Hello, welcome to the 15th and final session of the Council of the Circle of Revenge, A Close Encounter with the Critique of Pure Reason with Razan Agarstani. I'm going to pass the mic to him now. Thanks everyone. Okay, so we'll try to cover as much as ground we can do with regard to those last couple of chapters that I mentioned, which are not the last chapters of CPR, but Nevertheless, but before then, if you have any comments, any question from the past, I will try to wrap it up, even if we can reach to the end, so we can have a more thorough discussion at the end, but nevertheless, shoot.
Questions? Stanley maybe can pose a question so he can stay warm. At the moment I'm just trying to find Wi-Fi, but it's not really working. As you can see, there's a church behind me. Yes. pose a question. I didn't really catch enough of the first bit to do that properly, so I'm going to devolve responsibility to somebody else. I have a question just looking back over the whole class a little bit, and it's more just wanting
more explanation of how Kant goes about his argument and how the how the project of critique is the project of doing answering synthetic literary judgments. I guess I might also have a question. Now I've thought about it, if that's okay. Yeah, go ahead. Can we stack? Well, I was just wondering about the relation of Reza, your latest blog post to what we've been doing in the class. I mean, I guess that's kind of tangential. But also I would like to... In fact, it was more of a, what you might call it,
to be a kind of indirect answer to an issue that Artem brought on the Google Classroom page, his long question. That was really my answer to Artem, but also some of the issues that Theo brought about logic. So, we know that logic is the logic of illusion or sophistical art. And we are made to believe by Kant that logic as an organization means that exactly the basic sophism, that what is said is equal to what is.
But this is not really the case. And in fact if Kant tries to tell us this is the case, he is just peddling a very, very trivial understanding of logic, precisely because the very fundament upon which the transcendental method is built is a priority of logic. There is one issue to talk about the epistemic implications of logic, and there is another issue fundamentally different to understand that logic is the very organ of object constitution for all sciences in the most broader possible sense of logic.
without us risking either thinking that logic by itself is sufficient, is sufficient, that's underlined, is sufficient to arrive at object constitution, epistemic or knowledge claims about the furniture of the world, or without committing to the metaphysical high price of equating the laws of thought with the laws of world. All basically logic as Organon implies is that logic itself is the condition of the possibility of object constitution. By condition of the possibility, we already
understand that condition of possibility is a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition. Yes, of course, a logical system requires some extra logical information in order for it to become an epistemic judgment about the state of affairs. But we can't just go on saying that logic as a organon is a logic of illusion and instead and do something called logic as a canon that is merely about the correct applications of judgments. In so far as we have seen in transcendental logic, everything that every time that Kant
tries to tell us about a priori, a priori is in one sneaky way or another, is subjected to sensible intuition, as if Kant is quite humane in this very sense. But if we take Kant's own transcendental method seriously, namely the a priori and the logical structure, then we should also take the idea of logic as organon seriously, precisely because we cannot sufficiently, We cannot sufficiently address the question of epistemic right, or more broadly, object constitution, Gegenstand, without taking seriously the necessity of logic as the condition of
possibility. Taking seriously logic as a necessary condition is tantamount to taking seriously logic as or ganun seriously, that a logic that is no longer in advance, in advance, bold, subjected or subordinated to demands of representation. Because the demands of representation are constituted by logical structure, not the other way around. okay thanks i mean i'm gonna have to go over that when i'm in a environment where
there was there wasn't a kind of an additional follow-up to that and it's it's quite a like a broad brush um question and that would be so i'm thinking back to Pete and Ben's course on German idealism and the impetus the impetus behind that was and similarly Pete's book um the impetus behind that was this sort of trying to they were returning to Kant in light of this like so-called speculative turn or whatever you want to call it um I was thinking like how does your current the current stuff you're doing with Kant, does that relate back to any of that at all?
Do you think that was just the kind of catalyst for what you're doing now? Or does it have any answers to any of the questions that were seemingly being posed at that point? For example, you know, issues around correlationism. Does that even make sense as a term anymore? Sure, sure. I mean, okay. So I need to think about this, but the way that I am thinking about it at this very moment, well yes if it's if it's not something you'd rather not talk about now no no no no no completely fine with me no no completely no no absolutely i think it's an interesting really interesting question i'm really trying to wrap my head around this is in the sense that yes it was a catalyst absolutely but uh and and yes i i think the issue of correlationism perhaps not in the sense that
Mayasu pointed to it, but more in the sense that Reyes' critique of Mayasu pointed to the idea of correlationism, because epistemic correlation is necessary. I mean you can't just go talk about stuff in the world without epistemic correlation. But another thing is the issue that knowledge and thinking are quite different. It is one thing to be capable of thinking about objects or about the archive fossil and it's a different thing to talk about knowledge okay knowledge of these kinds of stuff so that's two things so yes I I think it is it it it it can
be connected to the correlation and it should but what really I think I have noticed is that that after reading Kant for I don't know how many times for this class, and also in the past couple of years when I was writing the book, I noticed that some of my initial commitments to the project of critical realism as advanced by Sellars and championed by Ray and quite encapsulated very well by Pete's essay on transcendental realism, have somehow been shaken in the sense that now I see that the original Kantian problem holds as much for
the project of scientific critical realism as it used to hold for Kant's exact version of transcendental philosophy if I was supposed to make you know a very brief formula for how I think about the problem is I would call I call myself a skeptical realist in the sense that I am no longer committed to idea that objects natural sciences or empirical sciences as they stand today can can
simply pretend as if they have circumvented the foundational problem of transcendental method so so in my carry on please no so in light of the position you're coming from now it seems like even sellers is a kind of is stuck with a kind of naive realism I wouldn't call this exactly a naive realism. I would say that it is a realism that what you might call doesn't have enough self-consciousness.
That's what I think about Selvar's critical realism. Or even take on Kant's transcendental logic. Now you see all of us, you know, Pete, Luca, me, probably less so, Ray, believe that transcendental logic or more broadly, Kent's project of critique can be thought in terms of what you might call to be abstract computer science, theoretical computer science. In the sense that it doesn't matter that, okay, so you posit something like the absolute, which is a thing in itself. And as Kant himself talks about this, and Findlay really underlines this fact, is that
Kant always believes that the things in themselves are a species of as-if arguments. as if arguments in the sense that they enable us to arrive at certain regulative judgment that allow us in turn to go on and say other things about the world that we couldn't say otherwise. So you might say that from this perspective the position of the thing in itself allow That was to create something like a transcendental search space within which we can arrive at certain kind of optimal, optimal from the perspective of judgment rather than optimal
in the sense of certainty, optimal judgments about the furnitures of the world, okay? So from this perspective transcendental logic, quite an abstract search space, is actually quite interesting, quite exciting, and I completely go for it. But the thing is that from a foundational problem of the transcendental method, I think both Luca and Pete pretend as if the position of the thing in itself was just a kind of naive but also innocent addition that we can just forgo with that in the wake of
modern sciences, natural sciences. I don't think that it was an innocent thing. And I don't think that it can ever be called a naïd, precisely because the implication of the thing is in itself, are in fact the implications of the phenomenal appearance. That's the whole point, that if you do not have the thing in itself, you do not have an implied sensible structure. you can't even talk about sensibility as if it is being a feature of the worlds. That's really, I think, a cornerstone of this problem. And I do not see in any way that natural sciences, by that I do not mean the practice of science,
I mean the philosophy of science. I don't think that the philosophy of science has also worked around this problem in a sufficient or what you might call plausible manner. Precisely because if everything hinges on sensible intuition as a tissue that connects the abstracture of a priori with the phenomenal world, and we are not, let's not even talk about reality at this point, let's just talk about phenomenal appearance.
But what does exactly gives us the legitimacy to accept the phenomenal world? The phenomenal world can in fact be the logic of illusion. Because the whole edifice of the phenomenal world in Kant is based on an as-if argument, the things in themselves. Kant himself says that we should never confound the regulative judgments of as-if-species with constitutive judgments. But nevertheless, he goes on and conflates
regulative judgments with constitutive judgments. Isn't it the whole point of transcendental logic? I'm sure that you have some serious, serious thoughts. go on and you're the pain me not me Theo you can as well yeah the air should go because I
jumped in and took over from his question I probably should actually just I should probably just go now because I think I'm probably yeah you can always watch these things on video I just wanted to drop in and also thank you for doing the seminars take care my friend take care Okay, thank you. I have a quick question, and this is mostly due to the fact that I can't really find the sources for it, but I've recently, somebody pointed out that Kant seems to be changing the relation between the phenomenon and the noumenon for the second critique. So in the first critique, he seems to posit that the phenomenon is kind of caused by the noumenon,
the interaction of the Numenon with us intuitively presents a representation. Yes, he doesn't exactly say caused. You see, I think the word causality needs to be very handled with caution when Kant uses it, precisely because a causal Numenon is an as-if causal Numenon. It's an as-if argument. It's a primary causation, because otherwise it would be a human and he doesn't want to be a human. Absolutely. So this is what I wanted to ask. So in the first, he kind of posits that in the first edition, it seems to posit that, well, there is a causation. In the second, he understands, well, that's a mistake. Then causation is the transcendental category. Hence, it cannot apply to the null. And so he goes into
the as-if hypothetical, but I just wanted to ask you things that, like, I feel like this position kind of crumbles a bit in terms of realism. Yes, yeah, of course, yes. So I just wanted to know whether you think that this kind of, the positing in the conscious sense of the noumenal, the phenomenal kind of breaks down in terms of actual objects. Yes, you see, okay, I would say that it absolutely erodes that kind of robust realism that Szilardzian legacy pretend to be the case.
Now, the thing is that, okay, I need to think about it, but probably my answer wouldn't be really a response to your question. But nevertheless, let me think about it. So the way that I see it, as I mentioned, is that the issue is not really the reality of the Giganeshtand or the reality of the object. It's not about reality at all. The issue is about the legitimacy of the phenomenal. Precisely because if the phenomenal is simply a hypothetical of some real interaction, hypothetical,
And we cannot ever extend this regulatory hypothetical as if judgment to something constituted. Hence usually realists, even Ray I have seen this, and you know I think Ray is an astonishing philosopher when it comes to these issues is really surgical. But the way that I see it is that they pretend as if the issue is about the coordination and reality, and namely epistemic objectivity.
I don't see this as really the case. I think the case is the legitimacy of the phenomenal appearance. The phenomenal appearance can in fact be the logical illusion. So long, in quotation, don't say that Reza said this without this next, what I'm going to say so long as phenomenal appearances are tethered to the as if hypothetical position of objects or things in themselves hello Chuggies can you expand a little bit about what you mean by the
legitimacy of the phenomenal appearances? You see, I mean, let's put it in the most rudimentary sense. So we know that the phenomenal appearance has, in fact, some sort of epistemic core to it. Now, Sellars, of course, tries to empty this idea of epistemic legitimacy from epistemic in the strong sense. Precisely because if you say that, oh, sense impressions are already giving us some insights
about the structure of the world it means that you're falling prey to the myth of the given world is not giving you any impression of this structure whatsoever it is a this is not what i'm talking about i'm talking about in some epistemic in the sense that kent already has it in the logic in the transcendental logic and it in the metaphysics of representation. What is exactly this weaker sense? It's not essentially epistemic, it's what you might call to be a necessary condition for epistemic attraction.
And what it is, is that in one way or another, in some sort of subterfuge manner, sensibility actually can be understood as somehow an interaction, a real interaction with the world. Which brings us to this conclusion that if logic is this kind of unconstrained manner of logical structure, there should be some sort of coordination at some point between the logical domain and the sensible domain in order for us to have this structure. This is all fine but the
very point that you think that sensibility is in fact an intro that can lead logic to some extra logical information is can be quite elusive in the first place this is really the point so you say logic but without extra logical information is the logic of illusion I would say that what you think is the extra logical information namely the sensible intuition qua phenomenal appearance can in fact be the logic of illusion because how what does it exactly that this extra logical information
namely sensible intuition, can lead us to something called objective epistemic claims. And by objective epistemic claims, I absolutely do not mean certain epistemic claims. All I mean is that they can be optimized over time in a search space. But this very extra logical information that is required to be inserted into the domain of logic for logic to gain traction on the furniture of the world, as far as it is, are already predicated upon the as-if argument or hypothetical position of things in themselves
can in fact be illusory. And hence, we are doomed in an epistemic hell. OK, I'm jealous of Stanley. I need to get a lighter and relight my match. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . So, Sorry. So you see this whole idea of Kant's circle of revenge is that Kant thinks as if he has exacted revenge on Descartes and Hume and Leibniz in one way or another.
I think really once you start to be nitpicky with Kant as he himself was nitpicky with prior philosophers, and that's the task of a philosopher, to be the loose canon of truth, is that you realize that the danger of transcendental method or a realistic thesis without precautionary caveats, so on and so forth, is not that Kant's transcendental method would fall on Humian problems or Leibnizian problems. In fact, it can be another variation of
Cartesian solipsism. If the phenomenal tissue was supposed to give us some critical engagement with the world out there with problematization of the phenomenal realm, we might indeed be in a Cartesian solipsistic cell. That's what I call Kant's straitjacket. It's simply Descartes' revenge on Kant that is retroactively implemented.
everyone is silent too much nightmarish stuff for you I mean it seems like he thinks that positing the thing in itself as if it were a positive object is the way that he gets out of the idealist or the solipsistic idealist project yes yes and then you see that as as i mean it all sounds good like fairy tales at the beginning of cpr but as he moves on it seems that he really genuinely conflates a regulative idea
of things in themselves with a constitutive idea. And at that point, the transcendental method is beyond recognition. It's just solipsistic idealism. It seems like this is kind of like, you know, if, you know, there is something to be said about the issues around, like, correlation, it's here you know because you know it comes down to like not only are we trying to gain epistemic traction on the world gain practical traction too so we can't restrict ourselves to only have as if arguments but actually get into
the constitutions of objects and so philosophy has to reach a causative phase. Yes, yes. And I think science does that. But then philosophy of science in the broad sense, I don't think that has addressed this issue quite coherently in the sense that, you know, in order for you to take the idea of empirical sciences is seriously, I genuinely think that you should endorse some of scientific realism of the critical variety that Sellars puts forward.
Of course with some caveats, but they are negligible. But even then, I would say that's really, I think, the issue that Pete brings in his transcendental realism, that in order to do that, science replaces thinking themselves with object. An object is what you might call to be I think we may have just lost you Reza. Oh sorry. Okay, I can hear you now, but it was just a second.
So, did you hear when I mentioned Pete's essay? You cut off right after that. Yeah. Yeah, so I said that, you know, in Pete's essay, this, I think he highlights this problem quite well. In the sense that the scientific account replaces things in themselves with objects. and objects are not these kinds of stuff out there, like nominal stuff, absolutely they are not. Objects are constituted by the domain of discourse. In fact, this is the whole point of Quine Carnap controversy about the limits of metaphysics, that we cannot handle objects as if if they are metaphysical entities.
But precisely because you need to have domain of discourse in order to in fact posit such thing as objects. But then Plato strikes back at this point. That man who can easily derail every philosopher in the entire history, he would say to you that, Okay then, tell me that how exactly if objects are these kinds of locally bound entities in the domain of discourse, constituted by domain of discourse, can actually gain traction on the furniture of sensibility.
I'm not talking about reality. All I'm talking about at this point is a phenomenal realm. But we know that this is not what science, scientific realism tells us. Scientific realism is a little bit greedier. It wants reality. So Plato would say that how does such an object that you are talking about can gain traction on reality? Yes, Rosenberg talks about abductive reasoning and the space of abduction, but these are just really fuzzy terms. I mean, what does guarantee that you can bracket the space of abductive hypothesis in order to converge on a good critique or object constitution?
These are just, yeah, Rosie Delusian prose, I would say. So this is answer really I think, Sally, that you thought, you know, what my new work, and this is not intelligent spirit, intelligent spirit is quite written in Kantian vein. But after that I noticed that there are really serious problems here, so I really, that's why there is a turn to skepticism, not in a very greedy, not in a greedy sense like you deny things like reason or reality as stuff, but simply a skeptic, a skeptic or investigation of the methods.
Our methods might be quite actually illusory. And then we need to in fact investigate to how, to what extent they are illusory. How would you distinguish what you're saying from LaRuel's notion of the one? To be honest, Hunter, I think, so, you know, I have read, I started reading Robin's, you know, collection on Laruel. You know, I had read Laruel previously, I mean, his prose obviously put me off, but I can, I could see, you know, really dazzling insights. But now
that I am reading it I see that he's actually articulating quite similar if not the same insights. But the thing is that I would say that essentially the kind of resources that Laruel is sticking with by definition does not allow him to overcome this problem or even coherently tackle its implications but yes from a conceptual perspective I think is I would say that he's on the right track the whole idea of transcendental empirics is doublet it seems like maybe you're you're privileging the scientific method more
than he would though or something like that yes yes yes absolutely I mean And really, I generally don't think that one can talk about science or epistemic scientific knowledge claims about the furniture of the world without at least in one way or another addressing the question of the scientific method and also the structure and dynamics of scientific theories, how they are constituted. I mean it's really interesting that, and that's really I think one of the greatest
thing is about teaching that philosophers usually think that when they start reading, writing a book, they change their ideas. But I think the true changing of ideas when you teach it, a course. So I am starting to teach a course about Kant. La la la, everything is rosy, good, such a calm transcendental domain. But then you realize, shit, things don't really hang together as they must. Does this mean the book will be postponed until you've settled these problems? No, no, no, no. If I want to do that, there won't be any book anytime soon, if ever.
Yeah, I was going to ask the same question, actually. No, no, don't worry. I mean, I get the feeling it's already... I am Canty on a cell. It's already been postponed a lot, I feel. Yes, yes. Hopefully it will come. It's just, you know, the stuff about the edits and things which are not... You see, really, this most serious problem I have told you guys is that I wrote that book with the intention of being purely introductory. But then obviously this is actually quite a high ambition, precisely because no one can ever produce a purely introductory form. So it turned out to be difficult and introductory,
which then Robin brought this issue to me that, okay, maybe you should cut some stuff. And I said, okay. And then we are still deciding on which parts needs to be cut. so is the material that's on your blog at the moment is that a kind of so you're working out these problems that have come up during yes yes yes yes absolutely is that with a view to kind of revising your argument in intelligence and spirit or is it just you know you're just kind of laying the groundwork for something that might come later well I think that some of it I think some of them are implicitly revising the claims made in the book but yes I think the main
objective is to actually write about entirely different thing the thing is that and really I mean you guys need to be in conversation on the blog I mean instead of me getting trolling comments all the time let's have some good comments about these kinds of stuff because I really think that these are important issues. And yes, it's real easy to pretend that to, you know, sweep them under the carpet, but they are coming back and hunting us at some point. It's exactly like Kant. Kant thinks that he has resolved issues of Hume and Descartes, but no, they will come and back him, sorry, bite him at some point. And this is quite serious. It's the whole idea that philosophy
is a circle of revenge, but a circle that never closes. My question is, do you think that the sort of epistemological barrier between us and reality is necessarily permanent? No, I would say that calling it permanent, Hunter, would require us to, in fact, endorse a kind of metaphysical thesis, something akin to the thing in themselves. That I would absolutely do not endorse. What I endorse is that I would say instead of imposing a priori
constraints and the limits of how we can talk about the furniture of the world or the world in general or the universe, I mean, if we are talking about a broader perspective, then the first step that we can in fact talk about without falling prey into dogmatic metaphysics is about the self-imposed methodological restrictions by which we think about the world. And hence This whole idea that I'm trying to champion, meta theory of one's theorization about the world, is the whole point of this. So sort of like the cluster of different domains of discourse
sort of working together. Yes, yes. Yes, but also somehow established in a metrological domain by which the problems or limitations of the earlier domain can be explicitly discussed. I'm not talking about resolving them, but simply coherently detecting, examining and addressing those restrictions. How do you separate investigation of method from investigation as to just the basic validity
of reason itself? I think there are... Okay, that's a really good question, really damn hard question. I would say for now, I would say that these are not mutually exclusive. They are quite co-constitutive. The logical method by which we shed light on the operation of rational discourse or reason are at some point equivalent to the same kind of rational discourse that we use to talk about the world.
It's just the former is implicit and the latter is explicit. And the point is to make what is implicit explicit. The meta theory that is implicit behind every theory that we have needs to be made explicit in order for us to understand the limitations of the said theory. So to paraphrase what you're saying, you're saying that reason as a method is the method that is able to elucidate, I don't know, the other methods by which we may go about like
verifying our judgments. Yes, but reason also has its own limitations and in order for us to in fact see the limitations of reason, we should no longer treat reason as this kind of Kantian or Hegelian force, but understand that what is it in fact we do when we do reason? The advent of computation, logic and mathematics. And those themselves have also met their own meta-theoretical assumptions. Meta-mathematics, meta-logic, meta-computation. The only way to get out of Wittgenstein prison or Kantian straitjacket is to endorse the
infinite notion, the infinite space of meta-theories or meta-logics as a regulative idea necessary for us to in fact investigate what it is we are doing when we are reasoning, but also when we are making claims about the world. It seems like a really slippery slope to walk on because it could go in the direction of some infinite regress where you're always trying to meta-theoretically account for meta-theory, you know, but I mean making that attempt and opening up that possibility is necessary
in order to be able to render explicit or theoretical. Yes, absolutely. The whole point, as I said, it's a regulative idea in the sense that, as Ken would say, it should not be valorized. it's an, and also as Carnap says, it's an attempt. The word attempt is quite precise in Carnap's work. It is not something that we take it as some sort of ideal state or ideal process. It's in fact going to be far messier than the mess we are already in. But nevertheless, sometimes in order to get out of the muddy water you need to swim through the swamp so then so then what does that do
to the kind of Kantian like the practical reason side of things or like where does sort of like a leftist politics that's informed by competition where is it like a danger of sliding into like Silicon Valley fascism or something or like i think i think you know well that that that is an absolutely difficult question to be honest hunter i absolutely have zero clue about this it seems that you see i i i have apparently in this regard i have a less naive theory and my practical reason is quite actually naive in the sense that I still believe in
kind of egalitarian ideals and stuff. But yes, I think that if we are doing the same thing in theory, we should do the same thing in practice. But then what does it mean to, what kind of as concrete as self should we take? I absolutely have no clue whatsoever. Well, it's certainly a very interesting question. Yeah, yeah, that's interesting for me as well. Yes, and then you see that... No, you see that, in fact, if we take the idea... You see, what is making actually Hunter's question very dangerous is because of one single thing.
Every of our practical claims, or practical reasons, are in fact predicated on a theoretical claim. As Heidegger would have said, when we say that the point is to change the world, changing the world is predicated on a particular conception of the world, namely a theoretical account. So, And with all that said about the restrictions of theories and this upstream move through the metatheory, then what would be the implication of such a struggle for practical claims?
having known that there is no such a thing as a practical claim independent of a theoretical claim. There is no recipe for changing the world free from a conception of the world. That sounds Kantian. It is Kantian. i didn't say that i am a fully recovered non-kantian i mean i i guess i don't exactly see the connection that is being drawn between fascism and skepticism unless i'm missing something because it seems like
sorry fascism and skepticism because it seems like skepticism would undermine any premise that fascism might have. Who says fascism is even remotely related to skepticism? I was just trying to bounce off Hunter's question I guess. Who is the term Silicon Valley fascism? In terms of sort of like deriving a notion of egalitarianism from computation hierarchies? I can understand that there There are certain kinds of skepticism that coincide with fascism, what you might call to be aborted skepticism or greedy, naive skepticism. But skepticism in the very core of skeptics, the force of investigation, as Pyro had it,
so as many other skeptic philosophers, that is absolutely the force of reason. becomes a skeptic of its own methods this is the self-consciousness of reason other than anything else yeah I think I think I agree Reza in the sense that it was only a kind of greedy skepticism that I would relate to fascism in terms of something that denies the possibility of rationality altogether can easily tip over into this kind of might makes right idea which I think is related to fascism I don't know
yes and the thing is that you know once once you you know once a reason it stops to be a skeptic about itself and its own limitations it becomes a teleological force and once the reason becomes a teleological force it becomes a force that legitimizes the current state of affairs, no matter how bad they are. A reason that does not understand and erodes away at its own limitations, it's just simply the force of a status quo, of the achieved totality, just an illusion as Plato would have called it.
I think this is like Adorno and Horkheimer saying, you know, there's a point at which enlightenment reverts to myth. It's this sort of thing. Yes. I know you don't like them. No, no, no, no, no, no. To be honest with you, I think that, you know, there is a component that you get in Adorno and Horkheimer. I think Adorno-Horkheimer overgeneralized the scope of their arguments about this scientific or rational enlightenment. But nevertheless, I think the core claim of them is exactly like this. It's a sense that reason actually is quite susceptible to take its own methods, its own
shape as the natural course of the world. And in doing that, it becomes a legitimizer for the worst tyrants. But I would say against Adorno and Horkheimer, the only recipe that we can see as viable is to take the idea of rational skepticism seriously. reason becomes the skepticus of itself. Okay, let's have a brief break and then we will start, Kent.
I'm doing quite good, how are you? Yeah, not bad. Do you think we're ever going to get around to doing this reading? Oh, I actually thought about getting to you today because I actually started reading that okay which which one the veil i'm on how to prove okay yeah yeah uh how how to prove it yeah um yeah sure i'll start with that then um um yeah i'll be at the moment i'm so i think slightly up in the air because i'm moving in two weeks but after that um should be good to go with all the readings and stuff. I did start reading it a while ago and it looks pretty good.
It really seems to be very good just to get solid familiarity with those sorts of materials. Well, it was recommended to me by someone who's studying mathematics. I think it's a fairly widely used text for the... Yeah, I've had it recommended multiple times myself. Okay, yeah. Well, that's for sure. Sorry for...
Go on, Stan. No, no, please. Sorry for contributing to derailing the conversation. No, no, no, no. I think, you know, this is the last session. I mean, at least if we can't cover the CPR, we can at least talk about some sort of anti-resolution to reading it. I just think everyone's interested in what you've been writing recently, which has come out of these classes. So I think it's kind of taken on the life of its own. yeah you know that's why people shouldn't teach because once you really teach it derails your academic shit no I mean and what what really what is the point of philosophy if philosophy
is convinced with its comfort zone, with what it knows and you know the cozy cubbyhole of its own argument, then that's not philosophy, that's just dogmatism. Philosophy I would say that if not tomorrow, at least next month you should come with your own best critique of your former work, otherwise you are I'm not in the business of philosophy, really. I mean, I have told you that I take, I think philosophy, and that's really, really bad thing to say, that I think that philosophy rises above science in this regard.
philosophy never closes the circle of its revenge. Science does. Philosophy just goes on digging and digging and digging. And it might be absurd, it might be completely a misguided enterprise, but nevertheless, it is only in digging that we can understand the limitations of how we think. Artem, you said something that is a curious statement, I want you to elaborate it.
You said, I think where I'd fall short is the empirical drivability of logic. What I mean by that, it was one of the peculiar things I found in Dialect of Enlightenment. I sadly haven't gotten to anything other than any of them written specifically on those topics, but what it seems they establish, you know, this very peculiar kind of image of rituals happening and how magic then goes into logic and how suddenly, you know, you can sacrifice animals instead of humans. And wow, that means that there is some sort of a symbolic equivalence. I think those discussions are quite feeble, to be honest.
Yeah, that's exactly what I mean by this empirical derivability of logic. I mean, it just seems, and I mean, Nietzsche kind of sticks to that as well. It's this kind of, if you take logic to be this sort of thing that's just in the world, in a very kind of, in a very bad sense in the world. Vulgar sense, vulgar and negative sense. Absolutely. If you take it as being something just kind of so akin to the world that you kind of just take it out of it, well, then it means that it's only going to be kind of inductive at best. What it means is that logical laws are then very kind of posed upon very derivative encounterings with the world.
And I just don't see how that like and I feel this is where it comes kind of full stop with Adorn and Hockheimer, because if you posit the fact that your critical toolbox is taken from the things that you want to critique, that is kind of the given state of affairs, then yeah, that's it. Then yes, of course, enlightenment is always already myth. But if you say, well, no, logic is a bit more than that, then that's it. I mean, that's where you yes it's top-notch comments also think about this you see so exactly
Adorno and Horkheimer do you wearing all between a critical framework that the ones who are standing for enlightenment be doing an implicit enemy of them is Carnap, logical empiricism. Isn't it exactly what they are trying to do, the same thing that Carnap tries to do in logical structure of the world, the appao? That's exactly what it is. But of course, Carnap does such a fucking fantastic, spectacular job, and he failed so spectacularly, in a grand way, that he knows that this project has failed.
And then he goes on to the logical syntax of language, completely forgets the empirical logicism, logical empiricism that he had, you know, posed and it was at the center of the Viennese circle. And it's really interesting that also, you know, kind of a tangential comment that I have been thinking and I've been talking to Pete about this, that if we are going to talk about this kind of rational reconstruction of Enlightenment project and its political implications, it is worthwhile actually to resurrect Vienna Circle figures against Adorno and Horkheimer.
Precisely because Vienna Circle people are the real leftists. They were all hunted by Nazis. They were really staunch Marxists. And you see that, in fact, even if when they say that, oh, well, my politics is not really my philosophy, no, it is in fact connected to the politics. Now, that is very interesting. Because I don't know, I'd like to see the link between the Vienna Circle and Marxism fleshed out. I mean, I know there's Otto Neurath, but that's not a topic for this conversation. But that is interesting. There are a couple of books.
I will send them to you, Stanley. There are actually a couple of books being written on this topic. Trying to link the so-called struggle for rational reconstruction, which is the project of Vienna Circle with their politics, which was quite anti-fascist and very, very hardcore leftist. Anything before I start? Oh, go on, please, please, sorry. I was just going to reply to Artem.
I mean, I would totally defer to your greater wisdom on matters of logic. I think part of the problem is that the conception of philosophy that Adorno and Horkheimer has is, you know, they're not even really trying to be philosophers in the way that perhaps you Reza would understand it and perhaps we do intuitively understand it because they are critical theorists yes yeah in some sense they think so philosophy only survives because the because of the myths that it has agreed to well the moment at which it could have been realized was missed by which
they mean with Marxism and the workers movement. But that's a conception of philosophy which is incredibly different to the paradigm that we're sort of working in within this seminar. So I think the issue of how critical theory and philosophy relate is actually quite complicated. And I'm not sure if I have any answer to that question. Yeah, the thing is that the way that today's critical theory is correlated with philosophy is actually adverse
to the very investigation of how they are, in fact, correlated. basically is holding the champion, the banner for doing philosophy, even though it absolutely abhors the word philosophy. There are really worthwhile avenues to investigate how they are correlated. But as I said, today's set up, academic set up, but so as para-academic set up of the fight between content, I mean sorry, philosophers and does not have room for such an invention,
but it tries to suppress it, both on the side of critical philosophers and on the side of the philosophers. No, I think you're totally right. And that's why I'm very interested in trying to make that happen. But it just seems like everything is stacked so as to not allow that to happen. But anyway, okay, that's everything. The cards are definitely stacked against us. It just takes a whole lot of labor to sort of carve out a space and a niche and then be able to do the hard work of being able to take these philosophical problems and carrying them out to their practical conclusions.
No, absolutely. I mean, sometimes I really do think that, is it really worth it? it's not just the cards that are stacked but also you need to convince rival people rival thinkers so you get the right thinkers the you know in various kinds of uh basically guises and then you also get a kind of traditional marxist and they also need to be convinced and you know yes there should be some fights but ultimately fights are not sufficient they are necessary they are not sufficient you should be able to
convince them and hence all of these things together just show you that Jesus Christ maybe Maybe I shouldn't be even finding philosophy before depression, once you really think about the broader scope of the problems at hand. But then I would say that this is precisely the reason that we should not see philosophy as philosophy belonging to this voice or that voice. should be absolutely no one's voice, a collective voice. And only through philosophy, in the broad possible sense, that some of these can be fought on a good ground in a productive
way and some enemies can be convinced. It also seems like, at least to some degree, that capitalism has enough of a hold on collective desire that it's very hard for... Oh yes absolutely yes and that's that's another really like a big you know elephant in the room in the sense that okay you say consensus building is is necessary but then the very setup of capitalist late capitalism is quite adverse to such a consensus building precisely because it's not that it is what you might call to be late capitalism
to be the society of fragmentation that might be the case but what is really even more insidious more fundamental than this is that capitalism logic by definition is game theoretic it's competitive it's based on methodological individualism in the accurate sense of this term. And then you get basically what I have called in the Hobbesian jungle, as if it's not each other. In the Hobbesian jungle, even
the kin, it's alive its own kin. So even if you are friends, you think that you live in the same niche theoretical space, it's only given a matter of short time that you actually start to become the enemy of your own kin. And then infighting begins and then round and round the same problem, the same paradigms and pathological patterns. So yes, in fact to do this, the question of capitalism absolutely needs to be answered. You can almost imagine that the popularity of something like object oriented ontology
or something is like a kind of ideological mystification or like, you know, sort of like sexy, sort of poetic nihilist philosophies will sort of take hold and order, like, yes, in some function of like intensification of like capitalist self-amplification. Yeah, I mean, in the sense that you see capitalism essentially what you might call to be competition without labor. Yeah, well, competition requires work and a huge amount of work, but it is not essentially a collective labor. In the sense that within the framework of competition, that's why I called, used the
metaphor of Hobbesian jungle, is that you always go for the path, which is methodological individualism and preferences. So if our preferences correspond in one way or another, then we are friends. But then, as I said, even in this friends setup... Hey Reza, I think your signal's really spotty. Could you lower the bandwidth a bit? How can I do that? Just right above you on the top bar, there's like the ascending bars, triangle, right triangle
shape. And then just... Right triangle? I do not see a right triangle. It's like a... It's like ascending bars right next to the mic and camera mute. oh yes yes yes yes and if you just set that low that might or even very low I can limit bandwidth okay that'll probably be better we were losing a little bit of the dialogue I'm sorry I'm really sorry okay if you want me to go on with Kent and the stuff that we need to talk about, let me know to a start. Otherwise,
just bring on the questions and we can say that at least we address all the questions that we have been tackling throughout the course. Chagis has been quite silent today. I guess I have a question. Sure. So, taking a Kantian approach to the subject and agency, but also taking a sort of transcendental
skepticism approach. I'm curious about what you think about the status of capital in terms of whether it is an agent or not. Would you deny that capital is a subject or would you just deny that we know for sure that it's a subject? Sure. I think within the realm of the Kant's specific formula for transcendental philosophy, I think capital is not absolutely an agent and capital is not a subject. because Kant has a quite specific formula of what it means to be a subject.
To be a subject means you are responsible and the author of your own judgments. In the sense that when you assert a judgment, you will be held responsible for what you have asserted and the implications of that need to be taken into account. This already we investigated a little bit in terms of the relation between the threefold synthesis and a perceptive unity. Now capital, as it stands today, as capitalist system, does not have this kind of agency,
Precisely because when we are in the domain of judgments, these judgments are not qualitative problem solvings of this kind that by which capitalism, technological system is being driven. They are qualitative judgments. And qualitative judgments are I think are fundamentally different from this kind of quantitative problem solving. Now, so this is, I said, current capitalist system. But then the question arises, as you said, that whether a future capitalist system can be something like an agency. But then my counter question would be that how can we even call this system capitalist
if it is an agent in a Kantian sense, precisely because agency requires collectivity in a Hegelian sense of a spirit, mind. And by that I do not mean that everything is connected as if in capitalist society, but no, a connection that enables us to be the judges, to be, to judge, to make qualitative assertions and those qualitative assertions are not just in the domain of theory but also in the domain of practice. And if that is the case, then yes, capitalism can be agent. But then, as I said earlier, then is it really even coherent to call such a system a capitalist
system? precisely the parameters of capitalist system are quite severe. You know, there are certain kind of parameters like methodological individualism, instrumental game, sorry, decision, decision, decisional form of rationality, decision choice theory, so on and so forth, which are essentially emblematized in the kind of a free market. And free market is not... It's a free market... What is exactly free market or neoliberalist society?
Neoliberalist society is essentially, as I said, driven by two principles, methodological individualism and choice theory, in the sense that preferences are in fact what you might call to be a reason. And when we reason, we always essentially beginning with the importance of preferences. Obviously, this is not reason, as brought about in reason philosophy in the last section of it. But also, you get this historical account that essentially free market liberalism is is what you might call to be overextension of these two
principles to the domain of collective choices, collective preferences. So essentially free market, what you might call to be, if methodological individualism is at the micro level, so as choice theory, market, neoliberal late capitalism is on the macro level. It's the extension of these principles to a collective level. So this is really, I think, for me to be the core of capitalism, at least in its current instantiation. And anything that actually endangers these principles, then it also endangers capitalism.
And if the notion of reason is that kind of qualitative collectivity that we were talking about, then I don't see how it can be commensurated with the idea of capitalism, whether in its current instantiation or another. I mean, I feel like the sort of methodological individualism and the free market, game theoretic choice theories and whatnot, it does to a certain extent establish, and not in any sort of, you know, theological landing and sense, but it does sort of establish something of, you know, like a capitalist agency. I mean, just like, even with people who, you know, who
have certain, you know, parochial cognitions, they still are, you know, a perceiving subject, you know, people who are implementing methodological principles, methodological individualism, and, you know, acting to, you know, optimize for, you know, privatized extraction and whatnot. I feel like there is, you know, something of an agency there. I mean, that doesn't mean that, you know, that agency shouldn't be, you know, severely caught into question, but, you know, I feel like... Yes, no, it is. I think I bracketed my claim. I said that Kentian agency, Kentian subjectivity. yes there would be an agency what what you might call to be a kind of a
sentience kind of agency in a very accurate sense but then this is not the kind of agency that we have been talking about and then you would say that okay if capital capitalism is an agent then so as the fucking missing precisely because it has the same kind of rudimentary so as Milky Galaxy if capitalism is that kind of you know thin or diluted agency right on the thick Kantian agency then so as the Milky Galaxy then we are why are we talking
about capitalism as a Skynet and an agent, we can just talk about go to the pond next to the, in the park and say that, oh, this pond is such a great agency because it has interactions of sentient problem solving systems. Yeah. I mean, I think that sort of does like point somewhat tentatively to like the direction head to solve that sort of problem. You know, because then the space of reasons become very important for this type of agency. And we all know very well
how capital tends towards severe high time preference. And it doesn't put any of these you know, collective projects of, you know, full-blown scientific rationality to be able to realize collective fruits. So, I mean, it seems like then, like, you know, if there's, you know, a place to go, you know, what needs to happen is, you know, there needs to be some way to establish some niche that has some, you know, economic sustenance
and has an interest in being able to drive that, you know, but also, you know, being able to allocate its resources, you know, not, you know, according to any, you know, capitalist, private individual interests, you know, or any, you know, even the sort of interests that you see, you know, popular among the left these days. but interests that push the... that are able to realize these collective fruits and whatnot. But I wouldn't say that this essentially... say that... I would say that this argument is not... cannot essentially be used as an argument
to the idea that capitalism is not simply an agent, precisely because it's just too thin. Say that thing, that this argument should be used against this idea that the rational agency, the rational collective agency, is necessary for social agency, but not sufficient for it, which means that you need to have something more than the Kantian rational agent to achieve such a goal. And that's when the nitty gritty concrete stuff comes to picture, like economic planning, you know, education, so on and so forth.
It's just that the very principle, the very undergirding principle is what distinguishes society as agency or collective mind as agency from capitalist as agency. Precisely because in the realm of the capitalist agency in the diluted sense of agency, all you can ever do is what you might call to be system optimization of low grade, of low granularity or coarse granularity, either extreme. and it is not as if the system can itself be changed. The Kantian agency is exactly,
is a recipe for a sapient agent or a sapient subject to change the very quality that it inhabits. You see, that's a real idea. So that's, you know, I think that Marx and Engels in German ideology were up to something when they claim that communism is a real movement that abolishes, you know, that abolishes totalities and overcomes the status quo. Precisely because Because what they mean is that they believe and they say in the next sentence that communism in this sense is not an ideal state, it's just what you might call to be a procedure.
And what is the aim of this procedure? It's a qualitative difference of moving from a system. So whatever system you have, you come with an alternative to your system, a better system, a more comprehensive system for humans, for the agents that inhabit it. But by very definition, the kind of principles that undergears capitalism, I do not think that capitalism can make such a move. It becomes an optimal capitalist system, but not something else. Yeah, I mean, the space of reasons that would need to be situated in relationship, you know, to capital in order to negate it, it has to be extrinsic, you know.
With the criteria of investment and support that we find in capital, you're just going to have to introduce different imperatives and different priorities that go against the individual privatized interests of current financial speculation. I mean, it could very well not be, you know, public infrastructure. You know, it could be, like, private infrastructure that ends up being able to do that, you know. But the way that it utilizes it is recently. Publicly and private, it's about the configuration of the system. Right. You can, in fact, have private systems that are attuned to public causes.
it's not as if I believe like a traditional Marxist oh well the actual ultimate battle we lost you again Reza can you hear me? hello? we can hear you now Okay. Now, I was saying that yes, I do not believe in such a distinction. Another issue that comes to the foreground is that okay, Kant also has this kind of collective notion
of agency and so on. I know we're losing you again Reza. One second, one second. Can you hear me? Yeah, we can hear you. Yes. Okay. So I was saying that another question that pops up right away after the discussion is that you know, Kant and Hegel both had an idea of rational agents that can be commensurated with collective ends. But then, what exactly happened in the works of these two thinkers,
in Kant's work and also in philosophy of rights in Hegel, that led these two people to be actually quite, have a very parochial form of rationalist universalism. Ultimately, rational universalism for them is nothing but what you might call to be imperialism, imposition of Prussian Empire and its standards on every other fucking nation on the planet. Then what exactly went wrong, even if they had the basic components?
Any answer? Well, it's like the illusion between reason and rationalization. Like a sort of practical slip from the use of reason to rationalizing a power structure. Yes, yes, but can we even imagine, okay, so this is the, so I would call this more of a result rather than the primary cause. So if we say that that's exactly what they did and that's what exactly they did, is that what really pushed, even though with all their profundity, to make such an elision?
I suppose it's also possible to argue that technology just wasn't powerful enough or that or that that their reason wasn't sort of detailed enough. Yes. Automation or something that actually requires something more complex than like an imperial structure that, you know. I think that actually is pretty close, you know, because I mean, you know, Ka and Hegel, they were both, you know, within the Prussian state and, you know, some, you know, Prussian nationalist biases, you know, and you can think of some sort of like,
you know, imperial or feudal structure of the disciplines in the sciences, organized somewhat systematically as Kant would like and whatnot as being something that maybe that they would rely on. And given more resources, maybe they could then arrive at conclusions that that would maybe insist upon some, that insist that we try to strive for some different mode of organization and causing us to revise the structures
that we're given in society. Yeah, no, I think all of these, I think can be taken as factors. I mean, generally, I think they can be condensed to, well, I'm sure that there will be more factors. But yes, one of them is one hunter said. It's a technological, relevant of technology. in the sense that you see the version of reason that both Kant and Hegel put forward is what you might call to be inflationary rationalism. I believe in this.
And by the inflationary rationalism is that reason has still some metaphysical essence that makes it imprevious to the critique. But once with the advent of technology, we see, and this advent of technology is not as if it happened overnight, right, you know, after them. has been ongoing since the beginning of time of human civilization is that the reason is a form of doing but not all the doings are rational or can be called reason. It's a kind of a specific kind of doing, know-hows. And with the technology this almost it was like almost a Copernican humiliation for this
traditional rationalist that they show that humans are unique precisely because they are reason mongers but they are also not unique precisely because reason in so far as it is a specific kind of doing can be done by other kind of things by technological systems by machines so the But inflationary rationalism I think was a big thing and that was somehow problematized quite severely, you know, beginning of the 19th century. And another thing is that precisely because they have an inflationary rationalism, both
of them, they take reason to be a sufficient factor. No, reason is a necessary factor for change, but not ever a sufficient one. In fact, to conflate between the two, you are doomed to make, you know, quite actually shady moves in the realm of society and social reality. Another one that Christian brought up is yes, I think, again, precisely because their notion of rationality is inflated, is bloated, is quite fatty, it is susceptible to these extra
residues of Prussian nationalism, European imperialism, so on and so forth. And this is, if there is a lesson to be learned, it's your reason to be lean, not fatty, in the broadest possible sense. reason to endorse rational skepticism whose political implications are yet to be fathomed. Yeah, and that's why I think this issue of the political and the social, it's going to
necessarily be a really long problem. Oh, it's still you. I mean, go to bed, don't think about these issues, think about flowers and gardens, because these are not going to be solved in our lifetime. All we can do is to contribute piece by piece to them and only try to get some immediate resolutions to this sheer scope of obscenity of the world in which we live. That's all we can do at this point. A revolution, and by that I do not mean a crash course revolution in the way that traditional
Marxist thinks, a revolution in the sense of a graduation of the system so as it results in the qualitative difference at some point, is not going to happen in our lifetime. our hopes in it because we'll grunt on them once we are disgruntled the path of reactionary ism is inevitable yeah I think I think at this point in time you know it the it's the answers are going to be you know, absolutely, you know, tentative and, and, you know, riddled with, you know, the
particularities of, you know, navigating, you know, academic infrastructure and being able to prioritize certain activities and fund certain activities for various, you know, reasons and as well as within the technological space, being able to try to introduce into the reasoning about what things to support predicated upon that sort of collective rationality as opposed to just absolutely short term high time preference capital interests. Yeah, I mean, if there is an impetus to work as a first step is how to reconcile the abstract
space of reason with its concrete implications. This is already, I think, has been put forward by Kant in what it means to orient oneself in thinking, insofar as Kant likens reason to a felt, you know, a felt. What is a felt? in homogeneous threads integrated into one fabric. Do you think there's any use for the notion of the event as articulated by, for example, Badu or Zizek in the sort of motivatory project?
I'm afraid to answer this question. And there is only one reason for it. Because I have read, you know, unacceptable of their theories of the event. I haven't read it. And precisely because of this, I have grown up to be completely suspicious of the notion of event in the way that I have understood it. At least in the sense of that kind of eruptive notion of event, I don't think that this is actually a useful concept.
And I think it's quite actually, you know, you know, comprehensively about the concept of events, you know, in Badiou's work, I'm willing to listen. I mean, I'm not sure, at least in the way that I understand it, I think that kind of, it is something almost I would say is that like some sort of, It's like a Kant's thing in itself. It's supposed to save reason, but actually it ends up or shed on the face of reason. And the same thing about with events. Or notion of quite similar actually in the mias.
I don't know Badiou too well. Although, I mean, I do appreciate him. I do read some of his stuff. It doesn't seem necessarily to be eruptive necessarily. I mean, I think it could be a little bit small. It's tied up to this problem of subtraction, which seems to be somewhat similar to how you address things along the lines of explicitating the proper scope of theories
in a meta-theoretic way, which also has a lot of relevance for, say, the political context of being able to theorize and create different types of political forms. So it could be useful. It's really hard to say without knowing. That's why I have reservations about this stuff. I mean, my knowledge about them, I mean, I have read, to be honest, it is not enough. You know, when, I mean, and I really do hate when people try to take down another person without actual attention to the details of what another person has written about.
But only, only on this condition that I have read this much and this amount, I would say that to me the concept of event is more like what you might call to be a circumvention. A circumvention. It's exactly like a thing in itself. posits the thing itself in order to circumvent actually hard to think about and with idea of circumventing posits like events or like contingency like things
in themselves you almost inevitably distinct to dissolve the problem right and then solving um i think you're frozen again reza Reza can you hear us? Can you hear me? Yeah. Yeah. Okay, you're good now. So I was saying, you know, this positive thing against contingency things in themselves, once you try to use them, no matter how cheerful you are,
there is a huge amount of risk that makes you susceptible to dissolve the problem you initially set to solve rather than solving it. And the point is always solving the problem rather than dissolving it. Yeah, I mean, as I understand it, like for Badoo, like from that approach, like the subject in that approach is something that is derived from the event, right? It's like contingency takes place in the subject, responds to it with a kind of mission or something. But if one were to use a kind of more Brandomian, Kantian approach to freedom and agency, I wonder if there's still a place for the idea
that sort of a miraculous contingency could appear that allow for something to take place in our lifetimes and not in our lifetime. Yes. You see, I think random is better than Kant in this respect, precisely because I think Kant's idea of transcendental perception is nominal. This is quite clear. He has talked about it. So many years has talked about it. transcendental a perception on its own grounds is nominal. It is not that it is synonymous with the derivation of subjects from the event, but nevertheless they all belong to the family of concepts.
You know, I find this... We're losing you again, Reza. I don't know if you can hear me. I might have to go just... I'm really sorry. Yes, okay, okay, let's... Audio too if you want to see if that does anything. Yeah, just in a brief response to Hunter, I was saying that I think Brandon is careful with this issue, because Kant's transcendental perception is quite nominal, and this is not
a piece of news. Kant talks about it, Finlay talks about it, Sellars talks about it. And these kind of these nominal entities, it actually, it's not that it is synonymous to Bad-Hugh's derivation of subjects from event but nevertheless they all of these things belong to the same family of concept which are I can't all this stuff about contingency and stuff.
I think at its core... we can't hear you at all now yeah I think the signal's quite bad right now I'm so upset because I think this is such an interesting topic and I really want to hear what you're saying yeah I'm just now we're not understanding you Reza Can you hear me? Yeah, the signal is just really shotty. It's like clear for a second and then you go out. Okay. Let's, let's, okay, let's conclude.
I don't know. I'm going to type in the sidebar in case you can't hear me, but. I can hear you. I absolutely can. Okay. All right. I was saying that let's conclude our final session. Okay. It ends with a bang. Yeah, I will post my response on Google Classroom. Okay, that'd be great. And thanks to everyone for contributing. I guess we'll see you next time. Thank you. And one thing that, one thing that is, I mean, to take these issues,
talk about them a little bit more technically, there is that course, hopefully I will start it in the spring, on philosophy of science. And we will definitely go into this and look at some, you know, know how these problems are being varied or being solved over time sounds good and I'll yeah I'll be in touch about that I guess too soon so thank you everyone for being such great friends all right thanks Reza take care everyone take care take care