Hello and welcome to the fourth session of the seminar, The Enigma of Carnap's Aufbau. So Reza, please take it away. Thank you so much. Hello, everyone. I hope you are doing well. So we are a little behind, as those of you who heard the gossip, so on and so forth. Fear not. we are going to take it to whatever extent we can. Today I will talk a little bit about how basically car naps, first, you know,
it seems that every time that I'm trying to say that, oh, we are going to do the introduction, wrap up the introduction, it's not going to happen. going to happen. So let's do this, that I'm going to give another point of entry to Afbaw in the historical context and then focus mostly on why, on what Carnac structuralism is and how it differs from empiricism in a traditional sense and from Russell's external world program. Z is here by the way. It's not sick. It's not dying. And hence, to that extent, let's hear the presentations.
Yes, see? Yep. Should I get going? Sure, sure. Absolutely. Right. Okay. Can everybody see my screen? Absolutely. Thank you. Right. Let's see if I go into full screen. Does everybody see my screen? The full screen? Yes. Yes, definitely so. Yeah. Okay. Great. All right. Thank you so much for letting me present on this. I think what I'm going to be arguing is basically, I'm not going to make the mistake of confusing my presentation with a personal critique of Carnap.
So what I'm more interested in is looking at this famous dispute, and sorry if this is not news for some people that are attending here, and use it as kind of like a vector into positing some questions that I feel like are legitimately not within the scope, obviously, what we're addressing in this seminar, but which I think kind of like can be explicated from the dispute. as necessary conditions to thinking about our questioning within Aufbau. So I think that's kind of like what I'm trying to get at here. So basically, what are we talking about in terms of this dispute? It is to some extent quite a famous dispute and can be, if we look at commentators who write about it,
also from a perspective of from now from just 10 years ago, for example, can basically be seen as a dispute that revolves around two opposing projects oriented at overcoming metaphysics, and that is Carnap and Heidegger. And roughly, we can build up a couple of catchphrases that can kind of frame this, this, this, this tension that kind of bubbles up from these different projects. So we could, for example, think about the factivity or the correctness of the Karnav constitution system versus the facticity or the truth of attunement to the world that is argued for by Heidegger.
Or if we want to think about it in terms of alternative subtitles for their respective work, we could say that the one deals with the necessary conditions for something versus the other, as in the piece that Carnap is reacting to, as the nothing as a pure possibility condition, as a transcendental condition for the possibility for there being beings that we can relate to. So it's been associated ever since it's formed as a dispute with this divide between analytical and continental philosophy, which is generally how it's framed in the way that people talk about it. And it's kind of important, and we can see that from the timeline, that the status of the dispute is a little bit overblown. There was never this talking heads explosion of these two magnificent thinkers on stage.
we can see that for example Carnap had been working on Aufbau for a long time as we said before and it was published as his habilitation thesis actually before being in time then as a book and the actual thing that Carnap is reacting to in 1931 is Heidegger's inaugural address at the University of Freiberg I think on what is metaphysics and then Carnap responds to this and it actually takes until 1943 until heidegger responds to it rather obliquely in a republished edition of what is metaphysics in the in the epilogue to it so i don't want to go into detail because the subject matter is quite something but what we can perhaps frame this fight as
is on the one hand that the constitution system offers an island of philosophy in a sea of pseudo problems whereas grumpy martin in the corner would perhaps refer to it as one island of questioning in a sea of nothing that surrounds dasein's many islands of questioning so it is not the only island there are many islands and they have a certain ontological conditioning that is important to see as a constituting factor so i'm just going to go straight to the most famous quote possibly of Heidegger's inaugural address, and I'm just going to briefly read this out. Philosophy gets underway only by a peculiar insertion of our own existence into the fundamental possibilities of Dasein as a whole. For this insertion, it is of decisive importance,
first, that we allow space for beings as a whole, second, that we release ourselves into the nothing, which is to say that we liberate ourselves from those idols everyone has and to which they are wont to go cringing, and finally, that we let the sweep of our suspense take its full courses so that it swings back into the basic question of metaphysics, which the nothing itself compels, why are there beings at all and why not rather nothing? So the interesting aspect about this is that if we think about, I mean, everything we know about Carnet by now from our reading is that it is kind of very, it's very near to think why Carnap would object to this kind of thinking, to this kind of phrasing about the conditions that
metaphysics actually is supposed to question. So what Carnap's point is in his critical article that takes this address by Heidegger as an example of the absurdity and meaninglessness of the language of metaphysics is exactly that if you subject his inaugural address to the kind of analysis that Carnap undertakes, it becomes nothing but pseudo-statements, precisely because within the language that it posits, there are the same grammatical forms for meaningful and meaningless word sequence. So in another way of putting it in another way, it is inadmissible to the deductive syntax that Carnap deems meaningful in terms of true logical philosophy. And so at
best, it's really nothing more than an attitude that Heidegger's What is Metaphysics pursues. So his procedure, his methods, the one that we're also getting familiar with, shows that the logical analysis of the inaugural address yields only the negative result, as in these statements are meaningless in this domain. So we can kind of think about this a bit further, and please excuse the punny headlines. Yeah, I just can't help myself. But so we can even go a bit further in the sense that Carnap actually does argue and can argue and is in a really good position to do so, that there's only a certain romanticism through which Heidegger's development in the inaudible address of the nothing, the no thing and the annihilate are admissible.
As in this is only a negation in the strict constitutional coherence that is similar to art or poetry as an attitude of transcendence. So again, the attitude status that it has, which is to say it is nothing to say of science in the sense of logical empiricism that Carnap pursues. So if it's, if, and this is the other route that he goes in his analysis, if it were otherwise, mainly that Heidegger actually means that the nothing is a particular entity or particular name, then this is absurd. Because the nothing as an entity is merely deducible from prior logical statements. It isn't an entity, it can't be an entity as such. So Heidegger's response, 12 years later, and this is it, that is all there is.
That is the response to the project that Carnap is trying to argue for. And I'm just going to briefly read this out again. The suspicion against logic of which logistics may be considered a consistently developed degeneration emerges from that knowledge of that thinking which finds its source in the experience of the truth of being, Zion, but not in the consideration of the objectivity of the being, Des-Zion-Den. exact thinking is never the strictest thinking so what i want to do is from this very cryptic way of talking that heidegger puts forward and that kind of criticizes um though the basis on which he criticizes it is very interesting to read about from retrospectives um is to kind of
like now go into okay what's the point of this so what heidegger actually is trying to argue that nothing is the positive constitution of being in the world, that the nothing is actually involved in us being able to approach, disclose, reason about beings as an entities in the first place, and that this is exactly the human participation in the world that is constituted through the nothing, the nothing as a transcendental ontological structure. And on the other hand, this means that when he says, and if you link these two, the consideration of the objectivity of the being is never the strictest thinking. This means that the constitution system in itself is actually of that Dasein, of that being in the world that discloses from nothing, as in it cannot think beyond its own part in the Dasein that thinks about beings.
It can't say anything else about this conditioning that is sort of prescribing to the limits of its own work. So if we look at this a bit more closely, then maybe some questions that we could put along these lines to Aufbau, the constitution system, is what work does the constitution system do? for example what Carnet would do would be to try to make use of the semblance of negation to make sure that there are things that are excluded from sufficient grounds for analysis right so in a way it shores up status to the beings that that it's trying to assess and what are the limit conditions
for such work we could argue with Heidegger that perhaps there's a particular era of Dasein where logical assessments of the world come with a particular attunement. These are particularly valid because they offer a way to approach the world that only makes sense in this era. And what ontological structures uphold such limits? As in, it is still fundamentally ontologically conditioned as revealing from nothing, as making sure that there are entities that we can talk about. And then, for example, a question that would go more directly to this ontological structure that Heidegger is pointing at is why are there beings for a constitution system at all? So what are the conditions for the constitution system to talk about beings at all and not rather nothing? So again, just to wrap this up and this Carnap
or Nothing slide. So the constitution system is itself an ontic possibility of Dasein, as in it's a theoretical attitude that is in codependence with Dasein and it deals with beings, not being because of this it is incapable of talking about itself outside of its own domain so I'm just going to quickly stop over this so I think there's there are some important notions here so just quickly why I think this is interesting and why I just briefly wanted to introduce that there is this other layer of questioning that we should not least focus on is that this general tension between factivity and facticity or correctness and truth is still pervasive and still pervasive also in the very simple everyday objects, entities relations phenomena that we're dealing with.
So let's just think recently about misinformation labeling of tweets versus the actual effect that these tweets have, the explanations of algorithms for experts versus the opaque effects that such technologies can have on end users, the cookie notification onslaught versus the GDPR compliance that make them necessary in the first place, or the four seasons total landscaping victory celebration versus the actual bizarre shit show that it kind of was. So there's this overall tension between these two ways of framing things. And just really briefly, what I think is problematic in thinking about the logical, inherently correct structuring approach to
explaining relations in the world is that it kind of propagates a sort of myth of transparency, as in Once we have these logically closed structures, we're able to explain and account for beings in the world. But that isn't exactly the same as saying that, as understanding the actual effect of how these relational structures actually manifest. So, for example, in computer science, there's an interesting discussion about this in terms of the transparency fallacy. As in GDPR now grants people a certain right to explanation, but do technical explanations actually communicate, no matter how technically correct they are, do they actually communicate what effect technologies have in how you perceive the world?
So that is kind of like a small scale example of that. So kind of where I want to arrive at here is that the truth of the phenomenological manifestation of relational structures is not the same thing as the correctness of the constitutional system as a logical structure of relational concepts. So what I'm kind of trying to say is, and which we can see in this dispute, no matter which way around you want to argue, and I don't want to say one way or another, but I don't think there's a reason to forget that there's no exclusivity here to the realm of the empirical and that both sides of questioning at the very least should not forget the other. So that's it. Oh yeah, here are my references in case you want to look.
I uploaded the slides on classrooms if you want to have a look there. Many, many thanks. Excellent, excellent, excellent, fantastic presentation. Very brief. So, I think one of the greatest things, but I don't think that it's actually something that Karnak wouldn't actually basically disregard, is what you said. Exact thinking is not the strictest
uh thinking you know the strict strictest thinking with the heidegger uh kind of heideggerian position i say that uh yes i i would say that carnapp i would say that exact thinking is not thinking in a strict sense a strict sensor right but then it would ask what is actually thinking right what is actually thinking this is how he's going to trap heidegger right then um he will say that uh he will say that so you are saying that and this is this is how he is going to most probably start the the argument that you are saying that why philosophy should start from that which is
rather than that which is not, right? So Heidegger basically unknowingly does a gesture that Gorgias did, right? And Plato ridiculed him for that, right, in dialogue to Gorgias. So instead of why philosophy should start from being that which is rather than that which is not, right? But the thing is that Carnap has, as we have seen it, with regard to the idea of concept and object, structure and being, right? He would say, he would adopt a very Parmenidian or mutated Parmenidian, basically, thesis.
He would say that thinking is being. thinking is being just like that we read that object and concepts are not exactly the same it doesn't mean that they are the same but there are two modes of interpretations about one constitution that constitution the name of that constitution is philosophical logic right for Plato is just philosophy, for Carnapur is philosophical logic, and that's what differs him, differentiates him from Plato. He would say to Heidegger then, so if philosophy, would you be able to tell me what thinking of that which does not look like?
essentially he will he will push him to the extent that what parmenides had said or palato had said about gorgias that which is not cannot be thought of and that for and that which cannot be thought of for which we have to remain quiet meaning the impossibility of philosophy right so this this would be this would be a i would say i would say that carnapp's possible one of the carnapp's possible strategies to answer to this uh showing showing to heidegger philosophy precisely is that uh what you might call to be co-constitution of thinking and being
not either thinking or being the co-constitution of thinking and being right and any sort of philosophy that strives to get out of this co-constitution necessary co-constitution falls apart and becomes an aporia, right? An aporia. Essentially, what Carnap would simply would say, metaphysics par excellence, the organon of pseudo-problems. So this is why I think that Heidegger doesn't really, Heidegger, sure, Heidegger, I think that Heidegger really one of the,
I think that you mentioned exact thinking is not this strict thinking, that I would say that completely is not thinking a strict sense of, right, exact thinking is not thinking a strict sense of, if we are going to twist his words a little bit, that I think that, yes, Absalai is actually to Karnap in Aufbau. But he has so many chips, Karnap, in the construction of Aufbau to kind of show that, yes, I agree, but, but, always that kind of but. But then would you be able to tell me what thinking consists of? Right? I think that Heidegger
one of the things that I actually think that they do both share is that they prophes, I mean no, not both prophes, they are both completely attentive to the history of philosophy right, I mean the tradition of transcendental idealism, pure idealism, empiricism, positivism, conventionalism, so on and so forth, right? All of this, all of this, both of them. And they want, in secretive way, for one actually secret, but for one, not much so,
to reinvent the groundwork of a future philosophy, of a fundamentally new philosophy, meaning that having a certain kind of departure from what has come before with regard to thinking and being, right? Thinking and being. For Carnap, actually, he thinks that, he says this quite explicitly, that the only thing that this is possible, and he actually says that I want to diverge from the history of philosophy in a complete sense by basically founding the new philosophy and the new logic.
Completely show that anything that cannot be plugged into this logical structure, logical construction of the world, will reveal itself to be have always been a pseudo problem right a non-question as Plato would have said it right whereas Heidegger tries to still maintain that I have certain kind of attachment to the history of philosophy right and my his problem is not that he wants to diverge from idea that thinking is founded, why thinking is including beings rather than nothing, but that showing that to, as you said, with regard to the idea of islands, to start from thinking and being
the fundamental co-constitution that is in the Platonic Barmenedian philosophy, deprives you of other forms of thinking, right? But then if you think about it, this is a great project, actually. This is a magnificent project, I would say, precisely because we can think in terms of possible philosophical worlds, right? Worlds of philosophy or worlds of what actually thought consists of, right? but then Heidegger is just such a brat ultimately and we see it precisely the consequence of his bratness in continental philosophy what is
really a magnificent question and a magnificent thesis basically becomes a fuel for what you might call to be whimsical onanism in philosophy. In what sense? In the sense that, you know, you get this thing that, so exact thinking is not really philosophical thinking in a strict sense, right? So then you have to have those kinds of islands, the influence of those kinds of islands in this very tiny island that we ourselves established
and this usually translates into ideas of creativity eruption eruption uh basically uh polisomy right all sorts of stuff that render um that that try to overcompensate what is misguidedly understood as philosophy with a fanatic penchant for exactness with vagueness and fuzziness which I think it's actually worse than the fanaticism for exactness as we have seen it in continental philosophy but of course they don't they are both pathologies they are both pathology but pathologies
that unfold from the history of philosophy itself. There are the consequences of the history of philosophy. So, so, so. I think, I think what's really interesting is, and maybe that was just the point that I was trying to get at, is like, perhaps, I mean, for me, it's important to think about that in terms of what I look at, like, what am I comfortable with? Am I comfortable with the island that I'm sitting on Or do I need to more thoroughly reflect on the conditioning structures that make that island a possibility? So if I say that my island of logic and mathematics
works particularly well, that doesn't mean that I can account for the possibility of other islands, which I think is also something that you were saying. Absolutely. It's just like, think about this also. So for example, we are part of a specific world, right? A specific world. And anything that we are thinking about, we would say that it's about the kind of the specific world in which I am a part of. But when it comes to the possibility of other worlds, how are we going to actually think about that kind of possibility? You can change here basically the term world with the term philosophy or philosophical domain.
How are we going to think about the possibility of other worlds without falling into metaphysical vagaries? It is not as if Carnap just doesn't want to deal with metaphysics. he actually has a very neutral neutral very neutral attitude to our metaphysical problems he doesn't say that there are wrong or false he thinks that if you don't have that kind of neutral problem with other possible worlds the existing of other possible worlds disconnected from this world or islands out there with regard to this island, then you will inevitably become,
you know, what Kant calls someone who follows the vagaries of thinking, vagaries of thinking, right or vagaries of speculation. Karnap essentially doesn't rule out as I talked about the possibility of other minds last session doesn't rule out that there are their stuff but you have to have some sort of accountability some sort of tractability from what I have in terms of a specificness in this world or these kinds of philosophical domain which is fundamentally tractable to that which might be completely different, right? So that's Carnap's idea, which I think that, I think is healthy, to be honest with you. Yes, it is, it might not be
philosophically ambitious, right, in a, you know, continental sense, but at least it's healthy to some extent to some extent of course it has its own flaws and we are going to talk about some of the flaws of it but it's healthy precisely because it it it it does not lead to certain kind of valorization of other worlds of um basically other forms of intelligence uh right eruptions of absolute contingencies to the laws of nature, which I think that they all have a Heideggerian vibe to them, right? I mean, the influence of Heideggerian content of philosophy
is absolutely, absolutely irrevocable. So, do we have a second presentation? Or that was, no, that was it. Okay. I need to get a glass of water. Let's have a five minutes break. Then we come back. I will start talking. This time, minimum amount of question until the end of the class, like the last 20, 30 minutes.
I shared it in the classroom stream. It's really confusing. What is classroom stream? I don't know. click in my browser on google classrooms that's what happens so it's where you have a google classroom too yeah it's where um the the site discussions and the video recordings end up as well um well i can i can send you the file though yes that would be that would be much appreciated yeah for sure yeah i didn't get to everything but um i got very excited no that that's it was a really good i think to be honest with you um and also if i might add i think i'm not necessarily trained enough to completely hide
where my where my preference lies possibly are you hiding area uh be honest with us you know we are not going to post it on twitter no my forefathers should forgive me but i think i am more of a heideggerian than a carnappian yes i think look i think you know my personal opinion just briefly is that i think um the the the scope of what Carnarv is trying to do is incredible and I think it's absolutely fascinating um I just think that the as and you know being in phenomenology obviously I also side just intuitively more
with certain continental kind of like approaches but I think in terms of the grasp intuitively though not systematically yeah okay let's not argue that but Kazir Carnarv are actually more phenomenologists than many continentals oh yeah for sure for sure um but i think in terms of what the what kind of the point but in this dispute is like the the grasp on whether you want to call it the nothing or just the transcendental condition for their being things or for our being as being able to refer to beings in certain ways i think that kind of grasps exceeds the one that the that the Aufbau... This is what I tried to say
when I said that the gloriousness of a question that Heidegger says, you know. But the thing is that I'm afraid that Heidegger himself, even if he might have answered that question, the legacy that he left mistook that question that basically exact thinking is not philosophy exacting is by all means philosophy i mean look this is plato's 101 the good butcher agree and i think what's interesting is because i've spoken spoken about this recently with um with david you know um i think the the the tradition of this questioning was really acting as if okay so everything's said so we now just write stuff that sounds like that
basically yes yes yes but that is not of course none of them none of them are in to that kind of stuff yeah so what's much more interesting is this rigorous questioning of if you want to go through the terminology like how does the nothing as a condition change like how does it um like how does it as an ontological structure make different kinds of uh questioning such as the for example as an example right how does it make that possible so thinking right right right right right right i understand i understand look my my position here is i'm always um uh i you know i i'm i'm you know that analytics don't want me continentals don't want me i am basically on shed list of every single faction in philosophy right for the kind of moves that i usually make
I would say that yes the ambitions of philosophy are far more than exact thinking right but then I would say that thinking should be tempered with exactness with verb for exactness otherwise it's not really thinking you know it's it's a source of vagary but then when it comes to nothing and being, I think that this whole nothing and being is a rather, even though it is really an interesting philosophical thesis, to me, to me personally, I mean, I don't want to say anyone else, to me personally, it is rather a trite relic of old
philosophies of ancient philosophies and scholasticism. What I'm actually more interested in is that, what does it mean to live in one philosophical world and adopt other philosophical worlds? By philosophical wealth, I mean a certain kind of attitude toward what might be or might not, right? I think that turning it into a certain kind of philosophical world allows us to think about the question a little bit more concretely
in terms of methods, epistemology, logic, so on and so forth. Meaning that we can still have Rodolf and Marty in a party without them killing each other, plus all the history of philosophy. And we say that philosophy was always about the invention of the future philosophy you cannot escape the history of philosophy no matter what you do philosophy is a discipline that never closes the circle of revenge
and philosophy and precisely that kind of attention the idea that philosophy is a species of history, and as Brandon said it, philosophy is the only discipline that has a, the only program that has a history, then we should understand that, you know, all such, what you might call to be instances of rivalry, of contradiction, debates, acerbic or not, are part of the history of philosophy. And if you can't understand
that the dynamics that leads to future philosophy, to philosophy parks, because this is my thesis, that philosophy is only coming from future meaning that we are always talking about certain kinds of assumptions that we have inherited from past in the history of philosophy where we always try to make a rupture it what has come before us right and that's i think that that's that's philosophy. So for me, as a philosopher, both Carnap and Heidegger, not talking about the
details of their arguments, because that's a different issue altogether. As philosophers, their status as a philosopher, I would say that even though I don't like Marty that much, but I would say they are both great philosophers, right? Essentially, they are doing what I just said, They're creating philosophy, namely the future of philosophy. And if you are not doing that as a philosopher, then you have no business in this area of inquiry, namely philosophy. You are just a scholastic. You are just like an economist. Okay.
Okay. So, so remember, my dear friends, we talked about a lot about that you know the whole core of this thing is being revealed the idea of what this book is about is being revealed in just like that merely like first 12 pages like look you don't even need to read the rest of it right you can you can you can you can construct it itself right based on what he what the clues that has provided you so far, right?
I mean, if you have knowledge of history of philosophy with regard to Russell, Kant, and stuff, what he's already giving you in the first 12, or let's say maximum 20 pages, already gives you the arsenal to write off-bowl. You don't need to actually read off-bowl after page 20. In my opinion, why? Why is that? Does anyone know that? Why should we actually read of Baha'u after page 20, where he sets his thesis already? Methods, logistics,
what is at his stake so on and so forth I think that is the key to what Carnap ultimately becomes transitioning from Afbao to a very mature philosopher later in his life that even if I set my premises and everyone could come up with their own Afbao my afao is better than yours why is that is it because he kind of says uh as long as it's clear and it follows from a set of rules that you produce for yourself yeah it's that then it kind of it's it's fine but philosophy should be
rigorously sticking to to those rules that it sets itself and playing within a kind of game that yes but what where what are these rules though i guess like kind of rules of abstractability in a sense or is it something tractability yes uh but is it just the rules uh or is it also about certain kind of positions that he makes initially like premises for his own philosophy. I mean, for example, think about this. So essentially, he is not doing anything unnatural or extraordinary in the history of philosophy.
He says that the elements, the primary elements of any constitution system, which allows us to think about one constitution system for all concepts of sciences, regardless of how especially science is like economy versus neuroscience or that they're all founded upon one single epistemological doctrine or principle and what is that that all objects of science are derived from experience right so which which this is this is actually the base of his methodological skepticism
i mean not my my apology methodological solipsism methodological solipsism also so what he's trying to do is to tell uh everyone that look all epistemological, every sort of epistemological project that we can ever have, according to the history of philosophy, has always been founded upon subjective experience. Subjective experience, not in a kind of like Hegelian or Kantian sense, subjective experience in a very primitive sense, what he calls the auto-psychological thesis,
meaning that the kind of primitive, primitive givens I have in my experience, primitive givens I have in my experience are the ultimate element, atomic elements of everything that I can ever produce or we can ever produce. But that sounds a little bit dangerous too, right? You know, is he trying to be basically saying something about the myth of the given? Is he trying to, you know, basically buy into the idea that sensation is epistemologically
given? I'm like a thriller. I'm going, not going to answer this until the end of this class. what he's actually interested in more than this question is something else the question of methodology that goes into such a project the project that where you can create a concept a constitution system for concepts and objects whose elementary ingredients are, you know, subjective experiences,
auto-psychological, auto-psychological, auto-psychological means that experience, not even in the intersubjective way, right? Not, not even in intersubjective way of experience that, you know, some philosophers are talking about. so he's trying to create such a system and basically this he thinks this this methodology to recognize such a system of object and concept constitution whose primary ingredients are that of subjective autopsychological experiences
is the fundamental methodological kernel of all epistemological projects in philosophy. It should be adopted, and now it should be recreated logically. Hence, logical constitution, logical construction of the world. Question here, before I move forward. I just have a really quick question about the nomenclature because he then talks about the
heteropsychological which if I understand this correctly it's kind of just the way in which that is it doesn't equate to it. PEPRO means usually that intersubjective, but not intersubjective, more like a continental instance. Yes, yes. It's not autosychological means that what is really actually the interesting thing about autosychological, it is not really about a kind of like that only the senses that I have, only the senses I have are real, right, as a, as a fundamental of my experiences. It actually has a different part, which Carnap actually is more interested in, is that from
the auto-psychological perspective of experience, of subjective experience, all other experiencing subjects at the level of auto-psychological experience are treated as physical objects, merely behaviors of physical objects. And to ascend from that, treating other subjects as physical objects to experiencing subjects, you need to have a different level, intersubjectivity. and intersubjectivity comes with other kinds of premises and addendums right go on and my apologies to interrupt you that was kind of answering my question i i just uh
yeah i was kind of curious about that distinction between the heteropsychological and the intersubjective where yeah the heteropsychological seemed to be a kind of just an additive thing with respect to the auto-psychological, right? Yes, yes, yes, yes. In the sense that we can always ask, how are you going to have actually auto-psychological without hetero-psychological, right? Ukarnab constitution system essentially tries to distinguish that these questions belong to different levels of experience, right? that every experience begins with auto-psychological determination or
auto-psychological demarcations then the intersubjective ones then the cultural ones right and this is the broad ways through which we can we can trace the epistemological valence or levels of concepts of sciences from physics to things like economy and social sciences. question questions people who have been silent
you said no questions till the end and now you're asking us for questions come on yes okay my apologies yeah i have bad habits of this it's okay okay so what are you doing uh okay So, as I mentioned that, so the problem of epistemology in Afbaw is this kind of movement from subjective experience to objective knowledge, to objective knowledge. So, subjective experience begins with auto-psychological determination, right?
meaning that meaning from with with with a nod to methodological solipsism methodological solipsism if you don't know it in in this very sense very very rudimentarily formulated is an epistemological thesis that all sorts of epistemological attitudes and philosophy begin with basically most rudimentary forms of experience, ear sensations, right?
At that level, when we are talking about individual, we are simply talking about individual, not in the kind of socialist sense, but individual in a very empirical, philosophical sense. Right? Not individual as being individuated because of the intersubjectivity that it has, but individual as, like, I wouldn't say a bundle, like a hewn, but individual as... That which basically has a certain kind of self-enclosement, psychological self-enclosement, hence auto-psychological determination.
But of course, now you see that we are basically dealing with a little bit of a slippery slope. this all sounds awfully like the myth of the given, right, in Sellars, that as if all knowledge can be traced back, you know, to a certain kind of epistemological foundation or categorical foundation, namely sensation. But as I will argue, Carnap actually is not uh pro this stance in fact his idea of the given is fundamentally uh in the opposite direction of the given that for example people like
sellers or no sellersians have been talking about um like as if the world the sense the sensation of the world uh sensation sensation sensation so what is sensation sensation simply in you know in canonical philosophy means that uh the capacity the capacity of of self uh to be impinged upon by items in the world items in the world right so then hence sensation um the whole point of the
myth of the given is that these sensations are fundamental epistemologically or categorically categorically to the constitution of our knowledge of the world right in the sense that you can say that it is world that has data and this mind that is like a blank blank slate And the world, as Salars talks about it in terms of the myth of the given, basically imprints its characteristics on the mind as if mind was basically a block of wax.
And a formless block of wax. So after the transcendental term, it becomes different that, no, the mind is not really a block of wax upon which world characteristics of the world are being, or a structure, if it has any, the structure of the world is being imprinted. It becomes the idea that a structure is actually part of the mind, right? That there is no conceivable, as a given, as a given, a structure to the world.
Any sort of structure is an act of minding, minding the world, right? so Karnap idea of given is definitely not this not this idea of given that I just talked about and the way that he the way that he actually tries to talk about it is a source of his divergence from basically Russell's external world program so as empiricism empiricism which basically in philosophy at least since the time of cellars but much earlier uh classical empiricism has been
associated with the myth of the given myth in the sense of an ideological fixation with regard to a purported foundation for all knowledge meaning sensation. So how is that Carnap uses sensation as basically the primary ingredients of the constitution system and its epistemological levels, but he doesn't commit to the givenness in a kind of a Szilardian or negative sense, the givenness of the senses or the primary ingredients of experience.
So continuing, the subjective starting point of epistemological constitutional system requires an endorsement of as i mentioned of a methodological solipsism so methodological solipsism for carnapp's amount of Karnap amounts to as he says an application of the form and method of solipsism in this sense methodological solipsism is not really a commitment to the truth of any judgment
about the soul or significant reality of some particular epistemic subject. Right? It's simply, so for example, you have certain kind of senses, right? Senses, namely being impinged by the world outside of you, by the items of the world outside of you. So the methodological solipsism does not commit you as an individual subject to the truth of or the veracity of such sensations.
All it commits to is that the methodological solipsism, all sorts of epistemological projects in philosophy should be traced back, should be traced back to certain kinds of elementary ingredients within experience. experience. And that is not a question of endorsing the truth of sensations. It is a methodological tactic or strategy within the solipsistic sphere of an autopsychological
individual, hence autopsychological determination as the lowest level of the epistemic hierarchy of any sort of constitution system in sciences. So methodological solipsism is simply a commitment to a type of constitution order as the order that captures epistemological relations. and as I said, all epistemological schools tend ultimately toward it. So solipsist, or at a psychological R, in this sense, in Carnapian sense,
are not terms that have any determinate content prior to the constitution project itself. so here we have a certain kind of axiomatization uh that the solipsism as i mentioned is not about the truth in the sense of the kind of or the veracity of of of the kind of sensations uh or these primary ingredients of experience that we are talking about precisely because all these truths are being cast out in favor of the function of these primary ingredients, or namely, auto-psychological sensations, within and in the context of the constitution system itself.
Talks, questions, stuff. My apologies if these things are getting a little bit torturous at at this point, it's going to get even more so in the next few sessions. Waiting, waiting. Nothing? No one? Reza, Bob has a question. I can allow him to speak. I noticed that, like, sorry, again, my apologies to everyone that I have a really bad eyesight.
So I used to be very nearsighted. Now I can't even see him nearsighted with my glasses. um so i noticed is bob auditing the class or is he in the class he's auditing okay okay my apologies that yes uh yes please if uh you know uh this is why it was that was a kind of like i wanted to ask you all of you that um please do relay these questions to me because to be honest I really can't read. Yeah. I will allow him to speak just a second. Bob, you can speak now. You have your mic open. Yes, guys. Thank you for this. Thank you for this possibility.
I know who Bob is, by the way. Okay. My question actually is on the basis of this last point about the autopsychologist. epistemological autosychologism basis of Carnap's system. I think one he tries to do is to have some basic elements, but the axiomatization comes from the relation between its basic elements. In the contrary to all the systems before him, like Russell's system or Frege's system, the interesting thing about Carnap's system is that he gets away from this idea of, Is there, as you told, is there any assertion or truth in the idea of I think or does not? I think even the most beautiful part of Afbal is the part that he gets rid of the, he gets rid of the mental objects, mental objects of Frege.
Before this part, he based four objects, if I remember correctly, intersubjective objects, autopsychological objects, material, and culture. And basing it on autopsychological doesn't come to the myth of the given, because it's more about the relation between these basic elements, not argumentation in a mathematical sense of view. So if we take this project in this way, we don't need any names. Am I correct to suppose that? Names in what sense? Names, what do you mean by names? You mean explicit definitions? No, no, no. Particular items. Yes, absolutely not. No, no, absolutely.
Those are just out of convenience. Those are absolutely just out of convenience. We don't have names. We don't need names, actually. that's yes and absolutely you are you're correct i will of course talks about this further uh today yes and this is essentially uh friege's uh friege both friege and russell's uh programs at the end of afbou are revealed to be part of what he has always been in afbou admonishing namely metaphysical philosophy. So our power in that sense is truly kind of what we might call to be an autophilosophical emulation. Simply trying to show that even when we found philosophy
on the new logic, as long as we don't have this kind of logical epistemological system of constitution, basically all of our great insights are part pseudoprogmatic and part completely off the point with regard to what actually they are trying to question or say about the world, right? Yes, exactly. Great point. Can I ask a little following question? I try to not take the time of the class. Just my meaning about names. Is there all this metaphysical basis for the myth of the given comes from actually the necessity of name?
what Kripke talks about as analytic a posteriori, the names of things that the semantics cannot have, cannot give them. I think all the problems maybe about existence of the objects in the world or something like this all come from this problem of naming. I think that is a little bit of a Kripkeian position. I think you see, I think that there are, I would say that maybe not. I, you know, I love Kripke I like his discussions about rigid designators and stuff all of this stuff but the thing is that no I think that the whole idea of the given the whole idea of the given in philosophy is one of the most nebulous super
basically villains that has ever been existed it's like shape shifter It can always manifest itself in different, completely innocuous forms, not just names, not just explicit definitions, not, for example, certain kind of positions or decisions that you make in philosophy. It can basically become part of practice, part of actually how we define theory, so on and so forth, right? So, of course, Kripke's idea of naming is fundamentally sophisticated, right?
If I think he's right, to be honest with you, but I don't want to say that this naming is, you know, the source of the problem, because precisely because if we don't have have a kind of sufficient understanding of what script key means by naming, right, then it might create further kind of confusion, right? Yes. Yes, I understand. Okay, thank you for your answer. Absolutely, my pleasure, sir. Anything before I move forward? uh yes uh virgilio typed the question uh virgilio would you like to formulate it like uh speaking
or would you want me to read whatever you prefer i'm having sort of uh very poor internet connection here so maybe i could just read what I wrote already if that's okay. Sure. Absolutely. Basically an observing form in the form of a question perhaps. I wonder if for Carnap constructing the world through its phenomenal basis in conscious experience must in the end give way to some kind of a physical construction of the world. of the world, meaning the world has to have a physical basis.
Any thoughts on that? My apologies. I missed the last question, basically the question, the words in the question, which was the key part of it. So you said that does it entail what with regard to the physical construction? Yeah, yeah, yeah. if constructing the world has to begin or proceed initially from a phenomenal basis in conscious experience, must constructing the world in the end give way to something like a final construction of the world deriving its basis in some kind, deriving its basis in physicality,
sort of that. Yeah, yes, well of course Karnav is physicalist as we have seen it, right, you know, the whole idea of utter psychological determination is a physicalist thesis, right, but please do correct me if I am misinterpreting your question. Are you suggesting that such a physicalist come constitutive system allows for or gestures toward an actual reconstruction of the world? Is this what you are asking?
I think I still remain within the logical construction of the world. Even a logical construction of the world can in one way or another be derived in some kind of a physical basis. Yes, of course. Well, absolutely. No, absolutely. This is absolutely a physical basis. Yes. Yes. If that is your question. Yes, absolutely. I mean, this is the whole point, Iqarna. What I wanted to say is that the consequences of this, however, are actually rather bizarre, philosophically. Why is that?
Precisely because even if all logical constructions have a physical basis, homogenous or heterogeneous physical basis, what does it tell us? It means that basically we can reconstruct all sciences in the name of one single science. What essentially it means is that it's a certain kind of multi-realizability thesis.
So if this is the case that there is this physicalist basis and then there is a logical reconstruction, then all sciences can be reconstructed in different ways. Meaning that all sciences actually are reconstructions of one another. Meaning further down the line that all sciences are reconstruction of one, just one single unified science. And that's really actually quite a very interesting thesis. Questions, questions?
Heckling. I'll ask a question if I can. Absolutely. Yeah. By the way, I still remember your last question. You should bring it next session because next session we are going to talk about it. About extensionality? All right. Yes. So just going from the discussion you're having, I mean, there is a project here of rational reconstruction, right? He wants to show that all sciences can be given in these terms that have, maybe from a certain perspective, a firmer basis. Rational reconstruction here is not really robust.
Rational reconstruction project comes later years in Carnap. But yes, there are germs of that project here in Aqbal. yes but what he's not doing and this is really really where the the the point is what he's not doing as i see it is telling us things like oh um the social sciences and uh art history and things they've never truly been done on a scientific basis and we now have to find the way to uh put them a right right he's saying these cultural sciences as he calls them do go on uh he's not radically saying as he does about say metaphysics that they're bankrupt projects because they're
not symbolic logic he doesn't want to be canceled maybe maybe maybe that's it but he goes out of it and this was in you know in the in the part we read this week uh and so i was just wondering if you had but but he thinks that um that sort of our identification say of an artistic style go forth by uh i mean maybe ultimately go forth by indicators um they have to be uh they have to be co-extensive with with something that can be put in the the auto psychological physicalist terms but he also says um oh in practice this is often done through empathy right is his word yes yes yes and which is which is and that may be a weird translation
i know i know that's a really great point right that translation is weird but he means it's done by no he actually needs empathy really okay all right well so what is he what what is he and but he's not complaining that's my point he's not saying yes and that sucks that can't that can't be right you can't do that right and do art history so i think what do you think he is doing and saying there i think that look uh precisely we can we can think about this whole idea like social sciences, humanities, even media studies. I don't have that much against media studies, a little bit. He would say that these are all sciences, right? It's just like the physics, chemistry, economy,
humanities, philosophy, cultural studies, complete, so on and so forth. He would say that those are all sciences. But his business is not to actually, and that's what he experiences says he's not really concerned about special sciences right by that he means that all sorts of domain specific sciences including that of the humanities you just think that they belong to different objects of different domains of this logical epistemological project from the auto psychological which is that of the physics to psychological to the intersubjective or the cultural one right so that's exactly what he wants to say he wants to say that
look that there are cultural sciences which cannot be uh in a in a in a kind of like uh brute forced manner reduced to the other psychological without taking into account the logical relations that goes into the constitution system among the levels of the objects or relations within the other psychological the psychological and the intersubjective we cannot do that so So he's a kind of what you might call to be a gentleman physicalist, a gentleman physicalist, right?
So he doesn't want to play the game of all sorts of nasty physicalists. He wants to say that, yes, we can actually talk about music or musicology as a special science within its domain, according to the constitutional system, with regard to certain kind of relations which are obtained among certain kind of properties or types of objects within that level. so he's essentially he he's not is as i mentioned that he's is an enlightenment guy you know in the sense that he doesn't want to flatten the distinction between art right
or continental philosophy which is even probably worse these days i'm just my apologies for sporadic piss takings in this class he doesn't he doesn't want to flatten the distinction between these and something like physics or neuroscience for that matter he's actually as i mentioned he's a gentleman physicalist he wants to show that look even though we are always anything that we can say meaningfully, tractably, should start from a physicalist position within a logico-epistemological
constitution system, but we cannot really conflate or elide the distinction between an art, history of art and history of physics, an artist and a physicist, he thinks that they can all be part of this great enlightenment scheme precisely because they belong to the very levels of this constitution, logical constitutional system that makes the generality of all sciences, not merely exact sciences, but also special sciences,
but also cultural sciences. So, and this becomes actually quite severe and pronounced in his later works post, you know, this logical syntax of language with, as you know, the principle of logical tolerance, that he says that even logic, you know, the use of logic, is a matter of everyone can use their own homemade, homebrewed logic as long as it behaves like a logical system, right?
You can do it. You can do it. And you can reconstruct the world accordingly by way of the system. But then this also basically becomes a certain kind of, I would say, philosophical, logical, and political job for Carnap to answer that. So how can the principle of tolerance in logic, the principle of tolerance in sciences across the board, from the exact sciences to the cultural sciences, can all be having a happy life together?
I think he's quite optimistic about this kind of stuff. precisely because he thinks that essentially the principles of this tolerance, whether in terms of sciences, exact or cultural, or logic, logical principles or logical frameworks, is the very basically basis from which all the human endeavors theoretically and practically
unfolds that there is nothing outside of it so his is as i mentioned in the first session I think Carnap, we should actually read between the lines of Carnap, precisely because of his political contributions, that he's quite actually very, very politically and culturally a specific kind of person. that many of his philosophical theses are actually being influenced by his political
and cultural commitments rather than the other way around. Yeah, thanks. That's helpful. I just wanted to raise that set of things. tease it out a little bit. My apologies if I went overboard or I did not actually answer the question. Okay. So,
So I talked about methodological solipsism a little bit, that the solipsists or autopsychological are not terms which have any determinant content prior to the constitutional project. There are not metaphysical terms which must be imposed from outside of the constitutional system in order to make sense of the project as a whole. Now, so as we talked about the main crux of having an auto-psychological principle
as what you might call to be the primary ingredients of the constitution system, leads us to talk about, you know, so what is he actually, what is actually, you know, the status of
elements of a psycho- psychological determination. Namely, as I mentioned, are they given in the in the way that um post-transcendental philosophy uh philosophers have been criticizing or is this something else can it bypass those criticisms or not right um well Well, this comes first of all, answer to this question,
within Carnap's epistemological deviation from Russell's project of external world. And I was, as I briefly mentioned about it last session, So the point is that the logicist reduction was an epistemological success because according to Russell, it reduced all mathematical concepts to ones which have acquaintance. I remember I said that, you know, usually people talk about the given with regard to Carnap or
Russell as acquaintance, right? Given, even here we are talking about the elementary experience, right? Sensations in the auto-psychological sense. They're all mathematical concepts because it reduced all mathematical concepts to ones with which we have acquaintance. And in this way, it provided preeminent examples of constitutional epistemology to be taken over into empirical science. But rather, logicism acquires its epistemological point by reducing mathematical concepts to purely formal ones, where logic is simply the locus
or the topos of the form, the place of the form. It is the connection between objective scientific concepts and the pure form that we seek to extend to empirical science and capture in the constitutional system. Now, As I mentioned, the constitution system, which is the system of structuring the world. So, so far, we have been talking about the structure of the world, or the structural
definition or description of the world it is rather misguiding uh all we can talk about about the system of a structuring structuring something like systematic enterprise and basically the at the core of this structure is the constitution system which is also the the gist of objectivity of objectivity right of objectivity objective descriptions of the world right so here something happens
that so this structuring system or constitution system whatever you call it a structure of the logical structure of the world logical epistemological structure of the world whatever um ought to be objective precisely because it ultimately should address the scientific statements we can ever make about the world, right? Objective in principle. But how is that? Such an objective system can be constructed from subjective systems,
insofar as any constitution system has as its primary ingredients, what are to psychological subjective rudimentary experiences right subjective experiences so obviously the answer to this is logic is a new logic and the constitution system A purely a structural definite description always picks out an object uniquely on the basis of a structural features of the relations in which it stands to other objects in a specific domain.
It relies on the structural features of the relations. that is on those features of it that are preserved in the arrow diagram or a list of n-tuples where the objects related by the relations are given arbitrary designations. Now, the thing is that for such relations among empirical objects, these structural features are typically only empirically known. Such a definite description, according to Cardapp in section 13, has the advantage that we do not
have to rely ultimately on experiential abstention of any object in the domain as the ground of the sequence of definite descriptions for the object in that domain. What follows from it? It essentially means the purely structural definite description or descriptions fulfill the requirements we have for the definitions of empirical objects for objective science. science that they all rely on the structure of experience. It is an empirical matter that experience has a structure that permits them, and no prior determination of any objects in
immediate acquaintance is presupposed by or expressed in the definition. Now, How much time do we have? Maybe 40 minutes or so. OK, OK, OK, good. My apologies.
of the next chapter or part, so with regard to all of this that we have been talking about, namely the problem of the given right the given um or the the acquainted the acquainted problem acquaintance rossalian acquaintance um how far russell's constitution system or version of logical empiricism that's a that's that's the philosophical exercise um um maybe one or two maybe one or two whatever um can
right like a seven minutes each not more than that how with regard to the problem of the given or the acquainted in in the sense that we have been talking about namely the um basically um um namely the the i wouldn't want to say founding but but um taking taking as the primary ingredients of a constitution system, subjective rudimentary experiences, namely sensations. To what extent such a gesture commits Carnap to the myth of the given? If you say that it doesn't,
then why what does exactly Carnap provide in his constitution system that does not commit him to the myth of the given namely sensations as proto-structures as proto-structures remember that the myth of the given at least the myth of the category all given was that sensations, namely impingements of the items in the world upon the mind, upon the self or the individuals, are the fundamental building blocks
of all knowledges, which basically that by extension leads to another kind of thesis that essentially mind doesn't have a structuring abilities. It's just a blank slate, tabula rasa, and it is the world that imposes this structure upon the mind, hence the core of the myth of the categorical given. So what is exactly? In Carnap's view, in Carnap's constitutional project, in which even though sensations or primary ingredients or elementary ingredients are
taken to be primary, to be at the most bottom level, namely auto-psychological level, he's still considering all of these he's still not really committed to the myth of the given in sense of Sellars or Russell's form of acquaintance meaning what is exactly in Carnap's Constitution System Project that allows him to circumvent those
topsy-turvy problems and traps of the myth of the given having sensations as the foundations of knowledge right that's That's your, basically, your exercise for next session. Of course, I can talk a little bit about this
By saying that, he's actually, as I have been talking about, the the answer to this kind of question this question is precisely because he's in in the specific movements or maneuvers he make Carnap makes in order to separate himself from
Russell's external world program even though even though he begins were basically from russell's theory of acquaintance or the principle of acquaintance right as the source and the and the basically the square one of of paul's project Any questions? I mean, is the question clear? Is the exercise clear? Like, you know, you
have the principle of acquainted knowledge in the sense of acquaintance, in the sense of the given. But obviously, Carnap's project is not a Russellian project. And he cannot be he cannot his project cannot be understood in terms of the myth of the given why then second question what if you say if you actually say that yes okay Carnap is not pro myth of the given or has doesn't have this account of the myth of the given then you should say that by what account for what reason by virtue of what goes into his constitution system in Abbao, he circumvents this problem, this issue.
Clear? Do I need to formulate it again? OK. I think that's actually a good exercise, precisely because that gives you Answering this question essentially gives you why Carnap is not just the sum of Frigga and Russell. Questions or? would it be bad to try and hazard a guess at this question now should i hold on yeah yeah sure sure
please go on i was just thinking that maybe because karnap isn't trying to describe the real in this sense he's not committed to the myth of the given because he's not so much saying that in his kind of methodological solipsism he's not offering a metaphysical or even epistemological claim. So in this sense, he's not saying that the real is, and to that extent, it's revisable. But I'm not sure of that. But it seems like that is kind of one area in which then if the structure of kind of knowledge is sort of tractable or something,
well I'm kind of getting stuck on that point but yeah may I help you a little bit here may I say that are you trying to say that for Carnap's system there is actually no immediate epistemic relation of acquaintance or givenness that grounds our knowledge and provides the endpoint for analysis. That merely the idea of givenness is a methodological choice. It's a methodological choice by virtue of its being universal
across all epistemological choices, right? that meaning only having um uh Carnap's having uh the basically primary elements of experience namely sensations or you know element air labs elementary experiences does not commit him to any sorts of epistemological stuff that comes with the myth of the given, right? Precisely because for him, literally,
that the choice of having these elementary experiences is a necessary methodological one, right, without talking about their sense certainty, right, without talking about their objectivity or anything. He doesn't have actually, just like his principle of tolerance, he doesn't have any sort of proclivity
with regard to one principle of acquaintance as opposed to another. He thinks that within different constitutional systems, we can have different acquainted or givens, datum, givens datum, datum being in the Greek means the givens, right? as long as first they belong to experience and two they fit into that constitutional systems but more actually interesting he what he wants to say um is that um
the choice of what you might call to be as a physicalist of course as a physicalist the choice of these what you might call to be primary ingredients ultimately is logical and methodological only and not epistemological it doesn't tell us anything epistemologically because that kind of epistemological, what you might call to be explication or expression of sensation can only happen within and across different levels of a
constitution system, right? That's actually a great insight. And this is what also Alan Richardson talks about this. He says that a related difference between Russell and Karner is found in their respective attitude toward logic. As we have seen, Russell has an antecedent epistemological point of view given in his adherence, the principle of acquaintance, right, that allows him to have epistemological worries about basic concepts of logic. This is not true of Carnap. No concern of an epistemological nature about logic are in evidence in his book.
Indeed, the role that the structure plays in the account of objectivity indicates that logic, or Carnap, must be in place before any sort of epistemological question can be raised. In this way, Carnap's adherence to a Russellian theme of logic as the essence of philosophy actually goes deeper than Russell's own adherence to it. Hence, last time I said it, he was always into outrustling Russell. Within the external work program, Russell uses the tools of lodging in support of prior empiricist epistemology of acquaintance, right, in the sense of givenness. Carnap, by contrast, seeks to recast all of epistemology into a framework within which logical structure and it alone and nothing else is presupposed.
We have more than a change of tools in pursuit of an old project. We have a fundamental change in what counts as a philosophical project, given the rise of the new logic. and it's really interesting that so we if now that we we are seeing that what is his attitude is toward the given, the given datum, right?
So first of all, datum are like undefined, right? Essentially, they are neutral. They are neutral elements. They are merely logical elements, ultimately, even though logical in the sense of their relation, not in their nature, right? You know, because otherwise, then the whole project will become, you know, would be just a conventionalist project, right? he wants to have the uh it would be just a logical project not an epistemological project so he wants to say that yes all uh basically uh knowledge that we can ever uh accumulate uh you know or or develop is coming from these basic rudimentary ingredients of experience is coming
from experience or excellence got to psychological dimension as its first level as its first level then he also wants to do another move by saying that this is not exactly uh the givens of experience you know these kinds of primary ingredients or sensations They are not the givens, meaning that he doesn't believe in the myth of the givens, precisely because what he's interested in is the logical relations, the structure, the structure between them. And furthermore, he would say that basically
he's actually not even interested in what they can ever epistemologically say because they don't say anything really that's the whole point because they don't say anything like you know this is actually quite you know Selaar's always isn't quite you know of course, Salars comes later. It's quite very Salarsian critique of empiricism here. Is that, you know, when you see that, you see rain is coming and, you know, you don't, you don't need to have concepts or higher concepts. You say that, you know, just like
these kinds of dissuaches of water splashing against the window say something he thinks that it's just completely philosophically off preposterous actually because these kinds of empirical elements really don't say anything, really don't say anything about anything. You need to have a constitution system, you know, a system of constitution for them to actually say something about the world. And that is what the structure is, namely objectivity.
questions for some reason i can't find my sir can i ask a question again yes um is but before that does anyone know i i lost my main window and now i cannot see any of you now how can i i can hear you but i can't i can't see you but i can't oh my god this is just embarrassing okay it's the full screen right the thing yes please
um for something to be meat of the given if i understand correctly the structure must be in the sense data um for for car nap um that's all that's all experience that's all experience that's all experience yes yes must must be structured regardless of the mind that the structure is the reality and mind as you said perfectly yes that's our primary experience right yes yes absolutely and one thing that before you ask uh you you move forward i just want to intervene say this that i made a very wrong move in the last chapter of intelligence and spirit so
So we have datum in the sense of sense, right? You know, phenomenalism, which by the way, Carnap uses phenomenalism, but it just doesn't want to have the full-fledged phenomenalism as an epistemological project, precisely because within that epistemological project of phenomenalism of Mach, you get bundles of sense as having epistemological balance of their own, meaning having their own structure. He says he doesn't want to have that, right? He's actually more in line with some someone like Euclid, in which data, you know, the Euclid's book, Data, the Givens, where basically data are tentative, logically adopted
primary experiences which play logical function in the structuration of the world. Basically I will just ask something just like that. But one little note though, Do you think that all these questions actually are the point of ALFBA, that are the pseudo questions, that when we ask, is it first epistemologically, is it first my senses or as a sensor in the world? Or is it, I don't know, cultural objects? Which one? Was it first the worm or the...
right right right well the thing is that yes absolutely so so this is the whole point i mean what did i said uh you know last uh time that you know car nap it's not interested to say that objects are constituted concepts are constituted objects are the same as objects objects are the same as concepts or objects are different than concepts he just thinks these are just bullshit questions really like petty questions yeah exactly right and i think actually i would like to send this to my dear first friends you know who i'm talking about dr ray berzier that look this is what karnap thinks about objects and concepts
whoever says the objects and concepts are different or the same is just delving into petty problems of philosophy he just wants to say that look these are as he has been talking about two different interpretive mode of speech with regard to how the structure of the world is being constituted so his point is that the constitution of the structure itself which is which means objectivity which means objectivity having having having this caveat that all sorts of objective objective views about the world should start from subjective ingredients because otherwise it would be a formal
and rather than objective view of the world right so then he says that even within this new formula you can have you can basically become metaphysical just as russell's external world program and external world program and logicism he wants to say that no this all such problems of these questions being devolved into metaphysical pseudo-problems could be avoided if we had systematized our constitution system neutrally,
methodologically, and logically. logical neutralism I will talk about it actually let me write it so I can talk about this what is in logical neutralism right logical neutralism and methodological neutralism of course in Aufbau he does not um follow his own advices really that's why you know there are so many things wrongs about this book but this is this this this
ensemble of problems and basically enduring questions lead him to go towards other projects such that he can come back and address some of these outstanding issues. Can I ask a question? Absolutely. Oliver, can I just read Virgilio's question? just really quickly and then you can ask right after me. Okay, sorry for that. It's just I forgot to type it. So Reza, Virgilio asked the following. You mentioned about protostructures, which are sensations. By protostructures, do you mean physical potencies? I'm thinking of potencies
as logically constructible, meaning they must first be given to experience for logical construction to proceed. And this leads me to ask, do you think Carnot falls into the myth of the given by his phenomenalist commitments. I'm not sure he went full blast about physicalism. This, I guess, is what he intended to do in a rumored second half-ball, but didn't materialize. Well, no, I mean, that was exactly what I was trying to say. Yes, he's a physicalist in a very weak sense, right? It's precisely because he thinks that all sorts of empirical knowledge that we ever derive about the world are coming from these kinds of sensations or elements of experience, right?
But absolutely, I don't think that he falls into the myth of the given. He actually, and this is what actually differentiates his source of philosophy from the like of Sellars. Yes, they are both against the myth of the given. It's just that they're a strategy who are the myth of the given are fundamentally different. And this strategy of basically Carnap to avert various disguises of the myth of the given or the myth of the given in various disguises is not by questioning the ideological fixation or the kind of foundationalism for which the method given is famous for,
but create a strategy to in fact circumvent it by way of a logical epistemological system in which the primary ingredients of experiences don't have any sort of epistemological balance. They are just simply tentative ingredients, subjective ingredients that we have adopted within a constitution system as a whole. and if required they might some of them might be actually casted out like basically removed from this constitution
system it's exactly like you know what what he's trying to do is a kind of a euclidean thing. So those of you have read, you know, Euclid's book, so he starts from undefined, undefined definitions, right? Undefined definitions, like, for example, what a point is, what a line is, these are undefined. They don't have really connection with what comes before them. They're just like there, and we don't have any exact definition of them, so they are undefined. So then he starts to use this undefined and creates an explicit system of definitions for them. With regard to, for example, lines crossing one another, right?
Two points that are being placed on a line and creating a segment, so on and so forth. And then from there, he creates a system of construction, like proof about, you know, how you make a triangle. according to the system of explicit definitions and undefined ones and so on and so forth. And then throughout this process, we see that certain kinds of problems do emerge for some of those undefined concepts, such as, for example, what is actually aligned. So this allows us to create a different construction system, like in the Euclidean,
philosophy or a Cartanian geometry or a Cartanian geometry in which the construction of a line will fundamentally differ. So you see, he just wants to start with what he thinks going to be a general attitude, a general attitude, methodologically speaking, creating a constitution system. Within basically the structuration and the workings of these constitution systems, then he can see, and that's the task of the new philosophy,
we can see that those kinds of undefined definitions, those kinds of primary elementary experiences that we adopt, they might be actually, for now, put aside and we bring other kinds of stuff. We can reconstruct them anew, right? It's exactly, think about how we define a line within a Euclidean program, within a non-Euclidean program, within a Cartonian program of geometry, so on and so forth. So these are all constitution systems, but they are all based more or less on the same logic of constitution.
It's just that you have to basically construct them, explore them to the full extent, such that you can see that there are inconsistencies, shortcomings within the constitution system, either between the relations at different levels, or the kind of elements that we have adopted at the bottom, at the level of auto-psychological, or the kind of logic that we have used in fact to construct and this becomes later the obsession
of karna that look we can use different kinds of logic forms of logic right for different purposes and they're all going to be right as long as they function like a logic and for with that We have different constitution systems. That's what is called the principle of tolerance, right? It's just that, you know, think about this, that, you know, as long as this Andre Karras example, that think about a panel on a train or a spaceship.
So each of the bottoms do a specific function for a specific purpose, namely launching of this spaceship into the high orbit. So we have to do a certain kind of sequence, but think about that we create another panel with a different configuration following the same kinds of laws of mechanics, engineering, so on and so forth we have, but with a different configuration. And these are all good, great. And we can do that and still having basically achieve the same purpose. So this is what you might call to be
you know, the, you know, one of the, one of the thoughts of, of the more mature, basically Carnap, which begins after actually writing of Aufbau. So one of the good, basically, papers I have in mind on this is, let me get it for you. But it has nothing to do with Afbaldo, but you can think about it.
It's called, my apologies, it's called Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons by Kenneth Westfold. it's on the importance of having alternative constitution systems enough wow which is already is talking about it you know so what is what is what is the importance of having alternative constitution systems is part of the generalization of what it means to make scientific statements about the world right
It's essentially part of that enlightenment program that I've been telling you, that all sciences can always be imagined and captured as one single science, right? That basically these alternative constitution systems can always be generalized to more and more, you know, inclusive constitution systems. And then this later becomes part of the explication program, where basically the question shifts toward the principle of tolerance, having your own logic, right? As long as it's own logic, you're fine, you're good.
is a certain kind of what you might call to be constrained, constrained, and robust logical pluralism. So conceptual explication simply means a clarified, though partial, specification of the meaning or significance of a term or phrase in use for certain purposes. so there are explications means that so explication means that we can we can basically revise our concepts or objects in that sense of reality in the world according to different linguistic practices if there are actually linguistic practices and
different source of logics, right? Most important thing is that all such, everything that we are going to talk about in the, about our place in the world as an objective fact is always already objective. To the extent that is always already objective means that it's part of a structure. To the extent that it's part of a structure, it means that it is basically being engineered by a system of constitution. To the extent that every system of constitution is logical epistemological, but logically, what about logical formal relations means that if we
have different forms of logic as long as there are really forms of logic we can have different constitution systems which means also to that extent we can have different objectivities and these objectivities are not kind of sort of postmodern idea of that everyone can have a belief, their own belief about the world. No, it's that all such objectivities are part of one single structure of the world, and hence that of science. Hence the universalist thesis that goes into Carnap's of vow.
Thank you. Yes, do we have time for one more question? Sure, absolutely. Oliver had one. Oliver, you can ask, and then we can wrap up after his question, because it's already time. Sure. Go ahead, Oliver. It was because, well, you mentioned again now the principle of tolerance, and before when we talked, Franklin, you mentioned this, his kind of notion of empathy. And later on, it says that he says empathy or fastein, which is basically understanding. And a few lines later, he calls it in the context of concerning cultural objects, he calls it intuitive understanding.
And so the principle of tolerance extends to this notion of intuitive understanding or empathy. But what he says several times in the Aufbau is it definitely does not extend to that of interpretation. And I'm curious about this, his idea of interpretation, because he regards that as being mainly concerned with metaphysics. Yes. Right. Sorry, just because last time we talked about kind of in the context of inhumanism and the construction of an AGI. And one thing which, like very cursory, you would say that what an AI or an AGI cannot do is interpret.
I mean, usually when the use of AI is criticized, it's because of its hermeneutical incapabilities. And I'm curious. But AI or AGI? Because we don't have constructed an AGI. We have AI. I mean AI, of course. AI, yes, of course. I'm just curious if there might be any connection with, I'm curious about his, if you could clarify his idea of interpretation. Yes, I think this is something very interesting. Like, so what he's actually talking about in Alfao, like when he admonishes that kind of interpretation, it's precisely is a certain kind of what you might call to be
interpretation from the perspective of an informed experience, right? An informed individual experience or intersubjective experience. What he has in mind later in his life with principle of tolerance and logical interpretations or different interpretations of logic is not from the perspective of epistemological experience. is from the perspective that essentially the function of logic is universal this is already enough wow that all sorts of structures that we can ever talk about are uh scaffolded upon
the general function of logic but this general function of logic can be manifested or basically what is the English word for it or basically incarnated within a specific forms of logic as long as there are logic because all forms of logic according to Carnap, come back to the general function of logic, namely a structuration. So that's that mode of interpretation, which goes to the principle of tolerance,
quo, the multiplicity of logics, is very different from interpretation in the sense, in the common sense that we are talking about, like interpretation from you and me talking from our informed experiences, epistemologically informed experiences about certain kinds of things. No, that is the other one. The logical one is purely about the logical function, about the logical function. And it is the consequences of understanding, of understanding a logical understanding of what logic logical function consists in right
meaning the structure the structure or namely the constitution system he basically even though he reserved some room uh in the epistemological side of afbau for empathy and a little bit continental friendly is becoming a little bit content of friendly and so on so forth but he's not really content of friendly he just does it just that's not is part of his project right it. He wants to show that our notions of objectivity are undergirded by logic. But what is logic? Logic is a constitution system, ultimately. And that kind of logic,
and this is basically becomes part of his next project, the logical syntax of language, to show that the essence of this logic, of this new logic, has always been precisely by carefully distinguishing the syntax of language from the intuitive elements, Kantian intuition, Kantian intuition elements of a language and representation, we can come up with the idea of a universal language, not only that, but also different forms of logic and language within which we can have different logical or objective interpretations of the world
without basically hampered by our fidelity, our interpretive fidelity, our interpretive fidelity to experiential components of representational functions. so Carnap as we move forward in not probably not enough but in his life representational fidelities become less and less of an issue it become part of essentially the myth of the given and more and more the idea of logic and language become
with regard with regard to the constitution system becomes the basically the linchpin of his new philosophy that we can make objective claims structure the world differently by adopting different constitution systems and by adopting different kinds of logic as long as there are logical principles and as long as they are capable of basically plugged into constitution systems different constitution systems so
So this is what I would say that Carnap, there are certain aspects of of BAU, which are absolutely always going to be there in the work of Carnap, meaning the neutrality of constitution system, the project of generalization of constitution system, for the generalization of all objective claims about the world, right? regardless of their particularity or modes of speech and interpretation. What is going to be different in later works of Karna is his attitude toward logic, language, and logical relations,
which is fundamental to the moves that he makes later on. so what is this stuff that you are talking about now i can see george soros when has george Soros has anything to do with the goddamn Carnap. Jess was saying that Carnap knew Esperanto, and I was just thinking how hilarious it is. Back then, all cool kids had to learn Esperanto to be cool kids.
George Soros pushing me. All cool kids, all around the spectrum. So, who's going to talk next week by the way Donna I haven't you haven't introduced yourself you haven't talked so maybe you should be next week too yes uh yeah sure I can do next week Superb. Look, problem solved. Does anyone else? Oh, Cassio wants. Maybe, Cassio, if you can do it next week.
I think Cassio left. Anyone else? Edna? Not you, Edna. The other Edna. Yeah, I can do it. True. Excellent. Excellent. Excellent. Okay. I think that's it. uh so we are so really behind i just cannot imagine what we have been doing uh but anyway um um my apologies now you see now you have to humiliate me in front of all people I'm joking with you. I was going to.
No, I know. I'm just counter joking. My apologies if we are behind. But I hope that the class has been a little bit interesting. Yes. And by the way, you see, what is this? It's like a fifth session? Four sessions. So we have four more sessions, right? Four more sessions. So maybe you should start to panic a little bit and write your essays and stuff. Right?