Kant’s Circle of Revenge (Session 5)

Hello and welcome to the fifth session of Khan's Circle of Revenge with Reza Nagaristani. We're going to pass the mic to Reza and Indigo right now. Thanks everyone. Okay, so as I mentioned, we are going to talk about the rest of space and time. And if there is time, we go to the idea of transcendental logic. As I mentioned, I will read, when it comes to the part of time, I will read you a little bit of my manuscript, kind of trying to go a little bit more into details with regard to the question of transcendental idea of experience temporality, and so far as Kant

himself emphasizes at the end of the transcendental aesthetic with regard to the question of inner means that this is the ground of everything that comes after, in what you might call transcendental logic, namely the logic of thinking or cognition or representation of mind as being part of the world. Being part of the world doesn't mean that this is the furniture of the world. You see, that's the thing. This is a very, this whole idea that, idea of transcendental logic with the understanding that the mind is always part of the world.

If you interpret it, you can interpret it in two ways, as a furniture of the world, in which you can say that it can be explained away by our understanding of the world as it unfolds or that it has in fact something else that makes it, that is in fact a part of the world, but it has also certain what you might call formal dimensions that are irreducible for it to simply be explained away, to be explained away.

Not that they cannot be explained or that we cannot give an account, a naturalistic account of such formal dimensions, but the way that they function within themselves cannot be explained away by how world or nature functions and this is this is one of the things that you see that again like there is a right-wing Szilardzian and a left-wing Szilardzian so we can say in fact when it comes to the question of transcendental psychology there are again a right-wing Kantians and left-wing in Kantians. But certainly is it differently a left-wing Kantian, so as people like Kaz

de Rere or Hermann Cohen. But there are also right-wing Kantians, and you might think of them as earlier, you know, kind of Kantianism. You can see this in people like Paul Latour, who is actually a friend of Hermann Cohen and they both know Kantians. But he has, at At least when the early work of Paul de Torpe has this kind of understanding of mind and transcendental logic essentially as part of the, as a furniture of the world in a kind of very, very Schillingian sense.

So yeah, there are this kind of division as with regard to the question of transcendental idea, the transcendental logic and how you formulate the relation of mind to the world of which it is a part. So that's what we are going to talk about today and with that said, comments, questions, pestering, anything. I have a question about, just basic question about Kant and his decision to use the word representation even on the level of like the pure intuitions. He speaks of like that time

and space as representations and also interchangeably with senses I mentioned to you that's well you see there are representations and you might call to be they belong to this rudimentary order, lower level hierarchy that we were talking about last session, but they're also a priori. In the sense that, think of this, that there are two, when we are talking about space and time, their representations are very, very different from the representations of items

in the world or what later on you might call objects or Geganishtan. Why? Because no matter how much you put objects together and you try to, and this is Kant's of course idea, no matter how much you try to talk about the relations, sensory, sense impression but also intuitive relations between thus and so items situated in the world, you you still can't arrive at the space. Again, comes with the idea of that double abstraction that I was mentioning, that nothing exists, space doesn't exist in anything. Things are contained in a space and time.

So if you remove those items and even their representations, you still can't think that there is something called a representation of a space, which is a priori. Applies to the sensory, you know, sensations, but is irreducible to the sensation of particular items in the world. so it'd be useful maybe like to think of representations as like operations elaborate on this a little bit like if it is a an application of the mind something prior

onto the world. Yes, I mean, space and time absolutely Kant thinks that they are essentially transcendental products. He actually, in one of his later, he, you know, one of the things is that, not in Critic of reason I think it's in the it is that essay that I mentioned to that discursive essay on a space and time I will I will share it online there is one instance that can't finally talks about for the first time on about the space and time as object as objects of thought objects of cognition you might think

about them as manners by which mind is structure the world manners and these manners cannot be derived directly from relations between particular sensible items or geggenishtan go on this is well this is the same part where he talks because it's object, there's no thing in itself of time. Yes. And this is where Sellers has a disagreement with him, right? Because he says, you know, science grasps the thing in itself of space. Yes. And I think, well, also Helmholtz has this disagreement with him.

Yes. Yes. Yes. Yeah, which brings back to the idea that I mentioned to you, I can't recommend enough Nature of Existence, Magda Gart's later work. I think Magda Gart agrees that science can investigate space as a thing in itself and time. But his point is that we are never sure that how much the characteristics of this thing in itself is actually an overextension of the characteristics of our transcendental

experience. Magdagart is essentially a Hegelian philosopher. I mean, he was the one who introduced Hegelianism to the British circle. So he uses Hegelian skepticism against both camps, against Kantianism and against those, what you might call to be the proto-analytic philosophers, you know, proto-scientific analytic philosophers. What would be the method of checking in the case of making judgments about space and time

as they are in themselves in a scientific manner? If you can't do it empirically. Formally, in mathematics mostly. Yes, yes. I think that's the whole idea that the formalization is important. Another thing is that here comes another, I think we need to talk about it later on in a more elaborative fashion. So the idea is that one of the things that, I mean, so basically you absolutely require

a formal framework. Well, another thing is that this essentially brings into question the spatialization of time. As I told you that, you know, not all forms of a spatialization of time are illicit. are unjustified. There are in fact specializations that are justified and what are they? You might say them as a metricization of sequences of events that allow us to think time and space in relation with one another rather than as disjoint representations.

But mostly the whole idea of the investigation of the... You see, the whole idea is that not everything empirical is a thing in itself in Kant. You might think that only external objects are the things in itself. No! Transcendental, a perceptive self for Kant is a nominon thing, is a thing in itself. You see? So when we are talking about a thing in itself, it's not just sensible objects. They can be simply formal dimensions. The same thing goes with space and time, and hence the investigation of space and time in themselves can be done by way of mathematical sciences.

So there's not multiple numinal things, though. There's only one numinal thing, right? Or? There is one numinal dimension, But the manifestation of this nominal dimension can be myriad, can be various, what you might call to be, you know, indexes. Items, I mean, there are things in themselves that you might analogically compare them with are phenomenal appearing items in the world or objects, Gegenstand, sensible objects.

But also something for Kant like transcendental perception, transcendental aperceptive cell, is a cell nominal. So you see that they are, you can, so the cellars has a diagram in that pre-Kantian themes. It's basically this dark surface and there are these holes in it. And these holes, what you might call to be the sensible objects that you can actually perceive phenomenally at the order of appearances. But also you can introduce different kinds of holding to the surface and you say there

are manifestations of the nominom, like the transcendental self. pole and its other pole, the thing in itself, whose manifestation is what is a geganeshan, the sensible object. And this is, we get to this, but this is exactly where Findlay criticizes heavily Kant's idea of this the cares of the nominal that what really happens when you see the transcendental perceptive self also as a nominal we

will get into we will get into this when you know we get to later chapters any Not really, but I guess you could just say it simply that even if there's one noumenon for any phenomenon, there can be many levels of description of that noumenon. Yeah. You know, some of which may be conflicting, or some of which you'd have to work out their incompatibilities. Those incompatibilities, do you mean like thinking about the noumenon as an epistemic

limit against thinking about the noumenon as some type of object which we don't have access to? As those would be seemingly contradictory notions of what the noumenon or the thing in itself is. I mean, I was just thinking about, say, like, if we take time as a numeral, then, you know, there'll be various kind of formal descriptions of time, some of which may be conflicting, and we can then investigate, you know, which description is more, it should be more correct

or which description yields pragmatic orientation of time in a better way, for example. So the formal description of that numeral reality has to be empirically investigated. it and you you just as as far as i understand it i'll i guess i'll restate it when as it comes back to part of

the what make time and space themselves a priori or pure intuitions is that there's no way to step say step outside of time or to step outside of space to then you know say empirically investigate those as objects those are always the conditions under which empirical investigation itself can take place. Reza, did you hear that? No, I didn't hear that, sorry. I was just gonna ask, it seems like, from what I understand, what Kant's saying is like, part of what makes

the reason that time and space are considered pure intuitions is because there's no way for the a perceptive subject to step outside of these yes step outside of time or to step outside of space yes for a person yeah a perceptive subject cannot uh step outside of space and time to then view them as empirical objects of investigation. So then there seems to be sort of a problem here about how would you then study these things empirically if they're always the conditions under which empirical investigation takes place.

Well, the whole thing is that, as Dinego was saying, that you don't study them empirically. study them formally and precisely by a study them formally that you are capable of broadening the scope of your empirical traction on items on the world in the world but this is also so Helmholtz started a geometrical empiricism and so there was a empirical exploration of the formal understanding of space and time Yes, mathematical sciences in the sense that there is always a conjoined set of observations and a system of formalism within which such empirical data might be interpreted.

Yeah, so for example they were doing things like looking at, okay, if you take the laws of Euclid and look at them at a cosmological scale, do they still hold? You can empirically measure whether a triangle, whether the Euclidean laws work at the scale of, they were doing these kind of studies, Helmholtz and the successors, Cassira and Moncari. So yeah, but then, you know, that's not just it's not just pure empirical observation but you know with the formal yes it's a conjoined or you mentioned another thing is that now

obviously this brings the question of geometry that you know can't really really emphasizes. But then you see, so I think this is like I think you have at the same time conjoined empirical and formalization, but also you need to have, and Kant emphasizes this. You need to have what you might call to be the apodictic, a priori geometry. What you might say to be a kind of a formalization of geometry, detached from the level of what

is observable. Otherwise, can we really think about how we can move from Euclidean geometry to a Riemannian geometry. And in Riemann, for the longest time, his product was called to be a delirium of mathematics. Precisely because at the level of experiential data, at least the kind of experiential data that was, or empirical data that was available, you couldn't make these kinds of coordination between your empirical observations

and your geometrical system. How are you defining formalism here? I mean, that might be quite a basic question, but as someone who's not particularly well versed in mathematics or geometry, I don't know, that would be really helpful if you could expand. Well, formalism, it's a tricky one, but basically it's a set of symbols symbols that have syntactical relations. So there are rules for the organization of those symbols.

That would be the simplest kind of thing. Yes, yes, yes. I mean, we had this talk last night that basically formalism is about syntax. When we are talking about syntax or the question of form, it doesn't mean that it is essentially done in absolute autonomy from content. Yes, it has a relative autonomy to the content, and that's basically what allows the mobilization of syntax. Now Carnap in Logical Syntax of Language, he introduces in fact two definitions of syntax, And only one of them becomes basically, you can connect it to the idea of formalism.

So one is the idea of descriptive syntax, what you might call to be, again, a formal syntax, but one that has been restrained or somehow constrained by the semantic of our natural language. And one he calls a logical syntax. and logical syntax is something that you can in fact mechanize it. You can decouple it from the semantic content in order then to reapply against a new backdrop of problems or content. So what you might think of formalization in this sense,

as I mentioned, I think in the early sessions, there was this movement against Kant, starting from actually no Kantians, but also people who later on became the forerunners of analytic philosophy, they thought that the idea, as I mentioned, that Kant's idea of logic is fundamentally restricted. Insofar as Kant thinks that logic is a canon rather than the organ of thinking. Main point of emphasis for Kant is transcendental logic that is,

you know, connected with experiential dimension. But people, and he basically tries to somehow subordinate formal logic to the transcendental logic. People like Frigge, like Cohen, later from Kazir, who was actually a student of Raymond Cohen, and Karnap, who was a student of Kazir, they realized that this kind of subordination of formal logic to kind of transcendental logic or to what you might call to be the dimension of the apperceptive self, the understanding guy, opens the way to psychologism. Namely, logical laws are subordinated to your psychological

representational system. So what does it take to decouple logic, to detach logic in a systematic from this threat of a strong or weak psychologist. I don't think that Kant is a strong psychologist, but I think he's a weak psychologist. And one of the solutions to this problem was essentially what is syntax? What is the logical form and what you can do with it? And then you see that precisely as soon as this movement starts, the movement of formalization, the move toward

logical syntax, you get in fact different interpretations of syntax from church and theory, mechanizability, computability, to free-care, you know, manipulation for the laws of thoughts and so on and so forth to Karnap, basically invention of languages, languages that are no longer constrained by what you might call to be the evolutionary basis of our natural language. If I'm understanding correctly, this is the idea of the mind as like the left-wing path,

as you earlier described. Somehow, yes, somehow you can say it, but of course it's very kind of odd to call super formalist people as left wing can't yet, right? Because they are usually for content that they are the right makers. But yes, you can think about it that way, yes. But with some, you know, caveats about how this works. But yes, yes. And there is this fantastic essay. Well, Christian is not today. I'm sure that Christian is good at finding stuff. There There is this great essay, I think I mentioned last session about this essay, it's by Estebaody,

it's called From Binded Representation to Unbound Oceans. And it's essentially on this idea, on this idea of Kantian psychology, how it has been tried unsatisfactorily to be solved and how actually those formalistic people solve this problem. Here's the author. I will put it on our Google Classroom. Have you read the essay?

I haven't. No. Okay, shall we start? So, let me just read some stuff, I mean, starting from, you know, the last paragraphs that I was reading last session, and then I moved forward. So we are still in the realm of space. So I said that the fundamental problem with the received Leibnizian relational theory of space is that it can't account for the possibility of synthetic a priori geometrical propositions.

Empirical concepts together with that which they are grounded, empirical intuitions cannot yield any synthetic proposition except one that is also merely empirical, i.e. proposition of experience. Therefore, it can never contain necessity and absolute universality of the sort that is nevertheless characteristic of all propositions of geometry." I remember that I read this last session. Now Kant's strategy at this point against the Leibnizian-Wolfian theory of space is to maintain the inadequacy of our conceptions to the intuitively given structures of space,

rather than the other way around. Space is not merely some general manner in which extended parts and their limiting points are related to one another. If it were, there would be no such difference as that between the left hand and the right hand. space has to be an actual structure of regions even in the absence of matter. It is the prime ground of the possibility of combining material parts. So this shows that basically this thing exhibits itself in different ways, in physical and

biological differences. The difference between screws which turn to the right, screws which turn to the left, between left hand and right hand, so on and so forth. Obviously Kant has here chosen a strategy of subordinating conception to intuition. Intuition reveals differences of which conceptions knows nothing. Hegel and Bergson will follow him on this trajectory, particularly in regard to the continuous and the developing. But Kant could equally well have chosen the strategy of subordinating intuition to conception

after the fashion of Leibniz and Christian Wolff. And he does in fact do so in dissertations, in that essay that I mentioned to you, and also in the critical writings, for their space and time, on account of their inconceivable properties, are firmly relegated to the status of mere appearances. The understanding or reason or mind has not, Kant thinks, the slightest difficulty in framing either concept or in grasping its possibility. The formation of both concepts

involves more than mind's native capacity to distinguish parts within holes and the capacity to put parts together so as to form holes. That the parts and holes must be substantial and real and not merely ideal. We will get to this later on in next few sessions. But when, however, the mind tries to entreat or envisage an actual instance of either concept, it comes up against an absolute barrier in the form of an infinite series of division or argumentations which can never be completed in time and which also characterizes the space

so this whole idea that you know um there is there is this whole idea of continuity about the transcendental ideality of the space and time and camps uh that that you can't think about the space and time as part-whole relationships, or for that matter divisions, discreteness. For time and space are alike such that their division can be continued indefinitely without yielding us simple elements, points and instants are not isolable elements but merely boundaries,

while augmentation by successive addition can likewise be carried on indifferently, without yielding us the cosmic whole that we are trying to compass, to encompass, whether you're talking about time or space. So insofar as, you know, neither you can divide them in order to understand what they are, nor you can put them together, their instances or their regions together in order to understand the continuous whole. And this is, I think, so this is a quote from the essay by Kant.

For since in a continuum there is no term to regress from a whole to its giveable parts, sorry, and in the infinite no term to progress from the parts to a given whole. A complete analysis is in the former case impossible and a complete synthesis in the latter case, nor can the whole be completely thought of in conformity with the laws of intuition whether as regards its composition in the former case or as regards its totality in the latter. So this intuitive barrier is not however a conceptual barrier for Kant, and it's quite

mistaken to confuse the intuitively unillustratable or unimaginable with the conceptually unthinkable. Kant thinks that it's not conceptually unthinkable, it's intuitively or imaginably unthinkable. And this is a doctrine from which Kant never deviates. Again, a quote from Kant, for whatever violates the laws of the understanding and the reason is certainly impossible, but not so when being an object of pure reason, it simply is not

subject to the laws of intuitive cognition. you So Again, in the second section of this essay, then Kant continues his what you might call to be transcendental exposition of space and time. He says in section two that there are three essential aspects to what we understand by

a world. The first is matter, is its matter, which consists of all the distinct substances that enter into it as parts, not however their attributes, successive estates, and so on. For if we included, sorry, the latter, even the most simple substance might, in respect of its attributes, be rated a world, as a man, you know, egotistic or private world of thoughts, feelings, images and so on, often is. The second essential aspect of a world is its, you know, it consists in the real manner

in which its constituent substances are coordinated or brought together so as to make of them a single total world, the reality. So the reality of this matter of coordination is important for Kant. substances don't make up a world merely because they are arbitrarily put together in someone's thought, as Leibniz had imagined, that diamond of the Grand Duke might in someone's thought be put together with the diamond of the Great Mogul.

The connection of the substances in a world must in some sense be objective and not merely based on external reflection or comparison. So the idea is that when we are the representation of space and time, as I mentioned, you can't achieve them by comparisons or by reflection in fact. This coordination is conceived as real and objective, not as ideal and based on the mere whim of a specific subject, according to which, by enumerating any plurality, one would at will generate a hope. For by comprehending many things together, you without difficulty can produce the totality

of a representation, but not therefore the representation of totality. back to that, you know, Hewens' separability principle, which is one of the main issues that can challenge us in the critique of pure reason. The succession of a representation is not the representation of succession. The awareness of a sequence of impressions is not the sequence of awarenesses. It is also essential that the form of a world should be a coordination and not a subordination.

The constituents of the world must all be on a like footing, not someone sightedly dependent on others. It is for this reason that actual causal connections between substances will not suffice to cement them into a common world. Since causal connections do not run systematically from all world substances to all, but only from some to some, what we require is rather a principle which will condition the possibility of causal interaction among substances, whether they are actually

interacting or not. So Kant again holds further that a world only can be a world if it has a permanent nature, which in its turn depends on the permanent existence of its substantial parts and on their permanent natures. It cannot therefore be held together by actual causal interactions, which are essentially impermanent, and in many cases non-existent. Space and time are, by most intellectuals in traditional German idealism, they thought to constitute the universal form which binds all substances together and makes interactions

among them possible. That can only allow them to provide a phenomenal connection among all mundane substances. You see, a spirit, Geist, is a substance too. That might sound very strange, but we'll get into this. Mind is a substance, not for Kant probably, but differently for Hegel. So again, but it's not a mundane substance. Kant can only allow them to provide a phenomenal connection among all mundane substances, which may indeed point to some common connected principle, but cannot itself constitute it.

And in the third place, the substances in one world must have the third necessary property of exhaustive, you know, omnitude or universitas, of being all the substances that are brought together by the form in question and so constituting its total world. Such exhaustive omnitude can quite readily be conceived, not however intuited or imagined through the sort of piecemeal synthesis or analysis we are able to form in time. Only a being like God, who is equipped with intellectual intuition,

can embrace an infinite infinity of items in a single glance, could carry out such a synthesis intuitively. What Kant objects to are using even the temporal notion of simultaneity in the case of such divine oversight. Any comment on this? Well, I was thinking about that. So when you're talking about the continuum, I mean, there's... So Zalemaier's book on Persis Continuums is really amazing, I would suggest to look at anyone who's interested in looking further in the continuum. And there he's saying, you know, Kant grasps the continuum.

I mean, Kant really inherits that interest of the continuum from Leibniz, but takes it further because he realizes the concept of supermultitudeness, which is where you, where there's no, I mean he gives this definition of the continuum as having no parts that could be composed of other parts. Yes. Right, so, and that's, so you get, from that you get the concept of supermultitudinous, And then Peirce extends this further with the notion,

I mean as Zalamea describes it, of generosity, immodality, and reflexivity. And then, I mean, what's also I think interesting here with regard to space and time is the way that, so Bergson's critique, Bergson's concept of Dure is a critique of the spatialization of time, right? But as Catrin argues, it's Whitehead who really grasps the problem because it's not just that there's a spatialization of time. The problem is the treatment of space and time as being composed of points.

And so what you can do is extend the same problem of the continuum to space. So you say that there are no points in time. Just as there are no points in time or what you have is a continuum, where there's kind of localities rather than points, the same goes for space. So you don't have a point like space. You have boundaries, you have, yes, localities, neighborhoods of space. Neighborhoods of space, yes. There is another, other than Zalamea's text that Inigo just mentioned, there is, you know, Lamborghini and Pinocchio have written on this idea that how can Kant arrive at the

idea of continuum of this continuity of space and time or what you might call to be genericities which are inexhaustible by their particularities okay how can he arrive at that the idea of continuity by way of the transcendental ideality of a space and time and that's that's that's a fantastic essay i mean i don't want to get into involved with that because it's you know quite goes deep into the kind of formalization that's true which you can show that even at the level of experience temporality the way that at least can't understand

you know how we get our impressions distributed you know in a space but also our inner senses which we should run some sort of a sequence and on which we have some meta-awarenesses how this kind of distribution essentially lead to idea of continuities of a space and time it's let me I'm not sure about this spelling but see is it yeah

Questions before we have a smoking drinking break? Well, don't ask me that question now. I don't want to answer it. I wonder if, because in McTaggart's essay that you posted in the classroom,

a main necessity of time is change. And I wonder if Kant bases any of his conception of time in actual change or whether that is unnecessary. No, in fact the concept of change requires a prior representation of time. It's not that representation of time is derived from the concept of change, but the concept of change, so as the concept of, you know, what you might say, you know, the duration

or per-duration of objects is derived from the prior representation of time as a pure form of intuition. Now, however, I again don't want to get into this, an argument can be made against this Kantian idea. We haven't get into the time and I will show you how Kant tries to construct the idea of what you might call to be first grade or rudimentary time awareness or time consciousness. I don't think that Kant is successful at constructing this argument to show that simply

Okay, let's do it this way. The transcendental ideality of experience temporality can be constructed by addition of a different kind of awareness into our de facto awarenesses of items in the world and how they run as a sequence. So imagine a cat chasing a mouse. So from the seeing one of the cat, it sees of the mouse as this, you know, a great fuzzy

tube, which is just a stuff. You know, it's stuff in the sense that it's what you might call to be Aristotelian Dissuches or todeti, namely material individuate singulars, but they don't have conceptual structures. So when this mouse moves away, I have an impression of this. The cat has an impression of this. You might write it down as IOB1, impression of object B1. There is no, I'm not saying T1 or T2, I'm saying B1, meaning that this object is here

Here and now it hasn't disappeared even if, you know, we're just talking about even if a mouse goes behind a rock or behind a door, still the cat chases it. So the disappearance of the mouse from the impression or awareness one of the cat is not tantamount for it to have ceased to exist. So there is what you might call to be a proto-awareness of the difference between disappearing and ceasing to exist, analogical to our difference between appearances and reality.

So this is impression. Now the second thing that the cat nervous system has because it's a de facto impression is that it also creates a reproduction of this impression. An impression by virtue that if it sees the mouse next time, obviously the impression is not the same impression. It's an impression that is situated in the context of its memory and the real environment in which it re-encounters the mouse. So the impression, what you might call to say that the impressions of the cat are lingering as a kind of a sequence, but it's a de facto sequence.

It doesn't have a temporal order yet. It is only from our own conceptually equipped perspective that we see it as a temporal order. but it's a de facto order, it's a causal sequence. So you can say that this re-encounter with the mouse is a reproduction, we can say it I-O-B-2. Now of I-O-B-1, it was impression, is a new noun, IOB2, what Kant calls a reproduction. Now there is another one that if it sees the mouse after an impression and also its reproduction, it also has an IOB3, what you might call to

be an anticipation of what is going to happen. So this is a sequence, just because we have numerically distinguished B1 from B2 and B3 doesn't mean that they fall in a sequence in a temporal sequence in what you might call to be a B series right earlier than later then now this is what we have as at the level of inner senses, de facto sequenciality of our impressions, reproductions, and their anticipations. But a good argument can be made to show that the move that Kant makes in order to turn

them into an actual temporal sequence ultimately fails. And I don't want to get into that. There is a little bit of this in manuscript, but I will at least talk about how Kant construct this schema of impressions that are de facto ordered and how we transcendentally experiencing it as a temporal order, which means that from a low grade perceptive subjectivity, we can see them as unfolding in time as unfolding in time because otherwise

because this is essentially again comes back to the human problem that just because there is a sequence of impressions doesn't mean that we have an impression of this sequence as unfolding in time in order to move from the first one the second one you need to add something else and that's what we'll we'll talk about today, how Kent manages this problem. Let's have a break and then come back. OK. How about is seven minutes OK? Or should we? Yeah, seven minutes is good. I'm afraid of both a drink and some cigarettes. Yeah. Sounds good. So this is the guy that I met with you.

Yeah. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Yes, they are really good, but I really can't wear all of those things. Sorry, we are... I have switched to vodka, by the way. We are getting into an intense discussion.

My brain needs optimization. We have quite a few people asking questions in the sidebar. Stanley do you want to sort of bring your question up first maybe? yeah okay which one do you mean? Do you mean about so the question of is sensation purely causal in camp? Okay that's one of them. Yes okay you see sellers as far as I mean Inigo knows more on this front I think sellers for example doesn't

essentially identify them as causal as what is in terms of processes or absolute processes somehow the thing is that they are causal is structural now when we are saying causal at least if we are using the word causal we need to add that extra you know designation the don't do factor causal because if we are saying causal, then how do we know that they are causal? Because you see, we already came to this conclusion that Kant doesn't believe in this kind of causality that is just there and simply we access it. That would be just kind of bad empiricism, naive empiricism.

So they are, what you might say, causal structural or de facto causals. We have them as de facto causal structural materials of intuitions, but it is only in virtue of analogy to our du jour conceptual structuring relations that we can identify them as thus and so being de facto causal so this idea of purely causal needs to be uh you know um said with caution because if you

don't do it then then what would be the again again the difference between kantian system and the kind of empiricism from which can wants to diverge yeah okay yeah yeah I totally get it so the phrasing of the phrasing of oh it's not optimal really in that it implies that there's this naive access to causality which obviously can Hume and being, you know, taking him seriously, can't believe in, right? Yes. Yes. Yes. And what was any other, I can't read this stuff here. Sorry.

Stanley, maybe if you want to ask your first question too, I think it's where you said, And I think this is here because mind is in some sense logically irreducible to neurobiology, conditions of possibility of having a mind. Okay, yeah, I mean that was just a response or an attempt at a response to what Maria was saying about inferring philosophically certain things about the mind without reference to neuroscience. But I was just saying that I thought that was because here mind is logically irreducible to just like the brain or whatever electrical activity is happening there.

It's mind is something distinct from just neurobiology in this kind of Salazian sense. Okay, so Inigo has worked a lot about this predictive brain processing that I mentioned to you, a Swanson essay that I posted on the classroom and stuff, so he's going to talk about this. But yes, I think Kant believes that mind is distinct, I mean obviously it doesn't say that but you can see that at least in this early tradition of German idealism mind is irreducible logically to the brain logically irreducible but

the very logical irreducibility of mind to brain requires you to also take into account how brain is related to the mind and that's you know that's essentially opens up for in fact Salarsian naturalism normativity the naturalistic term or or naturalism is a normative term so it's a two-sided street but this two-sided street you need to be very careful at what level you are talking about the relation between mind and brain you go on yeah I mean well seller's objection is to the mechanistic conception of causality in talking about perception. So his argument is that the experience of looking at the pink ice cube is irreducible

to a description of the kind of causality implied by a mechanistic kind of impact of particles on particles, right? Because of it, and it's precisely because of its kind of, because of the continuum there again, right? So it's the homogeneity of sensation, the fact that you can kind of, that any, that the experience of that colour can only be somehow composed of more of that colour, so it's pink all the way down. But then, I mean, Mexinger kind of refers directly to this problem of cellars and just says, well, this can be explained in neurobiological terms.

the experience of homogeneity is neurocomputationally generated. So it's not a problem to explain this in neurobiological terms. And you don't have to move out of the framework of scientific causality, as it's known. But what you do have to describe is according to several levels of organization of the brain. So you need a functionalist, computationalist, representationist understanding. All of those different descriptive paradigms are necessary. You can't just have a pure kind of impact paradigm.

You need a kind of organizational understanding of that. That would be part of it. And I think, you know, also you can look at kind of, you know, so, so, uh, the soul also made this distinction between kind of, uh, you know, the, the causal, um, the causal level of description and the motivational level of description, which was necessary for, for intentionality. I think it's something similar to the way that Sellers distinguishes this as well. So if you look at, say, for example, auditory perception, you've got a difference between the mechanical pressure waves

that are received at the tympanum and the way that pitch is extracted from those mechanical waves. And there's a demonstrable difference there, but it's related to the, or it can be explained in terms of the mechanical processing capacities of the inner ear and then auditory cognition and so on. So you can give a neurobiological explanation, neurophysiological explanation of that, But you need to have, let's say, you need to move to something like what you could call Aristotle's formal cause.

So it's no longer just explainable in terms of efficient causation, but you need formal causation. So the structure of how that – and this is what Sellers is pointing at with the idea of pure processes. He's not saying kind of, oh, you know, sensation can't be understood in terms of causality. He's saying we need a different understanding of causality in order to account for it. And what about the mind and brain? Well, that's a different thing. So I think, you know, that's where you get the really logically irreducible part is that the mind is, you know, as you say, like a project, a task. And so then, you know, any description of what the mind is can't account for what it could be or what it ought to be, and the way it is a project and a task.

So you see, I mean, German idealism later on, particularly beginning with Hegel and Fichte, they make a distinction, as I mentioned very briefly in previous chapters, between four things, at least. one mind as geganishtand and mind as object mind as the object of thought and mind as a sensible thing okay as a sensible object so mind as a sensible object is what you might call to be and fully within the realm of today's

neuroscience, computational physics, so on and so forth. But mind as object for thought is what you might call to be mind as a concrete task. And the thing is that there is an asymmetry here between mind as object and mind as object, mind as an object for thought, and mind as a sensible object. Precisely because no matter what mind is as a sensible object, mind as object of thought can diverge from it, can become something else. So this is one, the first two. The second two is that the difference between the concept of mind and the idea of mind.

So what is the concept, thus, Begrief, the idea of, or concept as notion, not as Kantian concept, or Hegelian concept, notion. So what is notion of mind, or concept of mind, in that sense, concept with capital C? Well Hegel understand the concept of mind as what you might think of it as a seed or blueprint for the mind as a project of self-realization according to its own logical concept what he calls the idea of mind so concept of mind as a seed as

this rudimentary blueprint for the construction of the idea of mind or self-realization of the idea of mind as a project, as a task, as the object of thought, you can think of the concept of mind as the irreducible, coextensive, cupola of mind as a physical object and mind as a logical function. The physical side of it can be changed, but it has an irreducible function. What is the function of mind?

A structuring. In the wake of the transcendental turn, mind becomes that which is structures. Everything else becomes the blank slate. And then you see that how exactly this thesis of German idealism, extending from Kant to Hegel and Fichte, going into Hermann Cohen and so on and so forth, is essentially what you might think about it in today's idea of multiple realizability and AGI. That you can abstract certain logical functions that are abstract, that are in relative autonomy

to their physical substrate. You can change the brain with an artificial multi-agent system. have the same function structuring of minds with a fundamentally different physical substratum. So physical substratum supports the logical function of mind, but the logical function of mind logically speaking is irreducible to that particular physical substratum, our for example nervous system, our brain. I had another question I'm not sure if it's in any way related to this this sort of like dual

aspect way of thinking of brain and mind but it's it hadn't really hit me until reading the critique this time through that space and time seem so fundamentally antagonistic to each other and I'm one I wonder I guess if this is something that Kant seems maybe aware of or I know Inigo was talking about Bergson's critique of the spatialization of time and there could and you could perhaps think of a critique of the temporalization of space to the opposite and opposite critique so it

seems like these are sort of poles and cons project what can we do that temporalization of space. You see in Kant at least, as I mentioned, the space, the primary rule of space is attributed to the author's sense. What he calls, Sellars calls these sigma relations. Sigma relations are what you might call to be some sort of a spatial relations between items in the world given by the prior representation of the space that are analogical to a spatial conceptual relations that we obtain by having thus and so a spatial concepts

between objects in the world like for example the idea that you know this this This iPad is on top of the table. So this being something on top of something else is a conceptual spatial relation, right? It's a du jour relation, by right, by conceptual rights. Now, Sellar's interpretation of Kant tries to say that this du jour spatial relations

that we have is rudimentary. We are not talking about complex geometrical relations that mathematical sciences have given us. Well we are talking about rudimentary du jour spatial relations. The very fact that we have such du jour spatial relation between this iPad and the table is precisely because there is a de facto relation analogically speaking correlated with our conceptual spatial articulation of how this iPad stands with regard to the table at the level of outer and inner sense. This is what he calls them sigma relations. Sigma as a

sign of like a space. Now he also argues the same kind of relations for time. They are called Tau relations. Again analogically they are comparable to our conceptual temporal relations. Now, the thing is that the sigma relations are primarily attributed to the outer sense, and the tau relations are primarily attributed to the inner sense. The role between a space between sigma relations and tau relations, or what you might call to be a space and time as transcendentally ideal is not antagonistic, it's complementary

because ultimately what Kant wants to use transcendental ideality of space and time or representation of space and time is not about how space and time are in themselves, But how they can complement one another so as we can have an experiential history. Imagine that mention of that hot dog sandwich that I mentioned to you. I ate a dog, I ate the sauce, I ate the buns.

Now, there is a difference here. How can we go from I think X, I think Y, I think Z to I think parenthesis X plus Y plus Z. The second half of this equation is what you might call to be an experiential history, that we see ourselves as subjects who have experiential history and a corresponding world history to this experiential individual history. So Kant wants, Kant doesn't want to start to talk about world history, space and time in terms of world history, where he wants to talk about them.

How is that they can be thought as bricks, as bricks that you can put, or Legos that you can put on top of one another, space and time, so that they can, what you might call, provide us with some rudimentary capacities. or conditions of possibility of having experiential history, of having a priori experience. And obviously, first, in order for us to have such an experiential history, first you need to have some orderliness at the level of space, items being distributed in a space.

With understanding that space here is no longer relations between items in the world, but it's an upriory representation. Then what you need to have is that once these items that have affected your senses, and by virtue of that you have a comprescent impression, a spatial impression of these objects at the level of outer sense, then you need to report these impressions of items in the world, or what you might call to be awarenesses of items in the world to the mind. That these impression of a mouse moving in this direction, in this direction, that direction, going with regard to the table, underneath the, you know,

behind the rock, so on and so forth, these are spatial relations. But how can you also see them as temporal relations, in terms of some sort of temporal orderliness, which is purely perspectival, I suppose, at the level of sensation, at the level of inner sense. What is the importance of this? Because if you only have spatial relations, then there is no way that you can create that experiential history. There is no way that you can see them as a cat, as a proto-subject, experiencing these spatial relations or distributed items in the world as part of one single experience,

That's part of one single experience. In order for you to arrive at one single experience, I think parenthesis, X plus Y plus Z, close parenthesis, you need to have a temporal awareness or some temporal orderliness. And that's the rule of time comes into camp. So it's not antagonistic. It's what you might call to be complementary. Yes, they are fundamentally different, but they are complementary. The reason they are complementary is precisely because they allow us to not only have an experiential history, but low-grade, a perceptive subjectivity. What is a perceptive subjectivity?

I have a single unified experience of the world, and this experience is my own, and no one else. In order to make that kind of move, of course, at the level of sensation, we don't have anything remotely close to our perceptive subjectivity. We can't say that the cat knows that its experience is its own or that it has a single, unified experience. No, it doesn't know. It has a de facto access to this proto-experience. So moving from this de facto to the level of du jour, or what you might call to be a

perceptive self, requires adding new faculties, like imagination, intuition, imagination, understanding and reason. But nevertheless, Kant wants to tell us that space and time ground the conditions of possibility of mindedness and correspondingly a perceptive self. You go on. Well, I don't know what I want to say, but I guess, I mean, well, from the perspective of predictive processing philosophy, you've got the perception is fundamentally directed

towards prediction error minimization. So that means that there's this inbuilt asymmetry to the way that the perceptual field is organized. And that's directed towards the future. So any kind of already, any way that you're kind of going to move around space is already about how you're going to predictively kind of coordinate your actions in that space and so uh the the the experience of space is intrinsically

temporal but the experience of time is not necessarily it's been intrinsically spatial Yes, yes. And yeah, this is, I mean, you know, you can, the best kind of model for this is the hierarchical estimation model, hierarchical trajectory estimation model of perception. So what's happening is you're continually tracking the trajectory of different processes that are occurring in events which are segmented according to the understanding.

So you've got some kind of schematic predictive conceptualization of what kind of event is occurring within your experience, and you're tracking trajectories that are happening at various different hierarchically nested levels. So you've got the fast changing events which are helping you to track slow changing events and vice versa. Stanley just asked if Nigo could recommend some literature on predictive processing,

maybe that's something we can do after the class if you sure yeah what was that paper that you mentioned about the hierarchy of trajectory oh that's so that's by a bunch of eyes and we can take it yeah it's it's in the it's It's in the collection, the edited collection, by Bon Jovi and Thomas Metzinger, which is called Predictive Processing Philosophy. And there's PDF. And there is also that essay that I posted online in the classroom. Or maybe I didn't.

Or I did. I think I did. Sorry, I can't remember. That was Swanson's essay on Kant and predictive processing paradigm. And it's on the classroom, I believe. And then Chagis, you had a longer question. Do you want to just ask that aloud right now? Yeah, I was just wondering if we could just talk about that paragraph from the end of the Taggart's essay. I thought it was just really sort of bizarre, this whole idea of like, well, if the series isn't temporal, then what is it? And what is it made of? And is there different degrees of this that's defining the series? It's not atemporal. It seems like it's not related to temporality at all, but it's a series. So what is establishing that series? He was posing a series of questions about that,

and I just pasted it in the comment box. I was just wondering if maybe you had any ideas about what he's saying there? I can read it out loud for the recording, and then maybe Reza and Inigo can respond. It says, but the question whether such an objective C series does exist must remain for future discussions. And many other questions press upon us which inevitably arise if the reality of time is denied. If there is such a C series, are positions in it simply ultimate facts, or are they determined by the varying amounts in the objects which hold... those physicians of some quality which is common to all of them? And if so, which is that quality?

And is it a greater amount of it which determines things to appear as later, and a lesser amount which determines them to appear as earlier, or is the reverse true? So, before, I will try to, you know, more elaborately answer this question on Google Classroom, because I need to, again, read those pages from Dr. Garth. But there is Adolf Grunbaum, without mentioning it in terms of C-Series, he has made a similar objection to people who are saying that we have such a thing as time consciousness, even

in the vocabulary of transcendental ideality of experience and morality. So Grunbaum in fact tries to show that even at the level of experience and morality, this is stuff about time flows simply by virtue of not having us concept of past and present present present future but simply by virtue of the you know the rudimentary earlier than or later than series or sequences we still can't say that we have temporal consciousness. Now Russell also talks about this in

analysis of mind. So the thing is that so Kant wants to move from the human idea of sequences of impressions, sequence of impressions, to the impression of the sequence, namely at this point we are not talking about past, present, future because that requires tense vocabulary, but we are simply talking about earlier than and later than. And this earlier than, later than, let's pretend that less and more is somehow analogically comparable to earlier than and later of that which of course Russell in fact questions this in analysis of mind so

imagine that we have already got to this point that we can talk about the series where we can talk about earlier impressions and later impressions now the thing is that Mactagarth wants to show that even if we have arrived at such a series by some gerrymandering of our conceptual resources, we still cannot say that there is a time that moves or that there is a time in fact between this and that.

that they exist in time or they exist in time precisely because for something to be even earlier than something else it's an and it's it's a proposition uh for for something to be for something to be uh transformed for proposition to be transformed from a statement about something is earlier than something else into a proposition that would tell us that something exists in time or something has temporal characteristics. It requires a notion of flowing time, of flowing time, that there is a flow of time that connects

this preceding to this succeeding thing. Now Grönbaum and Magdagart imply and suggest that this is a synthetic statement. The idea of a flow, that something flows between them, that something temporally connects them, is a synthetic statement. And the content of this synthetic statement is not given within the proposition of something precedes something else, or something is earlier than something else, or something is later than something else. That simple fact of diversity of now contents.

I have the impression I.O.B.1 and I have the impression I.O.B.2. The simple fact of diversity of this impression does not by itself translate into a synthetic proposition with regard to time or temporality of this such and such impressions. Because the temporality of such and such impressions required a synthetic content. But when, where does this synthetic content come? Agar's entire you know critique is that such a synthetic content cannot be obtained and every way that you are trying to obtain this synthetic content becomes circular you are simply relying on the same kind of you know premises

becomes the conclusion conclusion become the premise and so on so forth Yeah, I mean, so, you know, the flow of time is not given. It's a necessary attribute of the computational process of thinking, which is predictive. So it's either you don't, of course, you can certainly, you know, you can have befores and afters without having any flow between them. But you have the flow because you've got this synthetic process of predicting what's going from this situation, what's going, what will happen next.

And what will happen next is part of the generative model. And that's related to your kind of hierarchy of hyper-priors and priors, right? Yeah. Some of which are, and this is something, so you were talking about this example of the cat, or the one yesterday you were talking about, so if you have a, the mouse is running away from the cat, it's getting smaller. But the cat doesn't see it as shrinking. As a shrinking object. It sees it as running away and that's because it's got an evolutionary embedded hyper prior. Inbuilt inductive biases. Exactly. But then there's other aspects.

Something going behind something is something more learnt. hyperpar that's learnt that you have to kind of understand as you grow up. Yeah, it doesn't cease to exist, it just simply disappears. And the thing is that this question of predictive processing links back to this whole idea of experienced temporal, transcendental ideality, precisely because this doesn't mean that this is really the matter of fact about the world world as it stands, that this notion of impression of time that we get between different sequences so on and so forth are coupled with our behavioral evolutionary, basically instantiated behavioral

dispositions, in the sense that if we don't have such behavioral dispositions, then there is no such a thing as this kind of forecast according to such and such impressions. Because induction in itself, predictive induction in itself, doesn't give us any form, any impression of temporality. It's when you put it inside the agent as a pragmatic constraint. An agent obviously requires some, it's basically what you might call to be a sufficient causal structure that mediates between environmental input and behavioral output. And it is only in the

context of this sufficient causal structure that mediates between the two, that we can talk about this kind of temporal impression of our own predictions. Essentially comes back to this fundamental idea that Kant had already put forward and Magdagarth sharpens it, the time in this sense becomes a pragmatic, agential representation, rather than as if time exists. So Magdagarth in this sense radicalizes the Kantian thesis, takes it to a fundamentally different level.

Would it be possible to talk about the taxonomy of sensations? It's just that, sorry if I'm going over the same thing again, but in B45, right above the start of the paragraph, counts as sight, hearing, and feeling through the sensations of colors, sounds, and warmth, which, however, since they are merely sensations and not intuitions, not in themselves allow any object to be cognized least of all a priori. I've just been having a bit of trouble figuring the taxonomy of it all because it seems that the object affects us through sensation and the way in which we relate through sensations to an object

is empirical intuition, yet it seems sensation just somehow can't put them very distinctly from intuitions and I've been just wondering how that actually works out in terms of taxonomy. Sure, I'm sure Inigo can talk about this much more contemporaneously. The thing is that you see sensations come for Kant as come present flux. in what you might call to be a confused flux. There is no unitary or unified manifold of sensations at the level of outer sense.

It's just a compressive flux of you being bombarded by these items in the world affecting your senses. Now, these items in the world are not yet objects or even Gegenstand. Kant here analogically talks about them as objects. But object constitution, for that you require categories and you require a host of other faculties to in fact have something like a sensible object. They are what you might call to be, you know, this kind of de facto causal interactions between us and external items. Now at this level of sensation, so you have this come present sensation, it's kind of

a confused flux of one thing coming after before or coming at the same time, so on and so forth. So there is no such thing as a temporal order at the level of outer sense. Now, intuition, on the other hand, you can, I mentioned last session, that when it comes to intuition, we need to think about it as an act, as an object, in the intuiting and the intuited. Now, so we are essentially wanting to talk about the difference between sensations sensations, or pure sensations, and the intuiteds. You can think of sensations as this comprescent, confused flux, and intuited as some rudimentary,

organized and orderly manifold of sensations, that they have been thus and so perspectively ordered in space and time. Now that's called the Intuitant and it's different from pure sensations. I don't know what to add to this really. I mean, I just say, you know, so if you take the form of intuition of time, Kant's form of intuition of time as a most abstract level of hyper prior for the particular processing system, then you've got nested within that a whole series of other priors

at different levels of expectation, of abstraction. So these are organizing your manifold of sensible intuitions. And then the abstract kind of, you know, the most abstract level is what's giving some kind of coherence to that whole organization without which you wouldn't have any, you know, you wouldn't be able to organize any prior expectations if you didn't have the most abstract level of prior expectation, which is to have some kind of temporal kind of progression.

Yeah, the idea that you see, another way that you can think about it is that you might say that sensations don't have any formal constraints. They are de facto causal, okay? And hence they are compressed, they come in confused fluxes. Now the level of the intuition or the intuitive manifold of sensation, sorry, the manifold of sensible intuition is that it's at the moment that you have added some formal constraints to this confused, compresent flux of sensations. What are they at this

point? Sigma and Tau relations, the spatiotemporal, perspectival orderliness. This is not a spatiotemporal in a conceptual sense, but what you might call to be pure perspectival orderliness. You see, a predator that chases a prey exhibits a perspectival, spatial orderliness. And it can be couched completely in terms of neurocomputation. that again a predator can you know find long bones example chases the predator

along the shortest path you know this doesn't mean that it has a concept of this or that it does it intentionally or consciously it but it has that sort of capacities, that kind of egocentric framework equipped with rudimentary, you know, this kind of predictive processing paradigm that is capable of, with pinpoint accuracy, catch the prey. So this is kind of what we might call to be pure, perspectival, spatial orderliness. It doesn't require conceptual inferential resources.

In comparison with this pure perspectival spatial orderliness, we also have, I mean, a sentient, a predator, again has also a pure, perspectival, temporal ordelliness. Imagine these birds who, you know, arriving at some, you know, a prey or some seed, they issue a melody of sounds that always come in a sequence. It's a de facto

temporal thing. Or another thing, you can think of this de facto temporal awareness, which is not conceptual awareness, it's not time consciousness, the kind of time consciousness that only a subject has, and a perceptive subject has. Another example of this would be a uh you know a safe you see in order to open the lock of the safe you always create a sequence like one then five then six that's the key once it reaches the sequence it opens the lock you can think of this de facto perspectival pure positional temporality at this level right now nothing more nothing less I'm kind of confused on this topic.

Maybe this is kind of a rudimentary question, but when I was looking at the transcendental aesthetic, it seemed like I was reading Kant sometimes as saying that space and time are the necessary form of intuition, but other times it seemed to be saying that they are intuitions because they're unitary. And it's sort of like if they are intuitions, how is that not circular? but if they're just a form of intuition how do we have access to them okay no no you take this I will you see yes and that's what you know when I was reading that paragraph before the break that yes there is absolutely a can't is quite

aware of I mean chance can makes this move here but he then goes on and he says that no they are not intuitions there are forms of intuitions but there are also intuitions in the sense that there are not concepts there are not concepts you see but that doesn't mean that there are intuitions in that sense of what you might call to be intuitions of particular items in the world okay the only reason that Kant calls them at this point intuitions in so far as they are not concepts, they are representations. He doesn't really tackle this kind of inconsistency in critical pure reason. That's part of the dissertation of space and time, and later on,

work. But yes, so you can think of this, I mean, to get rid of this Kantian confusion, is that no there are absolutely forms of intuition and the only reason that we can call them intuition is precisely because they are not concepts they are not concepts it seems important to him that there's only one space and time yes there is one form of a space and there is one form of time yes because because if it becomes two different forms of the space and you see this is the reason that that he calls them one form of space and one form of time, because it's not that in reality that there are no more other forms.

He's not interested in the question of reality of space and time. What he's interested in is the import of the transcendental ideality of one form of space and one form of time for the aperceptive subject, for a subject that has an experiential history and is capable of attributing those experiences to itself and take them as its own. In order for the subject to arrive at such experiential history or subjectivity, it only needs to have one form of space and one form of time because if you add another form of

time to the experiential subject then you again you become a bundle a human bundle simply you have oneself become multiple selves then you can't you don't know that the person that ate the dog the the sauce and the buns would be the same person who have the same experience of having a hot dog you might then say that like Hume and that's humans thesis that then this the eye that thought X the I thought why the up the eye that thought Z are different eyes hence the subject becomes a bundle of sense impressions again

So they're one, but they're not individual items because you don't have a phenomenal experience of them. Still a little bit crowded to me, but I think that was helpful. Absolutely. So let me go on with our ... If you get tired, you need to go down. So continuing Kant's idea of a space and moving to time,

Kant thinks that an empty, substantial space, as believed by the English, by Locke and Hume, is plainly a fiction, whereas an empirical relational space, as believed by the Germans like Leibniz and Christian Wolff and Crucius, violates the certainty of geometrical insights, and opens up the possibility that we may one they meet with a you know by by a lineal rectangle or for the kind of what you might call to be a rim or a Riemannian surface that is different from our you know the kind of spatial

relations that we obtain from between single items in the world so can't That assumes throughout that we can be quite sure of whatever flows from our mind's permanent nature and can be sure that it does flow from that nature, an axiom that is, of course open to question. He then argues that since space is a structuring form of our sensitivity, we can be sure that its destruction principles will apply to everything which that sensitivity can ever experience. So Kant ends the last section of the disquisition on space and time by commenting on the manner

in which we tend to construct linear spatial images of time, a device that the critique will argue is unavoidable. And it's somehow a very tangential, you know, complementary response to what Hunter just said, that it's unavoidable, this kind of representation, singular representation or Unitary representation of space and unitary representation of time. And the form of them, at least the temporality appears to be linear, is unavoidable. Not because it's unavoidable in reality.

It's unavoidable for us to have an experiential history and a corresponding world history to this experiential history. Kant then points out that time has this priority over space. Now we are moving to time. That it applies to all phenomena whatsoever, whether external or internal, whereas space only applies to what is external. As I mentioned, subject doesn't have a representation of space in itself for Kant. It has a representation of time in itself, in its own subjectivity, but it doesn't have an internal representation of space.

Of the latter doctrine that time is primarily the form of inner sense and is only derivatively the form of outer sensibility, which would give motion a strange position in the material world. There is here happily noterace, time further has a superior importance of conditioning the application of the law of contradiction, of the conceptions of cause and effect, and through the procedure of counting of the concepts of number. The forms of time and space, not being abstracted from sensory data, are for that reason not empirically acquired, according to Kant, yet without being innate.

spring rather from the activity of mind itself, which binds its sensations together according to the laws of its own, which action can itself be cognized intuitively. So, without doubt, Kant remarks at the end of section 3 where he says, either concept i.e., of time and space, is acquired but not abstracted from our sensing of objects, for sensation only provides the material, not the form of human cognition. It is abstracted from the mind's own action in coordinating whatever it senses according

to perpetual loss. Each concept is therefore an immutable type which for that reason can be intuitively known. Now it's of course clear that Kant does not here clearly distinguish between the spatializing and temporalizing actions of the mind and the resultant order they impart to the phenomena, nor does he clearly recognize that the actions in questions cannot have taken place in time at all since temporal order is their outcome. The forms of time and space not being abstracted from sensory data are for that reason not empirically acquired yet without being innate, to emphasize what

I read now let's get into the idea of you know temporal awareness temporal awareness one analogical to what we might call to be seeing one of a space of items particular items in space as registered on the outer sense. So the inner sense is the one where we, according to Kant, the question of time springs up.

So, as I have mentioned to you, Hume thinks that simply us having de facto sequences of affections or sensations suffice to generate something that you might call to be rudimentary time awareness or time consciousness that you simply become aware of how things are given to you or how things affected you

That was part of what we call separability principles. That which is separable can be distinguished and that which is distinguishable can be separated. And then we said that there is a correlate to the separability principle and that's called integration principle that's which can be uh uh distinguished uh can be integrated and that which can be integrated uh can be distinguished or in a very or to make it more uh elaborate more

clarified we can say that the impression of an item in the world a sequence of impressions of an item in the world is equal to the impression of that item in Or a sequence of representations, de facto representations, causal structurally registered representations, is equal to representation of that sequence.

of awarenesses of impressions is equal to the impression of awarenesses so simply you see that how it fits to human empirical framework precisely because if we have a de facto series of impressions how we have been affected by items in the world, then from that we can infer that we also have the representation of thus and so being affected in the world, which is the function of mind. Now Kant thinks that this is a fundamentally confused

position because it confounds act and object of content and there is no way that you can infer representation of sequence or representation or an representation of impressions from from uh sorry impression of representations from representation from impressions of representations so if you have those de facto causal sequences that doesn't essentially translate to some sort of rudimentary consciousness from which you can bootstrap more higher faculties.

So the leap of faith from empiricism to mindedness appears to be incorrect. It doesn't, such a leap doesn't exist. In order for you to arrive from that kind of empirical impression to impression of how you have been affected you need to add something extra and that something extra cannot be derived or obtained simply by at the level of sensibility or outer sense or how we are affected by items outside of us

Now, let me read this. Or is it just to give a time stamp for about 10 minutes till... Sure. So, and again, when we are talking about the sequence of impressions and the impression of sequence, the difference between the two, this just doesn't apply only to time, but it also applies to space. but in what in time this problem becomes fundamentally more

you know more prominent sellers we were just talking SARS has a famous example for you to understand the difference between these two the impression of the sequence and sequence of impression think of your hand like this then this and like this being raised and think of this as you move your hand for example the vivid see the brightness of your motions which correspond with your impressions of this object being moved this arm being removed also changes from right now it's bright

then the second move that previous impression of my arm was in the first position becomes dim a lingering impression and then it becomes now this one is bright and then in the last position this one is bright the first one was dimmer, the second one was less dim. The impressions were dim. So it's a kind of lingering of impressions. Now Hume wants to say that this shifting of the position of the arm corresponds to an actual temporal orderliness of which the subject or the self is aware.

And Kant wants to say no. Sellars makes this example of imagine that just because there is such a movement that appears de facto moving in a sequence and in dimness, from dim to brightness of impressions, doesn't hold up to corroborate the temporal orderliness of our impressions. And Sellar's example for this is imagine of a Hindu goddess, the ones with many arms up in this position from lower to horizontal to raised, like Shiva or Kali or whatever.

Now it has all of these positions. Now imagine that you put this statuette of this Hindu goddess under some strange lighting where illumination simulates as if these hands are moving. But of course they are just all-compresent impressions. These hands, you can think of as-compresent impressions. The Hindu goddess has all of his hands, all of the impressions coming at the same time. But that illumination, the change of light, it appears that as you move this statuette, it appears that the hands are moving.

But that doesn't mean that they are really moving. They are compressive impressions. So that is just because that there are in such and such sequence, this doesn't mean that there is actually a sequence of impressions here, or an impression of sequence, because that impression of sequence can be produced through different ways, but that doesn't mean that they are temporal. Any? I think it's important to say that there can be many different qualities of the experience of temporal succession within the same, you know, it doesn't change the form of that intuition.

So, for example, you've got vastly different experience of time where depending on the experience of time or temporality is highly malleable. So if you've got an unpredictable sequence of auditory signals, you'll experience it as way longer than a predictable sequence. and similarly, even if you had a completely disjointed experience where the succession of images appear to be going backwards in time

or forwards and backwards in time, there's still a sequence of images that are occurring sequentially one after the other. other. So the form of time stays the same even if the content and the quality of that completely are open to change. Yes. So, you know, essentially, so now that we are starting by the question of time, I I mean, the transcendental ideality of experience temporality, as we said, we are moving analogically as speaking from awareness one, seeing one, to awareness two, or seeing two,

seeing of or seeing as, between non-conceptual and conceptual. The first conditional possibility for such a move was pure, perspectival, situated, spatial awareness of the kind that we talked about and that's related to the outer sense that we talked about the predator-prey example. Now the second one, so in addition to this kind of perspectival, spatial orderliness the kind we looked at on a different level and even more crucially we need a temporal

orderliness. It's not time consciousness. You see, at this level we are not talking about subjective understanding of time as we have it, like in our tense language. But we are talking about de facto temporal orderliness corresponding to our de facto a spatial awareness model. So we need a temporal orderliness that relies on a more fundamental successively interrelated capacities. So what are these capacities? One, the capacity to synthesize, compressent sensations, the simultaneity of the manifold of senses.

The role of synthesis here is an operation of combining, binding and gluing partial maps of objects that come as comprescent sensations, registered as these local invariances of shapes and colors, smells, etc., into a spatiotemporal global maps of objects. Two, the capacity to synthesize the simultaneous states of objects into sequences of occurrences. Think of the synthesis as what is required, for example, for a predator to capture the movement of the prey, especially temporally. And three, the capacity to be aware of representation of objects and sequence of occurrences as

representations and that's the most fundamental function of inner sense I said that the best way to define inner sense as a faculty that is responsible to report what has de facto been registered at the level of outer sense to the mind as in fact a form of awareness or representation so you get But at some really basic level, some de facto representations of which you are not aware of, neither by introspection nor by conceptual reasoning. Now, how these de facto representations can be re-presented or presented again to the

mind. So essentially what we really do call representation starts from inner sense, from the act of re-presenting what has already been registered at the level of outer sense. And this act of representing is not a simple act. something that is a form of organization, a form of synthesis, a form of ordering. The primary form of this ordering is temporal ordering.

How are we doing about time? yes we're right on the button right now but I'm happy to stay later people would like to okay I can you know okay let's just stop here and before going to the kind of a little bit intense you know confusing the stuff all I can say about the last thing that I just said about about this idea of de facto representation, causal structure, it registers, and the act of representing, is that you can think of this in terms of de facto awarenesses of items in the world,

and a temporally ordered awarenesses, of awarenesses of items in the world. awarenesses of items in the world as a matter of de facto representation and then awarenesses of awarenesses of items in the world what you might call to be meta-awarenesses representing this so there's a quick question on that so the act of intuiting is eternal it's internal yes eternal like it it the active intuiting is not itself temporal because it constitutes time

hard to say really I mean you can do that as imminent it's not it's not eternal it's it's what's constituting time yes it's what it constitutes your intuition basically. It sounds like what would make it not eternal in this way is the fact that perhaps it itself is subject to change, right? Which would be... Not the form of time. The form of time is one is required for you to in fact perceive change, but the form of time or representation of time as a priori is not

really is not really subject to change so a very quick quick quick clue as how Kant tries to move from this de facto sequences of events and level where just have the level of outer sense to what you might call to be a proto time awareness one at the level of inner sense is that the first thing that for are sentient to be capable of arriving at this kind of pure perspectival temporal orderliness or what you might call to be first grade, low grade, you know, apperception, is that

it should be capable of distinguishing what it experiences from the world history that is de facto has caused this experience to initiate. Hence, the difference between representation of items that are, you might say, being unconsciously registered at the level of causal structural nervous system of the organism, and the representation of those representations of items as belonging to itself, as part of its own experiential history, that corresponds to, yet nevertheless is distinct from the world history of how

it was affected by those items. It's quite tortious I think. I mean I was just thinking about this question still of the eternal, you know, you could say kind of really, causally speaking, you know, the form of intuition is within, you know, it's temporal, it's within time, in terms of a naturalistic kind of explanation of biological thinking, right? way, but then formally speaking it constitutes time so it can't be in time. Yes, it's a priori. So yeah, I think it's just those two ways of approaching it then.

Anything else or should we close it and start next session fresh? Because I think that we got a little bit overboard with some stuff. Yeah, we're sort of in the deep end of the pool right now. Does anyone have any last questions? If not, I'll stop the broadcast. Are we reading anything in particular for next time? Yes, okay, I will. So I mentioned transcendental logic. I noticed that transcendental logic is actually quite a slim chapter, a slim section, it's not that much.

So there's also the chapter after that. Because I will go fast over time, we have already got the conceptual problems, transcendental It won't take that time, and then we move to the next subject. Super. Excellent. Thank you, everyone. All right, thanks, Reza. Thank you, Inigo. Thanks, yeah. Take care, everyone. Yeah, thanks. Have a great day. Bye bye.