophy holds. Philosophies, faculties, capacities should be held together, should integrate such that we can have self-consciousness. So this is Kant's side of things, a project built upon the essential invisibility of time.

Now, Hosell's project, a project built on the tacit ambition of making time appear. appear. Now, you see, the word appear here is quite actually makes things a little bit more disconcerting than what they already are. Because isn't it that time as a formal condition of sensible intuitions and inner sense is responsible for the appearances in the first place, then how can we make time appear?

So Husserl's project seems to deal with the enigma of time headlong in the sense that it wants to engage with an understanding or a conception of time that, as I said, is both constituted and is constituting. What is responsible for appearances and that which can appear? Questions before I move forward? I have a question.

Yes. Would you say that when you talk about the invisibility of time for Kant, is that more relating to his notion of objective time than the, I don't know what the word was, if it was like personal or individual time, but in the text that you also wanted to quote today, there was a difference between objective time and personal time in Kant's work, and I was just wondering whether this understanding of the invisibility of time is relating more to this of this conception of objective time?

You see, yes and no. In the sense that, let's think about this, that at the very least, transcendental deduction and transcendental aesthetics, where basically we are talking about the forms of intuition, right, the space and time, is predicated on a diagram about representation. Where we have representations, right? And each representation can be also, in Kantian sense, can be taken as an object and an act, the representings and the representeds, right? So we have the central,

box of the diagram we call it representations. Then two arrows come out of it, right? One arrow goes right and is connected with object. We call this arrow reference. Then there is arrow going left from the central box called representation to the subject. We call this arrow reflexivity. Right? So it seems that for Kant, ultimately, the rule of time has something to do with how representations

are organized not only at the level of appearances but ultimately within a concept as well that at each level of synthesis there is an implicit rule of time right that creates It's both the objective, namely the arrow called reference to the object and the subjective, the reflexive arrow that connects the representations, representings, and the represented to the subject. Now the thing is that when Kant talks about objective versus subjective, it really doesn't

doesn't mean pertaining to the object or pertaining to the subject because as we know the subject can be taken as the object right and the same way for the object he really talks about validity of judgments of the certain sort of validity that i have the quality of being objective or subjective, right? So objective time for him is not really a metaphysical time, but rather how the sort of representations that we have as acts and their contents relate to the object.

and what would be the rule of time within that bracketing of the problem of representations our reference to the object that would be the domain of the objective time and the subjective time equally is not something that we might say that oh my simple my perception of time right Yes, it has that sort of connotation, but that is not really the complete Kantian story, because it is ultimately subjective time for Kant is about how representing acts and representational

contents relate to the subject and the role that time plays for that reflexivity. So it is, and this sort of ambiguity with regard to the subjective objective time is ultimately being distilled in the very idea of inner sense in Kant. inner sense as a dual function one enforcing or imposing time as a formal condition upon the appearances upon the sen upon the sensible or sensations to create appearances

to create appearance, because appearances don't exist by themselves. You know, there is only affectivity by sensations, and affectivity by sensation doesn't mean appearances. So appearances are already assuming that they are the product of a synthetic function, namely the synthetic function in the inner sense where the reference is at issue, where the relation between representations and the objects is an issue. So we have an appearances in that regard. And appearances are how the form of time,

namely various relations of simultaneity, synchronicity and diachronicity, are being imposed upon sensations, right? Structuring, so to speak. And this is the first function of inner sense. And the second function of inner sense is that how it reports such appearances to the mind at the level of the other arrow, which was reflexivity, the relation between representations, representing acts and representational content

to the subject. So here we see that if that is the case, then inner sense, where we are truly talking about transcendental ideality of time has two functions or has two roles, characterized by objective time, the relation of representation to the object and subjective time, the relation of representation to the subject. It really depends on what we are bracketing here.

But this bracketing, as I'm going to talk about, is actually not possible that much in Kant's philosophy, precisely because the objective sense of time sometimes appears as quite a subjective way, and the subjective time appears to be objective. and this is because the fundamental role of inner sense right playing the dual functions of

organizing sensation into appearances the function of apprehension and two, the function of reporting these apprehensions to mind. Now, the curious thing is that organization of sensations being affected in thus and so manner under forms of intuition space and time yield appearances so this is the first order of appearances so to speak right but precisely because of this sort of dual functions of

inner sense in Kant it seems that we have actually two orders of appearances one that time plays an objective role right of organizing thing sensations as appearances right with regard to an external object or an object and two the second role where such appearances needs to be reported to the subject and just take a different sort of appearance by virtue of being subsumed under time subjective

arrow of reflexivity, how representations are being related to the subject, both as acts and as contents of representations. And it is quite an interesting thing. And this is completely one of those, you know, what do you want to call it? The chaos of Kantianism where all good and great about apprehension, about the objective time and how sensations are being organized, that side is very, very, very good, at least on the paper. But the second side, how these appearances

are being reported to the subject, according to a subjective time of representational acts and contents, is the major, basically, point of controversy in Kant and among Kant's scholars. You know, what sort of appearances, what sort of appearances are these being reported? They cannot be just appearances of the object as being organized sensations, but precisely because there are appearances that are being capable of being reported to the mind. Through the second arrow of inner sense reflexivity

where time doesn't actually make an objective organizing function but has a subjective characteristics and hence it is truly possible to talk about appearances as we canonically talk about appearances of which we can be conscious as appearances of appearances as appearances that have been worked out furthermore by the arrow of reflexivity and how time intervenes with the arrow of reflexivity

from representations to subject. And it seems that for Kant, there is always time's mysteries unfold not in appearances proper, namely sensation as organized by the objective role of time in organizing them in the function of apprehension, but rather in the second function

which is that of reporting thus and so appearances to the subject according to an arrow which is not a reference to the object but reflexivity to the subject and hence obeys different sort of time constitutions or time processes. That would be called, at the very least on the surface for now, we can call it time subjectivity. That doesn't make it unreal or purely subjective, but simply is a designation of the relation between representations

or appearances with the subject by way of an arrow called reflexivity rather than reference, which is always a reference to an object. So time subjectivity is a quality of reflexivity, namely the quality of how representations, representational acts and contents have thus and so a status with regard to the subject. Thoughts, questions? Yeah, I've had to read Krauss and got confused completely because she said that, whereas

we know that reason is not spatiotemporal on the level of categories, time appears, and it's regulated by inner sense. I wanted to ask whether inner sense is somehow controlled by reason, how they are related at all? No, it is controlled by, controlled, you mean intervened by reason, right? There is a level of intervention of categories, not reason, really. When we are talking about reason, Kant really doesn't have a good distinction between reason and understanding. It's understanding that really plays the role of semblance of reason for Kant. Yes. No. Again, inner sense has a function, a primary function of apprehension, right?

That makes appearances appearances, right? But then it makes appearances as appearing to the mind. as appearing to the mind. That's what we call, we can really call appearances of appearances. Because simply by organizing sensation to dozen so appearances does not have any sort of bearing upon how these appearances appear to the mind. So inner sense, that dual function the second function of inner sense is to make appearances appear to the mind

reportable to the mind not introspectively so to speak but reportable and it is in the second function that yes understanding intervene with inner sense but not in the first sense of inner sense so inner sense has a primary function organizing sensations into appearances par excellence by way of and that's the parallelism between inner sense and outer sense and ultimately outer sense make appearances appearances synchronically and diachronically across time and space right and the second one we're understanding reason, intervene with the function of inner sense

is along the line of reflexivity, how thus and so appearances are being reported to the mind, appear to consciousness. Not only empirical one, empirical cognition under the rubric of experience, but as any possible content for any possible formal concept. That is really an important one. And this is something that only Hoselle talks about it. That time, people might actually think that, oh, time is all about experience and experiential content.

Right? Anything that has an experiential content obviously has the stamp of time on it. Hosell wants to radicalize his Kantian thesis to pure cognition, not merely empirical cognition, namely experience. That even pure cognition, the relations of thoughts to one another, irrespective of experiential content, presupposes the rule of time. How? Can anyone tell me why? Think about this, a kind of a hint, the extent of this problem.

So we think of something like formal logic, right? Arbitrary signs, syntactic signs, which can be deployed according to their own syntactic constraints, right? That would be formal logic, more or less. But this is, this formality, this pure relationality of syntactical forms to one another assumes a certain sort of abstraction, so to speak, from the material content, from the experiential content. That's why we can shuffle syntactic

forms around in syntactical systems according to their own formal constraints and not experiential content of it. But this also, in a very oblique way, implies that we have taken for granted that we have made a leap of abstraction from experiential content. And that is the whole point of a formal system, as Katharina Ducil-Novaes has talked about, that formal systems are characterized by their capacity for de-semanification and re-semanification, that we can attribute formal systems to different experiential contents.

We can use formal systems in different contexts, which means that there is actually an assumption that we have abstracted sufficiently from the experiential content and context such that we can manipulate syntactic forms. And that already in an oblique way presupposes the fact that we can manipulate formal syntax precisely because we can apply these forms, project these forms, syntactic forms, onto different contexts.

And further, it means that these contents require a certain sort of quality. for them to be there, to be the reference of our logical senses in a Phrygian sense, for forms to be applied to them. And that, for Rossell, is the very basic assumptions in any form of logic, the assumption that syntactic forms have dozens of plastic protein characteristics precisely because

it worked against the backdrop of the unitary horizon of experience a horizon that allows for the projection of these forms onto the content not any sort of content, but all contents possible, all contents of experience. And this presupposition means that for something to be the content of a sign, of an arbitrary sign, it ought to emanate from a unitary spatiotemporal background or horizon, which is time.

time of all possible experiences. As the possible, all possible content unto which all possible variations of syntactical forms can be projected. Now you see, the question is becoming really fast, spiraling into all sorts of assumptions that we couldn't even like grasp, we were just thinking about subjective and objective time. I have two questions. The first one is very technical. When

you talked about two functions of inner sense, you talked about apprehension and the other, you mentioned it as reporting to the mind and I wanted to know if that's self-affection because self-affection yes I mean however you see the problem with the vocabulary self-affection this is obviously not really Maria a Kantian vocabulary right yeah that's true I would say that this is a very controversial term. But yes, absolutely, it is a self-affection. But the most important thing is a self-affection at what level? Is it merely empirical? Is it empirical with a tinge of being transcendental?

Is it being purely transcendental? And also, what is the medium of this self-affection? What sort of consciousness? Empirical consciousness? Non-empirical consciousness? Self-consciousness? What is it exactly? That's when I know that Katharina Krauss is quite adamant to revive the idea of self-affection. But it is one of those things that I always ask myself, is it worth it to introduce a vocabulary that is making more unnecessary debate than not? I don't know about it really at this point. But I think, I suspect it is one of those vocabularies.

It's creating more unnecessary fuss, you know, rather than... I think that that relates to the second question that was about, I hope this is not that naive, but I always suspect about talking about time that, I mean, this is very basic, but the very act of talking with birds and objects and subjects is a sort of, in a sort of way, is constrained in the very capacity of us talking about time or even conceiving it outside of itself. I don't know if that's the case or the objective. You mean subjects as like other people?

No, no. I mean, I probably mean it in the most linguistical, grammatical sense possible because the idea of mentioning verbs, I think, involves an idea of time. and so any verb that you pronounce or say or mention and so it at least for me I think this is naive but I still wanted to say it makes for me difficult to think of a I mean how to get rid of this for me conflict between talking about time and time being itself present in the ways in which we talk about it this may be reduced to a sort of philosophy of language but I think it what's like something more than just that yes no it absolutely it does and you see um i mean

obviously you know um we can't ask a philosopher to give us all the keys i mean in fact you shouldn't ask philosophy to give you all the key that would be the worst source of dystopian nightmare that you can have on your you know on your plate uh but with regard to can't obviously Kant, as I mentioned, the whole idea of reason and understanding comes back to this idea, very simple idea that Kant doesn't have an account of intersubjectivity. And the idea of intersubjectivity creates a different arrow of time, not only to the object and subject in the Kantian sense of appearances and the consciousness of

appearances, but also a different sort. And that ultimately brings the idea of time within the language. In terms of what Husserl would have called the fundamental armature that makes the relation between the subject and predicate possible. That's a different, that what you might call to be a third level. And I'm attributing this to a sense of intersubjectivity as a function of language and the function of time within the infrastructure of language in terms of the relation, not only in terms

of the pre-predicative use of language, but in fully fledged predicative sense of language, of gluing subject and predicate together, that ultimately is that sense is responsible for us to actually have any language, but more importantly, to observe linguistic behaviors as dispositional outside behaviors. Otherwise, it wouldn't be possible to begin with. Like, think about this. I say that I feel pain. Let's just put aside all this stuff. The pain is not real. It's cool all the way in, right?

But I'm saying that I feel pain. I feel good. And I am saying this to you in a fundamentally different language. right a language nonetheless but a different language and then you want to say that you actually understand what i mean when i say i feel pain regardless of what pain might be i'm actually using pain because pain comes under the concept of qualia and is the most murkiest of all these sorts of consciousness, right?

Wiggenstein has a good example for this in the sense that, look, we never have actually a knowledge of other person's pain or what it might going through because that knowledge is not coming from the outside. interestingly. It is a knowledge that comes from the inside in the sense that for me to understand what you mean when you say I feel pain, I have to construct my feelings in tandem with my own language such that I can be aware of the sort of linguistic behaviors that you display

as mapped onto my own construction. So the function of language always begins from the inside as a construction that reaches out and captures something important, dispositional, our exterior, and brings it back and turns it into the understanding, for example, that I can understand what you mean by saying feeling pain, even though I do not know, neither you nor me most probably don't know what pain is. this means that there is nothing in sensation.

By virtue of the commonality of sensation to our experiences, we can say that I have a certain sort of semblance of familiarity with your enunciation that you feel pain. There is nothing in sensation or appearances of sensations that allow me to understand in any sort of way what you mean by saying that I feel pain. But rather, it is that we construct our own feelings through language and time. Time, having a double function here, both diachronic and synchronic in the sense that it allows for the gluing of subject and predicate

and hence judgment. being possible in the first place, to construct my feelings with language and language being applicable to such feelings, such that I can create a certain sort of map that your position can be accommodated by this map. Otherwise, there is no way that I can say that you feel pain. And the role of time for this construction of my feeling and language in tandem with one another is key here. There is no other way without constructing the sort of

judgments that I make about my feelings. Without that, I wouldn't be able to understand what you mean if you say x and y in your language might mean i feel pain yeah that's such a thorough explanation um it doesn't resolve anything but it's no it doesn't at this point it doesn't of course it does absolutely and one of the interesting thing is that here it shows that the role of time is not actually included to experience, but also is weaving through a diagonal axis of not... So as I said, there is this

vector of time that moves from representations to the object, and there is this vector of time and moves from representations, understood as representings and represented acts and contents, to the subject. And then there is a diagonal vector of time, how different representations for different subjects can be, who can be otherwise as objects of one another can be rendered commensable such that we can be all subjects by virtue of this diagonal vector and that is the vector of time that allows by way of language and linguistic judgments

allow us to reach for the other such that the other doesn't become merely an object but another subject and hence intersubjectivity as the full chrome of objectivity Reza sorry just to make sure we are on the same page I don't know if I have understood you correctly or not I understood your remark about Wittgenstein's beetle in the box thought experiment when he talks about pain as yes as being the functional role you don't need to know what it feels like to understand the meaning of of the pain that has a functional

role within an intersubjective public language so meaning meaning here becomes what for example brandon says every transcendental constitution is a social institution do you do do you mean that time has the same kind of status as being some sort of that that content transcendental transcendental ideal idealism of time becomes i don't know socially instituted that no that is exactly what i meant oh okay that that time is the other soy uh other side of the coin of what you might called to be sociality or social practices of discursive practices that time is really

that side of things and here intersubjectivity and this is this is the discovery of us sir Subjectivity works against the background of time, and time is what allows for any sort of social intersubjective practice to emerge in the first place. And that is because time not only, you know, as I said, relate to the object and the subject along the referential reflexive vectors, but also diagonally, allows for the constitution of a subject

that could otherwise be merely without time an object of empirical cognition. And this thesis of time not only applies to other subjects outside of me, but also me as I. Go on, Edelshad. I see so... Sorry. So Brandom's Hegelian slogan, you know, every transcendental constitution is a social institution. You could say that this idea maybe came from Hegel. Yes, yes, yes, definitely so. yeah yeah yes uh i mean with i mean this is something i will start to talk about it

later sessions that interestingly um this whole idea that uh you know um the idea of intentionality right Why is it so important for Husserl, that intentionality? Intentionality not as mental content, right? People usually want to deflate this deflationary accounts like, you know, Dennett and all that sort of, they want to essentially reduce intentionality to mental, right but internationality for sale is not mental precisely because it is emerging from

you know vectors various vectors of inner time consciousness horizontally vertically and diagonally and ultimately it is responsible for the idea of validity not only subjective but also objective and not only subjective and objective but the very criteria of validity namely intersubjectivity namely you know social discursive practices you know every cognition ought to be a recognition. Or so it goes so far as saying that every recognition

is only recognition by virtue of emanating from this presupposition, this givenness of time as a unifying horizon. Just like what I was talking about with regard to the content of the referential content of a formal syntax. The fact that syntactic forms can be manipulated to such an extent is precisely because they have abstracted themselves sufficiently

from the realm of experiential content, which itself presupposes that all contents that they presuppose and upon which they project their syntactic forms coming from one unified horizon. And that's the horizon of time. the horizon of all possible existence like you know existence like in the way that for example would create existential quantification for each sign you know to make it function with regard to a particular content

and then we can disengage it from particular content content and apply it to another particular content that assumes a unity of the existence that unity is only given by time as a horizon Reza can I ask something sure yeah can we return for a moment on this beautiful sentence and a bit dangerous also maybe time of all possible experiences can you a little bit expand on that

it does because yes it feels that it kind of assumes a form of pre-determinism you know is it in that direction or is it like no no no no as i said uh most important thing and we get to this so we can kind of uh kind of file uh the sharp edges of some of these uh you know statements later on for sale really it's not uh he's not really interested in any sort of metaphysical assumption of our time. Like literally. It has a neutral position. There's a whole idea of a rokenfragen questioning back or questioning backwards

methodological foundations as part of the project of phenomenology, a lot of ourselves phenomenology. We can suspend, neutralize, or forestall the metaphysical assumptions of these, and I still talk about time, saying that the horizon of all possible experience, the way that he goes on, and I'm only going to make a little bit of a statement here and leave the rest for later sessions, is that, as I mentioned, remember that I said that time is a puzzle precisely because of its nature it's both constituting and it's constituted right so from one perspective saying that time is a horizon of all possible experience seems to

be problematic if you are talking about it from the perspective of the constituted exactly yeah but if you go to the other side of the constituting everything every those sharp contradictory edges dissolve into the eminence of time right and essentially Husserl wants to reconcile the constituted and the constituting roles of time in philosophy. Great.

Thank you. Reza, have you read Husserl's on the origin of geometry? Yes. I think that's a pretty good reading for this problem because in that essay or writing, what Hooser shows is that, well, geometry is a good example to approach to the problem of sense and objective sense. How is it possible that something has an objective sense, not only for me, but for the others? And then he tracks the origins of sense to what one may call a three-leg relation

between history, idealization, and writing. And the problem there is that the text is aporetic because or is puzzling because what Husserl argues there argues there is that you cannot reduce idealization to writing or history, you cannot reduce history or times, so to say, to writing or idealization, and so on and so on. So you have this kind of imbrication between time, history, idealization, and writing that makes something like geometry, mathematics, in general sense, sense in general, possible.

And that is a really, really good approach. Derrida has a pretty good reading of that. I wanted to say that this is fortunately, unfortunately, it is one of the very few texts by Derrida that is absolutely good. Yes, yes. That's what I was going to say. That is very unlikely from Derrida. Yes, it is actually quite good. And no, really a fundamental text. Another text that I really highly suggest, I have forgotten the title of it, is Paul Ricoeur wrote a text on Husserl. Ricor doesn't understand really the nitty-gritty of Osserl, particularly with regard to the question of time, and really thinks that Osserl's questions of time and engagement question of time is misguided, but it really doesn't understand that aspect of Osserl.

but he understands the scope of Husserl's methodological foundations, namely the question of Ruckfragen. Ruckfragen is essentially, remember that I said that there is a component of Platonism in Husserl, right, particularly with regard to the eidos essences, but these essences are not platonistic in a canonical sense, right? There is no two-tier ontology in Poisson, that there are rather demarcations of phenomenological of all possible appearances, right? Hence, there are laws, essences, laws of appearances.

the question of roquefragen which we come back to it toward the end is really the question that think about an intelligence an intelligence that falls under the criteria of intelligibility making things intangible. Not only the, you know, the vector of how representations relate to the object, but also the relation of representations to the subject, namely reflexivity, but also ultimately the diagonal arrow of subject and subject, namely intersubjectivity. Now,

Husserl thinks that there is a reason that any sort of intelligence that ever comes falling under the criteria, the laws of intelligibility, will come to something like logic or mathematics or geometry. Why? So it is not as if these are instruments that, you know, like these sort of less wrong narratives that intelligence learn to use this technical instrument to advance its own goals. No, for Husserl, the emergence of logic, mathematics, and in fact, philosophy is really the inevitable consequence

of the horizon constitution. That there is something strange going on at the core of experience, of being with the world, of being with the world. that motivates these things internally. And this motivation, what Husserl calls the law of motivation, for the emergence of things like logic, mathematics, philosophy, that is intertwined with time. And that's actually quite an interesting thing. you know and the the project of roof uh rookfragen questioning backwards or questioning back

is to go to these foundations to these core elemental motivations that certain sort of trajectories regardless of the historical contingencies are inevitable. But precisely because of the essential nature of these motivations is that we have historical variations, historical contingencies, accounts of evolution of consciousness. And these are all questions that do actually, for a sale, emerge from the question of time.

so my apologies give me two minutes i have to do something very quick i will come and read the text some notes that i mentioned and then we call it a day okay i think we have 20 minutes left overall uh no more than 30 minutes it's 12 51 one. You need more than 30. We have 30 is fine. Okay.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

So this is a, you know, part of a small talk I gave a few months ago. I thought that perhaps it's actually not a bad kind of a premise to set some of the problems before actually moving forward, right? We do actually start to systematically encounter with the problems at hand from the next session. As people who have taken my class, we are always behind.

There is no good time management on part of me. So bear with me. So problem one, this is a problem that has been actually talked about by a number of philosophers and philosophers of science in the 19th century, Mark, Ernst Mark in particular, and that's um the question goes like this and time here we are not talking about objective metaphysical time i mean sorry metaphysical time not objective time as i don't want to confuse you

here on this sort of stuff we are not talking about the metaphysical time or any concept of time but time has constituted and constituting with regard to the structure of empirical and non-empirical or pure cognitions. We can say that without time as a formal condition of empirical cognition, but also in an extended way, the condition of all empirical cognitions that is experience, consciousness, without time in that sort of sense first thing consciousness dissolves into appearances

into mere appearance mere appearances and appearances to mere sensations and mere sensations respectively dissolve into mere stuff. So the conundrum is this, that without time, all that could be called consciousness, whether empirical or not, becomes impossible. simple as that right this brings

why in philosophy uh since the early ages uh but also to uh descartes hume lock walk, cant, eagle, there is such a, you know, significant emphasis on the question of time and its relation to consciousness, right, and I, people who have taken my class again know that I genuinely hate to use the word consciousness, it's one of the most unexplicated, clunky sort of way, but we have to go with it. And when it's necessary, try to explicate what sort of consciousness

we are talking about. Pertaining to what consciousness? So what consciousness from what? So in that sense, so time and consciousness philosophically have been thought together, right? And that has, instead of creating certain sort of resolving landscape in philosophy, has created a dynasty of headaches and puzzles throughout the history of philosophy.

so time we can say is not as enigmatic of a space at least on the surface and paper it only appears to be more enigmatic in the sense that it encroaches upon the innermost parts of experiences of ourselves and the world but if our awareness of our experiences writ large, have a distinctly temporal flavor, then perhaps we should question that is it time which is experienced, or is it experience which is timed? Furthermore, if we abide by the thesis

that insofar as experience is never in a direct contiguity with the stuff that make up the world but is rather an organization of sensory contacts provided under a spatio-temporal constraints and one way or another subsumed on the concept then perhaps we are not actually talking about time as a as an ontological entity or metaphysical concept when we talk about experience. What we are actually talking about is the inner logic of having an experience as such

and how this having an experience takes the form of temporalization of a peculiar quality that is at once the constituted experience and the experience that is constituting its own horizon. A transcendental logic which does not so obviously correspond to the laws of space and time unless we take for granted that our experiences at the very basic sensory intuitions are directly expressions of time beyond the scuffles which are at the heart of having experience

between mere sensory data and concepts but that is not as we have talked about that is not our assumptions here now we can call this the logic of experience is greatest bliss and greatest blight. What is this bliss? Concurse. Exactly then, we seem to experience ourselves and the world, not as outside of time, but always in accordance with the inner temporal organization of experience, which is not exactly time. Kant's transcendental ideality of time, right?

or off time. This judgment is, however, the result of our own peculiarly time hijacked or temporally hijacked consciousness, and hence unconscious, as it will be discussed later in our seminar. In a sense, we have a time quosynthetic temporalization that could not possibly be time. It is a bliss because the order of conceptual self-consciousness has its own time, right? And it is a curse because such an order becomes unaware of its own time, as in contrast to

what time might be outside of the available organizing means of experience. But is it really a curse? Or ultimately it will be revealed as a bliss. And that's so, you know, one of the things that we are going to see. This vicious transparency of time, that one point becoming the horizon of all possible experience. And by virtue of that, by its very definition, this allows us from seeing the possibility of

any fundamentally different sort of experience outside of the temporal horizon that is constitutive our experience is it really a curse or is it a bliss right regardless in other words such an order the order of experience of time and time that is being experienced tends to see time as its own time like the order of self-consciousness and therefore

Or it sees time as something from which consciousness is made of. Thus, if experience is always synthetically temporalizing and temporal and has its own time, and additionally, if this temporality could not be time as such and merely a transcendental ideality then by the farthest stretch experience has an unconscious which is exactly its time-bound consciousness so consciousness only become unconscious the unconscious

when it sees the roles of time in its own constitution. This is actually a notion that first was systematically put forward by Brenton, the teacher of both Freud and Husserl, even though Husserl and Freud both took different interpretations of Brantano's idea of the unconscious. But they all have this idea that why is that the unconscious always appears and expresses itself

through the vocabularies of the conscious, right? so for Husserl for for Freud as I have talked in the previous seminar is that that no that there is the unconscious and the unconscious however can only appear through the conscious hijacking like a possessing demon the vocabulary of the of the conscious right that's this basically but but it is not really the conscious now Husserl goes a different route similar though ultimately we will show that they are very very

similar so it goes a different route that says that that shows that the unconscious is really consciousness when it reflects upon itself phenomenologically speaking outside of its given horizon essentially consciousness the unconscious is consciousness seeing itself on a different plane by being aware of its time constitution, no longer as being constituted by time,

but as a constituting time. And a good metaphor of it would be being in a train. a train that moves at a constant speed and imagine the role of consciousness is dual here one is that one that it sees like a passenger to the window the cynic views as move past one, from one to another, right? The scenic views through this window.

And then it would be completely absurd to talk about an originary experience or originary scene, perceptual scene in the scenario, right? It has always in media's rest quality consciousness. Scenics moving, passing from one to another, right? This is one, the constituted consciousness of time. And then the other one is the constituting. It's the experience of being the train itself without those windows.

The true is imminent flux. It creates a constituted scenery. Coming back. Thus, if experience is always synthetically temporalized and temporalizing and has its own time. And additionally, if this temporality could not be time as such by the farthest stretch, that experience has an unconscious, which is exactly its time-bound consciousness. Kant cryptically refers to this unconsciousness, quo-conscious temporality as an order of appearances of appearances.

and as we talked about this first time that this sort of appearance of appearances crop up in Kant's work is through the introduction of inner sense and it's dual function one that organizes sensation to first order of appearances and then these appearances are being reported to the mind and accordingly appear as the appearances of appearances, namely conscious appearances, so to speak. Whereas appearance pertains to phenomena as in contrast to things in themselves,

whether the nominal object or the nominal self, the appearance of appearance concerns with what seemed to only on the surface to be the full-blooded awareness of awareness of a phenomenal appearance itself. So it is an awareness of the awareness of awarenesses in a human sense. Right? It's kind of a metal awareness. Freud might have called this the consciousness of consciousness of ourselves and the world as the purest expression of the unconscious now a tentative thesis

can be put forward tentative because this is as I said a puzzling realm is that this purest form of the unconscious is time itself. That which is temporalized and that which is temporalizing. Not a time outside of us, but our own time. the time in the crypts of inner sense and individual and collective experience which allow us to have a world to begin with

but more specifically make us to have this world rather than the other I am referring to a time that prevents us to have a different world because in its most cursed expressions permits us to have an experience of ourselves in the world and simultaneously posits itself as a consciousness that refuses to be otherwise a particular sort of appearance which goes under the radar and therefore not up for negotiation, but merely an object of reflection. What makes us aware of our thus and so experiences we have on ourselves and the world

is the intrinsic and self-made temporality, which is at once constitutive of experience and is the exclusive property of having an experience in the first place. So the specific temporality of our experiences becomes both the source of our cherished experiences and also a blind spot in the worst scenario, insofar as it becomes both the explainer and the explained of conscious experiences, a key for having any sort of experience to begin with. It is the constituting factor and the constituting result or effect at the same time. Now, as I mentioned, Freud would have called

such a blind spot the unconscious, knowing, you know, the mechanisms of this consciousness by way of Berentano, while also adding his own theory of drive to it, right? As not only something of which we are not conscious, but also, and more significantly, something that lurks under the guise of consciousness, while at the same time, works behind the back of consciousness. and this is the metaphor Freud's metaphor of insider is apt here the insider is someone who appears under your guise but is in effect working against you at some point the dominant influence

of this insider becomes so strong that you end up to do the biddings of the insider while you think you are just expressing yourself. It should be clear that this unconscious is not actually the same unconscious Freud speaks about in relation to drive and drive-like behaviors. Time consciousness as the greatest form of the unconscious is not libidinal in any sense, at least it does not follow libidinal understanding of drive. It precedes libido and the system of pleasure and pains. It is beyond them. But unlike Freud's drive, as sonotropically beyond the pleasure

principle, it is of the order of life and its experience of cognizing and recognizing world of which we are a part. It is of experience, itself belonging to life worlds that blinds us to a life which is experienced. It is, as one might say, is the unconscious which precisely belongs to the conscious experience and not to its extinction or to something, anything other than consciousness. It has no obvious connection to the realm of the inorganic or death drive

in the Freudian sense, but perhaps it is of the inorganic, for it is through and through of a form of life which is imperceptive of its own life and world-making experiences, because such experiences somewhat having a blinding effect on it. It is of a life carried away in the river of Lethe, namely a life that moves against recollection and disclosure, or aletheia, the sort of life, the sort of unconsciousness posing itself as the experience of life is not of death exactly, but

in various vocabularies as the realm of nebulous life or shades of life or specters which haunt the entirety of life's own conscious history by virtue of this conscious history being the vicious transparency and the motivation of the life itself. And we are creatures born into this realm of the unconscious. Our conscious temporality, which is a time of conscious experience, prevents us to have a time outside of it.

Our so-called time works behind our back in the guise of an experience of ourselves and the world which cannot permit a different experience, at least on the surface, of ourselves and the world and thus of time, whatever it might mean outside of conscious experience. Our history is taken then, or can be taken as a hostage by exactly a time which makes the consciousness of the history possible, and by all accounts is also the temporal history of consciousness which contributes to the recognition and reflection upon that history.

we are essentially alienated by time and within time of who we are and what being with the world as in contrast to being in the world is or might be so i will stop here and then i will get into more perplexing issues that come next session. But first and foremost, next session, I want to read some highlighted passages from Kant to bring back this whole idea that why in Kant time should always essentially be invisible

as a project as the core of the project of transcendental idealism and namely the constitution of transcendental perception agency i think our time is up but i know that raviv has one question uh if uh we will be able to my apologies lika again you remember all of my classes for some reason i always think that the class ends as 1 30 the class we are over 20 minutes sorry my apologies 10 minutes actually

10 minutes because we started 10 minutes fast approximately so okay let's uh have that question and after that i'll make with just one brief organizational note okay uh yeah thanks i i can't tell you whether this is a silly question or not but one thing that's been on my mind as we've been talking about time in relation to its um inseparability from like experiential uh like the manifold of experience or whatever um why why time and and not space for instance like what what is it about that variable that because because the way i see it

a lot of the same issues that time presents in terms of both it being generated by and generating experiential phenomena I mean you get the same issue with with with uh space as well and it this might just be me no you are no you are correct i mean uh at least in kant uh the role of time is quite uh more important than than the space i was gonna say it could just be me not knowing my kant well enough uh but insofar as they're both um and i i know that at least that they're both categories of the mind and in kant and if we're

talking about again these properties derivable and also deriving uh experience it seems to be similar to temporality in that way and yet is it because we don't have i suppose maybe we have a more intuitive framework for understanding space than we do time just given the way our sense experience works yeah i mean uh remember that i started reading my notes i said that at least on the paper time is less enigmatic or more enigmatic than a space right at least on the paper on the paper um you see for kant it's quite a a straightforward word so to speak

philosophically. A straightforward word in philosophy doesn't mean a straightforward word in other places. There is a straightforward story about time and why it's more important than the space form as forms of intuition. Because of outer sense, they have a certain sort of organization, extension of organizations, right, that intervene with sensations, the receptivity, the capacity to be affected by dozens or so intrusions. That's essential outside, kind of like a receptacle sort of way. But time, as I said, has a more important job.

one precisely because in addition to synchronic organization of sensations it should also be able to do a diachronic organization of sensations in time right and hence across time and space but that is not really why time is more important than space, as a form of intuition and can't. The reason that is more important is precisely because of that dual function of the inner sense that I mentioned. One is the organization of appearances, synchronically and diachronically, but ultimately being constitutive of self-affection,

of thus and so appearances being reported to the mind and hence transitively being constitutive of all cognitions in general. That definitely makes sense. And it certainly seems like like what you're saying totally makes sense i guess i guess i was just wondering because the more i was thinking about it the more it seems like a lot of the same issues are present for space as well and and so for hosserl the problem becomes actually quite very difficult because hosserl does not make such a clear kantian distinction in terms of sensations

or being affected by objects, yeah, right? By things. Precisely because, and this is, we see, now I know that Delshat is going to have a party because this pushes Hossel to engage with sensibility in terms of embodiment. And when we are talking embodiment, the role of space and time start to fuse together. That is the whole idea of Husserl that sensation is not merely a passive reception, a capacity, but a passive synthesis in activity

given in the kinesthetic encounter with things. that is based on my motion. Right. Virtually that these sensations are being organized. And this motion has time and space at the same time contributing to it. Because it's this, so you're saying it's this, this, this, the procedural element of perception as, like you said, this passive process of an active thing that makes time in its dimensionality more applicable.

Yes, time and space start to blare, to become constitutive of sensation, because sensation is no longer a capacity, mere being receptive to being thus and so effective. What is rather a synthesis, Kant absolutely does not call sensibility synthesis. Synthesis is something that is being applied to sensations, but it's not synthetic in itself. Whereas for herself, sensibility is synthetic itself, given that it has something to do with embodiment. Right.

How you move, and this movement creates retention and pretensions of certain sort of profiles of the object that are being synthesized passively but in the activity of moving of of of engaging at a very uh kind of uh basic level with things outside of me. So if, if I guess just the one, the one more point to harp on this is like, I definitely see how time, as you said, organizes, uh, experiential phenomena and it, and it gives it,

sort of a directionality but does space not do that as well like are we not like deriving directionality from the space direction the wrong word to use i i mean i just mean like if if what you're saying is the process of organizing sense phenomena is both the is both like constituting time and constituent of time which is i does that that's pretty much what you're saying right you see one of one of the things the best

way to think about it and i will let you think about it so we can come back to it later sessions is that think about this that space gives us analytic moments whereas times gives us synthetic moments essentially things that can be put together and synthesized into a series right this is this is one of the things that from lock on boards becomes a problem, right? That simple, a series of, a successive series of sensations doesn't give us the awareness

of succession of the series, right? These two are different. Space gives us analytic moments of succession. it does not give us the content of the synthesis of these analytic moments by itself i see yeah i think honestly the point about space being analytic and time being more synthetic makes a lot of sense actually i'll probably have more to say about this as the class goes on just because i don't just as a more i understand your argument but also i'm really interested in in space and philosophy of space as well. So I kind of wanted to ask about that. Superb.

Sure. Absolutely. Thoughts? Anything? And please do let me know as I'm, you know, because every time there are different audience, there are different sort of desiderata, how you want me to present the classes. And I can actually take some of the recommendations into account. I actually have a question for you. So I've been reading a lot of Plato recently. And one of the things that stuck out to me kind of, as you were talking about this was a possible link with the idea of like

learning as remembrance. in the notion of constitution that you were talking about. And I wanted to ask you if there was any veracity to that or if you think that kind of connects in any way. Yes, yes, absolutely. This is something that, I mean, so, you know, in philosophy, history of philosophy, you have different accounts of learning, right? It depends on the sort of overall project under which learning is being formulated, right? so you can get plato which is not really plato is pretty uh you know socratic in a sense learning is a form of recollection right then you can get in a lock or hume that learning is a process bottom up

from from completely you know uh different sort of substrata right and then uh you get uh something in Kant that learning is always has that, has an element of pure synthesis between understanding and sensibility, right? That can only be thought interactively, bottom up and top down at the same time, right? And the role of imagination, particularly productive imagination under which understanding connects with sensibility becomes really important. It is really good, magnificent

Kant's understanding of this or the way that it presents is kind of a very, you know, something that as a student of philosophy, you can actually get very attached to it precisely because it's really looks robust. But the problem with it is that in Kant, by his own doing, there is a vast gulf between understanding and sensibility and the role of imagination the synthetic function of imagination under the guise of a schematism right schemata to create the learning process as a whole by bridging this gulf it always reminds me of these tragic tragicomic stories where the knight in shiny armor arrives way too late

to save the damsel in distress. And the damsel in distress in the Kantian story is always being saved too late by the introduction of the function of imagination, right, by eschematism, makes learning possible. Osel wants to be both, as I said, platonic and also understand the bottom-up process. So how can we think about essences, idas, in a bottom-up process where they still have their essential insights, essential valence,

so they don't become purely empirical, but also entertaining the existence of essences does not lead us to a two-tier ontology of forms and senses in Plato. So I would say that it really depends on these three sorts of canonical stories of philosophy. you know, purely platonic, for actually empirical, Kantian transcendental, and Hosselian transcendental, of how we see learning being possible. And absolutely, then we see that

we want to, it depends also what motivates us to say how we see, what we want to see learning, right? it obviously if we are into ai the most first motivation for you would be to be to see learning as a bottom-up process purely in an empirical project of human luck as we have seen it in ai deep learning and stuff right uh but then that's probably not good because it then opens up a whole new host of problems. But really for me is really

to focus on what is in learning that makes it both predisposed to be engaged at the level of process and not as something too late or by miracle of forms or God to be introduced later on but also being have a quality of a relativized a priori being capable of implementing rules top down while being also conceived

as a process I think that that i would say that for me at least is a kind of healthy understanding of what entails in formulating learning learning that both conceived as a bottom-up process right by way of embodiment or empirical processes whatever that can be naturalized but also at a different scale of learning faculties where learning can actually reformat itself of the quality of sapience right yeah that answers my question and um kind of gives me a lot more uh to think about yeah thank you

absolutely so my dear friend time thank you so much Lika I promise next time I do a better time management love you and see you next week thank you bye bye see you next week see you guys you