Reza Negarestani Intelligence and Spirit

Thank you. Thank you.

I just thought he was asking for some kind of symbolic to the part of this part Did he show you the focus? No, he said that I would have to give him some more Reza One second the volume One second, can you repeat something out?

Yes, I guess everything. Wonderful, wonderful. So, do you want to start right off? Or, you know? Absolutely. Yeah, the thing is that the picture coming from your side is a little bit glitchy. I mean, do you have a nice smooth picture? I think that if this continues, then maybe you should turn off your camera, and I will retain my camera just for the sake of that. Okay, wonderful then. Yeah, if at some point you have that prompt, just tell us, or I can do that right away. Sure, absolutely. So, that's just the part. I can introduce you or something, like formal stuff.

Sure, sure, I'll send it, it'll be great. So, if you didn't know, this is a lecture slash Q&A with Resniger Isani, author of Cyclonopedia and forthcoming Intelligent Spirit, a wonderful chapter from which we have read just beforehand. yes this will be a small 15 minute talk and after that we can ask all the questions we can hopefully depending on the well if you want to we can talk right away but you know you told me you were gonna have like a 10 minute something Sure. Thank you everyone. Thank you for coming. So, as you have probably read the text, the text is a specific section. Do you still have my picture?

Yeah, I'm just turning everything off just for the sake of the lecture. Okay, please let me know if my connection also goes out. Just remind me if you can hear me. Anyway, so yes, this section is actually part of the second chapter of the book where I do very briefly conduct an engagement with David Rodent's disconnection thesis.

You should understand that David Brogan's work on post-humanism is quite actually sophisticated. He's not like transhumanist of the kind that you hear in media, like me post-trone, so and so forth. But nonetheless, I think that in the last instance, it suffered exactly the same kind of pathologies and what you might call to be flaws that other forms of what you might call to be AI was humanism satisfied. So, if I was going to somehow enumerate the flaws, they could be listed as one.

The idea that essentially how David Rodin pictures future post-humans is built upon the understanding of dynamic systems. At least since the time of Poincaré, we know that dynamic systems are essentially predisposed to the smallest perturbations. What does that mean? It means that over time these small perturbations can accumulate and they fundamentally change the trajectory of the system.

so far that the trajectory of the system becomes divergent from its initial conditions. So if we take human, the concept of human, the figure of the human, whatever we mean by it, as some sort of initial condition system, you know, AGI version 0.01. And then, of course, given these kinds of small perturbations, which are introduced by technological time, which, by the way, you should understand that technological time for Rodin is essentially a counterpart of Darwinian deep time,

like kind of technological evolution. So given such a small perturbation over time, the system, namely the human, its trajectory fundamentally diverges from its initial condition, meaning humans here and now. And of course I criticize this precisely because I don't think, first of all the whole idea of applying this specific feature of dynamic systems in terms of stability analysis to a concept is itself a question not understanding the other problem that i have with

with this idea is that this explosive divergence from the initial adhesions is nowhere actually being implied in the analysis of stability in the dynamic systems. It's simply a fall core. Simply being propagated by, I would say, some people who really don't have any grasp of system analysis or words like that in some philosophies. So this is the number one. Number two is the idea that, okay, technology

can exert such influences upon the concept of humanity to the point that post-humans, which are essentially technologically evolved species, fundamentally differing from humans, to the extent that we cannot even use the concept of human in order to articulate how they might be. Well, this is what we call basically what Kant calls sure-mind or speculative enthusiasm, also known as vagary. This is just a vagary, a whimsicality, you know, short of a methodological enunciation that allows us to argue how technology in fact evolved and what kind of technologies

can, in fact, influence the concept of the human, and to what extent all such, basically, I would say, or post-humanist, these fall in a trap of what Kant calls vaguely or speculatively simply armature speculation. He wants it. Third, the entire thesis of the disconnection or basically unbounded with humans

is not actually, does not actually tell us what this thing is. You see, However, Rolgan is quite careful, quite cautious about to make sure that the post-humanity of these future species or future AGI doesn't look like some sort of radical aliens in the sense that it's fundamental. So what he is conceptualized to do, he comes up with a term called estranged post-human successors. Strange as a contrast to the word alien. Now, strange means that while it is not in a very ready-made way,

while it is not in this ready-made way not interpretable, but this does not mean that it is not uninterpretable in principle as such. So, of course, lacking the methodological aspects and also the criteria of interpretability, the specification that pertinent to it, Aroden, so as other kinds of post-humans like Nick Bostrom or Jelikowski, all they can talk about is about the ethical or existential repercussions of the emergence of a true AGI or a strong AI.

This is what Nick Shaw-Rowe calls a paschal scam. It's essentially a virgin of a paschal's wager. In the sense that, okay, like a skeptic says that, well, this is not going to happen with such intensity. And they say that, well, what if it happens? You know, it's like an An atheist says that, well, if God doesn't exist, God includes it. And they say, well, what if God exists? You see, this what if is already what you might call to be a whitewash over theological assumptions of the Pascalian coming.

In the sense that, yes, everything can be turned into a what if question, a pastoral scam, a pastoral wager. But you should understand that the entire discussion of pastoral at also is built on implausible conditions that by virtue of some flawed methodological criteria are turned into plausible conditions. And then we have to, we ought to take the plausibility such conditions so seriously as if our lives were dependent on like you know if you are an atheist

or you are a non-believer haskell says that what if god exists well then you are basically to scam this kingdom into this discussion that okay maybe i should actually pray five times a day and do this and do that precisely because you know what it actually exists but the whole thing is a scam you know the whole thing is a probability scam it's a probability escape number four is that, sure, David Broden tries to, as I mentioned, represent the idea of a future

AGI or post-union not uninterpretable in principle, which means that it can be interpreted, Well, of course, insofar as the criteria of determination are underdetermined, means that they are actually un-determined. In that case, I actually discussed about the idea of computational cost and so on and so forth. that, okay, let's not talk about rationalization of what this criteria determination of post-human future, let's just talk about empirical computation. But the very criteria by which he wrote it

sets apart post-human future from the current humans. Its post-human future, or disconnected or unbound post-humans, become in fact uninterfertil to its goal, to its own surprise. insofar as they will not have any empirical computational criteria of interpretation. And in that sense, once the criteria of interpretation in any sense, whether rational or empirical,

faults or collapses, then we are essentially around theology, theological things. We can just actually talk about angels dancing on a page and call it the post-givian future. So these are the four, I would say, main critical points that I will heavy against with density's connection pieces, but also what is usually considered as a giant for schemes. So this was, you know, the rundown of the entire paper. I am delighted to hear your questions, suggestions, or thoughts.

Thank you so much, Grekza. If I may, I can start the questions. So just before reading the chapter, I reread your points on humanism and also the Three Nightmares of the Inductive Mind. And I made you mistake me, but it seems that the drama of Three Nightmares seems very connected to what drama is talking about at some fundamental level. And also, I'm not sure if that's true, but I felt like you were doing a very Putnamian move when you were talking about how basically every open system in this sense satisfies Provin's criterion for an AGI the same way that Putnam uses his theorem at the end of the appendix in the reality of his representation.

But I just wanted to ask your general opinions on... This is kind of a foregone question. Around the school, you know, we've been hearing Andre Rowan's lectures on the new problems of axioms versus types, rules, you know, the Bredson, the Hilbert system, a more constructive approach to mathematics. And after the text, there is this very practical question. After Pete's text, after your text, there seems still to be a problem in terms of the realizability of transcendental logic in terms of formal procedures, in terms of formal languages. So it seems very natural to talk about like Retson-style systems,

something like Martin-Loff type theory, where you posit types and rules, yet it seems that the way at least Pete suggests treating trans-ethical logic is that there are some axioms embedded into it. So something, so a programming language like Hustle itself doesn't introduce a proper stable ground for NGI. Do you maybe have any sort of formal opinions on what it takes in terms of formal languages and actual procedures on what it takes to build an NGI? Sure. Only as a thoughtspot I can talk about these subjects. In the sense that essentially we can never extend or overextend or overextend the idea of transcendental logic through formal logic.

And by formal logic, I do not mean formal logic in a classical way, but I mean simply all formal linguistic instruments, logical instruments. Essentially programming, you know, kind of coring forms of logic, so what's it like. Now you see here Kantian dilemma arises. So Kant in the Greek of the universe, as you know it, make a distinction between transcendental logic and formal logic in general. Of course, for Kant, pure formal logic, namely logic as an organ, as the consistency of all sciences, is an illusion.

Whereas transcendental logic is real transcendentally real. In the sense that transcendental... So what is this? What is this factor that makes such a distinction possible? So you should understand from a computational perspective, essentially all computations require a subset of physical substance in the sense that it will be just absorbed to talk about computation as if we could just do this without any kind of physical task. whether it's time, space, memory, computational cost, resources, and so on.

And that's why today I would say that it is possible to think of transcendental biology. It's essentially a theory of computational complexity in the technical sense of what we mean by computational complexity. complex in the sense that all of our computations require certain amounts of resources, certain amounts of cost. This cost of course requires a certain amount of metabolism, energy, so on, so forth. Or for example, the biological institutions such as ours. Another thing is

is that from this perspective, transcendental logic understood in the vein of computational complex and being is essentially the idea of thinking or computation or calculus from the perspective of a limited being. You see, and that's why Kant sets apart sets apart the idea of transcendental deduction or transcendental subjectivity from a class of possible subjects, possible subjects, which can be said to be endowed with intellectual attention, like God.

As if they have infinite memory, they have infinite time, they have infinite space, so on and so forth. So the idea of transcendence of logic, essentially what you might call to be computational logic, corruption for limited beings such as us. We don't have infinite time, we don't have infinite space, so on and so forth. We are also, any kind of computation costs us something. So this is what I call transcendental logic re-interpreting, computational re-interpreting. Now, what is formal logic?

In human logic today, you can think about it as essentially the resources, conceptual or logical resources, which are temporarily divorced or separated from such concerns about the physical instantiation of motivation. They simply are concerned with the logic of the sentiation of computation. Now the thing is that as long as you do not allow for formal logic to blossom, to expand,

so as we can actually understand how we can possibly compute, your transcendental logic is limited. Now, this doesn't mean that formal logic by itself is sufficient to address the problems of subjectivity or subjective computation or computation as pertaining to limited being. All it means is that the conceptual logical resources should not be appropriately subordinated to the physical concerns of computation. Thank you so much.

So does anybody else have any questions? Who's first? Okay, yeah. Hi, I wanted to ask you a question about your divergences with the project of David Rodin, which you are criticizing in the chapter we were talking about. So, I wanted to ask you, do you provide a kind of something like a positive account introducing the alternative view to the notion of the ecological agency of the hyperplastic agents as developed in Rodin. I mean about that so do you have something like the theory of agency for the AGI as kind of cognitive agent and

how can it be conceptualized and if there any kind of relevance to the recent non-reductionist and non-functionalist theories within the cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Thank you. Sure. You see, a possible scenario to data world depth, I would say, does not essentially it doesn't mean that it's essentially non-cabinativist or non-physicalist or non-functionalist. First of all, we should understand that the pieces of functionalism can come in so many different ways.

We have normative functionalism, we have physical functionalism, we have multidimensional or multidimensional functionalism. And the same thing about physicalism. For example, physical is usually understood as a kind of brute-greedy reduction in philosophy online. Or for example, look at the new work of Orly Schenker. S-H-E-N-K-E-R. Orly Schenker. Orly Schenker's thesis about physicalism online. Now you see that things have fundamentally changed.

These terms and terminologies come in variations, and not all of them being the same thing that, for example, we traditionally knew about such circles, as if they are kind of reductivist, you know, flattening so on so forth, ontologically flattening so on. I would say I don't have actually a problem with David's thesis. In the sense that yes, absolutely it is possible for a future HDI, regardless of if the possibility of eventualization or not,

to fundamentally differ from what we take ourselves to be as biological species. However, such a speculation by itself is not sufficient for us to talk about post-itemopinogen. The only way that I am thinking that this can be possible in a scenario is when we take ourselves as what I call the prototype of a post-human Asia. We are simply living in the history of intelligence.

We are capable as far as it is concerned with the history of intelligence. However, to get out of this game, to actually be capable of philosophically and scientifically talk about post-human intelligence or HR, rather than geological, talking about it, we need to understand exactly what Kant and Hegel already incited. And what was that? An idea that our transcendental structures, by virtue of which we cohere and organize

our sensible intuitions so as to come up with a structured form of appearances, and by virtue that then we move the scientific image of ourselves in the world. All such transcendental structures can in fact be renegotiated. We can think about, and in fact science allows us, to think about other forms of space and time, other representations of space and time. For example, time, even in a Kantian parliament, is essentially an asymmetric error of time.

It moves from past to the future. Hence, you have compression 1, compression 2, and compression 2, corresponding to past, present, and future, once brought under the interceptive unity. Now, science actually tells us that there can be other kinds of species, there can be other kinds of observers in the universe, endowed in different areas of times, moving, for example, from future events. or might not have any kind of time-based technique, in the sense that time is methodical for them. Now, this allows us to actually envision different kinds of models for what we call the observable, the subjective observable.

And once we get into the nitty-gritty details, we might be able to actually renegotiate the ways by which our biologically and locally constituted, for example, structure or memory, entitles us to a certain kind of perception and not others. Of course, Camden would say that a speculation about other kinds of perception is still an armchair of speculation. But the thing is that at this point, with the advent of modern sciences, they are no

longer armchair of speculation. There are actually what you might call to be visions of alternative, under factual rules, and their subjective inhabitants. Thank you so much. Next. Yeah. One second. We just have some time glasses. So, good evening, Krzysztof. My name is Eugene, so first I would like to thank you for the fact that you have joined

us today. So, my question is, can you please give us an expression of the concept of technological time? and if it's so... Can you read that? What kind of term? Technological time Technological time, okay Yeah, it's from the text we read today and actually I want to ask like a sub-question if it is so how does it relate to the concept of technological singularity if it is so. Thank you. Absolutely. Well,

in the sense that post-humanists such as and use the idea of technological time is absolutely identical with the idea of technological skin attack. It's essentially the same thing. So I mean, not basically the same thing. So technological time, what you might call to be, is essentially teleological, not in a scientific sentence, but in a kind of dynamic system, trajectory, fun-working, of understanding of technology. Essentially, a kind of what you might call

to be a technological counterpart of Darwinian deep time. In the sense that a speciation, it goes through a procedure of entrenched constraint, complexification, so on and so forth. And this complexification usually is proportional to the reduction in variations of the species. As the complexity of the species increases, the variations, namely the possible changes in, for example, the morphogenesis of the species are being reduced.

Because of this, and this has something to do with the concept called generating an extraction In the sense that you see, so you can think of this like this, that you have different layers of a build You put the base, armature, and then you build bricks on top of it, and more bricks, more bricks Now, you see, as you put the stuff on top of what you have already built, your existing constraints, it is very hard to actually vary your structure drastically. You have to abide by the fundamental, by the armature, by the existing constraints which

are already in place. And this, yes, this allows for increasing complexification at the cost of decreasing variation. With the technological time, you also get the same. For example, you have certain cultural canalizations like tool making, language use, evolution as modern science as well. Now after this period, which you might call to be the kind of initial phase, technological evolution becomes ever more complex, but it does not become very.

Because the variation can actually result in a fundamental collapse. Exactly like evolution. Like imagine that we were growing another brain by some sort of mutation right now. We could all doubt that such variations are not allowed when entrenched constraints are already in place. So technological evolution is essentially, as I mentioned, identical to Darwinian evolution. However, whereas the Armenian evolution in principle applies to especially in biology,

technological evolution applies to the culture of the evolution. To the same extent, we have a lot of communication processes which are specifically cultural and societal, like tool linking, language, for example right now the emergence of cognitive, nanotech, technology and so on and so forth. Thank you. My question. Yeah, I have a question but it's a little bit tangent to the text that we've read. You mentioned in the beginning of this text about how AGI should be concerned with, should be full-fledged with normative dimensions and rulemaking.

and this point I think is related to the thing that you discussed on Facebook some months ago about the partner's liberal functionalism and we've several days ago before we've read your text we've also read partner's critique of inductive discrete machines of understanding of cognition as inductive discrete machines so if you can i think it will be it will be great if you can comment

on how you relate the project of AGI to partners, unrealized project of liberal functionalism and the project of AGI as a non-producer of normativity as such? Sure. Of course, this is actually quite a difficult question and I'm not going to send those on my own answers on this. It's something that I need to think about. But all I can say at this point is that I do take side of the path. In the sense that, for example,

You should understand where Adnan's action comes from. Adnan comes from a critique of poker, in the sense, but also a critique of empiricists. It is that all of our engagements with what we call intelligent or destruction of the furniture of the world are clearly related. And this essentially, the reason I mentioned this, precisely because the reason why Bhatna thinks that inductivism, without understanding that inductivism simply doesn't mean that

you are using induction, it means that induction is the only method that you can use and you He thinks that this inductiveness by itself is essentially a myth precisely because every kind of scientific procedure, every kind of interaction that we actually made with regard to the world is theory-related, at one or at another. So the theory-relatedness of our attraction upon reality, upon engagement with reality, is central to the entire Patman's thesis.

Now, the thing however, that I do not agree with Putnam, and I think that he also joins you might call to be the ilk or the gang of conservative humans is that the department says that, okay, you know, inductive exam is kind of a formal learning procedure that are not sufficient to make a general intelligence such as ours. They cannot do it. and he makes it formal proof of it. It's called diagonalization of it.

His alternative answer is that the reason that it's not possible is because we have informal rationality. informal rationality in the sense of someone like Brando or maybe even Hubbard's. The norms are informal rationality and these norms cannot simply be converted into statistical equations like an inductive machine to formal learning machine. Now, there is this writer called Kevin Kelly. You read the 90s, he wrote a very escaping critique of Papa and I'm fully agree with him.

He makes actually a very funny joke. He says that, you know, so you have a computer at the middle. On one side of it there is this computer scientist and on the other side of it is a philosopher of mind. Every time the computer does something and the computer scientist says that, oh, he had a desire so interesting, the philosopher of mine says, turn off this stupid shit. I can give you informal rationality. But what does that mean? What does informal rationality mean?

It's simply, the more I have read of Blake Putnam, it seems that he more rationality is just what he might call to be the last strain of conservative pre-scientific humanism, in which the concept of reason or normativity itself is being discussed in terms of terms which are opaque in the scientific and logical procedures. We should be actually, I would say, we should be actually very vigilant about such ideas

of informal rationality. Every impact, if something that modern mathematics, modern computer science, modern logic show us is that in fact our reason is nothing but a multilateral view of different kinds of computation put together. And in that, all our rationality should not be understood as something that we essentially is simply our own unique way of thinking about the world and that's a very unique thing.

No, I would say that in all our rationality should at this point be understood in terms of theoretical computer science. And that actually does not simply reduce the idea in the sense of reduction. It does not reduce the idea of internal rationality, enrich it. It enriches it. I have a follow up to that. So in terms of, as we just heard, I think, two days ago, or yesterday, two days ago, Ray's talk on Brandon's critique of cellars, and he takes this kind of turn that we shouldn't actually talk about cellars as weight reduction, we

should actually criticize him for his holdings. And I just wanted to ask, was this one of your... Arthur, can you please repeat the last part of your question? Oh, yeah, it's just that Ray, at the end of his talk, said that rather than criticizing cellars for his so-called object naturalism, we should rather criticize him for his, like, holism. So, and he suggested that we should rather take a much more naturalist turn than cellars. And I just wanted to ask whether that was one of the things that actually turned turned you to car cars rather than to sell cars in your recent years.

Yes, well I'm actually quite very anxious when someone brings up the term naturalism. Naturalism for different philosophers mean fundamentally different things. Naturalism sometimes actually means naturalization in some philosophers, in the sense that you get today Jordan Peterson with some of the Bolshev New atheists, like who's that guy? Arthur Alckmin, the one who wrote about memoplexity who came up with the word mean.

the evolutionary scientists. Doctus. Doctus. Doctus. Doctus. Doctus, yes. So for them, naturalism simply means kind of green naturalization. Now naturalism, I do not know exactly what the brain means by naturalism. But for me, naturalism, I believe in a hegelian understanding of naturalism. In the sense that naturalism essentially pertains or concerns with the concept of nature that allows both a move upstream and a move downstream.

Up the stream to the space of existence and downstream to the space of causes. Now, of course, none of these can be dispensed with at the expense of the other. Essentially, if you have only one of them, you are bipolar naturalist, and hence you are not essentially in philosophy. Yes, if by naturalization we need this kind of move upstream and move downstream toward the enrichment of the logical resources and toward the enrichment of the causal fractures,

Yes, I do agree that we need to fairly nationalize the arts, but this is simply beholden to the very concept of nationalization we are using in our rhetoric. So here, one of the problematic figures is basically Carnap, because there are a lot of kitsch interpretations, but I really wanted to hear your formal take on how do you think Carnap actually still appropriates this conscious reason, vis-a-vis how Powers writes about it. So we haven't covered that, and I really wanted you, if you have any kind, because it seems

you know, if you have any kind of, because it seems very kind of strange, Karnat is the speaker who is usually very much Yes, actually, Karnat is quite contradictory to what people understand about the question of naturalization. You see, at least in the time of when he wrote the logical destruction of the world, his masterpiece, his curse to the force, He was also, when you actually read it quite carefully, particularly in the sections on the psychological determination, you realize that Carnapis, he was, he were going to give you the word naturalization.

By naturalization he meant exactly like this kind of move upstream and move downstream. You have to enrich both logical structure and you have to uncover the causal factors. And try to somehow correlate them with one another in the sense that they co-peer back in the last instance. However, in the later works of Karnak, particularly after his essay, his incomplete essay attempt at the logic, and his book The Logical Syntax of Language, Karnak believed that nationalization can never actually be about uncovering or because of the factors.

It can only be about the enrichment of the logical structures by which we uncover the causal factors. So he only believes from that point out of work in the move upstream toward the logical structure, toward the enrichment of the logical system. precisely because to any other kind of moon actually results in something that Selars called the men of the given. Thank you. Karnak himself has found the truth not only in Selars. In fact, he believes Selars in his later work

that Selars is still behold as the men of the given. But he finds the root of the method of the given in Wittgenstein with Kant. Wittgenstein's picture is really of language and Kant's idea of logic transcendental logic, logic as a canon. A logic whose entire beauty is about the right application of rules of logic to the sensible Thank you. Does anybody else have any questions?

Oh, yeah. One second. Hello, thank you for your presentation and answers. My question is related to the text, what is philosophy and to today's text. And question is, what is the role of understanding in the project of artificial general intelligence and philosophy as a program approach which understands thinking as a computational process? Maybe concerning the critique of John Seul of this computational approach.

Thank you. Thank you very much. My apologies, Artem. I think the voice got caught up at the beginning. Would you be able to repeat the first part? I heard the last ones, but I mean, I just kind of recapitulate both things. My apologies. don't worry, the person will repeat it. One second. Generally the problem is what is the role of understanding. Understanding in the project of artificial general intelligence and in philosophy. Because even in the context of relation between developed artificial intelligence and humans,

there is a problem of some understanding. Thank you. Yes, thank you. So, may I actually ask a question in order to answer this coherently? When you say understanding, are you actually referring to the kind of Kantian concept of understanding? Maybe in the sense like so understands it understanding like the special capacity of human beings to have with semantics

and maybe in some sense it's a problem of hermeneutics but in the context of relationship between realized artificial intelligence and human beings. Sure, sure. I think I can get exactly the question that you are posing. It's in the sense, if I'm not mistaken, that usually humans understand what they actually think, what they see, what they experience, whereas a GI just doesn't. And this is actually a problem that was posed by Jack Copeland in his introduction into

into artificial intelligence, a book that he wrote in late 1980s, which is basically, this is really the whole idea of chemistry, idea of understanding. You see, understanding is essentially a furniture of experience, of subjective or perceptive experience. We cannot talk about understanding without experience. It's in the sense that we are, when we see something, we just don't detect it. We just don't simply differentiate, for example, this pattern from that pattern.

we actually understand what it means we are trying to even though that understanding that actually subject to further negotiation yes so in that sense probably to answer the question we really need to understand what understanding itself is I mean, we know that in Kant, understanding is a kind of a two-way street. One, from the space of sensible intuitions toward perceptual judgments made in the domain of understanding,

which Kant calls intuitings as opposed to the intuitive objects and one moving from the space of understanding to the space of sensible intuition. And that's really what Kant calls categories. Categories are essentially what we call category is less than other classificatory structures. We cannot talk about any kind of experience, and if we could understand what we are seeing, what we are smelling, so on and so forth, if we did not have some sort of categorical structure that could classify our sensible intuitions, give them some organization, some limits of formatting.

Now the thing is that AGI or AI at this point, we don't have any AGI ability. AGI is simple, pure stipulation at this point. But for example, when we are talking about AI, essentially we are in the domain of exactly exactly the same kind of back and forth movements between understanding and sensible issues, categories and objects, and intuitive objects. Intuitings and intuitive objects. And that's why we can, for us, such movements allow us

to talk about our experience. Talking about experience means understanding. Now the thing is that, okay, why is that? For example, we cannot yet ascribe in a coherent manner, even analogically speaking, the notion of understanding to an AI or a form of machine. Precisely because the way that the axioms of the language or logic or programming classificatory categories are brought to bear on the sensible intuitions,

for example, the kind of data harnessed by a camera, a hashtag Uber machine or a drone, that they are not fully in contact with. They are not merged together exactly the same way that we have it as a relation between the intuitive object and the intuitive judging act unleashed by understanding. We don't have it precisely because this is really what you might call to be a secret transcendental logic. If we could solve this problem, which is essentially a mode of integration between the empirical

data or observational data and the kind of programs that's embedded into a machine, if we could broaden these two poles to bear on one another, then I would say that we could make a fundamental breakthrough in the development of HDI. But right now, these are just what might all be at this point. The relation between empirical observations gathered by a drone with a camera up and the program itself, of the axiomatic programming that is embedded in it,

this relation is something quite corromal actually. The data are not being structured in the sense that they are, in a way that they are being structured in our case, between understanding and categories and sensible intuition. This structure, the data for drone for such an AI machine deep learning, They are simply being labeled. Categorization of data, we're called data, simply it's labeled. And all classificatory acts are simply happened at the near level of labeling. Labeling of this data is this, this data is this pattern, pattern matching, essentially.

What we, in our case, it's not about just labeling. The categories of understanding or logic of our language actually do something more than they do. They ratify the possible range of the sense data that we have just received. So we can talk about different possible variations, and from there, make different conclusions about what we could actually anticipate to see in the environment. So you see, these are actually quite fundamental issues from a classical perspective. And I think that even though I still

think that Kant is a conservative class right, I think you can't work, but that's a revolution of greed in terms of understanding this relation between categories and sensible intuitions. Understanding and sensible experience. So now we have a lot of actually very general questions since there are a lot of people different backgrounds we also have a lot of people who actually wanted to know you know since this practice on neorationalism they're you know the move from your current project from your work on

cyclonopedia is in some ways vastly different so if you could maybe you want to talk about how the side move from the project of Cyclonopedia to what an intelligent spirit is like, you know, how did this path occur? I really don't know. I mean, probably you know, maybe not that people know that you see. I wrote Cyclonopedia. I started writing Cyclonopedia in 2002. 2005 it was already finished. Three years basically it was waiting to be published. First with one publisher who went bankrupt and then re-produced with it. By the time that I finished, I had a lot of projects.

However, in hindsight, even though I, you know, as you probably know, I often make files like a little bit of BDL and find it actually quite weak and a little bit of execution, I do, there is a connection between these stuff. Essentially you should know where I am. I used to be a fundamentally a Deleuzean answer. If any approach that we have with Godfod should be understood in terms of the broad history of Godfod.

The philosophy is that rather than just the nation, which is what passed. And that session really tries to take all of these the Luthien pieces, their farthest illusions, what happens as a final stitch. Well, you sometimes hit the wall, and I did hit the wall. The point is, even though I was still interested in a set of concepts, I just didn't see that

and how to more actually, coherently, be excluded, explained and further built on without me moving towards a different kind of philosophy. The whole idea is that philosophy has to come to any philosopher. Sometimes philosophers actually get this illusion that they are the voice of philosophy, but that's just a mistake. Obviously when you only work with a kind of philosopher, no matter how much your concepts

are still intact and you hold them dear, you notice that such a philosopher is no longer sufficient and for you, gladness, your words about the concepts you are working on. Yes, you are trying to build those. And yes, so what are these concepts? I think that it's obvious that one of the concepts of the mind. Another concept is the idea of outside, you know, in the Delusian sense. But then you notice that the kind of philosophical division

or philosophical niche, your vision world could aim behind the methodological advantages to tackling such concepts. But, what do you mean by that? Such methodological advantages are essentially exhaustively instant. And that's why I saw that they can no longer, I cannot push these concepts with such a methodology that I'm also structured with philosophy. So I have to move on to different kinds of philosophy. To get a new kind of aims and arrows to shoot at my concepts.

And that was basically it. That's how I turned into this kind of philosophy. It is not by any means what it might call to me is some sort of mourning or a kind of Christianity-born kind of stuff. No, no, no, it's simply not understanding the lead part of philosophy, or you at some point understand the method of the method of the country. By the country, listen, he is very limited, and then you will have two grandchaps. That's why I would say this. Raza, I'm so sorry, your feet was constantly breaking.

So could you repeat the same answer, but in a very succinct form? I'm sorry. Sure, sure. I was saying that essentially it's not that psychopedia is about different concepts. Yes, some concepts are different, but the whole concept are still the same. outside the idea of thoughts, the idea of non-human, so on and so forth. However, to work with concepts require a sufficient argumentarium for two blocks of methods. I realized that working in a post-instructural way had very much limited my methodological

maneuvering. So that's why I have to branch out. It's not that as if I woke up one morning and thought, oh shit, I am now a Catholic reborn. No. It was simply out of methodological necessity. And as it kind of, oh, we have another question. Yeah, thank you. It's sort of a follow up to the previous question. In synchronopedia, you put out what I may call a theory of a certain kind of writing. and also I think this book also exemplifies this practice of writing

well we may call it theory fiction or whatever and how do you evaluate this specific writing practice, this practice of writing philosophy philosophy now is it uh to put it very crudely i'm sorry it's not a confrontational statement is it the only way you can formulate it uh do you think it's it's a failed project or is this just a project that you are not more not interested anymore Sure, sure. The sound was a little bit distorted,

but I think I got the gift. So my apologies if my answer is totally irrelevant to the question. But yes, you see, to be honest with you, I'm actually far more normal than many people who try to somehow bring together their philosophy and fiction party. For me, fiction requires a different kind of procedure. You see, the worlds of literature are fundamentally different from the worlds made in the domain of philosophy. Yes, they do indeed have connections. They have a tissue that connects them together conceptually,

But the approaches that you make in the world of fiction writing and the world of philosophy should be fundamental. There are certain kinds of moves I can make in the realm of fiction that I cannot do in the realm of philosophy and vice versa. And to that extent, no, I don't use exactly this every kind of concept that I have at my disposal in philosophy at the service of literature. Because I think literature is fundamentally different from the idea of philosophy. And usually I get these objections from people that, well,

now you are talking about human rationality. But then how the fuck did you write about oil as a sentient being? Well, this is a fiction. The world of fiction requires a different kind of approach. And even the way that we interact with each church fundamentally different from the way that we interact with philosophy. And I guess as my kind of follow-up, I wanted to ask about specifically the project of neo-rationalism. And I mean, this is the question that you asked me to ask anybody who will be at the school, and that is, I mean, there's a classical question of how neo-rationalism

and that is at some point answered by Pete's post on the Anthologistics Forum. But at the same time, I wanted to ask, he seems to have a more succinct view of people like you, like him, like Ray. But I wanted to ask whether you think that there are some divergent approaches to problems that you pursue rather than... You at some point referred to this as you don't want it to become an ancestral festival. So do you think that there is some diversity in this time? Some people want to become an ancestral service. I mean, I would say that those philosophers who in fact are happy with their posing circles

and they simply try to downplay possible points of divergence are not philosophers. There are propagandists. Philosophers absolutely should go for divergence. I mean, our entire alliance is only the thing. All of us. As such, we should not really be happy when there is a risk of being taken hold into some sort of niche or ancestral collection of ideas. And yes, of course, every thought, every new vector of philosophy emerges from some sort of consensus and we move through it.

But then after a period of consensus, when you actually start to elaborate ideas, you understand that there are so many, in fact, points of divergence and separation that they need to be at it. And I would say that yes, absolutely. The points of the emergence currently are my commitment to the idea of realism. I thought about it as it seems to me it's not that the idea of realism is a hazard, but unless it is rife with so many problems that haven't been articulated since the time of Kant.

And by the way, I do not think that Kant is a correlation in the way that Meosun talks about, fact of realism. He isn't fact of realism, but even in his realism, making flawed moves that I have seen being made by the life of sellers, by the life of my friends, Ray and Pete. This power doesn't mean that we are, you know, divorcing each other. I mean, essentially We are agreeing on the same set of premises. But I think that it would be worthwhile to elaborate these points of divergence with regard to the question of realism,

with regard to the question of objectivity, with regard to the question of what we mean by this. Thank you so much. I think we have the last question. and there's this sort of context to it. I mean, we're all right here. Can you hear me? Can you hear me? Reva, can you hear me? Okay, we'll try it one more time. I'm just going to...

Thank you. I don't want to go to the table. I don't want to go to the table. I don't want to go to the table.

I think we're kind of we're using the internet connection from here I don't think Siberia supports this kind of conversation but we I mean I kind of told you about this also we have a lot of new researchers who are trying to go into their own fields and trying to tackle some sort of novel problems philosophy and novel outcomes so this last question is kind of about this so

I want to ask this conclusive question but to ask it I want to return to our first concern about the part of your book. To return to this connection thesis and as I presume this thesis presuppose some kind of an attitude of human beings who are related somehow to their future. and in that case I wanted to ask whether your critique of this disconnection thesis have a related attitude to their future maybe it's somehow related to autodidactism yeah thank you

Okay, okay. My apologies. Your voice was being cut at the end. Arthur, could you really, I mean, I don't need to, I got the gist of the whole question, but the last part, would you be able to repeat it, Arthur, for me? It's basically the question that connects, I think, with everybody in the school. It's a question about Do you think that it's somehow connected, you know, with not maybe just general ethical concerns about what's happening right now in the academia, but maybe also has something to do, you know, with reason in general? Yes, well, you see, the first thing is that I'm talking about, that piece of stuff is not simply being self-taught.

I mean, yes, I know, I understand that the meaning of the word simply means being self-taught. But you should understand that the autodidacticism is essentially a brand or a vein of a different kind of philosophy that's usually, you know, have been performed since the time of it. For example, I suggest Epine Naphis, the result of the film Ahun Hababia, and Epine Tophar, the philosophers, theologians, the philosophers, the philosophers, the philosophers.

As a question, both of these works deal with the question of after didacticism. In the sense that philosopher is someone like a feral child, like one who has been born on a desert island, and spontaneously generates. It starts to roam around, see stuff, and then at some point, by some virtue, either outcast the ways come to the island or that child manages to make some sort of device that bridges this island to other kinds of islands. the philosopher, the autodidactic philosopher, coming into contact with other kinds of subjects.

Essentially, autodidacticism, the more you think about it, is the whole point of the desert island. What does desert island actually mean? It means that a land oasis in the middle of ocean. Many people actually make a cliche of, as in some sort of escapist, you know, dream of doing philosophy, of thinking differently about the world. But the first things that we should understand about the notion of island, particularly the desert island, is that it is the very signification of the idea that I am living on an island, a particular kind of world,

and the particularity of which signifies that I am actually part of an infinite ocean, where there There can be many other islands, many other alternative worlds. And this is really, I would say, the ultimate pieces of plasodidactic system. A certain kind of philosophical upbringing, philosophical self-discipline, that coincides with the conclusion that I am willing to embrace all possible alternative worlds. to venture out. And that's, I would say, the task of philosophy, if not the task of life.

Okay, Reza, thank you so much. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. Have a great day, my friends. Thank you. It's already nice here. You have a good one. Well, take care, very much. See you. Thank you. Bye-bye. Thank you.