Plato, a Reality Game in Four Levels (Session 10)

Hello and welcome to the final session of Play-Doh, a reality game in four levels with Reza Negristani. I'm going to pass the mic off to you now. Thanks, Theo. Okay, so the last class and so today I promised that I will talk a little bit more about philobus you know the main theme of philobus and after that you know we can discuss if you have questions there are already some questions theater send me a number of very good questions I would like to answer with any of you but you know some discussion or some argument to make and we can we can go over them so

So with that said, just to kick and start the discussion on Philibus, if you have any questions or comments on Philibus, feel free to ask and if you don't, I will start. let's hear if you have any comment or question or even like minimal stuff la la la Theodore, Maria, Hunter, anything

Chaggy, I'm just going to die right there so as I mentioned the whole idea So, I mentioned that the most endearing idea of Plato is the form of the good, the form of forms. And it starts from his earlier period to his most mature works like Fido, Timaos, Sophist, Laws, and Philippus. Each of these books are addressing a specific topic about the good.

I mentioned that Fido, for example, is about the relation between intelligibility, Logoi, and the good. In Philebus what you get is the good for man. The thing is that with Plato, so many scholars of Plato say that Plato never fully fleshed out what he actually means by the good.

So the latest work in Plato which pertains to the idea of the good is Philobos. In Philobos, as I mentioned, it's the good for the man, good for the human. But nevertheless, the dialogue starts about the good for the man, but as you move forward in the book, in the dialogue, it seems that this is just an excuse for Plato to discuss what the good is itself. I mentioned that one of the central topics of filibus is the so-called thought about

restoring the fourfold, the platonic fourfold. The fourfold being to Apiron, unlimited to Paris, the limited to mix or mictun, mixture, and the cause of mixture. We have talked about what all of these things are. So philebus essentially is the first work that tries to identify very explicitly the mixture as the good, the mixture as the good. But this is not the good itself, it is the good intrinsic good.

Intrinsic good is good as an idea, it's not good as a principle, good as a form of forms. Throughout the dialogue, it is revealed that a good life is a mixed life. Namely, what is exactly a mixed life? A mixed life is a life that includes both the functions of mind or intelligence and pleasures. But not all sorts of pleasures.

Plato is very careful about this. In fact, rules out certain pleasures, because those pleasures are, by definition, they cannot be mixed, they cannot be rendered intelligible, they are recalcitrantly unlimited, mainly indetermined. And in fact, precisely because of their indetermined nature, they cannot be part of newer and newer mixes. So what is exactly mix? Mix as I mentioned, or mixture or mikton, is when a limit is introduced to the unlimited.

So limit is a principle. Limit is not in the colloquial sense of a limit. as a restriction. Limit is something that makes determined. It's a process of determination. Unlimited is a process of what you might call to be Heraclitian flux, something that is indeterminate as such. Now in Philippus it is introduced that all existent things, all existent things, and remember that all existent things are different from being of forms because forms are not existents, forms are beings.

Okay? Existent and beings are two different things in Plato. Plato says that all existent things are unlimited, okay, to apyron, not to perils. So they are governed by the process of unlimitation or to apyron. He says that all pleasures also are unlimited, to apyron. Comparing this to the analogy of the divided line, we have already seen what to abhiring

means. It's really the flux of sensations at its base. It's completely unorganized. So the process of how to organize this requires introduction of determinate limits into this flux, into this apironic flux. And the functions of mind are supposed to exactly do that, for the functions of intelligence, to introduce limits to the unlimited.

In Timos, he explains about this interlocking of unlimited and limit to create a mixture in terms of the process of craftsmanship. like an artisan, there is a chunk of clay, this chunk of clay is to apaira, it's an existent material, it doesn't have any form, it's abstract and indeterminate. The artisan, which is the mind, introduces a form or a shape into this chunk of clay and makes something

out of it. The product of the craft of the artisan or the craftsman is a mixture. So when Plato says that the good for the man is a mixture of both pleasures and functions of the mind, he wants to say that functions of mind require some existent material to

produce a good life for a species, a species, not biological species in the sense, but in the sense of a class of particulars, a class of knowing subjects or knowing creatures. From this perspective, in the early pages of Philippus but also in Pheidel, exactly like Hegel, Plato introduces mind on two different dimensions, two very different, he gives it

two different pictures of mind. From one perspective, mind is a mixture, and from another perspective, mind is a principle. So mind as a mixture is the concept of mind, which is a logical function of mind, the one that mixes the stuff, its logical functions, its structuring, organizing functions, and And the other one is this physical embodiment pertaining to individuals, to the knowing man. So from this perspective, mind is a mixture, precisely because in so far as physical material

is to apparent, is indeterminate, the first thing that the mind should do is to impose a form on its own physical embodiment and to mold this physical embodiment according to its own form. I mentioned that it is a Hegelian idea precisely because this is what the concept of mind in Hegel is. The movement from the concept of mind to the idea of mind is this process. So in In Hegel you have the concept of mind. Concept of mind is a logical idea, namely what mind does, its function, normative function,

and its physical embodiment, which is the impurity. And this is what Hegel means in Encyclopedia, in his famous line that mind or geist is the bone. Mind is impure, precisely because it's contaminated by physical embodiment. You can't just go on and talk about the abstract functions or the concrete functions of the mind, disregarding its physical embodiment. So this is the concept of mind. But mind is the only thing for Hegel and Plato that is capable of creating an object for

its own concept. Creating an object for its own concept. So this process of full coordination of mind as this impure mixture of physical embodiment and logical idea toward an actualized concept in which the object, or the object rather than the Gegenstand. Object, we mentioned that object means object for thought, object of thought, object for

knowledge, whereas Gegenstand is a sensible object. So this transition from the concept of mind to fully actualized concept in which the object, mind as an object, fully coordinates with the concept of mind is what is called the idea of the mind. So there is a difference between idea of mind and the concept of mind. Idea of mind is the process of this determination of both what the concept is and also transforming the object that corresponds to this concept, or constructing it in fact, according to this

concept. And this is exactly like in Plato. Plato introduces mind as mind of the particulars, mind of the species, which are precisely have both biological, existent components and also formal aspects. At this level, mind is an ingredient, is a mixed ingredient in a good life of man. An ingredient which is ingredient like all other ingredients, like for example desires,

desires like for example food like health so on so forth although Plato is very careful I mentioned to you that Plato approaches this in Timos as a recipe as a process this whole process of craftsmanship or the or the or the mixture which is called the good life for men as a recipe recipe meaning that everything is ranked in a recipe right so mind is on the hot mark top of strength unlike other ingredients it is ingredient like other ingredients but it's ranking there is a prioritization here mind done the highest rank so from

this perspective in the good life of man mind plays an important role it has a function that introduces limits to the unlimited, to the existent materials, including its own physical embodiment, and by virtue of that it transforms it. It creates better and better mixtures, namely more theoretical and practical intelligibilities of itself, if not also So here mind is ingredient, an ingredient which is a mixture, the apparent of its existent

material physical embodiment and toperus of its noetic functions. What are these noetic functions? Plato is what Plato calls the twofold of the language and Logoi. Language and Logoi are responsible to the introduction of measures and by way of the method of dialectics introduce limits to the unlimited, hence making the indeterminate determinate, rendering it intelligible. So we have the first three components of the fourfold regime. But then what is exactly

the cause of the mixture? Plato, in the later sections of Philebus, from the mouth of Socrates, He says that the mind is akin to the good itself, or intelligence is akin to the good itself. But how can this be? Because the mind was introduced as an ingredient, then how can it be the cause of the mixture? So this comes back to the idea that I mentioned. Plato introduces two pictures of the mind, mind as pertaining to the particulars or the class of particulars, namely the species, and mind as a principle.

This is what you might call to be the idea of mind in Hegelian sense rather than the concept of mind. It is simply what you might call to be the process of making a mix, making a mix by the function of the intelligence, which is the process of structuring or organization. So Plato thinks that the logical idea of the mind is essentially the principle. It is responsible for its own being, for creating itself as the object of its own concept.

And from this perspective, precisely because in Philobos mixture has already been introduced as an intrinsic good, the principle that is responsible for creating the intrinsic good, namely mixture, becomes agathon, the good itself, the form of forms. Questions? Can you elaborate on this sort of tension between these two ways of thinking about mind? seem almost in opposition.

You see, okay, as I mentioned, the best way to think about it is that you remember that when we talked about the third man argument, we talked about ideas on two different levels, right? Ideas in the sense that they don't admit self-predication precisely because that will result to attribute the qualities or the features of the particulars to that which is universal, right? But also at the same level, there was a matter of participation. The particulars, class of particulars, namely a species, partake in the universals, namely

forms. So the first one is really the class of participation. Material beings like us, like humans, as a biological species, participate in the logical function of mind. And that creates a class of mind as ingredients, mind as pertaining to the class of the particulars, namely a species. Hence the good life for man. But there is also a logical idea, a logical idea of mind by itself that makes this participation

to be possible in the first place. participation in mixed life which is to be yearned and desired and is sufficient for that species. So is like mind kind of giving birth to itself as it comes to know itself more and more? Yes, but not only knowing itself, what Plato wants to show, first of all, in Philippus, Plato doesn't recognize good as a goal, as an object of a goal, as an object of a goal.

It's a principle, it's a principle that derives and it's self-sufficient. is outside of the good for Plato. Now the thing is that it is not simply a matter of knowledge but exactly as he has introduced in Timos, good doesn't, mind doesn't simply know itself more and more but mind is, crafts, it's the object of its own concept, the object of its own concept. Hence, ! Knowing itself entails constructing itself. Yes, and that's why Hegel and Plato, who are arch-idealists, they have this in common,

this absolutist dimension, that this is precisely the dimension of the absolute. That mind is the only thing or idea in the universe that is capable of constructing itself as an object of its own concepts, and by virtue of this construction or coordination of a concept which is itself with its own concept, which is again its own function, is capable of attaining absolute knowledge of itself, absolute knowledge of itself, and

not a knowledge of a sensible object. Because knowledge, and that's why Hegel in Science of Logic, he introduces absolute knowledge, It says absolute knowledge is when knowledge ceases to exist, because knowledge in German idealism intrinsically related to the idea of a geggenstand, namely a sense of an object, and hence constrained by nominal or the things in themselves. But Hegel wants to bypass this problem, this Kantian dilemma, by introducing a new dynamic in the philosophy of mind to show that mind, ultimately the goal of mind is not the knowledge

in the sense of knowledge of a Giganishtan that Kant had introduced, but an absolute knowledge precisely because it's the construction of object, object according to its own concepts. And this process of full coordination between object and the concept is what you might call to be absolute knowledge, unconditioned knowledge. Unconditioned in the sense that it's not conditioned by the sensible, by the existent, by the gegenestand. Like it's not responding to heteronymous forces on the outside? Yes, but the thing is that for Hegel is actually more strange precisely because this process

you see, so Hegel tries to construct this formula of your self-consciousness. So self-consciousness is a concrete movement. So you have two different kinds of self-consciousness. One you might call to be abstract or formal self-consciousness, and the other one is a concrete self-consciousness. Abstract or formal consciousness is I equals I. You know, I is I. And this is simply an egocentric view for Hegel. Hegel tried to show that even within this formal or abstract self-consciousness of the mind, when we say that I is I, I plays two functions at the same time, I as a subject

and I as an object. But there is a problem here. When I becomes an object, then it becomes an object among the many other objects in the universe. Right? Hence, there is, even within the abstract or formal self-consciousness, which is ecocentric, there is an epistemic schizophrenia. There is an alienation, whereby I, at some level, is treated as an object within and constrained by reality. So, Hegel tries to show that the movement from this abstract self-consciousness to concrete

self-consciousness is only achieved by when I as an object becomes a momentum for the intelligibility of other objects in the universe as subjects, as other self-conscious beings. Hence his famous saying that self-consciousness only finds its satisfactions in another self-consciousness. So he tries to show that the concretization of self-consciousness toward the idea of mind is something that can only be achieved by change in the conditions of object intentionality.

Where the relation between myself and myself changes in the presence of another subject outside of me. But the subject doesn't need essentially to be another human being, but also any intelligibility in the universe. So the more I expand out and see them as self-consciousness, and hence that makes my relation to myself as self-consciousness more intelligible and more concrete. And that's why for Hegel the absolute is not just pure idealism, it converges on realism

precisely because it requires the objectivity of an unrestricted universe as the guarantor for the intelligibility of the subject that has a relation to itself. So this mind is finding a good life for itself amongst a community, amongst a community which

alienates it from itself? Is that sort of... In the first, you see, so basically the first in the... at least for Plato we can't talk about alienation. I mean, for Plato this is all positive. But Hegel starts with this understanding that alienation, he introduces alienation both as a negative force and a positive force. In the sense that I equals I is both negative and positive. Negative precisely in the sense that that creates basically that creates alienation not from myself only but also from the world

that warrants the intelligibility of myself. So from this perspective if you want more intelligibility of how you relate to yourself, Hegel's idea of self-reference or self-relatedness, then this self-relatedness requires what you might call to be a circuitous path, to spread out in the universe and see and basically renegotiate the relation between self and self in terms of the relation between objects

and subject, hence the so-called intelligible unity of objective reality. It's a radical otherness and subjective, basically, spontaneity of mind or thought. So from this perspective, yes, from one point what you said, but from another point, which is alienation as a positive force, is that the only way that I can coherently relate to myself, hence attain concrete self-consciousness, is when I see how am I relating to myself

in the presence of an unrestricted reality. And that's basically that movement out of the egocentric view and embracing of other subjects and also the unrespected reality.

So I found this passage. Sorry, I'm trying to go through my bookmarks. So I read a few passages from Donald Davidson's doctoral thesis on Phyllis,

which I mentioned to you a couple of times. He says that... He says that the good is complete in the sense of containing not only its own conditions for existence, but its own reason for existence. Just as the properly built building or estate or universe contains its own reason for existence,

the properly built estate will be perfectly good. Plato says in Republic, the world constructed by the demi-orge or the craftsman in the Timos is whole and complete. Because it is self-contained, nothing visible is left outside. Nothing goes in and nothing comes out. is self-sufficient, namely autonomous. And then he says that, he mentions that in Philippus

There are passages that try to explain the idea of the good life as a number of qualifiers, like being desired, being self-sufficient and being complete. So he says, whatever is good in the inclusive sense of constituting the entire content of happiness, eudaimonia, must satisfy these criteria, says Socrates. One, it must be complete. Two, sufficient. And three, hunted or desired or yearned.

For every knowing creature, you know, for every knowing creature. Plato, so earlier Plato, he had introduced this idea that everything follows the course of being good. A dog, a tree, simply by conforming to its form of doghood or treehood, right? Well, as I mentioned, in Philippus, Plato no longer believes in this kind of mishmash of doctrine of forms. He has got rid of some of these ideas, he has introduced them in theatitudes as categories

and no longer as ideas or forms. It reserves forms for the good and what comes out of it, the immediate ideas that come out of it, the good being the principle of mind. So it is natural to see why is that Plato here reserves the pursuit for the good only for knowing creatures, only for knowing creatures. Yeah, that brings me back to a question I had a couple of classes ago. It sounds like what that means is that species out there in the world or anything that nature

makes itself are actually sort of pseudo-forms or they're like as-if forms, but it would be dogmatic to call them forms you see Plato and philebus they are so basically this is the whole thing they are good intrinsic goods precisely because they are mixed what is mixture is the introduction of limits to a pirate to the material namely they have a stable lives a stable organism, stable complexity. They are organized unity between their parts. And the idea limit, limit is not a thing, limit is a relationship between material

ingredients, okay? They have this relationship. Plato introduces them as the good. Hence, he leaves a room for the human mind to treat every species as a good, as an intrinsic good. But that doesn't essentially mean that they can pursue the good in its purest sense, precisely because that requires the function of mind. Like they're not free because they don't have infinite ends. Yes. And essentially the whole idea of the fourfold is that only creatures who participate in

mind actively are being guided actively by the principle of mind, namely the good. So it's like any cultural project or like any process of construction that a human or group of humans or reasoning being engages in is kind of like they're more real than material processes. Yes, yes, Plato, I would say that Plato, for Plato, you know, he had already introduced that he, existing things are just what Hegel calls are dirt and water.

They are prime materials, they are ingredients, and as ingredient they are apiron for Plato, And being a Pyron means that they are not determined, in so far as he had already produced the idea of limit and determinant as the idea of intelligible. And understanding reality in Pfeivel, in terms of the intelligible, yes, then it means that these things are not real for Plato, in the sense that Plato means real, meaning intelligible. What I'm still trying to wrap my mind around is insofar as complex systems are able to

evolve towards a norm, like a system is in a hierarchy, a role, it's kind of nested under or a different system and it can, right? Like it actually, it does evolve towards a higher norm that isn't like it's sort of internally legislated task. Like in some sense, like material world seems to be able to evolve towards the good on its own, sort of without a human, without a task or like, without being capable of kind of logical reasoning and planning and like

like where what exactly where is the the the division yeah yes okay the first thing that I think is really important to know is that and this is not just Plato, in fact even from the point of philosophy of functionalism, philosophy of complex sciences, any understanding of the function of the system, of a physical system, is essentially modeled on the functions of practical reasoning. Like heart pumps blood. Heart pumps blood, okay? It

It has a dynamics. This idea might look innocent. Well heart pumps blood, but no. It is actually a normative piece of information that is not part of reality of nature, of the physical system. It's something that is simply a model. The constitution of this model is the normative way of how we make practical reasoning. That if a part is, for example, if an element is a part of a whole, we say in our practical reasoning, then it serves the function of the whole. Hence if it doesn't function, then it malfunctions.

So essentially, if Plato knew about complex sciences, and Hegel actually is closer, in fact, to this idea of complexity sciences, they would say that all of these functions are not real functions. They are functions that are modeled by how we think about physical systems. In fact, that's why it makes complexity sciences still an embryonic science, precisely because it is vastly tethered to how we as human minds practically reason about organizations.

And that's why in terms of physics, where you can get, for example, a non-functionalist or non-mechanistic account of how things work, you don't get these kinds of ideas of emergence or the idea of like that there is a functionality inside the organization. No, that just becomes basically metricization. So complexity science from this perspective is what you might call to be a bridge between physics proper and completely normative functionalism in a sense of practical reasoning.

And there are really good arguments even made in terms of complex sciences that all talks of emergence, of function, or mechanisms in the physical universe should be abolished and we only need to use the vocabulary of a statistic called physics. And at the level of vocabulary of a statistical physics, you don't get any of these things. You just get explanation and description. of these because they have because unless you are willing to for example as a complexist scientist you are willing to endure some sort of metaphysical claim about the existence of telus

or ends in nature which of course some do some do but that would be just metaphysics then that's not really science. So one of these questions that comes up for me in this sort of version of intersubjectivity that Plato is talking about is how would a subject, say subject A, say me, how would I be able to determine using my own logical reasoning structure whether or not an object, you, were a knower according to a different logical reasoning structure?

Sort of like, how would I be able to determine whether or not I was hearing a language or just noise? Well, that becomes the process that intelligence, as I mentioned, intelligence is necessarily correlated with the intelligible, okay? Any postulation about that there is a creature out there we use as a different kind of language, fundamentally alien, that I can't distinguish, no matter how much I progress, okay? Or some representational system that no matter how much I use science or different ways to decode it,

it won't be decoded. Then that Plato says that it's an intelligible, unintelligible thing. Because intelligibility, if someone is an alien out there that speaks something or makes some behaviors, then it forces me to explain why is that, that I take this to be a knower of its own kind, of its own species. Otherwise that would be just unintelligible, that would become a transcendent. Plato wants to completely get rid of this idea, the idea of this unintelligible alien-ness. And that's exactly what you get in David Roden's, in fact, disconnection thesis, as a post-human

is totally disconnected from us, and is quite actually observant, he says that it's not uninterpretable in principle. But he never says what is exactly the Criterion of Interpretation. But ultimately this leads to negative theology. Isn't this what exactly negative theology is? Via negative principle, that you define something, the intelligibility of something, simply by way of complete negation, abstract negation rather than determinate negation. And that obviously leads to consequences, and for example, rodents is a good example

of this. human becomes disconnected from human only to be reconnected back to human on some trivial level, a level of morality, aesthetics, like Nick Bostrom, what are we supposed to do with this unintelligible alienness? No, we are not fucking going to do anything, because it's a pseudo problem. It's a pseudo problem. Problems should be, ought to be intelligible, and intelligibility requires explaining why is that? I take this to be an intelligent being. So, yeah, it does seem to me like it's throwing an unsolvable problem in the face, but it's also, it seems like...

It's a pseudo-problem, because a problem is one that can be identified, you see? It's from a Quinean sense, it's a pseudo-problem. But isn't it for... Okay, so isn't it for... It's a matter of plausibility, and this plausibility has been formed under the condition of implausibility. It's exactly what Pascal's wager is about. Isn't it what the Pascal's scam is? Pascal's scam is that, oh, well, there is a god out there, we don't know what it is, but let's just... As if, they try to beg the question, what if it exists? What if it exists?

But this begging of the question is that it's a condition of plausibility that has been put forward under an implausible explanatory scheme. Hence, it's a pseudo-problem. put in like Kantian terminology isn't like why does Kant need to pose the idea of the thing in itself which is unthinkable? Well that's I think the weakest really part of can't and that's, no, I absolutely agree that can't, thing in itself is I think the

weakest part but nevertheless that doesn't mean, okay the thing in itself needs to be handled carefully. The thing itself means objective reality that constrains the process of intelligibility, extraction of intelligibility. Yes, but it is a thing in itself in the sense that it's a nominal and it's simply foreclosed to intelligibility, but at the same time being the constraint on intelligibility that is an antinomy, and that's I think the weakest part of Kant's. And exactly that's what Hegel attacks Kant on this front. Should we have a cigarette break and then come and take

questions? Sounds good. Excellent. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. sorry one second

Thank you. There is another point to bring about this kind of positing this kind of pseudo-problem. First of all, mind is intersubjective for both Plato and Hegel, in the sense that it's

It's not one knower who can recognize another knower of another species. Mind is essentially, precisely because of its intersubjectivity, it is tied to the process of intelligibility in the rational and scientific thinking. So when we posit an intelligent and knowing creature which is fundamentally outside of not just existing range but outside of the process of how we explain and render the universe

intelligible, then that exactly creates a metaphysical dogma, precisely because what it does is exactly like this claim, the saying that universe, let's just say this creature is just universe, the universe is unknowable. But what it does is that it puts an a priori limit on what we know and what we can know and what we can think. And hence this leads to what Kant calls dogmatic metaphysics, precisely because what it does

is that its primofasie puts a limit on what can be known and what can be thought. But then what is exactly the difference between such a claim and theological claims? Right. I mean, it seems like, well, it is a difficult pseudo-problem for me then. But, because if you say that, you know, mind is premised upon intelligibility, don't you run the risk of then saying that mind is not, how would you know that there is the unlimited?

beyond mind, or anything outside of mind. So it seems like... It is, it is outside of the existing mind, but Plato wants to argue that mind is the only principle that can bring all of these to the mixed life, okay? That can render everything intelligible, all a pyronic fluxes. Yes, and exactly it becomes like a Haykos problem. Only the very fact that we see a reality is in excess of thinking, okay, is not a priori.

There is no a priori saying that reality is radically other to us or constrains our thought or is in excess of our subjectivity, or excess of thought. It's the retroactive power of reason, or power of knowing, that we realize that reality has such and such properties. It's retroactively we can see these things, and that's only through the power of reason, the power of knowing. It's basically coincidental with the maturity of mind, with the maturity of reason. Yeah, I think if I understand what you're saying, it's sort of the difference of thinking of the noumena or the thing in itself as an epistemic limit.

Yes, that we put ourselves pragmatically in order to be capable of bootstrap ourselves to higher levels of epistemic, open up our epistemic scope. Yes. Because if we don't posit that epistemic limit, then we run the risk of utter solipsistic thinking. Yes, absolutely. Yes. So, and that's, you know, Hegel, I think, is really a fantastic philosopher precisely because all this sloppy interpretations that they interpret, you know, of course Hegel had also this in mind, this Whiggish interpretation of Geist, or progress of the Geist. Geist is

progressive, not in an essentially historical sociopolitical sense, which of course, yes, in philosophy of Wright, Hegel talks about it, but I think this positive insight of Hegel can be retained in the sense that Geist progresses, and only retroactively it can judge the conditions of its own constitution. I want to bring up, in the syllabus, Socrates makes the argument that not all pleasure and pain is intelligible and that it only depends on the strength of intensity. So there may

he makes the argument against the Heraclitians that maybe there are relations, micro-relations, but they are not intelligible and that seems to me to depend on the strength of the mind or the sensitivity of the mind to make intelligible some sort of order of flux. Yes. That kind of already, yeah, that may not be... Yes, I mean that's the point. You see, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that

he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I mentioned, that he, the idea of, as I of mind and the idea of mind. Idea of mind is mind as a principle. The logical function of mind. What is the logical function of mind? It is structures. It is structures. There is no inherent structure in the universe because that brings back the allegory of the cave. People who see the fleeting on the screen and they think that this is actually the world, This is the structure of the world. So mind is structures. This is the principle of the mind, the idea of mind, which is the good itself, the Agathon. So then there is another thing, the concept of mind. The concept of mind matures, both in the sense

of its physical embodiment and in the sense of its logical functions or the functions of intelligence. And yes, for a mature mind, which is the mind of a species, namely the class of particulars, it can be more sensitive to these apironic fluxes. It can render them intelligible. But that requires for you to admit that there is a principle that allows me to become more sensitive to such apironic fluxes. and that principle is the logical idea of mind that mind is the only thing in the universe that

the structures how much can be said about what mind as logical principle is like it seems like there's like it like fundamentally like the damage like there's sort of analysis and synthesis it can separate and then it sort of rejoins things on a new plane but by a practice kind of like it is that it isn't like that that's we can continue to update our understanding of what that is like that the mileage

functions yes what the principle okay this is a really difficult question and I mentioned to you the philosopher Paul not work so this is exactly the subject in Apollo-Torpe's essay that is mind as a principle conditioned. For something to be conditioned means that it can be updated, right? If something is conditioned, you can make the case that it's being conditioned can be elevated, hence being updated and revised. But if something is unconditioned,

It cannot be updated because this is what it is. This is the conditioning condition for every other conditions. So Paul Latwerp's, I don't think that you can find this in Plato, really, to answer your question. Paul Latwerp says that this requires for us to distinguish between mind as the unconditioned principle, which means the logic, logical idea of mind, and mind as a logical function assigned to particular species.

That logical function can be updated precisely because a species participated in it. sorry, it pertains to the species. Whereas mind, as a logical principle, cannot be updated. This is what it is. Without this minimum basic criteria, to understand, to take mind as that which is structures, and hence render things intelligible, There is no way to be capable of in fact updating our representational system, our own logical

function, so on and so forth. So does that mean there's a further distinction to be made between the logical and embodied aspects of mind? Yes, yes. So there is this what you might call it and that's what this is this is what I mentioned concept and idea, begreif and idea. In Hegel these are two very very different but subtly different concepts. Idea is essentially as I mentioned is when logical idea like a computer program has completely created its own objects. So it's not embodied, okay?

It's just a logical function that has been completely determined. So you get this, and then you get the mixture of it, a mixture which this logical idea has been mixed or entangled with the physical embodiment of it, or physical realization, and that's where you get logical functions of mind. functions of mind are essentially embodied in particulars or in a species, and that's where you get the question of updating. So the logical function aspect of mind is the embodied aspect of mind? Yes. Yes. So it's the same distinction you were already talking about?

Yes, yes. But then how is the unconditioned principle aspect of mind known? Like it seems like that... It doesn't know anything. It's not knowledge. That's the whole thing. It's the absolute knowing in Hegelian sense. It is the unconditioned principle of every other principle to mix. How is it grasped by the philosopher? Is it like a... Like it seems like it's asking for like an intellectual intuition or like a sort of an apprehension. No, this is the whole idea that even at the level of minded creatures like us, we can talk about a logical idea because and that's that's

really leads to a very very interesting debate between the Okantians, Hegelians and Kantians, where no Kantians say that essentially this means to understand what logic is as differentiated from transcendental logic. Transcendental logic, what you might call to be the faculties of mind which are embodied, Whereas logic essentially requires mind's logical self-consciousness, operating on two different levels.

A philosopher only by way of logical introspection into the minimum criteria that are required for him to make any other claims about its embodiment, its own functions, its mindedness, its the world, so on and so forth. That basic minimum criteria is the core of logic. classical logic, but logic in the German idea of the sense, which essentially Neokantians think that this logic and ethics, and that's Paul Maturbson, Herman Cohen's idea, that logic and ethics are the same. This is essentially transcendental ideals, transcendental ideals.

There are regulative ideals. So mind as a principle is essentially a regulative ideal. A regulative ideal that we have speculatively posited precisely because we have seen by logical introspection that it undergirds every other claim that we make about ourselves, our embodiment and about the universe as such. And what we're positing is basically, when we posit that, is basically the analogy of the divided line? Yes. And this is, for Hegel, it's essentially a speculation.

Not in the speculative realist sense, a speculation. And a speculation is not reflection, for Hegel. Intersection is a sublation or suspension of reflection. So reflection, what you might call to be rudimentary introspection, that I use my representational capabilities to look into what I do and what I say and how I think. is different. Speculation tries to suspend the psychologistic residues of representation. In fact, the entire organ of representation in favor of the logical or the laws from which

such representations are possible. It's really important if you want to look into this, check the difference between a speculation and reflection in Hegel, with a speculation is on the side of logic and representation being on the side of Kant's transcendental logic, namely representational faculties. What essay is that? You can, I think, well, Science of Logic, but also, is it Faith and Reason? is one of his earlier works. By Natorp?

No, by Hegel. By Hegel. The Natorp essay hasn't been translated, unfortunately. What I was going to make an addition here, what you just said, that's .. Oh yes, I was going to say that it's really important. This ultimately comes down to a very momentous distinction between Hegel and Kant. And so far as Hegel tries to salvage reason on the side of logical, greater logic, rather

than as simply a representational faculty, this leads to a very famous distinction between the Hegelian account of reason and Kant's account of reason. So Kant's account of reason is essentially a faculty, is a representational faculty. which means that it is within the scope of transcendental logic, functions of mind as entangled with physical embodiment and the sensible. Whereas for Hegel, the idea of reason, particularly positive reason, which is the speculative reason, as opposed to dialectical or negative reason, reason. Reason is no longer a faculty for Hegel. Reason is a form of thought that admits

the identity of opposites. And this very distinction is precisely what Hegel uses to show that The so-called antinomies in Kant, which have been arising because of the conflict between rational conclusions and experiential conclusions. For example, the question of time, that if, for example, world has a beginning. Kant shows that the question of world has a beginning leads to antinomies, leads to conflict because of this clash between reason and understanding.

But Hegel, by getting rid of the idea of reason as a faculty and reinventing reason on the level of logic proper or greater logic as a form of thought that admits the identity of opposite, it shows that those kinds of questions, like the world has a beginning or not, that have been posed by way of reason as a faculty, are essentially ill-posed questions. insofar as they try to restrict the speculative scope of reason to the experiential structure

of understanding. And that's, there is a fantastic essay, if you can get it somewhere, otherwise you can email me and I can send it to you by... Sorry. It's called To Suspend Finitude Itself, Hegel's Reaction to Kant's First Antinomy, by Reid,

so his last name is W-I-N-E-G-A-R. And it really goes deep into this idea of how he, Hegelian idea of reason, which is on the side of the greater logic and no longer as a representational faculty, shows that the questions made about infinity, like the world, like the universe, like even the scope of the mind, by reason as a representational faculty are essentially ill-posed questions and lead to antennas.

Both Plato and Hegel tried to show that mind as a principle, as a logical principle, is essentially on the side of infinity rather than the finitude of mind as a faculty as an embodied faculty the mind as a finite faculty every time they tries to pose a question about the infinitude of mind as principle or infinitude of the universe, it falls into

contradictions. It annihilates itself. So like there's no antinomy that reason can't in principle overcome? No, no, no, yes, absolutely. Reason, but not reason as a faculty though, reason as a form of thought, as a logical form of thought or logic, greater logic that admits the identity of opposites. both for Hegel and Kant is a form of thought that does not admit the identity of opposites.

Reason in Kant is essentially an extension of understanding, namely experiential representational undergirding. And precisely because of that, the Kantian reason, which is reason as a faculty, also does not admit the identity of opposites. It cannot think on the side of logic. It can only think in terms of the psychologistic residues of representation.

I have another question on this topic, but I can't quite formulate it. More questions. I have a question. Okay. I guess I ... Well ... Go on. I have ... Oh. Any of you. Doesn't matter. I just wanted to squeeze in a question about the syllabus. Just what seems to me like a contradiction in bringing the idea of order, harmony, and nature into desire and how at the same time pleasure and pain is relative to the memory

of it. But at the same time, Plato makes the argument, I mean, Socrates makes the argument that the attainment of harmony, the movement towards the attainment of harmony is pleasure and moving away from it is pain. So desire is always like oriented towards harmony and that is a grounding, harmony is a grounding of what's supposed to be a relativism. yes uh well i mean okay um the thing about is that when so socrates starts to talk about this but when you get to the end of philipus he had already changed this uh idea the idea and davidson

talks about this in, let me, it's around, it's okay, if you want to read it, it's called Three Criteria of the Good, it starts from page 136. And the idea is that later on in Philippus, so basically he has introduced already that good has some qualifiers in terms of desire, and desire as you say, by itself leads to some sort of relativism. But then, Socrates gives up this idea later in Philippus, and he distinguishes between

two different kinds of desire. It's a yearning for the good itself and yearning for the intrinsic good as its object. Yearning for the intrinsic good by itself is not sufficient for the good of man. That's really I think a very interesting thing, that yearning for knowledge by itself, if it does not have yearning for the good, namely the principle, that allows us to mix knowledge with other pleasures, is not good and it leads to relativism. And Davidson actually

brings this idea of relativism that he shows that Socrates introduced the idea of the good by the idea of being hunted or being yearned or being desired, which is the harmony stuff, the idea of completeness and the idea of sufficiency. He shows that none of these qualifiers can define the principle, namely the good itself. And that requires a different kind of desire, different kind of yearning. And that's the yearning of the mind for itself. Sorry, this is like the four manias that Desjardins kind of talks about a little bit towards the end of her texts, the four different manias?

Yes, yes. So the yearning for the good is Plato's long con, as you said. Yes, yearning for the good is the long con. And you see, the whole idea is that Plato, it's not that, OK, we need to make this very clear that yearning, Okay, so let's just say that we have some knowledge, we have some also some pleasures that have potential to be rendered intelligible and become part of the mix, okay?

Plato says that even this idea, that you have some limits plus some unlimited that can in fact be part of the mix is not necessary and is not sufficient, either necessary nor sufficient for the good of man. Because all, because you can in fact have a relation between, for example I'm trying to know more but also I'm trying to know more and also have in conjunction have some pleasure that is mixed with it. He says that this is not really by itself mean that I will be happy, I will be basically

participating in the form of form or the idea of good. Precisely because there can be a bad relation, a bad relation, by bad relation he means that unlimited relation, a bad relation, an indeterminate relation between this knowledge and displeasure. What Plato really is interested in is the good relation. What is a good relation? It is a measured or limiting or determinate relation between functions of mind or functions of intelligence and pleasures. The only thing that can provide such a measure, such a process of determination, is the principle

itself, good as a principle, good as that which limits. And you see kind of in the second critique where there is a feeling that motivates that and it's the respect for the law, right? Yes, you see, this is a point that Natorp also brings in his essay, that he essentially introduces good as a principle, good itself, as the law. You see, Natorb is a Neocantian, he has seen the rise of Hegelians and the old camp of

Kantians. What is exactly a law for Plato or for Neocantians? A law is a law of thought. A law of thought cannot be contaminated by the psychologistic or representational residues of the mind, namely mind as belonging to the particulars. So there is a really good discussion about this, that what is exactly the relation between law and the good in a platonic sense in Not Warp's essay. You can get actually quite a very nice elaboration of some of these problems in Cohen and Natour

in a book called Hermann Cohen's Critical Idealism, edited by Reiner Munk, M-U-N-K. where exactly they talk about this that law is the good but but this requires to understand what law is law cannot be attached or be subordinated to the laws or to the rules that pertain to the functions of an embodied mind embodied mind being the mind of a species or a

particular class because then that requires you to subordinate the idea or the form of forms the form of the good simply to the particulars that participate in it. In fact, both Plato, Naturp and Cohen and even Hegel try to show that if you don't have this law, this principle, as the good, you can't have any other kinds of representation. Any other kind of representation simply becomes pure psychology. And that leads to a massive critique of Kant by the people like Frigge and all the logical school of thought, that

Kant's transcendence of psychology is essentially a candy-wrapped psychologism, nothing more. Which, of course, I think is a very harsh statement, but I think it needs to be taken very seriously. So it almost seems like the Ticoma has this very, the embodied mixed Ticoma has this very rather material aspect to it that's definitely markedly different from the logical function or the logical function of ideas.

I actually kind of think that dicoma are the logical functions of mind, are categories. So categories, I mentioned that in the later Doctrine of Forms, you get, so those forms, which are what you might call to be the categorical forms, where it allow you to talk about, for example the form of dog, the form of a tree, they are understood as categories now. And they are essentially functions of mind and hence tied to the function of language and local. Whereas forms now are principles, are laws. Laws that in fact govern how categories

can be applied, how categories function. And this law is like removed. So the only invariance of law... It's not anymore an invariance, it's a principle. It's a principle. Invariance we can talk about it when we talk about objects or sensible objects which we try to categorize it. classified, name it, okay? Hence we require some sort of determination. So it's indeterminate. It's indeterminate. Yes, and this invariance allows for this process of determination, process of stabilization

of the flux of apiron, namely stuff or material out there. But the principle is no longer invariance. is the governing law. That is the logical idea behind all of these invariances. The logical idea behind these invariances. But it is removed. It is removed from them. Not removed in the sense that it is removed from them. Categories participate in it, but yes, it is not simply these invariances, it is not simply these categories anymore.

And this law is not intelligible because it is... It is intelligible, it is intelligible. It's precisely because it's logical. But it's purely logical. That's the whole point. It's purely logical. But doesn't that mean that it's not intelligible because the mixture of... like you can't find intelligibility without a mixture. Yes, but that becomes, you see that becomes again the whole idea of Plato, that Plato shows that the good is something that is not an object, but can only achieved by mixtures. And mixtures, understand that mixtures, as

we talked about this, mixtures become better mixtures. So the whole idea is that this principles becomes more and more intelligible and that becomes a whole idea of the long con We talked about it that precisely because in so far as this principle is there all we need to do is to function according to this principle and to two mixtures of course and These make constructing or crafting better mixtures which are life of our minds allow us to gain better traction on what the good is what the good is is at the same time the drive and the objective which but is it it seems to me as like

an infinite process it is an infinite process yes and Plato quite as explicit about this absolutely in process precisely because Plato insists that anytime that we think that we have arrived at something that can be said to be the totality of the good not the good way to doesn't want to say that as well as we have arrived at the good we are deluded no Plato wants to say that participating in this principle creates happiness for us precisely because that's how we function what Plato also at the same time wants to say that as soon as we think that we have arrived at the totality totality that the emphasis here on totality and the totality of

the idea of the good that's where we are deluded that's where basically pathologies arise that's sort of like despotism for Kant? Yes. Yeah. And, you know, there are really good ideas to be talked about here in terms of that Plato is essentially a metaphysician. And Kant is not a metaphysician. Kant attacks metaphysics. He wants to wage an all-destroying critical crusade against metaphysics. But as Hegel has shown, any person who thinks that he has got rid of metaphysics is going

to end up with a stockpile of the most dogmatic, implicit, and hidden forms of metaphysical assumptions. The aim is not to get rid of metaphysics, but to try to make a robust metaphysics. A robust metaphysics in a three sense at least. Robust in the sense that characteristics of reality, whatever you interpret reality, whether Hegelian, Platonic or Kantian, should not be simply the extension of characteristics of our understanding or experience. Not reason, understanding or experience, two different things.

Two, robust in the sense that metaphysics should not begin with positing an unrestricted reality but an unrestricted account of mind simply begins with the dimension of a structuration, which is the function of, which is the logical idea of mind, the dimension of conceptualization. Third, which is connected to these two, such a metaphysics should be always open to objective assessment, namely theoretical, systematic theoretical appraisal. And that's essentially, metaphysics is the first theory in fact from this perspective,

first theory. And that of course requires for us to understand what theory is. Theory is really the idea of mind. People throw this idea of theory into theoretical all the time to the point that it becomes a vacuous qualifier. No theory has actually a minimal description. If you want to logically talk about this theory, theory is a triple, a tuple, comprised of three elements, L, S, and U. L being language and logoi, namely reasoning powers of mind,

S is the question of a structure which is associated to the mind, that only theory or theoretical claims made by a minded community of mind creatures can talk about the structure of mind. And U is the universe of discourse, namely datum or comprehensive datum under consideration. This datum is not sense datum, neither in Plato nor in Hegel nor even in Kant. What's comprehensive datum provided by L, namely language and local. And theory is essentially functions in the ambit of these three elements, insofar as a structure is the logical function of mind.

L are the reasoning powers of mind, and U is the data that can only be achieved by way of the reasoning powers of mind, theory essentially is the extension of mind. And the reason that theory is defined in this sense is that what is exactly theory? What kind of claims theory makes? The kind of claims that theory makes is it says that it is the case that X is such and such. about the universe or about the spiritual beings, like geistic things.

From this perspective, even all the practices are subsets of theoretical claims. It is the case that, because it is the case that is really the idea of intelligibility. If there is no intelligibility, there is no way, theoretical intelligibility, there is no way that we can make the practical intelligibility we can talk about practice so theory is the first principle as an extension of modernity the LSU thing kind of reminds me of the holy trinity of computation yes where

Where does philosophy and computer science begin? Oops, sorry, Rezae accidentally muted you. I think you have to unmute yourself. Can you hear me? In Plato, in the account of Platonic Logoi, so you get language, mathematics and logic. Mathematics and logic are the third, were the third segments.

Now theory doesn't require by itself, doesn't require the logic and mathematics. only requires language for language I do not mean national language but theoretical language in the sense that it needs to have some minimal formal coherency and some semantic transparency so you know to answer your question we can say that only systematic theory require language logic and mathematics In addition to logic and mathematics, we can add one more logos, Platonic logos, computation,

completely interpreted in the Holy Trinity of computation, to show that computation is not only an infrastructure of language, but also it has fundamental connections with logic and mathematics. Hence, language, logic, and mathematics are essentially part of the Logoi. Now, to question that where does computer science starts? Well, the aim of, you see, what distinguishes philosophy from all specialized branches made by these Logoi, mathematics, logics, and computation is the kind of universe of discourse that they cover. The universe of discourse that they cover. Namely, the comprehensive data.

The class of data that is covered by philosophy not only is unrestricted, but also is a different class of datum. It's what is called truth candidates, non-givings. Whereas all other branches of logos or analytical idealities, including computation, they require the givens, namely formal axiomatic data. Lawrence Ponteau makes this distinction very clear that inside systematic philosophy,

we can have computer science, mathematics, and logic. and specialized domains with the understanding that they are completely autonomous on their own and philosophy needs to respect their autonomy without assimilating it but that doesn't mean that systematic philosophy is subordinated to either of these domains precisely because first First, its comprehensive datum, universe of discourse, is unrestricted in contrast to these domains. Because in computation, we simply, our universe of discourse is simply what you might call to be things that pertain to computation.

Numbers, axioms, types and programs. In logic we can say proofs and logical behaviors and connectives. In mathematics you say all numbers. Philosophy would say that the unrestricted universe of discourse means that it is not just these domains, but all of these domains together. So that's what the English and systematic philosophy wants to wait. Simply through the universe of discourse. so you would want to avoid reifying mind as computation basically or like that philosophy has is crowned by a kind of method of transcendental empiricism slash dialectics

or transcendental idealism or transcendental idealism. Yes, yes. Like the coexistence of opposites to reason and the kind of like abducted creation of context or such like that. Yes, yes. Or is that what you're saying? well it's not that the job like computer science is still just one one motive one one universe discourse kind of underneath well softball speculation No, no, no, there is no universal discourse.

First of all, you need to know that the idea of universal discourse, you know, is a very technical term, even though it's, you know, like theory, used quite often, but it has actually a very quite technical definition. Universal discourse is actually a term first originates by Augustus de Morgan, the same de Morgan, you know, logician, and he refers to something, a phrase called universe of proposition, which he means that the whole of some definite category which is under discussion.

It does not mean the totality of all conceivable objects that are under discussion, because usually when this buzzword is thrown around in philosophy, they mean the totality of all conceivable datum that are under discussion. No. The conclusion of this is that there is no such a thing as a fundamental universe of datum or universe of discourse. The unrestricted universe of discourse is is the synthetic integration of all particular universe of discourses, namely the whole of

definite categories which can be discussed. Now this whole talk about like the platonic loop, I think that's what you referred to earlier, like going from the intelligible in that loop as um in this talk of theory it reminds me of the way that blanchot describes critique as um something that the more that it exerts and develops and establishes itself the more it obliterates itself which work is this um it's it's an essay that he wrote on the purpose of criticism okay okay it's fun yeah Yeah, this is a fantastic, I think, description, yes.

And in Hegel you get the same kind of thing, you know, what he means by critique, it's very different from idea of Kantian critique, in the sense that reason annihilates understanding. And it creates a new domain, a new universe of discourse, or an unrestricted universe, in which understanding can gain a new foot. And then again, the idea begins, a loop, reason again annihilates understanding. It opens a new foothold for understanding, and then it goes further and further to the point of the absolute knowing.

Yeah, this is precisely because you see this loop between intelligence and intelligibility ultimately comes down to a metaphysical assumption really about the nature of how intelligibility and intelligence are related. Sure, we can only attain or achieve the intelligible by way of intelligence, by way of the principles under which it functions. But it requires a metaphysical assumption, and only retroactively posited by intelligence

itself that the scope of intelligibility always exceeds that of intelligence. In order for intelligence to move, to expand its scopes, it requires to annihilate itself according to the order of the intelligible. But it can only annihilate itself by taking its own principles seriously. You get this again in Hegel, as I mentioned, the transcendental, this is really the whole idea of this annihilation and retaining annihilation, preservation of annihilation, but at the same

time elevation is really the meaning of suspension, oak haven, sublation, determinate negation, as a labor. That, what is exactly a function of suspension? The function of suspension tries to show that what you took as immediate is mediated. And what is mediated can be elevated. to an essential rather than accidental immediacy.

I just want to give a time check. We're at about 10 to 1, so we're a little bit over what you said you could do Reza but I I can yeah I can yes let me let me just at least to answer let's go over one of your questions before I go so can I read them I'm sure that'd be great well you can read them if you want to go ahead and read them I've I've edited them sense and I don't think I have the or actually let me pull up the email okay okay because I have it is it but I don't know I have the whole thing I have to what typically characterize the

representational epistemology you go on describe it really quick okay yeah so I said what typically characterizes representational epistemology from non-representational epistemology is the subservience of thought to being. Thought's relationship to being must be one of accurate correlation, morality. Thought must apprehend being and truth, knowledge. Thought enjoys its proper relationship to being beauty. In some ways it is much easier to be a realist with this notion of representational

epistemology. The realist sees reality as something immutable, something that is, regardless of how one thinks of it. Something is objective if it is indifferent to how one thinks of it. There is a realm exterior to thought which dictates the possibility of making truth slash falsity statements. You can of course begin to see the kernel of theology and of state worship in this version of realism. Thought is subservient to being, or thought is subservient to God. This is the Parmenides in Trap, which confines the possibilities of thought to the scope of being, a truly puzzling problem. A non-representational stance on thought holds the relationship of the subject and object

is much different than subservience. Instead, thought's relationship to being is not one of docility, but of overcoming. Thought does not lack the truth of reality. Thought generates reality for itself. Whereas the naive realist admits the outside, or the real, commands what is possible on the inside thought, the idealist commits to the power of the inside thought to create the outside, the real, for itself. Thought is not merely a passive receptor upon which the truth of being is engraved. Thought takes part in the production of reality. However, neither the naive realist nor the idealist can be wholly extracted from one another.

They form a strictly external relationship, each affirming the existence of the other in a circuit of becoming. The power of thought produces the conditions of its own being. What are the consequences of this? If reality as a management system of being for thought is a simulation, what are the conditions by which this simulation is made? If the conditions for thought's generative simulation are in any way exterior to thought itself, then we've run into the Parmenidean trap once again. If thought is generative of truth, irrespective of the real, for the real which is made in and through thought, what significant difference is there between the philosopher and the sophist?

Isn't the sophist the one who peddles his techniques without regard for truth? Perhaps this is the question of what intelligence might mean within this cosmology. how do certain simulations come to be selected over others how do other simulations come to be processed out and i i just end it with uh to be frank i'm not quite sure how to talk about processing out certain beings or simulations uh we appear to be entering a very strange version of surrealism where it by itself is alienated from its generated worlds Okay, I would say that both of these visions are actually naive idealisms and naive realisms.

Essentially, and I don't think that either Plato, Kant or Hegel fall in this, yeah, might be at some point, but they don't in their entirety, they don't fall in either of these camps. So we mentioned this whole idea that essentially, so there are two things. One is that representation is constrained by reality, even in realist sense, even for

naive realist sense. But constraining doesn't mean being constituted by reality. For something to be constrained is not the same as to be constituted or being instituted. And the same thing about an idealist. the description of being, being constrained or being defined by universe of discourse within the domain of thinking is not the same as reality being constituted or created by thought. So this is really, I think, it's the whole idea of the

coextensivity of constraints. What kind of constraints reality make upon thinking? These are sensible constraints, sensible constraints, which can be explained either by way of processes or by way of causal interactions, okay? And what kind of constraints thought puts on the description of reality, without which we cannot really talk about reality? That's the constraint of the structure, namely systematic relationship between how things

including our sensations, stand to one another. These relationships are not given by themselves at the level of causal interaction. These are essentially a matter of representation, and representation is a matter of categorical thinking, because categorical structures are are not existing at the level of the universe. We don't know whether they do or not. But we can simply, because there are causal interactions at the level of our sensibility that can register them, we can say that these sensorial mechanisms or sensations by themselves

impinge these categorical structures on our blank slate mind. That doesn't make sense. So you see, essentially we are working within two sets of constraints, two classes of constraints. Their natures are different, and one cannot operate without the other. It maintains coextensivity of these two kinds of constraints, with the understanding that the constraints that belong to reality or being are essentially causal or processual constraints. The constraints imposed by the other are constraints of a structuration, categorical

Categorial Structuration. Now why do we need these constraints? Categorial Structuration without causal constraints doesn't gain traction on the reality of the being, that which is. As you say, it becomes again a sophist, a dogmatic rationalist. A dogmatic rationalist is a sophist in a Platonic sense. But causal constraints, why it needs a structural, categorical structural constraint?

Precisely because causal constraints are things that happen to us. But things happening to us doesn't mean that they happen for us at the level of mindedness, at the level of intelligibility. Happening to us is different from happening for us. If we say that we know precisely because we have these things happen to us that we know what they are, we have already aligned the distinction between happening to us and happening for us, namely takings, takings or judgments. So these two, I think, in order to really solve this problem, we need to understand

these two classes of constraints. And why is that they are important to have one with the other, with the understanding that their class is completely distinct. But, nevertheless, there is a complex interplay between these two. And this complex interplay essentially demands you to forego with any form of naive idealism or any form of naive realism, hence the idea of a transcendental term. And transcendental term, if not essentially Kantian, but simply the idea of the transcendental

term, if we take it seriously, then that's when we need to focus on what is exactly the complex interplay between these two sets of different constraints. But as you say, I think either of these two camps lead to their own pathologies. But I genuinely don't think that either Plato, Kant or Hegel, yes, parts of them, yes, but not in the totality of their systems, fall in either of these two naive camps. In fact, they want to talk about this complex interplay. Plato is really the whole idea of timelessness of ideas, the thought, generic thoughts, concepts,

or categories or forms, and sensibilities, the fleeting, and the whole divided line and how they need to be integrated in fact. Because otherwise there is no intelligibility. For Kant, it's the idea of manifold of intuition and imagination and understanding. For Hegel, it's a different kind of problem. He identifies it as a problem of the interplay between the reason and understanding, with understanding being on the side of experience and experiential data.

Hegel, I think, is a more extreme case of both Plato and Kant, precisely because Hegel doesn't really believe that we can talk, in fact, about causal constraint at the level of sensibility. We can only talk about them at the level of understanding. With understanding being on the side of the experiencing subject and reason being on the side of the suspension of the transcendental subject of experience. yeah I had I after I wrote you that email I started going more in depth into the first

critique and yeah like the even the formulation of that question doesn't really apply in any way to Kant and it's no no no no neither Plato nor nor Hegel I think you see idealist philosophers if you are a sophisticated idealism absolutely you are also sophisticated realism but usually the other case is not the same because really the whole idea starts from the mind a mind that retroactively sees itself as constrained by reality because otherwise that is a pure realism always becomes a naive realism in the sense that it mistakes what happens to us at the level of

causal interactions what we take ourselves is happening to be if in fact anything cognitive science shows us today that these are completely fundamentally different things just because something is happening it to me doesn't mean that I have any kind of introspective power over it. That's just bad empiricism. But again, as I mentioned, really I think

The whole point is to understand that these constraints are two different classes, are different, they're distinct, and they are interdependent. And this interdependence is something that we have only retroactively come across, which is then is a historical question. And then, focusing on the complex interpolate between these two, what are exactly the gradient, the hierarchy, the multi-level complexity that bridges these constraints to one another in the correct way? And I guess also that we don't yet know the whole story about the relationship between

no that's that's something that's projected into the future in principle possible to know and master but but we don't know yet true true and it motivates the whole sort of demagogic process. Yes, I mentioned Daniel, that's that reason's maturation coincides with the retroactive power of its knowing, of how it has been realized thus and so. by retroactively seeing some hints of how reason has this power of knowing that we can

basically anticipate that reason is going to be even more matured. So they come together, yes, and this is not something that we have, we have a full knowledge of it. But nevertheless that also comes to this idea that there is a logical connection here and that logical connection is important. Even if it hasn't happened, precisely because we see now after the maturation of reason, that maturation of reason, by maturation of reason I mean reason no longer sees itself simply as a furnisher of the world or simply

as the creator of the world in its entirety. This maturity allows us to come up with a logical idea of how these things works and how things might unfold. And that's really, I think, there is a reason that Hegel ends phenomenology of mind, phenomenology of minds and where he ends phenomenology of mind is exactly where the science of logic begins science of logic is the sequel to the phenomenology of mind

okay do you think I mean I'm not sure where Hegel lies in relation to Jacoby but does he sort of have the same belief that without the presupposition of the thing in itself I was unable to enter cons system but with it I was unable to stay within it yes I mean hey yeah but you Hagel is no friends of Jack will be Jack will be no one is really friends of Jack Jack Jack will be first of all is identified both by Hagel and Canada

an irrationalist. But yes, I think Hegel might say that a thing in itself is like this kind of nebulous door, that if you can't find it you can't enter it, but you can never find it. Finley actually has written a fantastic critique of this. What's that? Hermeneutic of the Transcendental Object? I have forgotten the title. I have a physical copy of it. Hermeneutic of the Transcendental Object? Yes. Hermeneutic of Transcendental.

I forgot it's called cans and transcendental yes yeah well yeah thank you for your response thanks everyone hopefully we'll see each other sometime soon and it was a pleasure to talk to all of you yeah thank you for the extra couple days again. Absolutely. Thank you Reza. You know, I am planning on joining the CANT class. So when are you starting and what should be some secondary texts I should pick up to read? Sure. I need one more week to decide when it starts because I'm still trying to finish

this cursive book. So as soon as I get the dates, I will give it to Mo. But in terms of secondary text, so Kant's, is it Cambridge edition? A critic of pure reason with a blue cover? Yeah. Yeah. Okay, that's for the primary text. And the secondary text, I would suggest Sebastian Rodel, Self-consciousness. I suggest Kant's, sorry, Seller's lectures are pre-Kantian themes. And then the rest are mostly essays and stuff.

But these are, you know, quite very systematic. Okay. All right. Thank you. Absolutely. Have you read Henry Allison's book at all? A Defense of Transcendental Idealism? Yes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I checked it but I haven't read it. There is another one by another female writer. I can't remember. Well, I will send it to you. But yes, I only escaped through it. Okay. Rosenberg, if you can find Rosenberg, is also fantastic. Rosenberg was a student of Sellars and he also wrote some really great book on Kant. But I think the reason that

I did suggest Rosenberg because precisely because he's a student of Szilard's most of his digressions and disquisitions and intent coming from the Szilardian side. There's also a small book that covers the critique of pure reason by a Danish writer, heart neck can't remember what the books called but it shouldn't be difficult to find it's like a 120 page synopsis okay that would be good another book that if you want to read it which I just mentioned to Theodore is the John

Finley's book but that's unfortunately out of print and there was no I maybe there is a PDF I don't know I don't think it was a PDF and it was like a deja vu or something. Okay, okay, okay, okay. It's called Kant and the transcendental object. Cool. You know I have a copy of that on my computer. All right, thanks everyone. If anyone's interested in being in sort of an email thread for the class before it starts, maybe we can start that and share readings and stuff. Yeah, I'd be down and been slowly but surely beginning to read the critique of pure reason. Yeah, for some reason I thought I would be able to get… Have fun.

Yeah. All right. One of the things that also you need to be very careful with Kant is this whole idea of first edition, second edition, third edition, you know. These are actually quite vastly different, the arguments in these editions, particularly threefold synthesis which is central to Kant's transcendental argument and one of the reasons that it tread carefully because this is going to be most probably replaced in the second edition and that's why I mentioned Findlay because Findlay how he reads it is that he always when he says something about you know the early first edition this is that okay this is exactly how Kant

formulates in the third edition and then we will come back to the third edition and show why can't thought that for example this is a pre-critical thinking i know um heidegger makes this um huge thing about i forget if it's the introduction or the preface but that he basically took away the fact of the transcendental imagination as not being in critique of pure reason being subordinated to the understanding. You couldn't take this in a sort of the Elysian direction with the third

critique being the free play of the faculties but I actually think it kind of opens up emphasizing like the fact that Kant didn't utilize the transcendental imagination in a certain way, that he basically leaves out the rather synthetic and kind of a posteriori part of the transcendental imagination in furnishing new synthesis well can't actually talk a lot about

productive imagination for can't really do kind of imagination is extremely important and it's essentially has also a mysterious function it turns as this very very cryptic paragraph about it is productive imagination he's so cryptic about it that Finley talks about a flagrant as a terror something like that but but really productive imagination I think is one is strongest of can't thesis and really once you understand what productive imagination is I think Productive imagination is what you might call to be an unfettered understanding.

It's even better than understanding. We'll get all to all of this. Don't worry. All right. Thanks a lot. I think you see where you're going with that though. You should wait. There's a sequel to be made. Sequel. All right. All right, I'm going to end the broadcast. Thanks, everyone. Thanks, everyone. All right. Bye.