The Vicious Transparency of Time (Session 3)

Hello and welcome to the third session of the seminar, The Vicious Transparency of Time, instructed by Reza Nigaristani. Reza, please take it away. Reza Nigaristani Thank you, everyone. Hello. So, as I said, this session I will try to finish some of this stuff. But most importantly, I want to, you know, kind of start kind of getting into kind of a more detailed picture of the issues by way of constitution and the topic for this session.

I generally didn't think that, you know, that there is a proper source of text for this session, where we are going to talk about time as the original moment of constitution, as the ultimate moment of constitution, and actually talk a little bit about what constitution is, specifically you know the sort of picture or a schemat schematos or schematics that we require in order to coherently talk about

subjective time and objective time uh and uh moving toward that sort of toposalian uh scenario where um you know the the objective time has has as its ground subjective time precisely because subjective time um when we are talking about subjective we are actually not talking about it in terms of kantian sort of subjectivity um and that you know kind of uh requires a little bit of a you know detailing uh to kind of give a picture of you know um why is that the objective time

has as has as its ground uh subjective time and what would be ultimately the implications of this you know um um as we see uh you know later uh in you know kind of like uh ending sessions uh it has fundamental uh i would say consequences for science um for thinking about the world um and um you know, the issues that I somehow discussed in the previous seminar on Freud about the idea of

angst, you know, egos, angst, repression, so to speak. time consciousness has a fundamental unconscious you know side to it so with that said let's I did watch you know both presentation thank you so much everyone I think that's maybe if we open it up to questions, if someone, anyone has questions for those presentations. And then maybe through these sorts of questions and conversations around the presentation,

I can build up, you know, the momentum for today's topic. Okay, I see a question. Maria? I have a terrible question. Aren't traces of time present in all partitions of the diagram? because when I thought about it I saw syntax, self-affection, categories which have traces of time according to crowds and appearances which might have traces of time. The only thing that doesn't have them is object because we don't know what it means. Is it true? Yes, yes.

Yes and no, in the sense that, you know, the traces of time in the esquemat in the transcendental hylomorphism diagram are essentially traces of time within the structure of consciousness and self-consciousness, right? So obviously it doesn't talk about time with regard to the object, but rather time as, you know, a kind of armature for the constitution of object and also objective claim about objects, right?

that doesn't tell us that much about the traces of time in object, really. Right. But the thing is that that would be, I would say, a very distinct Kantian sort of scenario or picture where there is no time in object. First of all, we have to say what is actually object here, right? Do we mean object as an integration of appearances,

the sort of integration for which we can have veridical claims, right? Or are we talking about something more realist, right, about objects, right, as something that is like transcendent to the structure of consciousness, meaning that it has features which exceed consciousness. They are not of the conscious structure. They are not of the mind, of laws of mind, right? I would say that, Hosea would say that, yes, in that sense, even transcendent object has traces of time. But these, as I mentioned, these traces of time with regard to the object are grounded in subjective time.

And essentially within, that is the confusing aspect, that within what you might call to be the subjective time, you know, the inner time, there are traces of time carried within the primary elements of consciousness, sensations. But these are very primitive, sort of what you might call to be, they don't have any object status, right? but there are nevertheless imminent objects of consciousness.

So that is really interesting that this required to coherently talk about this issue of whether that an object has traces of time or not. We have to distinguish between imminent objects of consciousness and transcendent objects of consciousness. Transcendent objects of consciousness are usually what you might call to be any sort of object in itself. Right? In a kind of a realistic sort of sense. And ultimately, as I said, the traces of time that we are talking about, for example, the idea of perdurance or endurance, duration, right?

of object in time is grounded in those eminent objects of time consciousness. Think about this. This is quite a very strange puzzling sort of stuff, right? Right. So when we are thinking about, so Kant also has that sort of a story where time has, you know, takes a form of intuition, a formal condition of intuition, particularly inner sense. Is it really, so

one. How much time is it really in time as a form of intuition? I mean does it have a temporal extension? Right? How much time does it have? Or is it just a it's just a form? Right? I don't think Kant really answers this question fully. That if we are going to think about Kant's idea of time as a formal condition, it appears that it doesn't actually have any time in it,

meaning that it doesn't have temporal extension. It's just a form, right? attributed to dozens of, you know, streams of sensations that give them the form of time, really. But the form of time doesn't have time in it, in a sense. And that, to Hoselle, is kind of a very strange sort of claim. how can it be then where the hell is coming this form of you know time where is it coming from really you cannot just say that it is coming from the mind so but what is this origin mind right

and that's essentially what self wants to give a different account where at the same time you say that time doesn't have temporal extension, but also it has a certain sort of a structure, you know, that fuels what you might call to be the intuition of temporal extension. A good example of this, and this is, so the account starts with tweaking of the idea of sensations in Hosea.

You know, in Kant, it would be a kind of a sensualist account of sensations, which, as I said, sensation is merely appears to be a certain sort of passive, quite a very sort of passive receptive capacity, right? It's not a faculty, it's a capacity. And then it needs to be organized further. Hossel wants to say that no, that there is actually a certain sort of already organization within sensation, that sensibility is a passivity in activity or activity in passivity.

that it has a certain sort of activity that already organizes sensations into a stream. And think about this, that sensations in Hosselian sense, a good allegory for them, is the enigma of a fossil. Right? Why am I saying something like that? You see, a fossil is like a crypt in time. When you are looking at a fossil, you are not only getting the current object, encountering the object, right? But you see a distant past.

but also at the same time you have a certain sort of anticipation that this fossil is the anticipation of all the futures right a good exact allegory of this is in you know uh darwinian influence shorter story a short novella pair of blue eyes by thomas hardy When the protagonist at the moment of cliffhanger, when he's falling, he sees himself face to face with a dead trilobite, eyes turned into a stone.

And in that very specific moment of encounter, of sensation with this thing, with this impression, He sees distant past, mean times of the past, and mean times of the future. In the sense that every sensation, being part of a stream, and rather than being discreet, has with it just elapsed nows and imminent yet-to-come nows, just like a fossil. It has a retention and pretension and anticipation of the future.

And this makes sensation and ultimately perception, gives it a very duplicitous sort of face, that there is a fundamental duality in all perceptions. Think about this. I don't know how much of you are familiar with, you know, tradition of, you know, kind of like sci-fi of the 90s, particularly there is this book that always struck me. It's Robert Sawyer's Factoring Humanity, right and it's about a necker cube right a necker cube if you look at it right in this sort of way

you see it as this sort of cube protruded and if you see it in that sort of way you see it as you know a concave one right a convex one So sensations, streams of sensations, as what you might call units of perceptions, have that sort of fundamental duality about them, but in time rather than in the space, right? That there is something that is, when the encounter of now with the object has always fundamental traces of a past

and fundamental quasi traces or anticipated traces of the future. But not both, but in terms of perception, there are always kind of, it's either of them, even though it is given within the stream of sensation as both in the act of perception, perception is always going to be about just one of them. And just in Necker's cube or duck rabbit, Wittgenstein's interesting example, duck rabbit is not an example of wrong pattern recognition, right? That you confuse between a duck and rabbit.

It's just wants to tell a story constitutive of all perceptual takings as. That it is the very nature of perception to see X as, right? And by virtue of seeing thing as, it can only be either duck or a rabbit. A neck or cube can only be seen as one. And so the whole point of the science fiction that there is an alien civilization which see their encounter with the Necker cube is at the same time, the protruded version and the withdrawn version.

Precisely because their sensations, their stream, the consciousness built their stream of sensation works different from ours, right? They see both the duck and rabbit in one single perceptual judgment, right? And you can think about this, as I said, all of that, all of that sort of perspectivalism that is being ensued, you can think about it also in time, perspective is in time. Remember, just a cant, you know, the inner outer form gives us perspectivality in a space, right? And time gives us, as a form of intuition, gives us a certain sort of perspectivality in time.

Now, when we are saying perspectivalism, it is always going to be either or, right? But we should understand that this is according to Osserl, that within this moment of either or, there is an ambiguity, simply the Latin word ambi, meaning side by side. Future is side by side posited with the past in any sort of now encounters with an object through sensation. And hence, the idea of a fossil would be a better, you know,

metaphor for this sort of, you know, a stream, originally a stream of sensations. And that is a fundamental, that is what you might call to be the imminent object of consciousness the fossil of time which is given in the act of sensation right in the extreme of sensations thoughts and questions about presentations please someone

i think i wasn't clear in the email that the plan the whole organizational plan is to watch the presentations before the session it's like for everyone to watch them and then during the session we can discuss them so i don't know if if it was clear from my email no i think it was clear yes no i think people are just shy they don't want to you know put that dirty pause on other people's presentations so please ask questions if you don't have any i have one sure

i watched uh yeah i liked the presentation by mstislav very much and it was uh i think they both really great very informative but uh i noticed i just thought about one thing uh when i watched it that i sometimes i uh i take appearance and representation to be one thing so So I looked into the Kantian dictionary, what is appearance. It said that appearance is a kind of experience within the limits of human intuitions of space and time.

So my question actually from there, my main question is what experience are we talking about? or are we talking about for instance when you just said you just talked about senses about information that is given to us by senses did you mean sensory experience and if you Yes, absolutely. Sensations, yes.

Sensations. And, okay, is this experience then the same experience that we have in philosophy of science, in empiricism, when we have experience that validates our theories, our concepts, and this sort of experience, I think in philosophy of science, it is simply connected to the real things of this world. But in Kant, what sort of experience we have? Inner experience. Experience within the human... Yes, but he wants to actually talk about not just inner experience, experience itself.

Really empirical cognition. right? Empirical cognition, not empirical consciousness, empirical cognition, right? So obviously appearances are what you might call to be the material required for the constitution of representations, right? But these are materials. They are not really acts of representing and that's the whole point that the representing act needs to somehow at miraculously or not um to be able to carry and extend over

it's a specific representational content, right? A relevant class of appearances. So what you might call to be this is a triangulation problem. The how can representing acts be coordinated with their specific representational object or content? the representing acts are cognitive acts, right? Their content is made of, not is entirely is, is made of appearances, phenomenal appearances.

That's all, you know, once Kant wants to show that all experiences, by their very nature, by the virtue of, you know, having a representational act and representational content, are at once cognitive and confined in the ambit of phenomenal appearances. And then hence, you know, as I mentioned last session, the Amphiboli passages, it wants to say that, you know, create a certain sort of, you know, a skeptical problem that when

you want to go to the realm of the thing in itself, where can you actually say that no matter how much you have extended appearances beyond appearances, you are not actually still working in the realm of appearances, right? No matter what sort of explanandum that you explain sorry explainants that you find for these appearances in favor of what you might call to be a thing in itself can be very well still appear be appearances because that would be just experience right

Okay, but I think this makes everything even more complex, because, okay, we have representational acts. to make this representational acts we need appearances appearances are somehow then become a content of representations but but appearances are transcendental and they are also they are also a form because yes as i said there are you see i said that the rep the representational content is made of appearances.

Now, that already also implies that appearances are also organized. So it's not as if just they are stuff, right? They are not stuff. But rather stuff that are, again, organized, you know, by the transcendental structure of experience itself. But nevertheless, is that there are material precisely because they have a sensory content. Right. I was wondering if I could comment real quick. I just thought of maybe an example that might be helpful for this distinction, but although it's possible that I'm mistaken.

So maybe it'll be an interesting discussion anyway, but I was just thinking about something I read a long time ago about people who sustain certain kinds of traumatic head injuries and they get some kind of hemispheric damage. and you get instances where there's people who functionally are blind or cannot see or don't react to anything presented on like the left side of their field of vision for instance and even though there's no damage to their eyesight or like the sensory organs there's something else that's gone wrong that prevents them from registering information like in that area or something like that.

I was wondering if that would be an example of an instance where the distinction between representation and appearance is severed. Because you have someone who's getting the material sense data, but cognitively is not putting it together for some reason. Does that make any sense? No, there are still appearances, you see, but they are not the sort of appearances that what you might call to be ordered further, right? Organized further by certain sort of other faculties, right? It's just that appearances are not really sensations. They are made of sensory stuff, but they are organized. That's the most important thing, that appearances always need to be organized

in some sort of way. It's just that they don't have by themselves a veridical nature. So in the example I was discussing just now, not even appearance is really functioning for this person who sustained this injury. Is that what you're saying? No, I would say that he has all the appearances. It's just that he doesn't have extra, what you want to call the Buchanan faculties or abilities to to turn these appearances to something more right to a certain sort of veridical judgment right right or perceptual takings and i suppose another problem is that if you're trying to derive this from the subject the subject's own experience on its own terms

then you can't really say I mean this person is still getting something and still making judgments about something but it's only compared to like another subject what you might call to be that you might say that for example I mean think about also people who don't have you know their linguistic capacities have been fundamentally disturbed right right right uh you you can think about this that they are they're falling in the realm of subjective experience right subjective experience um all objective experience have that subjective aspects but they have something more precisely

something that gives them a certain sort of objectivity objectivity here doesn't mean it being true really but rather the idea that it can be adjudicated that it can be brought under a certain sort of critical take right that's you see when we are saying that perceptual takings always are vulnerable predisposed to adjudications, right? And not only locally, namely subjectively, but globally, meaning intersubjectively,

and hence modeled on linguistic behaviors. That makes sense. Thanks for clarifying. I was curious where that would go. Absolutely. Yes, Diego. Yes, I just want to bring the distinction between first appearances and appearances of appearances, as they are detailed in the in the opus posthumum. In that work, Kant says that an appearance is a sensation in form, we can say, by space, time, and the specific determination that provides the work of the categories from the understanding, right?

And that first level of perception is equal to what counts, sorry, that first level of appearances is equal to perceptions, meaning informed sensation. And then there are perceptions of perception that are the unifying complex of the manifold perceptions. And the appearances or the first sense of appearance are just like empirical, whereas the perception of the perceptions are not just empirical,

but also needs or requires some kind of ideal to structure and to unify the manifold perceptions that are given. The idea of naturally, there are two main ideas. The idea of God that unifies the experience or the experience realm of practice and the idea of world. They unify the experience world of theory or speculative philosophy.

So it's just to say that Kant plays with this kind of ambiguous classification or disambiguous term of experience because he's also thinking about experience or mere experience as perception and, sorry, appearances as mere perceptions and appearances of or the appearance of an appearance that is properly or that is experienced properly. That is the unifying. Yes, the perceptive aspect of perception. Yes, absolutely. I mean, this is one of the things, at least in the commentaries on Kant,

people are talking about this quite often. I mean, particularly, for example, Rosenberg, right? that, for example, he tends to not see appearances in that sort of sense as perceptions, but rather the intuiteds, meaning a kind of a lower form of a constitutive, lower constitutive moment of perception, right, the intuitive. And precisely because when we are talking about perception as you say, they are ultimately forms or essentially informed and guided by a perception, right?

There is no such a thing as a perception without a perception. So a perception holds quite strongly for perceptions precisely because perceptions are takings to be true. They have a certain sort of judging, right, quality about them. And hence, you see, the kind of, when you get into the kind of a cellars, the difference between taking of, right, seeing of a cube, and seeing thus and so configuration as a cube, right?

They want to say that, well, the latter one is an actual perception. The first one is an intuited and the intuiting, right? Hence, it doesn't have the full-blooded, right? It's not a full-fledged quality of a perception. At least for Kant, this is, I think, is true. With Otserlo, it is a completely different sort of a story.

Oh, this is, oh, the Szilard's one, I don't know which, oh, this is like a conversation between Yalshad and Lika. I think some of this stuff, I mean, what's that, in the Kant and Prykantian themes, the majority of that is there about particularly this sort of you know that that yeah I think it's the first yeah I think it's the first chapter of science and metaphysics variations on content themes yes

Yes, okay. Any, any, yes, but this love. Yes, I'd like to add to what have been previously said about the decision of the experience in Kant and philosophy of science. suppose that there are just different schematical categories in what we do understand as experience in philosophy of science according to scientific criteria and Kant's idea of pure reason and its idea of experience. So I suppose that basic difference is like this.

Yes. Yeah, I mean, we should understand that, as I mentioned, that Kant, when we are talking about experience, at least in the philosophy of science, we do actually mean experience in a very Kantian sense, but also experience as part of reason, right? As, you know, reason is really the most important thing. Whereas we should understand that for Kant, as I have always said, reason doesn't really play any sort of role.

It's actually a faculty. right? Reason is only understanding, and hence you can see that he doesn't want to talk about experience as that sort of, you know, kind of a more global sort of part of the rational process, right? But rather as a kind of a transcendental schema of understanding, right? And hence, and hence he wants to say you know the the canonical orthodox sort of uh thing the you know by what's right you know transcendental deduction that why is that experiences make claims and these claims have the quality of uh veridical objective judgments right

and where where essentially where the objectivity comes uh you know to to this picture and then but of course precisely because Kant uh doesn't want to see reason as anything other than faculty namely he always sees a reason through a lens of understanding his his account of experience fundamentally as hava would have criticized it remain the confine of understanding wait um in this context understanding is basically the capacity to form judgments am i correct in saying

that uh judgments uh yeah judgments of uh yeah of of certain forms right okay and i guess reason in a more general sense would i don't know i guess be more more inclusive or or uh reason is the groundwork of judgments right yeah and not merely judgments uh that have their objects empirical content uh but essentially all sorts of judgments right it's the logic of making a judgment, right?

And that's, you can see that reason properly understood in that sort of diagram, then you have to move away from really understanding to what you might call to be a global theory or picture of signification par excellence, right? And when we are talking about the theory of signification, hence we are not merely talking about reference to the object,

but really the sense first of all the constitution of sense in the free and sense to which uh you know we can ascribe a reference so reason is is really as i said is a kind of a groundwork is a certain sort of what you might called to be, it allows us to see the conditions under which we can in fact refer to an object, make a reference in signification. And of course, for Husserl,

This is when there is something fundamental, as I mentioned earlier, and I'm going to talk about this in later sessions. There is a certain sort of fundamental, what you might call to be assumption about time. With regard to how sense, in a free vegan sense, operates. As I mentioned, you see, like informal logic or informal language, you can manipulate senses. You can have different senses. You can apply them, right?

Or, you know, you can manipulate play also with your syntax. of course this play is not unconstrained but nevertheless there is an element of what you know katarina dutrino weiss is an element of presupposition that forms form on uh you know resources of language uh have this capacity to be de-semantified such that they can be re-semanified such that these signs or symbols or forms can be applied to a different content context right and content so that's for sale that presupposition that in fact you can um you know

play with sense for which you can find a reference has a fundamental assumptions about time. Right? What is this fundamental assumption? The fundamental assumption that the play with senses always is being constrained by a presupposition about

a possible reference, meaning that, you know, that it is not unconstrained, right? It is always implicitly constrained by its reference, not a specific reference, but the existence of reference to begin with, of an object of reference, right? this means that it the presupposition is simple as that that the play with sense or syntax or you know the signifier this sort of a stuff

is being warranted by a fundamental assumption that all existence constitutive of the reference coming from one and the same unitary space-time horizon. And this, of course, create a very strange sort of interplay between formal logic and transcendental logic and that's that would be basically you know ourselves

magnum opus so let's start today's talk by the idea of constitution. So what is really constitution? I mean, this word philosophically, I mean, you can interpret it in a very mundane, ordinary sense, which is actually the correct one, you know, how things are being constituted. Well, what sort of things are we talking about?

Well, you know, various sorts of things, but particularly three things. Meanings, objects, and consciousness, right? for each of which the constitution differs, but there are fundamental levels, moments of constitution where we see that the boundary between these three topics of constitution meaning you know consciousness and object

overlap the boundaries the distinctions the hard distinctions at certain moments of constitution become fundamentally blurred. So, Rousseau wants to introduce constitution, again, coming back to that idea that I mentioned within the, you know, horizon of regressive inquiry, or questioning back or methodological foundations as a form of inquiry to the sources, right?

To the sources of objects, meaning, and consciousness. So constitution, you know, or inquiry into constitution is a form of reduction, right? But it is not a reduction in the sort of, you know, reduction that we are talking like a, you know, kind of like a materialist reduction, but reduction to moments. moments these are called moments of constitution and that's essentially what you might call to be characterized um or cells genetic phenomenology genetic phenomenology um

in the sense that we can think about uh you know again meaning objects uh consciousness and intentional acts, within a process of unfolding, a good way to think about this is actually given in its account of image constitution, right? You can, a good metaphor for this would be a kind of like a Photoshop filter, right? So what we call moments of constitution in genetic phenomenology, that you apply first this filter to this sort of, you know, sort of configuration, right?

And it creates this sort of effect. And then on top of that, you add another layer of filter, right? Another, that's moments of constitution. And then it creates within that sort of configuration, it kind of enables, makes possible a different sort of horizon, a different sort of configuration. And then adding this on top of one another, and it creates what you might call to be a cascade effect. Right? And this is what you might call to be the sort of the sort of object of our reflection, right? The topic of our reflection, for example, meaning,

intentions, right? Objects. So he wants to kind of, through this method of reduction or method of genetic phenomenology, kind of opens up kind of the skin of these sort of filters that you have applied, and these are the moments of constitution, to see if there is anything in common between these, you know, moments of constitution. What would be the origin of it? And why is it they are taking

this sort of shape rather than other right and this story begins here that the ultimate moment of constitution for all the other for all the three topics that i mentioned is time itself right time is being introduced as the ultimate moment of constitution So what we are going to do to see what is this ultimate moment of constitution and what

sort of questions, further inquiries, it motivates. But before that, we have to introduce a few jargons here, right, with those people who are unfamiliar. or at least you know kind of clarify some of some of the jargons precisely because these jargons have been used outside of several philosophy but in a fundamental different sort of content or similar content, but with a whole baggage of different sorts of connotations

and, you know, implications. One of these things that is really important to talk about is intention, right? Intentionality. So someone gives me, I mean, so the whole thing is that when we are instantly thinking about intentionality, we are thinking about aboutness. But what is this aboutness, right? What is this intentionality? When we are talking about aboutness, what exactly are we talking about?

I mean, you can, for example, give us, someone can give us like a story like Daniel Dennett, right? The intentional stance, where this aboutness is not really intentionality, but rather projection of mental content onto something that is not mental of mind, right? That would be Dan Danette's criticism of intentionality. But that form of intentionality,

he usually associated with Brentano, right? Franz Brentano was teacher of Gusserl. But even Brentano actually doesn't believe in that sort of thing in terms of intentionality. So intentionality here, at least in this sort of loaded manifestation, is not just aboutness. It's also aboutness that carries over and projects features of the mind onto objects that are not of the mind, meaning that they are transcendent to consciousness, right?

Well, so maybe we should start a little bit about what you take intentions or intentionality to be. Yes, Edna. Hi, I have a question. It's kind of related to this. I was reading yesterday in the article of the Stanford Encyclopedia about Husserl that he makes this assumption that all our thoughts are intentional. intentional, but it says that he says there is other thoughts that are not intentional. And I never found that in his text.

In this article, it's not the reference to any... You see, the story is a bit more kind of like more angled than that. So he wouldn't say all thoughts are intentional. He would say that all thoughts which emanate from consciousness, right, are intentional. But there are certain sorts of thoughts which are partially intentional.

And it says that there are certain sorts of thoughts. But when he is talking about thoughts, we should, and we are going to clear some of the fog around here. He doesn't mean really thoughts in the kind of ordinary sense. When Freud, I'm sorry, Husserl talks about thinking, he's, in fact, about every sort of vocabulary that he has ever deployed. He has a kind of a very strange sort of fashion of philosophizing. So he has this kind of multi-scale, what you might call to be picture of consciousness, right, and thinking. and where you can say that there are different layers of presenting and representing

acts and their specific objects. Husserl wants to see thoughts in their various characteristics within always this multi-scalar view. And he usually does, in fact, deploy them quite carefully according to the sort of acts that characterize them and the specific objects of those acts. So, for example, there are certain sort of thoughts on a very lower scale, according to Hosele, that are not really intentional. but some are partially intentional. But the point that he wants to make that anything,

any sort of mental act that is fully, you know, conscious, meaning that accounting for all those scales is going to be intentional. That, that, that there is something mysterious about being consciousness that is always directed about something. Okay. Right. So then who are these, let's say, propositions that are not intentional or semi-intentional? I can't imagine one right now. I will get back to them. Maybe you should bring this up. I don't want to confuse. I think that we should start from intention and then partial intention and then non-intentional one.

All I can for now say is that think about this, that is it correct that at various levels of experience, right, an act is always directed to a specific object or not. So the question can be answered here. If an act is not directed above a specific object of its own act in Hoselle,

and depending on how the act and objects relate to one another can be called partially intentional or not intentional not intentional here being the act is not as specifically explicitly directed to a specific object now this object doesn't mean object of nature but it can be an imminent object an object of consciousness. So he doesn't want to say that at all levels of consciousness, at all scales of consciousness, there is intentionality because that will be just essentially turns consciousness into a form of solipsism, right? But rather he wants to propose

a picture where there are intrusions of something else into the consciousness that makes consciousness to be possible, to be always directed about something, not just itself, but another consciousness. and that's remember the first session I mentioned this that ultimately this is what we are going to talk about that unconsciousness this is this is the lesson that both Freud and Husserl got from

Berentano and each of them built it in a different way and for Husserl is that unconscious is really consciousness directed at itself, but not intentionally. And hence, it creates a moment of alienation. And fundamental angst. and that has something to do with the constitution of transcendental ego and in fact Hosell wants to show

that in so far as as ego just like Freud is always used to be explicitly directed about something, you know, as the object of its intention, it starts to falter when it encounters with itself from a different side of the mirror where it can no longer recognize itself as the object of its own intention, as the object of its own consciousness.

A consciousness becomes a transcendent, transcendent object to itself, and that's the unconscious. Ben, the question turns out. Okay, sorry, I can't read the, I mean, there are too small font for me. Is there anything going on, Lika, on the chat box I should address?

I think Juan said that it resembles intention theory in the philosophical aesthetics of art, but he has put it with T, intention theory. and i noticed in uh on the facebook page of carl sachs that intentions as you talked about them as who sarah probably talked about it uh it's intention with s it's intention right it's so the intention intention um in scholastic philosophy

is not of the intensive, right? But of a certain sort of what you might call to be directedness. And that's usually when you are interpreting more modern way as aboutness. But it's really directedness. it's not about purpose also right it's not intention in the sense of a purpose or a certain sort of goal right it's intention as intention as directedness for something to be directed about something else and Hosea wants to create just like Kent who wants

to give us a story about transcendental deduction at the beginning. Jose wants to give us a direction about the origin of this directedness. Where is it coming from? What actually motivates consciousness before even going to say that by what rights I can say that my perceptions are objectively valid even before then by what a right consciousness can be directed toward anything else to an object directed to an object right and this directedness is is is really at the beginning of the constitution

is a legitimizing question for any other question that come after that, including those of Kant's. What motivates consciousness to actually be conscious of anything, let alone objects outside of its territory, territory, external objects, appearances. If you don't have questions, let's have a 10, 7 minutes rest, and then come, and then I start reading some stuff.

Okay. Okay, okay. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. So, this idea of intentionality is something that you should think about it.

and uh as we move forward i think that it becomes clear uh but for now suspend this idea that intentionality is a certain sort of mental content right that you projected right it's quite actually very interesting that who serl sees intentionality in its primary form in the operation of sense in the Friedan parlance of sense, right? And hence, fundamental to the constitution of meaning, right?

sense is not reference right but sense as I mentioned earlier always directed right toward the presupposition or implicitly presupposes a certain sort of directedness toward a reference even though it is not of the reference so So the idea is that Husell in his lectures, and you know, ABC, all those lectures, and

he quite actively changes view. He wants to, as I mentioned, he wants to dig deeper into the kind of like, in the originary or kind of more fundamental phases or constitutive moments of intentionality and consciousness, right? And for example, in a particular sort of, you know, Obviously, it's coming through the history of German philosophy.

Usually, the prior philosophies that have come before him, there is a sense that consciousness, at the most rudimentary sort of sense, you might say that consciousness is a sense sort of at the most rudimentary that you can't even call it consciousness, consciousness, but it's a constitutive moment of consciousness, is a certain sort of moment of pairing or association, a sort of blind mechanism, right? And you can somehow see this already in Kant, in the idea of outer sense, right?

bundles of senses or sensations are putting in so and so rudimentary relations or connecting points with one another right he wants to actually go to a lever deeper than this right rather mere associations of what he calls pairings which you can attribute to the uh what you might call to be the uh outer sense and the sort of associations uh that it provides sensations with,

and hence creates what you want to call to be a first level organization of appearances. So even deeper than these associations, he thinks that something else occurs, you know in in the founding construction of consciousness which according to him invariably brings about the formal continuity of consciousness in an elementary way this synthesis is what he calls it the inner time consciousness and in various places it calls it as an ultimate or absolute moment the fundamental level of

constitution itself. Colloquially you know in ordinary speech when we say time consciousness we usually mean consciousness of time right but time consciousness in Hossalian sense should be understood in a sort of different way because this of consciousness of a time uh somehow misleading uh to to you know uh as as a lens uh uh to look at what was actually

means uh by inner time consciousness and of course i will come and you know um in next seminars, you know, kind of fully elaborate what synthesis of inner time consciousness is, and then a Brentano-Hussell diagram of time synthesis. Before now, we can say that, you know, this of is misleading because it gives the impression that we are dealing with consciousness that has made time as an object in its own theme. Strictly speaking, however, we find such an objectively directed consciousness only starting

at the level of perception of things, right? nevertheless wasel would say that we know time and know again what you might call to be the salarism way give it a kind of a subscript no one so a very rudimentary uh not knowledge not a certain sort of epistemic sort of knowledge. We know time, he wants to say, pre-objectively. In fact, according to him, time is that which is first known overall with regard to the order of foundation or constitution. Consciousness

also needs to be again understood in a salient sense as essentially a stream of lived experiences. In other words, a flowing manifold. But there are many different streams, different types, in fact, of lived experiences. are all somehow known to me as my experiences. Right? So there is this whole thing that these are kind of like eminent objects of my consciousness.

They belong to me. And they also belong together. And hence they form a unity. This synthetic unity of various diverse stream of lived experiences for Hosell is temporality. So temporality in Hosellian sense makes up the form of how consciousness exists to begin with. and in a sort of weird way it does this in such a way that consciousness simultaneously

innerly knows this as its own form and this is what you might call to be the inner time consciousness and again remember that i made a kind of a metaphor for this uh inner time consciousness as um as some sort of duality intrinsic uh with a train ride right a train that moves at a constant speed. And so there is one, in one sense, that there are these scenic views

that the passenger sees through the window of this moving train, right? But there is also a different sort of way to think about this, is really the train ride itself. Right? So, and I will get back to this and again concerning this point that, so, inner time consciousness has a constituted side to it and a constituting side right and these this cannot

be taken apart from one another it's just that there are dualities that are intrinsic to its form to the specific form of its synthesis so you can say that all Husserlian so-called constitutive inquiries are guided by the basic goal of explaining how objectivity as being in itself arises for consciousness for consciousness and this also applies for analysis of time and this is why Osel takes up the problem

of time in a completely different way you know uh than um you know his uh kind of um you know, theorist of his time, which would be, you know, as represented mostly by Bergson and Heidegger. At least for Husserl, perceived things are typical case of objectivity, right? And starting at this point, he sees that for a whole series of reasons we are going to elaborate material objects are able to appear to us as existing things

that transcend our subjective actualization of their manner of givenness the main reason for this follows from the fact that on the one hand all manner of givenness are subject to temporal succession because they are situated in my flow of consciousness. On the other hand, perceived things have an objective existence as well for consciousness because they are themselves free from this succession of their manners of givenness. and because of this immovability, the duration of these objects' existence

is measurable and dateable. Therefore, the fact that they exist in themselves follows for sale fundamentally from the fact that these objects are present at a determinable point in time or over a succession of such points in objective time. Now, from this perspective, then Husserl's so-called analysis of time and time consciousness must be viewed, you know, from broadly from the problem with which, you know, he started out genetic phenomenology. How is this objective time constituted for consciousness?

So the first question that he asked himself is that how does such a time become known originarily? If we imagine objective time as a straight line, for example, every point on this line then is a now, a present. with this image we take all of the nows to be equal but this somehow doesn't correspond with our original experience of time there is originally always one now that has a priority for my consciousness right and it's what you might call to be the present

the day the year in which i am currently living and we arrange the rest of the nows into a certain sort of relation with the current present they are earlier they belong to the past or they will come later and hence belong to the future the past or future nows then further organize themselves according to their greater or lesser distance from the current now. Now in this way, originally experienced time is always oriented with the current present as its central reference. Now the manner of givenness of time oriented in this sort of way or configuration

are remembrance and expectations, right? What, as I will elaborate further, are retentions and pretensions. Through them, I represent the past and the future. That is, the surroundings of the current present that are temporarily closer or further away. I can, however, only represent these dimensions of my temporal horizon because I or someone else has once experienced

or will experience them in their current present. In this way, the manners of givenness, retentions or pretensions, remembrances or anticipations, are related back to their manners of givenness as presentings. Like all manners of givenness, those of the temporal dimension, are also carried out subjectively. And they appear always in the stream of consciousness. This stream, however, I want to say, is itself a temporal succession of intentional lived experiences. If a lived experience

has taken place, then from that point on, it retains an immovable position in the past of my stream of consciousness. And in this sort of way, the positions in time that our past become in themselves for my consciousness prior to any objectivity of perceived objects in objective time. And the fact that it's a given thing exists in itself rests upon its embeddedness in what Husserl called a horizon of potentiabilities. right potentialities potential abilities is word for you know neologism for potential possibilities

knowing this we can ask the question you know that essentially instigates the whole theory of constitution. We can ask through which achievements of consciousness does the elementary objectivity of these temporal positions of my stream of consciousness take place? That is to say, how does the pre-objective consciousness of my consciousness temporal horizon, that is inner time consciousness, develop through the fact that I possess the potential ability of remembering having actualized certain lived experiences and through this remembering the content of these experiences.

So answering this question enables Husserl to introduce intentions as always being distant experiences have a certain sort of distance or distance about them right distance that is distance uh that depends on the original experience and think about the distance in terms of you know uh what i said like that

usually the encounters, temporal encounters, the sort of perspective and time that are, you know, inherent to conscious acts, have a certain sort of, you know, kind of duality or doubleness about them, like, you know, a fossil that is like, at the same time, a cipher of distance past through the moment of originary encounter and also a distance that unfolds

as anticipations into the future, so-called pretensions. So the representation of the past and the future through remembrance and anticipations refers in its own way to live the experiences where what we now represent was once or will be immediately given as present. so in a sense yesterday is now elapsed today right away is an impending now so on and so forth so therefore present consciousness is originary time consciousness and therefore the first project for constitutive analysis is to

grapple within this dimension any types of manners of givenness that are unthematic for consciousness in natural attitude. Manners of givenness, for example, that motivate my conviction that it's possible to represent lived experiences in the first place that we have actualized in the past and thereby to organize them in an irreversible succession, you know, of temporal positions. Now,

Now, so in a kind of a sort of way, the sort of a story that oneself wants to put forward is that the fact that I can represent, represent anything, be it a transcendent object or an imminent object of consciousness, And hence two sides of experience that Delschel was talking about, you know, in the chat box, you know, the German words.

One is the encounter with an external object and the other one is the awareness. You know, these are two kind of like aspects of the word experience in German. So he wants to say that all of these sorts of representations, the fact that I'm capable of representing in any of that sort of connotations of experience, either encounter with an object outside of me or awareness of a mental estate, right?

An imminent object of consciousness is grounded, is founded upon the moment of presentation itself. and this moment of presentation is when what you might call to be is the synthesis of time that is given that is or maybe I shouldn't formulate this that is that is permeating in how the givenness or the manners of givenness

for dozens of objects are always being motivated, always taking this sort of form, right? This sort of configuration. So it's, if we are saying the representation, and it's not the Kantian story here, presentations versus representation. Presentation for Husserl is really the moment when time synthesis crops up and motivates

but also make possible any sort of representation whatsoever thoughts before i move forward sorry reza can i just ask a very quick question about the potential possibilities would that mean that in a certain level there would be something called potential impossibilities or something similar or is there a specific reason why is it kind of for me in my head it's kind of doubled, right? Potential is already what something is, could happen in both ways, right?

Yes, so he calls it potentiabilities, right? In the sense that he wants to say, highlight the fact that they are always constrained. they don't unfold to infinity he doesn't want to give that sort of uh you know infinite ocean of of possibilities but rather that they are always uh you know are constrained precisely because of the mode of presentation the sort of way the sensations are um essentially being configured, put together, right? As I said, in the passive synthesis, activity in passive synthesis.

The first time that this whole notion of potentiability actually crop up in Hosser is the idea of a spiel Rome. What is a spiel Rome? have haven't you noticed that um any sort of encounter perspectival encounter right with with an object involves a form of absence like for example um uh that you see this uh you know green box you know facing you right

then there is always a certain sort of implicit namely and this happens in the passive act of uh sensation that you immediately anticipate this to have an other side right even though this is absent right so the whole point that precisely as i said that sensation in hosserl as the sort of uh lung cancer spacing. Yes. So the idea of a Spielraum is this, precisely because of how sensations work in a kinesthetic way as a mode of presentations,

they already have that sort of pretensive, anticipative, you know, baggage load with them. So, and this anticipation, this is where basically the idea of a spiel realm comes. It's a room to play. The idea of a spiel realm is room to play, meaning that there is a certain sort of absent aspects of an object for which I immediately anticipate this to be this and that. It doesn't mean that the Spiel realm moves infinitely, right? But rather that it has a certain sort of what you might call to be anticipatory vector, like exactly like a dynamic

anticipated, like in embodied cognition, you know, Robert Rosen's anticipatory dynamic systems. This is inherent in the act of sensation as embodied encounter to have an anticipated model, internal model of this. And the perception takes this to a different sort of level by turning this anticipation to a thetic component. aesthetic meaning that it becomes a thesis right about what i take this to be true but then as for example think about it it might be an impossible object where you actually

change this perspective and you see that it doesn't really have a back yes and it's always this spiel room is always oriented like in the binary of absence and presence or yeah it's always a separation of its absence in a certain way yes yes yes absolutely and then but but but it is not uh as so cell calls this that this anticipation is adambrated and hence at some point it needs to seize it can't anticipate further further possibilities right

I have seen this sort of new interpretations where people have, it's an interesting way to think about it, people have started to think about the whole idea of spiel-roam or potentia-abilities and adumbration in terms of abductions, embodied abduction, Persian abductive, you know, mode of cognition, which is basically constitutive of, to the best of explanation. I would like to add something,

and is that the, this dark side of the objects of the objects are a structural characteristic of objects of perception, because in the, what Husserl calls the Angereheide sphere of consciousness, the inner sphere of consciousness, imagination can make vary the object and you can imagine all quite freely the multiple sides of an object whereas in perception you always just have uh the perception of one side whereas the other side is always perspectival only one perspective is given to

and the rest remains in the realm of uh you know anticipations yes and and the object is completed by consciousness based on Pax's past experience and imagination. And it's something very peculiar about how imagination works here, because imagination anticipates the way in which the dark side of the object is going to look like. But when it fails, it happens something that Husser calls disappointment. So consciousness is disappointed because the... the lack of fulfillment. Yes. Yes, that's it. Because the anticipation fails in its object and its object was to produce a complete image of the object for experience. Yes, and this is,

this is, I mean, we are flash forward, but it's actually quite interesting to think about this, that there is a reason that Husserl thinks that imagination ultimately underlines the possibility of all perceptions. And this is because of that sort of, you know, that kind of implicit a-perspectivalism that is endemic to imagination comes from two specific characteristics of a fantasing act and their object, phantasmata. One is that, one, as I mentioned last time,

that the object is not before me, it hovers, right? There's a certain sort of zero point orientation, constitutive of all uh fantasying acts and and phantasmata uh two uh actually three i said that two characters in three characters one zero point orientation and then you see that they're actually being corroborated by uh fundamental research in in mental imagery nor science uh particularly if i don't know if you have read hinton's classic essay 1978 on configuration and orientation mental imageries

uh conscious mental imageries um one zero point orientation two is that phantasmata always have uh as if as if uh sort of uh you know quality so when we are talking about perceptions um um we are definitely working with a positive object right in fact has as its you know presupposition perception the position of an object positiveness of an object right now in remembering we see that this positiveness changes

modified and hence becoming represented in a different sort of way that the positive become as if it were, as if it were the object that was once positive, right? But the imagination is not even as if it were. It is as if there is an object. Consciously, this object is absent and hence as if, right? It's always as if. And hence, this shows that imagination, particularly Hossel talks about imagination, not in fact primarily a form of representing,

but what he calls presentifying, right? It's a certain sort of presentation of the object within a fundamentally different source of time that is different from the time of perception and its mode of encounter, right? And hence, it has a massive amount of modificatory, you know, capacities at its disposal to modify the so-called, what you might call the objects of perception in the way that perception couldn't do that. And this as if brings us to the third characteristics of imagination, which is fundamentally specific to imagination.

And it's forestalled or neutralized position takings. in the way that I can do things with imagination that I couldn't do if I was merely abiding by judgments or takings of perception. Think about this, a good example of this, you know, I don't know how many of you have played with this new toys that have come like Dolly or, you know, Mid Journey text to image models, right? You can think about position takings of

imaginations not being all basically just perceptual takings, but position takings are neutralized, the content being neutralized. And hence, they have this sort of as if, as the way that you create a prompt for making a new image in these softwares, you know, prompt engineering. You know, for example, you write a prompt that, imagine an elephant flying over the house in the style of this, perspective this, high resolution generate something like that for you.

It's already there somehow, right? Yes. Even before this image is... I mean, since you mentioned now Dell AI, isn't it also that somehow humans are giving away the responsibility of our desire and image production towards the technological unconscious in a certain way? I would say that both Husserl, and this is really something that I wanted to really talk at the end, but it's good to actually talk about this. I would say both Husserl and Kant would actually say that no, this has always had a certain sort of technical side to it.

The time synthesis is technical. And then you see this also in Eskimata, Eskematization, the act of imagination in Kant, when he says, you know, that Eskimatas have their origin, the, you know, the hidden art of the soul, art in the sense of technique, right? And there is this fact that I think that Adorno was one of the first ones who criticized this sort of idea that, you know, that eschematization imagination has been industrialized, you know, in Hollywood, for example, movie makings. Eschematization has been objectivated and given from human creativity to the realm of machine. But really, if you read Kant, and

particularly in tandem with his overall philosophical anthropology project as you know bernard stickler has pointed out schemata and schematization imagination has always been an industrial technical procedure it's just that now is being fully fledged objectivated right externalized and of course that i would say that more than being revolutionary which is not really it's not revolutionary that's what i want to highlight it's not revolutionary but rather it creates a

moment of reflection about what we call imagination, even in the most rudimentary sort of way. So I think that these models are good precisely because they can be understood as mediums of reflection upon the act of imagination. but with this caveat that all models have metatheoretical assumptions are loaded with a certain sort of theoretical ideology that constitutes their structure and hence it gives us these sorts of AIs

It gives us the impression that there is nothing to imagination or image consciousness other than certain sort of rudimentary empirical processes, right? Precisely because the nature of the model is empirical. You know, the connectionist and the whole latent space, deep learning. But these are quite actually interesting to me. But yeah, coming back to the idea that imagination precisely for Husserl, he wants to say that this whole idea of time synthesis or inner time consciousness

is at full displays in the fantasying acts. And then this opens up a whole sort of, you know, kind of an interesting panorama that I will mention that then it seems that perception for Searle merely expresses a very parochial form of time consciousness.

And this is what I mentioned, this is something that's Rudolf Bernet, who was the advisor of Dan Zahavi, you know, he's in charge of Husserl Journal Archive, you know, in Leuven, has written some paper, very magnificent paper about this, that essentially because of this sort of idea that, you know, that consciousness

falls in the habit of perception and its parochial concepts of time, synthesis of time, it is always, you know, falls into a realm of angst or pure anxiety when it is confronted with the true nature of the ultimate moment of constitution, time consciousness when it can no longer abide by the mere habits of perception and that is

Brentano's idea that you can see it goes through Freud as well that that that the unconscious having the quality of phantasmata rather than perceptions carries with it a different sort of time synthesis. a time synthesis that is tied with the structure of drive and motivation.

And that would be, you know, Freud works it up into his own theory of unconscious, and Husserl works it to his own theory of unconscious. unconscious being really the encounter with the truth of time consciousness outside of the parochial ambit of perception and ego. It's not as if either Husserl or Freud wants to talk against perception and give a massive

amount of, you know, important significance to imagination. is just that they want to highlight the fact that perception and its mode of encounter, its mode of directedness, creates certain sort of habits for ego, which are detrimental to it. So as always, we are way behind. I have a lot of stuff to read, but I think next session

we continue. We have a reading material, you know, the time of the world, where I can actually start to talk about the relation between objective time, subjective time, and how objective time is grounded in subjective time by way of the moment of the original synthesis in inner time consciousness. Thoughts? And Delshall said that presentism,

no, it is not really a form of presentism as we are moving forward. It appears to be on the paper, but it is not really presentism. It's not even a specious presence of Jamesian nature. Thank you.

most important point for now is to think about the moment of presentation in the passive activity of sensation is where basically time for the first time crops up. And precisely because this mode of presentation, which is ultimately the synthesis of inner time consciousness, motivates in a bottom-up manner

and ultimately legitimizes what you might call to be representations of various sorts. and hence experience both as awareness of imminent objects of consciousness and transcendent objects that are outside of consciousness, but nevertheless representable. thoughts

mr slav what do you mean by that bottom-up not top-down manner bottom up in the sense of motivation right in in the sense that time the synthesis of time motivates representations the act of representation itself yes i see so we so we talked about this perceptions that always have sensory sense some kind of sensory

matter and they work with something positive and this is why they have this dangerous dimensions that they create habits you see the idea as I said that perception makes habits precisely because it's It kind of creates what you might call to be a very specific distance between consciousness and the world. Right?

you know the whole idea that you see it in Freud for example that that there is something diseased about consciousness in fact about ego about how actually ego works. To see always essentially the world by virtue of the distance that it takes its consciousness to be and at the center of which is the ego.

The ego posits a distance. And through this distance, it has a certain sort of encounters with the world and not others. So do you think that taking perceptual objects as phantasmata, taking them or relating to them as we relate to phantasmata as matter is a positive technique to break down those habits no they don't want to say that positive technique but they want to say simply that that there is a certain sort of um for at

least for kant more than hoselle that there is uh that the horror that there is a horizon of technique there. Right? That is not merely, that for example, for Husserl, the origin of this is given in time consciousness, ultimate moment of constitution. For Kant, no. For Kant is really quite actually interesting that he seems to have this idea that no the esquematas are coming from nature there is something natural about them the darkest

you know shadiest aspects of nature to which we can never you know which we can never fathom i think that there is something very interesting about about the relationship between time consciousness and imagination. And it is that experience seems to be creative. I mean, the schema is not the same for every consciousness. So there is something in the experience of time of a particular consciousness

that is embedded in the way in which a particular ego anticipates what is going to be next. And in fact, there is something about the particular life of that ego that determines what kinds of memories are retained by the consciousness. And this is to say, or what I'm trying to say is that imagination or time consciousness does not work, I mean, operates in a creative way, meaning that the experience is always, is very plastic, depending on the subject and the subject.

but that imagination does not work in a positive way. Imagination always works in a very obscure and negative way. For example, when you anticipate something negative in the future because that's your experience in life. So there is this kind of ambiguity on how imagination works works and how a time experience is a working on who serves phenomenology of time because and it's not just about the anticipation of what is going to be next but always this is working on present experience because what else what we were trying to say is that

that what I am experiencing here and right now is not just present, but also there is something missing there. There is something absent. So there's something obscure that my imagination tries to complete based on past experiences. And this is something very problematic about how this is possible in Husser's work. He says that consciousness operates through rigging or parenting. Can I say this?

The German word is parent, assimilating something to something previous. so the present experience is experience based on past experiences so if my past experiences are negatives that implies that present experience going to be experienced as something negative but also that i am going to a project a negative future yes absolutely so yes yes um yes that That's definitely, but it should be said for experience, but there is a moment where we can actually go further down

and not seeing memory in terms of experience, memories of experience, but merely as retentions. Yes, exactly, yeah. Yes, definitely I will try to find that essay for you and put it on Discord. I think it's called Unconsciousness, The Unconscious in Freud and Husserl by Rudolf Bernet. Yes, Michael.

I think that it's been helpful for me through the last few seminars to think about whenever you're talking about time as being as entailing a kind of noticing of difference to expectations or like the potential abilities notion that you were talking about before that, like, every time that I'm conscious of something, there is some kind of noticing of the parts. and of the thing that can be arranged in some kind of different way. And I can imagine it being some other way. And noticing that those two, that the sensing of the object and the potential abilities are different is the originary moment of like inner time consciousness.

Yes. Yes, in a sense, that is true. Yes. precisely because, you know, even the sort of represent anticipations that we give to representations are undergirded by that time synthesis within the presentation itself. The most ultimate moment for all of these to actually have any sort of you know, representational status. And then you can, again, coming back to this whole idea of, you know, retention and pretension,

oneself wants to actually say something to the fact that it is by virtue of the inner time consciousness and the, you know, the constitutive synthesis of time, that we have something like down the line, on an upper level, something like, you know, perceptions having static qualities of taking something to be true. It doesn't want to say that this taking something to be true is the sort of anticipations that are characteristics of pretensions,

but rather that there are taking correlates of those primary pretensions. Correlates. It's by virtue of those that we can anticipate, actually, in the judgments, static sort of way, take something to be true for an object of perception. And of course, taking something to be true is a aesthetic quality, meaning that it is actually open to doubt. And also disappointment, as Diego was talking about.

Yes, Matizlav, and that is after Matizlav, I think that we should call it day. Okay, I just wanted to add to the thoughts about about the correlation with what he said with your idea which you have explained, expressed in the medium contingency about happening and non happening of the event link to what have Leotard have written his work Sublime and the Avant-Garde, when he is saying, the possibility of nothing happening is often associated with a feeling of anxiety, a term with strong connotations in modern philosophies of existence and the unconsciousness.

But suspense can also be accompanied by pleasure. For instance, pleasure in welcoming the unknown. and even by joy, so to speak, like Boris Spinoza, the joy obtained by the intensification of being that the event brings with it. But the mark of question is now, now like feeling that nothing might happen, the nothingness now. So like anticipation of nothing to be to happen.

Yes. I mean, putting aside, for example, you know, Quentin Mayasu's reason of, you know, putting forward something like the, you know, absolute radical contingency, right, is the whole point is like, of course, as I said, putting aside those concerns because he's actually He wants to do that in order to fundamentally question the idea of sufficient reason. But you can also think in terms of that he actually gives a very novel understanding of time, time to understand it as a kind of like a diachronic object, the archive fossil

and that sort of stuff as a time in which anything can happen for some weird reason or nothing can happen for no reason at all right that that is the whole point of yes and that for him is really you know the sort of creative sort of leotarian interpretation yes But of course, I would say that Hossel doesn't really believe in this sort of stuff. First of all, as I said, Hossel doesn't actually believe in the thing in itself, in the Kantian

sense. I think we'll get back to this why. He thinks that this is just like, as I said, is a kind of solution badly or ill-imposed sort of question or problem. The idea of, you know, positing nominum. This is as we have seen it.

It really doesn't need that. If he has already, you know, created a certain sort of move where the ultimate moment of constitution, which is the synthesis of time, creates the grounds of things, experience of things and thinking about things, but also that sort of move that he, by virtue of distinguishing

distinguishing between uh you know noetic act and noemata he has then created also a space for something called transcendent objects right transcendent objects in the sense that they are representable in consciousness but they are not of consciousness and hence he has already opened that sort of things that moves that Kant wanted to make already as, you know, kind of the bolts and nuts of consciousness itself. The consciousness can be then talked about in terms of imminent objects of its intentional acts and its consciousness and transcendent objects.

which transcendent objects are not uh as i said are not having the features of consciousness or laws of mind but then this opens again a certain sort of avenue for the critique of the correlation ism as specific to oneself or it wouldn't be the this the correlation ism that is specific to kent

yeah it makes sense thank you so uh okay so uh next time reading and presentations and if you can manage to you So compress the presentations to 10 to 15 minutes max. Each, that would be great. So everyone can, even if they're coming just a day before the class, everyone can watch them and we can discuss them. We have one text, Time of the World. Yes.

For presentations. And do you want to send another one? Should we wait for it? No, no, no. That's, I think that's the one. That's already a very complex text. Yeah. OK. OK, so we are done then. Excellent. OK, thank you, everyone. Yeah, see you next week. See you next week. Bye bye. Ciao. Thank you so much. Bye. Bye bye.

Thank you.