Theory & Object (Session 7)

Hello and welcome to the seventh session of Theory and Object with Reza Negrestani. I'm going to pass the mic to him now. Thank you Theo. So, today I... Today, exceptionally, I won't ask you if you have questions. precisely because we are a little bit behind and trying to tone down how much we are behind. We are very behind. So I want to ask you if you have questions. Let me just go over a similar brief things and I wish that Esvidlana was here because

I'm going to give a very brief description of MPP, partial potential or possible model. And kind of recapitulate the whole structuralist view and then we move to Carnap. With regard to Carnap I'm going to talk about first the overall scope of Apbāo, the logical structure of the world from an epistemological standpoint and what Carnap actually wants

to achieve it. Then move on to a little bit of elaboration with regard to the so-called statement view, which I mentioned in previous session. And if hopefully there is time, I will go over one or two objections that have been made to this classical logical empiricist program. Next session, I initially wanted to have the face-off between inductivism and deductivism

to be after this session where we are talking about logical empiricism and the import of observational statements. But I think I thought about it and I thought that the best course is that let's just go with Carnap for a while for two sessions and then switch to the logical it probability or logical induction a la Carnac induction a la Hume and deductivism a la Cooper so let's start

So we know that, sorry, I'm running up my matches. The so-called scientific structuralists do not regard scientific theories as statements. This was the core of what I mentioned in the last session, the difference between a statement view for which Carnap, you know, is a great example and non-statement view, examples of

which are Stegmuller and Sneed. So structuralists do not regard scientific theories as statements but rather as defining predicates. The difference is that for the structuralists these predicates are exclusively set theoretic. Hence, I mentioned about the axiomatized systems or axiomatized theories. A structuralist view, then, scientific theories as structures rather than statements, structures

that are related to their empirical claims by certain systematic logical relationships obtained between how observations or empirical evidence are caught up in structural logical entities a structure one namely the rudimentary structure and of course a structure one can give us a structure to namely a more comprehensive concept of a structure in the sense of n-ary multitude of relationships obtained between such

logical entities or predicates. Specifying these logical relationships, reconstructing the theory in such a way as to uncover these relationships is one of the main goals of the structuralist approach. These relationships are are clarified by axiomatizations or axiomatic systems applied to a theory, in particular by theoretic axiomatization. And I mentioned that specifically Hilbertian axiomatics.

And the predicates defined by or reconstructed scientific theories are set theoretic entities. Sorry, these relationships are clarified by axiomatization of the theory in particular, by set theoretic axiomatization and the predicates defined by scientific theories are set theoretic entities. to this a structuralist interpretation then for example let's make an example outside of physics let's go to economy if the keynesian theory denoted by the

letters kt if the keynesian theory kt defines a predicate is a keynesian economy from now on we can identify such predicate as is a k is a keynesian economy then the sentence a is a k either is or is not true of the set a the members of the class of entities for which the predicate is a k is a Keynesian economy, is true, are the models for the theory KT. Thus, if some economy,

A, satisfies the axioms of KT, if A is a K is true, then A is a model for potential or possible model. Possible models, also known as potential models, for the theory, KT, Keynesian economy, are things for which it makes some sense to attempt to apply the theory, things for which is a K could conceivably be true. Potential models, in the sense, are things that have at least enough structural similarity to the theory in question to qualify as possibly

being models, hence a possible or potential model. So that's a kind of rudimentary understanding of what we mean by MP, potential or possible model. continue this Canadian example we can say that the US economy in 1960s is a potential model for KT the statement maybe may or may not be true but there is enough structural similarity that it makes sense to ask the question by contrast my coffee cup or the computer software industry are not potential

models for KT more formally potential models are set theoretic entities that can be characterized in the language of the theory things that could conceivably be models of course not all potential models actually are models therefore if the set of all models for a theory T is given by M of T and parentheses T parentheses close and the sets of potential or possible models by MP of T then we have the relationship of mt is a subclass of mp of t. In general,

scientists working in particular theory would only concern themselves with elements of mp of t, and the empirical activity of these scientists would consist of checking to see if various elements of m p of t are also elements of n of t model of t model of that theory now notice that neither Neither model of a theory nor possible model of theory, that is to say, neither M of t

nor MP of t necessarily involves any non-mathematical element. The theory, its potential models and thus models, could all contain or refer to purely mathematical entities. Surely, something must be added if we are to characterize scientific theories and not just their mathematical framework or a skeleton, their bone. Or put it another way, if we are to get beyond the so-called mere burbaki or to a structuralist philosophy of science, you know mathematical structure is then to a

structural philosophy of science with understanding the philosophy of science is not just about mathematical models and sets of equations but also empirical contents, evidences, observable evidences. So with that, as I said, surely something more must be added if we are to characterize scientific theories and not just their mathematical skeletons. Or to put it another way, if we are to get beyond Burbaki to a structuralist philosophy of science. The jump to science is accommodated by the concept of a partial potential or possible

model, MPP. Now what is MPP? A partial potential model is a potential model with the theoretical terms removed, a concept that is introduced to solve the structuralist version of the theory-ladenness problem, the problem of theoretical terms, according to a Snid and a Stegman. The structuralists provide a particular definition of what we mean by T-theoricity and then derive the set of partial potential models, MPP, from the set of potential models, namely MP,

by throwing out or lopping off the T theoretical terms from the description of the elements of MP. Essentially, you might say that MPP is essentially the empirical content of that theory. while its theoretical statements have been decanted, have been removed. So, the theoretical terms from the descriptions of the elements of, sorry, therefore each

elements of MPP, we can formulate this as X is a member of MPP where X is an element of a partial potential model, is something that could conceivably be modeled for the theory and can be described without using any t theoretical terms, any theoretical functions. This concept of a partial potential model gets closer to the empirical target of a scientific theory. While we are not quite there, a particular x or element could in fact be an element of

the set of MPP of T and thus have sufficient structural similarities to be a potential model for T and also be devoid of the theoretical terms and yet still be an abstract mathematical object like for example a system of equations made in an economic model. The final scientific link is forged by a set of intended applications. Remember, they were defined by I in our two-pole. The set of intended applications I is simply the set of concrete as opposed to purely mathematical

entities that the theory is about or is supposed to refer to. Every scientific theory therefore contains a set of intended applications containing those real systems to which the theory's practitioners intend to apply the set theory. So the set is assumed to be a subset of MPP. In other words, it is assumed that the elements of I must be the same structure as the elements of MPP, partial potential model. The concrete entities in I, things such as firms, for example, in our Keynesian model,

consumers, real domestic product and interest rates, or economic theories, must be configured, usually reconfigured into a non-theoretical vocabulary of partial potential model. Without a set of intended application, one simply has an abstract set theoretical structure. With it the structuralists argue one has a set theoretical reconstruction of a scientific theory. So putting all the parts together, scientific theory T is an ordered pair, a two-value twofold C and I, where C is the core of the scientific theory and I is the set of its intended applications.

Because the core consists of the set of models, potential models and partial potential models. One final characterization then is T equals well-ordered set CI equals well-ordered set M, MP, MPP, and I, intended applications. The sets M, MP, MPP capture the essential structure characteristics of the theory T and define the fundamental predicate X is a P where P is the predicate defined by T the core C is related to a set of intended applications I where I is a subset of potential partial potential model so essentially

you can say that the reason where MPP and intended applications are introduced to these sets of equations, these mathematical models of physics or economy is to account for the dynamicity of a theory. Remember that the dynamicity of a theory in the sense that we had a static structure of a theory, a core and a set of intended application, it's dynamics.

This is what you might call to be MPP and intended applications if they account for the dynamicity of theory. This is how we can trace how two different theories, for example in physics or economy, which pertain to the same theoretical core might diverge or might converge. One might dislodge the other theory as, for example, in the case of Einstein and Newton.

So MPP essentially in this sense is a model that captures the empirical content while its theoretical terms have been thrown out. How does this map onto Cohen's paradigm? You remember Cohen's paradigm of scientific revolutions was that, you see we have a course of normal science where we are working on a core of theory, M and MP, and we move on

and we might actually broaden the set of its intended applications. Once we broaden the set of its applications to real phenomenon in the universe, then we might actually come across something like anomalies. If anomalies cannot be indexed by the core of theory, then we come across a crisis, the notion of crisis in the Koanian sense. This notion of crisis is essentially what you might call to be a factor responsible for the dynamicity of the

theory how so because it pertains to what two elements MPP and I partial potential model that pertains to empirical content and on a set of intended applications once these two elements can no longer be held or or captured or investigated sufficiently by M and MP, namely the theoretical core, then this means that we have to abandon that theory and develop a new theory that can capture

such intended applications and such an empirical content. okay before i get take your questions let me go get some matches i'm running out of my matches Thank you.

Thank you. My apologies.

So, would you mind going over the... Questions. Can you hear me? Yes. Can you go over how an anomalous event, that relationship of that anomalous event and the dynamicity of the theory, just one more, quickly. Well you see, it's when MPP can no longer be mapped to MP. MP was model, potential or possible model, endowed with theoretical terms of the core

of that theory. it cannot be mapped to it if it cannot be accounted by theoretical functions or theoreticity of that theory then we have arrived at a crisis it's like the famous Eddington experiments when Eddington went to was it Russia or Arctic and he viewed and photographed you know the celestial bodies and he noticed that does not the kind of registered observational phenomenon no longer can be accounted by you know general Newtonian physics I

I mean, I guess it doesn't matter so much. I don't know what the implications of this would be. But what you're saying then is that the intended applications in a strict manner are included in MPP. What I was thinking was that when intended applications exceeds MP and maybe also probably if MPP is exclusive to what can be mapped to MP, No, it's not that it exists. For every theory, a set of intended applications should in fact be mapped to MP and M, once you have get rid of its theoretical terms.

Now, is that you might in fact, the model, the empirical model, I mean minus the theoretical terms, might at some point exceed, as you say, M and MP. And that's the notion of the crisis in Crony and Territory. So it's not MPP that then exceeds its intended application? No, no, no, not MPP. MP never, MP is just structure. I said MPP. MPP is the structure. MPP is the empirical content.

Right, right, right. That accounts for a set of intended applications. So MPP is I? MPP is not I. MPP is the empirical content of a theory. You see, like, let's, like, in terms of Ptolemy versus Copernicus, you see, the motion of heavenly bodies can be supported by both theories, Ptolemaic and that of Copernicus. However, there are some trajectories, some

movements that are not being supported and of course supported by these theories, these theories can be couched, of course, we are still in the early science, mathematical science. They can be couched in terms of a set of mathematical equations. So all of these observations or empirical contents can be supported by the sets of equations which define the motion of celestial bodies. Now, Copernicus arrives at these observations where trajectories of motions of celestial bodies

no longer corresponds to that of the Ptolemaic system. And they are everywhere. Now, that's when you say that the empirical content itself cannot be supported. by the theory and its equational system and hence you can no longer extend the range of application of the previous theory to such observable phenomena yeah I mean I get I get the problem the abstract there I mean in the concrete like that I should say I guess I guess like my question is like where does I

begin and end and where does MPP begin and end and like what is the difference okay and so MPP is the empirical content for every empirical content as corresponding implicitly corresponding to a set of MP and M by virtue of this correspondence you should expect a range of intended application to observable phenomena okay so mpp is not equal to i i is what you might call to be defined in terms of how mpp the empirical content is mapped onto, is correlated with, or corresponds to, to M and MP.

So I kind of has its foot in both? Sorry? So I kind of has its foot in both? Yes, I has its foot in both. Yes, absolutely. Reza, can I ask you a question? Absolutely. In the Kuhn piece that you had us read, he was not fully convinced by the formalism. he seemed to still think that there you know there was a kind of incommensurability between scientific

theories whereby sorry yeah there's an incommensurability whereby by say what you mean by a specific term changes entirely in a new theory or what a variable actually is, even though you're still referring to water or something. It's a completely different kind of entity. Yes. So Kuhn wasn't like yet totally convinced by the formalism. I was wondering like how does the, you know, just before we move on,

how exactly can you explain how this formalism, you know, solves that incommensurability, which for analytic philosophers is this big problem because it's the, you know, like a kind of rationality gap that makes them sort of panic. Yes. of course you can see another in a fundamentally different context but not disconnected from the question that you pose the indeterminability of translation as posed by Quine or Mark Wilson recently in terms of the idea that the classical picture of the concepts or for example when we say hard

in one theory essentially the local is a local picture and a specific to that theory and a specific to this range of internet application and cannot be overextended to the notion of heart at different scale like that beam example metal beam example when we say hard at the level of you know just the metal beam itself macroscopic fundamentally different from the notion of heart at the crystallographic or nanometer scale so yes uh this is this is a this is a fundamental uh objection actually to uh that structuralist view.

However, when we look at the work of Karnav, early work of Karnav also falls, even though he espouses a statement view, falls in the same trap. But later a work of Karnav actually tries to mitigate the indeterminacy of this translation or incumbenciability. in the sense that we of course every language might have its own sorry every theory might have its own linguistic framework now what does it mean to move from this linguistic framework of such theory to that linguistic framework of another theory.

This is how he tries to solve the problem by introducing something called a metologic or meta theory in the sense that even though we use different for example terms or variables and they are not while they are clearly defined in their own setup but moving from one theory to another theory falls under the problem of indeterminacy or increment durability. The whole point is that in order to solve such a problem, we should take so seriously

Mark Wilson thesis. And what is this thesis? The idea that the classical picture of concepts in science, engineering, so on and so forth, are usually inflated, like the concept of hardness, for example, I say, or the concept of bread. Now to do that, you should be able to create maps or atlases, according to Wilson. where you have different these local perspectives they are not subjective perspective but they

are local perspectives like these local pictures of the same concepts and then you should be able to glue them together according to a some meta theory that can hold both between theory one and theory two. This is Wilson, he says. Andre Karras recently has written an essay which I fundamentally suggest. It's called Engineers and Drifters. And he talks that Wilson's solution to this idea is not sufficient. should have like a secular and card and also global concepts that can be applied across the

board of different theories comprehensively like global concepts because you can think about the idea a good cliched example of that is the idea that the movement from ptolemy to copernican to Keplerian to Newtonian to Einsteinian is in fact defined by some global concepts of gravitation. That global concept of gravitation allows us to think about how we can glue these indeterminable or incommensurable terms and variables together. so as we solve the problem of meeting determinacy or incumensy reliability

between terms of different theories the Carnap or Kuhn that introduces the metal logic carna I mean one of the things for me that strikes me about influencer abilities that I I don't even know how we'd be able to talk about it at all it and let's let's just not talk about scientific theories let's talk about the two of us when I say hard and you say hard how do we know

exactly that the variable or term hard is the same for us only behavior realistically I see in some way I mean from a linguistic perspective I think quine objection can be refuted fundamentally in the sense that this is really the question of context sensitivity of the terms that we use and context sensitivity can only be resolved through linguistic interaction because that what language is language is essentially to the bottom context sensitive we have two different senses of the word heart how do we know that we

are referring to one reference called heart, hard object. Well, the whole point of this interaction is a pragmatic view of language will tell us that the reference is nothing but invariances obtained by way of pragmatic interaction between senses. Your sense of heart and my sense of heart. you however thing like gravitation

are not simply senses they are theoretical concepts don't global theoretical concepts And that's why we can do in vision a la Ceylars that there is in fact a progress in science In terms of, for example, theories of celestial motion, a la gravitation, quagravitation.

Because essentially all of these theories are built on one single theoretical concept, gravitation. And of course, this gravitation can differ not by virtue of the concept, but by virtue that whether this global concept of gravitation across different theories has the same range of intended applications. Of course, the Ptolemaic system cannot account for anomalous trajectories of motion of celestial bodies.

Copernatus can do that better than Ptolemaic, but still it cannot, for example, account for the kind of Keplerian observable phenomenon that accounts for decentralization of the universe, that nothing is at the center of the universe. And so as for Newton, the difference between the world high and the world on the low, between heavens and earth all should be accounted by the gravitation and even more so by einstein

Questions, everyone is silent. Maybe Valentin needs to say something. um reza can i ask another one if no absolutely absolutely trying to speak to um it seems like it seems like um that anomaly phase um you know where the anomalies build up, that should be one of the key sort of points

at which, like, you know, scientific work takes place or something to investigate it. But the formalization doesn't really have too much to say about how it goes from the anomalies. formalization, I think formalization does in fact say something precisely because without formalization you might not actually, this is so, Kohn has this excellent observation actually in affirmation of Stegmuller and Sneed in the sense that anomalies do occur usually in science. But sometimes these anomalies are vaguely understood and only vaguely related

to the theoretical core. This vagueness, if it is not elaborated and made explicit, can create the illusion as if we are still on the same path and we are simply doing the same kind of using the same theoretical core with the same range of intended applications hence we are in the course of normal science well once we actually logically make explicit the relation between intended range, MPP, MP, and M, then we are essentially making explicit

that whether this intended range and the empirical content of MPP can be in fact mapped onto MP and M or not. So this explicitation from the points of confirmation of the course of science is extremely important. Yeah, I agree with you there. But if it doesn't, Matt, if it doesn't agree, what does the formalization... It doesn't. It doesn't do anything. It doesn't do anything. Yeah. It doesn't, it just simply makes it clear to you, makes it explicit to you that this

mapping no longer holds. From that point, formalization cannot give you any indication as what can be done to solve this situation. That would be the practice of science. Yeah. But it is accounted for in the model at least that that's what happened. Yes, yes, yes. At the moment it has to happen. Yes, yes. Should we have a brief rest and come back five minutes? Can I just ask one question before we break? Absolutely. What you're saying is the duty of science is to re-enter or to integrate anomaly into

Not, I wouldn't say, integrating. I think, yes, yeah, okay, if you want, but I know how you are going to catch me on this thing. Got you. Moments, I know you. This is the whole idea is that formalization essentially makes explicit the relation between empirical content and the theoretical core. And thus, by virtue of this correspondence, it is able to give us an indication where our theory falls short of its supposed intended application.

namely the dynamic of the set structure. Peter, actually not a lot of course, yes, I agree that if we are thinking historically in this span, a miserly span, I would say, it's not that big of a deal. like what a thousand years we have actually thought about science in a coherent way, less coherent way to coherent way, is that yes, normal science is proportionally larger than

anomalies. But essentially, we hardly ever think about science in terms of a uniform normal course of evolution. Essentially we see science, from at least philosophical perspective, as something that changes our view about the world. As Copernicus did to Ptolemy, Kepler did to Copernicus, Newton to Kepler, Einstein to Kepler, Darwin to his previous, so on and so forth. So these stages do matter. They might not be numerically equal to the instances of normal science, but they actually constitute our philosophical vision and also historical consciousness.

of how science evolves and how we can change our view about the world okay let's have a break and then we'll get back alright so many of you have been silent today Just because I said I don't take questions, you shouldn't remain silent. You should rebel in fact. Okay, see you in five minutes. All right, sounds good. Chuggies, I think your mic isn't working either. It's like 50% shorter than what you guys say. So, bye-bye. I love Chuggies.

See you soon. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Can you hear me now, Reza? Can you hear me? Yes, absolutely. Okay. Yeah, it's my input volume. I always have it weighed down, but I'm sort of interpreting what you're saying, I don't know, like maybe like a sort of like a Hegelian history, like a pragmatic history of the mind or something like that. Like I keep thinking of like lordship and bondage, how there's this challenge within the sort of the self.

So there's all the sort of, you know, the anomalies that you're describing or the way I'm interpreting it is almost like, you know, in that sort of context, let's say. Yeah, of course. I mean Hegel, you know, I know that Hegel, you know, has a lot of metaphysical bloatware, but nevertheless I think that his view of science, even though he was not really that much pro-formal sciences and so on and so forth, I think it's actually quite similar to this view in the sense that you see the movement of the concrete self-consciousness in a Hegelian sense entails

the renewal of the relationship between the so-called spirit or the mind in Kantian way, in Kandil-sen subject and objective reality. And the renewal is when consciousness or rudimentary self-consciousness sees itself as another instance of an egocentric view and recognizes another self-consciousness, another sector objective reality, and by virtue of that it expands its arms to it, you know, its recognition.

Yeah, I was kind of reading something you had mentioned somewhere, and you were mentioning how something can become intersubjective qua objective, and with Hegel, the way I was reading the Lordship and bondage chapter was not as from an inter subjective way or like a external pragmatic way that Pippin sort of reads it as but it's sort of like John McDowell he sees it as sort of like an internal sort of Pippin characterizes it as like an allegory but so I don't know it seems to me that there's this like internal side to it um you see i i would say that i'm on this front uh somewhere between both mcdowell and pippin in the sense that pippin is over intersubjective and

mcdowell is over metaphysical the thing is that uh hegel is actually quite clear on this point that what he means by the concrete movement of self-consciousness, namely the renewal of the relationship between mind and the objective world, without which mind cannot be in fact talked about, namely in a platonic statement you can say an intelligence does not renew its relationship with the intelligible is no longer an intelligent intelligence because an intelligence can only be understood in terms of what it makes that renders the world intelligible namely its

relation should be intelligent so from this perspective I would say that hey girls renewal link between the subject and object or the concrete movement of self-consciousness is not only about intersubjectivity and not only about pure objectivity it's about both and how they can in fact shed light and how we do as experienced singular experienced subjects can renew our relationship with objective reality. This

is essentially Carnap's point as well after early Husserl that all objectivities are ultimately buttressed or undergirded by an intersubjectivity so the relation between intersubjectivity and objectivity is not ontological it is what you might call to be the condition of both epistemic traction and renewing the link with what we call reality. Yeah, I think one of the terms that I think McDowell used that I thought was really interesting

was intra-psychic, as opposed to inter-psychic or inter-subjective. He says intra, uses the term intra-psychic or intra-subjective. So, you know, reading Stegmuller and this whole idea of the intended application and sort of, it's really interesting. I'm just trying, I don't really have much of a background in science, so I'm understanding it purely in philosophical terms. And I'm just, it sounds to me so much like the Hegelian off-bow. And I know that Carnap uses that term too, this sort of dialectic, this intra-psychic dialect. Yes, absolutely. Yes. I mean, you see that Carnap, when we get to the logical syntax of language, he started his position with something called rational reconstruction. Rational reconstruction is essentially what you might call to be a kind of traditional

Enlightenment worldview. And then he thought that this rational reconstruction, quote, traditional Enlightenment fails. And then he went for dialectical reconstruction, what he calls explication. I will talk about this today. The explication is what you might call to be the dialectical conception and how it brings together finally intersubjectivity and objectivity. And one last question, I don't want to take up any more time with my questions, but when we're talking about intended application, I'm sort of interpreting this in sort of like a Kantian concept like quantity. how can we how can we use that that term intention in a sense where it seems like with quantity it's

just sort of like on the intuitive level just sort of automatically applied so that just when we say intended application is it always sort of like removed and sort of like a tool that someone is using or can the i don't know it just seems like intention in a kantian conceptual sense would seem a little strange to me. Well, you see, intended application in the sense that you can say that, okay, if we have, for example, such a logical structure or theoretical functions, when we say intention, we are always talking about, even in the Kantian sense, about something, right? About something.

Okay. So, intended application in our framework means that our theoretical core is about something, namely a sector of observable phenomena within the universe. And of course this intention is not purely empirical. It is constituted by our logical structures, a la Kant, that when we say this is about something, obviously we are already assuming a kind of logical categories.

Now, however, the difference between Kant and this, at least to some extent, is that intended application is not just about the logical structure, but also about the kind of empirical phenomenon to which we have applied such structures in a very transcendental logic sense the correct rule of application

Shall we start Carnapian nightmare now? I'm hoping it's going to be a little bit more of a candy land dream, but I guess we can take lunch. In philosophy, you never see dreams, only nightmares. If you are in the business of dreams, you better do something else. Okay. So

Afbaw, which is short for the logical structure of the world, Carnap's work. It is the most famous and well-known work of Carnap. However, this does not make it the best work of Carnap. I'm not going to talk about this, what is the best work of Carnap. We will get into later work of Carnap and how he revised his system later on. future sessions. Abbao begins with these words. The aim of the present investigations is the establishment of an epistemological system

of objects or concepts, a constituted system. Two important points can be made here. First, object is taken in its widest possible sense, namely for anything about which a statement can be made. That is, an object is anything that one can meaningfully say anything at all about. So you see, I do not know whether you are familiar with the course of the history of

philosophy where Karnav is coming from. Can anyone say something, anyone who is familiar can tell me where Karnav is actually coming from? I'm not comfortable with Vienna Circle and that they're like sort of like... No, Vienna Circle is essentially his position. Where Vienna Circle is coming from. Right, right, right. I know that they were like sort of studiously but heretically reading Wittgenstein. Arnim says Kant and again. Yeah, I think that he read Kant. Karnab is actually anti-Wittgenstein. Yeah, anti-Wittgenstein. That's why I said heretically. and yes Artemis write Kant but not essentially Kant the primary source of

Karna is no Kantians namely Marburg school Hermann Cohen Paul Nator and then and a student of Cohen, Ernest Cazwer. So essentially all of early Carnapian works are faithful to the projects of known Kantianism. course with elements as artem said on the sidebar of friege early or sarah gestalt theory thrown in can anyone

a little bit explicate how you see carna because i The only reason I'm asking this is because insofar as I see Carnap as essentially a monstrous figure and I don't think that in contemporary philosophy we cannot really see any figure such as Carnap. Carnap, if you think that Deleuze, for example, in content of philosophy is monsters, I think Carnap is far more monsters for two reasons. His views are fundamentally heterogeneous,

to the point that's one of the most difficult things for any scholar of philosophy of science or history of philosophy in general, is that what is exactly Carnap? What tradition does he belonged to. However, behind this heterogeneous, fundamentally rhizomatic, a span over different views and different applications, there is a unified karma. And this unified karma is truly a giant of philosophy. Literally, I do not think any philosopher in the 20th or 21st century

has ever reached the status of Carnap. The sheer scope of this man is just beyond belief. So any person who wants to say something, any one of you know a little bit about Carnap, it would be great to shed light about the historical context. I know that Laura might be interested, so as many of you, about the historical context of where he actually does come from. Well, the limit of my reading is mostly that the unbound oceans from Oloi, but essentially it sort of seems like a large part is sort of like a critique of Wittgenstein

that's just sort of like a particular like circumstantial detail that sort of like goes in the direction of something that like that's reminiscent of like what you talk about regarding say like the transcendental jailbreak where you know the a large part of sort of like the the sort of logical positivism is that the the is the choice formalism which which we have the freedom to explore different formalisms that allow us to gain a particular type of uh traction on yes yes yeah definitely definitely anyone else artem joan peter laura anyone Karnap is kind of a, you know, a leveling figure that almost rejects the entire history of, you know, philosophy as pseudo statements.

You know, he kind of wants to formalize a language, as I see it, almost like pin language to the world determinately, clearly or something. And I think he wants to almost like abolish philosophy in that sort of… Almost like what? Sorry? Almost like what? I think he almost wants… I mean, is it… I actually… I don't know too much about him, but, you know, is it a similar project almost to Wittgenstein in that, like, he thought that he could almost end philosophy or at least end metaphysics particularly.

Yes. Yeah, no, I wouldn't say philosophy. You see, that's why I wanted to, someone comes with this view of Carnap, which is established view of Carnap. So I can somehow counter it later on. I trapped you on this video. You see, Carnap, Barnab is, you know, his fault, and it wasn't his fault, is that he belonged to basically what you might call to be the worst of all possible worlds in a Leibnizian sense.

is a logic logicist philosopher but also his empiricist so he wants to combine logicism with empiricism how fucked up might this might sound this content of philosophers however however this is a very quick creature of carna carna Peter literally knows in and out of the history of philosophy. Every move that he makes is in fact in response to the tradition. And the greatest philosophers are the ones who respond to the tradition of philosophy

because philosophy is only, as only has a history rather than a nature, an essential nature or a fundamental past and in that sense Carnap logical empiricism project is essentially what you might call to be a reformulation or recapturing recapitulation of the entire history of philosophy before him since the time of Plato, Pre-Socratic and Confucius, the time of Kant, Hegel and the Cantidens. The idea that how forms can latch onto content, how rationalism and

empiricism can live together under one rainbowy hippie world. However, this was the early project of Karna. The sign of all great philosophers is that they revised their position too often. They never abide by what they said the morning before. And this is really one of the greatest signs that suggests that Karna is truly beyond the scope of what we consider as a good philosopher.

The view proposed in logical empiricist program, and I will actually talk about logical empiricists, majority of philosophers, you should know, understand this, you see logical empiricism has import both for philosophy in general and significant imports for philosophy of science. There is almost a cliché in history of analytic philosophy where everyone who wants to do saying that oh I'm doing something new first tries to set its project apart from logical logical empiricists or positivism a la Karnaf but only by virtue of

caricaturing Karnaf's position so this is one two and of course I will explain why logical empiricism really is the encapsulation of the main problems of the history of philosophy and not just history of philosophy of science. Two, Karna is essentially a revisionist philosophy. Unfortunately, we do not have that much of such philosophers today. Maybe Ray, Ray Brzez, To be honest, I cannot think of any philosopher at this point.

It's sad. But nevertheless, Carnap in every instance has the courage of testing a philosophical hypothesis, take it to its ultimate conclusive ramifications, and then if it fails, then he tries to investigate why it failed and tries to revise it step by step rather than just simply putting forward a new system altogether. So from this perspective I think that literally Carnac, so as Plato, those of you who were in my Plato class, I think are two philosophers in the course of history of philosophy who have

been subjected to the most caricatured dogmatic views by their comrades philosophers. So let us suspend all such views at this point. look at the work of carna as it stands for itself yes aka welcome to hell however I do agree with Peter that Carnap essentially it's really a strange from a

historical perspective that Carnap is a student of Kazirer and Kazirer is a student of Hermann Cohen and Herman Cohen is a Neocantian and the thing about Carnap when you look really fundamentally into its work it seems that his main enemy is who? is Kant and I don't think Kant has ever seen such a challenge than that of Carnap's. If you think Meyassu challenged Kant, then you are so sadly mistaken.

We are going through this Karnapp course to show why Karnapp essentially retains the most critical insights, the most viable critical insights of Kant while exposing the dogma of Kant and through that he tries even though inadequately, who are we to say that he failed? Inadequation in terms of history of philosophy is always a fruit that can give to something better idea, a better system. So in that sense, even though Karnath in some respects failed,

he set in motion a philosophical vision, really an encyclopedic version of human cognition with regard to the objective reality, the like of which we have not witnessed. And of course, I should not tell you that from a historical perspective, Carnap was a fan of Novalis. Carnap wrote the so-called Encyclopedia of Unified Science, where he tried to bring all visions of philosophy with regard to science in one unified framework.

So from this perspective, those people who see Carnap as analytic as merely an analytic philosopher, I think are mistaken. Carnap is not analytic. Carnap is neither continental. He's neither analytic nor continental. He's literally a philosopher who tries to envision a grand framework for how philosophy and science can finally match together, correspond to one another mapped together without flattening distinction

between either philosophy or science. From this perspective I would say that Karna has done much more work than those continental philosophers who brag about the great outdoors the unified vision or diametrically heterogeneity when you actually read the work of Carnap you see that his visions are fundamentally heterogeneous Carnap is a philosopher who believed that you have to attack a certain philosophical

problem from different perspectives. And these perspectives are not essentially commensurable. But until and unless you have not attacked a problem from different commensurable perspectives, You cannot even understand what this problem is and how it can be captured as a unified, homogeneous problem that can be applied across the board. Any comment before I start? I don't know. It sounded like a little bit of a Candyland dream to me.

A what? A Candyland dream, as I said before. But I can't. Well, yeah, yeah, yeah. Carnam is definitely a Candyland dream. Candyland dream is an illusion. But you have to go through the illusion in order to understand that it is an illusion. That is the course of philosophy. philosophers ultimately are peace-wise miners of truth in order to achieve as a symbol at the semblance of truth you have to first go through the course of illusion Anymore comments?

Jeff, Joven, Laura, Sepide, Adam, Artem, many of you have been very very silent. Okay. So I said that two important points are then made. First objective, object is taken in as wide as possible sentence, namely for anything about which a statement can be made.

And of course you remember that I introduced Carnap's view as a statement view, as singular as need, as a non-statement view. So have this in mind and think about it with regard to this notion of what we call an object in philosophy and in science. There is an object, that is an object, is anything that one can meaningfully say anything at all about. Second Carnap tells us that he is not merely interested in a taxonomy or classification

of objects but that in his constitutional system concepts, in quotes, from Carnap, are to be derived, namely constituted, stepwise, from certain basic concepts, so that a family tree of concepts results in which every concept finds a definite place. The two questions we must ask then are what is the constitutional system and what makes the constitutional system of the Afbaw epistemologically significant. So Carnap tells us, somehow informally, early on in Afbaw, logical structure of the world,

code Carnap. To reduce A to B and C or to constitute A from B and C means to produce a general rule that indicates for each individual a statement about A the way it must be transformed In order to yield a statement about B and C, this rule of translation, which we call it TR, in an example that I will be able to talk about today, or if not next session,

this rule of translation we call a constituation rule, or a constituational definition, since it has the form of a definition. A constitutional system then, according to Carnath, is a stepwise introduction of new concepts via such constitutional definitions. Since constitution is transitive from a logical perspective, the constitutional system will show how to define all of the higher level concepts from the concepts chosen as the basis of the system and what is the basis of the system can anyone tell me i mean according to the statement

view? Empirical atomic facts? Yes, yes, absolutely, yes. Empirical facts, atomic facts, atomic statements. So essentially the constitutive system is based on these atomic empirical facts. It's not that Quine or Goodman, Nelson Goodman for that matter, attacked Carnap's project in terms of the constitutional system, but how the constitutional system is based on

these such atomic facts and the way that Carnap tries to elaborate it. I will of course make a concrete example via Goodman in terms of color perception and color recognition. As becomes clear in his more formal exposition, you can read section 26 to section 45 of Abbao,

logical structure of the book, in order to get a handle of this formal exposition. Carnap takes the logical system in which he is working to be the theory of relations and the simple theory of types outlined by Alfred North Whitehead and Bernard Russell in the second edition of Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica. Similarly, he takes the notion of constituational definition to be explicit definition, in most instances definition in use as understood by Russell and Whitehead and exhibited in their

logistic reduction of mathematics to logic. Indeed the logistic definition of the concept of classical mathematics is clearly the paradigm case of a constitutional system of Carnap. Carnap's constitutional system have the concepts of the empirical sciences as their domain. However, he claims that this definitional procedure for the concepts of a science is part of the axiomatization of a theory. a lot of statement. This theme is also taken up his 1927 essay, Proper and Improper Concepts, where in discussing

the axiomatic formulation of scientific theories he writes, this is a quote from Carnot, the The concepts of any domain, be it geometry or economics, allow themselves to be so ordered that certain concepts are placed undefined at the beginning, and the remaining concepts are defined with the help of these basic concepts. Such a derivation occurs through an explicit definition, i.e. through establishing that a certain new concept word is to be synonymous with an expression that consists of all words, i.e. of such as have already been defined or which designate the basic concepts.

If such a derivation for a concept is given, we say of it that is constituted on the basis of the basic concepts of the domain in this way the concept of any domain allow themselves to be ordered in a constitutional system so according to this excerpt from Carnap's work now we understand why is that he is so adamant about axiomatizing a system, a theoretical system. So axiomatization always begins with what you might call to be building blocks,

some concepts, okay? Like Euclidean system. A point, a line, a plane. They are underdefined always. as concepts so you can't say what these concepts are nevertheless you have adopted them as the building block of your system what would be the result then within such scenario well the result is that even if if our main basic concepts, elementary concepts such as point, line, plane, so on and so forth,

are under defined, as long as we have axiomatized them within an axiomatic system, we can build on top of them. like i put this brick i put that break i put this break you know they're disconnected they are not making a building for me but as long as i put them on a fundament okay an axiomatic fundament on dirt and water I can cement between them and add more new bricks on on top of them and then I am capable of telling what these underdefined stuff or

concepts were according to what I have derived from them This is essentially what Carnap called the order of explication. Question here? What specific philosophical view is this challenging? it's idea that essentially every system requires some given data now Carnap when he was young he thought that these given data are sense data

in the sense that as long as we have some sense that like the sensation of heat, the sensation of cold, then I am capable of building a system of theory on such, you know, data. But then, here we consider this purely Humean empirical theory. And for that matter, Karna by no means is a human empiricist. When we say logical empiricist, as I mentioned last time, we do not mean empiricism like

humean empiricism and its offshoots carnage empiricism is fundamentally a collective or commensuration between rationalism and empiricism in the sense that carnapp thinks that we can only find sense data as the building blocks if we try to capture them axiomatic by way of some formal data and once we build on top of this formal data we create a system a system that by virtue of the sense that of being caught up in

it can elaborate what actually the sense data are. This is the whole notion of a structure. We cannot understand what a brick is unless we make a house. It's a very strange movement where, you know, what is derived from the axioms sort of turns back to bite its own tail, so to speak. Yes, like Ouroboros, yes, absolutely, yeah. And hence, that's why it's called constitutional system or constitutional definition.

This is really what you might call to be the kernel or the crux of logical empiricism, of Raishenbach Ankarni. So, any person, whoever tells you the logical empiricists are actually empiricists, say that you do not know anything about logical empiricists. So this is the first point. Theo, do you have anything? I see that you are frowning and twitching. I don't really have a question.

Okay. I wrote it on the sidebar, but I'll just say it as well. I was wondering how the synthesis of logic and empiricism avoids psychologists without moving in a Kantian and Husserlian direction. Yes. Well, this is... You see, I know that you are a student of Adam, and Adam is a superb, superb philosopher. However, we do disagree. I mean I think that all philosophers should disagree at some point because then we just have an incestuous circle. I think we fundamentally disagree on this point.

He thinks that Carnap is essentially a conservative Hosserlian. I would say that Carnap adopts Hosserl only to arrive at what he calls an unbounded, bound ocean. Essentially he sheds all the conservatism of philosophy beforehand and by virtue of that he strives to arrive at the core of the critical project, namely that of Kant and Hegel in the sense that the point we can only and this is of course

this is not happening in early work of Carnap but in later works in order to avert the threat of psychologism he tries to show that language is essentially our only interface with reality this is fundamentally a Hegelian insight Hegel says in philosophy of right language is the design of Geist of a spirit of mind if we do not understand or tackle with logic in its own terms

and if we try in advance to subject or subordinate logic to representational requirements or perceptual requirements then we can no longer be sure whether our picture of objective world is actually objective or simply a propagation of durian gray's picture of the world So, to do that, Carnap gives a new vision of language as a calculus, as a syntactic

calculus, which is called semantic in disguise, in which all you need is to understand the basic form of the language or the logical infrastructure. And that everything that we can ever talk about the world is only can be said about or intended by way of this edifice, linguistic edifice, namely general language. So this is how he averts, tries to averts, psychology. From this perspective, Carnap essentially radicalizes Frigas thesis against psychologists

and experiential documents. So I remember you and Theo had that one conversation after class about like, you know, like how do you correctly apply logical form to sense data, blah, blah. So what you're saying is that it tries to avert this problem by axiomatizing the sense data itself. No, that's not how Carnap essentially do that. Carnap solution, so let me tell you what would be the problem in this new setup of this new Carnapian setup. So we say that we need to take logic and language very, very seriously as a formal dimension.

We should talk about language, we should explore the universe of language and logic without in advance subordinating them to perceptual, experiential, representational requirements. Now from this perspective a more sophisticated Kantian would say that exactly what Kant said. How can you be sure when you apply a logical entity, namely a structural entity, to your perceptions to your flux of experiences to your observations that application

wouldn't be arbitrary how can you be sure about the necessity of such application well the solution of Carnap to such problem is that he tries to understand the proto-foundation of all logical vocabulary so and himself Kant himself says that logical categories are essential for constitution of our experience right problem one we couldn't have even experience without logical

categories because experience is only experience by virtue of its classificatory content, a structured content. Otherwise we couldn't even say that oh well I have an experience, a live experience. No. So the problem is that Carnap tries to show that beyond all logical, specific logical vocabularies, there is a necessary hierarchy of metta logic what you might what i would call a sense to the logical heaven to adopt platonic vocabulary and that we can do indeed arrive at a fundamental metal logic of all of our logical

vocabularies which can be applied to experience and by virtue of that we call experience our own experience and not something else. So the axiomatized data would more so be a consequence of the inquiry into the foundation of language? Yes, axiomatization what you might call to be, as I mentioned to you, think of this metaphor, allegorical. We know that every philosopher who writes a foundation of work, that foundation of work is pure crap. It's built out of what Hegel calls water and dirt, nothing else.

However, you can only build a house from dirt and crap. That's the whole point. Axiomatization is what you might call to be an initial move, an initial move that allows us to move and reflect about the foundations or put the foundations. I see exactly what you're saying now and this is what makes it so intriguing to me is that you think of axiomatization as the beginning, but no, for Karnap it's what you absolutely it's what you might call to be if it's the whole point you see

Karnam takes the idea of transcendent of philosophy so seriously because he's a student of Kazeera Kazeera is a new Kantian he was also a student of Herman Cohen the idea is that from transcendental turn onwards we cannot just talk about the universe in an armchair position like say that oh well there is this universe our objects is cyber Popeye there are these little unicorns flying and they are all you know withdraw from withdrawn from us so on so forth no the whole point is that if we take the idea of transcendental philosophy seriously

we understand that there is no structure inherent to the universe. Structure is what you might call to be the initial point of objective claims about the status of the universe which we encounter. To that end, we have to start again, and it is really a game. We have to start with from somewhere. We make a move. This move is called axiomatization in the Carnap system. So we have some underdefined datum or definitional concepts.

We do not know what the relations between them are. But by virtue of adopting such elements or building blocks, then we can build something moron to them on top of them a building the goal of this building is that not only it is capable of making explicit and defining the relation between elementary concepts or building blocks or axioms but also it is capable of going into proto-foundations to give us a new vision of how we could construct an entirely new universe by virtue of adopting new building blocks

So I have a kind of a question here. So it seems like, I mean, there's this really interesting sort of like ethical imperative here that you just mentioned that it's our own experience, becomes our own experience as opposed to sort of like this transcendental dogma that was in Kant. But with Kant, you know, my impression was, you know, he thought for really long and hard about all these things and he arrived at those fundamental logical categories that we have to have so yes so car nap is kind of trying to like get underneath that yes okay and so it's interesting to me because it's it's like it gets really confusing on this on this very strange level where this

becomes something for us as sort of this imperative that it seems that there's this ethical dimension to it to me. Yes, well actually this is unfortunately you see, I would say that just as we could call Nickland mad black delusionism, there is such a thing as mad black Carnapian. You know what mad black Carnapian is? It's essentially the late Carnapian itself in the sense that ethical Well, injunction of such principle, according to Karna, is the elimination of the experiential subject from the equation.

All such things can be algorithmically, statistically put forward without even a reference to what we might call to be an individual subject. all we need is a is a theory of axiomatization so that we can build on top of it and once we build on top of it reflect on the proto foundations we dig deeper we ruin the house when build a new house and so on so forth ad infinitum and by virtue of that we do not require the

psychologistic dogmas of the subjective experience anymore. We have started from it but through the course of such constructivism subject as we know it will be abundant, its concerns will be terminated, its memories forgotten, so on and so forth. You know, you see that Karnap, I said that the monstrous beast, literally Karnap is one of the first people who according to such views pointed the possibility of an artificial

general intelligence a new view of subject that is no longer about a bun abiding by experiential dogmas or experiential psychology of Kantian subject and that's quite a monstrous thing and so you know I understand why I do love Karnam. I don't know if you're going to like this, but couldn't you also say that this is the Lacanian subject in some sense? Adam, I do apologize from you. My knowledge of, and I really, because every class someone is talking to me about Lacan, and I just cannot answer.

My knowledge of Lacan is fundamentally rudimentary. So, would you be able to elaborate a little bit on Lacanian subject? Yeah, I guess just that Lacanian also thought of psychoanalysis as confronting psychologists in the sense that the subject of experience was ultimately just the ego or a phantasmatic reflection of the wholeness of the body. Yeah, the Dorian Gray situation. Yeah, and then so the subject itself was what is not experiential, is in some sense a self-relation through the fact that it's submitted to like a calculus of signifiers that comes to it.

Well, that sounds very, very similar to me. Yes, yes. If that is the case, yes, I would say that this is very, very similar. So, I see that Artem said that, is there a truly Hosserlian direction incarnate in your European. You see, yes, the whole idea is that Carnarv essentially begins from a phenomenological

perspective, a la earlier was there, which I'm going to talk about. I don't think that we do have that much time for me to talk about it. But essentially this whole idea of a statement view boils down to the understanding that in order for us to axiomatize, logically axiomatize or mathematically axiomatize certain kinds of our observations so as to exclude other relationships between these observations and only include the class of relationships which

holds between them like that for example color color and hardness generally generally i didn't say exceptionally generally we cannot associate for example like predicates of color with the predicates of hardness or smell. I know that for synesthesia people such things are possible and Karnav actually does talk about such things but these are simply exceptions. Generally in order for us to talk coherently about predicates of color from an empirical standpoint we should be able to axiomatize our

observations of colors visual field this axiomatization allow us to create a building on top of such axioms so that we can see the relation that can be obtained from such observational color specific statements and thus to conclude a class or type of color specific statements and not about hardness or smell or auditory so on so forth kinds of predicates now the thing is that this requires a fundamentally

hosserlian almost a gestaltian invariance of perception view and yes from that perspective karnath adopts a fundamentally hosserlian view at the beginning but the way that he approaches it and and the way that he takes it to this ultimate conclusion, I would say, control Adam, my friend Adam Berg, is not Hossalian, it does not abide in the Hossalian. It's something completely different. You see, when you see colors, you are essentially according to your memory you are making associations between types of observations

in your visual fields I will talk about this next session via a concrete example This associations are what you might call to be a gestalt, an invariance perceptual associations between colored objects registered on your visual field. This is the way that Carnap lays out the foundation by way of Hosselin phenomenology. However, the way that he builds the house on top of such foundation is fundamentally different

than Hosselin. The conclusions of Carnap, I don't think, can be commensurate with those of Hosselin. I mean it's kind of strange that Husserl seemed like he never really wanted to formalize what he did logically and mathematically. Well, Husserl was actually, I don't think that this is essentially true. Hossel wrote Transcendental Formal Logic where he talked about the formalism, the labor of formalization and labor of transcendental logic. logic but i would say that was sell as you say

precisely because it was phenomenal logical commitments did not take serious the consequences of formalization and once you take the consequences of formalization or the formal a la Plato, Hegel, Carnap, Frigge, seriously then you see that once you formalize actually what you see phenomenologically you can shed some of the phenomenalistic, not phenomenological, realistic biases of your experience. And you might arrive at fundamentally different conclusions

that regular phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty or Hosselle could ever arrive at. Yeah, I mean, like, he kind of wanted to stay at this descriptive level. He wanted to found the formal in some sense. Yes, yes, yes. Please don't say that I talked about these things to Adam. I love Adam. No, I believe Adam and I do agree on many of these points. It's just that our way of how we understand formalism and language and logic are fundamentally different. And I think that's a good thing. We should always have attention in order to arrive at new conclusions. Right. it's kind of because I feel like like John Petiteau like what he's done is like I don't know I think

really interesting that he's yeah John Petiteau I would say that I mean you know those of you who don't know about John Peter John Petiteau is a mathematician a very famous mathematician who began to naturalize phenomenology by way of mathematizing from a logical tradition and the way that I'm not fundamentally convinced by its conclusions but the formalization of phenomenology or observational facts might fundamentally, even in a Petitoian sense, might fundamentally override what you take

as your facts of experience. You see this is the whole point of Karna. Formalization of experience or structuring, logically structuring experience is the way of dogmas of experience. Potentially. Of course you can think about the implications of such a statement with regard to AI, other species, so on and so forth.

It should not be dismissed. It's really an important conclusion. A conclusion that I don't think that Kant ever recognized the import of it. Yeah, you get this strong sense that it's just like there's this rigidity to Kant, that he's not really allowing too much flexibility in the way that the object is formulated or- Yes, and then you see that how this rigidity is actually under the pretext of egalitarianism being inherited by continental philosophers. That our lived experience is what gives us new notions of reality, of great outdoors.

But that's not really the case. If we are simply abiding by our lived experience, we might, as a matter of fact, simply propagating our Dorian Gray-esque picture of the universe, simply subtle variations of us and nothing more. Formalism cuts through this dilemma. I don't know much about computer science or advanced logic or anything like that, but seems like the the evolution and creation of new languages is essential to the realization of I mean I don't know it's kind of weird to say but like new realities but it seems like you're trying to arrive at what reality actually

is well that's the whole point that according to the car now the notion of being this is it's not essentially car up is this is really as I mentioned in in the Plato course is that of Plato. The notion of existence or being is a predication within a certain language. So if you do form a new language, you might have new predication of existence and being. So, I mean, but that's extremely important with Carnap and the sort of program you're suggesting,

Yes, yes, absolutely, absolutely. And then you see, precisely because of this, Carnap is no longer can be said to be an empiricist. Even though his project is called logical empiricist, that doesn't make him an empiricist. I have this reaction lately to dialectics. if we can call Carnap a type of dialectic thing, is that it's just, they're impossible on their own terms, or they're definitionally absurd

in the way that Ouroboros is an absurdist. Okay. You are making a statement, but you have not elaborated and why you think that they are absurd. I mean, the way I understand it is like it attempts to pull the rug out from under itself again and again and again. Of course. That's the whole idea of relinquishing experiential dhugmas. The construction of metalanguages or metalogics is pulling the rug under what we thought is

the fundament only to show that there is a further proto-foundation, a meta-foundation, ad infinitum. But it's that ad infinitum that makes the act of pulling the rug out from under yourself absurd. Like, I don't have... Why absurd? It's precisely, it has practical consequences. You can only call something absurd if either theoretically or practically not making sense from a theoretical perspective. in so far as every logic already points a la Godel to a meta theory or meta logic so that's coherent from a theoretical perspective from practical

point of view if the whole point is to renew our relationship with external world or reality and thus arriving a new objective facts then we do need to pull the rod under our feet otherwise we are in the business of dogmatism but that's different I feel like if you believe you're uncovering more facts then then And according to its own principles, it's a noble ambition. Yes. But if you're a dialectician who thinks that the dialectic doesn't arrive at facts,

it's dialectic for dialectic's sake, then... No, I don't think that Carnap thinks of such things. And that's why I would say that Karnab, even though he adopts an element of Hegel's dialectics, he is not Hegelian. In the sense that for Hegel, as you would say, dialectic is just for dialectic. Essentially, it's a kind of intellectual intuition of dialectical evolution of the concept, with capital C. But for Karnab, that's not really the case. for Kana is the idea that how this dialectical undermining of the experiential subjects coupled with empirical content can allow us to see new sectors of reality to which we couldn't access

if we were remaining in a lower level. And even if you just look at this from a purely language perspective, you see that the application of language itself, not even using logic, oftentimes conflicts and contradicts itself. And I mean, in Plato, I mean, you know, if you read Plato, it's all just, it's stories, it's narratives. And you can see how language itself can even be reinvestigated, just like English or whatever. But there's always this continual, it seems like that's sort of important too. I mean, I don't want to drift too far away from Carnap, but just sort of reinvigorating the spoken language that we all use, like American English or whatever.

And seeing how that itself becomes. Yes, yes. Of course, you know, for example, we are talking in Farsi or English language about the world. We talk in ordinary language that this object is red, this rose is red, so on and so forth. Of course, as long as we do not understand what allows us to talk about such observable phenomena as such predicates or that such predicates mean something to you the same as it means to me then we are in the business of blindness transcendental blindness spot only we

only when we go and see the logical structure of farsi and english from a formal perspective then we can shed some light as why is that what entails when we speak about this rose is red What should I do when I utter the statement or assertion that this rose is red? And why does it commit you to accept that this rose is red, having in mind that the word red and the word rose, or for that matter is, might be actually very different for both of us.

the idea language is fundamentally context sensitive the context sensitivity of language has nothing to do with the way that we differently experience the world but it is because from a computational standpoint we are simply the system and the environment I am your environment you are my environment as a system and then we should coordinate a certain sense in order to arrive at a reference to call a rose rose via gertrude stein

so so is it kind of like wittgenstein's picture theory where where i mean i guess i'm thinking it would be sort of like a materialist theory of language where you would create these sort of just mappings or isomorphisms between words and things of words of the most things and yes adam you see early carnapp early early carnapp when he was young he bought to wittgensteinian picture theory and those of you who do not know what picture theory is is essentially when we say the language is a representational instrument in the sense that our linguistic vocabularies at some rudimentary level correspond or are mapped to our sensible

intuitions or observations of phenomenon or appearances. Now later on Carnap, in fact I think that already traces of this rebellion against this with Gnestinian, Kantian in fact. Subordination of linguistic vocabulary to representational intuitive vocabulary was already evident. But Carnap later on fundamentally made this explicit and as I mentioned the whole point of language is not about representation. Representation

can only be called representation if it has a logical structure. You can only call something a logical structure if you take the idea of logic seriously without subordinating it in advance to some sensible intuition. So yes, from this perspective then you can see the evolution of Carnap's view it starts from almost a Kantian view, Wittgensteinian view and then something that is fundamentally both anti-Kantian and anti-Wittgensteinian picture view. We can see other observable phenomena if we could arrive at a more comprehensive form of language.

where our observations and the relations between such observations could be couched in terms of more diversified logical relationships that could structure them because neither for Carnap nor for Kant nor for Wittgenstein since Dantun gives us the structure if we see an object red like a red dot that red dot doesn't say anything to us it doesn't even say that it is red it is only red by virtue that is not blue and green so on so forth so you need to have a formal framework that make explicit the relationship

between does and so conceived observable phenomenon with other does and so observe phenomena and imagine that if we can make a new language we can elaborate new relationships between the so-called red observed red object and the so-called blue and green objects Okay guys, I'm sorry to disappoint you.

We will continue with Carnap of Bao and I will make a very good example and the challenges that have been posed to Carnap's of Bao via Good Night and Quai in the next session. But if you don't mind, I have something very important to do today. So if you don't have a question, let us finish this class and then catch up next week. It sounds good, Rizzo. Excellent. Looking a little bit less like Candyland. Thank you everyone. I hope the class is not boring for you. I mean if anything is vague,

please do ask me. You see, to be honest with you, even the greatest philosophers of all times, don't know anything about anything. The whole point that someone becomes a philosopher, someone becomes a researcher, a true object, subject of thought, is when they hone their intellectual insecurity. Intellectual insecurity is not an object of shame. It is in fact the way that you can ascend to the semantic heavens I'm beginning to think that that that your label labeling of ascent to

the semantic heavens is beginning to look a little bit more like sugarcoating deep into the depths of hell yes well the whole thing is that thinking the more you think, the more you see the reality for what it is. And by that I do not mean simply physical reality, but also social reality. Of course with that comes psychological pains. And that's why you have to balance it with other stuff than philosophers. And that's why I do think that if you really take philosophy seriously, so as you should take ethical philosophy seriously the whole idea of art of living you any person who simply contribute its

life to thinking alone without having a notion of pleasure or balance is going get burnt out. The greatest philosophers of all times are those who see, who take seriously thought, they take thinking to its ultimate conclusions. But in so far as they understand what we are just limited beings, namely psychological beings, we have to create a balance in order to think more, not to think less think more to think more requires pleasure hobbies

distraction so on so forth so the candyland is not really that candyland you need to have candies in order to arrive at the candle and to use your metaphor sure sure anyway sounds good yeah I've got to go get water at 2 o'clock in the morning okay everyone thank you very much see you next week love to you all take care