Plato, a Reality Game in Four Levels (Session 6)

Hello and welcome to the sixth session of Play-Doh a Reality Game in Four Levels. I'm going to pass the mic off to Reza Negra's Sonino. Thank you everyone. Okay. Today we are going to, I will try to start with a little bit of, you know, the difference between being and non-being in relation to the sophist give like a kind of recap of what we discussed and a little bit polish it further and then we move to third man argument but as usual before that let's hear if you have any questions comments that is remotely connected to Plato or

what we have been talking about. Nothing? Anyone? Theo, you don't have anything? I could pull some stuff up, but I actually sort of want to get into the third man argument, so I think I'm going to wait until then. Okay. Anyone? Maria? Chagis? Adam? Christian?

Nope. I really like just listening, too. I mean, I don't really have any major questions. Yeah, sure. Sure. Yeah, nothing is popping up in the noggin right now. Okay. Okay. A little bit early for me. Okay, so as I mentioned, even though the problem of non-being or the negative, has been around in pre-Socratic philosophy, it is, we can arguably discuss that it's Plato

who first grasps the significance of the problem of non-being, or that which is not, the problem of negativity, as a problem of thought as such. And the reason for it is because to think is to be bound, whether one likes it or not, whether one approves this or not, to the norm of truth. And the form of truth is constitutively related to that which is not. The nature of this not tore me on.

I think someone's mic is probably on, so I can hear my own echo. So to ask this question, Plato, what is exactly the nature of this not, that which is not? Plato recognizes in the surface that it is a question about the being of the negative. exactly what kind of being the negative has. So what is exactly non-being? What is that which is not in this sense? To clarify the nature of this negation involves looking into

the question of being of non-being to ask how that which is not is implicated always in the thought of that which is is the question is to raise the problem or raise the question of thoughts' relation to reality, or it seeks to circumscribe. It is, in a sense, to inquire about the position of thinking in relation to being, to being that it thinks, or more accurately, to ask how the being of thought is implicated in the thoughts of being.

And that's, you know, we talk that this is exactly, there are a number of main trajectories in Plato's work unfold really at this juncture. You know, the doctrine of forms, the question of dialectics, the question of principles that undergirds how forms can gain traction upon more rudimentary forms of existence. Or in fact, we can talk about existence by virtue of this form, the question of to paras and to apiron, to limit and unlimited, so on and so forth.

So the problem of not or the negative is the problem of thinking's ability to discriminate between that which is and that which isn't. So in Plato the acknowledgement between truth and negation is the moment in which which you can say philosophy as the organ of thought emerges.

And in the sophists Plato tries to argue that the disavowal or dismissing of this negativity leads inevitably to sophism, to debility of thought, of thinking. Sophism in the sense that I mentioned what is exactly a sophist according to Plato. whereby thinking has to capitulate to the expediency of what is, what we call the subordination

of thinking to being. So now the question is at this point, what does exactly force us to face or confront the reality of non-being? We saw in the divided line that the first moment that this question arises is the issue of semblance, the fleeting, and then the transiences, the idea of the images, iconis, appearances, phantasma,

and falsehood, pseudos. So from this perspective, if the first instance, basically that forces us to confront the question of non-being, is it the issue of semblance, image, pseudos, falsehoods, then the very fact that Plato tries to define a sophist in terms of his appeal essentially to these semblances, to these forms of pseudo-imitations or copies,

copies of images, then we can see that there is essentially here a connection between the sophists and the republic. The idea of the images that we talked about in the allegory of the cave and the divided line and how these appeal or recapitulation to these falsehoods or semblances, iconis, result in either sophistry or philosophy in a Platonic sense. So what is exactly a sophist in this regard?

I mentioned that at least we talked about the old definition of sophist and platonic understanding of the sophist. From, at least in the Platonic perspective, you can say that sophist is someone who imitates what he is not, i.e. the philosopher, so he creates semblance. He has already capitulated to the domain of pseudos, falsos, and semblances.

And the first copy that he tries to create is the Philosopher. And in that, you know, and through that it starts to create semblances, things, what we said about the sophists, the sophists is the one who thinks what is said is what is. So this is the creation of semblance. So the sophists essentially has two gestures. essentially affirming what could trying to imitate what he is not a philosopher

in a technical sense and then by virtue of that creating a series of semblances namely pseudo falsehoods about which of course from the perspective of the sophists are not falsehoods creating a semblance of reality simply by you know methods of discursive thinking so from this perspective that the question in turns into how can we be confident of what the sophist is, of what the sophist is not

unless we already have some sort of grasp of what he is. See that becomes the theme of the sophist. How can really detect the sophist then? In so far as the distinction between philosopher and sophist is already, in this new definition, becomes precarious. And from Plato's perspective, it is precisely the sophist who knows exactly how to ward off his own philosophical identification as an imitator of wisdom by denying the possibility

of distinguishing between true and false. So the sophist essentially has this hyper camouflage that what he does is that he imitates something. He imitates that which he is not, the philosopher. But then how can he really protect what he is actually? How can he conceal what he is? The solution for this is to disarm philosophers' criteria of distinguishing between the true

and false. So ultimately, all forms of sophistry from this Platonic perspective, in one way or another, targets the very measures by which this distinction can in fact be established at its most basic level. So from this perspective, and we said that, what allows us to distinguish between true and false is the function of negation. Negation is that which tells apart or sets apart the true from false, semblances from

ideas, from the intelligence. So from this perspective, the first thing that sophists in fact is doing, the ur gesture of a sophist, is rejection of negation, not negation of negation, denying that negation exists, denying the function of negation. while denying that he is denying anything. So as I mentioned, this is essentially a way to thwart all sorts of forms of arguments

or essentially methods of inquiry into his own nature. So you can see that from this viewpoint, the sophist essentially is someone who obstructs all any pathways toward intelligibility. One, he's trying to deny negation but also denying that he's denying anything. Because to deny anything, to deny something, means that you intend what it is not.

Basically if you deny, if you affirm that you deny something, means you affirm the truth of negativity. So Sothis is careful not to fall into his own trap by diffusing this, by obstructing this, by saying that I deny that I deny anything. He doesn't deny anything. So you see that this is a very quite troubling archetype of Sothis that we have already seen it in continental philosophy. like all these anti-representationalists, anti-affirmationists, so on and so forth. There is this kind of, in different variations, this form of argument, this kind of position

is actually quite prevalent. And that's Plato associated essentially with sophistry, with falsehood and with irrationalism. so any question before I move forward so when you're talking about sophists denying even denying so are you okay so I'm just curious are you talking about on the level of the argument or or like the kind of the image presented or on the level of the convictions or idea of what about the craft of rhetoric like kairos and timing and the kind of basics of how to convince

those cannot be denied because it's a kind of psychologist of Yes, but you see essentially the idea, well, you see two things, is that, so let's accept this idea that the sophist essentially is a, in the most powerful sense, it's not just you know, the imitator of falsehood, but someone we might actually call a logician with metaphysical, with implicit and unwarranted metaphysical assumptions.

So rhetorics, yes, has rules, particularly in Aristotle. What you might call to be rhetoric is essentially not rhetoric in what we understand, but in Aristotelian sense, rhetoric in the sense that it is essentially the internal logic of discursive discourse. The logic of discursive discourse is norm-bound, so there are norms of discursive sayings. The sophist doesn't want to talk about these norms. doesn't care whether they can be denied or not what he's targeting is really

the the idea of two things that's there is no distinction between the norms of saying and the norms through which we can render being intelligible So he wants to deny this. The strategy of this denial, of this rejection, needs to be crafted quite subtly. Because if he explicitly denies that there is no distinction,

he falls into Parmenidian trap. Then he has to affirm that he is in fact buying into negativity, that he in fact believes into negation. So then he has to add another caveat to his argument, that I do deny, I deny denying anything. hence making sure that he does not affirm the truth of negativity in any part. Now this is very different from the kind of discussion that we have, but for Platonists and the kind of philosophers that they are for pre-Socratic post-Plato philosophers,

Essentially, this can be done in their idea of rhetoric, because they, for them, the norms of saying are somehow established. And they are immutable. Whereas, for example, a normativist like today, like Brandom, these norms are renegotiable. In fact, this is the whole idea that ultimately Plato wants to bring this point to the sophist, that even when you think that the norms of sayings are essentially immutable, and hence

Hence the relation with being, he wants to show that norms of saying are susceptible to the power of negation, even at the level of rhetoric, deployment of logical vocabularies, naming, for example, or even discursive deductive practices. For a sophist, the idea of rhetoric is not by any way normal. You see, Brandon has a fantastic term which I haven't seen him associating with sophists, but nevertheless I think that it's a good description of a sophist.

is someone who suffers from semantic unconsciousness. Semantic unconsciousness. You see, he does not have semantic consciousness. He uses vocabulary, he uses rhetoric, but he doesn't know what exactly rhetoric is, what it means to use a word, what does it mean to deploy a vocabulary to describe or explain something. He simply reduces everything in rhetoric to know-hows, to techniques, but hence circumventing the problem of rhetoric or discourse, which is knowing that or knowing what, I need to

know what, for example, this stuff that I call chair is in some way, and what does it mean to apply, what does it mean, knowing what does it mean to apply a label or a concept to this stuff. So it's not just about knowing how of discursive practices, namely the technique of rhetoric. Rhetoric essentially, in that Aristotelian sense, which we can simply call it discursive practices. Discursive practices are not just know-hows, but also know-whats and know-thats.

of concepts requires certain knowledge of not only practices, but the knowledge of by virtue of what criteria, by virtue of what standards of discourse, but also logic and epistemology, am I entitled to say something, for example, say x or say p hence q. So, would an example of sophistry be denying the principle of non-contradiction in logic? Yes, but you see the denial of principle of non-contradiction doesn't make you a sophist.

The other way might work, if you want to squeeze it, but the denying of the principle of non-contradiction doesn't make you a sophist. Is it because it is conscious denial, whereas the sophist is making an unguiled a bit of... Yes, it involves semantic consciousness. You can talk about new logics. Some of these constraints are, if not being suspended, nevertheless they are being weakened. That's part of it. The whole idea that logic is the organ of semantic consciousness. But a sophist is someone who uses the products of logic and language, namely thinking, without

having the semantic consciousness of affirming this, affirming that these, you know, these estrata of thinking, logic and language, involved with the function of negation. So this is why, like, Socratic dialogues start often with, like, the naming or like a conventional name or a term or something and then the immediate examination yes yes mostly yes although he's also a sophist he's either is it is a sophist

as I mentioned of a different kind is a sophist that you might call to be the germ of philosophy is is someone who This is the thing that Socrates, you see, as I mentioned, that nowhere in Plato's dialogue there is in fact one character being sold as a philosopher. Oh, this is the philosopher and not the other one. Philosophy, it's implied through dialectics, through the dialogue, through interaction, that one is more, a better candidate of becoming a philosopher or being distinguished as a

philosopher, and that's Socrates, precisely because he does not deny the power of negation. This is in fact, he uses always the power of negation. And also what I mentioned last time, his premise always starts with the suspension of either I know nothing or I know everything. He always, his position starts from the idea that knowledge shouldn't be understood as knowledge of everything or ignorance of everything.

Knowledge is a movement in which ignorance is being preserved and being mitigated at the same time. And this is the idea of knowledge. And we will talk about this when we reach to Menno's paradox. This is one of the things that Plato wants, the point that Plato wants to make with regard to Menno's paradox. And Menno is someone who has reduced the idea of knowledge and the possibility of knowledge to either or arguments. Essentially, either we have absolute knowledge or we don't have absolute knowledge. And through this either or, a specific kind of either or argument, he fabricates paradox.

He shows that if this is the case, that either we have knowledge or we don't have knowledge, then knowledge is impossible because it leads to a paradox which we will discuss. But Socrates' strategy is to show that there is no such an either or discourse in the domain of knowledge. The idea of knowledge is irreducible to absolutized position. That you have either you don't absolutely know anything or you know everything. Knowledge is essentially a continuous domain where no discrete claim can be made. Everything is connected.

So this is two things that distinguish Socrates as a candidate, a truth candidate for a philosopher. One as I mentioned, his use of, or at least his willingness to embrace the power of negation and also his position with regard to knowledge and the possibility of thinking. Because Menno's paradox ultimately, I shouldn't go into Menno's paradox, we haven't. Menno's paradox, people think that it is in fact about the possibility of knowledge. But Menno's paradox is about the possibility of thinking, more fundamental, to show that

thinking is not possible. Because ultimately this hinges on the knowledge of what thinking is. And according to Menel's paradox, the possibility of this kind of knowledge leads to a paradox, leads to an absurd claim. Either we know what we are looking for, in which we have absolute knowledge of it, hence the whole enterprise of philosophy is a sham, or we don't know, hence how can we identify something that we hope to answer once we actually find it.

For example, what knowledge is, what thinking is? If our inquiries about this question, then how can we really say this is thought once we reach it? So this is the nature of the paradox, that either-or argument launched from absolute position of absolute knowledge or absolute ignorance leads to a paradoxical situation, either philosophical inquiry is sham, hence the impossibility of knowledge as an enterprise, Or the idea that we can never know what we sought to answer, even when we reach it.

And you're saying that suspending this either or is... Yes, we will get back to this. And this is essentially the function of dialectics, that Hegel also, there is here, Hegel ultimately, I think from this perspective, his idea of dialectics is quite beholden to Plato's thoughts, because this is the idea of sublation, this is suspension. The negation of either or creates the opportunity of sublating this kind of argument into a more overarching argument in which the possibility of knowledge and thinking can be shown to

be a viable enterprise, to be viable. Okay. So, as I mentioned that... Sorry, can I interrupt just one more time? Sure, sure, absolutely. I'm trying to wrap my head around it a little bit. But on the one hand, you're saying that the problem of identifying the sophist is that the sophist is the person who denies the credibility of the negative. So it denies thinking's ability to discriminate.

So that would mean that, or are you saying that the philosopher then is the person who leaves open the possibility for thinking's ability to discriminate and affirm the negative? but if you're leaving open that possibility, how then would you, how then do you pin down what that, is it just that the sophist is the person who comes to the conclusion too fast or something? No, I don't understand the argument. Okay, you see the sophist does two things, essentially. I mean, his gesture is twofold. One, denying negation. while at the same time denying that he's denying anything, because denying means that he's...

Denying is to intend what is not, meaning thinking negation. So he wants to rule this out. The philosopher, on the other hand, does one thing, that thought begins with the non-being, begins with negativity. Negativity is the basic unit of thinking, and essentially this negativity is required for differentiating anything from anything.

We can't even talk about being, we can't even talk about multiplicity, the one, so on and so forth, without having a negative kernel, which is the non-being of thought, the power of negation. Now, where is this power of negation coming from? At least in Theaetetus, Plato makes clear that it comes from language, the logical infrastructure of language, the function of language. But, and that's the interesting part in Theaita Toits.

Very different from the sophists, Plato's understanding of language, namely what you might call to be the marriage between language and locus. He wants to, unlike the sophists, he does not want to simply pigeonhole the idea of language to rhetoric, particularly the technical side of it. But he wants to instead emphasize the connection between logos, namely epistemological methods, the third segment divided line and language and how these two fit together.

So negativity ultimately gains its power to distinguish things from one another. It seems like... Hunter, are you trying to speak? You're breaking up quite a bit. I can hear you guys pretty well, but am I still breaking up? No. Okay. It seems like he's also saying that we can have negativity by virtue of distinguishing things from one another.

that it's like the form of difference is what makes negation possible like that one term does not participate in the same term in the same form as another term that because they they're connected by the form of difference that's what negation is who the sophist I thought that that was the argument for why negation is real. Negation is not, you see, negation, okay, when we are talking about, we need to be very careful about this, that the reality of negation is not the reality of being in the Parmenidian sense

or in the contemporary sense that we are talking about. The reality of negation is the reality of thoughts which identifies being namely the reality of non-being at the level of the formal rather than the substantive being so this is important that the reality of negation is formal not substantive and like and like that is even an activity of thought yes yes the activity of of thinking yes absolutely um so okay yeah go ahead no no no go on go on

and so so it's not so it's not like non-being as the opposite of being it's non-being as sort of a relationship a way that terms relate to each other they sort of they either do relate to each other or not or they they are similar or they're different yes yes the non-being comes from when they differ. Yes, yes. As I mentioned, you see, this is how Plato diffused Barmenidian paradox, I mean the Heliotic paradox, by essentially arguing that the distinction between thinking and being, that there is such a distinction, and this distinction does not lead to paradox unless

You start your position, I mean, you end your argument, second stage of the Parmenidian argument, with illegally flattening or reducing the distinction to a substantive distinction, and hence from the Eleatic perspective that leads to a paradox, the paradox of being and non-being. But Plato wants to reconstruct the Parmenidian argument. So Parmenidian argument started with this idea that there is such a thing that Parmenidian is a rationalist in the sense that he endorses the power of reason and thinking, but ultimately wants to say the thinking and being of one.

So first, thought is capable of some sort of self-recognition, and by virtue of that recognition of being, but then this distinction is claimed to be precarious. And we mentioned that the argument was simply, first, is it distinction, formal distinction between thinking and being through which thinking can recognize itself and in that recognize the domain of being, but then this distinction reduced from the level of formal to the level of substantive. Plato wants to turn it around, to show that that move was illegal, by bringing again the

distinction between thinking and being to the level of formal. So from this perspective, the reality of negation, the reality of non-being that Plato tries to argue is a form of reality, belongs to realm of forms, not to existences in that rudimentary sense or in the being in the Parmenidian sense. It is not substantive. It is the very activity of thinking itself, the reality of non-being as a form of reality. And according to Plato's position, that's the only reality there is. So is all thinking negation?

Well, we can say that all thoughts, yes, essentially are negation. at least you see let's just go a little bit because it would be really hard to try to pin down this kind of argument in mere platonic lexicon for example in can't you see in cans in critique of pure reason so there are two things one that's let's talk about the most the most basic forms of thought and these are

what you might call from a Szilardian or Brandoomian or Wittgensteinian sense they are experiencing loud namely private experiences in a Kantian sense of what experience is experiences that are being modeled on a model of a public language. At this level of experience, I'm not even talking about language part of it, even at the level of experience, thoughts, these experiences of proto-thoughts, involve the discernment of items and sensory impressions from one another.

We saw it exactly in Plato 2. That's the very fact that we have experience of these shadows, that we have experience of a chair, because the power of negation has been organizing these sensory fluxes, Kant's, this is the idea of category, pure concepts of understanding that allow us to differentiate and organize our intuitions of objects. And then, but you might say this, that negation has difference, negation has difference, has

weak, medium and strong versions. And this introduction of the function of negation into the organization of experience is the weak version of negation. And this is exactly Hegel's critique of Kant's, that first we need to understand the function of negation in itself, and that's basically the reason. That's where you can find that a strong version of negation, what exactly negation is. Should we have a cigarette break and come back?

Sure. Sounds good. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Yeah, because you see, affirming the act of denying, you see, you need to, as I mentioned, what is important in this gesture is that it's, because denying something means that you, by denying, by affirming that you deny something means that you affirm the power of negativity, that there is in fact a difference between truth and falsity.

Which thought, rational thinking can in fact distinguish? But insofar as a sophist really does not believe in this, either he doesn't believe in it or he wants, that's what exactly is, that's what makes him a sophist, the difference between semblances and the intelligibles. He has to deny that he denies anything because otherwise he will be forced to accept that difference that is made by the power of negation between truth and falsity

yeah I think I follow I mean the definition of how let us just defining the sophist I'm not sure that I'm not sure I understand the argument for or it It seems that the argument first begins with a premise in the same way that sophistry first begins with a premise. So the beginning of Plato's premise is that thinking differs from being in… Thinking is, you see, that doesn't even begin with this, it's more fundamental,

that there is being because there is thinking. He's an idealist. He wants to even go further. This is very Hegelian again. The very fact that we talk about this being as being one is because there is thinking that is capable of distinguishing what being is as different from thinking. But then, that requires you to say that why is that thought is different from being that allows us to make this kind of difference, so then to be capable of recognizing that which is. Okay, thanks.

Let's continue. I'll try and have some more formulated questions. So, since the sophists insist that what is not can't be intended, it can't be denied. The sophists maintain that negation is impossible, since to think what is not is not to think. Accordingly, the sophists may conclude, not only is every thought of something and hence affirmative, it is itself something that is.

So thinking is doubly affirmative. It affirms what is thought of as well as that one is thinking. Here we encounter a kind of a substantive equivalence that I mentioned. Thought and thing are rendered equivalent by being both pulled down to the realm of the substantive. So underlying this kind of equivalence is the alignment of non-being with absence construed as the contrary of being. Since it is manifestly impossible to think the contrary of being

because every attempt to think nothing turns it into something, then it seems to follow that non-being is a chimera. This is Eliottic's position. Non-being is a chimera because to think non-being means that you are taking that non-being and treat it as something. But of course, non-being is not supposed to be something, hence the paradox. So the challenge facing those who would discriminate between essence and appearance then is to

explain what they mean by appearance as opposed to reality or the intelligible. And how they propose to identify it in contradistinction to essence, given that appearance is precisely what is supposed to be devoid of essential form. And then this leads to a question, what is appearance? What is appearance? Insofar as it inquires about the formal being or idus of appearance, it endows appearance

with the intelligibility. It is supposed to lack. Only once we have obtained the form of appearance will we be in a position to state what the sophist is and does. And this leads to the way that Plato tries to address the question of what a sophist is. as an imitator of wisdom. He manufactures copies of true ideas.

Eliottic Stranger discriminates or differentiates two basic kinds of imitation, likeness-making and appearance-making. Appearances are true or faithful copies. They bear the mark of fidelity to the original, namely resemblance. Appearances, what Plato calls appearances, are false or unfaithful copies. Hence, shadows.

Precisely because they do not have, they lack original, they imitate original. So they are what you might call to be, as I mentioned, they are not even, they are not But probably, I would say that from this perspective, the way that Plato in the Sophists, and the Sophists is a later war than the Republic, this kind of a little bit makes the allegory of the cave problematic. Because allegory of the cave, shadows were sold as appearances. But shadows were in fact had an original, the fire that was behind, sorry, the moving

figures. But in the sophist, appearances in fact are orphaned from any recognizable progenitor. So they are false copies. You don't even have a point of reference in reality. So in order to understand this distinction between true copies and Sulu copies or false copies, we must understand the difference between truth and falsity.

Because, as we saw in the Divided Line, Plato in fact wants to argue that the way that we can escape from the cave is by starting to render the true copies intelligible, their origin. But that requires, so that requires what you might call to be, you know, at the most basic

level that how can we differentiate good imitations or good copies from false copies. Because if, for example, shadows didn't have those figures behind them, then no matter how much we are starting to talk about them, we can never understand their reality. We can never understand that they are caused by those figures. So, the relation, therefore the relation between truth and falsity is connected to the relation between being and non-being. This is, we are, so this is not the non-being of thinking but in the Parmenides, so Plato

wants to start to address Parmenidian concerns. Those copies which are bound to being, which are bound to some reality at any level that you can imagine, whether rudimentary or not, and those copies or simulation or simulacra that do not have any original progenitor, are just simply chimeric, phantasmas.

to address the question of the relation between truth and falsity as connected to the relation between being and non-being, in order to address this, we must be able to think the latter, namely non-being, in order to understand falsity as the claim that that which is not is and the claim that that which is is not. So then the question becomes what does the expression that which is not, Thomion, apply

When we deny or reject that something is the case, for example, there is no chimera, like a phantasmical animal or there is no cloud in the sky, must not the thing deny possesses some kind of being? So again, you see, when we are talking about a chimeric being, which is completely what

you might call to be a false copy. simply a shadow without the object that casts this, without any reality behind it, simply an illusion. If there is an illusion and we are going to distinguish this from reality, we negate it, we say that there is no chimera. But according to this argument, this Parmenidian argument, that there is no non-being, and according to own Parmenidian argument, again, denying

something when I'm saying that there is no chimera, it means that this is predicated on the supposition that there is in five chimera. You see that the whole idea that there is no such thing as non-being. Because the thought of non-being is predicated on the thought of being. You intend that which is. And hence, when I say that there is no chimera, that's predicated on the being of chimera. So you see the kind of paradoxes are being emerged here. That's kind of why in this office he says, you know, it's not only impossible to say

what is not, but we can't even say what is. Yes. So obviously the question is here, if denying for example the chimera, that there is no chimera doesn't possess, doesn't presuppose some kind of being, then what is that we are

denying exactly? Consequently, we must understand the nature of negation. So this was, you see, this was Plato's argument to show that this idea of negation and non-being cannot be ever located or found in the substantive realm. Because according to his own Parmenidian or Eleotic philosophy, when we say that there is no chimera, we are presupposing that there is some kind of being that we are negating.

Otherwise then what are we doing really? What are we denying? Which according to Parmenidian argument that then implies that there is in fact a chimera, which then again negates Parmenidian rationalism, hence because it collapses or the distinction between truth and falsity, illusions and true copies. So this leads Plato to then pose a new question which is tied to the nature of being, understanding

the nature of negation. It seems only something that is, in some sense can be negated. Only that which is can be negated. Otherwise what content can negation or denial have? But that which is not, cannot refer to something, since something is a sign of one thing and and accordingly always refers to a being, something that is. Just as some things refers to several things. But then whoever says or others that which is not, then cannot be referring to anything,

whether one or many. Therefore, it seems we can't analyze what we mean when we say that which is not, since it cannot refer to anything that is either one or multiple. Therefore, the expression seems to be devoid of sense. But then, are we not denying something again and hence invoking the very thing we just said cannot be invoked? If we say that that which is not is meaningless, it seems we have to treat it as something, which is, in order to deny it, the property of intelligibility. It follows then, the assumption that being and non-being are mutually exclusive generates

contradiction. So the Eliottic stranger concludes that we have to try to think of being and non-being as somehow mixed together, thinking and being are one. Early then, we are able to understand how it is possible for someone to think or say something meaningful about what is not the case. So in the Sophist, this is the conversation between Theaiketus and the Eleotica stranger, But they both agree that having false beliefs about the world consists in believing either

that which is, is not, or that which is not, is. So in order to understand how people can have false beliefs about the world, it's necessary to understand how that which is not somehow is, and that which is somehow is it. Not the difficulty, according to Plato, in understanding what we mean when we say that something is. Not is, closely tied to the difficulty in understanding what we mean when we say that something is. The latter is as obscure to us as the former. what Chang is mentioning, the whole idea of, you know, we can't not only say that what

is not, but what is. Pre-Socratic philosophers had come up with solutions, various theories about how to understand being. People like Eliotics had said that everything is one, so change and multiplicity aren't or are not. While others like Heraclitus maintain that everything is multiple and constant flux, so unity and stability are not. And still, others try to reach a compromise by stating that everything is a combination

of two or more basic elements, movement and rest, harmony and strife, so on and so forth. Finally, there are people like Socrates who maintain that corporeal bodies exist but so So do incorporeal forms or ideas. But all these theories lead to various contradictions. If everything is one, then either one, either A, one is the name of being, in which case the difference between the name of being and the being which is named implies a difference

between the world and the thing so that there are two things, not one. Or B, the name is the same thing as what is named so that the name is the same as itself and therefore names itself and nothing else. But then it's the name of nothing. If we can't name the one, we cannot think it. And if we can't think it, it becomes indistinguishable from nothing, or that which is not. So if everything is multiple in constant flux and always changing, then everything is always becoming other than itself.

But if everything is other than itself, how are we to distinguish between different things? By destroying by unity and identity, the thesis that being is becoming renders it impossible to distinguish anything from anything and ends up asserting what it initially denied, that is, that everything is really the same. So here Plato begins to delineate a distinction that has the most significance in philosophy

between entity and property, or essence and attributes. The registration of change presupposes the recognition of an unchanging substrate. Significantly, this conceptual distinction of basic metaphysical balance is suggested by the structure of language itself in the shape of the grammatical distinction between subject and attribute, the structural entanglement of thinking, saying and being, or logic, language and reality, which will prove to be, in later philosophy, the cornerstone of the rationalist

thought. Since identifying being with the status of the one or the becoming of the multiple leads to contradiction, the paradox is, being must combine unity and multiplicity, identity and difference. But if being consists of two basic principles, such as rest and movement, or harmony and strife, then they must ask what these principles themselves are. They must be, since we claim that they are something, but if we do, it seems that being is something they have in common. is a third thing separate from the two elementary principles.

But we still have not explained what is the third thing, being is. If bodies and incorporeal forms both exist, they must have something in common. This something is capacity. Being is the capacity to have an effect on something or to be affected by something. Bodies are always affecting one another and hence changing. But forms are supposed to be the unchangeable principles or structures common to all bodies. If forms are known by the mind, then they are affected, and if that is so, then they they are somehow changed by being known, which is contrary to the definition of form as that

which is unchanging. So both the changing and the unchanging have to be admitted as somehow being. But once again this means that being must be a third thing, distinct from changing and unchanging. So we have to understand how it allows changing and unchanging to be associated, but also how it explains their separation or otherness. This means that being encompasses four basic forms, movement, rest, sameness, otherness. But it's otherness that holds these together and explains their mutual participation.

is but is other than being since being does not move. Rest is but is other than being since rest is immobile and yet movement is. Rest stays the same but is other than movement. Movement is other than rest yet it is as such is the same as itself. Sameness is yet shares in movement and rest, so is other than being. Thus otherness is distributed among these four ultimate forms, sameness, rest, and movement, are and so are all other than being. Being and non-being understood as otherness, entangled.

So this whole idea of otherness, thought is other than, it's that otherness, that fundamental otherness that can disclose the true meaning of being without reducing it to those four properties, movement, rest, harmony and strife. Sorry, difference, sameness, harmony and strife. So it's interesting, you know, in Platonic dialogue, I mean in Sophist particularly,

the impietative than the sophist. Plato again, even though he challenges the Parmenidian account of being, but nevertheless he sets a tone or creates some necessary conditions for us, philosophers, to be capable of thinking about ontology as such, being qua being, without reducing it to its properties and that only that this can only be done according to Plato by admitting the otherness of non-being to being and this is that formal otherness the power of

obligation that can establish, that can reclaim the true name of being. before we move to third man arguments. I wonder if

it seems like the grammar used is always like about presence is this I'm probably gonna be going over like the same thing you kind of talked about but I wonder if like will be or affirming or denying like a future term like setting it in time would change anything or let me formulate please correct me if I'm wrong you are are you suggesting that for example

you know a temporal predicates temporal tense tense tense tense vocabulary, in terms of verbs, are essentially change the nature of being precisely because they subject it to some temporal order, in the sense that it instantly becomes a matter of change in the future. Well, something like that. Yeah, I mean, it may be or may not be. So I guess like being is, I'm sorry if I'm wrong, but like it's dependent on naming semantics.

Yes. So whether something comes to be or not in the future doesn't matter because it already is. Anyways. No, you see, those things are entities or bodies. Okay. They are existences. They're subject to change. What you might call to be the antic realm. Whereas being is being qua being. being qua being is the idea that what you might call being as such so what is exactly this being that we are talking about entities you see events become

entities don't become this is now I don't think that Plato can answer this question Plato actually would say that being is is is timeless you can't really you can't really talk about it in in it in the temporal order because that would lead to the idea that we were talking about the paradoxes paramedian paradoxes you know that you know that's becoming is not being you know strife and movement are not being sameness and difference are not being a such concept because if

they are then they lead to paradoxes the thing is that so I I I think that Plato doesn't, one, he would say that being is, you can't really talk about being in terms of these tensed verbs, because that is about events rather than being. Or, a more, I think, realistic response would be that Plato does not have the resources to tackle this problem.

And this is something that you can't even tackle it until 20th century. that name, tensed verbs, do not have any time index. This is something that Hans Reichenbach came up with. They are token reflexive. There is a difference between the temporal, between our temporal perception, which is purely psychological and how tense verbs function. Tense verbs function by virtue of something

called token reflexivity. So for example, when I'm saying that it is raining now, it It means that at the moment that this instance is being uttered, event raining. When I'm saying that it will rain, it means that after this utterance, without any reference to any temporal order about future, after. You see, there is a difference between before and after, the order of before and after, the temporal order of past, present, future. Before and after doesn't essentially imply

a temporal connectivity. So when I'm saying that it will rain, means that right after this utterance, it will event raining. Or when I said that it rained right before this utterance, this utterance, this token, it reigns, hence token reflexivity. The thing is that this discussion has been, this is actually quite a very, very interesting discussion in philosophy of time. It's the idea that the order of before and after, contra, you know, so many philosophers like Bergson and so many, Whitehead, so on and so forth, they don't have synthetic assumption,

meaning that by themselves they do not mean any relation, any temporal relation that moves in one direction, in the irrational terms, between what has come before and what is coming after. They don't have a synthetic content, they are analytic. That synthetic content, so many philosophers think that, philosophers of time think that is purely psychological. There is no such a synthetic content in first in our descriptions of events, but also more

fundamentally in the structure of experience. But what I wanted to mention is that even tense verbs by themselves do not imply any form of temporal connectivity. You can decompose or analyze all tense verbs in terms of token reflexivity, the order of before and after. And that's exactly what science does. Science doesn't require, doesn't need to have a temporal order of past, present, future. All it does is attaching descriptions to the arrangement of individuals in the space-time

continuum, which are completely, time is basically metricized in terms of space, nothing beyond that. There is no temporal description. So would that be the same as saying Plato didn't have a chrono, he didn't have a chronological? Yeah, well this is one of the things, I'm part of those philosophers when it comes to the question of time, that I do not genuinely think that... Actually, my position is very, very, I would say extremist on this, more than even some

of people who argue against de-oration, is that not only that there is no such a thing as a temporal time, but in fact there is not such a thing, objectively speaking, but there There is not even a temporal account, a subjective temporal account of time, because that's purely psychological. Now, yes, that's exactly what you might call to be chronos is, but it's not even fact chronos. This is what you might call to be that time does not admit, time is a dimension of reality in which nothing exists as a temporal instantiation. So the temporal instantiation is purely an experiential side of things.

It relates to the subject. And you know, this is really one of the main arguments that has only recently become more and more prominent is, which is this argument between two accounts of time, you know, the kind of a more familiar account of time that tries to pin down the question of time in terms of temporal consciousness, and the other one that says that all of these assumptions can be shown to be circular and false. And there is no reason to not anticipate or to expect that there is such a thing as time, the way that we understand time temporally.

Time does not exist temporally. And the discussion, I mean the main discussion that is basically tries to answer these questions is the so-called controversy between time asymmetry and time symmetry. Time asymmetry is a temporal order, whereas time symmetry is the when that there is no such a thing as a privileged temporal order. But, so the variation that there is no temporal order is in fact some sort of radicalization of the time symmetrical view of processes or events.

Probably the best, there are some really great books written on this, but I highly suggest, I mean it's really a massive book but you can you know it's came through it's it's called fundamental problems on space and time by Adolf Gruenbaum and another one is is a book by JC is smart on the question of time I think Let me see, Problems of Space and Time by JJ C. Smart.

And the other one is a book Fundamental Problems of Space and Time by Adolf Rönn-Bauld. Sorry, not at all. Are we going to go for the Timaeus? Yes, hopefully, yes. you're kind of beyond but don't worry I will as I mentioned we will have some makeup sessions after the last one I think Timaus and Fido and Philebus are

essentially connected you can't read one without the other because just reading Timaus by yourself you might actually get this idea that So this is the thing. The idea of geometry, Platonic solids, you know, and stuff, can be read extremely badly. These are usually the people who read Plato's account of geometrical forms simply by reading

Timaeus. The thing is that the significance of geometric forms for Plato is far beyond this idea of this metaphysical, you know, geometric forms floating in some sort of Platonic heaven. They are actually Plato's, this is exactly an essential ingredient of this idea of what does it mean to have a recipe for a good life. This is the idea of demiurge. Geometric forms for Plato are you might call to be erratious, in mixing your cake we're

talking about. you need to have ingredients, practical theoretical intelligibilities, but also you need to have proportions and ratios of how to put together stuff. So this the question of Platonic forms in Timaos essentially trying to address, of course in the Platonic language of Geomics conforms, the question of proportion and ratio, namely logoi. There is, yeah sure, I mean there is no doubt that there is a mystical or esoteric aspect

in Plato's philosophy, I mean, but not really in the sense that we understand mysticism or esotericism. I mean Plato is definitely a rationalist philosopher, so you need to take, always prioritize this idea that he's a rationalist philosopher and only then he might be a esoteric also a philosopher in some places. Yeah, that's what I was referring to. Just one more thing, like the reason I brought up Thomas was, I hadn't read it, but isn't Plato's concept of time, which goes together with what you were talking about,

like that ion or like this kind of, the ultimate, all-encompassing, is it like... You mean, that kind of goes with that kind of absolute contingency? Yeah. You see, I think, on the first impression, yes. And I genuinely need to read more of both. But from my current understanding, is that no, they are ultimately not the same. Is that because there are a few reasons for this.

One is that Plato's rationalist in a very twisted sense. Myosu is more of a rationalist in a very twisted sense, in a very mathematical sense. The thing is that Plato, so this is the idea that in Measu, the absolute thesis about absolute contingency implies that laws of nature, not only laws of nature, but also how we can gain traction on these laws of nature can change.

So, the second one is fine. The first one, I think you can read it two different ways. One in the sense that if everything is constantly changing, because when you say that laws of laws of nature may change, that may change doesn't recognize any temporal boundary, hence meaning that right now the laws of nature might have changed. There is no constraint on this, which brings it back to the idea of the Heraclitian flux,

That there is such hyperchaotic flux that we cannot determine it by any way possible. Hence, hence, his rationalism is not a Platonic rationalism, precisely because Platonic rationalism entails the intertwinement of semantic, logical and epistemological rationalism. Whereas Meyasu, precisely because this hyperchaotic flux cannot be determined, hence ruling out

the epistemological, the adequacy of the epistemological method to be capable of freezing this flux and talk about it, it has to resort to a different kind of rationalist, and that's a rationalist of what you might call to be pure mathematical logical, in the sense that mathematics can emulate, can emulate this hyperflux, and only through this emulation it can give you some speculative insight of what this reality is. Plato would say that this might count as a sophisticated gesture for Plato, precisely because this comes back to this idea that

for Plato, mathematics has in fact a metaphysical import. And the metaphysical import of it is is that it can never be disconnected from reality. You can read forms in themselves, but ultimately all forms need to be applied to something else. Some things need to participate in these forms. Now this is one thing, so basically from this perspective Plato doesn't reduce mathematics to pure mathematics as such.

For Plato, mathematics have an epistemic input and that's why mathematicals are put in the third segment on the divided line. This is one. And the other one is saying, as I mentioned, I don't think that Plato buys into the idea of the hyperchaotic flux of becoming. Because as I just mentioned, or recapitulates Plato's argument, that does not count as being. that is not pure being.

Because it basically comes back to this idea of the paradoxes of harmony and strife, rest and dynamics, and difference and sameness, which are properties of beings but not being. But nevertheless, I don't think that regardless of these differences, and I think in Plato's cosmology at least, the point of emphasis is not really about the becoming of that which is, what is on the being of thoughts, forms.

It's simply what I want to say that simply Plato is not interested in this question. For Plato, what essentially wants to look into is the cosmology of not really the, of of existences, but the cosmology of true being in the thinking. And that's, I think, it's a quite, it's a different form, it's very Hegelian, in fact, when you extremize, make this piece as extreme, it becomes a Hegelian. And really one of the greatest books that I have seen talked about this, about this

idea what does it mean exactly to think about the time of thinking rather than the time of events or existences what does it mean to think about the ontology of thinking rather than the ontology of existences is a book called by lawrence pontil called structure and being yes And his name is Lorenz. I can upload that one to the classroom, actually. Yes. Oh, I think there are similarities, at least the idea

of this kind of cosmological time that doesn't admit things. But I think when you start to look at it, the assumptions that are being derived from these concepts of time are fundamentally different. And their conclusions are different, the assumptions behind them are different. I don't think that we can really like put them together. I mean, of course, so many people try to reduce Plato to this idea of pure formal thinker, which might actually have something similar with Meosu's understanding of mathematics, but clearly Plato ascribes a metaphysical and

epistemological status to mathematics. He doesn't want to get rid of the epistemological rationality in favor of simply logical or mathematical rationality. Because obviously, you see, this is the whole idea of Plato, is that Plato is a philosopher of intelligibility. He wants to be capable of designing a system capable of deepening the order of intelligibilities. Because that counts as the mission necessary for his highest, most revered idea, the form

of forms, the form of the good, as the expanse of all intelligibility, axiological, theoretical, practical and so on and so forth. Thanks. Questions? Anything? I just remembered this question that I had, it's just about a particular author. There was a third woman writer on Plato, Rose Chubrin. I couldn't find her.

One second. You're not talking about Desjardins? No, Rose Chubrin. One second. Here, I can... Sorry, one second. Okay, this is, it's R-O-S-E, Rose, and it's not, okay, her last name is C-H-E-R-U-S-E.

All right, thank you. Welcome. Okay, so the third man argued. So you're late. I just want to introduce it and then we go to a kind of a much more detailed discussion. probably next session and also it would be great if you can also you know because because I think the sophist the sophist I mean the the paradoxes in the in the sophist the aliatic

paradoxes in the sophists, the problem on the Third Man argument, and Menno's paradox are closely connected. So next session, if you can read or skim through some of the discussions in Menno's paradox, particularly that a specific part for Menno brings out the paradox. So we can, after discussing the term and argument, we can talk about Menno's paradox and underlining

the connections between these three problems and paradoxes, which what we might call to be the sophist, the Eleotics paradox, is about the nature of thinking and the reality of thinking, the formal reality of thinking, which leads to the problems of knowledge. The third man argument is a problem of what you might call to be the problem of the function

of language and logic, the function of forms, of how is that, when you are talking about forms if through the third man argument it becomes obvious that we that we basically create it we we there will be some paradoxes involved in this idea because you know the way that Plato has formulated forms and then Menno's paradox is, as I mentioned, is, I mean, on the explicit, how it's explicitly formulated, is a paradox about the possibility of knowledge, but as I mentioned, at its core, again, like Eliotti

paradox, is again a paradox about the possibility of thinking as such. So we are going to talk about these and these are the most important thing about these problems is that I think these are the most fundamental problems of ancient philosophy, if not philosophy as such. And you can see that depending on how you answer these kinds of questions, you choose your philosophical orientation. So Menno is not a sophist. Menno is an

heuristic or a skeptical person. Not in the rationalist and skeptical sense, but heuristic a skeptic heuristics are you know of course you know between those who launched the rest of argument and sophists are similarities but they can't be simply bunched up together but Eliottic estranges a learned sophist is learned substance and the third man argument is in fact really Plato himself criticizing his theory of the works

so according to the theory of forms you know And so first let me mention this, that's Theory of Forms is formulated at least in three dialogues, Phaido, Republic, and Parmenides. As I mentioned, as the time passes, Plato less and less explicitly make a reference to the theory of forms.

In Theititudes, in fact, there is no mention of theory of forms. in fact Plato adopts a new vocabulary for them we'll get back to that in the next session according to the principle of forms forms have some intrinsic properties.

Now the way that these intrinsic properties are being distinguished in Platonic dialogues is mostly via commentaries. Because Plato mentions, gives an exhaustive list of the properties belonging to forms. And there are in fact quite different versions of these properties. And there are arguments, controversies, ruling out some of these properties and in fact including

others. The first person who gave the first list of such intrinsic properties as attributed forms is Arsata. Such properties can be enumerated as oneness, every form is one. forms are unique or sui generis in the sense that for any property that they have, for

any property, for example, the property of being a cow, an appearance, or not in that in that illusory sense. For any property there is exactly one form. Then there is, other than that, there is the, you know, the, another property which is one and many the property of being one and property of being many are contraries

then there is the property of one over many you know for any for example for any plurality of for example being a dog the property of darkness there is a a form of f-ness, dog-ness, by virtue of partaking of which each member of the plurality is f, belongs to the category of dog-ness. So one over many. This is the whole idea that you can think of forms as generalities in which particularities participate. Plurality or complexity of plurality

participate in our subtle additionally and not just our son for but you know other commentators have additionally attributed to theory of forms also self-predication named that every form for example darkness is itself s dog so So self-predication, forms are self-predicating. This is one, forms are pure, criteria of purity, no form can have contrary properties and also

non-self-partaking. There is no form that can partake of itself. So these are the properties of a list of properties, which is, as I mentioned, this list by, it's not something that Plato provides, hence it is controversial, and then we will see why it's controversial. Because some of these attributes are not really attributes of forms, or at least Plato never claims that, for example, some of these forms can be defined in terms of these attributes. So, according to these, you know, attributes, at least some of them, a problem arises in

how things participate in forms and how forms relate to one another. So in Parmenides, in the first section of Parmenides, a discussion begins about this problem in terms of the form of being a large ethnic largeness form as for format form f for form so f less but I'm saying that

is something like large dog I don't know whatever and I started you know changes the argument from the perspective of largeness to the idea of man-ness, hence the third man argument. So the discussion can be very very briefly as Vlasters, as Gregory Vlasters has reconstructed it, it can be summarized as follows.

So let's just start with the idea, with this assumption that there is a plurality of large things, say A, B, C, D, etc. By the criterion, by the attributes, by the intrinsic attribute of forms being one over many, the so-called methexis criterion, then it can be said there is a form of largeness,

say L subscript, for example, A. There is a form of largeness by virtue of participating By virtue, there is a form of largesis in virtue of A, B and C, by virtue of partaking of which A and B and C are large. So you can think about this like as a concept. You see that there is for example the concept of a dog and this concept is a concept at

at least from a certain perspective in so far as this dog, that dog and the other dog fall under this concept. Okay? So this form of largeness, LA, by the attribute of one over many, there is a form, we can say that there is a form of largeness by virtue of partaking of which A and B and C are large. Now this was one over many. Now by self-predication the idea that every form of F-ness is itself

that every form of F-ness is itself F, then we can say that L-A is large. L-A is large. You see that how the problem is emerging. Because forms are not supposed to be large. Large things are supposed to fall under or participate in largeness, in the form of largeness. But by virtue of self-predication, the form that had been derived to the attribute of one over many is now again has been reduced to a potential participatory or a particular

instance of largeness, self-predication. But then, so we said that by virtue of self-predication, L-A is large. Then we can continue this argument by adding L-A to A, B and C that we said were large and we're participating in L1, in LA. To form a new plurality of large things.

This big dog, that big dog, this big dog, and the form of bigness for dogs that has now become an instance, a particular instance, a participatory instance. So this creates a new set, you might say it, consisting of different varieties of large dogs and your form LA, which has now become just large, not large nests. So a set of A, B, C, D and L, A. Again, by the attribute of one over many, we can say

yet again, there is in fact a form of largeness, say LB, in virtue of partaking of which, A, B, C, D, L, A are large. But then again, by virtue of these attributes of forms, L1 or L-A or our previous category of ethnes partakes of LB. So LA now partakes in LB. Which, this contradicts the uniqueness

of forms. The forms were sui generis. Namely, that there is one and only one form for each property, namely being large. Now the nightmare moves, expands even further here. So by, so not only, so the uniqueness of forms have been shown to be compromised by virtue of the Thurman argument. Now by virtue of self-predication, again, which was the idea, as I said, that every

form of F-ness is itself a form, LB is large, like the way that LA turned into just large rather than f-ness, largeness. So again, a new series emerges. LB can be added to A, B, C, D, and LA. Creating a new set of plural things, plural large things. Again, using one over many, it can be said there is in fact another form of largeness let's say LC by

virtual partaking in all of these pluralities Now what does this do exactly? You see what, so first it has started to compromise the sui generisness of forms, now it has basically shows that there is no such a thing as non, you know, what you might call to be non-self partaking form.

That's the idea that forms don't partake in themselves. So this is the whole idea that it's, the argument how it started led to this idea that forms in fact do partake in themselves. and hence they are not forms. And also forms are not unique. It creates, not essentially an infinite regress, but an infinite series, an infinite series that ultimately shows that forms are not even pure or one. even in their ethness.

So the third man argument essentially boils down to this, that if forms have such and such attributes by virtue of which we can bring intelligible, bring particular items under them, a set of large dogs for example, to talk about, render them intelligible as being large, then that creates a problem. The first problem is that it creates a problem of uniqueness, then the problem of non-self partaking, then the problem that these forms are in fact not even one, the criteria of

oneness. Now, this is the core of Velastus argument. The core of Velasquez's argument is that if any process in agreement is to be made at this juncture, after we saw how attributes of forms are being compromised, it must come

from some advance in understanding the logical structure of the argument. So the understanding, so Velasquez basically tries to reformulate the Third Man argument to show that the Thirdman argument doesn't essentially relate to forms, but to the logical structure by which forms have been formulated. So essentially, Third Man argument, in contrast to many commentators, is not trying to question

the reality of form, but it wants to do something even more serious, to question the logical structure of the argument in which the forms, the idea of forms, the intrinsic properties have been formulated, creating infinite series that retroactively contradicts those basic properties attributed to forms.

The thing, however, is that Velasquez's third argument, let me, before moving forward, let Let me mention this, you see, I think I mentioned it last time, that at least in Parmenides, the Third Man argument has been posed as a genuine expression of perplexity, simply an open critique of his own position regarding the theory of forms.

But as we read through Parmenides, we see that there is also another way of reading the Thurman argument, that this is not genuine puzzle, that's something that, for example, wanted to show the lack of resolution for the Doctrine of Forms. What he wanted, in fact this is a more, I think, interesting, exciting thing, to show that there are attributes that should not be ascribed to forms. Because if we do them, forms, the doctrinal forms essentially lead to the third man argument.

So what I'm going to do in the, you know, probably we don't have time. What I'm going to do next session is to break apart Blasthu's argument. to show that the logical structure of the last this argument what so as Aristotle on which blast is basically built accounts of German argument Essentially attributing not only attributing To forms properties that Plato wouldn't have attributed one but also it is full of confusions in the way that he crosses illicitly between different sections of his argument.

And one over many to uniqueness and uniqueness from uniqueness to non-self-partaking and from non-self-partaking to non-oneness. These moves are illicit precisely because of the detail of its formulation by Velasquez and Aristotle. Which then again brings us back to this idea that given these facts, this is much, I think, a better way of approaching that this is in fact Plato's exposition on this problem is not some self-critique or giving up, but simply pointing out the kind of approach that we

should not apply to the forms. And one of the reasons for this is that precisely this argument is posited in the first section of Parmenides. So he wants to rest theory of forms from the last ridges of Eliotic philosophy to show that if you attribute some of those Eliotic Parmenidian attributes to forms, you essentially end up in problems. Where are you finding this reading of the Parmenides' dialogue, if not in Glastus? Well it is Velastus, I think one of the best one is, I mean taking a part of the discussion

is something that I have been doing it, hopefully I will write something about this, but one of the best, I think, you know, two books actually that I can recommend on this front, one Plato's reception of Parmenides by Paul Mer and another one is I think it's yes okay it's called Plato's Parmenides the conversion of the soul by Michael H H Miller.

The first one was Paul Err. The first one was, sorry, British Reception of Parma Nabeas by Paul Err. John A. Palmer. Oh, Palmer. John a Palmer and the other one was the conversion of the soul by Michael H Miller yes I think you see the thing about there are so many I think this is first of all the most important thing is that you can't really find these kinds of materials in more traditional

scholarly commentaries on Plato because this is the analytic reading of Plato. Blastus is an analytic philosopher who provides an analytic. So this is an analytic issue, you see? And I think it's just a matter of, you know, searching. there was this really long series of conversation between Velasquez and different and philosophers trying to going back and forth debate the problem of third man. One annoying thing that I have found, this is only like congencially related, is

that there's like all sorts of analytic philosophy books that say they're about Platonism, but it's just about like mathematical Platonism, there's no mention of Plato whatsoever. Yes, yes I think so. I mean, well, Velastus is an exception, and of course because of Velastus, you know, people started to answer him, and Sellars. Sellars, you know, has some in essays in philosophy of history, in essays in history of philosophy, he has I think at least three three papers on Plato without any of this what you might call to be naive ontology mathematical ontology yes but I think to me the best

I think Plato's reading of Plato's as you mentioned you can't find the best readings of Plato in the analytic tradition nor in continental philosophy. You should find them in the tradition of scholarly concentration of ancient philosophies. People who are particularly capable of seeing this in the context of ancient philosophy, and having access to the resources and the language also. John Salis is I think is an astonishing reader.

So has Rosemary Desjardins. To be honest I'm actually quite confused how that beginning part where Socrates is interrogating Xeno and Parmenides even bleeds into what becomes the eight deductions. I'm just having trouble how it seeing how it can you can you send me the exact section so

we can hopefully after after next session after you know I don't think that this argument requires more than an hour so after that we will talk about parmenides a little bit and particularly the section that you are referring to. OK, yeah. And which translation are you using? I'm using the . I don't think the rate is coming next week, the way after that, the 16th, I think. OK, all right. I'm using the Plato Complete Works. I think maybe you edited by John M. Cooper. No, OK. Let's just go with the Playtools Complete Word, because that's more accessible one.

Everyone should have that in their PDF drive. Just send me the section. And you can post it actually on the classroom page so we can read it and see what's going on. OK, sounds good. Yeah. Excellent. Yeah. I mean, I don't want to, because it's already passed our time, I don't want to go, but the way that essentially, I think, Third Man argument can be, even in Velastusian, which is really the most serious one, the Velastusian version can be diffused, is to show that this idea of not so

So many commentators try to defend Plato, I mean, or rescue the doctrine of forms against certain argument by getting rid of the idea of purity in forms. But I think the whole self-predication part of the problem. And there is no real way that Plato means this kind of self-predication. that Lester is talking about. So we will put our emphasis on this idea of self-predication rather than purity, because I don't think that, I have read so many essays about this, that simply by getting rid of the attributes of purity from forms, essentially again, you end up in one

of the varieties of the third man argument. Because as we saw, it's self-predication which is the link between those compromising stages in the argument. That first led to the denial of uniqueness, then the denial of purity, and then the denial of non-self-partaking, and then the denial of oneness. So next session Parmenides.

Theo is going to send us the page numbers for those sections and also the third argument. And if you are really, I'd probably after those, we won't have time, but if you want, I think you can skim through Menno's paradox, the section on Menno's paradox in Menno, the conversation between Menno and Socrates, which I think that's also quite, I think Menno's paradox is probably one of the most serious parts of these kinds of paradoxes emerge slowly in place of work.

Sounds good. And then are you anticipating that Ray will be coming the week after next? Yes. Okay, all right. But I still need a confirmation. I mean if he shows up next week, because it really depends on his schedule. If it shows up, we'll just move our things forward. Sounds good. All right, anybody have last questions? Nope, OK. I'm going to end the broadcast. Thank you so much, everyone. Have a great weekend. Absolutely.

Thank you.