Kant’s Circle of Revenge (Session 2)

Hello and welcome to the second session of Kant's Circle of Revenge with Rezanegh Rastani. I'm going to pass the camera and mic off to him now. Thanks, Theo. Okay, so as I promised, you know, we will add two more sessions at the end. So last session, the previous session, we did a little bit of introduction, and I promise that I continue it and kind of situate Kant's origin of critique of pure reason at the intersection between British empiricism and German rational metaphysics which was

was dominant, at least when Kant was young. He was under the influence of particularly two figures of German metaphysicians, Augustus Crucius and Christian Wolff. So before starting this introduction which I try to you know go over it fast precisely because we are going to you know in more elaborated fashion we are going to get back to them as we are moving forward with critical peer reason but before that let's hear if you have any questions any discussions even if it is

not introductory anything that right now you know you think that a lexicon is being vague a discussion that we talked about you know wasn't elaborated sufficiently feel free to ask anything CEO yeah I have something that I was noticing I went back and reread the a edition again and it's just noticing that the way that he talks about experience.

Okay. So the first sentence of the A edition is experience is without a doubt the first product of our, that our understanding brings forth as it works on raw materials of sensible sensations. And I was just wondering how you saw that in relation to like, I mean, from that point of view, it sounds like the understanding is actually making experience possible. and that's how I sort of understood the second edition too but yes yeah yes well basically this comes to you know the the major rift between Hume and Kant in the sense that Hume thinks that he even thinks that synthetic upriory knowledge

is not possible precisely because how can we have concepts which are not derived from experience but also having this idea in tandem with it that all concepts should be broken down to sense impressions to the raw materials of of experience. So Hume would say that synthetic a priori concepts are impossible in so far as ultimately all concepts need to be analyzed or broken down into the basic ingredients

of experience, sense impressions. And precisely because something that hasn't been derived from sense impressions or experience, then how can it be broken down to sense impressions, hence the impossibility of synthetic operatory concepts. Now Kant comes with a completely opposite argument. Kant says that you can't have in fact experience without a priori concepts, pure concepts of understanding. That it is impossible to even talk about experience without a priori, without a priori concepts.

would say that this whole idea that Hume brings about, and it's not just Hume, it's really the whole tradition of British empiricism from, and even before that, from Descartes to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, that sense impressions are not parts of experience. There are material ingredients of experience, but experience is not made by them. So there are material ingredients, but for something to be a material ingredient doesn't mean that it's the fundament or the fundamental dimension of experience. okay and again against Berkeley Locke and Descartes can't would say that since

impressions don't tell us anything there are not thoughts there are not enhanced they don't have any epistemic status they don't yield knowledge having sense impressions doesn't mean that you have thoughts having sense impression doesn't mean that you have knowledge of something. That's basically the dogma of empiricism that can't challenge us. So yes, I mean, I think that from the transition from the first edition to the second edition of introduction, he still retains this, of course, because this is the main part of the whole a priori discussion. He retains this, but he wants to elaborate it

a little bit further, particularly elaborated in a way that he can move toward idea of synthetic upriory rather than just upriory, synthetic upriory, namely a kind of epistemic relation with the world which is ampliative, which adds something which at the same time is not derived experience knowledge is not derived from experience but also a knowledge that is in addition to what we see and sense okay I had a question kind of related to that.

So I guess towards the end of the last session you were saying something like that by restricting his account of the categories to that which makes experience possible. He is kind of missing out on how the categories are in themselves or aspects of them that go beyond that. But like, I guess my question is like how, like it seems like the source of justification for positing categories is that they make experience possible. like that that's why they're necessary. I was curious if you could elaborate on that.

Yes, sure. So, one of the first things that we need to understand that we can think of the entire critique of pure reason as simply a nested hierarchy. So, think of like a bunch of concatenated brackets within these brackets at the most basic level you have sense then you have or a sensation then you have intuition then you have imagination then you have understanding then you have reason okay so understanding comes between reason and imagination

and imagination is a faculty through which it go it is a complex faculty in the sense that it go it's it pulls up sense impressions via the manifold of intuition from bottom up and integrates them like for example the image of this chair the image of this chair is a manifold of intuition being such and such organized in spatially and temporally a singular representation of an object is called image so imagination don't think of imagination in a very intuitive sense that, you know, in a kind of a familiar sense. But when Kant talks about

imagination, imagination is the faculty of the image. The faculty of the image means a singular representation of a geggenstand, a sensible object. a sensible object. So, as I mentioned, imagination works two ways. Bottom-up creates a singular image but also it does something else as well, which is the job of the so-called productive imagination. What productive imagination does is that it applies, it brings categories or

pure concepts of understandings head to head with the image that has been provided for them, with that singular representation that has been provided for them. And hence, the creating the opportunity to move beyond singular representations, having generic experience of objects, generic experience of objects. So now, so this is, so understanding, as I mentioned, it's a mediatory faculty between reason and imagination, namely the entire spectrum of experience.

Now the thing about categories is that the way that Kant defines categories is that they are always bound to the idea of a perceptive unity of self, the I that thinks, the I that thinks. What is really the significance of the eye that thinks, this eye that never changes, the aperceptive unity? Well, Kant says that there is no experience ever without an aperceptive self, that all forms of experience require an aperceptive self. Now, what does this imply

how these connections are being elaborated. It means that categories, yes, categories are required for the possibility of experience, but they are also restricted by the transcendental structure of the subject of experience, an perceptive self okay so we know we know that categories are a priori elements or a priori components so as being a priori components there are essentially logical components so this means that can't here is making a significant move which we

We will discuss, we don't discuss it for now, whether it's wrong or right, but he makes a specific move. He is subordinating logic to the transcendental structure of the experiencing subject. Now what is the consequence of this? The consequences of this is quite actually significant. Precisely because we know that the transcendental subject of experience is essentially a representational

agent. So when we represent the world thus and so objectively by way of categories, with the understanding that our representation are also dependent on our transcendental structures. And what are these transcendental structures? Our perception of a space and time, our language, our memory structure, so on and so forth. Which means that logic for Kant then is ultimately bound in the horizon of the local and contingently constituted subject, not a universal subject,

but a local and contingent constituted subject, a subject that has thus and so a specific perceptions of space and time and has thus and so a structure of memory. That never goes into this, but this is really the consequence of this thing. And hence, ultimately, logic becomes trapped in this endless loop of representation. It is supposed to represent the world objectively, but in so far as the fundaments or the scaffold upon which it is built is bound to certain local and contingent aspects of a transcendental

subject, then it cannot move outside of this representational system. Hence, logic becomes reduced simply to a certain horizon of representational systems. this horizon of a representational system is the one that the current existing subjects of experience, for example a human being, is endowed with. Now Kant is, I don't think Kant actually has a problem with this, which is obviously quite unsettling because for Kant, first of all, Kant doesn't have a good understanding

of formal logic. All he's interested in is in transcendental logic. And transcendental logic is essentially a representational logic, basically a logic that is there only to serve the subject of experience, is representational capacities. But as we said, the representational capacities, going beyond or expanding these representational capacities require for you to arrive at new categories. Then how can I arrive at new categories if already my pure concepts of understanding are imprisoned in this circular sphere of representation? They are supposed to represent the world objectively, but also they are bound by the transcendental structures that make such a representation possible, and which are contingent and locally

constituted. So we see that there is an imprisonment of logic, and that's why Kant always identify logic as a canon for thought. Whereas Hegel, or a host of later thinkers, like Frigge, like Husserl, like Carnap, they understand logic as the organon of thought, not a canon of thought, as the organon of thought. The aim of logic is to break from the circle of representation. And the only way that we can do this is to suspend

the dependency of logic to representational systems and hence the subject of experience. And this is really the most revolutionary gesture in formal logic. This is really what formal logic is, its revolutionary gesture. And that's how we can in fact broaden the scope of our representational faculties. faculties, how we can broaden the horizon of what we represent objectively about the world. Just as a quick question if possible, because I don't remember where exactly, but just to

make sure, somewhere in the beginning of Transcendental Aesthetic, I think in Part 2 in Transcendental Logic, he talks about generalities and particularities on logic. is this book he's talking about when he talks about this so basically localities that are structured by some kind of two-cleaned memory language placement or is he by general logic and by particular logic referring to something more phenomenal yes he does he know he I mean yes he he he doesn't talk about logic when when he talks about yes but he has this idea too well what he's interested in is

in about ideas ideas aesthetic ideas or transcendental ideas what transcendental ideas as we will look at them, you know, the way that he elaborates them is quite wishy-washy. It's just, they are basically the functions, the part of the regularity function of reason. But again, Kant never tells us what reason is, other than reason is beyond the scope of understanding, is basically not held down by understanding, which is an experiential

faculty. So yes, there is this implicit connection between what you say, which belongs to the horizon of reason, as something being unfettered from the transcendental structure of experience and logic, formal logic. But for Kant this kind of connection between reason and logic you know is out of question, he's not interested in it. Nor he has enough or adequate resources to actually answer this question that what is exactly the connection between logic and reason the ultimate reason is logic and nothing else

what so what's the connection between the way able does that and the way frega does it I mean like seems like the I don't know figure that well but like Is that like carrying with the negative as sort of this path towards absolute knowing? Yes, I think, well, Hegel is not interested in formal logic because Hegel also is quite suspicious of formal logic precisely because the formal logic of his time is quite rudimentary. What he's interested in is an objective and a speculative logic, in a very strict sense of what he means objective and what he means by a speculative.

Objective in the sense that it is the unity and identity of opposites, in the sense that you have both the objectivat or objectivity of intersubjectivity, namely I have an experience, I have something, I have a claim about the world, you have an assertion. What is called objective at the level of intersubjective or interpersonality is that which beyond any particular subject. So that's one notion of objectivity. and another one is a notion of objectivat or objectitat in the sense that what is this?

It's really the idea that there is a reality that is radically other to us. So for Hegel, the notion of objective logic is really the unity of these two poles, which are not never going to be fused. In fact, they should never be fused. That's why they are called the unity and identity of opposite. Namely, their identity is preserved while they are being unified. Reality in its radical otherness and objectivity of thoughts or objectivity of our claims about such a reality, the two together. Now this is the objectivity for Hegel. speculative in the sense that the task of such a logic is to, for the first step at least,

is to suspend what seems to be immediate about this unity, about what we take to be objective about the world and what this objectivity really is. This move, this suspending move is that's what you might call to be creating the dynamic for logic, for Hegelian greater logic, to slowly shed itself of its experiential conservatism. And that's, you know, you can see this, the move.

Hegel writes logic, so basically logic starts where phenomenology of a spirit ends. Phenomenology of a spirit is not the beginning, is not the end of logic, is the beginning of logic. logic, basically tries to move away from the phenomenology and toward absolute knowing. And there is a reason for it. You see, Hegel is quite indebted to esceptical, ironic escepticism, the notion of epoche, suspension of judgment. That the whole task is to suspend phenomenology.

So how does that tie in with logicism or like Frigga's project? Well, you see, you have here a number of main key movements that connects it, albeit implicitly, with Frigga's project and that's the dialectical negativity as the very core of logic itself through which a dynamic initiates that gradually starts to takes away the formal dimension of logic or logic itself from the dimension of human

psychology or the phenomenology of human mind okay so it's like the the scope of frigo's logic is far narrower specialized yes it's specialized yes but what you see that this is exactly what free get and Hosterl and Carnap want to do basically to suspend the connection of logic with phenomenology of human mind or psychology in general well thanks absolutely

Any more questions? We have some silent observers today. I guess maybe just a slightly further elaboration on this relationship with Hegel. With who? With the relationship of Hegel with Kot. Uh-huh. And you mentioned the fact that on one hand you have the intersubjective objectivity, which was created and constituted through the dynamisms of logic.

then you've got the radically ulterior objective tasks. And, I mean, it seems like probably, like, with what you're talking about regarding how Kant's transcendental categories are locally and particularly constituted, that, and how Kant doesn't fully understand reason, is that somehow the relationship of reason with the transcendental imagination insofar as it allows an unbinding and transformation of the intersubjectivity,

intersubjective objectivity as a continuation of the dynamism of logic in order to create new categories to constitute a new intersubjective objectivity yes okay of course you see what hunter was saying I think that's where this whole idea of intersubjectivity and this connection with logic becomes a little bit tricky. This is exactly what Hegel endorses, and also what Hosserl endorses, that there is always an essential component of intersubjectivity

within even formal logic, within formal logic. And that intersubjectivity is ultimately intersubject. Okay, let's just hold on here. By intersubjectivity, I do not mean human communicating with one another. This is an intersubjectivity as a formal condition of thinking as such. I'm saying this is red. You are saying that this is green. Or you are saying that this is blue. and then we basically, through amendment of our claims, we say that this is velvet.

This has nothing to do with communication. It's a process of assertions and queries back and forth, which have a logical structure. They are mediated by way of language and then allow us to have certain objective claims. objective claims as I mentioned here doesn't mean that they are true or have final saying about the structure of reality objective means that they are independent of any particular subjects experience okay this objectivity for

Hegel is in fact and probably for Kant too is in fact the very condition of us having experience particular lived experiences so this objectivity yes is is part of the formal logic. But again, this comes back to this idea that insofar as the whole concept of intersubjectivity can be quite vague and loaded, it's perhaps not a good idea to talk about logic and intersubjectivity on the same page.

because this ultimately brings back to the idea that logic becomes part of human communicational psychology or communications between humans, between persons. Yes, if we take intersubjectivity as a formal dimension for the constitution of objective claims or objective logic that's fine but if we take intersubjectivity as this general social you know vague idea of social intersubjectivity no that's not that's actually I think a negative movement should be avoided but even the

more modest claim the more restricted sense of intersubjectivity I don't think that people like free your car nap buy into this idea they think that ultimately the way that you can broaden the scope of formal logic or objective logic is not by inter subjectivity but by what you might call to be decoupling syntactic form from semantic content basically releasing the full potential of the logical syntax of language and that's basically a difference definition of

formalism pure syntactic form as the semantified combinatorial characters that can create language or axiomatic systems through which we can form or build certain theories. Within these theories, investigate our experiential or observational data about the world and turn them into actual facts about the world. So these are all these ramifications, but as I said, it's best to avoid kind of see logic simply in terms of intersubjectivity,

subjectivity not just because it can have leads to some certain confusions but also because there is a different kind of movement in formal logic or in logic in general that tries to completely circumvents the idea that logic has anything to do with intersubjectivity even as a formal condition So I totally follow you there, and I see what you're basically saying is the autonomy of logical form and logical syntax as being prior and ultimately constitutive of intersubjective objectivity.

if I'm following you correctly what I was trying to hone in more was something like more specific regarding like what you said earlier about Kot and I mean it's the relationship of you know like the productive imagination and reason in relationship to Kot and Hegel with respect to, I guess you could say, like furnishing a greater logical syntax which is capable of unbinding our, I'm just going to read the notes that I took when you were talking,

how to break our imprisonment in particular categories and broaden our horizon of reality. Uh-huh. Yes, no, I mean, this is, I don't think that, despite what I said, I don't think that they are essentially separate things. In fact, you can bring logical, this autonomy of logical syntax and fold it back into this idea of intersubjectivity as a formal condition for logic. Yes, and that's ultimately, you can see it much better in today's computational authoritarianism. The idea of interactionist computation, the idea of interactive logic, and the idea of

mathematical structures all being part of the, inside the same spectrum, where you can say that this intersubjectivity is no longer this kind of inflated Habermasian or Brandomian or even Hegelian intersubjectivity, but simply a formal condition of computation and logic, or computation in general, from which logic is simply one manifestation. Yes, no, we will talk about this when we get into, a little bit into, you know, the idea of exactly how Kant developed these categories, and what is exactly, where the horizon of

categories, you know, ends, Kantian categories ends, and what does it mean to actually break away from or pierce through this horizon. So what time is it? Okay, let's have just a five minutes break and then come back and then I start the introduction beginning with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and then Wolf and Crucius. Okay, sounds good. Okay, great. Sorry if I was getting a little ahead of ourselves. Don't worry. Okay, see you soon.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

so i have to admit i felt like i was really struggling to keep up with that yeah no we should we should yes uh we as christian said we kind of got ahead of ourselves i if you get the main idea of that's of that representational prison that logic i'll just try and repeat what i think it was it was being said okay um was that like

of course logic can't be derived from experience logic has to be somehow a precondition for experience to take place right that's yes sort of the Kantian way we might talk about it yes claim one yes and then um logic essentially has to proceed in this way in which it's uh the way in which it's able to proceed is on the condition of inter and sort of formal interest objectivity which might or just a formal dimension formal formal thought determinations okay so yeah okay so formal thought determinations then can't would say that well what can't argument is that okay logic is supposed to condition

experience or at least a primary or categories and he's not willing to look at categories in themselves quality because looking at categories in themselves is formal logic then. It's not transcendental logic. So all he is willing to do is to see categories only in relation to experience, namely transcendental logic, logic subordinated to experience. But in so far as experience, there is no experience without the self, namely a perceptive self, then logic becomes subordinated to the transcendental aperceptive self, the subject of experience.

Next step in the argument. In so far as that every subject of experience is locally and contingently constituted, it inhabits certain particular transcendental types. structure of memory, your specific perception of space and time, so on and so forth. Which then means that if we have already established this kind of chain of argument, logic at the same time, or categories at the same time, wants to form for Kant, they want to form

experience but also they are inside the confine of the available representational conditions of the transcendental subject hence categories then cannot be expanded what is the consequence of this if categories cannot be expanded if pure concepts of understanding cannot be understanding cannot be expanded then the scope of intelligibility cannot be expanded nor the scope of what we mean by experience as Boltzmann would say we could we can never if this is the case

we can never arrive at new facts of experience It's like a Goodallian problem, you know, you can't step outside of your own system. Then, it's obviously a huge massive epistemological problem. Because it's like, again, like a Goodallian incompleteness theorem. The first one is just basically everything that you say is Godel susceptible because you are inside your own representational system. You want to have the cake of your experience and eating it too, you know, logically.

Right. I mean, it seems like that's also wrapped up in this problem of how do we essentially prohibit ourselves from transcendental illusion or dogmatic forms of rationalism, right? Yes, but also the idea that how... because the whole point of critical pure reason is the question of intelligibility, couched at different times in different ways. One time in terms of the possibility of synthetic upriory knowledge, another time in terms of epistemic rights of our upriory claims, the so-called transcendental deductions, which we will talk

about, another time about the mutuality, sorry, mutuality thesis. And what is the mutuality thesis? mutuality thesis is the cornerstone of Kant's critical philosophy it simply means the same activities of synthesis which constitute the represented world as an intelligible objective unity constitute the representing self as an perceptive subjective unity okay so these are all ramifications of the question of intelligibility and if the question of intelligibility really means expanding the intelligibility the horizon of intelligibility in the broadest possible sense

then so far as we are inhabiting certain transcendental types in a Kantian sense then we cannot step outside of these types hence we cannot renew our relation to reality to objective reality. Hence we cannot broaden the scope of what is intelligent. Hence you see Kant is, I mean we are fast forwarding a little bit here, Kant is now from a very radical thinker is turning into basically the prison guard, a cop, a metaphysical cop.

Okay. Please, again, as I mentioned, we are throwing around philosophical jargons liberally only under this assumption that you are familiar with them. So if you think that you have problem of what exactly the meaning of this term, just interrupt

me, ask me. Because these are really important. I tried to explain rather briefly about some of the main concepts that for now we require like a priori, synthetica priori, object, and so on and so forth. So as I just mentioned and also in the previous session we mentioned that the final or the core concern of critique of pure reason is a question of intelligibility. The question of intelligibility is the preemial question of philosophy since the time of Parmenides

and Plato. But of course, in so far as philosophy is the only thing that has a history and not a nature, if you start with a specific, even if you start with a very particular question, that question can monstrously transform through the course of history. And this is really the case here. The question of intelligibility, at least how we know it since the time of Plato, has completely become a different kind of question. It has become the question of

synthetic apriori. It has become the question of the possibility of experience. It has become the question of transcendental deduction or epistemic rights of our apriori claims about the world. It has become the question of the possibility of what Kant calls an aperceptive self or a thinking subject. So let's look at this question of intelligibility a little bit to situate, critique of you,

reason precisely in the tradition of different, you know, avenues, philosophical avenues that have tried to tackle the question, the question of philosophy, the question of intelligibility. And of course, you see, when you have intelligibility, the other side of it is intelligence. You see, you have here an irreducible capula, intelligence and intelligible. At different times, in different places, at different junctures of philosophical history, this question of intelligence and intelligible since the time of Plato has changed into question

of subject and object, theory and object, structure and being, objective logic and objective world, on and so forth. So these are all variations on one single theme, the very germ of philosophy. So we at least know that since the time of Aristotle, the question of intelligibility became systematized in terms of what you might call to be a rudimentary form of synthesis

and analysis. We know that since the time of Plato, ideas, there are something called ideas or idises or forms without which we cannot see anything of reality. Basically reality is unintelligible. There is no such thing as reality without forms. Aristotle takes this further, he tries to systematize this dependency of reality on our own ideas or forms or idis. by creating a continuum in the realm of ideas in the realm of thoughts in the

realm of forms in the realm of concepts what is the nature of this continuum well the continuum the Aristotelian continuum is quite simple you will start simple generic idea at the top and then you break it down you analyze it you analyze you break it down to more specific ideas a specific ideas that become as they become more specific they become more complex complex not not in the sense that complex is a good thing, complex as a negative actually. Complex in the sense

that you start for example with a dog hood and then from dog hood a generic idea which which is simple generic idea at the top you become you break it down you have a dog with this feature this color this face dog with this breed mixed with that bread with that bread so on and so forth so you see a specificity or or particularization, comes also with complexity. Complexity in the sense of complex conjunction

of different particularities. Conjunction of different particularities. And this is exactly the Aristotelian tradition of under systematization of ideas required for tackling with the question of intelligibility that is handed down to a scholastic philosophy, to Middle Ages, and dominates the Middle Ages for quite a while. The first person who starts, modifies the system of intelligibility, this Aristotelian system of intelligibility, of course leave it for the most part intact is Descartes

so for Descartes sense impressions are the infinitely complex ideas here no two things they car thinks that says impressions are actually thought which means that they yield some rudimentary knowledge of the world okay sense impressions for Descartes are thoughts

Two, that sense impressions are infinitely complex, meaning that they are at the opposite pole of the generic ideas. Generic ideas being the simplest form, like doghood as such, generic. Doghood with such, a dog with such and such features is a specific one. the sense impression is the infinitely complex one is the most particular so Descartes thinks the question of intelligibility is precisely because our senses why is that we have a question what is that in fact we can pose a

question of intelligibility why is that we can talk about things about the world about the state of affairs in the world and we call them intelligible well Descartes says that the world affects our senses you can think of is affecting the senses like me interacting with this table at this moment this table affects my nervous system my senses okay the product of this effect of this interaction is a sense impression what is a sense impression being how I have

been thus and so impressed by something that is outside of me okay so in so far as the sense impressions for Descartes say that how I have doesn't so being impinged on by something that is outside of me, they carry some infinitely complex, namely particular knowledge of the world that is already available to my mind.

Obviously I mentioned that here the word complex has a negative connotation in the sense that is infinitely particular is an infinite combination of different particular features or aspects of reality. Now, my mind, the basic ingredients of my mind are the sense impression. The sense impressions were they card as I mentioned our thoughts, but infinitely complex and particular thoughts. So we know that the question of intelligent since the time of Plato is a about the determination of particular aspects of reality differentiated

determinately differentiated from one another when I say so when I touch this table or I see this table my sense impressions are confused because they are complex. There are just myriads of different sense data that are conjunctively put together. Brown having such and such shape, such and such texture, such and such a smell, so on and so forth. So in order for me to determine the intelligibility

of this object, given the fact that the most complex representation or thought of it has already given by sense impression, all I need to do is to analyze, according to Aristotelian view, to analyze or break down the infinitely complex sense impression to particular aspects of this object, this table, primary and secondary qualities. It has such and such shades, it has such and such colors, so on and so forth. Any question, is it clear so far?

So far? Okay, so this is the Cartesian picture of determining that which is intelligent. analyzing sense impressions for infinitely complex particular thoughts into generic namely simple or more determined thoughts

Of course, this Aristotelian view that Descartes draws on has also theological implications. You see, doghood is the most generic idea of a dog. In scholasticism, the most generic, which happens to be also the most simple idea in a positive sense, which means the most determinant is God.

So from the simple God you move toward a species, particularities, conjunction of combinations of different aspects of such and such as specifications and particularities. So obviously this question of the idea of rendering the world intelligible for Descartes that involves with analysis of sense impressions into more determined genera or generic and

simpler thoughts has also theological implications in the sense that it is only God. that is capable of having the intuition of an idea in itself all at once. humans on the other hand after do something else as we said that their intuitions are sensible in the sense that sense impressions up for humans are

infinitely complex and then only they need to be broken down a step by step step to yield that more determinate intelligible form or idea or thoughts or concepts whereas God because he has intellectual intuition you can see through a particular thing and see this idea by passing the sense impression Here a rift takes place between intellectual intuition, a subject that is capable of seeing

what is given to it all at once precisely because what is given to it is not sensory but is intellectual is a concept of the dog with a such that is instantiated within each and every dog and the other one is a different subject a discursive subject, a subject who has only sensory intuitions in the sense that its encounters and interactions with the world unfold through time, hence the word discursive.

And it's one goddamn experience after another. And precisely because our sensory, as this second kind of object, our sensory, we have sensory experiences, we have sensory impressions, then we have to go through the toil of analyzing Our most complex thoughts, quote, sense impressions, to determinate simple thought forms, the most intelligible ones. Hence our access to the intelligibility of world takes time, precisely because we are

subjects endowed with sensory experience sensory intuition rather than intellectual intuition unlike God question anything so I'm just trying to make sense of this would I be correct in saying that um Descartes' mode of seeking and finding knowledge is sort of a reversed Arist... Arist... Arist... Dalian form of seeking knowledge, as in Aristotle is working from generic ideas and going down to more complex ideas, whereas Descartes is starting from sense

experiences which he sees as infinitely complex and moving back up to more intelligible ideas. Yes, I mean the order is reversed but essentially Descartes is working inside an Aristotelian framework. In the sense that you see Aristotle is obviously influenced by Plato, So he believes that thoughts always start from the most generic and only go to our specificity. But for Descartes, Descartes is no longer a Platonist and hence doesn't endorse a specific Platonic component of Aristotle, starting from genera to particularities.

What he is interested in is how singular, particular subjects, individuals experiencing subjects can render the world intelligible. Hence the order is being reversed for the subject and for the subject the thought always starts from the infinitely more complex sense impressions. impressions and are being analyzed into you know simpler more intelligible determinate possible more ideas however he despite being you know vastly in the ambit of the Aristotelian view he he is now interested also in

In a different, in questions that basically Aristotelian framework doesn't have the resources to tackle. So what is this question? It's the question of the relation between concepti and precepti. Concepts and perceptions. Concepts and perceptions. So. think of a triangle triangularity as such the concept of a triangle okay now

for Descartes obviously sense impression cannot give us the concept of the triangle why because sense impression is infinitely complex Whereas the concept of triangularity is generic, it's simple. So then where the concept of triangularity is coming from? Well, Descartes says that the concept of triangularity has an objective being, has an objective being objective being of a substance extended in a space it's not a thing the substance extended in

the space sense impressions can only yield or index particularities of this concept like the concept of like first of all sense impressions what you might say to be the configuration of such and such and such angles held together by such configuration an infinitely complex diagram or an infinitely complex configuration or thought what you do is to break this apart analyze it and then you arrive at mediating particularities like a triangle which has right angle

this kind of triangle that kind of triangle so on and so forth and then from this mediating particularities once you analyze them then you have the chance to arrive at the concept of triangularity as such namely a triangularity as an objective or intelligible being so this is a kind of uh Descartesian take on you know um the relation between concepts and perception that that perceptions are thoughts for Descartes so a sense impressions since impressions and perceptions are thought so you will start with sense impressions

then you move to our perceptions a little bit more clear more determined more intelligible less complex and then you ultimately end up in concepts or concepts in generic domain of triangularity so uh sorry could i uh can i ask a question absolutely just about the last bit Sure, absolutely. You sort of drew this link between being a discursive being and time,

which could you possibly spell that out a little bit more? Because it is a discursive being is one who can think a manifold only by thinking its elements as in relation to one another. explain how that relates to like in time yes well this is this is the idea that's the the synthesis of the manifold itself is a temporal synthesis this. OK, a good example of this. I mean, Rosenberg has this funny example.

OK, let's say I, so let's say that I hear about this guy who has come to this deli and ate ketchup. I think I remember this example because I really... Ketchup, sausage, and buns. So it's equal to this idea that I think X, I think Y, I think Z.

Okay, this is not yet a manifold of intuition. These are, it's not synthesized yet. So it's I think X plus I think Y, I think plus I think Z. Okay. so there is no guarantee for this to be a manifold simply someone coming to Delhi eating ketchup eating the sausage eating the buns doesn't mean that he has eaten a hot dog a manifold of intuition okay so what is really the elements that allows us to have in fact a discursive or synthetic manifold of intuition in

the first place this is a question that the source with human and can't and you of course doesn't answer this and humans really will talk about this is so-called you know separate separability principle so basically this is the question that's how trying or temporality is a necessary and universal component of the transcendental experience and also a universal and

necessary component for the synthesis of the manifold of intuition just because for example I ate ketchup at point one I ate hot dog at point two I hate buns at point three doesn't mean that I hate a hot dog and manifold of intuition right a sandwich obviously just because they have a successive order between them you can't say that they are in such and such synthetic relations with one another nor can you say that the same eye that ate the hot dog that ate the ketchup, ate the buns, ate the sausage is the same eye that had the hot dog

sandwich, the manifold of intuition. So you see time here is a really, is basically the ultimate key behind this idea of manifold of intuition. So discursivity in the sense of the synthetic automatic synthesis of manifold of intuition is is ultimately the idea that it happens in time, not in real time, but as Kant would say, a transcendentally ideal experience temporality. And this ultimately becomes the idea that the same I, that at different instances in time, experiences such and such sensory impressions is precisely the same I that have this unity

of the manifold of intuition. Is it clear, Stanley? Yeah, yeah, that's brilliant. Thank you. Yeah, that's great. Thanks. Any question here, any of you? Let me know if anything is vague. Let's not go. We can always add more sessions. We don't need to rush stuff and just carefully go over stuff because it's already important stuff. We'll talk about these more as we start reading the book.

Okay, so. Where was I? I just sort of finished like speaking around Aristotle and whatnot. Yes, you were saying that perceptions or thoughts source sense impressions and you start with sense Impressions towards perceptions and ultimately end up generic concepts. Yes, okay. Yes So

So this was a Cartesian view in terms of which, for example, primary qualities, like for example, for something to be blue, this chair or this table to be brown, it means that it has a formal, it has an objective being and it's formally already being given to thought by the world. Okay? This essentially brings us to question that, another question that I mentioned, variations

on the same theme the question of intelligibility is also the question of a structure and being a structure and being by virtue of thinking that sense impressions are thoughts descartes then endorses this implicit idea that through being affected thus and so by things that are outside of me the structure of world that naturally comes to inhabit my mind as formal entities so for something to be blue or something to be brown it means that

there is a correspondence a formal correspondence of that formal and blue in my mind but also it means that simply to sensorial or sensory interaction with the world the structure of the world impinges itself on our mind Hence, Descartes thinks mind is like a blank slate. Nothing is there. It's only when we interact with the world that this blank state is being impinged on

and is written on by these data given by the world sense impressions. The structure of the world and the structure simply being not a synonym, but in the same family of relations like intelligibility, objectivity, so on and so forth. So the intelligibility of the world, the structure of the world, effortlessly, you know, put its impression, imposes its impression on my mind, and hence my mind is no longer a blank slate. So, you see, this is a pre-transcendental term. What

is the gesture of the pre-transcendental term? Mind is a blank slate, and sense data is the structure or the intelligibility itself Kantian transcendental turn reverses this order the data the sense impression is the blanket slate and mind is this structure mind is the organ of intelligibility not since that's not since impressions but the sense impressions still have effectivity though yes but their effectivity is simply to instigate

certain come synthesis in mind their effectivity is not effectivity for experience it's not also effectivity they are not also effectivity of thoughts there are simply raw materials from which thought or categories or eschemata so on and so forth assemble them into what you might call to be a thought form a piece of experience a perceptual taking a perceptual judgment

Questions? How does Locke fit into this? Ok, we are going to get to Locke and Berkeley, yes. Ok, yeah, I thought you might. Ok, anyway, sorry. No, don't worry. So, Locke and Berkeley position, at least from a certain aspect, is quite similar to Descartes, in that they all think that sensory impressions have a cognitive epistemic valance.

There are thoughts, but also through which we can make knowledge claims about the world. Now the difference between Locke and Berkeley, however, is quite subtle. Locke is someone who can be called a determinable conceptualist, whereas Berkeley is someone who can be called a determined conceptualist. So for Locke as a determinable conceptualist, he thinks that an abstract idea, for example,

a circle in general or circularity as such is neither you know has this a specific quality nor that a specific aspect nor this a specific you know configuration it's basically determinable conceptual is so So determinable conceptualist is someone who thinks that general ideas or abstract ideas are devoid of, in themselves, are devoid of particularities or specificities. And what is needed for rendering the world intelligibles are essentially abstract ideas,

are hence determinable conceptualists. For a determinate conceptualist like Berkeley on the other hand, the situation is the opposite. That's the only way that we can talk about the intelligibility of the world is by looking at those recurring thoughts or occurence thoughts or occurence thought forms which have which are endowed with absolutely specific qualities and particularities.

So the difference between Locke and Berkeley really boils down to the clash between the stepping stone of our intelligible encounters with the world. Does it start with abstract ideas or does it start with accurate thoughts which have absolutely specific qualities?

So of course, you know, Lockean abstract ideas, we don't have Lockean abstract ideas precisely because all of our ideas and these are not idea in the platonic sense these are ideas in the sense of what we call to be abstract concepts lock in abstract concepts but can't even concepts we can't have these kinds of abstract ideas or abstract concepts precisely

because our abstract ideas are always our ideas of sense their abstractness is a matter of how we you know use them in reasoning there are not as such abstract whereas lock lock in abstract ideas is that for example this idea of a chair is actually abstract in its material constitution so

So it's a very different, as I said, it's a very different from Platonic idea, abstract ideas, or forms, or idises. Locke thinks that what is given to me is the abstract idea. And the abstract idea is something that is given to me by my interaction with the objects in the world. But of course it's not abstract precisely because its idea is comprised of ideas of senses. Also because abstractness is not something that is given but is something that is being

used for something to be invented through the course of reasoning about such and such particularity about such and such chair so on and so forth. So Locke, so the difference between, ultimately the difference between Locke and Berkeley, who are, again, they are both part of this tradition of empiricism. But if you want to hone down the difference between the two, you can say the difference between the two is that Locke is a naive realist precisely because he thinks that

this abstract idea is given to me through my interaction with with the stuff in the world and Berkeley is an idealist in the ambit that in the in the sense that they're both empiricists but the difference between Locke and Berkeley the one one is realist and the one is idealist so precisely because of distinction they also disagree about the definition of what formal reality consists in what formal reality consists in Locke, in this sense, is very much in line with Descartes.

In the sense that, for example, the concept of triangularity or red triangle, you know, being approached in a way that Descartes approaches them in terms of primary and secondary qualities. Both of them can exist formally in a material object so this chair or being a rectangular this rectangular form is already inside this material constitution its color a primary quality is already formally

constituted it. And through this interaction, they are impinged on my mind, but in a complex form, which I have to analyze it. Into, for example, rectangularity, conjunction sign, brownness or blueness, secondary and primary qualities. So, to compress this, to compress Locke's idea,

of how he sees the question of intelligibility I think it's best to Rosenberg read Rosenberg's sentence on what Locke thinks about you know the relation between sense impressions perceptions concepts and objective reality so Rosenberg says the asset of contents of a sense impression of a blue circle called them circularity's or circularity s and blue s is precipitate the asset of contents of

sense impression of a blue circle is persipy, a species of concept, i.e. objective reality. Locke's account of the correlated form of reality essentially parallels Descartes. Circularity as it is formally instantiated in matter, extended substance, call it circularity one, both resembles and causes the circularity S objectively existing in our sense impressions. So this subscript S is for sense impression. Circularity as is formally instantiated in matter, extended substance, called circularity one, the realist account of circularity, both resembles and causes the circularity S, circularity

of sense impression objectively existing in our sense impressions blueness as it is formally instantiated in matter call it blue too however exists as it were in the mode of potentiality as a power or disposition to cause blue s namely sense contents in procedures Where is that quote from exactly? In Rosenberg? It's from accessing can't. I mean the page number. I don't have...

I will find it. I have just extracted this, put it in a file. But I think it's in the second chapter. Okay. so so then you see that's lock is a realist position he thinks that primary and secondary qualities potentiality of blue and the shape of this for example table are already considered in the

material the staff material stuff with which I interact and hence once I am impinged by this stuff this is this ideas is qualities in or structures structures impinge themselves on my mind my mind being a blanket slate so then through this in this very interaction I can talk about this table being blue and

experience it but also asserts it as a belief this table is blue or brown and has such and such shapes Berkeley on the other hand if you remember we said that difference between Berkeley and Locke is that Berkeley is believes in ideas should have the stepping stone for our encounter with the world are ideas that have absolute specificity. So for Berkeley then something like color and

shape primary and secondary qualities always come not as abstract ideas but as sense impressions of those ideas like circularity subscript s rectangularity subscript s blue subscript s s being signifying sense impression rather than blue one or rectangularity one always

interact when when my mind is being impinged on by this table like this stuff here the first thing that is being written on my hard drive my mind blank slate is blue s circularity s rectangularity s brown s but not blue one or brown one and circularity one or rectangularity. So in this sense, the essai of both primary and secondary qualities are not concepes for

Berkeley, but precipice, perceptions. also is really important to understand that as we move forward the very concept that we are using our will be modified what law can Berkeley or Descartes mean by perception precipice concepts are not what can't or Hegel mean by perception or concepts or even what human understand by perception is not what Berkeley understand by perception you see the concepts are also being here being

modified as we move forward. So, Ultimately for people like Descartes and Locke, the question of intelligibility becomes a The question that our knowledge of the world is simply derived from our causal interactions with the world.

Not just experience, but causal interactions with the world. in being thus and so affected by this spatially extended stuff matter this table I am caused to think that this table has such and such qualities. This causal interaction is what you might call to be an order of isomorphism, in the sense that by way of this causal interaction,

the structure of the object in a one-to-one mapping translates itself into a structure inside my mind, into a definite thought form. Hence, what I know about the world can be illusory, but this illusoriness can only be when I analyze these sense impressions in a wrong way because at the bottom

there is no way for these causal interactions go wrong this is the course of nature the very definition of causal interaction or causal impingement on my senses through which this structure of the world translates itself into an isomorphic structure corresponding us a structure of itself in my mind this is just a few steps away from psychologists and isn't it like especially considering the fact like if we're you know seeing these things

wrongly and then we extend the argument Christian I lost you can you repeat that I said this is just a couple of steps away from psychologism isn't it if you know you're saying that the reason why we might not be perceiving this this materially affected intuitions properly and we extend the fact that we're not analyzing them properly because of you know like the material substrate of our mind or whatnot we're just like a couple steps away from psychologists yes I mean sure it has psychologists and implications absolutely yes not not psychology is psychological really psychological kind of subjective psychological because

psychology is really about this this idea that the psychological atmosphere or the psychological horizon is is the main horizon and logic is subset of the psychological horizon or the psychological horizon is the ultimate limit and there is no alternative to logic other than the alternatives given by the human psychology. So yes, it does work in this but more broadly it's the idea that ultimately this leads to subjective is psychology, subjective is psychology rather than the kind of psychological psychology but also it is essentially what you might call to be the

move of naive empiricism which is of course quite prevalent even in the more sophisticated forms of skepticism this I mean the whole idea that the structure of the world is already given to us simply by causally interacting with the stuff in it. But of course, this is exactly what Sellars calls the myth of the given. A structure is dimension of mind not the world sense impression quad data don't give us

anything with regard to the structure of how such and such things or all such and such aspects of an entity qualities so on and so forth hang together in such and and such configurations, a question of the structure. Of course, you see this, why I think people think that neuroscience, contemporary neuroscience,

main target of attack is rationalism. What I think the neuroscience main target is really empiricism. It's this very idea that we know something about the womb simply in so far as our senses our nervous system has been affected in one way or another by things that are happening outside of us

So, as I mentioned, so we talked a little bit about Descartes. take on the question of intelligibility in Locke, take on the question of intelligence in Berkeley. You know we said that Locke and Berkeley belong to its tradition of empiricism. The distinction between the two is that one you can call in a realist and the other one

an idealist. But also there is a distinction between Descartes Locke and Berkeley in the sense that Descartes is a rationalist, whereas Locke and Berkeley are empiricists. And now we have moved, we saw that basically Locke, so Descartes starts from within an Aristotelian framework, creates a kind of a rationalist gesture for understanding the question of intelligibility but then Locke and Berkeley come and work inside the

Cartesian framework but moving it toward empiricism in the sense that what you might call to be all of our knowledge is derived from experience and at least for Locke and Berkeley, this experience at its most basic level, the most fundamental level, is sense impression. Because sense impressions are taken to be thoughts exactly like they come. So this is, as we talked about in previous session, this is the gesture of encouragement. And the gesture, this is exactly what Sellars called the accordion words, in

sense that the word knowledge derived and experience create resonances with one another and really the important key in understanding empiricism when we say that all knowledge is derived from experience is neither knowledge nor experience is the whole idea of being derived being derived that distinguishes the emphasis once you put the emphasis on being derived the word derived that's

what distinguishes ultimately empiricism so within this now within this kind of empirical framework in which in the vein of Descartes sense impressions are taken to these thoughts we can now render the world intelligible properly

precisely because we said that sense impressions are the most complex are the most complex thoughts but we have also sometimes a la Locke we have abstract ideas now we have the extreme of this X spectrum, abstract simple ideas and complex ideas or complex thoughts, then we can move in two directions and hence creating the spectrum of the structure of the world or the intelligibility by analyzing that which is complex into the simple ones and by combining,

integrating or synthesizing hence you see the development of the idea of synthesis by synthesizing the basic thoughts or ideas into more complex ideas which are more specific more particular. Hence the double bind of analysis and synthesis as required for accessing rendering the world intelligible.

This very idea now, this very idea that analysis and synthesis, integration of that which is basic toward that which is more specific and complex and analysis of that which is complex into or particular into that which is more determinate and simple now becomes the core of the tradition of concept empiricism to which Hume belongs the arch nemesis of Kent So, what is really the core tenet of concept empiricism? Core concept of empiricism is that it says that we can have all knowledge of the world

simply by combining or breaking down the structures or the ideas or thoughts which have given to us or impinged on our brain or our mind causally by the structure of the world itself So concept empiricism, you see, it's not that they say that, oh, just because I interacted with this table, I know what this table is.

No. What it says, it says that there are some ideas in different degrees of complexity and or structures that are being impinged on my mind by way of this causal interaction. So this is the empirical point of it. Now, why is it now called concept and criticism? Precisely because in order for me to see this table as a whole in its various dimensions, in its particularity, in its generosity, in its connection with other tables, so on and

so forth, I require to synthesize or analyze these structures that are given to me causally in order to arrive at a coherent picture of the world. So this is the coordinate of concept of piracy. Questions? Could you just say how that's different to Kant? The difference, as I mentioned, the best way of differentiating this kind of movements

is what Kant calls pre-critical transcendental movement, from Kant's movement, in what I said. Mind, for all of these empirical movements, even for Descartes, for transcendental movement, is a blanket slate okay and the data which is causally transferred from the world into the mind is the structure namely intelligible intelligible core of intelligent structure is the core of intelligibility mind is a blanket slate the structure is impinged like a like a seal on a molten wax cellars

famous example on the mind like the structure of the world is this seal that impinges imprint itself on this molten wax on this blank slate so mind doesn't have any data. Mind doesn't have any power of structuration. Really, the fundamental power of structuration. The power of structuration, the power of structure, or the structure as such is already given, given to it by the world. For Kant, however, it's a different kind of scenario. There is no structure in the world. We don't know ever

that if there is a category of a structure in the world or not it's the mind that structures the sense data so mind is the structure and the data sense impressions are blank slant the relation between the seal and the molten wax is reversed And Kant sees this as being a satisfactory explanation of intelligibility too, right?

Yes, yes, Kant, yes absolutely. And this essentially becomes the idea of the coextensivity of subject and object, mind and world. That mind is a dimension of a structure, but the dimension of a structure is coextensive with the dimension of being. And the dimension of being is coextensive with the dimension of a structure. We can't talk about being without mind. Absolutely not. But it is only retrospectively that we can say only by way of exploiting the power, the

structuring power of minds, that we can say that there is indeed a reality outside of me that is independent of my mind. But the question of being essentially becomes the question of mind, the question of a structure. There is no such a thing as ontology without mind. There is no object without theory. There is no being without a structure. This is the initial gesture. But the unfolding of this initial gesture leads to a culmination in rational maturity, enlightenment whereby I see that there is indeed a world outside of me but talk

of this world is no longer warrant guaranteed it can no longer be warranted as a sound epistemological claim I can only postulate or hypothesize that there is in fact a world outside of me independent of my mind. But anything that I try to talk about it or think about it without having the dimension of mind would lead to unintelligibility. Now this brings back the idea of correlationism of course and I think correlationism here needs to be understood as the idea that sure, Kant's idea is not that we cannot think about this

mind-independent reality, because obviously, qua-Poleto, talking about reality without a dimension of thought or a structure is just absorbed. How are we going to, you know, what is this? I mean, it's unintelligible. It's so-called pure alterity. thinking is not knowing while I can think about mind independent of reality this doesn't mean that I can know this independent reality now of course can't is quite vague here knowing it and independent reality he never says that there is in fact and a fundamental a

priori limits to what I can know about this independent reality what he says is that independent this independent reality does not disclose itself to my knowledge in one basically moment precisely because the idea of sensible intuition versus intellectual intuition our knowledge rather than thoughts our knowledge are derived are rooted in sensible intuitions unlike God whose knowledge is rooted in intellectual intuitions in so far as they are rooted

in sensible intuitions their synthesis their integration and organization to become concrete pieces of knowledge takes time discursive knowledge takes time we don't know if ever we can know everything we can know not thinking we can know everything about this mind independent reality but this does not tell us that our knowledge of this independent reality is bound or limited a priori. It's only a process of discursive unfolding.

Answers, questions, comments, observations, heckling. I mean, there has to be, it seems like maybe not knowledge, but there has to be some minimal degree of understanding that the world admits of this compatibility with intuition. Compatibility with intuition. Yes, and this is, I think, this is exactly, as we talk, we'll talk about it. This is, Kant addresses this quite broadly.

So, OK, let me go a little bit fast forward for future sessions. So the question of synthetic a priori knowledge of the world, or the question of intelligibility, or the question of a structure, leads to a different question for Kant, in Critique of Pure Reason. This is the question of transcendental deduction. So what is transcendental deduction? What does this term mean? What does deduction mean? So deduction is just a legal jargon or quid juris. By what right?

By what right? Like by what right can I claim such and such thing about the world and call it an objective knowledge? Okay? So the question of transcendental deduction means that by what right my knowledge about the world, my a priori knowledge of the world can be said to be objective. The question of transcendental deduction. By what right my a priori knowledge about the world can be said to be objective, can have anything to do with the world as it stands in itself okay now this leads to a different question

the question of transcendental psychology the same conditions that are necessary for the possibility of having mind the dimension of a structure are the same conditions which warrant my transcendental deductions, namely the objectivity of my a priori claims about the world. So ultimately this question of cooperation between world and subject is exactly the question that I mentioned, the so-called mutuality thesis,

the center stone of critical philosophy. I read it one more time. The same activities of synthesis, which constitute the represented world as an intelligible objective unity, constitute the representing self as an aperceptive subjective unity. Namely, the question of transcendental deduction, The objectivity of my a priori claims are nothing but the question of how is that self is unified with the world. The thinking subject is unified with the world. The question of the relation between mind and the world.

And hence, the condition for the realization of mind from the world. You see? So this question is that there is in fact a unity between the mind and the world, but this unity is not this kind of empirical unity that is simply causal. By virtue of interacting in the world, I learn about the world, or I can say something about the world. It's something that the mind starts to differentiate itself from the world as what you might call to be a different order of it, a different order of it. And is capable of, by virtue of this differentiation, which is the topic of the transcendental psychology,

it is capable of using the components, the sense data that are given in fact by the world, by my causal interactions with the world, translate them into different kinds of schemas, images, representations or structures. And these structures are guaranteed to have attraction on this data by virtue of in fact being complexly organized from them. Complexly organized from them.

Now this guaranteeing, I said guarantee to have traction. I didn't mean that they are essentially true or false. But simply that means that there is in fact a correspondence, or not correspondence, a what you might call to be an entanglement. between mind and the world at a very specific level and this is a specific level it starts with the sense data and then it basically becomes more complex as we move from sense impression level or outer sense to inner sense to imagine it to intuition to imagination to understanding and reason so the question of mind and the world is really for for Kant is the only framework or

the condition of possibility of mind is the only framework in which we can ultimately answer that why is that we can in fact have some traction about the world and why is that the world somehow appears to be cooperating with us appears to be cooperating with us but this cooperation is no longer that kind of empirical cooperation in the sense that whatever is given to me what whatever I think about the world is what is given to me no what is given to me namely since data is not what thoughts are is not what our knowledge is our knowledge is a

complex what you might call to be or remobilization of these data at different scales of mind to create a massive you know multi-layered system that allow us to penetrate reality from different angles, not just by our sensory interactions, but also by our imagination, eskimata, by our concepts of understanding, but also by level of how these concepts are held together

in their own terms, in friendship. So this question, suddenly the question, so you see from this standpoint, Kant doesn't want to annihilate empiricism. He shows that empiricism is in fact a naive case of transcendental philosophy. where there is indeed a cooperation between mind and the world. But this cooperation is not empirical. It happens on different scales of the mind, by way of different complex interplays between sense impressions and concepts and everything that comes in between.

Questions, thoughts? This is sort of how Deleuze says, like, rather than locating a harmony between the subject and the object can't relocate to harmony inside of the faculties? Yes. Yes, absolutely. Yes. Yes. I mean, as I mentioned, we will talk about this. I mean, this is really one of the things that among continents, most of the continent, not all of them, is usually being ignored

that the question, that the basic question of critical pure reason, which is simply a priori or the question of intelligibility, they think that it's just basically the question of transcendental deduction. Namely, by what rights I can say, by what rights my a priori knowledge of the world can be said to be objective. But there is a more fundamental aspect to the critique of pure reason, and in the sense that But Kant shows that the question of the transcendental deduction is also ultimately a different question, the question of transcendental psychology, the conditions necessary for the possibility of having mind as a manifold of a priori faculties.

In this way, I mean, it seems like there's an element, I mean, actually, and it seems like this in the introduction to that like the question of how are synthetic a priori judgments possible yes also it's not a question of it's a question of if synthetic a priori judgments happen at all as well yes yeah yeah yes no yes both of them and and they are they both so basically if the question of this if is really the question of if there is such a thing as mind and if there is such a thing as mind then how is it being what is this conditional possibility how is it being realized so

uh you So the thing about, you know, coming back to the idea of concept empiricism that basically at least on one level critical view, the response to, is that we said that according to the paradigm of concept empiricism. From complex sense impressions, for example, such

and such circle, such and such triangle, we can by way of processes of, by use, by exercise of our basic mental abilities we can abstract primary and secondary qualities from like saying that this is a red triangle its primary quality and it's also a triangle secondary quality then we can also once we have these also abstract, abstracted qualities, we can using the operations of

conjunction, we can put them together, we can combine them together as exactly like side by side, saying that red and circularity, a red circle, a red triangle. So we can also have complex ideas, specificities, particular things. So this is essentially what's, what, how concept empiricism functions. For example, you this book next to this book is is something that is given to me by neck by sense impression so all

I need to do is I can I can use either the process of abstraction using my basic mental abilities or or the process of combination using logical conjunction to create more abstract, more complex instances of next-to-nextness, neighborhood, configuration, so on and so forth. So you see, essentially, concept of empiricism, as I mentioned, the empirical core of it is that it always starts with sense impression like Descartes. But Descartes was rationalist, but they have inherited this, that sense impressions are

already thoughts. And as such, they can be abstracted because they are complex. Once you can abstract them, then you can combine these, their primary and secondary qualities together and create more complex particular things more specificities and that's all you need there is no there is no such a thing as mind as some sort of spooky intervening factor in the world all you need is a blank slate and data given by the world or acquired through causal interaction with the brain.

So But of course the problem unfolds for empiricism here when we are dealing with basic mathematical concepts. How are we going to abstract the concept of a point? How are we going to combine the concept of a point? How are we going to abstract idea, concept of a line or abstract it?

but also the concepts of causality and substance. Both logical causation or logical implication and material causality. How are we going to talk about these? because every definition that we are going to come up with is already circularly based on the idea of causal interaction what is exactly causality in what sense can we say that that's that's that that stuff outside of me

it caused me to have such and such sense impressions. Because that required for you to have, in fact, both simple and complex idea of logical implication and a structural material causation, material causality. Couldn't I have put that just from the sense impressions themselves? something happens and something else happens and you piece it together. That is Hume's solution. And we are going to get to this. Why is that Hume's solution doesn't work? You see, if you remember, I said the whole idea of a person

who eats ketchup, who eats buns, who eats sausage. just because it successively happened this doesn't mean that there is a manifold that this person ate a hot dog just because there is succession this doesn't mean that we have an impression of succession so this is a very this is part of Hume we will get to this when we talk about the idea of the perceptive unity of self but Hume comes up with this thesis is called separability

thesis. That which can be distinguished can be separated, and that which can be separated can exist separately. What does exactly mean? It means that in the other complex, and this complex is distinguishable, then we can separate it. And what can be separated can separate, can exist separately in a kind of successive manner, in a non-complex manner.

Now there is a consequence, a corresponding consequence for separability, Jung's separability thesis is called integration pieces or combination pieces it means that by virtue that's everything that that is distinguishable can be separated and that which is that's what that we which can be separated can exist separately it means that as long as I have the complex of impressions I also have the impression of the complex as long as I have as long as I have a sequence of

sense impressions I think X I think why I think why I also have a unified consciousness of the order of the complex but of course these two are completely two different things one is an act and one is an object and content They cannot be conflated with one another. Just because something happens in such and such order, this does not mean that I have the impression of it being happening in thus and so order. So this becomes a massive linchpin of attack against Hume by Kant,

precisely because if you look into this problem, you see that this is essentially the question of the perceptive unity of the thinking subject, or the experiencing subject. I think X, I think Y, I think Z. does not equal to I think parenthesis x plus y plus c parenthesis these two are fundamentally two different species one is an act one is objects and contents so how is that we can in fact move from I ate ketchup I ate buns I ate the sausage to I ate the sandwich a

manifold of intuition that in fact exhibits such a spatially and temporal orderliness the same can be said about the chain of causal events And this is exactly an argument, as we will talk about, Kant brings when he starts to elaborate the concept of inner sense or inner perception. in the sense that just because my impressions even if we accept that my impressions have some sort of causal orderliness precisely because like like

imagine like this a good example okay imagine we I'm sure most of you have worked with you know graphic software like you and saturation in Photoshop and stuff imagine that our head is a monitor it's just a bunch of wiring diagrams and it's purely causal attached to a keyboard okay this keyboard is the stuff in the world that impinge that whatever happens on this keyboard makes a trace on the monitor in my brain okay now imagine there is a software that's once you every time that you push a button on the keyboard the brightness

increases on the on the monitor so first I push this button a or any random bottom that brightness increases to a degree then another button is pushed intensity increases brightness increases from that point to a further point and so on and so forth now there is no way that I would say just because because impression a precedes impression B precedes impression C on the monitor,

like from less bright to more bright, more bright brighter and so on, that there is a correspondence of this event on the keyboard. That the temp, that the, that increase in the intensity of the color on the monitor corresponds to the temporal order of how these buttons are being pushed. It is only when I mistake the monitor in my head as a TV that I can actually see it, then I say that, well, that's what happens.

But that would require us to go to a different kind of level of introspection. Just because of these causal connections, I cannot conclude, even if there is in fact a causal connection, I cannot conclude that the increase in the intensity of brightness in the color on the monitor corresponds to a successive pushing of the buttons on the keyword and from this correspondence then I say that well this precedes that and because of this this caused that one this will be just a psychological brand of a speculation which is completely unwarranted for Kant

Is it partly that Hume's account of experience doesn't even, has no way of explaining how memory or organization would even take place at all? Well Hume calls it the habits of minds. Habits of minds. What he means by habits of minds are regularities. regularities and so basically Hume, this is a so-called problem of induction for Hume that first of all as an empiricist unlike Kant he thinks that all of our knowledge should have should be derived from experience and you can't have any

knowledge that is outside that is not derived from experience. So also coming from Locke Berkeley Descartes tradition he thinks that sense impressions are units of experience and there is an orderliness into them that in and this orderliness is really the orderliness of nature that imprints itself onto the orderliness of thinking, what Jung calls the habits of thoughts or regularities of thoughts. But the thing is that so that's how he wants to overcome the problem of induction. That's the reason that we can anticipate something happening even

though there is no basis for our claim that what is going to happen will be in any way based on what has happened before, but he says that precisely because there are such an orderliness of habits of mind, we can say that, yes, that is going to happen. But that also hinges on this very implicit claim in Hume that he thinks that these impressions, these habits of mind or habits of thinking, are given by nature itself. In today's lexicon, in today's vocabulary, you say that our inductions are sound and valid precisely because nature gave those to us.

They are the products of evolution. But that's just a bunch of infantile story. How do you know that evolution gave this to us? because that requires you to move so many, mobilize so many hidden assumptions to come up with this idea. And even if nature really gave these competences to us, this doesn't mean that we have epistemic right by virtue of having something that nature has given to us. Just because nature is effective, that effectivity of nature doesn't translate to our epistemic legitimacy. about the state of affairs in nature.

So to pass for a second from Kant's critique of Hume to the critique of Kant that you've sketched here a little bit it would be something like that like the schemata and kind of everything in the analytic principles still that still only all pertains to phenomenal time like that that's that that's our sort of representation of the world but that there's still a different temporality that's that's more sort of uniquely related to the to reason kind of Well, the thing is that, I mean, so many people, I mean, people like Hegel at least, or Plato, you know, the arch-idealists, don't think that reason is temporal or general thoughts are temporal.

It's only experiential thoughts about the world that are temporal, precisely because they are derived from sensory impressions. I mean, they integrate, they are rooted in sensory impressions or sensible intuitions. The thing is that, yes, I mean, as we will look into it, when we look into this whole idea of transformation of transcendental deduction, transcendental psychology, we see that as soon as Kant's discussion about inner sense starts, and make no mistake, Kant's take the idea of inner sense as basically the scaffolding upon which every other discussion discussion in Critique of Pure Reason rests on. And he identifies, he takes inner sense,

what you might call to be the temporal orderliness of our experience as subjects as the most basic fundamentals and you see that the question of this transcendental experience transcendental temporality of experienced sorry and transcendental ideality of experience temporality which starts the question of inner sense you see that it moves on to art other dimensions of

mind towards intuitions towards imagination even in understanding so there is yes there is always this real firm entanglement between what he might called to be the perception of time and transcendental experience of temporality and mental faculties of the representing mind, of the representing mind, not the racial-enacting mind, representing mind. And of course that brings precisely the critique that I mentioned. And this is

precisely because Kant thinks that, for Kant, space and time are forms of intuition, are absolutely necessary constraints for the realization of mind. And hence experience, and hence intelligibility, and therefore the question of objectivity. So are we, what were.

Just to, yeah, I think we're, technically, the class says it's going till 3, but I think that was an error on the, it's actually supposed to go from 1 till 3.30. So we're. So we can cut it here and continue. I will just very briefly mention a little bit of Wolf and Crucius next session. And then please, so for the next session, it would be great if we can start reading, you know, critical reading. If you can read, let me tell you which parts you need to read. Okay.

Sorry. Theo, do you have access to to the table of contents yeah so there's the two prefaces the two

introductions and then it goes into the transcendental doctrine of elements is that including the transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic okay if you can read if it is not too much the second edition of the introduction and the transcendental doctrine of elements well let me see how long is the first part the doctrine of elements is almost 50 pages is doable for you I

think it should be doable I hope so because we will have two weeks now so is next week yes okay yeah that's that's good so let's let's just read until Through the logic? Or maybe until the end of conclusions of the transcendental aesthetic. page 192. I think it would be just a little bit too

over boarding. I don't want to overwhelm you if I say read transcendental logic as well. I think let's just read the introduction and and until the end of transcendental aesthetic, where we can talk about the role of space and time, and particularly now that we have a little bit grasp of how critical reason is connected to the problem of empiricism, and a little bit that I just talked about Hume, Hume separability principle, how Kant tries to show that, talk about the transcendental ideality of space and time as forms of intuition,

rather than as, you know, basically actual features of the world that are impinged, causally impinged on our mind qua blanket slate in the tradition of empiricism. That sounds good. I would just ask if you have advice on how to sort of pair the secondary sources with critique of pure reason or like in order in which you approach them. I would assume the Rosenberg first and then. I would say Rosenberg is good. But I would say that if, I mean, I, well, okay, let's, I think, I would basically think

that Sellars is a better one, Kantian themes, because it has a better detailed stuff. Rosenberg is more understandable, Sellars is more difficult, but I think Sellars brings brings some other kinds of discussions that are, I think we can somehow connect them back to, later critique of Kant, like people like Herman Cohen and Paul Latour, so on and so forth. And what's there? I really want you to read that book.

I'm curious what you'd think. Which one? A Defense and Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism by Henry Allison. Oh, yeah. I forgot to ask you about it. Is it online? Yeah, I can put it on the classroom. Okay, superb, superb. Yes, please do it. Please do it. I know he had a big influence on Popper's interpretation of Hegel as a radical Kantian. Okay. Or sorry, Pippin's, not Popper. Pippin's. Interesting. And Ray used Pippin in his Hegel course as one of those.

No, I mean, I love Pippin. And I think he's a fantastic thinker. I mean, I've only read one book by him, to be honest, the self-consciousness one, which I think is absolutely brilliant. Well, I think calling Hegel radical Kantian is a little event, squeezing the stuff. That's why I'm sort of curious to have you read Alison's book, I guess. So there is, I mean, can you upload Uy Peterson's second volume of the diagonal method that I sent you? Yeah, yeah. So, OK, there is this guy who has written this,

this is a little bit quirky, but that shouldn't surprise you. he has written I think four volumes it's almost 4,000 pages called Diagonal Method, Tools and Materials for Speculative and Dialectical Logic and it's basically development of logic and from what you might call to be pre-transcendental turn to post transcendental turn the second volume of his book is a specifically dealing with that we did transcendental turn we can't transcendental turn and

the question of mind and transcendental deduction and synthetic a priori and its connection with logic and the reason that I'm suggesting it is because it's highly unconventional this style of writing. Instead of he writing, he cites these excerpts from thinkers like Kant, he makes commentaries and then he goes on and he basically investigates, it's just basically a list of just simply excerpts, no material. He just connects these excerpts of various thinkers from pre-transcendental to post-transcendental turn. And there's really, I think, a fantastic way of triangulating Kant in this spectrum,

pre-transcendental to post-transcendental. Yeah, I'll upload that to the classroom for people. OK, superb. Excellent. OK, everyone. Have a great day. Have fun. All right. Thank you. One brief question, Reza. Yes, go on. Maybe we should do this off broadcast, but when is this book going to come out? I have sent the final version to Robin. The final, final version. The final, final version. But Robin, so basically Robin has told me that he wants me to take a break from anything book related for at least two or three weeks.

So he has done some, you know, recommendation and some edits. And he wants me to read it, you know, after this with this fresh mind. So that's why it has taken long. But also for another reason, because Peter also is reading it now. So, but, well, don't worry. Yes, the final version has been done and Robin is quite scared that it's, it has gone out of proportion. It's now 900 pages of collapsed version. Holy shit. Will I have it in my hands? No, we are thinking of either cutting it or changing the format.

Oh no. Oh no. Oh no. 2018 was right. Okay, everyone. Have a great day.