Hello and welcome to the eighth session of Kant's Circle of Revenge with Reza Negrestani. I'm going to pass it off to him now. Where's your milk, Christian? I'm here. Okay, thanks everyone. As I mentioned, today I started to give a little bit of those critical commentaries on Kant's idea of logic and transcendental logic. and then we move on with forms of judgment and categories. So with that said, any question, anything that might have bothered you
since reading these recent chapters? I'm flipping to it right now, but it seems like Kant gives a critique of a form of psychologism when he's talking about pure logic. Sorry, Theo, you got a little bit, your voice got a little bit distorted at my end. Could you please? Sure. So I said, it seems like Kent has a, I'm not positive, but it seems like he has a critique of forms of psychologism when talking about pure logic. When it's in the introduction, he says, as pure logic, it has no empirical principles. Thus, it draws nothing from psychology, as one has occasionally been persuaded, which
therefore has no influence at all on the canon of the understanding. It is a proven doctrine and everything in it must be completed a priori. Yes, yes. I mean, many people, I mean, particularly recent commentators on Kant have written about this. So, you know, starting with Frigge, Frigge essentially argues for Kantian psychology. that's in even in the sense of formal logic there is a residues of psychologists and in can'ts exposition on pure formal logic now the thing is
that the recent commentaries I will post some of them please do remind me to post them. They have pointed out that when it comes to psychologism, there are different variations, at least two, a strong and weak. So Kant obviously, per his own claims, don't fit into what you might call to be a strong psychologism when you are talking about pre-forma logic. But there is in fact weak psychologism. Also, so in terms of pure formal logic, but in terms of transcendental logic,
I would say that Kant facilitates between a strong and weak psychologism. And that's due to the whole idea that he thinks that logic, formal logic, wrested from or divorced from content is simply arbitrary. And I mentioned that there is no such a thing as this hard distinction between form and content in logic. And hence precisely because at the level of transcendental logic, Kant somehow subordinates idea of logic to representational faculties of the locally constituted
subject, the psychologistic consequences would be inevitable. Yes, but yes, in terms of formal logic there is no strong psychologist of the people, you know, more of a metaphysical term before cans but yes this this point has been brought up number of times with the author that female author of transcendental psychology she teaches I think at Columbia Kirchner you know see what I'm talking about no unless you're the only other person I can think of is um let me
search it for you. I mean the other interesting thing about what he criticizes like his criticism of logical illusion as a sophistical art. Yes, well Well that's precisely as I mentioned, you see, Kant is in fact coming from a very Aristotelian informed tradition of logic. So obviously based on the stuff that we talked about Plato in the previous course, it is
So right through the perspective of that Aristotelian account of logic to see pure formal logic as intrinsically susceptible to superstition. But that's not really the case with logic, even logic of the time when Kant was alive. So that's one reason and the other reason is precisely that there is no such a thing as a hard distinction between form and content. There is no such a thing as a formless content. So it's Patricia Kitcher, it's called Kant's Transcendent Psychology. There is a book that I mentioned.
It actually, there is a good argument on this strong versus weak psychologism in Kant's critical reason. Yeah, it seems like the most egregious errors of logical illusion for Kant would be when the logician applies their existing things in themselves. Did I lose you? In themselves? What do you mean by in themselves? Do you mean logic in themselves or do you mean things in themselves?
Maybe what I'm trying to... Things apart from our appearances, now I'm slipping into, I think, maybe psychologistic territory. You see, of course, among many modern logicians, and Russell is a good example of this. is a correspondence theory of logic in the sense that ultimately logical claims have a one-to-one correspondence with you know claims about reality hence the metaphysical metaphysical metaphysical correspondence view of logic but I think Russell and yes there was a movement but but they never gained
the momentum and they heavily came under attack by both philosophers and formal logicians there is no such a thing as correspondence yet if you say that no logical is logical statements logical connectives you know axioms of logic need to be treated on their own ground in their own terms, yes, there is nothing wrong with it. But if you say there is in fact some sort of what you might say a priori correspondence between logical truths and matter of facts of reality, of objective reality of the Giganeshtand,
That would, yes, that would then be a quite erroneous claim. And of course, these are a little bit more subtle than what I'm trying to represent here. It's not that Russell is a simplistic op-sum. Russell is quite an astonishing thinker. But nevertheless, that's a very Russellian view of logic. I'm sure this will be coming up throughout, but it does... Yeah, I'm sure, yeah. You need... I mentioned to you, depending on how much you are invested in this kind of project or philosophy
in general, there is a book called Diagonal Method. I can't remember the exact... I have that one, yeah. So it's a three volume and it's more than 4,000 pages and it oscillates between purely technical and accessibly philosophical by Uwe Peterson where he really goes into depth of these problems. Are there second and third volume of the other volume? So the first volume gives, the first volume if you want to really read it for the first time, the first volume, the introduction, read the introduction so you get the overall scope
of his project. But the real book starts from the second volume where he tries to deconstruct a transcendental term, Kantian transcendental term, you know, by way of, precisely by way of treating logic on its own ground and it's on term and then are there available yeah I did I did ask him I posted about this in the classroom because there's the third the third one is available in the about section but I was wondering if anyone had the first and second ones because yeah I have yes so yes that's that's a
really great book I think is one very very few book maybe the only book ever written on these issues that's a very very you know kind of deep level precisely one of the great things is that you know of course that's it has has a very grotesque style of doing philosophy and writing. So it's basically what you get is this citing different philosophers, you know, Kant, Hegel, Carnac, so on and so forth, so many people. And then he tries to contrast, make the contrast between their views. And
only through this contrastation converge upon some kind of integral view of logic that does not fall into traps of transcendental philosophy, Hegelian dialectics, or that kind of very over-ambitious scope of formalistic logic. Any more questions? Artem, Chagis. Chagis, I think we can't hear you if you're trying to speak.
I said that, any more questions? Chagis was trying to ask a question, but maybe you can type it in the sidebar and I'll just ask it for you. Is that right, Chagis? I still can't hear you. okay so chuggies says could we talk a little bit about the relationship between just junctive slash problematic hypothetical slash uh esoteric categorical versus apodictic relationships are these relations always paired with these modalities how does this relate to the quote life of thoughts
what do you mean by this mode okay how does this relate to I mean so we will I think I probably it's not a good idea to answer this question you know before we get into the doctrine of categories, metaphysical deduction, and the threefold synthesis. But the thing is that using a kind of analogy for you, and as always, never overextend the analogies so we know that the transcendental logic as a field of
cognition and that is capable of gaining traction on a giganish sounds reality a sensible reality is constituted of two extreme levels the sensible and the understanding. When it comes to extremes, we know that transcendental logic seeks to integrate and bridge the gap between that which is sensible and that which is the object of thought or understanding. You can think about the relation between such modalities of thinking in terms of the relation
between the sensible, the sensibly informed understanding and understanding as such for pure concepts, okay, which are logical. So depending, for example, in today's vocabulary, using today's expression, we can say that it is ultimately the difference between empirical computation and logical computation. So there is a gap between the two. Once you try to bridge the gap, you don't arrive at one modalities of thinking, but you arrive at multi-modalities of thinking. You know, one of the
reasons that Kant, I think, can be said to avert Hume's problem of induction is precisely because he sets a new standard for thinking, that cognition is a multimodal field. You have different modalities of thinking, modalities of inferences, so on and so forth, modalities of claims and assertions, as opposed to the human idea that everything can ultimately all of our knowledge is inductive in tandem with his empiricist project. Or for example, as opposed to later philosophers like Pooper, who thinks that everything is
ultimately deductive. So you might say that the relation between such modalities of thinking is about bridging the gap in multiple stages within pure dimension of thinking and the sensible dimension of thinking. You need to have different modalities in order to subtly and coherently bridge the gap. Otherwise, you will end up in either dogmatic rationalism or skeptical empiricism.
That would be inevitable. So for now, just very, very briefly, I wanted to say that, you know, if you, for example, hypothetical thinking from, for example, something like, I don't know, like categorical thinking. When we are talking about hypotheses, we are talking about evidence. So our thinking is not pure. Now, this becomes even more convoluted and complex when we understand that what we call
evidence also has its own different layers of what counts as evidence. Is it an observational data or is it a reference, as Carnot would say, as a reference to observational data, posed within the structure of, for example, the scientific theory or an assertion? So depending on these, you get even different, not just relations between hypothetical, categorical, but you get different levels of hypothetical thinking. in the direction or addressing the question of how to in the most fine great manner bridge the
gap between the sensible thinking and pure thinking so all the relations ultimately come to address this gap. And more advances in logic and computation and philosophy and language have made to even go beyond these kinds of rudimentary Kantian distinctions to introduce new forms of thinking, what Cohen at some point in his works called new thought determinations. And that's exactly, you know, from a Kantian perspective, you would say that's the task of transcendental logic.
So I just wanted to just talk about a little bit of this, about what is really the relation. The relation, well, you need to think about this relation, about the relation between two extremes, the sensible dimension of thinking and the pure dimension of thinking. we get into the categories and other stuff I will I will try to at least you know address a few of these distinctions more covee or anything if not I will start then so you know let's start with some of the
I'll read you a few of these citations made by Uy Peterson on the idea of Kant and transcendental logic and we'll talk about them sorry I have missed my record page I need to So, this is from Uy Peterson.
It says, Number two, no organon of the sciences. This is, you know, we know that this is a Kantian thesis. Pure general logic, insofar as it abstracts from all objects,
it is no longer an organon of sciences. It is the canon, as we read last time. By organon, namely, we understand an instruction, for bringing about a certain cognition. This implies, however, that I already know the object of the cognition that is to be produced according to certain rules. An organ of the sciences is therefore not mere logic because it presupposes the exact knowledge of the sciences, of their objects and sources. Thus, mathematics, for example, is an excellent organ known as a science containing the ground
of the expansion of our cognition in regard to certain use of reason. Number three, as a science of the necessary laws of thinking, again this is a very Kantian one, without which no use of the understanding and of reason takes place at all." Now what is important here is that Kant's characterization of logic as general grammar, And that's exactly what Kant characterizes pure formal logic as general grammar and its
relentless opposition of form and content, the rejection of logic as an organo. You see that these are essentially the consequences of how Kant contrast transcendental logic with pure formal logic. characterization of logic as pure grammar or general grammar, the hard distinction between form and content, and ultimately the rejection of logic as an organ. Logic is only identified as a canon.
This is Hartman and Schwartz's translation of Kant, and this is a quotation from Kant, where he says, logic cannot be a science of the speculative understanding. Again, you know, we are in the business of nitty-gritty philosophy at this point. understanding of a speculation is fundamentally different from Hegel's. Okay? We talked a little bit about this last session. He then continues, for as a logic of speculative cognition or of the speculative use of reason, it would be an organ of other sciences and not merely a
propedeutic concerned with all possible use of the understanding and of reason. So at least since Hegel, this Kantian approach perspective on logic, shown to be questionable and shaky, precisely because logic is understood as a groundwork. Logic is no longer a canon for science, it's no longer a canon for cognitions.
is really the tool of doing is what you might call to be the very condition of possibility of science and cognition and pure and cognition as such so this this difference between a hegelian perspective and the kantian perspective on logic ultimately leads to what you might call the difference between Kant's understanding of transcendental logic on the one hand and we know that transcendental logic is supposed to get rid of this sophistry and susceptibility
of pure general logic on the one hand and Hegel's idea of dialectical and speculative logic or reasons on the other. Sorry. The curse of PDF bookmarking.
I have lost my bookmark here. OK. Again, from Kant, logic has not gained much in content since Aristotle, and indeed it cannot do to its nature. There are but few sciences that can come into permanent state beyond which they undergo no further change. To these belong logic and also metaphysics.
Aristotle had omitted no moment of the understanding. So you see, there is, here you see a kind of, again, residues of Kant's subordination of reason and understanding to intuition. So Kant, we know that Kant believes in such things as things in themselves, as inexhaustible, by the sensible intuitions of the subject.
And he also believes in something called pure concepts of understanding, or understanding as such, and logic, along that realm. Now, the thing is that in so far as for Kant, the core of objective reality is inexhaustible, and this inexhaustibility can be traced to things in themselves. It means that transcendental logic, namely impure and particular logic, is also inexhaustible. And it contrasts the inexhaustibility of transcendental logic
with what he thinks is the exhaustibility of pure logic. That in so far as pure logic doesn't have any footing in objective reality of the Giganishtand, then it should be exhaustible. There is a point at which this science can no longer be developed. You reach the point of exhaustion. So you see, in his definition of logic, in this contrastation between pure and formal logic and transcendental logic, ultimately lies implicit metaphysical, Kantian metaphysical assumptions. With regard to whether logic is pure, formal logic can be in fact treated as a science,
And if it can be treated as science, can it be treated as inexhaustible? Kant's answer to this question is no. And it's no precisely because undergirding his definition of logic lies his implicit metaphysical assumptions. Any question on this? So, he thinks, you see, we have already put forth the nature of transcendental truth, that we can't talk about reality, of course, for now we are talking about simply the reality
of the Ganeshhtan, but not in the Hegelian or Noh-Kantian sense, the reality as is and art at the same time you are simply talking about Kantian idea of reality we know that talking about this reality without the domain of understanding would count as pre-critical moments right it's pre transcendental so but it seems that Kant's contrastation between pure and formal logic and transcendental logic, one being on the side of the pure concepts and the other one being on the side of intuitive, the gap
between intuitive and understanding, seems to drive its energy and source from a pre-critical moment. There is in fact something called an inexhaustible reality. The inexhaustibility of which guarantees the inexhaustibility of transcendental logic and only corroborates the exhaustibility of formal logic. But we know that how can you really talk about reality without formal logic? How can you talk about content without form, without slipping back to critical metaphysics?
Chargis, I'll ask your question on the sidebar because I think something's still wrong with your mic, but you say, when you talk about metaphysical assumptions, are you going back to the transcendental aesthetic and the inexhaustibility of intuition? Yes, and inexhaustibility of intuition precisely because our intuitions are sensible rather than intellectuals, and there is a nebulous correlation with the inexhaustibility. The source of this inexhaustibility can be said is not just in the fact that our intuitions are sensible rather than intellectual, unlike God, but also in the inexhaustibility of the
nominum, of the things in themselves. Feel free to type more if you want, and I'll just be your translator. Charlie has been sonically grounded today. I can see him. He's talking. More questions. I mean, these are, you know, I mean, they are simple, but when you think about them, you see that despite their simplicity, they start to make these cracks and fissures in Kant's philosophy.
And these are really in tandem with all of those stuff that we talked about and you know, cited Jacobi, you know, reliance of transcendental methods on things in themselves. I mean there's some serious tightrope walking going on in this whole project. Yes, I wouldn't say it's tightrope walking, I would say that it's the illusionist performance of a tightrope walker. He tries to pretend as if he is walking this fine road, but he's not really doing it. well how i mean i i feel like i can't talk about a lot of the
more recent logics but obviously what kant has in his time is uh rationalists with entirely different perspectives yes yes battling each other with no way to or seemingly no way to reconcile these perspectives right Yes, absolutely. Kant is essentially coming from the tradition of rationalist metathletics, of German legacy, like Cruzius. So he is really, I don't think that he ever managed to fully divorce himself from the influence of this brand of metathletics.
So this is one, and another thing, another point of influence on Kant is Aristotelian logic. So the mixture of these two is quite a lethal one. Once you try to bring back, I mean, still working the framework of Aristotelian logic while having some residues of German metaphysics, then this is obvious, you know, these are basically all this stuff that we get, things in themselves, logic as a canon, you know,
the whole idea that there can be such a thing as content without form and form without content, These are all the consequences of those, negative consequences of this mixture of having Arcotelian logic and coming from a very direct metaphysical trajectory. And I would say that you see sometimes people usually in philosophy think that methodology is something that makes your way of doing philosophy and how you reach your philosophy
goals optimal but no methodology informs the very foundation of how you do philosophy insofar as kant's methods are contaminated his philosophy is tainted Maybe it will be beneficial to everyone else if I sort of ask you one of the questions I was asking you earlier this week, which was it seems like on the one hand there's this way in which we verify statements through how we can logically justify them. and that's one poll and the other poll which Kent wants to maintain is this how we verify the truth
of those logical statements is through application to objects in general but it's obviously it's a there's a strange dynamic happening there because it's not as if we just say like we can't you know we don't want to fall into the myth of given when we point to something outside of us and say, use that as the ground of our knowledge. Yes, no, no, this is absolutely correct. This is the whole thing that's, you know, when I mentioned that in retrospect you can say it, but obviously Cam is not interested in this retrospect move that there is something outside of us that constrain our cognitions in positive and negative sense but he wants to talk about the conditions
of possibility at the level of conditions of possibility then this is becomes dogmatic metaphysics and there is no way around it you know I suggested to you all of you reading Pete Wolfe and his transcendental realism it's an astonishing essay it's really really astonishing you know revisiting it's a year ago I noticed that so Pete is quite careful to not fall in the trap of the things in
themselves Allah speculative realism because it's making the realism for big Every part is really the thing in itself, just candy wrapped in a different jargon. So he's very, very careful about this. He distinguished between, he introduces different understanding of reality, different indices of reality, what you might call to be the deflationary ones who think that the designation of being is the designation of logic. You can get diverse range of such thinkers from Lorenz Pantone to Brandon to Quine McDowell, so on and so forth.
So Pete wants to stay away, he wants to endorse what you might call the global deflationary account of reality or the sign, being there. For something to be there, it needs to be there as a designation of logic, as a designation of our conceptual inferential domain or the dimension of mind's structure. So Pete wants to endorse this thesis, but also he wants to... forego with a global deflationary philosophy like Brando, like Quaid, like McDowell, so
on and so forth, and instead go with a non-global version in the sense that there is in fact such a thing as an object, a giganishtan of reality that constrains what we say and what we think. And the way that of course he formulates objects is no longer things in itself. It's what we're called to be the object of science, of a scientific theory. Yes, this works. But even within this realm, you need to be very careful. I would say, this time that I read it, it seems that it's still quite susceptible to,
Again, all of these charges are being levied against Kant, a kind of surreptitious, critical metaphysics. I mean, the simplest way I can think of an objection to, well, it's not to Kant, but it's this alternative that we're speaking about. I guess it's not the form of our justifications that makes the statements themselves true. If we say that it's the form of our justifications which makes the statements themselves true, then I don't understand how we don't slip into just absolute nonsensical relativism.
Well, you see, this is, I think, more complex than this. As I mentioned, you see, Kant asks what is truth, and he flattens down the idea of truth to intuitive content or cognition or pure thoughts. The thing is that you cannot answer such questions without having different grades or concepts truth. If we are in really in the business as Kant was in understanding the condition of the possibility of arriving at truths for matter of facts about
objective reality then there is absolutely no way for us not having a theory of truth and justification that is absolutely purely formally logical divorced from all sorts of contents this is not to say that this truth would would amount to the kind of truth about objective reality, an epistemological truth. But nevertheless, you can't have the latter without the former. If you do not know how to apply concepts, if you do not know what would be the logical relations
and inferential relations with the concepts, assertions, claims, so on and so forth, in their own domain, then there is no way to apply concepts to the intuitive objects correctly so as to arrive at something that Kant might call truth. So I think this is, these are ultimately you see that, you know, this whole idea that stuff you think that analytic philosophy is some sort of pure knee-jerk reaction or reason against you know the dogmas of truth no analytic philosophy is quite actually well
aware aware of these problems that this whole concept of truth no matter how much you think after learning so much content of philosophy and corrupted, it's actually quite really important for understanding why is that when we say something about the world, not only makes sense, but also is objectively true. This whole idea of fact, arriving at a fact, you can't have just the idea of truth at the level of the intuitive content. You need to have a logical theory, a pure logical theory of truth.
But of course, again, this comes back to that idea that the logical understanding of, the logical idea of truth is absolutely necessary, however is not sufficient for epistemic truth. But conversely, you cannot have epistemic truth without the absolute necessity of logical truth, justification on purely formal logical grounds. What is really important is how to bridge the gap between the two.
And I think again Kant here sheds a great light on this issue. This whole idea of transcendental logic tries, attempts, even though in a very distorted to address this question. Of course, the way Kant formulates it, insofar as he doesn't really have a good grasp of logic, he tries to completely dismiss the idea that there is such a thing as the absolute necessary logical truth, elaborated in its own terms.
Come back. And I will read more, and then we go to the doctrine of categories. Great, this sounds good. Excellent. About four minutes or something. Sure. Thank you.
Okay. I think. So coming back to this idea that there is another way to approach address this question you see it seems that Kant's idea of existential quantification the idea of existence for something to be there of the sign origin seems to be a sensible object of a giganish times And he thinks that ultimately logic needs to be put in the service of this idea of existence
in the sense of an object that ultimately gives content to mind. Now, one of the interesting points is that surprisingly enough, Kant's idea of logic also has quite fundamental ramifications for his theory of morality, autonomy, reason, so on and so forth. This is part of Herman Cohen's critique of Kant, that he, Herman
Cohen thinks that ethics should be simply logic in a different guise. So how does he think about this? He says that just as we are going to have Dasein something is there an object a geganishtand we should have a dasign of logic something ought to be there something ought to be there and the rules
of something ought to be there are not given by the Dasein of a sensible object. And he believes that something ought to be there in fact takes priority over something is there, Dasein as a Gegenstand. That in fact you can't talk about an object without something to be there, the logical design. So this is another way of thinking about this in terms of the tripathlet of logic, ethics and facts about objective reality.
Now, coming back to the critique of Kant's idea of logic, Hegel says something like that. He says, it is declared to be an abuse when logic, which is supposed to be merely a canon of judgment is regarded as an organon for the production of objective insights. The notions of reason, in which we could not but have an intimation of a higher power and a profounder significance, no longer possess a constitutive character as do the categories.
They are mere ideas. we are quite at liberty to use them. But by these intelligible entities in which all truth should be completely revealed, we are to understand nothing more than hypotheses. And to ascribe absolute truth to them would be the height of caprice and foolhardiness, for they do not occur in any experience. Again, he says something, another quote from Hegel, the logic of the concept, capital C, is usually treated as a science of form only
and understood to deal with the form of notion or concept, judgment and syllogism as form. without in the least touching the question whether anything is true. The answer to that question is supposed to depend on the content only. If the logical forms of the notion were really dead and inert receptacles of conceptions and thoughts, careless of what they contained, knowledge about them would be an ideal curiosity which the truth might dispense with. On the contrary, they really are, as
forms of the notion, the vital spirit of the actual world. That only is true of the actual which is true in virtue of these forms through them and in them as yet however the truth of these forms has never been considered or examined on their own account any more than their necessary interconnections so you see the whole idea Hegel already points to a few directions that they have mentioned And getting rid of the hard distinction between form and content, which was a flaw in Kant's
exposition, but also the idea that without understanding truth at the level of form as absolute truth we should treat forms in their own terms and that's the only way that we can reach what Kant might have called truth now this particularly the last part of it is you know it says as yet however the truth of these forms has never been considered or examined on their own account anymore than their
necessary connections this necessary connections is particularly important it's the whole idea of dialectics on the concepts the inferential relations between the concepts are the ones that provide us with the contents Interconnections between forms are content generative. Content doesn't come out of nowhere. It comes from the inferential articulation of how these forms stand with regard to one another.
So, again, another one from Hegel. The mere logic of the understanding is contained in the speculative logic. By speculative logic, Hegel, as I mentioned, the word speculation means, so it has a connection with the word off-haven, suspension or sedulation, Negation is understood as thought itself. Negation allows you to create a dynamic between equally justifiable contrasting categories,
like being and nothing. Hence, it creates a back and forth dynamic that allows you to move from two indeterminate categories to a more determinate category, or less determinate category to a more determinate category. Hence, you can create a structure in which pure thought determinations become more and more determinate but also particularized. And a speculation in this scenario is responsible for temporary suspend what it seems to be
immediate data, immediately given to you as truth. So you have the immediacy of being and nothing. Each of these categories or concepts appear to you as immediate. But Hegel wants to show that these are all mediated. Hence, the movement of logic is the movement from immediacy to mediation and from mediation to the immediacy of logic.
Do you want to go first? Sure. So you have the immediate, you see? This immediate, the first kind of immediate is what you might call to be an immediate in the sense that it is as if the world has given you this category. The method of the given. That is immediate. I know everything about it there is this is like a fundamental category right like being a nothing this immediacy is given to you and you treat it as immediate negation however suspends may be alien sense suspends the immediacy of leads in favor of medias see that such
fundamental categories such fundamental pictures of the world that appear to be immediate are are actually mediated. Only in the last instance, what has proved to be mediated can be shown to be immediate from the beginning. The immediacy of which is not given by nature, but by logic. So, the mere logic of understanding is contained in the speculative logic and can be made out
of that one immediately. It needs nothing for that, but to omit from it the dialectical and reasonable, thus it turns into what the ordinary logic is, a story of variously compiled thought determinations which in their finitude count for something infinite. And then he again goes on saying that a speculative logic contains all previous logic and metaphysics. It preserves the same forms of thought, the same laws and objects, while at the same time remodeling and expanding categories. The basic illusion in scientific empiricism is always this, that it employs the metaphysical categories of matter, force, not to mention one, many, universal, and infinite, and so on.
Furthermore, it continues to reason along the line of these categories, thereby assumes and applies the forms of reasoning, and doesn't know in all this that in this way it itself contains and carries on metaphysics, and employs those categories and their connections in a completely uncritical and unconscious way. Hitherto, the notion of logic has rested on the separation, presupposed once and for all, in the ordinary consciousness of the content, emphasized, of cognition and its form, again
emphasized, of truth and certainty. First, it is assumed that the material of knowing is present on its own account as a ready-made world apart from thought. The thinking on its own is empty and comes as an external form to be said material, fills itself with it, and only thus acquires the content and so becomes real knowing. So you see this is trying to build up a critique of Kant. Further, these two constituents, for they are supposed to be related to each other as constituents and cognition is compounded from them in a mathematical, in a mechanical or
at best chemical fashion, are appraised as follows. The object is regarded as something complete and finished on its own account, something which can entirely dispense with thought for its actuality, while thought, on the other hand, is regarded as defective because it has to complete itself with a material and, moreover, as a pliable indeterminate form, has to adapt itself to its material. is the agreement of thought with the object. And in order to bring about this agreement, for it does not exist on its own account,
thinking is supposed to adapt and accommodate itself to the object. Thirdly, when the difference of matter and form, of object and thought, is not left in that nebulous indeterminateness, but is taken more definitely, then each is regarded as a sphere divorced from the other. Thinking, therefore, in separation and formation of material does not go outside of itself. Of the material and the conforming of itself to its remains, to it remains a modification of its own self. it does not result in thought becoming the other of itself and
Self-conscious determining moreover belongs only to thinking in its relation to the object Therefore thinking does not go out of itself to the object this as a thing in itself remains a sheer beyond of Thought So you kind of encapsulate all we said about, you know, this whole idea that essentially Kant's exposition on logic and his critique of pure general logic comes down to his metaphysical, metaphysical assumptions and the first you know symptom of them is that our
distinction between form of content material and thinking Reza can I ask a question yes absolutely um it's to go back only slightly it's I I was going to ask about this opening move of the science of logic, so the sort of unfolding of the concept from being to nothing to becoming. And I wanted to ask it specifically with reference to the idea that, well, because this is allegedly like a presuppositionless beginning, like starting with being is supposed to be the most abstract concept
or the most indeterminate concept and therefore it's sort of allegedly presuppositionless. I wondered if you could say something about that. And also, I feel like I've seen you elsewhere say that there's a possibility and a need to update dialectical logic with tools from logic. I wondered if you could point towards what that would mean, how that might be done. Okay, so, sure. I mean, obviously, you know, any scholar of Hegel would object to my understanding of Hegel,
but I never take myself as a Hegelian or Kantian. I always say that I think it's a sin against philosophy to remain orthodox to this or that philosopher. We shouldn't take any philosopher as a Bible. So, yes, Hegel believes that being is presuppositionless. but I think that that cannot be done without taking negation as the the fundamentals. And negation is thinking, in a very long tradition coming from Plato.
Without negation, being remains a fundamentally pseudo-category, pseudo-concept. So the first things that you are in fact getting in Hegel, I would say, is negation and being, and nothing is something of a complementary, you know, ad hoc, you know, addition to, you know, initiate or trigger the game of negative and positive reasons, dialectic and speculation. Now, because if you take being without thinking, then you are simply not really in the domain
of proper dialectical reason or the concept, but you are in the domain of pure metaphysics. So you have to have something in addition, thinking. And thinking is not a character. Thinking is what initiates and completes the movement of the concept or the notion, the negation. So you need to have negation as what you might call to be the architectonics of all concepts, and then you need to have something that constrains this, which is being. This is not by any means, I would say, a revolutionary move done in philosophy by Hegel.
This is really the premium question of philosophy, thinking and being. It's just the ordering of these that's is quite ingenious in Hegel. So this is one, being is not presuppositionless in this sense, really, despite Hegel's own claim. The supposition of being is thinking. And this is not thinking in a kind of pure logical sense, but the dynamic of negation as that which can, in a platonic sense, distinguish being from non-being.
the movement of determinations. Okay, yeah, don't worry. I wasn't looking for you to vindicate Hegel. I just wanted to know what your opinion on it was. Yes, no, I think that Hegel is on the right track for the most part. So this I said for the most part and then the caveat here brings me to the answer to your second question, that you say that why a speculative logic as forged in the manner of Hegel need to be updated by something like formal logic or mathematical formal in a sense.
You see, Hegel attempts to posit thinking or negation as the proto-foundation for every other movement in dialectics and in speculative logic. But the kind of version of negation that he provides is quite Aristotelian. It's an Aristotelian concept of negation, which in today's logic, they call it alithic negation. It's the idea that simultaneously, you posit polar assertions,
polar assertions, and negation simply is the articulation of these polarities. And if you really look at Science of Logic and also encyclopedia, you see that there is, despite Hegel being always subtle and quite sophisticated, there are once in a while when it gets to the idea that really what is negation? What is the function of negation? Which is the function of thinking as such. Hegel seems to resort to some sort of a sneaky gerrymandering. He says minus A, negative sign, A, positive sign, A, and he compared the idea of being a nothing
to these kinds of polarities, explicitly and simultaneously asserted polarities. So this is called elitic negation. It's a negation in which you say that negation is not really, really the fundamental, but is mediated by presupposed or pre-given polarities or assertions, as if you have the negative positive sign or polarizations of these concepts, and then negation simply builds on this. But according to Hegel's own account, this cannot be possible, because that's because the whole point of dialectic it should start from the
mediations of the concepts in order to reach the immediacy so if polarization so the idea is that we should show rather than taking polarizations as immediate according to Hegel's own version of dialectic we which should show that they are in fact derived from thinking. But obviously, Hegel's account of negation doesn't allow for this, and of course, you know, for obvious historical reasons, being the Arcotelian one. This whole idea that what is exactly negation, what is its function, and how can you bring the idea of negation to some protological foundation in which negation
can be instantiated and in fact constitute polarization rather than being built on polarization is something that can only be done in formal logic by looking into advances in formal logic in mathematical logic to see what is exactly the function of negation and how logical connections no matter how rudimentary they might look like are in fact mediated and derived from this architectonic fundamental process which is called negation of thinking so this is this is one of the reasons that i mean this is one of the reasons of why hegel needs to be 10 the read in tandem with
developments in contemporary logic. Not to rectify, not to somehow show that Hegel was wrong, but to show that Hegel was right. He was right, he was on the right track, but But the very tools that he uses, the very concepts, so-called, apparently from a Hegel perspective, presuppositions of these concepts that he uses, don't yield such ambitions at the end of the day. And in order for you to really try to bring it back to the right track, you need to rectify
some of these rudimentary concepts and moves in Hegel. But then again, so this is one, I mean, the most fundamental, the idea of negation, which is, for Hegel, the most fundamental one. Another one is the whole idea that the idea of dialectics what you might call to be a very, precisely because the function of negation that Hegel introduces as being responsible for the negative reason in the dialectical movement is circumscribed by the Aristotelian framework.
His idea of dialectics is also circumscribed by this function of negation, by this negation that is not fundamental. you can show that if you move and if you try to bridge the gap between a speculative logic and formal logic you can show that speculative logic can in fact accommodate a much broader broader dialectical behaviors you can add to the richness of dialectics precisely because negation is no longer a gerrymandered polarity. It's no longer some sort of a dishonest form of negation. It is really fundamental. And once you bring, give back negation as a fundament of thought,
its true power, you see that it unbinds the idea of dialectics. dialectics and really when you look into you know today's more advanced forms of Logic like Johnny visual arts work like you know Logic of computability so on and so forth then you see that these are they might look as if you know they're quite out there but But I think that they are absolutely can be brought back and folded back into the idea of dialectics and enrich the idea of dialectics. And the whole idea of objectivation, you see, because the whole idea of science of logic,
it tries to say that objects, there is no object without logic. The more you enrich the pure idea of logic, the more chance you have to expand the scope of what you mean by the objective. Sounds like in some way that's similar to Deleuze's critique of Hegel, but instead of rejecting negation altogether, sort of expanding the notion of what negation is. To be honest with you, I'm really at this moment, the only kind of deluge that I can
comment on with some sort of certainty is deluge of difference of repetition. I'm not familiar with deluge. I mean, yes, I understand, you know, Deleuze's idea of kind of rudimentary. I mean, I've read it. But I can't really remember, you know, that much about Deleuze's idea of negation. And I think that I need to get back to this and see that, you know, how far... Because, you know, obviously, we know that in Continental Philosophy, at least the kind of picture of Deleuze that he introduces, you know, anti-negativist. But yes, I think that at least some evidence in difference and repetition shows that Deleuze
is not really this kind of pure affirmationist. What is your point of reference here, Hunter? Do you miss any particular work? Yeah, I'm thinking of difference in repetition too. I mean, you know, he sort of associates negation with the concept, but sort of a Aristotelian notion of the concept and sort of the idea of thinking different without the concept. He's sort of thinking of it in terms of a more, you know, Simondonian kind of systems thing. Just briefly on the concept of Dilla's negation. There's actually a really good book on this by Andrew Kauf about Dark Dulles. I mean, I totally disagree with it, but I think it's really good reading Dulles,
and it just reads, like, in different repetitions, particularly like the third synthesis of Venados, which is like this, like, obscure, exterior, like, destructive impulse, which destroys interiority, destroys the world, destroys any positive concept. But, yeah, I just wanted to mention that book. It's actually particularly good. No, I'm aware of this thing, but I mean, really, since the last time I read Deleuze, it's been, let's say, 15 years, if not 20 years, so I need to get back to this and see, you know, now that the content of Deleuzeanism has somehow fizzled out, it's time to read
the lose without any kind of bias neither to all getting too overexcited not getting too hostile yeah I need I really need to get back and we saw this sudden you know come with you know some cool years others as whether the loses can be said to be a still you know in the in can't knows whether the lose can maintain some sort of negation some sort of gives room for some sort of fundamental function of negation or not it's interesting that you say that you think that like the problem of being or thought is so central to Hegel because
it seems like that's that's the premise of the Kantian critique is to somehow Absolutely. I mean, no matter how much Hegel criticized transcendental method, he is building on the transcendental method. He believes that he's a critical thinker, and the gesture of critical philosophy is a transcendental theory. So there is no way to get out of this. This is not really a transcendental. This is the most premium question of philosophy, at least since the time of Arminianus. Yeah, then I suppose this is the importance for Kant of the thing in itself
as a way of dealing with the antinomy of either intellectual intuition, which is this form of crude idealism, where it's the subordination of the object to thinking, absolutely and versus a form of materialist fatalism which is the subordination of thought to the object both of which he thinks are unintelligible positions yes no I know I completely and you know I'm neither sold it is you know obviously anything that I tell you I might come back year
later and say that what I said was just bullshit. But the thing is that I take myself as someone who oscillates between Kant and Hegel. I think that there are still fundamental insights, critical insights in Kant that Hegel doesn't have. And Hegel has some fundamental insights that absolutely Kant doesn't I'm not so and so I refuse to budge in for any of these camps I you know the only way I can see is some sort of reengineering and mutation precisely because you see the whole idea of the constant you know those of you
I've seen you know my long long conversations between me Pete or not Rodnick and Harrison Floss on Facebook I do believe that Hegel absolutely believes in intellectual intuition of the concept the notion does begin being a transcendental philosopher I even dimension of intellectual intuition no matter in what context it really creeps so I think that there is that there is this so yes there are there you know things that I think that Hegel no matter
how sophisticated he is, but he doesn't surrender to the charm of pre-critical philosophy, but unfortunately he falls prey to theology. Now you can judge which one is worse, theology or pre-critical philosophy. Yes, no, I think that there is a fundamental theological dimension in Hegel, a theology that is teleological in fact. And Kant's flaw as we have seen is really this whole idea of he's not capable of, for the choices,
the logical choices that he has made, he's not capable of looking into understanding and reason their own terms and that renders him ultimately susceptible to psychology okay one one one minute I will come back and start okay Chagis, I'll read your question when you guys come back.
Reza, just so you know, the computer is muted there. Maybe I can unmute you. I unmuted you. There, I got you. So what is Chagis' question? So Chuggies asks, how does negation relate to disjunctive relations? A74 in the critique on disjunctive relations, quote, this community consists in the fact that the cognitions reciprocally exclude one another and yet as a whole determine thereby the true cognition.
For taken together, they constitute the whole content of a single given cognition, end quote. And then Chuggies just added, he said, related question, is quantity quality relation and modality necessarily fixed or can they be combined and or experimented with? So you see, that's exactly, Hegel and Kant still understand the idea of disjunctive thinking and negation on the same Platonic plane, I mean, our Sicilian plane. It's the idea that negation for them is one that excludes the other.
in order for you to reach these kinds of exclusive, or what Ken calls community, you need to assert them at the same time. You know, persistence, and for example, in existence. For example, contingency and necessity. These are community, you know. In order for them to become disjunctive, to become, you know, negative, mutually exclusive, need to be there at the same time but that's precisely an elitic idea of negation that is not really fundamental in logic in order for you to really move one you know a step deeper
You need to grasp an idea of negation in which the truth values are not given. You see the truth values of necessity and contingency can only be posited once both claims are asserted, that the world is contingent, the world is necessary. truth determination is already given by way of pre-established polarities between the concept of contingency and the category of contingency and category of necessity. Now logic, modern logic doesn't, I mean past classical logic really, doesn't really approach negation like this,
that the truth value is actually determined by the function of negation. In order for that to be the case negation needs to go needs to be more architectonic it needs to be more foundational i would love to talk about this but that requires a whole you know bunch of stuff about logic and how it understands negation but yes absolutely from a kantian idea of community in categories and Hegelian idea of dialectics are quite actually related, even if Kantian says that no it's not Hegelian, Hegelian says that no it's not Kantian. No, they are related precisely because they are predicated on a particular concept of
negation which has been inherited from the time of Aristotle, alitic negation. simultaneous assertion of truth values. In an earlier seminar, you talked for a while about intuitionist logic as kind of like a form of logic that posits negation as prior to having any possible terms. Would you say that's the form of contemporary logic that... So intuitionistic logic is not really intuitionism. You see intuitionism is of a Brauer's mathematics, constructivism.
Intuitionistic logic of Hayting and you know, other Kolmogorov uses elements of Brauer's Kantian constructivism with elements of classical logic. Let's say that it is more fundamental, the idea, so that the function of negation in internationalistic logic is more fundamental than that of classical logic and by extension Aristotelian logic, but it is still not fundamental, precisely because it relies on certain constraints, unnecessary constraints of classical logic still.
But you see that at least in the unfolding development of contemporary logic, those forms of logic that finally the idea of negation was elaborated fundamentally by way of so-called notion of duality, mathematical logic, were borrowed and derived from intuitionistic logic. So it played a kind of a key role in development of what you might call to be a protological idea of negation, negation as really the fundament. But you don't really get that kind of fundamental protological idea of negation in intuitionistic logic. you get a better one a better version but it's not really you know fundamental
precisely because of the constraints of classical logic in it maybe we should move forward and yes a lot of these questions in the classroom So the objective logic then takes place rather of former metaphysics which was intended to be scientific construction of the womb in terms of thought alone. So you see the whole idea, and of course this requires far far more elaboration
outside of and beyond the scope of this class. But what I'm trying to say, that logic, dialectical and speculative logic, is metaphysics. Now what is the reason for saying so? Because there is no such a thing as criterion of objectivity without logic. but also there is no such a hard distinction between content and form. Once you forego with those two objections that Kant made against a formal, I mean pure general logic,
You see that metaphysics cannot be thought as such because there is no such a thing as thought as such. as such as pure form is never absolutely impoverished from content. There is a co-constitution, co-extensivity between content and form, between thought and its content, between form of thinking and content of thinking that is underlying
the edifice of logic. So from this perspective, metaphysics can no longer be thought as form of thought alone, nor can be thought as object in itself. So this is the gesture by which modern logic but also Hegel's dialectic and speculative logic needs to be understood. Abolishment of the hard distinction between content and form and also the co-constitutivity
of being and thinking. The criterion of being with a small b is what you might call in logical terms existential quantification. Now if we have regard to the final shape in the elaboration of this science, then it is first and immediately ontology whose place is taken by objective logic. part of this metaphysics which was supposed to investigate the nature of ENDS being in general like ENDS rationales rational being and this
comprometer comprises both being an essence a distinction for which the German language has fortunately preserved different terms but further Objective logic also comprises the rest of metaphysics insofar as this attempted to comprehend the forms of pure thought, particular substrata taken primarily from figure eight conception, namely the soul, the world and God, and the determinations of thought, considered what was essential in the mode of consideration. Logic, however, consider these forms free from those substrates,
from the subjects of figure eight conception. It considers them, their nature and worth, in their own proper character. These are some of these quotes were from you know Lee Peterson's you know second second book on the diagonal method now you can read them from 800 page 850 to 900 so I think you know having talked about some of these you know problems in Kantian exposition of logic and transcendental logic now we can move toward Kant's
theory of concepts where we can in fact talk about forms of judgment and categories or pure concepts of understanding. So one of the things, one of the main issues or one of the main insights that separates Kant's theory of of concepts from concept empiricism can be traced back to two fundamental insights presented
by Kant, how he understands concepts. Because you know, in concept empiricism, we were, you know, ultimately everything was bottoming out in sense impressions. Kant is no longer a British empiricist, he's a transcendentalist. So obviously his theory of concepts also requires for him to think about concepts in their own terms, rather than with, rather than in terms of some sort of primordial dependence on sensations.
It's not that the sensations are not required, but requirement doesn't mean that thoughts ultimately are satisfied by sensations. So the first of these two fundamental insights that define Kant's new theory of concept is, one, concepts are principles of unity. 2. All consciousness that something is the case is judgmental consciousness. In today's jargon you say that whatever I say about the state of affairs is ultimately
a theoretical claim. There is no such a thing as a claim that is not theory-related, whether by theory we mean ordinary theories couched in natural language or scientific theories couched in formal axiomatic setups. All consciousness, if something is the case, is judgmental consciousness. has propositional form so the first one is that concepts are principles of unity and to every form of consciousness that there is something this kit is the case
for example there is a pen inserted in the glass of water or there is a red book, this is such and such, is a judgmental consciousness. And judgmental consciousness, which is conceptual consciousness, always take a propositional form. Concepts take propositional form. So the first of these theses developed Chan's crucial observation that we are discursive of perceptive subjects. So what is exactly a discursive subject with discursive intelligence?
it is one who can think and manifold only by thinking its elements as in relation to another when I am thinking of a book I implicitly think unconsciously it's already compressed in my concept of a book of certain features and the concepts empirical concepts pertaining to them so concept takes the form of a principle of unity of integrating these you know conceptual conceptually articulated features but also what i am thinking of the book i implicitly think that
This is a book. I am talking about one book, many books, so on and so forth. And such judgments about the book always take the form of a proposition, an assertion, even though implicitly stated. So in contrast to divine who can grasp the manifold of elements all at once, a discursive
intelligence needs to collect organize and integrate and relate the elements to form a thinkable entity this is a book this is a tree for it to be a tree it should have the concept of a branch the concept of photosynthesis the concept of this the concept of that so on so forth there's a there's a kind of a compute kind of like in today's term a computational compression at the stake here you know uh you have compressed certain kinds of relations and uh elements and the whole idea is that in order for you to really elaborate what it really is
not only you should be able to apply and use the concept of a tree correctly but you should be capable of a step by step unpack is implicit relations between other concepts that are already enveloped in the concept of a tree, the concept of brass, the concept of leaf, the concept of sort of synthesis, the concept of roots, so on and so forth, down to more detailed stuff.
So, that's the kind of essentially, this kind of intelligence that essentially belongs to the realm of the concept in which features and relations are integrated, but also they can be unpacked over time so as to arrive a new concept, concepts which might in fact revise our previous concepts is called discursive intelligence.
So sellers think that a discursive intelligence in a nutshell is what you might call to be a synthesizer. It synthesizes or integrates different features and relations. I would say that in order to go one step further, you would say that a discursive intelligence is a synthesizer and analyzer. One who grasps the relations and features and concepts as principles of unity, but is
also good is able to unpack step by step different inferential come in inferentially articulate or elaborate different grades of the content of the cons of concepts he uses so a synthesizer and analyzer so would it make sense if it's like already been like analyzed to some degree of like very very diction to be able to use like the implicit composite of a certain concept and like further conclusions yes yeah I mean the whole thing is that when you are working with any kind of empirical concept you are at a point
where you have both residues of previously analyzed concepts and you have new synthetic relations between you know different features, intuitive features. And yes the whole point is to you're always beginning at the middle. You are no longer starting with the beginning or at the end. The whole idea is that it's Brandon's thesis really, the inferentialist thesis that the whole idea that the concept for you to understand the meaning of a proposition or to inferentially articulate the concept you
should not only be capable of saying or claiming what it is followed from what other features, concepts it follows from, but also you should be capable of saying that what it leads to, the implications. So, when it comes to the first fundamental insight of Kant in the framework of his new
theory of concepts. Kant calls, which was the concepts or principles of unity, Kant calls the principle of unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one, namely the act of ordering one and multiple representations under one common representation, which we call a concept, a function. A function. There's different kinds of function as Aristotelian functions or causal functions.
This is what you might call to be a normative function. So Kant calls action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition a function. And essentially this function is tied to this idea of synthesis. Discursive intelligence is a conceptual synthesizer.
So within this definition of ordering different representations under common one, or function, can talk about different acts of assigning different acts of order at least three first rudimentary one multiple instances to a single concept for example x y z r f you know this body that body the other body you know this this metal that metal that's other metal or bodies okay multiple instances to a single concept be multiple encounters to
a single object you can think about this multiple encounters to a single object this is usually formulated in Kantian parlance as a recognitive judgment so you have a concept of a glass okay imagine that you encounter these this glass under different shades of light submerged in you know some colored water you know
part of it has been chipped so on so forth you will still recognize it as a glass but with this and this such and such new features so multiple encounters to a single object as associated with the cognitive judgments. C. Multiple experiences to a single subject. That's the perceptive, the perceptive core. So a perception without conception is an absurdity. The very fact that I had the dog, the ketchup and the bun means that I had a hot dog.
x I think x I think plus I think y plus I think z equals to I think parenthesis x plus y plus z. Multiple experiences to a single subject. So multiple you know multiple experiences assigned to a single subject means that the subject that also experiences this subject is one the same hence the perceptive component my experiences I am the one who experiences such and such things but these experiences are also experienced by this by the same and one a perceptive subject so that my experiences are my
own. So to have a hot dog you need simultaneous apperception. Yes. Whereas like this is kind of connected to the issue that you brought up regarding... No, there is no simultaneous apperception. A perception that is capable of understanding that the very subject that eats a dog, ketchup, and bun under such and such a spatiotemporal constraints and such and such images or schemas is nothing but the same subject who had ate the hot dog. Right, right, right, right. So I mean this is kind of similar to like
the fact that we had a bun, ketchup, hot dog like separated us out of hot dog. Yes. This is similar part of the issue, it seems, maybe, of the representation of sequences? Yes, absolutely, that's it, yes, that's it. That's essentially Kant's answer to Hume's separability principle. So, I mean, you can't really have any ascribed continuity between heterogeneous experiences? No, no. Unless they're giving... Even if you had... I mean, you can think about this, that you have a hot dog right now. A minute later, you have... Not a minute later. Let's say a second later, you had separately ketchup.
A second later, you had a bun. Provided you can eat in that suite. Would you say that I have had a hot dog sandwich? no so he described like continuity represents impressions sequence of representations or impressions is not the same as the impression representation of the sequence yeah any questions before I move forward
Do these three descriptions equate to the encountering subject? On a discursive subject, a discursive being. Yes, and the acts, and basically it's acts via the concepts. One multiple instances to a single concept, x, y, z are all such and such, multiple encounters to a single object, multiple experiences to a single subject.
There is nothing esoteric here really. This is actually quite fundamentally in tandem with what you call today's computationally informed cognitive science. What do concepts are really, you know, outside of our Kantian philosophy for a while, and see that concepts are essentially rule-based linguistic entities. And by that I do not mean just natural language, but any kind of language, artificial form. So basically there is no such a thing as the meaning of red.
Red doesn't say anything. Red only say something when it is put in a propositional context. This is red. So you have to have at least a subject predicate for. Once you have that, then this is red, then it means that this is not green. So in order for you to say this is not green, you should have certain kind of reliable differential responsiveness to such and such a spectra of light, but also you should know and use correctly the concept of green and the concept of red. You can only do that by understanding a certain threshold, a certain threshold, not everything,
a certain threshold of how these concepts can be connected or are related to one another. This is the concept of compression in information science. Obviously, the concept of red, we don't think about it that this is not this, this is not that, this is related to every fucking thing in the universe, because that would be just, our cognitive resources cannot handle that. So there should be a form of compression, and this language allows for this compression to happen. So then we can select it between different compressed entities, between different kinds of concepts, so we can then apply them
to this or that state of affairs. I mean one of the greatest things about Kant is not that he's also a great philosopher in the context of his two-day philosophy, a superb one, but also he is far more in line with today's developments in information theory, computer science, and cognitive science than his contemporaries. You can literally unpack some of this stuff that Kant says and they look esoteric in purely computational cognitive science vocabulary terms.
So all of these unities of manifolds will turn out to be at the end independent interdependent on one another. The first critique, Kant emphasizes, Kant's emphasis is on B, multiple encounters with single object which is which then he says that it's dependent on C multiple experience to a single subject but you know going back and forth within both
edition a and edition B it seems that as if Kant is trying to say that's basically the point of departure for the new concept, for the new theory of concept, is really A, that is multiple instances to a single concept, X, Y, Z are all, for example, such and such, F. And then he begins by, you know, fine-graining the level of interdependencies. That, you know, this act is dependent on that act,
or this act is dependent on the other one, so on and so forth. What is that the first one is A, number A is important? Multiple instances to a single concept. Any idea? X, Y, Z are all F. Do they only be elaborated in the background of it? For the reasons of compression, again? Yes, but can you elaborate on this?
No, so then new functions can be performed... No, I can't elaborate, sorry. You see, there is a truth that it is, you see it's kind of a basic form of compression, the kind of compression from which you can gain diversities and selections of different kinds of compressions and conceptual acts. So what is this exactly? It is a form of subject predicates. Essentially, the two fundamental insights of Kant. concepts of principles of unity's a concept of body is relates to this metal
this book that book other book this and that so this is one two you can say that all substances having such and such characteristics are all F bodies subject and predicate so it is really the most fun it encapsulates the entire you know what you might call to be the machinery of new theory of Kant's theory of conception what concepts really are at the bottom principles of unity and
and propositional forms which can be judged and ought to be justified. So Kant's new theory of concept, as I mentioned, already dissociates him from conceptual empiricism
Locke and other people. First is that you know what Kant identifies as a form of judgment and concepts conceptual content is inseparable from judgment you know that that's the most important thing. Concepts and judgments come hang in hand you can't have one without another these are really integrated so what can have already identified can't uh what can have already saw
is that the form of a judgment cannot be accounted for in terms of uh locks so-called mental chemistry. Assertions or propositional forms, this body, this metal is a body, iron is a body, this book is read, so on and so forth, is not the same thing as a complex idea in an empirical sense that we briefly talked about in early sessions once you allied the distinction everything complex ideals and propositional judgments or propositional form
into a modes of being contrast between the is of identity and the is of predication the received model concealed judgmental or propositional form. So you have being red, being a square, being red and a square. So in empiricism precisely because your ideas are ultimately bottom-out in your sense impressions, you say that being a red book means that it's being red, the sensation of red, being you know, for example, such geometric shape being such and such, or pink ice cube. It
means that being cool, being at the level of sense impression, being cool, being pink, being a cube. So essentially the concept, the propositional form that is a pink ice cube can be understood as a complex of ideas or complex of impressions conjunct of being cool, being cubic, and being pink. Or for example, you know, Socrates is wise. You can think about it in terms of Socrates' identity and being wise is predication, and
it simply means being Socrates conjunct wise and wise. Now this confusion was aided by Descartes' account of judgment as the willed affirmation or denial of the content presented by the intellect or the canonical form something like the what we call the tree of porphyry so you have usr elementary uh you know ideas then you can create more complex ideas and come from complex ideas you can analyze them to more fundamental Kant, however, saw that a judgment is not simply an affirmed conjunction of ideas.
Judgments have intrinsic logical forms that cannot simply be laid out in terms of conjunction of ideas, having the sensation of being cubic, having the sensation of being cool, and having the sensation of being pink. So he says on this issue, the understanding can make no other use of concepts than that of judging by means of them. What follows from this embodies a dramatically new engagement with concepts and judgments.
The understanding finally is dissociated from ideas at the level of sense impressions. So understanding becomes a new thing, as different from sensations. So you see that Kant's theory of concepts, new theory of concepts, does multiple things together. A little bit belatedly in Critic of Pure Reason, after he has already set out his ambitions, By introducing the new theory of concepts and what really how concepts and judgments
cannot simply be thought in terms of conjunction of sense impressions, core perceptual ideas, he introduced a fundamental new break from empiricism, the irreducibility of understanding sensation and judgments of understanding or thoughts to sensible impressions okay I'm going next session I'm going to have you know more we are going to go overboard next session to make sure that even though we are you know today we are on the time limit well you know since we are always going three hour her
I promise you that we'll make it up for it. And also, we have at least two or three sessions, make-up sessions at the end, because I'm sure that we are not going to be able to finish this whole thing. Plunging into the abyss takes time. You just don't fall into it. All right. Well, thank you. And I'll end the broadcast right now. Thank you. Thank you.