The Vicious Transparency of Time (Session 4)

Hello everyone and welcome to the fourth session of the seminar, the Vicious Transparency of Time, instructed by Reza Nipiristani. Reza, the floor is yours. Thank you so much and hello everyone. Thanks Friya and Joelle for great presentations. Let's open up the presentations, questions for like 10 minutes, 15 minutes, and then I will take it from there. So we kind of saw with Freya's presentation. As I was mentioning, you know, early, before the recording has started, I remember that

I said something that, oh, this essay is complex, but probably was a case of bad memory. I read this, you know, a couple of years ago, and when I actually read it, it's not really complex, but I really liked that both presentations kind of like, you know, it creates a certain sort of sense of progression uh that you know um clarify some of the ambiguities in what he was trying to do um um yeah so let's start uh questions uh someone wants to uh you know um

start with a major or not even major clarification or any sort of questions for presenters. Please go on. yeah i i had certain questions and i think freya also like covered it pretty pretty good presentation so there is something that loma writes that the first step from subjective towards

objective objectivation of time is through a synthetic unification of his personal narrative memories in on into objective unity but can we at all like name this uh synthesis of unification of personal narrative memories an objective unity what would make them objective in what relation to would it be objective yes uh when we are saying objective here uh that's that's the whole point uh that he wants to it's not objective as if it is real right the question is not about reality here or in any sort of metaphysical sort of sense but rather constructive by way of objective art

by by way of the the pursuit of objectivity so when they are talking about objectivity they They simply mean a narrative, right, or a picture in various vocabularies or a, what you might call, we take that can be adjudicated, that is open to judgments of the certain sort of form most probably propositional form uh that makes it judgeable right that is the quality of

the objectivity that they are talking about right it is not as if they are saying anything uh or Hosselle claims that the transition from subjective time to objective time amounts to a claim about the reality of the world or time as such. But rather, this idea implicit in Husserl that this sort of objective time, and of course with baggage of the transitioning from subjective time to the objectivity, regardless of what we call this idea of time real as opposed to that idea of the world or this and that,

they play a constructive role, right? By virtue of their judgeable content, being judgeable, they play a constructive role in any sort of realistic account of time, or for that matter, world. It's not that objectivity simply means reality here, but rather that it is judgeable. Right? prone to adjudication. That's why he also basically says that objective time is grounded in subjective time. Is this what? Yes. And of course, the last phase, which requires the encroachment of intersubjectivity as the

medium of objectivity. intersubjectivity is that sort of phase if you can think about it when uh you know um these sort of uh subjective narratives or stories that have been articulated subjectively from uh from for example degree zero of mere associations uh now can be um can have a judgeable content right uh essentially they they have certain sort of claim factors about them precisely because

they can be linguistically couched and that language is really that linguistic factor about them is really the mark of intersubjectivity. And can I ask another question? Sure. Yeah and this is a bit off topic but I was wondering what Husserl or Dieter Lomer means when he says the world? I didn't find it. You see, again, world, it's hard to say. I don't know what he means, but I mean, philosophically, we can actually come to an understanding of what world is during that time

of philosophy, right? Essentially, at the turn of the 20th century, world is usually taken, well, it means a lot of things to a lot of philosophers, but at the very least, there is something common between all these assumptions about positing something like a world is that it implies a set of all predicates about that which exists and that which can be experienced. So it's about worlding or enworlding in a salient sense has something to do with

a story about constitution of the certain sort of predicates that we can project upon stuff about material stuff right and this sort this set of predicates the totality of which of course for many philosophers during that time the totality is not given in advance meaning it's ongoing it's called the world so world is really the idea of totalization of predicates that you can project onto a stuff

yes Elaine so I think I had this question already with Kant but it reappeared with this text on Hussow because if just if the origin of individuality lies in central intuition but not in all cases So this perception of time for them, basically it has some sort of events. And is this, like how is the resolution of these events? Is it to be measured like in the resolution of our senses?

like we see more or less 25 to 50 frames per second with our eyes so that that the events are limited by this somehow or the resolution of our ears is slightly better um so how is this taking an account you see uh um when we are talking about for example uh as i mentioned earlier, in Hosellian idea is that when we are talking about describing this sort of events, right, we should understand where Hosell is coming from, actually, in the understanding of describing a phenomenon, such as, for example, a cinematic, you know, scene, or listening to a

a melody or a tune, right? The point is that Husserl is essentially coming as a kind of a divisive philosopher wedged between Mach's phenomenalism and Brentano's phenomenology and intentional person, right. In the sense that for Max, and this is quite, he talks about, Max talks about it in his famous, you know, text, The Economy of Thought,

that all essentially descriptions, all ultimately confined by sensations. right, by sensation, by the flux of sensations. And Berentano has a different sort of take that, you know, that all descriptions are actually intentional, but his idea of intentionality is subjected to a form of psychologism, human psychology, so to speak, right, empirical psychology. Husserl wants to create a holistic account, which is, at the end of the day,

is very quite actually like the holistic accounts that has been given by people like Quine or this sort of people, you know, again, in 20th century. He believes that, for example, description of this sort of temporal events cinematic or melodic in nature is not is both actually uh sensile which is called the hyaletic right uh confined to sense to sensory fluxes right and also intentional but he wants to say that the hyaletic content plays a very a small role in determination of describing thus and so events, meaning that it is really not about

sensory inputs, so to speak, or bundle of sensations, and we are merely confined by those sort of sensory input, and hence we produce such a description of a temporal phenomenon. he he wants to say that no it's really between it's about the interaction between the hyaletic content which is the sensile or sensuous content sensory and the intentional adumbration right and that this interaction uh which can be understood as a process of articulation of sensory content is an ongoing process, is incomplete so to speak. So he doesn't really,

Hoselle doesn't want to produce a story about such temporal events that that will sound a little bit empiricist or phenomenalistic insofar as sensations or sensory fluxes put hard limits on the sort of temporal events that we can perceive. The perception and the description of such temporal events can only be talked about coherently within the interactive dynamics, the ongoing interactive dynamics between the hyalitic content

and the intentional acts understood as adumbrations. Freya? I was wondering kind of in this regard as well was also when when Luma talks about this pre-predicative knowledge, which is kind of this first level of subjectivity, which I understand is also this hyaluronic dimension of understanding, right?

I was wondering, because he's also saying that there are moments when we are awake, when we can have these sensations and when we're asleep or when we're dead, we don't have them. But I was also wondering why this is not more nuanced here. Basically, I was wondering what the status of attention is in this whole scheme. And also, yeah, also maybe perhaps in relation to intentionality. Tensions at what level are you referring to? I mean attention when attention oh yes attention you see essentially intentionality as I mentioned

has this connotation of being towardness directed so it has a form of attentionality so to speak right it's just had this attentionality is conducted within a continuity between the highlighted content and what you might call to be any sort of full experience so it's always it's not as if you you i'm pretty sure probably you know this that it's not as if like it's a attentionality in the physicalistic sense

right in the in the sense that bother or i don't know um uh stanislav dohan talk about it in terms of attentional global attention space right that there are certain sorts of uh sub um personal levels of information processing that all other sorts of attentions are built on this is not the sort of a story that Koselle wants to give. But his idea is that that any source of intention always carries with it. By its very nature.

A directionality, right? Which is an index of attentionality. And this attention The job of a phenomenological philosopher is to explicate the exact level of attentionality. But now here something strange happens to Husserl. So this is the job of phenomenological transcendental reflection, right? To explicate the level, the exact level of this attentionality. Bahusel noticed some sort of fundamental problem, and this becomes quite actually influential in the, you know, 20th century, turn of 20th century account of scientific phenomenologies, for example, for people like Boltzmann.

Now, when you reflect upon that exact level of attentionality, saying that, trying to explicate it at what level of the mixture between the hyaluronic content and the intentional act it is being performed, you essentially change again through the act of reflection the content of the attention itself. What Hossel wants to say is that that attentionality has a certain sort of enigma about it.

And that is the enigma of intentionality. That the moment that you try to reflect upon it and explain it at which level it is being exercised you are in fact changing it manipulating it and hence description right description of all phenomena all and by extension all intentional acts and objects are dynamic, are ongoing. It is not as if they are static. That you can merely say that it is only at this level that is happening.

But rather this level is co-constructed by the mode of reflection that determines it. hence this creates a fundamental enigma in the description of dynamic systems in science where the role of observer as a reflective agent changes the very phenomena to be observed that's quite very interesting that it creates a level of appearances that do change as soon as you start to reflect upon them

to understand them as does and so appearances that this understanding, which is a form of directedness or intentionality, manipulates the information or the contents of this attention system. That was really a kind of fundamental insight of phenomenology that's early physics of 20th century picked on, right? Boltzmann particularly. So Boltzmann project is understood as predicting appearances,

as a science of predicting appearances, right? usually couch in terms of the dynamic between micro state perceptions adumbration perceptual adumbrations which can have hyalitic and uh you know inarticulate intentionality and uh the sort of uh you know uh observations that you can uh see and reflect upon for example such as the expansion of gas if you open up a bottle that contained gas. So Boltzmann wants

to actually show that the act of observation understood scientifically here as codified perceptual adumbrations does in fact change the very informational of the content of the system you are trying to observe, meaning that observation is not neutral. This is the correlative of the Husserlian thesis and the phenomenological thesis that reflections on the mode of attentions being understood as, you know, certain sort of intentionalities directedness change in fact the informational content of the highlighting unintentional acts you are trying to describe

which makes then the problem not undetermined right but rather more nuanced than what we usually perceive that any talk about attentionality and directedness and intentionality is in fact a double intentionality The second intentionality does change the content of the intentional act. And hence, intentionality is never neutral.

This has fundamental consequences for the act of describing any sort of phenomena, scientifically or otherwise. thoughts for you anyone how does this differ from uh simply heisenberg's uncertainty principle you see when we are uh There is something that I probably am a little bit flashable.

I want to talk about there is this thought experiment, highly vague, only mentioned a number of times in exchange between Boltzmann and Brentano. There is a German name for it, but it literally translates to pulling the drawer thought experiment or opening the drawer thought experiment. And it is what you might call to be a proto Schrodinger's cat sort of thought experiment. Right. It based on reconstruction of this vague references that between

Brentana and Boltzmann, it's simple as that. You know, you open a drawer, you put an object in it, you close the drawer, and then you open it. Any person who doubts the existence of a physical object, its duration, will be shown that, you know, you're wrong. That physical object persists regardless of the elapsed time of your perception.

Being hidden in the drawer, right? but then Boltzmann understands this a very different sort of way that there is a lot of sinister manipulations going on in this thought experiment mere by by mere assumptions it is he he doesn't want to talk about uncertainty he wants to talk about doubt and Hosse also wants to talk about doubt that any sort of perception has as its fundament a constitutive doubt understood as a certain sort of probability and symbol and how this probability of phenomenological perception

moves or transitions to the sort of probabilities by way of which, you know, you posit the physical object to begin with. And they can be understood in terms of, you know, probabilities of microadimbrations at the level of microstate and the macrostate of the observation of a physical object reappearing in the drawer after you close it. Now, this creates a massive sort of problems for Boltzmann down the line. One, on one level,

this shows the exact sort of manipulations that go into perception of endurance of a of a physical object independence apparently of perception. Boltzmann wants to show that actually these thought experiments can be taken in a different way to show that there is actually no uh what you might call to be logical but only probabilistic logical bridge between your phenomenological perception

and the physical objects endurance through time meaning just because the physical object showed up again in the drawer after you opened it this cannot be thought as a testimony that there is a continuity of a logical kind between perception of duration and actual duration. In other words, a physical object can be in the drawer and yet your phenomenological perception

registers it as an empty drawer. And again, otherwise, complete the way around it. um i was talking to a friend about this i don't know uh i've been starting to watch this uh german netflix series dark right it's about time travel and there is a scene uh in first session uh of the the first episode, where there is this boy who is called, you know, wants to be Houdini, right? And he does the cups and ball trick, right?

You know, put the ball in a cup and then shuffle them around and then, you know, or not shuffling around, that's all. but you put the ball in one cup, but then when you open the other cup, the ball is in there, right? And then the father asks him, how did you do that? And the boy sinisterly answers, no. The real question that you should have asked is when I did that, right? This is the discrepancy between the physical endurance and the phenomenological perception. in the sense that Boltzmann wants to hypothesize a certain sort of phenomenological perception as a sort of thought experiment.

And that is completely real and justifiable. That from the sort of perspective, it appear that you put a ball in the cup, but from my perspective, right I was actually removing the content from the cup think about this that you know this sort of Greek sort of mysteries about time and are usually vulgarly formulae in terms of Heraclitian flux but no think about a different sort of panorama such as the river of Lethe forgetfulness right of disclosure uh uh on on undisclosure in the sense that uh within the river of lite if you

put something introduce put something in this river it always appears as if you have been removing a content from this river right This does not change any sort of fact about the physical persistence or endurance of the physical object. It just merely shows that there are different ways that perceptual adumbrations of a temporal object can be probabilistically connected and bridged to macro observance of the set phenomenon.

such as an object reappearing after opening the drawer. And obviously this opens a massive sort of black hole of riddles, which I'm going to talk about in understanding of time and time asymmetry. and really the whole idea of perceptual identity the identity of an object as what you might call to be synthetic unity of its appearances

thoughts before I start yes Fria this is very not very well worked out but I was just thinking when you talked about the symmetry of time. I know that Norbert Wiener in his first book on cybernetics, in the first chapter he writes, he differentiates the rockets. I was thinking about the celestial bodies because he was comparing Bergsonian time to Newtonian time. I see, I see. By the example of celestial bodies and he's just

explaining how the difference is that in Newtonian time, he looks at like the solar system and you can spin the solar system in both ways and it will always have the same sort of movement. You know, it can be backwards and forwards. Whereas if you, for example, have meteorological phenomena like clouds, you can only if you would watch him on a movie you could only watch him in one direction if you would spin it back then it would then there would be a completely different image and I was just thinking when you talked about the symmetry of time whether this is something

like this in fact there is another example that Noah Winner makes at the beginning of cybernetics uh about a rocket uh you know a rocket that is being launched uh from one civilization that sees time in one direction right when we are talking about time in one direction here it's very interesting that we are not actually talking about uh real-time uh asymmetry in in a metaphysical sense but but can be just merely a perceptual uh uh sort of probability of how you observe a certain sort of phenomena and that is completely fine uh so there is a civilization that has this sort of

temporal uh dilation uh of the dust and so characteristic and there is another civilization having a different sort of time dilation or time extension of the of other sorts of characteristics so you can just intuitively thinking about having two different arrows of time right and the thing is that according to this example if one of these civilizations sends a rocket to the other one think about the rocket as a bottle as a message in the bottle right trying to communicate the other civilization will never actually find this rocket as incoming the message in the bottle is never being delivered why

because the other civilization who's the receiving end of this message always sees this message as part and more so an armature of what already exists in its world as part of nature and thus not a message not a disturbance in the flow of information and hence not a signal and again these are these show that Hoselle and in fact wants to talk about this that these

absolutely have no bearing whatsoever about the reality of time in fact perhaps we shouldn't never talk about reality of time, but always thinking about perception of time, right? As certain sort of doubt inbuilt within this perception. And when there is doubt, as we say, following Descartes, when there is doubt, there is amplification. of objectivity or depletion of objectivity.

So we should think about this doubt in terms of the sort of consciousness of probability, how they can unfold and how some of these probabilities can inform and amplify objectivity and some of them they do tend to deplete objectivity but none of them say anything really about the nature of time if it was there was such a nature nature, reality of time.

Thoughts? Questions? I have a question, but I don't know how much it's relevant. to our our conversation that we had about mirage and oasis when we talk about doubt so how can we shape this relationship between the mirage and oasis when we have doubt about the existence of a location and that led to creation of the oasis yeah that's a good point I mean, isn't it the whole idea that the mirage is a certain sort of consciousness or an intentionality, right? Seeing a mirage that has as its fundament, as its constitutive core, doubt.

And doubt is doubt in terms of, but this doubt is not a static, it's dynamic in the sense that you have to answer to the beckoning of the mirage. You have to navigate, right? You have to get into the point of the mirage to see whether the objectivity is being depleted or being amplified by the evidence of having an oasis, right, and a body of water. The whole point here is that This is not purely a Cartesian sort of doubt. It's a doubt that is embedded in the dynamicity

of the intentional act. An intentional act whose nature should not be understood aesthetically, but dynamically in so far as it changes. It's an ongoing process. I shouldn't actually use the word process here. I do not want to give you one single misleading remark that these intentional acts should be understood in terms of real processes. No, that is not what I'm talking about. I merely, for the lack of a better word, just like with use the word process here. I am not making any sort of remark whatsoever

that these are actual real processes, but rather completely different story that all picture of processes are built upon the ongoing and manipulative adam brady in the sense of adam great nature of intentionality thoughts if not we can have like a five ten minutes and then i start the lecture

and then we will take it from there but first let's see if any anyone wants to say something yes raviv hey uh i was wanting to talk a little bit about uh the dimensionality of time as it kind of came up in this uh reading and I was curious if you think that what's being said here is essentially that the perceived one dimensionality of objective time is derivative of the necessary dimensionality of

time as a subjective uh process of um patching together these these different occasions as he's talking about in the paper yeah multi-dimensionality or two-dimensionality being synthesized yes uh yes of course and lomer is quite actually careful to not make any sort of saying that he says it is objective time right he doesn't actually say that objective time having one dimensional sort of uh you know characteristics is real time it's just that is uh what you might call to be objective time here simply means an articulated

an articulated fully articulated perhaps a way of talking about appearances this doesn't make any sort of assumptions about the real reality of these appearances no no for that matter one directionality of time no i i understand that i was just interested in um i don't know the whole the whole process seems very um i don't know it reminds me of like a theory of manifolds or something like that you know yes yes there is there is a i mean yes i i think you know the the one of the ways to think

about it that this is actually quite um theory of manifolds so on and so forth there is a fundamentally a kantian flavor even present in ourselves uh you know understanding and this is precisely because both kant and husserl work with a retentional model right rather than an extensional one or a cinematic one those are completely different precisely because the reason that retention model is being adopted by kant in his you know account of you know awareness of awareness of awarenesses method awarenesses in inner sense and Husserl in

sense of, you know, melody consciousness or tune consciousness, which I'm going to introduce this diagram, precisely because a retention model is what you might call to be maximally neutral model with regard to a certain sort of assumptions that we make about the reality of time. Essentially it is like the best sort of model that you can adopt it if you really want to start talking about time from a very neutral, metaphysically forestalled position. It's for Kant it's transcendentally ideal, right?

as the beginning of any sort of discussion. And for herself is really the inner time consciousness, the phonological and intentional hyalitic mixture that he wants to talk about. Essentially, so here, extension models always have the sort of thing that they are, they look better in terms of corroborating physical theories of times, but precisely because they corroborate physical theories of time better precisely because they already have built-in assumptions about the metaphysical nature of time in them.

But rather retention, you know, models, these sort of assumptions are being suspended, bracketed, to speak and yes there is a fundamental continuity between Hossel and Kant the idea of manifolds and the synthesis and all that sort of stuff yes it's just kind of formulated in different sort of framework okay thanks okay let's have a break for like seven minutes and then come back

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Hello, how are you? Hi, how are you? Thank you.

Before we start again, I had a long question. Sure, sure. Go on. I didn't want to take a lot of your time. So I really don't know where to start. In the paper, when the author talks about identity and individuation, it made me a little bit confused because somewhere he says, you know, Husserl synthesis starts with the hieratic, hieratic intrusional content, then goes to subjective time, then goes from subjective time, goes to objective time as a sort of two way reduction or some two way emergence. So I don't know what you call it. And in that sense, you know,

I was reading Alan Gibbert, Alan Gibbert's paper called Contingent Identity. Okay, okay. I will check it. Would you be able to put it on? I haven't seen it. Would you be able to put it on? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, definitely. So, contingent identity, you know, the usually the distinction in analytic philosophy is between necessary identity and contingent identity. Content identity being some sort of content extensionalism in the sense that the intuitive content of the external world determines the content of whatever comes from the higher level phenomena. phenomena. A necessary identity is like some sort of intentionalism with an S that just

like Brandons, for example, the identity of a given thing or the identity between two things comes from some sort of subjective robustness of counterfactual robust properties that always hold for a given property in a given fixed frame of reference. Sure. Yeah. So I was I was not sure. I think the authors somehow jumping from somehow in some in some certain area being a proponent of contingent identity in the sense of the hyalitic always comes first.

And then at the end of the paper, he talks about proto-individuation and individuation at the higher level, it's the intersubjective communicative realm that makes something identical or some sort of criteria of identity and individuation of objects. from us, from our communicative practices, this would be a necessary identity because when he talks about assertions, I don't know what he means by assertion but if he means assertions as some sort of positions within a logical

space of reasons. No, no, no, assertion as a position taking, which is fundamentally different as an assertion in the, this is a very common word that people during that time use without any sort of, you know, full-blooded assertion of sense, right? It's just a German word for a sort of position taking. Okay, so why are you talking about intersubjectivity? And that's why, that's why I think he could be, he could be meaning that because the, the intersubjective realm that ultimately becomes the criteria for identity and individualization of of things uh is intersubjective so i i think even if there's not it's not the full blood

of the personal sense in the brandomian sense but it'll still be it's still this assertions are always uh inferential in the sense of some they are not they are not modally insulated or modally uns insulated or separated from uh uh from other subject subjectively robust relations that you you have in the in the in our community right right right i mean look he has this idea that he actually talks about there's some when he's talking about uh various perceptual stories right different pasts the continuum of various sort of past uh and then he talks about that uh the word for this is kind of like uh you know enduringly having a grip of of something right so at that

point yes uh you obviously when any sort of assertion you are talking about it's not isolated right but it is not in any sort of way at that level that he's talking about it is not any sort of you know kind of a perceptive fully a perceptive uh judgment right but rather um what you might call to be um a certain so you so you have first the associations in in this realm of highlighting content and stuff and then you build it up and you come to this level so we are here again at the level of associations but associations to fundamental different sort of objects

which are you know memories and uh you know various lines of past and perceptual stories uh it is i would say that hossel uh i don't know about lomar but hossel wouldn't call this kind of a inferential in a full-blooded logical linguistic sense, but inferential in a certain sort of probabilistic sense. Okay, okay. But you said, you know, the world is the totality of predicates. uh if that's the case it will remind me of wittgenstein's first premise interact patterns

that the world is but that is but that is not about the the association of memories we are not really talking about predicates it's still proto predicative or pre-predicative right at that level we are not really talking about predicates when we are trying to synthesize or create a certain sort of isomorphism or associations between such and such perceptual stories having different sort of pasts we are still working at a different sort of level when we are talking about predicate we are actually talking about the sort of predicates are only available to level of full objectivity and full

articulation of thus and so associations. So the idea, the character of identifying individuation for objects comes from below. Why? No, no. Why? Yeah, he doesn't. You see, this is not what Husserl wants to say. At first, as I mentioned, so there is a high leutic content and then the intentional act, right? what was sell as i mentioned was only is a wedge between mark phenomenalism which he tries to give a sensational right uh account uh which is unfolding bottom-up and brent thomas account

which is top down in terms of intentionality right intentionality being very strong and somehow it miraculously you know works through this sort of you know micro association and stuff whereas Hossel wants to show that the hyalitic content is there right but it plays a fundamentally decisively a small role in comparison to intentional acts and how we should triangulate various levels of the articulation, namely synthesis and unification that enable the transition from subjective time to objective time, is true, one, they interplay between the

intentional act at various levels, and how they work up or take into account the highlighting content right so that the whole idea here is a certain sort of parallelism or concurrency so to speak to use the vocabulary of computer science you know you have you have two deep two top down top level and the bottom level and essentially uh these two uh work uh they need to be distinguished these two levels, right? But then they basically have their own laws, sensile, hyaluronic laws,

or intentional laws. But the thing is that for you to be able to triangulate any sort of exchange between them you should think think about how they asynchronically act on one another that's the whole idea of concurrency meaning parallelism with sync without the need for synchronicity between the highlighted content and in intentional act it's a fundamentally a computational problem you know to to not assume first of all a deep level of synchronicity

between these two levels the intentional and the highlighted content give them their own relative or full independence, but also through these assumptions work out various levels that they do interplay. But ultimately for Hossell, absolutely in any sort of object objectivity I would say it's a necessary objectivity is objectivity by rule right rather than by the highlighting limitations by sensuous limitations no but he doesn't want to do so that is how

how he is different from mere bottom-up accounts, right? Which is exemplified by Mack during his time, right? And it's different from Brentano, who holds a certain sort of... pure parallelism between the intentional act and highlighting content in the sense that highlighting content is merely a kind of like a kantian so opera of sensation mere receptivity right no actually herself wants to adopt machian view that there is an activity in this sort of

of passivity. Sensation is not mere reception, but is an activity within passivity of receiving dozens of sensations, right? And they do create a hyaletic content, right? But that is hyaletic content vastly is disproportional to the significance of the intentional act as the constitutive moment of articulating and organizing the content itself. It's just that I don't think that Husserl is your traditional necessary,

you know idea of identity in the sense that in a brandomian sense or other sorts of people and that's precisely because i would say that it that there is a sense of full process again using this word quite with with reservations because it doesn't want to make any sort of naturalistic assumptions about them being processed as if like the process in reality but there is a process well nature in how this necessary necessity is being built

but also again going uh but it also is always act also as a as a reflective sort of uh you know uh constitution in the sense of you know persian abduction the abduction does create its own object of hypothesis in a way Like when you manipulate a dynamic system, you are essentially creating its behaviors through which the integration of does and so behaviors, then you would be able to say that this is a system

that I am describing. Rather than by simply resorting to some sort of, you know, laws from above or rules about from above. The idea of constitution here is always implicitly a story about co-constitution. okay so

coming back to the the topic that i mentioned you know the the inner time consciousness let's just go over it and uh you know talk about it a little bit uh you know kind of flesh it out uh what it is and what it is not kind of defogging some of the misconceptions about usually as being associated with uh you know time consciousness particularly Husserl's account of inner time consciousness. So first of all, Husserl's phenomenology of inner time consciousness or time consciousness, what he calls it,

inner time consciousness, usually in parenthesis, first and foremost tries to attempt to explain time through an analysis of intentionality, which is to say Husserl refers in his first lecture to St. Augustine's reflection on time that I mentioned in the first session, if I remember, and contextualizes to his own phenomenological project. Husserl says, naturally we all know what time is. It is the most familiar thing of all. But as soon as we attempt to give an account of time consciousness, to put objective time and subjective consciousness into the proper relationship,

and to reach an understanding of how temporal objectivity, and therefore any individual objectivity, whatever, can become constituted in the subjective consciousness of time, we get entangled in the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions. Now, by positing or introducing, you know, this distinction between objective time and subjective time consciousness, so probably I think a no more, you shouldn't actually, you shouldn't have said subjective time and objective time. The real distinction is between objective time

and subjective time consciousness. Time consciousness in the sense that I mentioned it's, you know, last session, not really as consciousness of time. Gosselle is definitely not motivated by metaphysical concerns over the nature of time, nor does he conflate objective with objectivity in the proper sense, which he simply takes to be an element of objective reality, right, in the constitution of a temporal object.

Nicholas Warren in his book, in his text, Husserl and the Promise of Time, observed the situation that what Husserl tries to entangle as follows. The force of Husserl's suspension of objective time is aptly summarized with the remark that there is no now, past or future in objective time. It's only objective in the sense that simply, it's subjective time, uh fully rendered um or disposed predisposed uh to to adjudication to judgments that's only what it

means right it is not really objective in the in the sense of positing any sort of realistic claim about about the nature of now past or future what was self means uh is usually exemplified by considering the function of clocks, you know, for example, are, you know, common as well as scientific understanding of objective time in that full sense of objectivity is mirrored in the service of clocks in terms of, you know, which time is represented as a linear succession of fixed now points marching a stepwise in order to regularity.

uh this is called you know usually the objectivity of chronometric time and it's connected to objects of measurement such as a clock or a you know metronome which are categorically different from temporal objectivity as extrapolated uh you know from subjective temporalization on the one hand and temporal objects on the other, both of which are not assumed without involved a transcendental ego. Again, as the Warren suggests,

in you know Husserl and the promise of time uh Husserl's suspension of objective time can also be examined from another vantage point as a suspension of times master metaphors or the master metaphor what is the master metaphor the master metaphor of time as a flow or a stream captures a deep-seated intuition that time is an embracing container or form in which events happen irreversibly. Right. So that's really important to understanding that why yourself doesn't want to make these sort of commitments.

One is actually motivated by suspending the so-called master method, master metaphors of time, time as a flow, as an arrow, its direction being an arrow and so on and so forth right or worse becoming. So as early as 1900 you know with publication of logical investigation and you know elucidation of the project of descriptive phenomenology

Husserl retained a certain sort of metaphysical neutrality with regard to the question of time. This sort of metaphysical neutrality, you know, attests to his conspicuous disinterest metaphysics in pursuit of phenomenology. Dan Zavi, for example, argues that, you know, really the complexity of ourselves, you know, phenomenological undertaking should be viewed as inclusive, inclusive to descriptive, neutral, and metaphysical methods at once, you know,

but without any sort of making up his mind about the certain sort of method or model that is only justifiable by virtue of having certain sort of implicit assumptions about the reality of time, about the sort of metaphysical positionings. Now, the most important thing here, again, something that now in retrospect that maybe

i should have actually uh recommended for you to read is this phenomenological or possell's phenomenology uh particular take on the on the question of subjective and objective right which now i am seeing that it has created a certain sort of confusion so phenomenology's position on subjective and or objective distinctions is formulated through Husserl's introduction of you know such metaphysical term methodological tools right it's from a logical descriptions progress from either as I mentioned Markian or Brentonian

approaches through bracketing discursive givens without assuming their propositional qua metaphysical content such a descriptive neutrality attained through discursive bracketing epoche in the sense of both bracketing and suspension is enabled by the suspension of any naturalistic talk or claim right therefore preparing the ground for a phenomenological reduction as for example under suiting uh his word ideas and also the crisis of modern european sciences as a as a descriptive account of any international constitution which involves

according to himself transcendental reduction transcendental reduction does not here imply a kantian or any sort of metaphysical ideas it's rather needs to be understood as a methodological idealism aiming to encompass all descriptive content highlighting sensuous and noetic intentional so in this regard Husserl's time theory cannot be construed as simply engaging in the conceptual differentiation between

objective and subjective time even though that Lohmars essay taken out of context might give you that sort of impression. Husserl's time theory, you know, from early on to later lectures CBE manuscripts does not depart from any metaphysics or metaphysical assertion about subjective internal time in contrast to objective external time precisely because Husserl conceives a sensory you know linguistic and cognitive posits which should be bracketed and suspended phenomenologically

But, you know, as mentioned earlier, Husserl's phenomenology encompasses the conceptual divide of objective-subjective because it helps to analyze the intentional constitution, noesis, or noetic acts, acts of intentional cognitive content, and noemata, objects of intentional cognitive content together they constitute the description of intentionality as a transcendent or reflective object so that's the subject matter of you know transcendental phenomenology as introduced in ideas

by ourselves and within you know the purview of transcendental phenomenology also uh what says later articulation of what we will investigate uh today of of double intentionality in relation to imagination relies on the genesis of subjectivity as fundamental to the understanding of time, right? So again, quoting the Warren, it says, a central issue that emerges in our discussion of Husserl's chronological analysis of time consciousness is the impossible puzzle

of how absolute time consciousness is both constituted and self-constituting or constituting. If we follow Hosserl in placing an emphasis on the retention dimension, absolute time consciousness, as a continuous self-differentiation or flow, differentiate itself in a twofold manner along the lines of a double intentionality of retentional consciousness as a differentiation from itself in terms of transcendence of constituted time objects. Now in order to construe the puzzle of imminence and transcendence you know in as exemplified in double intentionality of

of retention consciousness, as I mentioned earlier on, we can imagine ourselves kind of riding a plane and this plane has windows, of course, with the assumption that this train is in a constant speed, where cinematically, all the scenic views seen from the windows of our seat is perceived in motion and as passing, right? Which relegate perception of such views as accelerated retentions without any fixed originary perception, there alone any sort of residues of presentism,

like as an originary now, in the sense that Brent Tano had it. Without any fixed originary perception, while our experience of being and riding the train is also registered as a continuous temporal retention, regardless of the passing of the temporal objects, i.e. the changing of the scenic views seen cinematically through the windows, right? The self-temporalization of the retention of consciousness of the train ride in this sense is thus an expression of a transcendental ego that i said is important here for ourselves for neurological method

whereas the active perceiving of the temporal objects out of the train window both reflect the immanent fulcrum of the experience and grounds the transcendental aspects of consciousness in imminence namely the train ride itself another formulation of Hossel's time theory, as I have mentioned, you know, in passing before, can be given by

concentrating on, you know, the static analysis of the double intentionality of temporal objects that can be addressed by a twofold question. How can we explain time if time is defined by intentional constitution that is highlighting and noetic content noeses and noemata and intentionality that is consciousness is constituted by time such circularity is at the core of ourselves time theory that i mentioned in the first session

and can be interpreted as a phenomenological intentional reformulation of Augustine's you know anxiety about the fundamental question of reporting of our temporal experience temporal experience in the sense that is it time being experienced or or is it experience that is timed Yeah, so both experience, both of both highletic and noetic content and explication, which

requires consciousness, are equally, according to a cell, constituted by temporal relations are required to explain time. Vossel posits internal time consciousness as implicating both assertions as irreducible and reciprocal. Time to consciousness and consciousness to time. Now, Now, let me get my screen sharing.

actually before that uh let me let me say something about you know we i tried to kind of a little bit talk about it last session uh precisely given the rule of intentionality here i think that we should and precisely because intentionality just like the idea of phenomenology is being used and misused in different contexts i I think it would be a little bit helpful to kind of underline what specifically Husserl means by intentionality. Sorry, one second. I think I forgot my lighter. One second. Let me go grab my lighter and I'm coming back.

Thank you. Sorry. Sorry.

So, in a salient sense, intentionality is definitely not the intentional stance as you know, as defended by Perantano and then, consequently criticized heavily by the sort of, you know,

naturalistic philosophers such as Dennett, and other people. So intentionality for CERL includes experimental psychology, right? That's from Brentano. Gestalt theory, cognitive science, and in a way is pivotal concept for any critical discourse on cognition. There is a common tendency, you know, to confuse, particularly when it comes to the idea of intentionality,

to confuse phenomenology, which assumes intentionality, with cognitivism in general. This tendency attempts to reconcile, you know, phenomenal and phenomenological differences as cognitive descriptive levels of various data classified as hyalitic descriptions or noetic descriptions or physical, physiological, linguistic, and cognitive categories. but we shouldn't confuse or conflate phenomenology at least in a whossalian sense and cognitivism in general

some cognitive projects like varela's you know jean petitou's ronathan Tom project's attempt to retain a version of phenomenology to a holistic cognitive approach so as to not upset the transcendental or anti-naturalistic strain of Hossel's phenomenology. Yet Hossel asserts his anti-naturalism in particularly logical investigations and his, you know, famous paper, The Crisis of Modern European Sciences, as a suspension of any common sense acceptance of physicalistic or mentalistic assumptions

to a phenomenological reduction. Essentially, phenomenological idioms or modes of reflections shall not be confused with either mentalistic or physicalistic idioms. Such a suspension or bracketing shouldn't be, you know, construed as a denial or for that matter affirmation of either realism or anti-realism,

but rather a healthy abstention, abstaining from, a metaphysical position to proceed with a phenomenological explication of experience and its objects. And so, you see, there is a reason that Carnap is fundamentally interested in Rosera. Precisely because the phenomenological reduction assumes and actively, vigilantly tries to suspend any sort of metaphysical posit,

it but rather tries to you know create as best as it can and under check uh and under control i mean but of course this control as we know at least in carna but also in in a hostell sense is not always what you might call be fruitful. So using a methodological neutrality, at least by suspending metaphysical posits, and then move forward without having any sort of prior, what you might call to be a stance about the question of realism,

anti-realism. And there is a reason that, for example, you see, I mentioned it on Discord, that Dan Zahavi is quite suspicious of projects like speculative realism and these sort of debates around realism or trying to re-describe phenomenology with a particular focus on the question of realism versus anti-realism, yeah, that precisely because that would undercut

the phenomenological descriptive method. So, in this respect, you know, both experience and object as the content of phenomenological reduction are regarded as descriptively neutral or forestalled or suspended. For Ossel then, an object is an inclusive concept, standing for anything that can be predicated. Right? Therefore, experience is an inclusive as any frame of reference to a given state of affairs.

Ossel then distinguishes between two categories of objects, for example, in logical investigations, and real objects which are perceptually experienced and ideal objects which are categorically comprehended or intuited. Both real and ideal objects are intentionally constituted as products of our cognitive dynamics, generally speaking. However, such constitution by means of objects noetic directedness, i.e. intentionality, is not based on the divide between particular and universal, or contingency and necessity from the get-go, but rather assumes complex

forms of predication, conjugation, synthesizing, and concurrency, which are analyzable reductively. Consequently, the intentional analysis of objects does not reduce them to real or ideal, but instead explains them in terms of noetic, noemotic constitution as acts and objects of intentions. Now, since time equally involves and determines intentional temporal object and is constructed by intentionality, the procedure of phenomenological reduction in either or

noetic noemotic terms is inadequate and inapplicable to time as such therefore Husserl is then required to provide an account of time consciousness to explain the constitution of the actually present in his own term object as such the role of time consciousness or inner time consciousness then for phenomenology as an inseparable twofold nexus cannot be overestimated then Hossel stresses in ideas

that phenomenological time is prerequisite for attaining not only the content of experience as an active and discrete synthesis but also for enabling the continuous synthesis of time itself but then how can the circular definition of time vis-a-vis intentionality be avoided And particularly, or more specifically, how will the phenomenological reduction of imminent temporal objects not infinitely, not infinitely regress in relation to the transcendent, i.e.

temporal constitution of consciousness itself as a continuous synthesis? So, this essentially motivates Hosserl, this sort of enigma and puzzles, to drastically revise his earlier accounts of time theory, to the point that Hosserl is forced to elaborate various explanatory models and finally concludes in his own words, the process that constitutes the imminent object of the first level would only have to be itself generally a constituted process,

which is itself a perceived and internally conscious process. But it would have to be such that it is in itself conscious of itself without requiring new processes. It would have to be a constituting process for itself, a primal process whose being would be conscious and conscious of itself and its temporality. Therefore, by distinguishing between two levels of temporal constitution, the first objective and the other primary as its own object, Husserl then tries to attempt, attempts to avoid the infinite, so-called infinite constitutive regress of

consciousness to time and time consciousness. And furthermore, you know, to explain the so-called interdependence of consciousness and time, Husserl first of all, differentiates between temporal object and an objective absolute time flow. Through the quotation that I just read for you, Husserl, seem to struggle to come to terms with such a twofold constitution,

you know, repeatedly formulated as concept of imminent temporal objects and transcendent temporal acts in the constitution of absolute time flow. What seems undeniable is that Husserl reformulating of Augustine's in intentional terms, however, has provided a considerable discursive context, you know, for phenomenological cognitive analysis of intentionality and time as interwoven. Now, what we are going to do is going to, you know, analyze the relevance of this interwovenness, this without jumping to either the failure or the success of the project, but rather

emphasizing and focusing on this sort of, you know, opening of this new discursive context for the examination of the role of time and consciousness and our intentionality, being interwomen, motivated, always, like a helix. And see the relevance of this for the description of appearances, not only, you know, appearance of appearances, so to speak, in terms of experiential, experiential, you know, awarenesses or meta-awarenesses in a Kantian sense, but also description, of physical phenomena,

and particularly within the, you know, within the ambits of scientific description, and see how the so-called vicious transparency of time has its stamp all over the world, uh objective in the the full-blooded sense objective scientific description before then i want so in order to understand at least at the other you know that kind of inarticulate uh you know

lower scale, looking at, you know, the interwoveness of proto-intentionality and proto-time consciousness, right? Essentially, we want to look at Hosell's diagram of of time time consciousness right this diagram is obviously is a reworking of brentano within so far as brentano is a committed presentist and hosselle is not this diagram is heavily different in in its implications than that uh than the one that brentano has made and you can check brentano's

time diagram online. It's essentially a line with columns either drawn off of it. And each line has a certain sort of now discreteness, a certain sort of a specious present that has the past series already embedded in it, grafted onto it. The thing is that Brentano presentism, as Husserl found out very soon in his even earliest lectures, in fact, this is something that happens in all sorts of presentist accounts.

in that it opens a fundamental implausible scenario that precisely because every now presence, every now unit, either articulate in terms of a species present or just now as like temporal monads, right? creates a picture of experience, right, in which it would be completely objectively right to assume that whether

the whole world come to existence three seconds ago, or the whole world succumb to cease to exist three seconds from now, it never changes your experience. Your experience will be always the same, bound to the discrete now. That is the consequence, the logical consequence of presentism. So it falls under the extreme variety of Russell's five minutes ago paradox.

that literally it would be completely fine, not even plausible, it would be completely fine if the universe leaped into existence five minutes ago. It doesn't change anything whatsoever to your experience. Or for that matter, if universe succumbed to exist, five months from now or let's not even talk about five minutes let's say a microsecond from now a micro microsecond from now it doesn't make any difference right that's that's that's a logical

consequence of presentism really inflated to its ultimate consequences and also saw through that that is precisely, it is no longer like Russell's. It's not, it doesn't create doubt, but it creates fundamental antinomy that makes experience itself impossible. The articulation of experience would be impossible, in fact. So, before I start and share my screen questions.

A small question. If I'm not mistaken, you are developing this idea of Russell's paradox in chronosis as well, yes? Yes, yes, yes. There is an implication. Russell, as I said, Russell actually, he wants to actually question. make make okay russle wants to make the idea of universe jumping into existence five minutes or five seconds ago and everything will be all fine a plausible statement a plausible statement, right? He does not want to say that it's logically necessary.

The thing with Brentonian presentism is that it makes it logically necessary, you know, that it's all fine. Anything that jumps into existence outside of the now, as being this sort of temporal monad, would be all fine. It doesn't really change your experience. Yes, I understand. Yes, Delshat. Yeah, this just reminded me of Davidson's Swampman argument. Have you heard about?

No, no, no, please go on. Yeah, Swampman's argument is basically Davidson in his argument against semantic representationalism. he imagines a thought experiment in which you imagine that by sheer chance a complete replica of you of Reza is created out of nowhere in a swamp. And down to the quantum level of all the fermions and bosons are exactly the replica of you. But you will never call this Reza because what this being lacks is the history. so this kind of argument that's used in cognitive neuroscience

that's Boltzmann's brain yeah exactly Boltzmann's brain yeah so I've never thought about it in this way but Russell's paradox and presentism would be exact I think the same kind of subcategorical of the same argument absolutely yes you know beings are not defined by their nature but by their histories in a Hegelian slogan. Yes. Yes, definitely. So, yes. The thing, however, with Boltzmann's brain, though, the thing is that Boltzmann, when he proposed the so-called cosmological hypothesis and started to look at its implications, it says, strangely, he's not actually making

the the assumptions that you know that that it is that it's probable that does and so or in fact it's possible that that does and so thing can actually happen you know that would be an exact replica of me without any sort of history right just in a very instantaneous moment of time without any sort of temporal extension. He wants to say strangely that given how microestate and macroestate are connected,

there are in fact extremely highly improbable fluctuations that can happen that can make this a plausible situation but not plausible in the sense of that you can say that like Brentonian or, you know, as a matter of probability. No, he wants to say that improbability of thus and so fluctuations, if they would be as improbable as we say, then it underlines the possibility of such an existence,

which is quite a very sinister sort of argument, right? It doesn't want to say that it is probable or plausible that these things can happen. No, it's by virtue of its pure improbability that this thing can happen. And that's the argument that really, I think, I have read so many pieces that's arguing why Boltzmann brains are bad for your brain, right? You know, you shouldn't think about that. But I think they always somehow miss the point of what Boltzmann wants to talk about. And essentially, Boltzmann brain is an argument

to show that judgment from entropic fluctuation is by definition not a good judgment. And this good not being a good judgment not only extend to the emergence of the so-called Boltzmann brains, right, but also to the ordinary judgments that we usually ascribe to, you know, phenomenon by virtue of, by resorting to entropic explanation, like such as, for example, unscrambling a scrambled egg. Why? He says that essentially that there is something fundamental in this entropic explanation

that is wrong. That if you are saying that, oh, well, you know, the time asymmetry means that you can never actually unscramble in the sense of irreversible processes, unscramble is scrambled egg. And if you are resorting to entropic fluctuations, as a function of the connection between microstate and microstate, observable microstates, to explain about these sorts of appearances, then you could easily talk about certain sort of improbable fluctuations in entropic that is completely justifiable through the idioms of entropic explanation that could lead you to the

quandary of Boltzmann brains, right? It would be justifiable as well. So the whole point is that Boltzmann wants to say that, no, in fact, you cannot resort to entropic explanation to talk about even the ordinary phenomena, such as when you open a bottle, you know, the gas escapes from it and never comes back to it. And you see that those sort of explanations are quite actually vast in the history of science as being understood quite canonically, like dogmas, precisely by virtue of, you know,

putting all their eggs in the basket of entropic explanation right you know as a function of entropy uh someone else uh that's what you you still have a question yeah yes go on sorry sorry just a short one uh i was thinking about the relation between subjective time and objective time in analogy to say manifest objects and imperceptible objects. So three basic ideas came

to my mind. One of them, if manifest objects just like phenomenological time is just identical with a system of imperceptible objects or ontological time, just like a forest is identical to a number of trees, number one. Number two, manifest objects or phenomenological time are really what exist and the ontological time and the impersonal objects are just symbolic and abstractions and idealization of this phenomenological time and manifest objects. Thirdly, manifest objects or phenomenological time are just appearances to us human beings of an underlying reality, which is the ontological time on imperceptible objects.

So I was struggling to know what exactly this paper is arguing for. Is it just like trees and forests or just the idealizations or some sort of emergentism or reduction? This is something that I will definitely talk about future sessions, and we are moving toward that direction. I mentioned already micro states and macro states as a sort of Boltzmannian correlate of the phenomenological vocabulary. That would be the interplay between ideal noesis and noemotic ideals, abstractions of the sort that you are talking about,

and the sort of appearances, manifest appearances. And the whole point is that there is a fundamental deep-rooted interaction between these two. It's not as if they are on two different ontological, situated on two different ontological realms, right? But rather, any sort of ontological claim about the nature of the manifest appearances or the abstract ones requires an account of the interwovenness, intertwinement of these two.

And the Othalian idea is, as I said, ideal noesis or ideal noetic acts and noemotic ideals, such as numbers and abstracts, stuff that we associate when we are talking about imperceptible, unobservable, in fact, stuff. But that is something actually that opens far more actually interesting puzzles. That's, I think, where Husserl's classical phenomenology at least starts to kind of crack. But this is precisely because, not because of how it has been formulated is wrong,

but precisely because the accounts of the intertwinement between these two and the descriptive levels which we usually want to talk about when we are talking about the interactions are not quite explicated well right the interaction is the inter intertwinement that that we don't understand, the exact levels. We can't reflect really on this intertwinement cohesively. Hossef would have said, this is precisely, as I kind of mentioned in a kind of a,

briefly in passing, Josef would probably would say that this is actually the nature of the phenomenological reflection. That it makes, that the reflection on the intertwinement itself changes the content and hence deviates us from what is actually might be happening. This is one of the reasons that you know, I do highly recommend, I mean, those of you who haven't

read Hosselle's text Crisis, Crisis of Modern European in sciences, why that Hossell sees that there is some certain sort of tendencies emerging in sciences that is fundamentally anathemic to its labor of explanation. So let me,

okay, share this screen. can you see the screen excellent so this is ourselves time diagram right it can be there are different ways that it can be drawn one but I chose these two and particularly the second one creates us a better understanding of what's going on so Hosell's you know analysis of time consciousness as I mentioned differ

from you know uh logical linguistic or psychological uh psychological analysis by um by actively avoiding any assumption about the existence of time as based on causal relations linguistic predication or mentalistic primacy right as for several states in early analysis you know, of inner time consciousness. The temporal form is neither a temporal content itself, nor a complex of new contents that somehow attach themselves to the temporal content. Temporality is thus the formal condition of possibility

for the constitution of any object. So Husserl, in a way like Mark turns, And of course, Brentano turns to musical tune or melody as a certain sort of exemplary case or exemplification for experiencing time, right? This diagram is just exemplify. Something that Lomer talks about this, you know, know, as that sort of inarticulate level of subjective time and establishments of identity

at that very inarticulate level, right. So yeah, Husserl, unlike, you know, Mark, however, for him, temporal objects are not, you know, to be understood as cases of simple or complex sensations, but rather require analyzing sensations in terms of perception and impressions. as well as intentionality, i.e. in terms of directedness and intendedness. Now what makes

Rossell's analysis very interesting is that on the one hand, he doesn't suppose, for example, like Brentano, a representational content or categorical imminence to a temporal object for acknowledging its conscious content. On the other hand, Husserl explains such temporally conscious content not in terms of modes of temporal appearance and predication, you know, memories of past, present, future, etc., but in terms of the cognitive enactment of primal impressions, cognitive enactment

of primal impressions, retentions and pretensions as modes of temporal apprehensions, right? it. Furthermore, Husserl interprets a temporal object as involving what he calls double intentionality. And I will talk about this double intentionality more in details, either we don't have that much time, but definitely next session. So Husserl apparently, you know, modify this time diagram a number of times. And that was, as I mentioned, was a reworking of Brentano's diagram.

The time diagram, as you see it here, is a model of two-dimensional temporal coordinates that can be seen as equivalent to three-dimensional visual perspectival coordinates. hence it can be regarded as a representational manifold only insofar as three-dimensional perspective does not prevail in a spatial reality but rather exemplifies a space metric space in relation to perception such as in vision and depth. So Hossel's time diagram is not about the perception

or impression of temporal phenomena or time itself, but rather the structured objective relation or proto-objective relations. So he wants to talk about essentially time diagram, as I mentioned, captures a certain sort of semblance of thus and so a structuration that is required to be worked that can be worked out down the line and upstream to the moment of full articulation. right but nevertheless it needs to have

thus and so sort of rudimentary structuration imagine you know a melody that starts at point T0 and will end at point T4 in this diagram from it presents perception it's sorry it's present or now perceptions present perception is at t3 this is what is usually regarded by Hosserl as the moment of original or primary perception

Now consider T0, T1, T2, T3, which is C, and T4 as impressions, where T0 would be the primal impression, T3C, the original impression of the present now. and T3 is the original impression is related to the points A1, right, A2, A3, through the projected impressions of T0, T1, and T2. The original or primary impression T3 is situated as the now point of the temporal horizon

and is defined by a series of retentions and pretensions. Retentions are the intention which is informed by our consciousness of the receiving or sorry receding like running back receding off sinking sinking almost uh sinking off by receding musical tune, a temporal object. A protention, however, is the sense of anticipation of what is about to be heard, right? The retention of the tune is therefore exemplified by T0,

A1, T1, A2, T2, A3, as they're running off in Hosell or sinking off continuum of the tune. And so T0, T1, and T2 are running off, receding, sinking from the present moment to past moments. This phenomenon of running off and sinking off continuum indicates for a cell the fading of past impressions as they leave behind something like a comet tail, right? when a comet that's the the you know the the the the comet starts to vaporize you know and it

creates a tail so uh that leaves as they leave behind a comet tail uh t3 a3 t3 uh uh sorry uh t3 a3 t3 a2 3, 3, A3. I might have marked this by mistake, so just you rectify it when thinking about the diagram. So the passing off of perceptions, which is to say the decrease of the vividness of impressions, is not to be confused with the running off of retentions, namely the fading consciousness of the intentional phenomena.

Rather Husserl distinguishes the perceptual continuity i.e. of impressions from the retensional adumbrative continuum. The physical dissipation of sound as waves is therefore differentiated from the lasting resonance in our perception, and hence cognition. The former involves measured metric time, the latter an experience of temporal continuity. The x-coordinates are the horizon in Hossel's terms, or the continuum of the present original phase. Along the x-continuum,

we can trace not only past original time phases, but also the pretension of a forthcoming time phase. Now, Hosell analyzes the cognitive ability in perceiving the coming pretension in correlation to the length metrically represented of the retensional continuum itself. For example, if one walks, you know, walks in late to a, you know, an opera or a concert and start listening to a musical tune at a later point than the rest of the audience, who have been present there for some time, then one's retensional continuum is shorter and less informed. As a result, the

latecomers, potential sense, i.e. cognitive capacity to identify or catch up with the music or the tune will be less clear and effective than that of the rest of the audience who have been present for some time in the hall. So the A coordinate is the vertical alignment of the phase continuum intersecting at T3 and can be construed as encapsulating the retensional continuum A1, A2, A3, and the protention A4. What Hossel designates as the M-axis or the M-direction

is a direction of the sinking into time and can be viewed as the running off of primary or originary impressions. That is to say, as a temporal object here, a melody, a musical tune unfolds, it recedes from its past impressions into its recollection or memory. Now, it's important to differentiate between retention and pretension on the one hand and the recollection and anticipation on the other. The temporal object as it is experienced consists of a continuum of phenomenally chasing objects, here sounds,

right, which merge one with another. Therefore, the segment T0, T1, T1, T2, and T2, you know, T3C are three temporal objects which continuously sink into pretensions, each a triangulated topos or place that continuously recedes or runs off, right? Retentions and pretensions don't constitute the temporal objects themselves, namely phenomenal

impressions such as musical tunes. Instead, they somehow provide the representation of the temporal continuum by which consciousness is continuously present. Time, accordingly for herself, is neither a naturalistically assumed flow or event, nor is it a mechanical chronometric measuring apparatus, because it both assumes and presupposes temporalization as involving both temporal objects and self-temporalization of an ego the self sorry uh maybe we shall switch to yes okay let's let me just finish the sentence and

then that will be for today so the self-temporalization uh of this living presence this is from Hosselle, of this primal or absolute ego occurs through the generation of retentions and pretensions of its original impressional appearing, which is that of a timeless welling up of impressions. So we will continue with the diagram um but good way to think about this that this diagram essentially creates a very uh it's a kind of like against the presentism of brentano but it also has has a certain sort of

creates or highlights the role of continuity in perception, particularly temporal perceptions. That is not as a perceptions or now perceptions are discrete units like windowless monads, but rather they are thresholds. Thresholds that are you know, congruent with one another. And perceptual identity has as its essential, meaning of the eidetic insight,

the presupposition of discontinuity, understood as thresholds or gates gates, you know, phantom gates between perceptions in this diagram. So we will get back to this. I will talk about this, but that was today's lecture, and I know that we are over time. I think that on Discord, you can decide what to, who is going to present. We have a text, I think. we have two texts and we already which texts are the names of the presenters we have

a text by findlay who sells analysis of inner time consciousness and yeah yeah and the hardy one and we have uh six presenters for it uh so i want to ask the presenters to please uh try to make a collective presentation and try to make it no more than 20 minutes and please send them upload them to the folder not after Thursday so better on Wednesday actually because

the time difference affects me severely when you have day I already have almost night and I wait for the presentations like till 2 a.m and I'm very sleepy at that time already. Excellent okay let's then reserve questions for next session we will open questions because I know that we are running out of time. We don't have questions. Write down your questions and I will take the questions at the beginning of next session. Thank you again to Fria and Joel for magnificent presentations. Thank you very much. Thank you everyone else for great

contributions. See you next week. Thanks, Josep. Bye. Thank you, Josep. Bye. Juan, you wanted to ask some question? Oh, Juan disappeared. Okay, Lika. Have a great weekend. Bye.

Thank you.