Hello and welcome to the 14th session of Theory and Object. We can start ahead with questions now. I was just asking Reza to go over what he thought were the similarities and differences between what Hume identifies as a problem in induction induction and what Boltzmann sees in problems of causation as well. Sure. So, very quickly, I mean in the most brief sense, the difference between Hume's
problem and Boltzmann problem in basically approaching the problem of causation is that one, we know that Hume essentially reliance on the structure of a memory in which sense impressions can be retained and compared with sense impressions at a later time which are being obtained by your encounters with the same items in the environment now of course Hume already shows in the problem of induction that
this inductivist, pure inductivist approach to how we derive something like a law of nature or a causal connection can be challenged. Its solution to the human problem, to the problem of induction is that these are the habits of mind. You should understand when Hume talks about mind it doesn't mean Kantian mind. It simply talks about a sensorial memory. As I told you a few sessions ago, you can think about the facts, the observer of the
human world, not as a human, but simply as a tape recorder. Different frames, it registers different pictures or impressions of the world, negative pictures of the world. Now with Boltzmann things are very very different. First of all Boltzmann is something of a proto-Hosserlian in the sense that he believes in the transcendental constitution. He believes that the way that we see, first of all, before going to that, of all, Boltzmann actually neutralizes human problem from the beginning by questioning the
asymmetry of time. He shows that impression one, at a later time impression two, at a later time impression three, so on and so forth. The way that we can only make an invariance out of them, irregularity that we might call to be a causal connection or pneumological invariance are all depending on how we see time the arrow of time the flow of time Boltzmann points of attack is not even the problem of causation it's far more fundamental it's the idea that if there is such a thing as a temporal arrow by
which we can synthesize make a synthetic assertion about our analytic impressions or slices of different pictures of items in the world at different times just to say that for example this is how the pattern unfolds this is how the nomological invariance can be distinguished he actually says that this all depends on the idea of the time that you have a representation of time in a Kantian sense and he shows that literally you cannot using either
Kantian or human principles show whether time is asymmetrical moving from past to the future or future to the past the asymmetry of time or time is symmetric and there is no difference between past and future these are just what's more called to be transcendentally ideal registrations so once he attack the asymmetry of time the problem of causation the human sense becomes even neutralized because itself can be predicated on a perception of time on how we synthesize memory impressions temporally if there is no temporality in
an any asymmetric way then how can we in fact do derive such pneumological invariances early Boltzmann however he believes that there is such a thing as time asymmetry in the sense that impressions move from what you might call to be the forgotten to vaguely remembered to remembered and to the rememberings corresponding to what you might call to be past future past present and future anticipations of how we deal or encounter with items in the world
however in later work of Boltzmann after he comes under critique uh by particularly one of his own friend one of his colleagues Joseph Lochemit he begins to dot this recipe first he says that okay time might not be asymmetrical let's just assume times time is symmetrical. But then he exactly says feel free to change the arrow of time whether from past to future or future to the past nothing happens. Still from the statistical point of view given the initial conditions of a system its
its boundary conditions, it can be shown from the point of modern statistical logic that the system will evolve toward equilibrium, more entropy, or decrease in the quantity H in his formula. But then Lochemitz and a few others point out to this fact that identification of the initial conditions of the system in the Boltzmannian sense, what you might call
to be impression one of the system, impression one of the system. But it is not a sense impression It's what you might call to be a statistically decomposed idea or framework of a set of observable properties for any given system. They show that initial condition of the system in the way that they are being derived and singled out in the Boltzmannian system actually do have unique time asymmetric properties in which it can be shown that time moves from past from future.
a presupposition that Boltzmann has already challenged and questioned himself. This is something as I have mentioned a couple of times, it's called the principle of mu innocence, molecular innocence. So the idea is roughly this. When we were talking about the Smead and particle, classical and particle mechanics, we talked about that molecules, particles, are defined by their momentum, mass, energy, so on and so forth, depending on the kind of framework that you are working. Now the thing, according to the Boltzmann Statistical Mechanics or Statistical Physics,
two particles which have not collided yet, their velocities and momentums are not correlated yet. This is an intuition, right? Sure, if two things haven't really met together, then they are not influenced by one another. This is all good needs with this intuition. But haven't you noticed that this intuition is actually dependent on the very idea of time asymmetry, that time moves from past to the future? because if time could move from the future to the past in fact you can say
that even though two particles have not collided with one another could be correlated they would have influenced one another so you see the idea of time makes symmetry for Boltzmann becomes a massive headache in the idea of the pneumological invariances particularly in the context of thermodynamics the second law the idea that you know you have a compartment you have a trapdoor in between in one compartment there is a colored gas colored particles of gas you
open trapdoor and then you see that the gas moves toward the second container you see it it sends impression this doesn't mean that it is actually a causal connection even according to Kant so you see the the particles escape the second compartment they never come back to second to the first compartment the move is a starts from four equilibrium to toward a tendency toward complete equilibrium.
And this constitutes for so many scientists even today as a pneumological relation. But this pneumological relation cannot actually be corroborated by the thermal entry because because thermal thermodynamics is essentially an observable thing. Observable in a sense that it's biased by our, you know, biases of our intuition, observable, sensible intuition. So the reason that Boltzmann develops a statistical physics, or a statistical mechanics, is to actually try to reinvent such observables at the level of microphysics, where observables play no role at all it's just a statistical positions and
features of of the particles and even then he falls in a trap it conflates the statistical pure statistical physics physical characterization of particles with observable time asymmetric characteristics, such as the principle of the new innocence, molecular innocence? Do you, just thinking about the way that Kant approaches the problem of causation in that he more or less kind of internalizes the problem.
Yes. And also he also, you might think, I mean, probably I'm not sure about what I'm trying to propose but if you actually look to can't let's say we resurrect can't today and it reads all this stuff that has been said and actually can might be actually a model proponent of causation that literally causation cannot be reduced to any form of empirical or even a statistical base vocabularies. This might be it.
Sure, go on here, sorry. Actually, you go first. Mine's a little bit of a tangent. No, no, no, you go, you go. I wasn't going to say anything important. I guess it seems like there's this effort in Hume and in, as far as I understand, and I'm not a scientist, but an effort in science to talk about causation happening in nature itself, as opposed to talking about causation happening as a mode of cognition that the subject has.
Yes, yes, absolutely. Well, however, you should understand that not all scientists think similarly. I mean, they absolutely have different implicit philosophical assumptions. Yes, for the majority of today's scientists, they think that causation is something that happens in nature. But then, that's what philosophy of science comes and catches them off guard. to show that some of this is something we are talking about, about deriving pneumological relations actually cannot hold by virtue of counter examples, exactly like the explanatory
counter examples that I made last session. The greatest, I would say, insidious, escepticism. So first of all, Hume is usually considered as a chief esceptic, empirical esceptic. But the thing is that you remember in the can't class I will say that really it's it's sure can't falls under the revenge of Descartes but can't exact the greatest
revenge on you the whole point that can't actually come up with the counter example so you say that these series whatever patterns they might have fall in the same place they have some relations with relata and then we can derive a nomological invariance from them what's adhering to the thesis of modality that simply all pattern recognitions are modal recognitions or modal cognitions it can be shown that's well we were talking about last session
with Valentin that he says that okay repetition the psychoanalyst can can can see the repetition as being the cause of such hysteria. Like for example, whenever my knee hits the table, the glass falls. Whenever the glass falls, I have heartbeats and I start to feel, you know, unwholesome. But then, what if there is a hidden pneumological factor is at play here?
Something that is beyond the impressions that are registered for you, including the connection between the knee, the table, the fall of the glass, and hysterical laughter or heartbeat. What if this is all the consequence of a tremor in the ground, an earthquake? Empirical approach to causation cannot solve this question at all. It's only when you actually try to see causation in terms of modalities and counterfactuals that you understand that this might be actually true, or it might not be.
But nevertheless, the only way to examine is by way of modal vocabulary and counterfactuals, like the match example that I made a few sessions ago. you it seems like part of the problem we'll just use your example so your knee hits the table and the glass falls off and you attribute the glass falling off to your knee when there could have been another factor which was the cause yes
he didn't know my logical relation yes it seems like um on the one hand I mean that has my utter sympathy because it's so obviously the case that you can misidentify cause but it doesn't give any room to posit something as the cause it just says that what you identified as the cause might not be the cause yes well that's the whole point that you see it's only in the pre-scientific critical account of causation is that you have a definitive singular connection
between a cause and its effect. In the modern account of causation we simply out of convention and that's the conventionalist view that we single out a causal factor or an effect according you see why is that out of convention precisely because the idea of modality of counterfactual like you are you know wet match match with oxidizing agent in its head or without it we do ignited in the earth atmosphere or out in the vacuum and they all have different effects. However, once we actually do them and see all these lists of different variations
of cause and effect in terms of counterfactual, in terms of modalities, then we are capable of creating a bracketed context within a limited bracketed context. And context can always be expanded and hence the cause and effect can also change. Within this context that we can say this is the cause of this effect. But yes, the whole point of context sensitivity of a causal relation, namely the modal theory of causation, is that the true cause may never be known. May never be known. In fact, the search for the true cause would be fundamentally critical and pre-scientific.
Nomological relations are fundamentally context sensitive, are defeasible and non-monotonic, meaning that they change once their premises, even their smallest premises are being changed. So then the pneumological classifications, the causal classifications, are a species of modal classifications and the context that they afford. For us philosophers who have been brought up with firm ideas and beliefs about what
cause and effect is, surely such challenges to theories of causation that the real, the True cause can never be, in fact, excavated precisely because it doesn't exist in the first place. Causation, nomological relations are simply modal relations. Context-sensitive, bracketed relations might pose a fundamental cognitive challenge. It's just that we are still, I understand that even if we try to be very radical, our worldview is still somehow our estetilium in terms of cause and effect relations.
So you're saying like at best we can just like dramatically limit the explanatory possibilities that we have but not completely reduce it to something singular? Absolutely, precisely because that singularity never existed to begin with. The search for it is not even philosophical or scientific, it's theological and teleological. It paints quite the schizophrenic picture of logic. Yes, well, why do you think that non-motonic logic is so dangerous to so many classical
who actually borrow their ideas from classical physics. I mean, my apologies if I am jumping ahead of myself. I hope that you know what the term non-monotonic means by now but if you don't it's simply the idea very very briefly that so you have a formula a logical formula it can be inductive
it can be deductive it can be whatever so you have a set of premises then you have an arrow arrow shows the consequence relation and then you have a set of consequence things are following from your premises now this relation might logically hold in all possible worlds but according to non-monotonic logic the The task of logic, and that's somehow a task that is not purely logical but it's also epistemic.
When we actually see our logical formulas try to apply to the real world, we should find something called a defeaser. A defeaser. What is a defeaser? A diffuser is a set of premises, it can be just one premise, that you add to your list of existing premises and it fundamentally changes the consequences of that logical relations. In terms of identifying context, I mean, how do you even go about identifying an appropriate
context? Well, obviously this is where if we are talking about empirical experiments and rather than just merely logical formulations. If you are talking about engaging with the furniture of the world then of course this is where the idea of scientific method comes into the foreground. What is scientific method? It says our methods should be clear. It should allow us to repeat with exactly the same methods in different environments, the same experiment
to see whether they hold up or not. And that's what you might call to be the germ of our contextuality. The method, what informs the context, the repeatability of the method. And of course methods can be wrong too, but that's another issue fundamentally. And that shows that the scientific enterprise is not all about causation, it's not about explanation but it's also about determination of the methods that we actually use. What are they? Can we in fact repeat them? With what kind of accuracy? That accuracy if there
is a threshold to it, if there is a mistake can it be negligible or it is not negligible so on and so forth. Lana, you have been very, very silent. I have a question. Sure, go on. I have to say that during the whole class I was a little bit interested in why we are we are going to talk about time and the other things. Well, we almost never spoke about it before. So do you understand correctly that question of time comes besides this work of Boltzmann?
Sorry, I missed the last word that you pronounced. Boltzmann. Boltzmann, yes, okay. The whole story that we're having here, the story of philosophy, of science, It's through Boltzmann in his work in statistics, what he called critical, as opposite to pre-critical statistics. And because it has to do something with statistics, it has to do with all this account of the philosophical science that we spoke about, like this problem of induction is it is it the right link it is not essentially the problem of
induction you see for example imagine the witch burners in the medieval time they were also in the problem of induction you know we talked about this uh i i can't remember when was last session or the session before it, that if a woman shows such and such signs according to such and such repetitions and patterns of women who were actually captured as a witch, this woman is also a witch and hence she should be burned. So this is what you might call to be a purely naive human inductivist pattern recognition,
critical, pre-modern, pre-scientific. The thing about Boltzmann is not about this idea that as long as there is a repetition or a pattern, we should actually think about it as if it holds a causal or pneumological connection. It is simply the idea that according to such and such initial conditions conditions and such boundary conditions there is a nomological expectability this is you see a statistical expectability is fundamentally different from certainty or even naive probability in an ordinary sense. There is a statistical probability, usually bracketed, for example,
between 0, 0.5 and 1. There is a nomological statistical expectability that under such and such conditions this equation this formula this set of behaviors will lead to such expectability if it can be shown that under all statistical ensembles that are possible the expectability fall in one or another bracket it can then can be shown like the second law of thermodynamic as elaborated by Boltzmann then it can be shown that no matter how much systems
dynamic systems differ in their initial and boundary conditions particles in their positions momentum energy configuration so on and so forth there is a very specific increase a threshold of increase in the level of tendency toward equilibrium so this is fundamentally different from the human sense it is no longer a deductive judgment it is a statistical expectability given the analysis of a dynamic system in
which you can in fact calculate all sorts of statistical possibilities for given such and such momentum energy and position of particles. And how does it keep background to our conversations or understanding?
So, Svidana, my apologies if I have, it seems that either yours or my connections are, I get your voice in a very, very choppy manner. Would you be able to repeat it and a little bit louder? This is also very hot here. I was just wondering how this new understanding of nemo logical laws or whatever nemo logical via Boitsman how does it inform
the attempt to characterize or speak about science in a way how for example Karnap tried to... I think it's fundamentally different. I don't think that Karnap ever actually thought about the idea of causation in a very or nomological relations in any way. Yes, Reichenbach did. Reichenbach, his friend and his colleague did. But for Carnap, it wasn't really this. For Carnap, the entire project was centered on different kinds of issues. However, for example, with Reichenbach, Reichenbach is actually fundamentally Boltzmannian.
However, just like Boltzmann did not realize the import of different scales or resolutions of a system under a study, and by virtue of confounding these scales of a reality, like a system under study that even though he no longer thinks about macroscopic or observable properties of particles or or gases and he only thinks about such particles in terms of statistical ensemble nevertheless he made a mistake and smuggled illegally illegitimate
illegitimately an observable characteristics that only belongs to the microscopic gases to the properties of microscopic unobservable particles whereas statistical configurations have no place whatsoever for what you might called to be run-of-the-mill observable phenomenon or observable impressions, like the idea of irreversible processes or unfolding of time or temporality from past to the future, namely asymmetry pieces, time and strophics.
Rauschenbach completely was Bolsmanian, however, like as I mentioned, like Bolsman, he did not grasp that even though you have tried to get rid of such human, impressionistic characterizations of the phenomenon or system under study, you still might fall in the trap of applying one or two of your specific observable, microscopic intuitions of the phenomenon
under a study to completely unobservable statistical descriptions of the system. Exactly like what I mentioned, the principle of molecular innocence, mu innocence. For those of you who actually want to see Reichenbach talking about Boltzmann gas theories and the idea of the direction of time, the idea of temporality, you should read his book, which is a fantastic book, really, really poetically written, almost read like a continental piece
of philosophy. It's called Direction Time. And for those of you who wanted to read a critique of Reichenbach, read Hugh Price's book, The Archimedean Vantage Point, where he fundamentally criticized the philosophical tenets of Reichenbach in the sense that, you know, literally when you are in the business of even a statistics as applied to real dynamic systems like systems of GATS, you might actually by some completely unconsciously, indeliberately, you might actually apply
some of your observable intuitions to the statistical ensembles which actually have no room for such observable descriptions. You should understand Boltzmann as the father of modern philosophy of science precisely because Boltzmann himself laid out the foundations that when we are dealing with the dynamics system within a physical system we are dealing with it at different scales or resolutions of the system one thing that might hold true for an upper level of
the system might not hold true for a lower resolution or level of the system But nevertheless, he himself applied something from the upper level, the description of the system at the level of the microscopic mechanics, thermal entropy, to a level that was supposed to be explanatory for these thermal behaviors. And hence, he made a mistake. The whole point of explanation is that you want, if you are seeing a picture or a slice
of reality, a sector of reality at a specific scale, like thermal, behaviors of a gas, you want then what you call scientific explanation qualifies as moving to a deeper level by which at that level you can actually explain why is that the phenomenon of this gas in a closed system were behaving such and such at this scale. So essentially you are trying to show that any phenomenon that happens at the thermal scale of behaviors of gases can be explained caused by a neurological
relation by a statistical relations between particles which are unobservable however as I mentioned Boltzmann made a very very intuitive mistake he brought But the whole idea of time asymmetry, which only applies to the observable macroscopic phenomenon and applied it to the identification of initial conditions of a dynamic system at the level of macroscopic particle physics, where you cannot have time asymmetry at all.
in the Newtonian physics at the level of mechanics and in this case a statistical mechanics all laws of physics are symmetrical what you in fact need to explain is a time asymmetry of physical laws at the level of observable phenomena like for example the escape of a gas from a bottle you can't just apply to the lower scale in order to explain it because that's that's your explanando not your explainance this kind of i don't know if uh if you want to talk about more about time today or not but
but I've just noticed that so many people reach to talk about time itself or something like that. Yes, new tone, new tone, absolutely. New tone is new tone. And then I will show that these questions are essentially open. And that's basically why Mix, rather than we should simply thinking about them as kind of philosophical antiquations, we should actually understand them as philosophical invigorations of the field of science. And that's why I'm going to talk about, you know, what is exactly Newtonian absolute space or absolute time for that matter?
and has they ever been actually in a coherent consistent or legitimate way be challenged I don't think so so what you're essentially saying about the different phenomena of scale this might be a a bit of an appropriate way to put it, but it's just basically a type error from premises and the conclusions that you draw from them. That is, you just cannot take a premise that comes from information gained at a certain level of scale.
Begging the question. Begging the question. Yeah, begging the question. Yeah. Yeah, absolutely. It's a begging the question, but not in a logical sense. in a statistical or physical sense, yes. Is it begging the question? Begging the question. I mean, how can you actually explain the time asymmetry of your reversible processes at the level of microscopic phenomenon by a statistical configuration whose initial conditions are set by time asymmetrical presuppositions? the principle of new innocence okay let's have it it's really hot let's have a
I'm ready whenever you are. Yeah, I guess I wanted to add something else to that too, but I read your your comments but but does really can't forbid us to talk about the things in themselves does he really yes he does forbid us from the actual knowledge of the thing in itself
well in fact you yourself know that the very fact the transcendental deduction as the objective knowledge of the world in the Kantian sense is possible is by virtue of the ingression of the nominal entities and their influence upon our sensations in whatever manner possible Just because Kant says that we are not, I'm not thinking about them, doesn't mean that he's not using them, exploit them. He's actually the entire transcendental deduction, I would say, positizing, piggybacking on the
idea of the non-man. Otherwise, our sensations are even possible. Why do we in fact need to have transcendental logic? Because if there are sensations that are not possible, as the effects of some, what you might call to be dark causal factors, the nominal factors, then the transcendental logic is not even possible. Then the understanding is not possible. And by virtue of that, the objective knowledge of the world is not possible. The entire project of the critique is not possible. I mean, I guess I just see that as like also the case, if we admit a form of time realism in a hard sense.
I mean, I don't have any solution to this and typically I'm just more agnostic about it, I don't see how we could talk about time in any sensible way. Yes. Well, this is the whole point that there are, I would say, at least three competing ideas about time. Time absolutely does not exist. time is not real it is simply the figment of not imagination but of mind of a
perceptive subject here you go John Ellis MacTaggart Parmenides and probably even me belong to this category. Time is absolutely real as a physical entity, Newton. Time is essentially relativistic, co-constitutive with the apperceptive subject, Schrodinger, Eddington, Einstein even perhaps. So these are three. But what I actually want to talk about is that even though I belong to the first camp,
I think so, at least so far that I have seen the questions, I still see that those people who try to simply get rid of the idea of the absolute time and absolute space as a position to the new tone haven't really offered any good philosophical or scientific reasoning just because It is unintuitive for us, or even from a Kantian perspective, dogmatic for us, to imagine independent physical reality.
This doesn't mean that there are not such things. One, two, maybe in fact, and that's really the whole nasty bugbear of this whole question, Maybe, in fact, Kant's anti-dogmatic, pre-critical, anti-dogmatic response was itself dogmatic, because it was set and premised upon a set of entirely dogmatic presuppositions. So these are all open philosophical questions and as I said I'm not going to take side with any of these at this point precisely because the whole point of this course is
to just reinvigorate the philosophical questions. I go around to ask philosophers, friends, what is the reality of the reality of time entail? I must because sometimes it looks to me that it's just I don't understand the
input of the question so could you just give some kind of example sure a simplest example change in field theory in particle mechanics any any even even like rudimentary that a leaf changes its color from green to yellow how can you actually say it has changed is there really a change or is something like the Goodmanian paradox, a guru. Green then blue. Green before time t, blue before
time t, after time hypothetical time t and we should actually no longer talk about change but we need to talk about complex predicates that can actually capture these ideas of the phenomenal what you might call to be revolutions not in terms of temporal change but in terms of complex predicates the whole idea that for example we say you know that there is this particle moving inside a polarized bulb in the laboratory, what does exactly or actually mean by it? Why is it
important to in fact talk about it as if it is moving? All these perceptual dictations about what is happening in the world are actually based on the idea of time and change. These are absolutely, you know, I would say that they are not just philosophical questions, they are scientific questions and in fact it can be shown in the complex dynamic. I would say that complexity science is far more than regular physics beholden to the concept of time and time asymmetry or temporality than any other field of science the whole idea that we see that a lot of one career that's given certain
initial conditions of the system with infinite a small perturbations in the boundary conditions of the system the trajectories of the system can never be considered as predictable in the canonical sense. Why? This is all about the idea of temporality. It's all about idea of time, how the system evolves over time, because these are all beholden to the idea of temporality change, the way that we extract pneumological instabilities or invariances from certain temporally framed impressions of the system, so on and so forth.
But you still maintain that time doesn't exist, or did you say that it's not real? It's two different things. Yes, but the thing is that you should understand that when, for example, Parmenides Arminides says that time is not real, it doesn't mean that, for example, we cannot think temporally about the furnitures of the world to interact with them. It simply means that these are all figments of the mind and they should be addressed as
as if they were never ever realities of mind independent stuff out there. And that also the real I would say import of the kind of old Parmenidian view which goes through Plato, goes through somehow Kant, John Ellis Magsaggart, even late Boltzmann, Hugh Price at this point, you know, Jozefnick. It's all about this idea that once we actually subscribe to this idea, then we maybe should
be capable of actually developing new models of deriving pneumological invariances new theories of causation fundamentally either too unavailable to those who simply think that time is either fundamentally physically real or or time, even as a transcendentally ideal element, moves only in one direction. Carlo Rovelli?
try to reformulate everything without even like are you referring to Rovelli? I think so, some Italian name but... Yes, Carlo Rovelli, yes, yes, I know that. Rovelli is actually quite insightful but I think that there are fundamentally some wishy-washy moves in his work. I can't go to the details but a very great critique good critique complimentary critique of Carlo Rovelli has been written by Joost Ophink U F F I N K I think J O S space U F F I N K it was
I think. And the name of the paper is Bluffing Your Way to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. He's an absolutely majestic, I mean, he has some YouTube lectures at Harvard. He's a philosopher of science and physicist that he points out that, yes, Rovelli actually make some great remarks, but the way that he goes on to actually build his opposition to the kind of classical temporal anistropic of time, they are methodologically unsound.
But yes, I'm familiar with the work of Rovelli. I mean, you should understand that Rovelli is a huge figure in philosopher of science, but among scientists, he's not actually being taken seriously at all. Because of simply the idea that is the way that he methodologically criticized these ideas are rather vague. doesn't he just you know he's like more like content of philosopher even though it's not that he tries to criticize the idea we thought actually framing the
methodology of those people that he's criticizing and the methodology of himself as the criticizer. Okay, any more or should I start? Wait, you're only just beginning? Yeah. Reza, you really need to learn to tell us to shut the fuck up. No, it's just like, no, to be honest with you, the whole point of philosophy, I can
talk about esoteric concepts and come up with new stuff, but the whole point of the philosophy is really the conversation. If there is no conversation, there is no learning. Literally, there is no learning. No, this is true. This is true. That's why I tolerate you. Okay, anyway, that's a start. I mean, I'm sort of curious, like, what is the real difference if we say, like, what is the impact if we say, okay, time is just a figment of our mind, does not actually exist out there. It's just a matter of sort of processes unfolding. like what like how does that change the discussion okay uh very quickly are you familiar with
Boltzmann cosmological hypothesis no so essentially since the time of newton and his controversy with leibnitz and berkeley There were different factions, somehow corresponding to the old factions at the time of Greek philosophy, when they were talking about the question of time, like Miletusians, the... who is Zeno, what is Parmenes and Zeno, what is their school of thought?
Eleatics. Eleatics, yes. Eleatics and then Platonics. Well, Eleatics and Platonics are more fundamental things in common, but also Heraclitians. Now the thing is that this conversation, once the germs of the modern science begin, through the conversation between Leibniz, Newton and all other people around them, it leads to, at the very least to three pieces about the nature of the space time actually more than that the space is real time is not free
a space is real time is simply an extension they are unified in all of these first ones neither a space is real nor time is real Now, this has also two variations. They are either unified in their own reality or they are not unified in their reality, physical reality. Or rather than a space is real, time is not real, and they have no unification whatsoever, or they have unified. They are unified in their categorization. Now, each of these, what you might call to be
enumerations of space-time problems, foundational space-time problems, lead to a fundamentally different view of how we can actually engage with the furniture of the world. How we see things like change, causation, invariances, instabilities, exceptions, so on and so forth. According to the Boltzmann cosmological hypothesis, which is basically his latest thesis after doubting his own work on the second law of thermodynamics, he defends actually something
more like time is not real and it's also however it is unified with the problem of space it's very actually kantian in nature according i have mentioned this before the science fiction example of this would be like this the cosmological hypothesis How we see the unfolding of time or temporality, the asymmetry of time by which we can derive pneumological expectancies and see change in the stuff in the world depends fundamentally
on thermodynamic statistical configurations of the regions of space and time, or regions of universe in which we live. So Hans Reichenbach in the direction of time says something like that. But imagine that there are humans in this region, there are observers in this region. It's a very small region of universe that is basically characterized by its own statistical anomalies, where the course of unfolding observable impressions for any observer seems to take place from past to the future, figuratively speaking.
In the other regions, there is another race of humans, a different kind of observers, where the course of observation happens, looks like as if it unfolds from future to the past. So what does that mean? I mean, if your course of observation unfolds from the future to the past, means that you no longer is capable of actually even buy into the philosophy of empiricism as being known to us. Isn't it the whole philosophy of empiricism that the empirical evidence, the footprints
of change, lie in the past and from that we epistemologically conclude that certain anticipations should hold if such and such things have happened in the past. So in a universe that the arrow of time comes from future to the past literally don't have such a kind of empiricism. It might be a different empiricism, fundamentally alien to us. So Boltzmann according to Norbert Winner essentially comes up with a science fictional scenario.
you send a spaceship from one of these regions to the other the Fermo's paradox where are they where are the aliens why why haven't they seen them well because the very fact that we are Kate we are not capable of seeing the phenomenon the incoming phenomena from an outer universe in our universe precisely because they fundamentally different in their temporal vectors means that alien space ships or aliens could always have been here it's just
that we see them as part of our natural constitution rather than as an arrival of an alien species, as an object that comes to us. If the time vector is different, that incoming object, that incoming signal can be actually part of our natural constitution. So this is Norbert Linner's science fictional take in his work on cybernetics on Boltzmann cosmological hypothesis. And that's actually fundamentally disturbing idea.
You see, cosmological hypothesis is a hypothesis. It is not even a hypothesis that is agreed upon among scientists. However, it is very, very difficult from the point of a statistical physics to actually rule out such a scenario. And really for Boltzmann, rather than for it to be a statistical challenge to the principle of observable physics or microscopic physics it was actually a philosophical question that yes the change in our conception or representation of time fundamentally change
how we see our interactions with the world with the universe as a whole So I'm sort of curious, like what kind of experimental apparatus would we need in order to collect data in a world that, you know, I mean, you know, I'm really interested in the idea of complexity theory. The island world, the island world, yes. Yeah, the island world, you know, where you have different types of phenomena unfold and different types of things.
Yes, well the thing is that unfortunately it is just a thought experiment. According to the principles of physics, imagine that actually Ehrman, that I have suggested a few of his works for the reading, but a few others also have shown that okay so imagine that the entire idea is that we can in fact even even you know our own physical terms and our own mathematical universes capable of thinking different manifolds of a space and time like for example a four-dimensional different four-dimensional
manifolds of a space and time as a set contained by a five-dimensional space and time now the thing is that literally and this is what Boltzmann hypothesis cosmological hypothesis was that literally there is no way for us to even ever be capable of contacting or seeing these other universes. It is now you see that this is actually a very Kantian thesis. It's exactly like the nominom. It is there. It is what actually allow us to make sensations and come up as objective claims, veridical
claims about the world. But can we ever actually contact the nominum entities? No. This is cosmological hypothesis from a Bolsmanian perspective. such and such principles there is absolutely no way for any observer observer living in one of these manifolds to contact another observer in another manifold and that's really I think it's a fantastic idea for really out there science fictional novel why is that we are so alone in
this world well because well because the principles of physics don't allow us to communicate fuck nature her really I have married I really recommend you to read the direction time by Hans It's a fantastic book, fantastic, utterly beautiful. I will read that. I mean, just to go full science fiction and to bring it back to like your earlier, I mean I think this was like maybe like a month ago now. It seems like a hundred years ago, discussion of different languages and how this could be like a different, oh, I'm forgetting the terminology.
terminology, sort of like different languages for mathematical hypotheses, analogous to like different compiler programs. Yes, yes. Different compilers. So, two questions. The first is, could a sort of a complexity theory or a different... an empiricism without time that is able to be, I mean, this is like a bunch, this is very science fiction-y, an empiricism without time that was capable of being understood by a non-human consciousness.
You know, is this maybe a realm of true prediction? I mean, we sort of like have basically gotten away from conditionals as being possible for predicting anything. And we have to sort of get rid of prediction. Can this bring back prediction? Sure. I mean, I have two answers to this. Is that first would be a challenge. Can there be in fact any possible empiricists in any possible world who can be an empiricist without time? That's, I think, a very good philosophical question. And that would be the platonic challenge to Hume, I would say.
Can we ever, in fact, an empiricist without time? Because the whole premise of any form of empiricism is about the regularities which holds between a sequence of impressions or bundles of perceptions in a human sense now if you don't have such actually what you might call to be the crazy glue namely temporality that holds together our impressions, then there wouldn't be any empiricist. Our observations are as bad as our worst logical syllogism claims about reality,
like Aristotle. Now, this is one. Two, is that the idea that, imagine that, okay, we mitigate the thesis, the thought experiment, and we make some compromise. We say that, okay, it's not that they don't have any conception of time, it's just that their conceptions of times are different, or representations of time are different. Then, as Boltzmann would ask, would it be ever possible for these empiricists to actually have a happy ending, ever life after meeting each other in one single universe?
Now that's I think is a far more interesting question. And actually I would say that this is far more in tandem with how we are going with artificial general intelligence and neuroscientific experimentations that show us that the structure of memory can fundamentally differ, can be reconstructed. So we can have memories in which impressions don't take cues from what has the input that has gone to the memory but from the anticipation of the outputs that come into the memory box.
So these are all thought experiments that we might be able to do. I really don't know. These are fundamentally speculative questions, but nevertheless, just because they're speculative doesn't mean that they are false or they are armchair speculation. I think they are fundamentally important philosophical questions precisely because they bring back highlight the very premises that we have so far taken for granted, namely with regard to the question of memory, the question of anistropia of time, so on and so forth. Something like I think about all the time when we talk about like Kent's conservatism,
and I think we kind of touched on this a little bit at one point can you hear me yes of course okay okay because I'm glad you guys can't hear me I just wonder like something it seems like his conservatism in some ways that it provides some sort of like foundation upon which we can like understand you have to have like some kind of limitation in which like something can valid or like there's something like about the one time or one space that becomes intersubjective that we can understand and use as a way of like verifying things or something like that yes yes however I'm sure as you know
that yes chance believes in transcendental idea of temporality that the that the experience temporality is simply ideal, meaning it's not real. However, this is what you might call to be the dimension of mind. Within the thesis of the transcendental deduction by which the ideal minds are capable of making objective, veridical claims about the furnitures of the world, according to Kant you should in fact have some sort of absolute physical time, the time of the nomina, mind independent time and space. And that's when things go fundamentally
diverging from what you might call regular Parmenidian or Platonic ideas of time. Isn't that more or less an as if argument though, Horkhan? Yes, but is it really as if? Or is it as if as if? You know that Kant is a weasel. He just always tells us how we need to be cautioned about the procedure of the critique. Well
When you actually read his damn book, is he actually a cautionary thinker? Does he follow his own recipes? If it is just an as-if argument and not a constitutive judgment with regard to the absoluteness of the space and time, then how can you actually retain the thesis of transcendental deduction in the last instance? for the nominal entities
who have some primitive, and by that I do not mean causal. Causal for Kant is essentially a categorical thing. It's a species of understanding and hence mind. For nominal entities to have some minimal influence upon our sensations, They should be capable of creating a gradient or congruence of changes. So our sensations ... Okay, let me make a thought experiment for you.
So you have this black box, this green box, whatever you think it's black box. This black box is a nominon. This is a perceptive subject. Okay. We don't know the gulf that lies between the two. We can't even talk about it. It's really dogmatic, precritical philosophy. However, all Kant tries to achieve is that as if this thing was there, this black box, the nominon, but this one is not as if.
This thing is real in a transcendental sense. So how can this, sorry, this, the subject, that perceptive subject, can get an impression of this, of a black box? you can't you can never get the full impression in the in the sense of knowledge you can never know what this thing is you can get all the impressions of it you know it's rectangular color green so on so forth but this is come
this very configuration is predicated on the idea of an absolute space and time not in an as if configuration but as a real configuration because if it was simply an as if configuration the relation between this black box and this a perceptive subject then how can in any possible world this actually influenced this the sensations of the subject that will be just purely a speculity, enthusiasm or various, Kant says it. So there is a presupposition with regard
to the absolute nature of a space and time through which this implicitly influence this. But it seems like, I don't know, what he's saying here is that something like creating reality or presupposing reality in exotic systems is something we should be careful about. That you have to have a certain kind of framework for reality to emerge. Yes, framework is absolutely, framework is the most important thing. And I have mentioned to a few of you, including Jeff, reading Nelson Goodman's, you know,
ways of world making. This frame of reference, the frame of reference, the relevance of the class of problems that he can pose absolutely shifts from context to context. Yes, we can, and this is the whole point of context sensitivity, for the point of the frame of reference, that yes, within the frame of reference, the specific frame of reference, all these things are good and nice. They're actually non-nogmatic and not pre-critical. However, they become fundamentally pre-critical once you actually lose your frame of reference. And that's really the question of Boltzmann.
You see, in one world, the way that objects influence our sensations can be fundamentally different from another frame of reference, another universe, in which the influence of of a stuff in the world upon our senses is something fundamentally different. And hence, the question of objectivity at this point is not the question of reality as if it was something solid, something unified. The question of reality can only be talked by way of objective frames of reference.
And that does not rule out that there may be many, many different kinds of reality, which of course Kant had already called dogmatic, this very thought. There can be different realities out there. I guess I'm just, I don't know how you would, I'm sympathetic to Kant's position on that, partly because how would we even begin to identify, so what- We can never identify those other frames of reference.
I know how you are going to unfold your discussion. Right. All I am saying is that the very frame of reference that you have chosen for your as-if argument is itself fundamentally relative. And hence, it can actually be challenged on the same ground that you could challenge talks about cyber Popeye, lava lamps, you know, all the speculative realist kind of shit that that are being peddled today.
And that's really a germ for even more skepticism. Theo is getting happy now. So it's kind of like in relation to the reference within the system, those things do have degrees of reality? Yes. Or something like that? Not degrees of reality, The reality itself can only be approached by the questions of relevant classes or problems that can be posed in a corresponding frame of reference that makes that reality real. This is Goodmanian thesis. There's a particular variety of the natural frame of reference.
Is it the choice of kind of space and time? You see, okay, one second. Just give me one minute so I can elaborate this coherently. I need some stuff here. One second. Does anyone remember the name of the book that Reza mentioned like 20 minutes ago? Yeah, it's The Direction of Time. Okay, thanks. Bye-bye. Bye-bye. Go on mute. Go on mute again.
Maybe I'd just sort of like to ask the class for people who are interested in I just spilled a whole glass of water on the carpet. Let's forget about it. It didn't happen. it's just biases up time a symmetry up
so with regard to your question the frame of reference let's start from a very basic exam you know that there is already a kind of conflict between what you might call to be Anti-realists and realists, pluralists and monists, relativists and what you might call to be truth vindicators or truth defenders. Of course these factions all can come in various degrees but I'm simply talking about the best
of all of them, like the good relativist versus a good absolutist or a good truthist. Usually the whole point starts from something like a conflict between Mach and his contemporaries, you know got forgotten his name anyway usually comes to something like that that's Sun revolves around the earth in one frame the Copernican frame I mean
In another frame of reference, Earth revolves around the Sun. Now from pure pig-headed relativism or pure pig-headed realist or truthist, there is an essential conflict between these two worlds. There are essentially worlds in conflict, but they are really not. Yes, they are in conflict from the perspective of a Keplerian view, which is another third world, where you neither have a geocentric view nor a heliocentric
you the thing is that however each of these systems actually are capable of coming up with irrelevant and fundamentally legitimate class of questions or problems where the Copernican frame of reference we can legitimately pose such questions as how long does it take for the earth to revolve around the Sun in the toilet in the toilet in the toilet my system such questions are irrelevant nevertheless we can also make a very fundamental
legitimate question how does how long does it take for the Sun to revolve around the earth now you see this is a basic idea of the frame of reference the frame of reference from a logical and empirical perspective is extremely important why because it gives us information with regard to the class of problems that are relevant to our system and can be posed as legitimate questions
But not only that, living in any frame of reference allow us to arrive at an order of derivation, simply from the premises of the system, what else can we derive? What else can we derive? What other facts can we derive? So, this is essentially what you want to call to be the importance of the question of the frame of reference. What might be fact in one frame of reference might be a fiction in another frame of reference and vice versa.
The point is to be capable of, and that's the task of philosophy, that's the task of particularly philosophy of science, to be capable of somehow finding the connective tissues between this frame of reference, so as capable of reinventing this frame of reference at different resolutions of reality without overextending the logic of one world or one frame of reference to another. Exactly again the concept of hardness that we talked via Carnap's idea of explication.
Hardness at the level of the elasticity of the metal beam is not the concept of hardness at the level of nanometric configuration of the metal. We cannot simply overextend or or over a stretch, downward or upward, one hardness, one conception of hardness to another. Because they belong to different scales or resolutions of reality, the frame of reference in which the problem of these concepts are addressed are fundamentally different. You
So in Carnap that's kind of like a confusion of spheres is that kind of like he talks about that a little bit the confusion yes yes and then now you understand why he's so emphasizes so hard and the idea of developing different languages to develop different languages means to take the idea of logic as an organ very very seriously in the sense that each language is the structuring frame of reference for a resolution of reality that is under study.
So does science then become verifying that your frame of reference is correct, so you don't sort of devolve into some sort of... Yes, yes, absolutely. I mean, probably not science, philosophy of science tries to actually articulate that whether the frame of reference under which you address a certain class of problems or questions are relevant to this frame of reference or not. Can they in fact be resolved in this frame of reference or not?
so it's almost like it's taking kind of like another level you know yes yes absolutely hence the entire emphasis we spent what like four sessions on car nap there is a reason the car is important precisely because his later work gives us the best, most what you might call to be in a vulgar sense, open-minded view of the scientific enterprise. Anything else can fall into dogmatism.
Sure, this also can be dogmatic but nevertheless this is all we have at this point. It is what you might call to be, in the Leibnizian sense, the best of all the methodological worlds. Well, it becomes, and this might be very simplistic, but there's a change from what are the laws of nature to, it's almost like set theory, like what are the groups, I mean, the enterprise changes, the scientific enterprise. yes yes you see well it's now becoming very late for me to talk about it
having newton absolute space but you see one of the critique against those people who actually try to show that newton was wrong by virtue of the relativistic framework of space and time is because their entire their entire objection hinges on the very kind of mathematics that they use sure when you use a for example a kind of rimanian cartonian geometry in order to look at the space-time configuration space-time manifold then you see a
relativistic but then this brings back the old question that we have been talking about frequently on what grounds such mathematical fields or instruments are legitimate as designations of physical reality that itself is an open question and there can be shown in fact to be so many mathematical frameworks by which you can derive both absolute Newtonian space and time or fundamentally relativistic frameworks
Theo can you repeat your question my apologies I'm really you know that my eyesight is really bad I just cannot read this stuff. No problem. I mean my first question was just that do you not buy Kant's transcendental proofs where he arrives at what he believes are the... I think it's more that he thinks that it's the only possible way for us to have experience for us in this I don't know even loose sense maybe do you not buy his transcendental proofs because it
seems like it relies upon unified time and space and if you get rid of those I I don't see how... How you can retain it, yes. Yeah. Well, the thing is that I think Kant... You see, the more I have thought about it, after coming from a kind of vulgar materialism, which is the characteristics of French philosopher, I don't have any qualin to call French philosophers vulgar. After coming from that trajectory, Kant's transcendental critique to me sounds like
Quran or Bible. It was just like the canon. But the more I read through it, I thought that those people who think that actually the proof of transcendental deductions are what you might call to be scripts written in the stone are fundamentally dogmatic. The entire point of the critique is simply a thought experiment, as if thought experiment. And that's all we have, all we have. There is nothing else.
I mean, sure, you can be skeptical of this, but then carve with a better alternative, if you will. The thing is that as if, as long as we know that we are in the realm of a thought experiment and these proofs are not what you might call to be canonical proofs but informal proofs in the frame of reference of the transcendental project, then we are fine. We are doing the great task of philosophy. Other than that, I would say that you are a theologist. Any other way, if you think that there are actually hard facts, or you can simply negate
them by virtue of their you know mistakes without coming up with them with with as great help of an alternative then then you are not a philosopher then you are not doing philosophy that the whole point of the critique for me with regard to can't is that he's a person who sees the wealth of the challenges that are ahead of him and these challenges all of them fundamentally nasty they don't go away so instead of trying to respond to each and one of them one
by one, he tries to come up with a framework in transcendental philosophy, the term toward modern philosophy, where under certain conditions such questions can be mitigated so that we possibly might arrive at new solutions after the transcendental turn. And that's really the task of philosophy. As I've always told in the class, it is absolutely wrong for us to think that either science
or philosophy, particularly science, can actually get rid of such pesty problems that plague the foundations of how we approach the objective world. These are absolutely, they are not ever going to go away. This is just a very fact. And really I would say that despite all the shortcomings of Kant, he makes a great attempt to show that we should start from this path onward. We might actually arrive at different kinds of stuff, the detriment of his version of
transcendental philosophy, but this is the premise of modern philosophy. Anything other than that will lead to complete theological bankruptcy. It's not a task of philosophy. You know, I think I was like, one of the things I thought was sort of strange in Carnap was this whole idea that he has with like the that there is like one scientific world in which all relations must exist it's it seems sort of in a way conservative to me too that he sort of maintains that yes right yes I'm reading it properly that there is one objective scientific world before yes yes but
However, to defend Karna, I wouldn't call this a kind of objective world in a way that Kant talks about it. It is not as if there is one world out there that can be called objective. The very notion of objectivity for Karna is fundamentally different from that same notion for Kant. The whole point of objectivity for Karna is simply how we can make new statements about the world in which our observations can be caught up and formatted as new objective statements
about the state of affairs of the world. Carnap's beliefs unlike Kant, there is no such a thing as an object. Objects are simply atomic facts about which we can make a statement in one or another language. really important which means that we can have different accounts of objectivity precisely because we have different classes of a statement because we have different kinds of languages
i was kind of i don't know if i was stretching it too much when i was reading him though um i kind of got the sense that there was like this almost kind of allegorical almost like continental strand there where he's saying like maybe experience car nap is absolutely i mean car nap you see to be honest with you i you know people think in content of philosophy we have heard there's a story is really nasty stories about how uh vienna circles behead content of philosophers in their own you know quarter the none of these true there are urban urban legend car nap is actually far closer to Duluth's than any analytic philosopher and it shows that the entire distinction between
content and analytic is just a sham. It's just some boogeyman made for impressionable graduate students to not move in one direction or another. Yes, absolutely. Carnap is fundamentally continental. I mean, the principle of tolerance, the principle of tolerance is like Lyotard de Verand or Deleuze Rison. Well, that's what I thought was so brilliant about his logical structure of the world is like, I love that there's just virtually no formulas at all. It's all just, and the writing is so interesting because of that. It's so strange and alien.
No, he's superb. I mean, one of the greatest things that's, you know, the aim of these classes are not just about to tell us about the critical history of philosophy, but also alienate us from the prejudices and the biases to which we have climatized, habituated. What are these biases? The idea that we think that continental philosophers are great open-minded people, analytic philosophers are these Hegelian gnomes running around in chaos and trying to kill us, to assassinate
us in every possible opportunity. No, absolutely these are not. whole point is that there has never been a distinction between analytic and continental from the perspective of the history of philosophy but it's I just he was just it seems like in the logical structure of the world like he does make some really bold bold claims about experience in reality that yes yes Justify it with a geometric system. Yes, absolutely. You should understand where that influence is coming from. It's coming from Husserl, a veritable content of philosophy. Literally, the whole point of the earliest elementary experiences
and how we can synthesize them, the so-called autopsychological determination thesis, It's coming absolutely from Lucero. It's not coming from some frigate or some logistice. It's coming from a continental philosopher. but yeah and I think yeah um just and some of the it was just some of the arguments that he's making I think are really interesting just like you should read you should read the last chapter
of the logical syntax of language and also the last chapter of the foundational theories of probability they are utterly alien they are like you know people talk about post human unbound post-human disconnection thesis they haven't really read Karnak before all of you guys there were such philosophers who saw humanity being a fossil literally from their statistical point of view and from the linguistic point of view because what makes us human is nothing but a mixture of
of the statistical capacities and linguistic capacities. Imagine we can come up with new different statistical frameworks. Imagine we can come up with different form of languages. This human, which is not biological in essence, fundamentally different from ours, from the home with sapiens sapiens some of the stuff that Carnap was saying though I can't remember where I read it in Kent but he said something about I think it was arithmetic or something but he's like it's all just relations and that seems to be like the foundational claim for Carnap is it's all
relational and then you know taking looking at it from like um just like a Euclidean perspective in the axioms, or maybe even a Spinoza perspective, the axioms in Spinoza or the axioms in Euclid, you do have these sort of basic ideas that are fundamentally relational. They can't exist independently of their relations. Absolutely, absolutely. And that's the whole point of the Constituations system that Carnap's put forward as early as the Aufbau is the idea that facts, you see, among naive rationalists and naive realists,
the difference between facts and fiction is the difference between that which is found, a law of fact, and that which is made, a law of fiction. However, within the Carnapian constitutional system, everything can be both fiction and fact depending on the frame of reference. Literally, the only thing that makes them facts versus fiction in one system versus another is the kind of relations that hold among them, that is obtained among them in a specific linguistic framework for model relations. Okay, shall we stop?
I think I'm having some sort of bodily meltdown at this point. So hot here. Yeah, we can end the broadcast whenever you want. Anyone who has the final word, I'm willing to listen to it. If not, let's go offline. I mean, one thing that I'm interested in thinking about, and this may be taking the idea of language too seriously, is the sort of language for quantum computing beyond like regular matrices, which strikes me as something like
programming a logical computer with circuit diagrams. So if anyone has any, if anyone's thinking about that or has any kind of thoughts, I mean, ping me, I guess, or... I think you see, Meredith, I think that since the turn of Kornat, the way that he actually depicts language in contrast to Wittgenstein and the pragmatists like Peirce as a calculus, which means a mechanizable edifice a calculus which is also semantic in disguise we see a whole
progression in the philosophy of language that progression is unfortunately up until now it's fundamentally hidden to those philosophers of language who talk about truth about in a canonical sense about meaning so on and so forth you see in fact theoretical computer science today shows that language mathematics computation are all held together by deep fundamental connections. This is what I have mentioned.
It's called the computational tritorium, or computational trinity thesis, in the sense that if you make a revolution in one field, it eventually leads to a revolution in another field. if you make a revolution in language, it will lead into a revolution in computational mathematics and vice versa. Such distinctions, I would say that between language and computational programs no longer holds. It only holds for those people who actually see language from what you might call to be the manifest image, the ordinary talk about the languages that we use.
I don't know if you guys want to go offline, but I was just going to simply check in about next week. And I didn't know what happened with Adam. I missed the first five minutes. So Adam hopefully will join us next week. We'll talk about time and particularly Grun Bown's critique of logical positivism, or logical empiricism particularly its critique of reichenbach and eddington and hopefully adam will add some stuff and i will take it from there and actually provide a kind of a brief critique
of grunbaum by more contemporary philosophers like uh jos offing so if you can just read like All I can tell you, I really don't know the page numbers anymore. In the Foundation of Problems of Space and Time by Grunbaum, check Reichenbach Thought Experiment. Just search it. And there is actually a whole chapter about the critique of this idea that time moves in one direction versus another. And of course I mentioned why this idea of time direction is so important for us to actually
formulate our idea of invariances, instabilities, or pneumological expectability. And basically, Guernbaum utterly crushes the Reichenbach Tath experiment. So you can look at that one. That's a really great start, I would say. All right, I'm going to end the broadcast.