Hello everyone and welcome to the 11th session of Theory and Object with Rezanegar Stani. We're going to pass the mic to Tim now. Thank you Theo and thank you everyone. So today we will continue with that you know the old thesis of Wow and I will you know briefly go over the core of the problem particularly as criticized by Nelson Goodman after that we will move directly to the confrontation or the debates between deductivism of the prepare philosophy
and inductivism of Carnap's inductive logic. Next session we will look at Hemphill's paradigm of scientific explanation and so you can read the hempel reference that I have given you here by the way what is this what is today's session is a 10th session the 11th 11th and we are still in car now that's just utterly bogus okay well no
we will have four sessions, makeup sessions at the end. So at least we can go to the space time problems and stuff. Sounds good. OK. any questions before I start a request for it are we planning to go through your arguments in your essay yes we do and I'm really sorry for
recommending something of mine but I thought that it is somehow a good at least a succinct encapsulation of the entire debate between Karna, Seymuller, Putnam, Popper, so on and so forth. Anyone? Nothing, pure silence.
Okay then. I can ask a question. Sure, sure. I was just wondering, I mean for me it's all very new, but I was, but I started to have impression that for certain trends of thought or practicing general artificial intelligence like for certain proponents of inductivism induction has some kind of primacy or essential important and i don't understand on which ground it is given to the ground of empiricism okay of course for karnat this is a little bit more complex than this you see for example
Hume is of the empiricist kind in the sense of a kind of rudimentary embryonic empiricism in which simple observations or sense data can actually tell us something about the universe okay fundamentally about the structure of the world in which we live. But for Carnap, we talked about it, that he at least as early as the project of Auffalo, he did not buy into pure empiricists of the human kind anymore. He was a logical empiricist and logical empiricists, we talked about this, that it's literally not a kind of by any means a conventional empiricism so for
Karnat things get a little bit different precisely because a logical empiricism as far as it is concerned with the problem of induction or inductive learning it is not about observation it is not as if you know records or impressions empirical impressions of our of our senses as how it doesn't so been affected by the world can tell us anything about the world is for Carnap is that such observations can in fact be addressed or referenced by way of an inductive logic.
An inductive logic is what you might call to be essentially a theory of probability in a more kind of contemporary sense after Dufinetti, Bruno Dufinetti, rather than the kind of human sense so you have a logic but the nature of this logic is that of probability it's the logic essentially works with measure functions probability functions prior so on so forth and our observations in that sense our basic sense data or atomic sentences observational sentences are referenced or parsed in the framework of an inductive logic, logic being capitalized.
Anything? Anyone else? Okay then. So, as I mentioned that, you know, we went through some rather kind of labyrinthine talks about ERLIPS, elementary experiences with regards to the old theses of Aqbal, if you have watched or remember from the previous session at the end.
Now let's carry on and continue with this discussion which is a little bit dense. After that we will move with induction versus induction. So as I mentioned Carnap's main goal in the first part of his constitution system, the so-called auto-psychological domain in section 106 to section 122 of the logical structure of the world or half-bowl is to show the meager basis of the system suffices for the definition
of various kinds of terms by which one may express and analyze a subject's S's experience qualitatively. In particular, Carnap wants to define the general term, phenomenal quality point, the extension of which should be the set of phenomenal counterparts of visual, auditory, tactile, etc. sensory quality points as described earlier on in the previous session. While the quality points are just points in some mathematical spaces that come associated with sense modalities, the phenomenal counterparts
to these quality points, which are called phenomenal quality points, are set theoretic constructs on ERLAPs or elementary experiences. We mentioned what exactly elementary experiences are in the previous session. A quality point P is meant to induce a phenomenal quality point in the sense that the latter
is the set of all ERLABs, elementary experiences, in which P is realized or brought about. The set of phenomenal quality points is therefore the class of all sets of ERLABs which are induced in this way. However, while this is intended interpretation of the predicate phenomenal quality point, Carnap has to show that its extension may be defined, whether directly or indirectly, solely in terms of the basic relations of membership, you know, in theoretical terms, and ER, short for ERLEB.
The way in which he tries to accomplish this is roughly one by defining a similarity relation denoted as SIM, S-I-M. And we talked about associations last time with regard to Russell's five minutes ago paradox and acognitive phases. So, if you missed last session, I definitely suggest to go over it because we have gone over these definitions.
The way in which he tries to accomplish this is roughly one, by defining a similarity relation SIM of Erleps as the reflexive symmetric closure of ER. Now actually let me for you to follow this accurately, let me share my screen so you can see my notes. Well, actually, I don't like, okay, wait, let's just one second, one second.
yeah so here to start from here the sets of phenomenal quality points is therefore the class of all sets of Erlems which are induced in this way. However, while this is the intended interpretation of predicates, the nominal quality point, Carnap has to show that its extension may be defined, whether directly or indirectly,
solely in terms of the basic relation, membership, and ER . The way in which he tries to accomplish this is roughly one, by defining a similarity relation sim of Erlamps as the reflexive symmetric closure of ER. You can check Wikipedia for reflexive relation. Essentially, in naïve set theoretic or set theoretic terms. what you might call to be so imagine you remember that we talked about X er Y X
air lab Y essentially a mapping that can be you know diagrammatized by way of an arrow x to y or x in some sort of relation of an elementary experience associated with elementary experience with y now a reflexive relation is a theoretic terms in what you might call to be a kind of generalization of an inverse function which means that just as you can draw an arrow from moving from x to y it can equally go to from y to x namely the inverse function also points so reflexive
symmetric closure is essentially a generalization of this uh constraint two by abstracting from sim the phenomenal counterparts of spheres in quality spaces. We call them phenomenal spheres. And three, by defining the members of the extension of phenomenal quality, and finally, by defining the members of the extension of the phenomenal quality point in terms of these phenomenal spheres, A step one is intended to have the result that X sim Y if and only if X and Y realize
quality points in a common closed quality sphere of diameter epsilon, i.e. X and Y realize quality points that have a distance less than less or equal to epsilon. So we talked about acognitic phases, we talked about associations and similarities between those which have been remembered but not forgotten, between those which have been just remembered and those present remembrances in a Rossellian wheel or the Richard Simon concept of acognitic fades now then this latter constraint is what you might say that well imagine if
you have the sense impressions this photographic images being recorded on a light-sensitive tape recorder what does exactly what kind of constraint should it puts on this idea of a tape recorder in order for us to make sure that associations hold objectively because of course from a Popperian sense we can make and also from Carnapian sense we can make all sorts of associations for
example just because there is a red dot in my optical view and then I turn my head around and on a distance view I say something else that is not really a perfect association everything can be connected with everything in order for these connections or associations between these sensory impressions to be somehow in a very rudimentary sense objective, you need to have some constraints of distance with regard to your optical field. That's why we are introducing, or Karnap at least, we're
introducing the sphere diameter, epsilon. It's essentially they belong in the same optical or visual phenomenon field. Is this clear? I can't see you because I don't want to get rid of my shared screen because I know that I will not be able to get it back. So just say if you have any questions on this front anyone anything i'm i'm processing it for a second okay so
So I said that diameter epsilon, i.e. x and y, realize quality points, quality phenomenal points, that have a distance less than or equal to epsilon. The steps two and three constitute Carnap's method of what he calls quasi-analysis. So what is quasi-analysis? You see, according to Carnap's methodological concept, quasi-analysis, the fundamental units of experience are not the qualities, the color, shapes, et cetera, involving individual experiences,
as as experiences. But those experiences themselves are taken as indivisible wholes. But this means that analysis understood in a decomposition sense then cannot yield these qualities precisely because they are not seen as constituents of the elementary experiences. Instead, they are to be constructed by what he calls quasi-analysis, a method that mimics or imitates analysis, namely the composition of elements, in yielding quasi-constituents,
but which precedes synthetically rather than analytically. Similarly the elements of quasi-analysis are synthetic rather than analytic, namely pure analysis, hence the word quasi-analysis. In reality, Kardap's method of quasi-analysis is just that method of logical abstraction that Fugge has called abstraction. My apologies for the typos. An equivalence relation holding between things of one kind, concepts in Frigge's case, is used to define or construct things of another kind, numbers in Frigge's sense, just as numbers
are not constitutive of the concepts to which they are ascribed but can be constructed from appropriate equivalence relations, so too can other quasi-constituents be constructed. You see, for example, when Carnap talks about a red point, a red dot in your visual field, You see, this red visual field, this red dot, this element, elementary experience, can be thought in terms of quasi-analysis. In the sense that it is under synthetically red,
but also with regard to Frigge's analogy that I just made, You no longer talk about a red dot, you don't say red dot is there like in Kant. This is a red dot out there in my visual field. A red dot is turned into a set of real numbers or coordinates for such and such qualities and such and such coordinates in time and space. And hence, the introduction of the epsilon that I mentioned earlier, the diameter of the sphere of your visual field, actually tries to create a boundary of potential associations
within a space-time coordinates for such visual registers such as a red dot, a blue dot, a brownish dot, so on and so forth. So as I mentioned, the steps two and three considered Carnap's method of quasi-analysis, a method of abstraction that generalizes Figuez and Russell's method of abstracting equivalent classes from equivalence relations, namely associations.
Phenomenal spheres are thus supposed to have a mediating role between ERLAB's elementary distances and phenomenal quality points like a red dot. Analogously to the case of phenomenal quality points, a quality sphere Q is meant to induce a phenomenal quality sphere in the sense that the latter should be the set of all Erlebs which realize some quality point in Q. The set of phenomenal quality spheres is then the class of all sets of airlines which are induced in this way the first part of quasi analysis is intended to define the extension of phenomenal quality sphere to this class
where the definition is to be spelled out solely in terms of membership and ER you see This is not a big deal. I mean, the definition might be a little bit terse and deft, but it's not really a big deal. It's the idea that, you know, for example, in early philosophy, you know, coming as early as Kant and I would say later on for example in the work of MacTaggart, John Ellis MacTaggart, in particularly in his first, I mean in a two volume book Nature of Existence, MacTaggart
talks about this kind of elementary experiences in terms of two things what he calls a bundle and what he calls a group. You see a bundle is what he might call to be simply a human empirical relations between your sense impressions so as long as in a humane sense you know that in a humane sense there is subject is defined in terms of bundles of perceptions or sensory or sense data rather than the kantian idea of a perception or unity of our perception
Essentially for Hume, because he's an empiricist, he thinks that the person who ate the hot dog, the sauce, the dog, the ketchup, the bun, the mustard, is also the subject, the person, person capitalized, ate a hot dog. This is what you might call to be the bundle view. All you need is simply a conglomeration or a collection of sensory impressions of what
you have eaten or what have been, for example, in our case recorded on this light sensitive tape recorder. a group view of subjectivity or subject s and its experiences is not really a bundle it is a bundle but it has something fundamentally more it's also about associations without such associations and these associations are are not given by the sense impressions themselves. You see, that's really important. So they are synthetic rather than purely analytic. These associations are what you might call to be
the view that we are now talking with regard to Carnap's idea of the quasi-analysis and how, for example, the red dot, the blue dots, the green dots, As long as they inhabit or register in your visual field under such and such constraints of the phenomenological sphere, the phenomenological quality points, so on and so forth, the distance, the equivalence, translations, you can make some sort of what? associations about them. But these associations are chiefly and majorly are not the fruits
or the products or byproducts of how these empirical impressions have been put together in your visual field in space-time coordinates, but in terms of the kind of constraints that you have put in your visual field where you can identify these phenomenal quality points such as red dot and blue dot in terms of thus and so similarities and associations? Questions?
Stop. They're brewing, don't worry. I hope you are not having brain meltdown at this point, because it's just too early of a day. I mean, what I'm thinking is so... What I'm tempted to say... Can you say, okay, that's been so constructive, but... It's like the empiricism in this, I'm still not fully getting, because... The way that I see it is that these sort of quality points, they end up having logical relationships with each other.
Yes. That makes me think that they're also, you know, logical resources. So then I wonder, is logical resources themselves constructed from experience? No, they are not constructed from experience. Or at least observed through experience. They are neither observed through experience nor constructed through experience. They are essentially what you might call to be logical mathematical construct. Essentially they have nothing to do with individual experiences.
Their roots are informal intersubjectivity or language as such. Now the thing is that we talked about mathematical spaces, set theoretic spaces, etc. etc. At least for Carnap, early Carnap, all mathematical relations, all mathematical associations by which you can in fact make clear the similarities and associations between your phenomenal quality points in the air lab space are given by mathematics. However, Carnap is a logicist, which means that all such mathematical associations that
make clear, phenomenal associations can be in fact reduced to pure logic. Okay, I get that. Reducibility of mathematics to logic for Carnap is a key at the beginning. Yeah, yeah. I mean, that's what Hilbert thought as well. Yes. But what I'm wondering then is, like, I mean, I do agree that the interaction of logical resources is formal and transcendental. What I'm not really getting is that it seems like a big part of the empiricism is that you have development of logical resources through explicitation, etc.
And I'm not like it's I think the development is logical and so ahistorical but it seems like the fact that... It is historical but not evolutionary in a natural evolutionary sense. So just something that Carnarv actually talks about this in his later work. like think about uh natural about language sure language is given to us by evolutionary means biological evolutionary means but once we have language and we are capable of making explicit
the rules namely the transformation rules that are obtained within the symbols of a specific language then we are capable of making other languages now the history of language in the in the latter sense which is the history of language as a general language as opposed to merely natural ordinary language is no longer evolutionary but it does not mean it is a historic precisely because it is the history of logic the history of philosophy okay that makes sense i was saying you see history
is a quite a sticky term here when people talk yeah when you talk about history you can mean history in a colloquial sense of history of everything or history as simply the history of of the concept, okay? Hegel believes that only concept has a history. And Carnap also really buys into this implicitly. Would you say that logic develops through like interactive consequence? Implications. Yeah. A space of implications, yeah.
which is basically a dialectical thing. And so you would say then that this implication, you know, some of it can come from, you know, empirical data and taking those to their logical consequence, but also the pure formal resources for logic themselves and how they interact and taking those to their consequence. It would be through both. At least in Afdaw, this dialectical nature of the evolution or the history of logic and language is not fully foreground or explicit. But in his later works, particularly through the notion of explication, this becomes fundamentally
a main feature. concepts are ultimately dialectical and hence unnatural. Doesn't mean that they are supernatural but they are not natural, which is essentially platonic being. And so when you say that explicitation creates new... Explicitation or explication? Yeah, yeah. They take... explication, explication. That they end up creating new, sort of like axiomatic tools from which to draw things is the creating of the quality spheres which include all of the air laps.
Yes. There last been... You see, for Carnap's explication, he actually talks about in his later works as conceptual engineering, which is very much actually in tandem with Deleuze's concept engineering. Of course, I would say that Deleuze really didn't fundamentally understand what concepts are. He understood what ideas are, but not actually concepts. For Karna, conceptual engineering is nothing natural. It can be naturalized. It can be naturalized. What the operation itself is not natural,
it's pure logical. So as soon as you could expand the sum of the overlaps, the total through explication, and then you would want to draw new quasi constituents which construct the policy experience. Yes, okay. This is really good. I mean, can you repeat this for everyone? Yeah, so... Commentary on this. There's, I mean, I'm seeing, like, there's sort of, like, two things, because in one hand, you have all the air labs, which is just all of experiential data.
and then you can imagine extending your sense organs or something to that effect or you know more primordial concepts um that set ends up changing but that's just your your data it's not what you draw from it and with logic this seems like maybe like with logical resources the sim relation, like similarity relations, that you are able to construct the quality points. But it seems like there is also, you know, you can expand, say, intuition routes from expanding the air labs. but it seems like it also expands the logical relations,
which constructs the quality spheres from some of the overlaps. Okay, yes, let me kind of encapsulate this. It's essentially the idea, what Christian is talking about, is that, so, we understand conceptual engineering, Essentially that the associations between our phenomenal points are not made by phenomenal points themselves in a kind of a Rossellian, Humean sense, but by way of our logical resources
or logical concepts. Now this means that if we are thinking about the history of the concept, and the history of the concept in dialectical sense is exactly what Carnap means by explication. So explication then has two different but commensurable trajectories. is what you might call to be pure concepts as developed solely by way of conceptual resources with regardless of the associations obtained between phenomenal quality points or atomic
statements these are what you might call to be global concepts okay which are absolutely necessary to the second trajectory is what you might call those concepts which pertain to associations between airlines essentially they are in one way or another have something to do with our elementary experiences and also the application of such concepts to a subjects experience in the
second sense we are dealing with local concepts they are called local precisely because they can be revised by our new forms of exp elementary experiences by our new forms or kinds of observation Essentially, Karna, when he means explanation, he means both. And hence, the dialectic between the global concept and the local experiential concepts that can be revised through the course of observation, so on and so forth, for Karna is the very course of enlightenment. I just have a question because I'm not sure I'm understanding all the terminology.
exactly are the relationship or associations between there it's between mathematical objects and but then it seems like no logical a carna carna does not does not admit mathematics mathematical objects in his vocabulary at least early on right so it's logics if it's so you what you might say to me concept developed through logic as an organone without any mention of the transcendental logic i.e. the idea of application to sensory data these are called global concepts or concepts developed through transcendental application or transcendental method or transcendental
logic in Kantian sense where such logical resources or concepts are actually pertain to a specific elementary experiences and thus can be revised as we do change our experiences or arrive at new observations or elementary experience of them. I guess I'm just having difficulty understanding, so it's logical relationships between logical objects and i'm not that global concept global concepts global concepts they are completely
devoid of any experiential data right it just seems like the global concept with which i i guess i was just calling it a logical object uh are we risking like a type of infinite regress when we say that we're building logical relationships between logic logical objects no because you see Theo even let me let me actually change the discussion to the other pole by saying this that okay you might take side with
Kant's transcendental logic, that logic should be coordinated in terms of the correct application with those elementary components of experience or elements. But then this already implies that we do in fact have some relations between our logical connected and logical objects by virtue of which we index such associations otherwise you are in the human nightmare in the pure talking about associations and the whole point of carnapp is that association can be as so empirical associations are the objects of infinite
regrets not the logical relations when i say a blue dot and a red dot a green dot in somewhere else when I turn my head I can make an infinite associations with them with within them then what does it actually mean it means that I can actually say everything I want about the world about how things in the broadest possible sense of the thing hangs together in the broadest possible sense of a term. Which means that you are no longer in the realm of objectivity.
You are in the realm of pure subjectivism or psychologism. Shall we have a break? Sure. I'll just... Artem told me that his mic wasn't working so I volunteered to read for him. sorry who Artem oh Artem is in Russia that's why the mic is not working he says I was wondering you seem to have a very semantic holism reading of Carnap do you think that this is Carnap's imminent position or are you providing a more personal reading of it you see Carnap at the beginning does not have any form of semantic holism
It literally doesn't because Vienna Circle didn't have it. But as Carnap moves away from Aufbau and tries to refine the project Aufbau, it becomes more of a semantic holistic or coherentist more generally speaking. And yes, absolutely, later Carnap is by all definitions a coherentist or a semantic holist. But of course, for Carnap, the idea of semantics itself can be couched in terms of syntactic
relationships and this view I would say is far more in tandem with the new advances and theories about how language works from the perspective of theoretical computer science rather than philosophy of language a lot of It's going to start. I just have one more question too. And this you may have addressed in your paper, but I don't know if I understood it correctly.
the logical relations between global concepts is this is this an analytic or a synthetic approach you see this is really actually i would say a very a highly unexplored thesis even by Carnap himself. It looks as if Carnap means analytic. But the thing is that in so far as for late Karna, the concept of explication, namely
conceptual engineering, namely the relation between global concepts and local concepts, can only be understood dialectically but not separate from one another. You cannot have pure analytic conceptual engineering or logical relations. They are always with an eye on the synthetic side of things. So that's what makes it dialectical really. You know, dialectics in a platonic sense means that you don't have pure poles. The poles, synthetic analyticity, can only be thought with regard to one another.
You can't have one without the other. Yeah, it seems like in a way though, it's saying, we arrive at analyticity. By way of some, by some sort of what you might call rudimentary synthetic phase. And then you get back to the more advanced synthetic phase by way of a more advanced analytic phase, and then goes upward and upward. It's like a ladder, literally, like a ladder. Explication is a ladder. Chaos is a ladder. Okay, now for that, let's finish this,
have a seven-minute break, and then we come back. All right, this one's... Is it kind of accurate to say analyticity or like the polls? And then like the motor is more like, or like the fact that the poles had tension is more like on the synthetic side. The idea is that Carnap is essentially a very staunch pragmatist, but not in the way of Brandon or Sellars. But pragmaticity, what is pragmatics in the sense of philosophy, not the colloquial sense of calling someone a pragmatic person? Pragmatism is essentially the view of the concepts as a pendulum.
poles are decided by the swing of the pendulum they are not pre-established oscillations of what determine the pole yeah yeah what I notice a lot you know just one last brief thing is I'm looking at like last systems like system and environment. The thing is you have most things on the side of the system. Same with game semantics. And I mean there's ways say with the attitudes to make explicit external decision and whatnot. But the thing is you're setting something up and it
interacts but the unit as a whole, it can be composite, it can be analytic, but there's dynamic, synthetic dynamic. Absolutely, absolutely. This is fundamentally, I would say, a common feature between Salar's holistic view and Karna's view. Of course, Salar's, I would say that he has a very caricature understanding of Karna, precisely because you see, from a historical perspective, it's like, you know, you are a speculative realist and then you have a cricketer understanding of can't or hegel
no but if you really think it from a kind of god's view then you see that they are actually on the same footing they are part of the same gradient carnapp thinks essentially in terms of interaction and dialectics in the sense that explication is to replace the vague concepts couched loosely in terms of a natural ordinary language by with concepts which are couched more refined concept which are couched in terms of formal language
so this can go all different kinds of way but the point is that essentially this is what you might call to be the clash of the images in cellars between the manifest view of ourselves in the world and the scientific view of ourselves in the world however unlike sellers Carnap actually thinks that this dialectic or this tension or this oscillation does not mean that scientific image replaces the manifest image manifest image is as dynamic understood under this new paradigm is as dynamic as a scientific image it can change fundamentally and hence create
new ever more hierarchies of scientific images and that's what really I would say that carn up on acid okay let's have a break now great, see you in seven minutes Thank you.
We still have a few minutes, but I just had a question that I wanted to ask. I know I'm probably being kind of painfully obvious to you right now, but I'm just kind of trying to understand exactly how this dialectic procedure is able to be both synthetic and ensure any form of analyticity. or like as you said in your essay really lucidly an inference is either ampliative such that content is extended but then there's no guarantee that the conclusion is true even if all premises are true or is truth preserving in which case the conclusion is true and the inference is valid but the content
is not augmented. But Theo, that doesn't really pertain to the idea of analyticity with the idea of syntheticness. That I would say is more an objection between deductive and inductive inferences. You see, inferential kinds cannot be so well in a well formulated manner applied to the difference between analyticity and syntheticness. Analytic and syntheticness distinction is not an inferential distinction at the beginning, it's about the application of logical
rules to experience or subordination of logical rules to experience or observation. You see, think about this metaphor that Andre Karras mentions. You know, it's a kind of a good metaphor, I mean you can think a little bit more about it. You see, So we have, let us say that all we have are synthetic concepts of the sort of the local kind.
And essentially that, you know, we have to, our concept of hardness cannot be understood as a global concept or synthetic analytic concept precisely because concept of hardness fundamentally difference at different scales or sectors of reality, you know, at different scales of a metal beam, the crystallographic, the nanometrics, so on and so forth, okay? So in that case, if all we have are such local concepts, then there is absolutely no way that we can ever talk about something as unified and universal as a Copernican imperative
or enlightenment. Because essentially we are drifting away, because the whole idea of enlightenment is about unification, you know. But if you are in the business of drift, infinite drift, then there is no way that you can unify these under one kind of paradigm called enlightenment, scientific enlightenment. However the thing is that you can also in the same vein think about global concepts In terms of something like, as I mentioned to you, universal paradigm shifts between
Copernicus and Kepler. So Copernicus shows us Earth is not the center of the universe, but it's still, you know, sun, you know, solar centric. But then Kepler shows that that center is not also important, that the universe is not sun centric either. And then Newton, and then Einstein, so on and so forth. You see, Carnap thinks actually about this, and that think is really something fundamentally unexplored and it can be talked about more coherently in terms of philosophy or history of philosophy that's the
reason that we are in fact capable of working with these local heuristic concepts like hardness one hardness to hardness three add in flight and it's It's precisely because we have something like global concepts. The first kinds of global concepts are what you might say that Carnac calls them logical concepts, purely logical concepts. Only in terms of logic and only in terms of logical association you are capable of moving from one language to another. Language one of hardness one to language two of hardness
two, language three of hardness three. So he essentially tries to say that the move from one theoretical language to another is the first evidence of us having global concepts by virtue of which we can refine our local concepts. Because if you didn't have the move purely logical connections that enable you to move from language one to language two, which is essentially formal, then you wouldn't be able to even identify something like hardness two. But hardness 2, for example, the theory of crystallographic metal ingredients is not
exactly couched in terms of the ordinary language of which hardness 1 is a part. So you see, that I think is really a good counter objection to such views. what actually enables us to move from these kinds of synthetic concepts to ever more refined synthetic concepts is by way of some sort of very analytic view of logic in by virtue of which we can see the constraint of our logical system and move toward a new metal logic and that's why Carnap wrote his you know
logical syntax of language essentially as a development of his famous essay that he never finished called an attempt at metalogic. What is metalogic? It is the analytic understanding that by virtue of such logical constraints and such axiomatic definitions you might be able to arrive at a new, more expansive, formal language where the axioms of the first system can be explicated in terms of the axioms of the second linguistic system? I guess I'm... Maybe this is just an ongoing question for me.
isn't there an equally plausible and its own right kind of alternative way of viewing that where you see the negative movement and it makes I mean what good what on what basis do we say that then like what are we basing our logical relationships on and if we're attributing well how do i say this it's um you can think about this you can think about this that's an either or question
is it the priority of logic or is it the priority of experience Carnap says none of them each of them at their own scales have their own priority now imagine that you relinquish the priority of logic in its own sphere of logical linguistic domain and what what do you get will it be just pure bullshit of human empiricism where you actually think that associations can be identified simply in terms of sense that own a kind of you
reduction and absurdum discussion. Yeah I mean it my understanding is that the way that you're characterizing it as we have global concepts and that's why we can refine them. We can refine the global concepts. We can use them to refine our local concepts. Right, right. Precisely because global concepts are in dialectical connection with our local concepts. Like the scientific image of man in cellars and the manifest image of man in the world. And local concepts can refine global concepts.
No, that's I think, that's the whole point of Cardiff, that they can't. Mark Wilson actually thinks that they can and there are only local concepts Okara thinks that to refine local concepts you need to see the logical constraints or logical associations that can be obtained in a new way between such local concepts but how can you do that if you don't have another language And how can you have another language if it happens in the realm of logic Recognize the constraint of your axiomatic system so two things here like I get that argument
so do Do global concepts become local concepts vis-a-vis global concepts of another logical system that's one question and the other question can you repeat it again can repeat again I said that um do can't do global concepts become local concepts or higher concepts become revised when one is able to encompass them in the axiomatic foundations yes different logical system essentially a sec okay go on go on and then I know this I think actually you see it comes to what I just said to Theo you see for example you have hardness one a local
concept hardness to another local concepts hardest three add-in so hardness one and these concepts of concept local concepts of hardness or variations of it are essentially local concepts precisely because they apply to new observational sectors of experienced reality like crystallographic nanometric and the micro level so So, but we know that by virtue of this Carnapian critique, that in order for us to in fact identify hardness one, some associations between such particles at this scale length of reality
should obtain in order for us to in fact make or engineer the concept hardness one. And such associations cannot be obtained by mere observational or experiential data. They require logical connections or logical associations. Of course, where do such associations come from? well they come from the kind of language to which any of these subscripted concepts of hardness belong so hardness for example one belongs to ordinary language
like english we talked about the hardness of a wood or something like that but then And hardness one, if we are actually going to move to local concept hardness two, yes, it requires both new observational data, but primarily a new kinds of associations between phenomenal experiential data by virtue of which we can say that this is hardness two. And such associations can only be obtained by our move in the global concepts from language one to language two.
So if there is a consequence, a transitive consequence that emerges from local concepts and higher concepts because of the dynamism introduced by the fact that the higher concepts apply to the local concepts and in unpacking such it can lead to the revision of higher concepts. Yes. I'm not sure I understand exactly what the relationship is then between the global concepts and the local concepts um and i mean maybe this has something to do with this question last week of like why can't when you see it's when not only our axiomatic or formal resources
bottom out but also how the resources of our right kind of the the the right application of the right kind of axiomatic elements to the right kind of observable experiential datum bottom-out you see we cannot move simply from language one to language two or heart we can we can actually move from language one to language two but we cannot move from hardness one for hardness two if
we had not recognized that observational datum or the experiential sensory data pertaining to a new concept of hardness can in fact be discovered. And such discovery requires the development of a new language that is capable of adequately indexing the relations or the associations between these phenomenal observable data at this deeper level. at this, for example, a scale of a crystallographic structure or nanometrics structure.
So you see, it's essentially what you might call to be logic come empirical datum constraint that allows us to understand the relation between the global and local concepts dialectically. There's still kind of something that bugs me about it because it seems like determining when to apply a global concept to a local sort of parochial observational point would reside within either global or local way of determining. By global, we are simply talking about what you might call to be purely analytic logical.
In the sense that Carnap believes a lot of Neville Kantians and Kant himself, that literally there is no such a thing as experience other than by virtue of logic. And this becomes again the question of transcendental logic. What transcendental logic in a fundamentally new light in the sense that in order for us to have transcendental logic, we must have both logic as an organon as untethered, un-unimited observational data, but also transcendental logic as the right application of logical
resources to observational resources. It seems like local and global concepts are both. I know. I mean, Theo is having a meltdown. I know, I think we should actually try to make a diagram about this stuff. Because I would say that right now, in terms of just talking about this stuff, they are getting a little bit too more convoluted and dense. Go on, Christian. So, a few things.
Seems like both local and global are analytic and the synthetic comes from the tension. Well, you see, the local concepts, in a sense, are both analytic and synthetic, but their nature is essentially synthetic precisely because they are what you might call to be the coordination of analyticity with synthetic information, or transcendental information in that sense. And the other question would be, it seems like there's sort of two modes of how global
concepts interact with local concepts. One is explication having as a consequence the revision of local concepts, which is one form of explication. Yes. Yes. Enlightenment two, and then Enlightenment one, explication in the first sense, moving from one language to another. Yes, yes. One platform to another. You see, language for Karnab is like a platform. You see, so you can make different kinds of apps. These apps can be thought as local concepts, okay? But of course, on different operating systems or platforms, you can make different kinds
of apps with new capabilities, more ever more refined capabilities. Move from one operating system or one platform to another is essentially what Carnap calls explication one or enlightenment one the the realm of the global concepts um the other question is um or the other the other one that i mentioned mentioned would be um that global concepts are also used to reach conclusions from yes conversion conversion conclusions yes kind of a unified and one is one's downstream and
one's upstream absolutely absolutely and and they are in interaction it's like Joseph Conrad meets Francis Ford Coppola. You know, upstream, downstream kind of stuff. And absolutely, yes, they are absolutely like that. What's enlightenment too? Well, enlightenment too is what you might call to be the refinement of local concepts. toward ever more refined detailed scientific image of the world like a metal beam so you first see hardness one at the at the level of my naked eyes
then you invent a kind of a microscope with theory of crystallography and then you see a new fundamental kind of a stuff at that level and then you go to the atomic microscope where you see nanometric observable phenomena with an eye on the theory of nanoscale hardness or elasticity and these are this is basically this is this is really what this is what sellers actually call scientific image. But for Carnap, the scientific image is not only about local
concepts. It is dialectical between global and local concepts. To the extent that local concepts are predicated on global concepts and global concepts can And in fact, we can diversify our global concepts, not refining them. We can diversify our global concepts by having an eye on the local concepts, by enlightenment too. I just have, I mean, a more general question is that I don't really understand exactly how enlightenment as an actual historical phenomenon how why it warranted a certain
level of confidence in new revised global concepts it seems like it evidenced a failure of previous global concepts but i don't know exactly where the positivity do you know what global concepts are and the Enlightenment legacy, there are new theories. There are Kohnian new theories. What Kohn's called paradigm shift, revolution is essentially a global concept. Newton is fundamentally different from that of Copernican revolution. So as Einstein from new tone so the paradigm shift is essentially what you might call to be the evolution of the
global concept but this evolution is fundamentally theoretical rather than observation right but i mean i guess i what i'm getting at is kind of that is that at least as far as i understand popper it's not really clear what role positivity has in his understanding. What do you mean by positivity? The ability to concretely say, I mean, you know, we can disregard Newton, we now can move on to a new theory of, I don't know, cosmological movement and or even into like Einsteinian theories of relativity. I'm not sure, I understand that that what Popper's indicating is a movement
or like the fail, what is he, he calls it the, yeah, the inability for the non-falsifiability of a theory. It's, yeah, thank you. It proves for him that theories have to be falsifiable, But it doesn't, I don't understand exactly which is that they have to be critical of themselves, but I don't understand where some sort of certainty about the reliability of our existing theories comes from. There is no reliability on our existing theories. Theories are not reliable.
And that's why they are dialectical. is fundamentally different from reliability or canonicity of truth. You see, dialectic means that our concepts can be changed not only because we have invented new languages but also because we have arrived at new observational evidence. So Popper actually is on the right track but he really does not understand like Carnap the impetus and the significance of moving from one language of theory to another language or one language to another language
and the thing is that Carnap thinks that this movement is essentially a theoretical movement It is the labor of theoretical justification. Why do I need to move from language one to language two? So, I can form language one of hardness one to language two of hardness two. Well, this is both because of the limitations of logical connections afforded to me by language one but also the observational evidences that I might have arrived at new
observations a la Cohen's anomalies where I need to find a new fly form of associations between new observations which I call anomalous observations I I haven't seen them before. Something strange about the Kuhn story of him recounting Aristotle's physics is that he has this eureka moment where he looks out the window and all of a sudden he kind of like can see how Aristotle's physics would make some sort of sense.
But then, and according to him, it's the, I guess it's what it's describing might be fundamentally different than like the contemporary physics that Kuhn is working with, but he had like a newfound respect for the way that Aristotle was doing physics. Yes. Logically in the sense of it. Yeah, I mean Aristotle, you should understand that Aristotle was on the right track. And that's the reason I would say that in opposition to Ray, not in a fundamental opposition, but in a kind of historical opposition to Ray, who simply dismisses the Aristotelian
ptolemaic framework i have mentioned this before over and over the copernican revolution is essentially a rectification of the ptolemaic system it is not as if it was a radical break no it's when you actually explicated both logical mathematical resources and the observation resources and try to somehow coordinate them with one another rather than flattening their distinction. And since global concepts are not diversified, like maybe you do get rid of them if you're trying to save,
I don't know, computational space or something, but like the Ptolemaic system is still a global concept. It's just now we have different systems. Absolutely. Oh, yes. really people people just know I am I am a cultist of the Copernican imperative and of course Western enlightenment I hope that you don't hate me for saying that you know Western life has nothing with Western culture Western enlightenment simply the idea that mathematics and logic take the upper hand ultimately and of course mathematics and logic have been developed by different civilizations at different times but but really the idea is that when if you say that tolemaic system was
some sort of like some sort of bullshit religious worldview that's absolutely bogus and unscientific unphilosophical, unhistorical. No, they were absolutely onto some fundamental discoveries, it's just they had limitations of their logical connections. They didn't have a mathematicalization. What do you think instigated the Copernican revolution, the Galilean revolution, the idea of that nature can be mathematized and mathematics has its own premises in its own right and if we might diversify their structures or
relations with mathematical objects with an eye on the sort of associations that we thought about is the case between our observational data then we might actually rethink what we have just experienced that earth is no longer a static object it's revolving but also is no longer the center of the universe Okay, let me, let me, let's stop with the questions.
Do you have the share the screen? Yes. Okay. So here, this sentence. In reality, Carnap's method of quasi-analysis is just that method of logical abstraction that Frigge has called abstraction. An equivalence relation holding between things of one kind is used to define or construct things of another kind. just as numbers are not constituents of the concepts to which they are ascribed
but can be constructed from appropriate equivalence relationships or relations so too can other quasi constituents be constructed. After having defined phenomenal quality points Carnap's strategy is to introduce a definition of of a new similarity relation, sim-relation, which is defined on the basis of the similarity relation for Erlep's but which applies to newly defined phenomenal quality points. He is especially interested in the connectivity components of this new similarity relation. These components are expected to be exactly the phenomenal counterparts of quality spaces
because if S, the subject, has experiences which are sufficiently varied, it is likely that phenomenal quality points which correspond to visual quality points are never qualitative neighbors of, say, phenomenal quality points that correspond to auditory quality points. Carnap then shows how dimensional numbers or dimension numbers may be assigned to the connectivity components, which seem to be possible because he assumes that every subjective quality of space has a well-defined dimensionality. In particular, the visual quality and dimensionality,
in this sense, you might think about the constraints put on associations between air labs or similarities between the air labs. Phenomenal quality points that correspond to auditory quality points. Carnap then shows how dimension numbers may be assigned to the connectivity components which seems to be possible because he assumes that every subjective quality of space has a well-defined dimensionality. In particular, the visual quality of space is supposed to be only five-dimensional quality space, a five-dimensional subset of the Euclidean space R5, where the first
two coordinates corresponds to X and Y coordinates of places in the two-dimensional visual field, and where the other three coordinates represents the hue, brightness, and saturation of the color response that sits at these places. Every color at a place thus corresponds to a unique quality point, a five-dimensional space that is usually depicted as a cone-like mathematical object, which is also called the color cone, accordingly for all other sense classes. For example, the auditory quality space may be assumed to a two-dimensional subset of R2 and so forth.
In this way, Carnap would be able to identify the visual sense modality by its dimension, such that on the spaces he could define the phenomenal counterpart of the visual quality space as well as the counterpart of all other quality spaces that are associated with the the remaining sense classes. However, unfortunately, this strategy of defining phenomenal quality points and distinguishing phenomenal quality spaces is affected by two spurious shortcomings. As Goodman shows, one, Carnap's method of abstracting phenomenal quality spheres and phenomenal quality points from a relation of mere association or similarity for Erlebes is deficient.
Carnap's method of determining the visual phenomenal quality of space by dimensional analysis fails if the set of Erlebes is a finite cardinality. We will now deal with these two problems in more detail. We will focus first on what Carnap calls quasi-analysis. By definition, sim is reflexive and symmetric relation on the given set of elementary experiences erlebs. If x is a set of erlebs, let x be called a clique. With respect to sim, if and only if all x and y is a member of capital X, being x
relation sim y. Here is the main idea of the first step of quasi-analysis. Consider some set x of ERLATS which realize a quality point, a phenomenal quality point, between a fixed quality sphere Q of a diameter epsilon. For example, take epsilon over 2, half of the epsilon diameter, a radius essentially. Q might be the set of visual quality points that have distance e over two or less from the quality point that represents a particular tone of red located at a particular spot in the
visual field. X will certainly be a clique with respect to similarity since every two members of X are parts similar. This is because every two members of X realize points of Q and thus points which are metrically close from metrical points of view associated, i.e. which have a distance that is less than or equal to epsilon from one another. Now let X be a superset of X, capital X, such that every heirloom in X' still realizes some quality point in Q. Then
X' is again a clique with respect to sim and thus X' is a clique that is larger than X. X' seems to be a better approximation of the phenomenal counterparts of Q than X was. Accordingly, Carnot suggests to define the phenomenal counterparts of quality spheres to be maximal clicks with respect to sim, where x is a maximal click with respect to sim if and only if is a click with respect to sim and there is no set y of ERLAP such that x is not a subset of y and y is also a click with respect to sim. However, this method does not work in each and every case.
Sometimes the intended phenomenal quality spheres are not introduced by quasi-analysis, since they cannot be separated with respect to the similarities that they induce. Goodman calls this the companionship difficulty. they are introduced unjustifiedly because several earlaps are pairwise similar without there being a single quality sphere in which all of them realize a point this is referred to by good man as a difficulty of imperfect community and of course mactaggart calls this
the mistake of the bundle view so essentially what he might call to be the good many and objections to carna can only pertain to the old thesis of of ball in the sense that the old thesis of of bowel which probably Carnap at some earlier point in fact did endorse and was that we can simply as I mentioned earlier on extract associations by which by virtue of Erleggs that we have in a parameter space of our visual field.
So we can say that the light red dot, the dark red dot and the black dot are in this way and that way associated by virtue of being members of Erlangs. But I mentioned to you that associations are not empirical. You have empirical observations of these dots, but the association between them from which you can talk about i have seen a red dot over there or a black dot a fly over there
is not going to be obtained by mere bundle view of associations in a human sense you essentially need to have a class of logical equivalence relationships between such register on your visual fields. So I highly suggest to you all read a Sanford entry
on Goodman's critique of the visual field problem. It's a very good streamlined version of this problem. But essentially this problem comes to the idea of associations. Either do you identify associations in terms of mere empirical registers, or do you actually think that such associations are subsets of logical connections? and then with that a whole can of worms open you know the idea which of course
Karnak builds on it in his later work so if you say the associations are not fully empirical every virtue of which for example I identify a red dot by virtue of its empirical mirror in Persianistic connection with a blue and a black dot then you need obviously a something like a logic a set of logical connections but if you need a lot set of logical connections then how can you actually ever be so confident to say that the set of these logical connections do pertain to this and only this kind of empirical registers.
Are we going through some sort of utter systematic meltdown? so silent and I can see your smiles are a little bit forced at this point Reza, could you explain why we have to connect logical connections to some specific empirical
reality? Why is it a condition suddenly like this? see well you see that this is coming essentially from the basically the challenge between Kant and Hume so Hume thinks that for example your sense impressions if for example we were talking about a new example are are essentially these photographic impressions, each stamped by a space-time coordination, like on different cells of a negative film, you know, a negative. So first you get this, you know,
then you get this with a little bit of discoloration, then you get this with a little bit of rotation, so on and so forth. each cell you can think about this empirical registers. Now the thing is that Kant believes and this is by the way is called the bundle view from a human perspective. So Kant thinks that the bundle view can fundamentally, sorry, cannot, fundamentally cannot tell you anything about what this thing is you are talking about sure you have these time stamps registers of different shapes recorded at different cells of this tape
but then essentially you need to look for the associations between them but how can you actually derive such an association the idea the association between the empirical impressions namely images recorded on your tape can be infinite and by virtue of it they can be fundamentally random and arbitrary so then you need to something have something more this is where can't it introduces logical connections or categories but for Carnap can't's categories or logical connections are not that great of a solution yes they
are necessary but they are not sufficient Just because I saw at point P1 time T1 a light red dot, at time T2 P1 I saw a darker red. at time t p3 t3 I saw a black dot this doesn't mean that by virtue of this bundle view of impressions I can call it I just saw a fucking fly well that's
requires associations the whole point is that the empirical impressions by themselves do not yield associations as such if we take associations as objective claims about what I have seen then I require something more than just mere empirical impressions So what do we call then those connections, empirical connections? We don't call them associations and not something logical. Well the thing is that Kant thinks that there is no such a thing as empirical connection
or empirical association for that matter. come from logic or language or structure or mind rather than mere sensory impressions. Sensory impressions are like these discrete snapshots of reality. What holds together these impressions and give us a global impression of what I have just seen is not given by those impressions per se but given by language logic to categories by mind itself this is essentially the linchpin of can't's
challenge against empiricism and by extension human Karnap follows from it, but he revises this notion, refines it. And so what exactly was it that Karnap rejects of his earlier work in Aufbau that we're discussing now? what does he distance himself from? So in early Aufbau or early essays that lead to Aufbau, which I mentioned by way of Goodman's objection,
he still sees associations between Erlep's as association in the empirical realm. Later on he noticed that these such associations cannot be couched in terms of empirical sentences or observational atomic facts, but rather they are fundamentally a species of logical connections. Because you can have so many arbitrary associations, even if you have put constraints on your visual field, like epsilon, the phenomenal sphere, so on and so forth. sorry i'm i think this part's just unclear to me still is what is it that determines
which associations are arbitrary or not you see it's not that which associations are arbitrary or not because any association can be arbitrary but we are talking about objectivity and I have already mentioned that objectivity is not about that whether your judgment about the world is true or false and false being arbitrary But rather, how can you come to the status of making an objective, namely not subjective,
but rather intersubjective, namely shared among all experiences and subjects of the same class about the world? This is what we call objectivity. It is not about that it is true, it's rather the idea that it's a veridical claim. What is a veridical claim? It means that it can be revised precisely because its nature is intersubjective rather than subjective. So this move is what you might call to be the understanding that if we abide in the realm of sensory discrete impressions, time and space stamped impressions, then essentially
we are in the realm of arbitrary. Only when we can find out a way to coordinate our air labs between different subjects, S1, S2, S3, so on and so forth, you, me, Lana, Joven, Jeff, Christian, Chaggy, so on and so forth, then we are in the realm of objectivity. Objectivity in this sense understood not as an experience simply belongs to me or you, but an experience that can be thought a-perspectively. This is what objectivity is. Objectivity is not about truth, canonical truth, that it might be actually fundamentally
true. It's about that in so far as we have moved from pure perspectival, subjectivist view of our way of looking at the world to something in between where we can coordinate by way of something that is not purely empirical, our experiential elementary experiences of the world. and thus we can revise it this doesn't mean that it's ever going to be true but this is simply what you might call to be crafting of a new medium that allows us to do something better
that we couldn't do in our subjectivist sphere. This doesn't mean that it is safeguarded against the assault of skepticism, but it simply means that the class of claims that we are now making are a different class from those which we could make only in the realm of pure subjectivist, perspectival, rudimentary experiences. I'll go first.
I was just wondering if I could ask you a question before we go on. Just like when you talk about similarity... Similarity, similarity. Back to Carnap, similarity relation which is based on what you talked earlier like this Erla relation, ER relation. Yes, and that's early Carnap. Early Carnap maybe to Af-Bao. I still not sure if Aufbau fully commits to such pieces, but yes, okay, let's say that this early to Aufbau, but after Aufbau, he fundamentally thrashes this view. In similarity relation also.
yes he no longer thinks that their lapsed similarity or association can be obtained by way of simple you know association empirical associations because my question was about like yeah the status of this uh relations but if he just dismisses them we need some more questions yeah well you know that philosophers are shady bunch they always betrayed themselves and betray others as well okay no the thing is that Carnap's late work he understands that such associations essentially is
what you might call to be predicated on the move from language one to language two so yes first of all which what does mean exactly essentially it means that Karnak realizes that there is absolutely no such thing as human empiricism even when we try to identify associations within different air labs we do so by virtue of resorting to the language that is given to us and what is this language? Well, its natural language, the evolutionary language, Russian, Chinese, English, Farsi,
Arabic, so on and so forth. But then he sees that to fundamentally refine the associations between the airlines, we We must move from language, one, namely natural language, English, Arabic, so on and so forth, to a constructible language, a language in which rules of transformations, within symbols, can be fully made explicit.
And that's why you get the new version of Karnath post the logical syntax of language. And then I understand correctly he doesn't believe that such a transition can be done in the verses. Exactly which transition? language one to language two like to the extent not on the empirical plane absolutely not on the empirical plane but on the logical plane it can be done and it is absolutely a logical on the logical
plane that you can make such moves and that's what i call the global concepts the the idea that you can arrive at this juncture where you can say that oh my local concepts or what I have just observed can no longer be corroborated by the logical connections of the language I used is something that can only be done by way of logical connections in terms of pure language so you look into the
logical connections of your own current language when you try to come up with a new kind of language and that's basically essentially what for Carnap is the kernel of constructible formal languages where you can create an infinite hierarchy of formal languages where you can index ever more associations among new observations or earlamps. How does this not fall back into some kind of sub-objectivist, you know, like ultimatum
in the end? The only way that I think that it doesn't, I would say that this is absolutely not the only way but the way that it doesn't fall in this trap is precisely because how can you in fact develop a new language what does it take for you to make a new language is the development of a new language a subjectivist thing i.e it is subordinated to subjectivist biases or experiences no it is These are the logical relations. And what are logical relations if not fundamentally formal intersubjective relations?
Yeah, I'm just trying to piece... Because even when you go to thinkers like Thoreau or Emerson or something like that, could also find some kind of like transcendental you know like logical expansion expanding our experiences in relation to transcendentality so it seems like for what you're saying with Carnap and this is why I was really taken with Carnap is that there is a kind of standard and this standard is the languages that we make of naturality extends beyond these mere subjective transcendental associations and yeah so i'm just like trying to figure out it like if
the leader kind of yes okay so basically i think that at least now this is not the karnath this is my reading of karnath you know literally everything that i've told you so far is actually karnath himself moving from earlier works to later Carnot but this is my own reading. I think that the way that Carnot can answer to this question is by way of saying to you But, well, you see, language is never subjective.
Language is never private. Language is about logical connections, and logical connections are always intersubjective. So what does this mean? It means that he endorses a very rudimentary, with Gnestinian thesis about the nature of language as such. There is no such a thing as a private experiential language. Language is essentially should be a shared medium between experiencing subjects. This does not render or it does not basically save this idea of intersubjective medium from
subjective biases. I would say that Carnot is fundamentally aware of this fact that even if you work in the domain of intersubjectivity, core logic, you might still contaminate your language, you construct a language with experiential biases of subjectivism and hence psychologists. And that's also a Quine thesis by the way. Fakarnath I think clarifies this point far better than Quine.
But then I would say that this is a fundamental Kantian problem. If not this, then what else? If they move through one language to another language so as we can refine and make more explicit the connections between our logical connections and logical talks about the world, by resorting and by taking, by resorting to and by taking seriously logic in itself, then
what else that comes back to Theo's earlier you know objection and what else are you going to the domain of pure empirical impressions or are you going to allow a social Darwinist commentator on the evolution of language the view that language can never be ejected from our experiential contingent and arbitrary biases well the thing Carnap thinks that the view of constructability of logic if puts on the logical
connections rather than experiential so-called associations we can do in fact arrive at new languages and these languages the more we refine them in terms in terms of their own logical connections mathematical logical computational connections the more we eject ourselves from the domain of experiential subjectivity
So I'm not sure we're going to get to it today, but I am interested. Does the problem, is the induction, deduction problematic? So the induction, induction problematic, does it tie into this somehow? Yes. essentially what you might say that deductive is a lot of her he believes that you see what deductive ism means for poker is not essentially means that you are in the realm of pure analytic deduction okay what deductive ism means
by poker he thinks that there's stuff that we can talk about the world essentially are deductive in French our relations between the components of our theory now this is really important theory versus deductive inference it is It's not as if Popper is so naive to say that, well, we can talk about the world simply by deductive inferences a la sophist and aristotelic form of logic.
Robert thinks that essentially the kernel of theorizing about the world is a deductive kind of framework. And hence, if we remain faithful within this deductive theoretical in Italy framework, then we can talk all sorts of kind of things about the world. So this is what for Popper means deductivism. Deductivism doesn't mean being a follower of Aristotelian deduction or deductive influence. Deductivism simply for Popper means that everything that we can ever talk about the world is derived
from our deductive derivations from the kind of theory that we have applied to the world so this is purpose what he calls deductivism now for carna is a little bit more complex and more different in the sense that for Carnot theory yes it has a logical structure it has a linguistic structure so on so forth because the structure is always the dimension of the mind namely language and logic a lot later but the thing is that kind of things that theory always needs to be coordinated with
experiential data with observational statements and to that extent we need to have something more like a theory conjoined with pure observations of us as subjects as how we have seen the the world behaving. So in that sense Carnap's inductivism doesn't mean that he's a human inductivist because you remember for Hume induction simply means a bundle view of pure empirical associations
between sensory data. Whereas for Carnap he thinks that all such associations can only be obtained by way of a logical layer a logical hierarchy in which such observational registers for impressions of data or caught up so literally from this point on and we are late late but for next session you should think about about the controversy between Popper and Carnac with regard to the question of deduction versus induction, not in terms of Aristotle pure analyticity of logical laws of syllogism
versus pure associations of empirical data a la hi'oon, but in terms of something more complex that both for these thinkers deductivism or inductivism are not pure deduction already means theory and theory can only be corroborated by observational data and the same vein for Carnap That inductivist logic doesn't mean that I am simply talking about pure empirical bundle view of associations between the big data of the universe, but I see these data in the
light of logical associations. Okay, any more last question before we go take our nap or have some sort of gardening escapade or whatever you want to do, including Gorgias? Oh, Reza, I still didn't understand why Cardinal doesn't want to keep this similarity relations
and their love relations. You said something about language, didn't you move into story of language one to language two, but I didn't get the answer actually. You see, the core of the problem that leads Karnap to change his view since earlier works and Ackbao to later works is actually already there. You see Karna believes that a structure which he by which he means mind, logic of mind, of logic, of mathematics, of language, so on and so forth.
A structure is what formats such associations, makes them clear, makes them explicit, right? So the germs are there. Now in the later works is what you might call to be Carnap's, it starts to take the idea of a structure so seriously in the sense that a structure no longer should be subordinated a priori to the empirical facts. it is exactly like Selaar's myth of the given in his challenge to empiricism
naive empiricism is what actually allowed us to format and a structure of our experience of the world so literally from this point of perspective you might say that Carnap and Sellars actually coming from exactly the same tradition they have realized that empirical associations don't give us any information about the structure of the world what is a structuring and what is structure is that of the logical concept. So ultimate question a la Kant comes down
to this idea that how can a structure linguistically, logically, conceptually understood be applied to the basic observational facts of individual experiences. Okay, clarifies. Absolutely. Jeff, yes, next week we are, So, still we haven't gone through the induction versus deduction, but next week the reference that I provided with regard to Hempell. Introduction of that book or the essay that I suggested by
Hempell would suffice, essentially about the idea of explanation in science. Thanks. Absolutely. And Reza, if I wanted to look at the chapter or section or work that where Kana sort of goes in this direction, which one would I look at? Well, I would say in the Carnap's work, it's 106, I mentioned it, what was it?
106 to 122, right? Yes, yes, yes, yes, absolutely that. It's also a section, it's a section, the section itself comes earlier from these sections I mentioned. You can search in Carnap's PDF, the PDF version of his book, Logical Structure of Wound, for auto-psychological determination. That's your, you know, I would say that basically the base point. But if you actually want to read a kind of more integrated viewpoint about how this sector
of Carnapian view fits together with his later work with regard to the logical syntax, explication so on and so forth the last chapter of andre caro's book explication as enlightenment the one that i just sent it to you the last sec the last section the last chapter which what was the temple essay that you're talking about the book was the explanatory challenge is that correct yeah yeah yeah that's that's what and what was the essay that you were recommending no I I I thought that I have recommended an essay but I didn't I just
remember so the book just as coming through the introduction and some of the preliminary remarks it suffice okay shall we say goodbye and we are going to have some barbecue doing some stuff other than philosophy I do not want to hear you talking about philosophy all the time with me it's the worst way of kind doing philosophy any Any person who talks always about philosophy is literally going to hate philosophy at the end of the line. Sounds good.