Hello and welcome to the sixth session of restructuring enlightenment and turn up to conceptual engineering. Reza, a little to you. Thank you very much everyone. Hello everyone. So this is the sixth session, right? So there is a possibility that I might actually, well of course I'm going to ask Enda to see if we can do it. I might have to leave 20 minutes earlier. Enda, if that is the case, would you be able to host an additional 20 minutes either next session or the last session? Thank you so much, thank you. So that first good news
uh class will be done in 20 minutes earlier uh also uh so basically today we are going to get into the idea of explication we are talking about in more detail uh that's what we are going to do talking a little bit about the notion of analyticity that Carnap is talking about and then from there what we are going to do is to make at least one example of explication and that will be Turing's idea of computability, right? Instead of Carnap's idea of probability because we deal with Carnap's idea of probability
next session. So that would be I think that Turing idea of computability would be a kind of a nice example connecting to what comes next. I know that the reading material for today was Katharina Jussiudno-Vey's chapter on two concepts of the formal. That's actually also a very good background material and all of this. So I think that's it.
Let's have our presentation and then responses and then we start. Good morning everyone. I am going to present the second part of the international formality and Edna is going to present with me. I don't know if I go first or see. Yes, you can go first. Okay, I'm going to present the Formal as Compotability. First, I will say that formal has been an adjective that uses a methodology that means as a specific way of mechanically manipulating symbols.
For this, it is necessary to distinguish formal as the desementification and formal as computability. For one can proceed mechanically, formal without a step of formal abstraction of meaning. There is a big conceptual difference between tracing things as meaningless and just manipulating them computability. The way to illustrate this, Dulti Novak seems to say, is to provide examples of profound one approach and not to the other. For this, Thomas represents the formal as the semantification but not as computability. Well Frey relies on the formal as compotable for the foundation of mathematics. Now we go to formal as compotability.
This use seems only to have become generalization in the 20th century and that consists in to operate formally in the following machine. Mechanically, the structure contained in a calculus. This is annotations system defining with a clear rules. This idea is evident in Carnap, the logic syntax of language. In the 19th century, an interesting computability was awake in the context of Hilbert program, particularly on the decision problem. McGregor returning paper on compatibility number with an application on the, and I don't know how to pronounce the word
That is German. The furbicence of the compatibility in the 30s was a very large. For example, Alonso Schur defined the Lombard calculus, which is a formal system designed to investigate the definition of function, the notion of function application and discussion. The other sites, Goebbels defined recursive function and Stephen Klink defined the formal calculus with the formalist program. Apparently, this early use of the term formal is the sense of cutability and computable, turned aside essentially from the formal at the semantification. Then Dultin Abbas says that Frege could think
in a computable way, but he was not concerned in the mechanical past, but in the interferational steps. This time was epistemologically clearly, not mechanically rationing, resonating. Altro, he demanded an incorporation of content and this can be read as a hint of mechanically of the rules, but this is for Freck, was not there, but a mean to epistemology transparency. Another precaution was Leibniz for his notion of calculativity, but he does not use the term formal as such. So the notion of the formal as computability is not in Leibniz, it's not in anyone before him either. As I already been saying, it is not only the theories
that it is consolidated, the term of formal as computability. But what does it mean to say that something is computability? One can say that something is formal if it refers to computability, but this is not saying much. So we have to focus in the 30s when turning, short and long, convert on the same point of reference, the notion of compatibility. What we must bear in mind that before turning machines compatibility was an informal notion. To compute an action is most follow predeterminary patterns which leads to the question of how mechanical, how machines work in general. Intuitively, one could say that they execute previously predetermined action in a predetermined
sequence until a result is achieved to calculate our computer is to reason as if machine could reason. And this was the aim of the text, I think. If the scar test throw of animals as machines because they could not think, now the idea of thinking machines arise as those artificial intelligence do. Before, the idea of a thinking machine was considered a metaphor because it was believed that think was appropriate to certain creatures such as human beings, gods, or angels, and anthropomorphic manners of thing. An example of this, prior to the computers of the 20th century, are the investigation of Ramon Lull. In his work, it is a particular type of machine that develops a sequential deterministic machine.
It starts from the idea of computational as a combination of symbols and their possibility mechanically. Although the machine reminds in part a metaphor, but for Loulin and Leibniz and his polemic with the car who believe in the mechanical as related to logic and its opposition to human rationalizing, not properly to the machines. To calculation by Leibniz refers not to machines. His motto, Calculiamo, let's just calculate, is an imperative addresses to people, not to machines. Even the turning program was not properly referring to the machine in the first. but that the computer was a human being following instruction from a table and not properly
a machine doing things. So clearly when speaking of a mechanical procedure, it is not much actual machine that we have in mind but rather the ideal of a machine doing things. The abstract machine which always behave according to plan, this is according to instruction containing it. So, we can speak of the symbol matching, since from Wittgenstein's Duh. The matching has already given movements, which leads to the notion of formal. It is computability variable. The intuitive nature of computability, a computation can be defined as a passage from an initial state to a final stage,
by mean of a small step from a step to a state. There are successive transformations of infinity and numerable states. Thus, a turning machine is a really simple device. It is the proof that the simple chip can compute any recurs function of positive integrants. This turning machine makes the connection between computative calculation and what can be described as an externalization of resonant. the tape with sales and the read-write head and the instruction table are external and physical device involved in a computation procedure. To go further, having seen that, the computability
is a philosophical rich field one can finally turn to with her quote who leaves a provocation. By reliving the reign of unnecessary work, a good notation seems it's free to concern on more of a problem and in effect, increase the mental power of the race. That is a kind of provocation in the final part of the text. And this is the notion of compatibility in Katherine Dutton-Weiss. And that's all for my part. And I don't know if Edna is going to follow. Yes, thank you. Since Sebastian presented Dutile-Novail's text approaching the computable
aspect of the formal languages and its relationship with machines, I'm going to talk about the relation between computability and the semantification in the realms of cognitive human process involved in abstraction and the machinery action of ignoring the context only following an algorithm. I would like to rescue Novaya's quotation of Godel's formal definition in which the latter articulate how it's necessary to work with the outward structure of the formulas, not to their meanings. If one pretends to reach out the mechanical versus a formal language, which implies that this could be realized by someone who knew nothing about mathematics or by a machine, says Godel. This means that both the person who solves an algebraic formula and a machine following program and instructions in a binary language,
for example, are abstracting meanings, matter, to meet up structures, forms. This is a reference to Aristotle. To systematize and axiomatize context with a purpose to get an exact objective solution not distracted by this objective content. So as I see it following Dutton-Novae's position, the computable aspect of any formal language executed by a human or a machine, is possible if and only if the human or the machine abstracts propositions striping its content first. As Sebastian reminds, maybe Leibniz was the first thinker in conceptualized formal languages as computable, even if he did not use this word. With his calculus ratios in nature, a project
followed centuries later by Ferregui in his first logical project, we can track the mechanical intentions to create axiomatic systems that lead into exact solutions for specific problems. The Latin word computare is associated to calculare and both refers to the act of count. Even if the word to count seems to refer to an abstract thought related act, it's important to to remind that calculus means pebble. Count with pebbles or with a technology like the abacus implies. First, the semantify. Our human minds abstract prepositions into little pieces of stone. We convert these pieces into symbols in which the content is not explicit or meaningless. Two, compute.
Handle, second, compute. Handle these pebbles' symbols is a very first mechanical practical methodology, very similar to the act of write down algebraic formulas, logical prepositions or programming. With this approaching, my conclusions about formal languages are that the computable aspect is inherent to the semantification one. And if it's possible to do the relation, computable is the empirical practical process that follows the rational procedure of the abstract, the semantification. This correlation is present in both human minds and thinking machines, that's all. Thank you so much, both of you, Edna and Sebastian.
Excellent, really great. Two things. We have read Katarina's text where she talks about two notions of formal de-semantification and re-semantification precisely because that which is de-semantified has the capacity to be re-semantified meaning that the fact we are capable of creating this
semantified system of symbols in order to analyze the relations that are derived or being held among them, we are capable of deploying that very system against the backdrop of new contexts and re-semanification. Re-semanification has a direct consequence of de-semanification, meaning that we can re-semanify, we can basically use formal system as a touchstone, as a saying stone, a saying tool for new, basically, theories of meanings, context sensitivity, so on and
hence re-semantification. So that's the one that she wants, she thinks that it's like the proper class of formal system and then the computable one, which she thinks that, she doesn't say that these are two different, she thinks that, I mean two completely distinct notions, but she thinks that the second one, which is Turing computable, Church Turing computable, is a subclass of a de-semanified one. By saying that the idea of mechanizability in computation, mechanizability means that we can define precise rules over axioms to move in finite steps from a bunch
of axiom, bunch of premises to certain conclusions or consequence. So she thinks that computability in that sense is a subclass of the semantified, precisely because if you have this semantification, then you would be able to define mechanizability, the concept of mechanizability in computation rather than the other way around. Now, I think that there is something strange happening here, precisely because I think this is something that I want to ask you. she talks about Leibniz and the old history and stuff. I think that she does, she actually
indulge in a certain kind of unintentional dodgy move here by taking for granted the idea of mechanizability as an explicato, as an exact concept. Rather, she indulges in the impreciseness of the idea of mechanizability. That's something that Godel actually does the same way. So we have two ideas of mechanizability in computation. One, the idea of what we might called to be development of a step-by-step rules, precision or definition of the precision of rules
in order to derive the consequence from the premises, right? And then we have a second idea of mechanizability, simply a finite step procedure. Finite step procedure versus definability of rules to a precision, to a point of precision that you have them as basically instructions, as algorithms, right, as algorithms. These two are fundamentally different ideas of mechanizability in computation. So it seems that she tries to bunch up this
together and through this bunching these two notions of mechanizability together, she comes with this idea that mechanizability is only a subclass of the first notion, which is this notion of formal, which is the semantification. But if we go with simple idea of definability of rules, definability of rules already implies within itself that idea of dis-semantification, and it does not really, doesn't require that much recursive theory of Alonzo Church and Turing's thesis, namely the finite steps, which is part of the halting problem
and this decidability problem stuff. So there is this computer scientist, Gandhi, who shows that the classical Turing thesis is imprecise and vague, precisely because it's vagueness It's what you might call to be, it can be applied to so many forms of procedures, mechanizable procedures. So what Gandhi does in computer science, he tries to make the idea of mechanizability, mechanizable computation precise to show that that is in fact the power of Turing thesis,
but not something that Turing or Church either were aware of or actually were interested in. But it shows that precisely this idea of the clash of two ideas of mechanizability, the finite step procedure and explicit rule procedure, two sense of mechanizability. Once they become one, that basically becomes the power of Church Turing thesis, and it can be applied to so many other basically examples, which they thought is not going to basically apply to. In the sense, Gandhi's first critique is that Turing essentially built his thesis from the idea of effective calculation of a human computer.
Now, the human computer is more in the sense of a finite step, mechanizability. Gandhi shows that if we broaden the idea of the computer from a finite step to explicitization of rules, precision or different definability of rules, then basically we have exactly what Turing always wanted, but it is not stated explicitly in Church Turing thesis. The sort of Turing machine that can basically model any sort of calculable function or calculable
If you're going to read a text, would you please share your screen if it's not too much trouble? Sure, it's not that much. I can't find the Gandhi one, but I find Gibbs one. So basically, Godel says in 1964, says, Turing's work gives an analysis of the concept of mechanical procedure, algorithm or computation procedure,
or finite combined combinatorial procedure. This concept is shown to be equivalent with that of a Turing machine. A formal system can simply be defined to be any mechanical procedure for producing formulas called provable formulas. Now, there is so Gandhi and Gibbs, they have they look into this to the idea of that basically both for Godel and Church and Turing, There is a certain kind of free vacillation between mechanizability in the technical sense, meaning definability of precise rules.
And finite step procedures, right? So they say with regard to that, they say that this requirement for the rules and axioms is equivalent to the requirement that it should be possible to build a finite machine in the precise sense of a Turing machine which will write down all the consequences of the axioms one after the other but the latter is the consequence of having the idea of a mechanical procedure so the same thing happens i think in not the same probably a similar thing happens in katarina's uh idea uh that
by definition of computation computation becomes a subclass of dissimultification, formalized dissimultification. But I think that that already rested upon, or contingent upon this flattening the distinction between two notions of mechanizability. Mechanizability as a finite procedure, recursively finite procedure in the way that Turing talks about, Church and Turing talk about in their thesis, TT computation, what they call the Turing thesis
computation, TT computation, and mechanizability as such, which is not about recursivity in the canonical sense of Church and Turing put forward. So that would be great if, you know, any of you can talk about this. I mean, you brought it with Leibniz. So with Leibniz, we have the same thing. It is, it's not obvious. I mean, these Leibniz, Ronald Luhl, Giordano Bruno, So many of these kinds of classical examples, it seems that the idea of mechanizability as an explicated concept is being lost in them.
So much so that it's being transported, this kind of vagueness of the idea of mechanizability to Godel, to church, and Thuring. Yes. I just wanted to ask, can you expand a little more on the difference between final step and mechanical? As I understand you, by mechanical, you mean a complete system, right? That if no, no, mechanizable mechanizable simply means. So how can you mechanize something like?
we say we mechanize something like a recipe meaning that any sort of what we do function we can write it down as explicit rules simple as that this is there is no nothing more than that now now what does this mean when we say we explicit as as a rules as rules means that they don't have any sort of room for interpretation meaning that they are meaningless already in without they don't have intentional content one would what would be the final step uh solution uh then that that that that notion
so that's so that's mechanizability in the pure sense of mechanizability then Then as the consequence of that, with regard to a recipe, we would say that for this recipe to work, for it to work, it needs to have finite steps, finite steps procedure, mechanizability in the second sense. That is a finite step procedure. So in a technical computer computation sense, in a mathematical sense, these two users are often being taken as one. Right? Particularly in recursive theory. Sorry to cut you off. What wouldn't that be a halting problem?
The difference that you're talking about? Halting problem, but yes, halting problem. But the problem actually arises from decidability problem. the classical Turing's person about decidability. Because what is decidability? Decidability means effective calculation. Effective calculation, even that's actually even higher, more general than the halting problem. Precisely because it means that even the sort of inputs that we admit or function should be decidable. If we cannot say yes or no to these inputs, then there wouldn't be any sort of finite procedure to begin with. Halting problem tries to turn the finite procedure into effectively calculable computation by saying that this finite procedure should halt at some point.
in so so so these are these are all you see this is actually as we move forward we see that within the notion of computation there are these various explicata which sometimes even by fathers of computations are being melded together uh or uh flattened out Edna has a question. Edna. Yeah, I would like to ask you all if, following this archaeological Katarina's movement, if you don't find interesting that this mechanical concept comes from the Leibniz era, from the
physical mechanics, from Newton and mechanics, I mean. I don't know. taking it for granted maybe because this paradigmatic um process in the science of uh newton and in physics are like or base of everything in science i don't know it's just a question yes but but i think that this is why precisely i think people like wolfram even Katharina, I think that this overemphasis on computation, modern computation, having its root in people like Leibniz, as Wolfram does, is quite misguided historically. Precisely
because, as you say, Leibniz has a certain kind of roots in certain kind of physicalism, to speak, or physical procedures, implementations of computation, whereas Turing Church Land thesis is really the direct consequence of the revolutions in logic and mathematics. Simple as that, has no implementation in mind, right? It is really what you might call to be that unbound ocean of logic once being realized fully what does it mean to treat science as symbols or marks as
meaningless but taken to another level that in their meaninglessness we can create systems of pure logical relations to analyze everything that we can talk about in terms of such logical relations. You know, coming back to the idea that I was talking about would be logic as an organon of all sciences as a constitution or logic as a canon in a Kantian epistemological sense. I think here with thesis with computation, we are getting closer and closer to that point when we see see that the power of computation is precisely because every source of what you, what, what
we do, what we do can be modeled on, but also constituted by, of computational process, computational processes which are not primarily physically implemented, but are what? What are coming from the constitutive role of logic. And that's why this is, this is something actually quite really interesting that majority of this is stuff about pancomputationalism, the idea that there are actual computations taking place in the universe whereas computation as a respectable
extension of logical sciences or logic par excellence and are the results of precisely this unexplicated concept of computation or mechanizability one that comes from logic and and the other one that comes from more of a, that's kind of Leibnizian, Roman news, physical implementation stuff. Of course, there are different ways that they can be connected to one another, but I think we should really be careful to understand that church and Turing thesis has much less to do with Leibniz, than with Frigge and Wittgenstein.
Lipe, do you want to go ask your question? Any person. Thank you, thank you, Wenda. So I originally had a question, but now I have a comment, which would serve only to compliment Edna's question. So first the comment. Well, yes, I do agree with what you just said, Reza, but I think that dodginess and infusing mechanizability one and mechanizability two on the part of Katerina Novais, I hadn't noticed it at first when I read the book, but it serves the, I think it's that that confusion serves the purpose of the book.
which is to announce formal languages as a tool for extended cognition. So when she announces that, when we write a formal language with our hand, we are extending cognition to that moment when we are not thinking about what we are putting into a formal language. And my question was, when you were distinguishing between finite step and explicit rule, I was reminded of something I read a long time ago, and I didn't know as much as I know today, which is pretty close to nothing.
Roger Penrose's book about the impossibility of artificial intelligence. And I asked myself, isn't this the cause, isn't this confusion what causes him to say that artificial intelligence is unattainable? Look, I mean, this is just like stuff that I have, I mean, yes, extended cognition. Yes, of course. No, that's a great point of Katarina's book. Um, um, of course, uh, I would be really, um, I'm kind of, uh, worry of this whole idea of extended cognition. Delsha is going to curse me for this.
I would say that Katarina tries to piggyback on this whole idea of extended cognition to, uh, um, kind of attach herself with that sort of, you know, kind of liberatory, uh, uh ameliori ameliori rather liberatory ameliori form of uh logicism and and formalism by using the word extended cognition yeah well you know how about this uh isn't it the whole idea that the concepts since hegel uh is that uh uh that which over which no man has a hold right that's that's already extended cognition but that's not really extended cognition in the way that today's
theory of extended cognition works right simply the whole idea once you work with the concepts you can't uh you can't actually it constraints your intentional uh interpretations yeah the range of your interpretations and uh look the fact that science is possible is precisely true the fact that we follow concepts over which we have no hope, right? Wherever the concepts go, we have to go with them. That's the point of science. Science doesn't want to wait for formalization of formal systems in the sense that Katarina talks about to start science. Science
began with that assumption through the use of its own scientific concepts. Formalization takes it to a different level precisely because it makes it fully mechanizable in the sense in the first of mechanizability one. So I kind of felt that Katarina sometimes try to satisfy too many people at the same time. And that lead to a certain sort of a sleeperiness, I would say. But nevertheless, I completely agree with whatever she says in terms of the extent cognition, really magnificent stuff, really great lucid philosopher. But yeah, this is my kind of point of disagreement with Katharina.
So the second point, what was the second point? Oh, Raja Penrose. My God, Raja Penrose. Okay, look, this is something that I always like people attack me that first of all, people who never read intelligence and spirits, I mean, who wants to fucking spend days and months on 600 pages of boring bullshit. That is completely fine with me. But people who says that, well, you know, that this book is about AGI, Resorto, I try to valorize AGI. Most probably, in fact, definitely haven't read it. If they have read the book, then they are idiots for saying something like that. If they haven't read it, sure, everyone can have a go at it. We haven't read so many books, but nevertheless,
we make conjunctions, conjectures about them. But the thing is that this is the problem that I think I try to talk about intelligence and spirit as long as first of all the book is not about AGI the book is about human an outside view of the human meaning that for us to explicate the concept of human we need to have an outside view of it that outside view of it is AGI but then AGI itself requires qualification the whole idea of AI requires qualification explication When we say it is not possible, what do we mean by exactly by that? At which level it is not possible? In what sort of context? Are we talking about AGI in terms of, you know, phenomenal self-consciousness?
Are we talking about, you know, basically problem solving capabilities? Or are we talking about concept using? Are we talking about sapience? And there are all these kinds of stuff. So that sort of over optimistic, over pessimistic, rejectionist or affirmation is the stance toward the problem of AI is the consequence of the poverty of the concept of AI. meaning that this concept is fundamentally unexplicated. Any sort of systematic answer to this should come through the task of explicating the concept of general intelligence. Any sorts
of move against this sort of problem is doomed for inevitable failure. I just have a very quick question that would take us back slightly to the questions before around Leibniz and et cetera. But I guess my question is more to do with the intellectual history of this development of formalism and whether we can think of that moment with all those attributions of the foundation of computation to thinkers like Lull and then to Leibniz and so on, whether we can think of the moment at which we have like Frege, Wittgenstein
and then followed by like Turing, Karnap and so on as a kind of decisive shift such that it still is in a kind of, there is still like a historical kind of lineage, right, that goes back to Leibniz and so on? And that then? There are. But not in the sense that people are trying to make it out to be. In the sense that, for example, there is the topic on memories, manipulation of memories that you get both in Leibniz and round loop. That absolutely has magnificent influence on on computation on on the notion of machine right uh what what people i wanted what i wanted
to say that precisely because the the concept of mechanizability uh an effective calculation are not explicated fully people tend to also have a partisan historical reading of this of this lineage, right? I think that it would be interesting to someone actually first starts to explicate notional mechanizability computation, then sees various contributions, historical contributions that go to the concepts coming from different directions rather than saying that,
you know, computation has its roots in, I don't know, Leibniz, Ronald, Lou, Giordano, Bronus, and so forth. That would be just like kind of a, that's a really pop historical book, but it's not really historical analysis. Because this is actually something I'm really interested in working on, so I was kind of curious, yeah, like whether... Yes, that would be magnificent. I don't really recall any sort of book that has been written along that kind of line of historical analysis? Not realizing reason? Realizing reason. You mean Brando? No, Daniel Macbeth. Oh, right, Daniel Macbeth. But Daniel Macbeth doesn't know anything
about computation, though. But her argument is interesting because- Yeah, they're interesting. No, that's very interesting. But that would be, you see, that would be more with the line of uh free gas logic so up to free gas logic right so that also leaves out so many of other kind of like you know revolutions in physics actual mechanical machines engineering out of the equation which absolutely go into people like romeo bidenitz and part of the history of computation. Yeah, that's actually a good partisan historical analysis. But if you want to put engineering revolutions, then there needs to be a kind of a more... But that's because these
things become really difficult projects because not all of everyone knows both of this stuff. Bipartisanship usually in the historical analysis is impossible by the facts of our limited knowledge. Can I ask a further question or shall we take a break? Sure, sure. And then after that, rest and coming back. I just wanted to ask really about the feature of mechanization. the future or feature feature this idea this characteristics of something a formula of
mathematics or a solution to a formula of mathematics or any kinds of thoughts be calculable in a mechanical steps and that's i think in an explicated way we can we can as you said it, we can say that there would be in Frege's vein, there would be no gap in inferences between different steps of a proof, for example. This kind of machination or mechanization does seem like we try to, I don't know, fool ourselves or delusion ourselves, delude ourselves
into a game as if the game is the really virtue here. You need to elaborate a little bit on this. Yes, I'm going to do this. While the game, for example, the mechanization game is probably in relation to mathematics, is a very good algorithmic way for learning. If you don't need an expertise, and the expertise become very easy, just manipulating some kind of signs and something like that. a human computer in the vein that Turing talks about has some transformation rules and some formation rules.
So what she or he does is following these kind of rules for a really easy way to calculate. And this calculation is mechanizatable. Let's use that word. is mechanization because in the first place, in the first place, in the first syntactical a priori presupposition, the actually presupposed arithmetic nature for it, because there is units in it and these units are substitutable and all that kind of jazz that you can argue about logically. So I don't know what you mean by presupposing arithmetic. You see that's That would be just like a little bit saying that, look, to think means that you presuppose thinking.
No, no, no. Presupposing concepts. I'm saying. Arithmetic is essentially, what is arithmetic really? Arithmetic is the very idea of that we can have tractable procedures, tractability, right? So the idea of tractability in mathematics is extremely important. And the idea of tractability cannot be achieved by something like geometrical analysis or so on and so forth. The invention of arithmetic is that this tractability comes, accountability for tractability comes into mathematics, becomes a respectable discipline in itself.
And through this, we can actually, what we can codify, we can codify what we have already been doing. Yes, but that doesn't need mechanization because Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or Frigga or disemantified and it is just the rule of manipulation of science. That is the part that is extended cognition. That is the part about extended cognition, but that is not extended
cognition. That's my understanding, actually. The mechanization is just a feature of the system. And this feature works because the system is arithmetical. That's what I'm saying. And this is also exactly because the same exact reason, the system is incomplete. That is the machination cannot be whole. You cannot have all the states of a machine. So a universal Turing machine. No, not the states. You cannot have all the rules of the machine. You cannot have the machine. You see, well, the thing is that, look, obviously the whole idea of first. This is basically one-on-one of people like Giuseppe Longo and this source of, you know,
kind of a biological approach to cognition and stuff. But then they failed to... Ultimately, their final linchpin is that, look, this is all based on arithmetic. But there are sorts of this kind of geometrical, and of course that sort of discussion bottoms up the distinction between continuity and discrete in mathematics. Geometry on one side and arithmetic on the other. This, look, that I think is a very shady discussion because the process of codification is really important here. The process of tractability of mathematical procedures.
Of course, that doesn't mean that you can, that's the whole idea of non-computable is also a respectable thing. The idea of the effective computation doesn't require for everything, doesn't assume every sort of function to be computable. There are some that are non-computable, meaning that the effective procedure doesn't actually say the effective procedure, mechanizable procedure, doesn't say that every human form of cognition can be turned into an algorithm. Right? Because that would be fundamentally against Turing, uh, idea that there are functions that are non-computable, right? There are functions that are non-computable. We cannot just
But that sort of notion is also requires further explication in theory or practice that are non-computed. Now it is shown from an information theoretic perspective that literally every sorts of function that since has been proposed for not being that being in theory or practice being non-computable they are at least computable in theory or in practice that changes precisely because you see really the whole idea of computation is really the as i mentioned a number of times
is at the core of it is a notion of effective calculation. Effective calculation comes in various degrees, according to the context of computation. So there are modifications that you can make with Church-Turing thesis, that a non-computable function will be rendered computable or effectively computable at a lesser degree. So there are all these sorts of stuff out there, which make theory of computation not only the only theory of extended cognition we have, but it is also the only respectable theory which can be followed
step by step, proved or rejected in specific cases. There is no such other kind of theory. Like literally people who are talking about geometry or geometrical logic as being the base of things. Yes, they are great modeling tools. But you can't actually make that much with those kinds of these kinds forms of geometric methods. They are great precisely because they bring the sort of richness that go into real cognitive processes that brute computational modeling wouldn't have. But then once these richness is being revealed by these extra models
by the geometric logic that are usually used by people who are, you know, provenance of an activist theory of mind, like Longo, Jean-Luc Petit, Alain Berthaud, and so on and so forth, then you can actually turn this into computational procedures, make them try to see whether how much of it can be either they can be turned into an algorithm as a whole, or that such cognitive processes needs to be distinguished from one another, you have to decompose them to separate functions, and
those functions that can be turned into algorithm. Ultimately, I completely agree, surprisingly, with Nick Jabo, who says that this is actually Turing 101, by the way. It's not Nick Jabo. This is Turing argument from disability. Turing says that when people say that you can't do this, you can't algorithmic computationally realize this sort of human behavior, this aspect of human being, that sort of aspect of cognition, I would say that either you don't know what computation is, namely the richness of complexity
of the theory of computation, or you actually mistake those kinds of human features as something else. So Nick Javo says that the ultimate really battle against the canonical concept of human is that AGI most probably is not going to be realized as a whole right away. Like you build AGI like a ex-Makina kind of robot and stuff. But, but, but through the course of historical analysis of capacities of humans, we are capable of turning one cognition by other cognition
or cognition one step at a time into algorithms such that ultimately humans will be shown to be nothing more or less than not a bundle but a global integration of some special algorithms. I think that is absolutely true. Any person who would say that is not possible primophagy needs to actually come up with a reason as what is exactly ineffable about human cognition with regard to the theory of computation. Consider the theory of computation, as I mentioned,
it's not about effective calculability in the strong sense that Carnap uses with regard to universal learning machine, but that we have different forms of effectivity, each of which address a degree of computational complexity. we should understand that not all problems require for us to resort to the higher bounds of computational complexity to talk about these kinds of stuff. Like, for example, think about this. Think about something really as simple as that.
I don't know, drawing a straight line. There are various algorithms that can actually compress this problem or finding prime numbers. So there are brute force computations, but there are also quite compressed ways, context-sensitive ways of finding prime numbers among integers by way of algorithms, which do not require that sort of full recursive theory of Alonzo Church and Turing.
Essentially, and the rule of arithmetic simple as that in theory of computation. It is a codification procedure, nothing more, nothing less. Codification. Codification is required for tractability of rules. If you don't have codification, you cannot track trace rules. Even geometry has that codification, but it's, but the codification of geometry proper, for example, Riemann, it gets clunky. It gets clunky. In fact, this is one of the reasons that algebraic geometry comes in 20th century to address that sort of clunkiness of Riemannians,
non-Euclidean geometry. So this is really the role of arithmetic is extremely important. One, through Hilbert showing that it is the ultimate codification procedure. Second, through Godel, first incompleteness theorem, not the second one, first incompleteness theorem, we now understand that there are incomplete arithmetic systems. And that thesis of incompleteness ultimately turns into a thesis of quasi-computable functions and non-computable functions, which put constraints on the sort of ambitions that computation
has. But to put constraints on ambitions of theory computation is one thing to misunderstand or to reject in a kind of denialist way to say that human cognition cannot be turned into algorithms. One algorithm by another algorithm is something else. These are two fundamentally different claims. If by the last part, you mean my comment? No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, So I was saying that usually people say, people, I mean, look, the majority of anti-algorithm people and anti-algorithm people bundle up these two claims together. There are two fundamentally
different claims. The existence of non-computational functions actually, first of all, can only be attained, can only be rendered explicit through the theory of computation. Uh, but that also doesn't translate that, uh, by itself does not translate that there are some core cognitive capacities for humans that cannot be rendered into an algorithm. And let us also, uh, before the break, say that the concept of algorithm has, since the time of Church and Turing has evolved far beyond their imagination. In fact, Turing,
in one of his papers, I have forgotten, I can find it for you, says that the nature of classical Church-Turing thesis is a limited, a special case of computation, reflect a special limited case of computation and there would be different paradigms of computation reflected by more sophisticated machines and of course ultimately every sort of um computational machine should be answerable to the concept of turing machine effective computation in the sense of Turing and Church. But the thing is that we can think about computational machines
that capture the richness of so many phenomena in the universe that the traditional classic Church Turing couldn't basically capture. Think about this concurrent as asynchronic concurrent systems asynchronic concurrent systems a good example of an asynchronic concurrent system would be um old um uh lockdown systems when you are trying to uh use in the in the four in the 50s and 60s 70s when you are trying to use a your bank account or use a later debit card. So for example think
about that you have two cards associated with one bank account right you and your partner. You go and take this money from the basically the the the machine and at the same time your partner also gets the same amounts, namely the full amount in your account from the machine. So basically your account goes to negative. Right? So how can you actually avoid such resource starvation, resource starvation problem? This is called the dining philosopher problems.
It is considered to be one of the most complex of all computational problems. Resource starvation for a bunch of processes or core processes that are interacting with one another and over one single resource. And this resource can be a symbol, a token, money, whatever you can think about. Or a server, right? A server. This Henry DiCastro came up with this problem. You can Google it. It's called Dining Flosser problem. There is no canonical solution to this, but nevertheless, today's
algorithms are uh basically are are equipped with certain kinds of facilities with certain kinds of uh you know extra uh functions and procedures that can in practice not but not in full theory that can practice cases of the dining philosopher problem, the main problem of asynchronic concurrency. So these are algorithms when we are talking about is not really that sort of brute algorithm that we had in mind with Leibniz and stuff. The whole theory of computation has changed fundamentally because its relations with mathematics and logics have been far more
renegotiated than the time of Church and Turing and Hilbert. Two things before the break. You can read this one. It's actually a very good writer and Lucid. Oh, my God. All right, let's use that. Oh, yeah. No, it's called The History and Concept of Computability by Robert Soare. S-O-A-R-E.
His all of his stuff are quite, you know, canonically good. He has a bunch of essays, if someone can find them on actually on the on the notion of mechanizability. In. Handbook of Computability Theory. So that's and the other one. I think I forgot. Oh, the other one. About, you know, the sort of stuff that current algorithms, problems, current algorithms are dealing with, rather than, you know, the kind of recursion, but really the sort of richness
that associated with certain kind of computational phenomena that church, classical, traditional, traditional, you know, the early church-fearing algorithms couldn't capture in their entirety. Read And either Georgi Czaparitse in the beginning was game semantics or computability logic, either of these two. They start very smooth, but they get a little bit technical. these two essays by Kjorgi Jakaritze or Andreas Blan's essay on games. I have forgotten what
the title of his. Can't remember it. Can find it for you. Both of these. Sorry Reza, what was it, the last one? Andreas Blass. It's an essay. Let me see if I can have it. I mean, I'm sure that you can find the reference in Intelligence and Spirit. Oh, it's called Semantics and Linear Logic, I think. Maybe, yeah. And Gheorgi Japparitze in the beginning was the game Semantics, a little bit easier version, or the better version,
but also more technical called computability logic. Essentially both of these three, I mean both Jabhariz and Duas, two computer scientists, they are trying to show that why the new revolutions in logic with regard to interaction game generalization of interaction games have informed a new generation of algorithms where algorithms are capable of capturing sort of asynchronous concurrent processes or interaction within events and processes that old-fashioned regular
Turing machine, even Turing machines with oracles couldn't capture in their entirety, in their full richness. Yeah, I mean, one of the things about the computation today is the highest, most advanced fields in theory of computation is the study of concurrency, true concurrency. It started with called Adam Petri who at the age of 13 was a child genius. At the age of 13, he started to create
a series of diagrams for chemical reactions because in chemical reaction, complex chemical reactions, you have a bunch of processes that works asynchronically synchronically with one another and they consume resources, chemical resources, transfer them to them. So then other processes won't be able to consume those resources to create reactions. So he tried to create diagrams of these, called Petri diagrams, P-E-T-R-I, Petri diagrams. And then he later moved to computer science, became one of the most famous computer scientists, and putting forward for the first time the concept of concurrency that later on was picked up by
another great computer science scientist, Rob Milner. Rob Milner is anything written by him, I mean, not non-technical stuff, is worth reading if you want to get into this kind of nitty-gritty of this sort of explicated concept of computation because even basically beneath the idea of mechanizability effective calculability there are even more fundamental concepts of computation that's something that recently like in the past three or four decades has been come up.
Before we start, I just wanted to say that what if we try to argue in the last line of argument, actually not for the limitation of computability, but for the misunderstanding of this limitation because it seems that this limitation actually doesn't uh doesn't apply everywhere that it is being that is that is used to against the um against the computable arman i think you got disconnected arman sorry this is a day of
I don't know, some political events in Iran. And the internet is not very good. I was saying that for the .. Yes, no, absolutely. That is absolutely. You see, when we are talking about, we say computability theory. So we are already towards certain kind of explicatory avenue that you don't say computable theory, that which is computable. So obviously, that also implies that which is not computable. And obviously, yes, the understanding of the nature of the computable is fundamentally fruitful for understanding also its limitations and its range of applications.
Remember, the argument from Turing's disability tries to reconstruct the limitation of computation on the side of the commonsensical concepts. That is the greatest thing. You see, that's why I think that all the extended mind people hate Turing, the whole nature of Turing's assault on cognition. precisely because he tries to, instead of like people saying that, well, you know, the sort of, in AI, this sort of computation always inputs the data that come into the machine is already a structure by definition of the decidability problem, right? Whereas in cognition,
oh, this free-floating jazz and stuff, right? We don't have that sort of firm structuration. But then Turing actually tries to show in a number of different essays that in fact, the sorts of inputs that go into basically natural cognitive processes are far more structured than at different level of structure. And the thing he tries to show that that level of multilevel structure of data can be decomposed and for each, possibly we can find an effective algorithm. And the thing is that Heath's problem that's made in discussions and arguments from disability
shows that most probably when you say emotions cannot be be computationally realized is precisely because the notion of emotion is an explicando, is a vague clunky notion that you stick to it in order to safeguard some bullshits ineffable essence of human cognition from the assault of compute, computability theory. That I I think it's absolutely, this is also Carnap's idea, right? That majority, but the thing is that usually Turing is understood as the hero of common sense, whereas Carnap is not, right?
Carnap just hates idea of common sense. He thinks that common sense is by definition evil. Like unexplicated concepts are by definition evil. He says that they are good, to do to carry on as ordinary speakers but any sort at the level of any sort of actual philosophical scientific discussion they should be explicated and this is precisely because you will exercise much more conceptual intellectual evil using them rather than not go on one more further entertaining question for everybody to have fun I'm going to have something crackpot. One aspect of cognition, I think about a lot,
and one aspect of cognition always seems like it's very, it's the most difficult to enable algorithmically. And that aspect is actually the most logical aspect, and the normative aspect of one, in a platonic sense, that the good or one making is basically a logical, but not only logical also I'm sorry to say that I know you're gonna lynch me for it but also a bit epistemological thing because one making is ultimately related to the form of life as you guys put it so the most difficult problem about artificial intelligence doesn't seem like
rules following rules, it actually seemed like one making understanding in a sense, understanding in a platonic sense. Yes, look, the thing is that, well, I mean, I want, by the way, I'm not leaving early, so don't worry about it. So one thing here, this is before getting to the nitty gritty of the explication. Yes, understanding is really the point. Understanding is that thing. But hear me out here. This is why Hedio thinks that Kant is conservative thinker. Precisely around the issue of understanding. by showing that understanding itself, that precious understanding that makes you feel fuzzy
as an epistemological agent, is constituted by the organon-like rule of logic. And the thing is that, of course, understanding is an agential problem. Absolutely you need that in order to have something semi-like personhood, right? This is Kant 101, you know, understanding the, the, basically the synthetic unity of our perception, which comprised of the, the task of productive imagination or understanding as such. That, without that,
you don't have any sort of agency right and many people think that um ai's foray into pure logitization uh mechanization of mind is an assault upon agency i mean obviously this is a canonical uh less wrong nick land sort of way that you know AI in the mechanized world completely derails the idea of agency I absolutely don't see such a thing absolutely don't such a thing I see that it is really we should it comes back to understanding that the question of agency is a question at the level of understanding
absolutely you need but that doesn't mean understanding is something that cannot be realized by a bunch of integration, a bunch of functions, right? The question of logic is at a different level. Again, Kant, I think that Kant's really, if we pay attention to that, Kant already knows about this. I mean, Kant's idea of personhood or a perceptivation is completely that what Kant just doesn't realize is how far understanding has its roots in logic. That's what Kant doesn't appreciate. Sorry. Quick question. In that line of argument, then we must
say something about logic, but say something... I don't want to say ontological, but say something of what it's something to the idea of what is logic no yes what is logic absolutely and this is what basically starts uh hegel in its own kind of bizarre sort of understanding of logic then in the really systematic way from free and then moving to the 20th century absolutely what is logic yes i mean isn't it whole idea of karma is this trying to show that what is logic is ultimately the question of the method of logic that is absolutely the whole idea the principle
So we have been talking about explication, i.e. conceptual engineering as the ideal of the Enlightenment, right? And subsequently, by extension, the problem of how to construct a multi-level complexity of language. By that language in a general sense, so what the rather natural language, right? Language in general sense, language in a way that we can make new concepts far more fruitful, far more precise than the clunky concepts of ordinary natural languages.
is the gist of Carnap's project of explication. So, explicating a vague concept already presupposes a constructive ascent to the domain of metalogics or metalanguages, whereby the existing issues can be resolved from a higher vantage point. Right? To this extent, the incompleteness of a language in the sense of incompleteness, the first incompleteness theory, a la Gaudelaire. The incompleteness of a language, by language we mean simply at this point, syntax, the way that Carnarv's use it, syntax and semantics
that is built upon that logical syntax of language. Or theory at hand does not suggest intrinsic epistemological conceptual obstacles. I mean, you have heard this stuff that, oh, Goddell showed that basically epistemology is always hammerstrong rationalities, hammerstrong, so why actually move toward that? you know, that sort of kind of pseudoscientific, sophomoric understanding of the incompleteness theorem. The idea, first of all, we should understand that the first incompleteness theorem, which is the most important one, only applies to formal systems,
formal systems in the Goodell-Helbert sense, right? It does not include things like epistemology, rationality in the sense that we use it in philosophy, so on and so forth, right? It is a very specific formal system. So to this extent, the incompleteness of a language or theory at hand does not suggest intrinsic epistemological or conceptual obstacles. It instead points to the prospects of what can be built from the viewpoint of current insufficiencies and how from the perspective of what is built can we reflect upon what is available so as to unveil better classes of relationships, coherencies, etc.
So explication as a labor of the attempt at methodologics accordingly is not just a form of concept clarification or explicitation. it concerns with conceptual engineering within which conceptual clarification or even conceptual amelioration exists as an auxiliary task auxiliary task from the time of Kant to George Edward Moore and C.H. Langford Explication has been regarded as an analytical relationship between consents, between subject and predicates in Kant, between the implicit sense and the explicit sense in Hosserl,
and between analyzandum and analyzance in Langford. Analyzandum that has been analyzed and those constituent analyzants and those constitutes and analyze considered which constituted which constituted that constituted analyzandum. In other words, in the late Carnapian paradigm of explication, there is no universal law of drivability to exact and a license from the analyze on them meaning that so kent's idea of analyticity rests upon the concept of derivability derivability
whereas Carnap's uh idea of analogicity which is made and modified uh on top of Langford and Moore's concept of analyticity does not imply such drivability in a sense explication is instead built on the lack of complete correspondence between two concepts the explicandum which is vague imprecise concepts most probably a common sense concepts life mind
I don't know, computation, cognition, so on and so forth, these kinds of bloated concepts, and the explicato, the precise concepts, the simpler concepts, the more fruitful concepts, the more exact concepts, all related to one another. in the tuple I'm going to talk about nature of explicato, namely more precise, less vague concepts. If this, or more explicated concepts, or explicated concepts, if this correspondence is defined in terms of the aforementioned analytical relationships, it is not about conceptual
engineering, but merely conceptual clarification or conceptual amelioration, like ameliorative reasoning. We should understand that Carnap doesn't simply think of explication either as clarification and explicitation, a lot of Searle and Kant, or something more contemporary very like Sally Haslanger's idea of ameliorating reasoning, that you ameliorate the content of the concepts such that it can accommodate different varieties and diversifications. No, sometimes conceptual engineering requires
to create concepts for which we don't have existing criteria criteria of diversification or clarification. It simply means you create a sort of concepts to pose certain kind of problems which are outside the range of our existing problems and their respective solutions. That is a really important thing. The conceptual engineering is a far more general, more broader task and amelioration or explicitation, all capture bits and pieces, features of explication.
And Reza, before you go on, there was just a question from Connor, if that's OK. From who? From Connor. Oh, OK. Hello. Sorry if you forgot about me. No, I thought that we have a new student. yeah sorry i don't speak a lot i i'm uh i'm just enjoying the high level discussion that kind of sometimes flies over my head i was reading i've been reading the critique of pure reason for the first time and um uh i'm uh past the regulative use of ideals but he's speaking let me actually look at this section uh it's pure reason it's pure reason and it's dogmatic use i think and he distinguishes between um uh philosophy as understood as like the deployment of concepts and then um i think mathematics he uses as understanding as like um the conceptual
like creation like the creation of concepts and i'm i can't forget i mean i'm forgetting right now how he specifically derives that but um how how would if you don't want me asking how is the shift here from that understanding to carnap like um laid out does that make any sense understanding and creation of concept i think that for carna uh it is both really uh meaning that um a conceptually and a task of explication um requires both understanding of a of a new of a concept right and also the task of creating new concept but also this is impossible in can't
Carnap wants to do this by virtue of creating a new background such that these two tasks become integrated. And what is that task? Simply the logical syntax of language, right? The principle of tolerance and logical syntax of language. Meaning that you can create that notion of analyticity. a notion of analyticity. So what is exactly notion of analyticity in late Carnap? Does anyone know anything about this? I have actually, I haven't read that much stuff about this. I mean, people talk about the famous paragraphs that he writes, but the notion of analyticity
in Carnap is really interesting. So the notion of analyticity in Carnap is something like that in late Karna. Think about a game of chess, right? So you have the rules of chess. With the rules of chess, you can play chess. You can win or you can lose. The notion of analyticity, Foucault up here, is a systematization of all relations that can be obtained from such existing rules, such that within these relations, logical
relations, syntactical logical relations among the rules of logic, we can also be capable of telling what is exception to the rules, meaning that certain kind of moves that you can make in a chess game that are either prohibited or not prohibited but for which we didn't have written rules right that sort of analyticity allows you to create a concept for which you didn't for which you didn't have existing rules you see so the understanding rules and the creation of rules
collide in this new notion of analogicity that allows to have both rules and the where we talk to define the exception from both and hence the introduction of new rules. and if you don't mind me uh uh comment further i think also the problem with the contest he's like very uh obsessed i mean not obsessed because he's like very limited to his historical context but he's very concerned with like representation and that kind of uh epistemology So I think he's doing something like we can't create new concepts in philosophy because it's like dependent upon our, oh God, I'm forgetting all my Kantian terminology.
I think he would say something like it's dependent upon intuitions being united in understanding or something like that, right? Yeah, I mean, this all comes back to this idea that the difference between transcendental logic and logic. Logic as a canon, right? And logic as an organon, or the constitutive organon of all sciences. to the fact that to the extent that Kant definitely on the side of logic as a canon, he, his idea of logic par excellence has fundamental limitations so as his understanding of the concept. This is, this is a fundamental bias that Hegel begins to systematically unravel
in his work. But of course in concrete historical sense of development of logic, this happens with the emergence of Frigge and then basically further works are built on Frigge's revolution in logic. Yes, absolutely. That's essentially what I have been talking about with regard to, you know, or not me. I mean, Steve Aoudi and Andrew Karras has been talking about that there's a new vision of logic, which is the unbound ocean, as opposed to Wittgenstein prison,
which has its roots in Kantian's tethering of rationality or reason or logic to intuition. So So I was, as I was saying, if we define the task of explication as Carnap did in logical foundations of probability, we can see explication along four axes, four criteria. Similarity, exactness, fruitfulness, and simplicity.
These are, these, however, should not be taken separately. they should be taken as a tuple, as a four tuple, put them in a tuple, meaning that there are relations, non-reducible relations among these four criteria. Similarity alone will only yield conceptual clarification, random conceptual engineering. Simplicity, on the other hand, by itself is a free-floating criterion. What does it mean for an explicatum to be simpler or more parsimonious than the explicatum? There is no answer to this question unless we define the epistemological context of the simplicity and the situation under which the notion of simplicity is operative.
Like, which one is simpler? simpler. The Copernican statements made in the Copernican system or statements made in the Ptolemaic system about the motion of celestial bodies. Right. Just doesn't make sense. I mean, a great number of philosophical texts will have shown that this is just like it's taken out of the context of a specific context, epistemological, its own epistemological logical context makes no goddamn sense, other than unless and until you have some sort of metaphysical attachment with the notion of simplicity as if simpler statements are by
definition better than the non-simpler ones, which we actually see in information theory in computer science among people like Paul Vitannier and so on and so forth. So there is no answer to this question unless we define the epistemological context of simplicity and the situations under which the notion of simplicity is operating. Hence, exactness and fruitfulness, i.e. a conceptual behavior that covers more specific or differentiated sectors of reality, are primary factors for explication. to move from for example think about the concept of elasticity or toughness as an engineer
for a piece of metal for a piece of uh stone material so on so forth so we have toughness at one scale limit The concept of toughness for thinking about, I don't know, toughness of some piece of rock. At the level of molecular scale length, it's usually 0.0001.
We say toughness one. So we have a formulaic idea of toughness of this piece of rock, that scale rate. Then we have, when we go to a different scale rate, like something like nanometric, like mu point one, mu point one, uh, a previous concept of toughness at this scale of the rock literally has no purchase. You can't calculate or predict the toughness, the behavior of this rock under, you know,
a hammer, uh, consistent strain, so on and so forth, with the same formula that you use to calculate the toughness of this piece of rock at the level of the microscopic molecular level. of your calculations at this nanometric levels of respective concept of toughness one fall apart so you need to have a conch toughness to a different notion of toughness for this piece of rock right and a different formula to capture that idea so to move from toughness one to toughness
two for a given piece can be easily mapped out as the movement between similar concepts or a mer or a more presumptuous assertion and a less presumptuous assertion simplicity but the move from toughness to brittleness. So you see, in the concept, what I want to talk about, about explication, when you are using the idea of consciousness, cognition, mind, life, we are not simply talking about mind one, mind two, mind three, like explication in that sort of sense. Like we had an explicit criteria of toughness, right?
And then we moved from toughness one to toughness two. Because they both belong to the same category, always unexplicated concept of toughness. A general idea of set of concepts about toughness. But sometimes with these kinds of philosophical questions that philosophers have this nasty habit of using all the time, like life, mind, cognition, embodiment, so on and so forth, it's not just embodiment one, embodiment two, embodiment three. but it's also embodiment as a host of a goddamn whole lot of other kinds of other kinds of concepts such that traditionally the idea of toughness for a piece of metal or rock
has its had as its own conceptual constituents the concept of brittleness the concept of elasticity and the concept of some other kind of concepts. So all these concepts were bundled together, were given to you as this bloatware of a concept called toughness. You can see it with the problem of consciousness, the problem of person, the problem of a perception, the problem of phenomenal self-mom, the problem of rational agency. All of them are bundled together and given to you as a concept of consciousness. And then you say that, well, then you work with the
concept of consciousness, meaning an unexplicated concept, and then you come up with an idea, and then you overextend the conclusions that you have derived from that sort of bloated concepts to those areas which this concept, even though has included, has no business to work with. Like an unexplicated concept, basically, it's resources being used to address the specific questions of phenomenal self-model, the specific questions of aperceptivation. Obviously, that is never going to work. Like you use the concept of toughness in the traditional sense in order to talk about brittleness of a piece of material.
that just doesn't work because brittleness is a fundamentally different concept just because happened that you you had brittleness elasticity and so many other concepts all bundled up in your old concept of toughness that doesn't mean that the conclusions you derive from the behavior of concept of toughness in your material engineering problems can be extended to so can be extended to or as resolutions to problems of brittleness the problems of elasticity of piece of materials that's absolutely out of the question so think about this that not always
we move from toughness one to toughness two in so far as we have certain kind of generalized constraint to understand the concept of toughness, but sometimes it requires us to decompose the concept of toughness to show, to bring out brittleness, elasticity, so on and so forth. Young's elasticity. And that requires something more, something that methodically deviates from the old concept. That is the task of conceptual engineering. That is the task of conceptual engineering. It demands the engineering of fundamentally novel concepts by virtue
of decomposing old concepts. Not in the analyzing the old concept, not in the sense of deriva, simple derivability, but also introduction of new rules upon which new concepts can be built. Remember the notion that I mentioned about the game of chess with regard to Carnot and stuff, right? It demands the engineering of fundamentally novel concepts, just as we have to explain the description of a surface phenomenon by accounting for qualitatively distinct levels which afford that description. However, imprecise, we ought to explicate an inexact concept by a new concept whose criteria of newness or novelty is a well-ordered two-told. Well-ordered, well-ordered
tuple exactness, fruitfulness, simplicity, similarity. The artist's task of explication correspondingly bottoms out at revealing the systematic relationships and correspondences between the elements of this tuple for a certain concept and within a specific linguistic framework. Inexplicative framework, however, we soon find ourselves torn between global stringencies and local drifts. So what are global stringencies? Look, as I mentioned, there is, when we are talking about the concept of toughness, we We have some global astringencies to understand more or less by way of some sort of explicitation,
preliminary explicitation to understand, or historically, meaning after the fact, understand what was the sort of global astringencies or global constraints that allowed us to link toughness one and toughness two. Like for example, how is that Newton's gravity, Newton's concepts of gravity and Einstein's concepts of gravity fall into the same set, right, because of the kind of global constraints that they were. So that's what you might call to be global extrinsic system allows the task of explication to have an integrative framework.
Even though concepts, Einstein's concepts of relativity far diverges from new tones, but nevertheless they both respond to the same set of constraints. So, in the explicative framework, however, we still find ourselves torn between global astringencies, global constraints, and local drifts. So what are local drifts? What if the concept of toughness, as we explicate the concept of toughness, we open the sack of the concept and we see that the little baby concepts coming out of it and
these baby concepts are different sorts of concepts they are not all about toughness in fact none of them maybe only few of them respond to those constraints by which the concept of toughness was identified, right? Pretellness has nothing to do with toughness in engineering. Elasticity, young's modulus elasticity has nothing to do with toughness. So these little babies concepts come forth. And then imagine that these baby concepts, once you try to explicate them, they create other their own ancestry dynasty of baby concepts. So then there is a local drift, drift to the point It appears that we can never actually have an integral framework of explication.
If explication was supposed to be the ideal of enlightenment in the sense that it can rally local explications, local explicata, around sets of integral criteria, it appears to us Because once we do this sort of conceptual surgery, we never actually get any of those great integral ambitions. Because the concepts drifts and drifts and drifts further and further to the point that it has no resemblance with its original explicando that we used to use in a common sense framework.
So can we ever integrate the new concepts in relation to the old concepts? Can we glue back pieces of an old map in order to chart a new expanding territory? Can we sustain one singular albeit varied picture of the world? Or are we doomed for multiple pictures of the world which never stop at any point? If we only engineer concepts, what then does warrant that we are explicating the same concept? What is the guarantee that we are actually talking about the same concept as we have dived into the bottomless realm of explicata? This is what we can call, after Mark Wilson, the curse of the local drift.
But the prospect of this drift are surely exaggerated. Even though Einstein's concept of gravitation is different from Newton's concepts of gravity, nevertheless, the latter exerts limiting and enabling constraints upon the former. Concepts do constrain themselves and one another. That is the most important thing to know about concepts. Concepts not only constrain themselves, but concepts in their own neighborhood, no matter how different they might be on the surface. In French, so to speak, they do in French really constrain one another. Concepts do constrain themselves and one another,
whether they are couched in the same linguistic framework or they are couched in the framework of ascending meta-languages or meta-theories. This is why in the paradigm of conceptual engineering, we do not have just infinite drifts of concepts or conceptual fragmentation, but also opportunities for global conceptual integration. To relay how Einstein's theory of gravitation is linked in Newton's account of gravity and even more to that of Copernican-Keplerian equations of motions is not something that is given. It is the very task of explication, meaning finding neighborhood constraints
such that concepts do, we see relation of concept, we see the relations obtained among the concepts not of the same family, but also of different sets within the ages, within the, uh, under the dominion of implicit constraints, implicit conceptual constraints, inferential constraints. Explication in this way is a constant oscillation between local rifts and attempts for integration between the local aptitude to diverge and the global appetite to
converge. Any sorts of third way or one way lead to not understanding nature of the explication as a driving engine of enlightenment. So do we have the first, first actually, okay, how about this? Questions, then after questions, I need two minutes, then the diagrams, then more text, and then hopefully we'll finish. Anything here before I move forward? Maybe just a quick one. You were talking earlier about how there's like a set of bloatware within a concept of elasticity.
And then you also talked about how there is something similar in, I guess, like philosophical or concepts that are like a lot more vague. And I was just trying to make sure I have correctly that there is a distinction between these two. Right. Like there is a distinction, a distinction between a concept like elasticity, which at least you can kind of like when you perform this operation of explication, you can get those kind of kinds of laws that that are somehow tractable in a sense to other. They respond to certain sort of constraints. Yes. Yeah, like when you open the sack, there are things there rather than wound eggs, as you would, as Socrates would say, right? Whereas with this philosophical concept, you could maybe argue that there isn't always, and that is a kind of test, in a sense, or am I kind of going?
No, no, no, no, absolutely. Yes. No, there is a, look, I mean, the test, it's really hard to say what that test would entail. Obviously, first and foremost, whether they specifically and directly answer the constraints upon which these bloatwares are connected to one another toughness. And for example, like with toughness, we know that riddleness is not really toughness. But nevertheless, we can actually see how the point of connection might be for them to be bondage together in a common sensical way. The same thing about consciousness, right?
So, or consciousness. So we can actually say that phenomenal self-consciousness and rational agency. Well, obviously, you know, phenomenal self-consciousness, and there need to be some sort of phenomenal self-consciousness as a neurophysiological structuration to support the sort of activities that rational agency does. But obviously, does this mean that they are the same or they can be obviously connected? Absolutely not, right? This is just like the bane of this whole idea of, as I mentioned to you, like people like Bernardo Castro and this cult of consciousness people. Did I just say consciousness people? Yeah. Okay. Consciousness people, like they just want to reduce everything to consciousness.
What the fuck does that even mean consciousness, right? What are you trying to, what sort of aspect of consciousness are you talking about? So this is a total bloatware to the extent that, as I mentioned, any sort of resolution for such a problem is only going to be digging a deeper hole for yourself to get yourself out. So obviously you need to open the sack, getting what sorts of other concepts it holds and what would be the relation. some of these relations can be tested against the sort of criteria that you vaguely try to understand consciousness with but some of them are can only be attained historically as i mentioned after the
fact by looking back to see that now for example we have the means to understand how Einstein's concept of gravitation and his coloraries are attached to the concept or kind of not attached, related, related to the concept of, to Newton's concepts of gravity, right? But it's only after the fact, it's historical. So obviously this is actually what explication should be, right? Something are the task of the present, but something should only unfold through the ongoing
task of explication. And historically, we can only talk about them and move and constructively move out of those kinds of problems. But yeah, I mean, but when you really talk, think about this whole idea of explication, then you see this is why Karna, Gabrielle was talking about that. I really genuinely think that this is really a major theme in Karna that, look, this is not philosophy anymore. Because that stands against anything that philosophers do currently. The way they talk about time, contingency, embodiment, body, mind, so on and so forth.
And Gabriel was saying that Kana literally had an alternative to that. And if they say that, well, this is not philosophy, and this is a fuck it, I would call it philosophy. It's not just your philosophy. It's not your philosophy, though. Right? That's the whole point. Probably it is not philosophy, really, in a canonical sense. But that's what I think is an extremely well-conceived way of moving forward. To, at the very least, agree on what we disagree. Right? the whole idea of Connor that you know he always end up in these sorts of conferences where people
just even don't know what they are disagreeing about because they are talking past each other because they are using these sorts of concepts which mean a lot of other kinds of things and I think Connor had a question as well if that's not anymore Felipe, did you want to ask yours then, Felipe? Hey, I'm sorry, we're short on time, but I would like to have some validation of this conjecture. When you were talking about the local grifts and the not rightful fear of a tree of baby concepts that is growing and stuff.
I was thinking that what you were saying earlier about codification being the condition for tractability. Could I map this onto what you said? well we we shouldn't worry about uh an eternal tree of baby concepts because the concepts themselves the codification uh beget the tractability of the of the conceptual tree makes sense tractability yeah probably not in the tractability in that sort of technical sense i was talking about, right? But a certain kind of traceability of the origins of the concepts, right? The origins and the consequences of the concepts. I didn't want to say that codification
and that, that would be just a little bit of a dodgy move that Reza usually does, but I'm a changed man now. I'm not going to make those kinds of moves. So let me have a two minutes, I will come back. Thank you. Thank you.
Thank you. Okay, my apologies. So can we look at the first diagram that I shared? The concept of analyticity. Where is it? Classical explication. Classical explication on top.
do you have it you mean me i gotta do you want me to share it on the screen yeah sure actually i think my computer is a bit sick so maybe let's just get on with it yeah i'll share it when i get a chance okay so um for those of you who have already had with uh so this is this uh thing that carnapp says um he says what i mean by explicandrum and explicantum is to some extent similar to what
ch langford calls an alizans analyzing the license the analysis then states an appropriate relation of equivalence between the analysandum and the analysence, the notion of analysis in Moore's philosophy. It's usually that of supplanting a relatively vague idea by a more precise one. Perhaps, then he says, perhaps the form of explicants might be considered instead of explicatum. However, I think that the analogy with the terms definandum and definience that which defines would not be useful because if the explication consists in giving an explicit definition then both the definience and the different and um and sorry and and and different
my god because um and i shared the screen i lost my my screen now uh and And so, however, I think that the analogy with the terms definando and definiants would not be useful because if the explication consists in giving an explicit definition, then both the definiants and the definandum in this definition express the explicatum, while the explicandum does not occur namely that explicandum the debate concept so the procedure of explication is here understood in a wider sense than the procedure of analysis and clarification which
can't was there and langford have in mind the explicatum in my sense is in many cases the result of analysis of the explicandum and this has motivated my choice of the terms in other cases however it deviates deliberately from the explicandum but it still takes its place in some way some way right this will become clear by the subsequent examples well we didn't get to the examples but I'm before that I'm going to go a little bit further and talk about explicato next session we will make the examples Carnap's probability one probability and
tiering uh tiering concepts of uh computability even though we went chit-chatting a lot about it today so uh my apologies uh can we go to the second diagram the uh the one which is called concept clarification explication articulation something like that it's a bigger diagram thingy these are the three that you sent me yeah that's the one one yeah okay so So, you see, the ideal of explication is one of piecewise upgrading. One concept at a time.
One concept at a time. Why? It starts in medias res, not from first principles. But how are we to conceive of this as taking place in the actual practice of science as a social institute this is where the picture sketched so far would begin to fall fall of current skepticism about the idealization of all the style philosophy of science you know and and of course the all the style idea of enlightenment remember from chaos the world that that was uh one of the early essays of Carnap right order ordered ordered world
for Carus at the very least at least Carnap's picture is quite compatible with a more sociologistic post-Wittgenestanian post-Kuhnian view of scientific practice viewed as empirical phenomena evolved and constructed languages can be regarded as residing in different social contexts and from an ideal or engineering viewpoint they can be seen as having different functions different uses either way this fits well with the picture we find say in the opening passage of philosophical investigation where it wittgenstein compares the heterogeneity of language uses the different uses of various tools
in a toolbox or the levers in the cabin of a steam locomotive like or basically for your spaceship You have a dashboard full of different buttons. Each of these buttons represent different functions, different uses. It's not that this view of using language is not that degenerate into some sort of hazard pluralism, right? It's a pluralism at a methodological level, but integral at the level of its own ideals,
meaning that in order for you to take off of planet Islam Earth, you need to use all of these buttons in conjunctions, in the right sort of way, conjunctions with one another for the spaceship to take off the ground, right? So that's a kind of view of language or practices of philosophy that Carnot wants to still hold to, you know, a kind of multiplicity in one, multiplicity in one at the level of method. in one as a low-low method is compatible with oneness, integral oneness of basically the
ideal, the enlightenment, yeah, one in multiplicity and multipleism in one. So, my apologies. So in this sort of explication, the conundrum of explication, we are participating or we are entangled with, in a rather chaotic world picture, immediate awareness embedded in everyday life around us. It is ordered to some degree by categories of common sense, local to a particular culture,
context, some are more precise than other common sense concepts, and some are not, so on and so forth. This is the world in which we live and act, articulate and presented to us in evolved languages. On the other hand, the local cultures of certain sub-communities that specialize in particular task, the systematic pursuit of knowledge, the science, however one might want to identify those with, have constructed various elaborate devices for this purpose, including deliberate, including communication, communicative systems whose rules are so, to varying degrees, consciously and deliberately made up and agreed upon, and often continually renegotiated, repaired and if necessary abundant. Collectively the sub-communities employing such systems use
them to represent the provisional theory of the world, the most adequate they have been able to devise so far, adequate for instance to all of the facts they collectively know. This theory is represented in constructed languages, ideally in the long run in a single unified language, capital L. So as to exhibit the common zero-ability of all the parts of the theory and enable us to bring these different parts to bear on problems, solutions require many different kinds of knowledge. The explicative interaction between evolved and constructed systems, natural and
and formal languages takes the form, not of wholesale replacement or superimposition or carnal, but of piecemeal interaction exchange within the context of a dynamic mutual feedback relation. From the engineering point of view, This of course raises problems of its own, one of which is a clear identification within the language subject to explication of the pieces to be thus replaced piecemeal by explications framed in terms of constructed languages.
In the absence of sharp individuation of concepts, how can we ever clearly identify an explicando? Okanav's explication must be preceded by what he calls clarification as a first step. It is a largely informal task of establishing a mutual understanding about the identity of the explicando before even proceeding with its replacement or conceptual engineering in its precise way that I was talking about. Though he did not underestimate this challenge, he thought it could be overcome as a practical level.
He says, there is a temptation to think that since the explicando cannot be given in the exact terms anyway, it does not matter much how we formulate the problem. But this would be quite wrong on the contrary. since even in the best case we cannot reach full exactness. We must, in order to prevent the discussion of the problem from becoming entirely futile, do all we can to make at least practically clear what is meant as the explicanda, right? So you need to at least make some preliminary attempts at converging upon the concepts from which you are going to diverge,
right? You need to agree at the very least on the point of disagreement. This is something that he had already said in the early late 20s, 1920s. So there's a kind of a variation of that sort of reimagining philosophical discourse. What X means by a certain term in contexts of a certain kind is at least practically clear to Y, if Y is able to predict correctly X's interpretation from most of the simple or there are cases of the use of a term in those contexts. It seems to me that in raising problems of analysis or explication,
philosophers very frequently violate this requirement. No surprise. They ask questions like, what is causality? What is life? What is mind? What is justice? Et cetera. Then they often immediately start to look for answers without first examining the tacit assumption that the terms of the questions are at least practically clear enough to serve as a basis for an investigation, for an analysis or explanation. Even though the terms in question are unsystematic, inexact terms, there are means for reaching a relatively good mutual understanding as their intended meaning here and now.
So this is as close as Carnot gets to be a pragmatic. You shouldn't expect anything more than from him in terms of his commitment to pragmatism, the way that Karras talks about. So yes, so his pragmatism is more of a concrete engineering problem rather than pragmatism in any sort of American pragmatism sort of way. So that was I know that we had too much computation divergence early on, but they would be actually be fruitful for the next session when I talk about two notions
of probability and Turing's explication of the concept of complication with respect to Wittgenstein. And after that last session, we will have kind of trying to make a little bit of criticisms of address some of the criticism levied against Karna and possible Karnappian solutions to such criticisms. I think that would be it. Is there something that we should maybe read for next week? For that and then also for- No, I don't think so, no.
Well, we've got two presentations, so- OK, if you want, if you are- OK, I mean, we have already read too much. I mean, how about this? I mean, OK, how about this? one sec. Okay. Logical foundations of probability. Okay. Page three, which is under clarification of an explicando. Two page. My apologies.
You asked for this, though. to page 15. Of course, after that, it's also really interesting discussion, formalization and interpretation, but page 3 to page 15. Oh, any question about the diagram? So the diagram is quite actually, you know, basic. You see concept clarification, explicitation, articulation.
That is really the first diagram derived from Kant, Hosserl, Langford's concept of analysis. what differentiates conceptual engineering from that sort of stuff is deviation from the analytic paradigm of content determination or sameness of content between analyzing and don't and analysis, introduction of new concepts, literally, right? Concept engineering. Remember, concept engineering is based on a notion of analyticity in which you can introduce new rules.
Remember talking about the game of chess, certain kinds of illogical systems that you can delve into relations among, obtained among the rules of playing chess, such an extent that you can see what sorts of move are prohibited and some, what sort of moves are allowed, but nevertheless are exceptions to those kinds of rules. Hence the introduction of new rules and hence introduction of new concepts. So obviously they, this new notion of analyticity that Carnot is working with, yields a new concept, a new form of conceptual construction, in the sense that conceptual
construction does not mean simply explicitation or amelioration or clarification, but also conceptual engineering, the introduction of new concepts. Then we have the Carnapian idea of of explication, which is entangled within this whole domain of metrologic, attempt at metrologic, logical syntax, logical syntax of language, and the later works on semantics built on top of that, different from the kind of canonical notion of semantics that our philosophers have been talking about. we have explicando weight concepts we have classificatory uh comparative quantitative
concepts that sort of thing is addressed in that uh ex excerpt that i just mentioned to you for you to read next session then we have similarity exactness foodfulness simplicity as a tube well-ordered cupid, meaning that you can take them separately. Then you have explicatum. Within that sort of system, explicatum is the end game, explicatum more precise. Then explicatum can be understood in two sorts of ways, as I mentioned, toughness, the relation between toughness one, toughness two, or the relation between toughness, brittleness, elasticity,
so on and so forth, right, or with regard to consciousness the same way. So you have global expediencies, integration possibilities, and local risks, fragmentations, baby concepts, all the way down, you know, baby concepts all the way down. And then the tension between these two should be informative for the new engineering idea of the enlightenment project. Zenobia, did you want to ask your question aloud?
And then, yeah, sure. It's just a quick one. Is this global stringency is the same as global constraints? Yes, global constraints in the sense that there are certain kind of, for example, as I mentioned, there are certain kind of constraints within an established theoretical framework, either present or historically understood, that we see that theory one, theory two, with their own sets of concepts, have in fact responded to the same set of concerns, constraints, and constrained by those kinds of concerns, right? I mean, this obviously is an extremely,
I want to just be very clear about this, extremely reductive way of talking about this. This question of theory comparison, theory comparison, is itself quite loaded with other sorts of assumptions, right? One of the greatest books that if you want to read, I have actually added, I had, I had a seminar on this, I think, something about philosophy of science, Stegmuller Grunbaum or something. There is this book, two actually, there are two books, but one of them is really difficult, I don't suggest it, but the book that I do suggest is The Structure and Dynamics of Scientific
Theories by Wolfgang Stegmuller. It's about theory comparison in the sense that how can we actually understand or identify that two theories do share certain kind of core, either in terms of micro theoretical cores, macro theoretical cores, or range of applications. Such that we actually be capable of comparing these theories. Right. Think about Ptolemaic system, Copernican system, Keplerian system, Newtonian system,
Einstein system, right? Sure, Arman. Thank you for taking my question. I just wanted to ask about the theory comparison. Wouldn't you say that, for example, the line between Newton's gravity and Einstein's gravity is a unifying line that Hegel puts it as force, understanding of force, what is force, and how we how we understand force and not the here by force just i i just doesn't mean f equals
ma by force you can think of any anything unifying of any uh probably or seemingly two no absolutely yes that is yeah that from from look from a classical dynamics perspective right from a classical mechanic perspective actually the notion of force is a unifying concept for that but then you actually step into quantum mechanics where your concept classical concepts of force goes haywire totally fucked so do you need so you need new isn't isn't this a sign hard to say Arvon, really hard to say. Yeah, for example, the concept of force is a really, absolutely,
you're right. Concept of force is quite a key, at least from a classical study of these two theories, to compare them. But of course, there are other kinds of constraints. It's really hard to say, I mean, there is a huge amount of... This is why Maria said that, you know, it complicates the stuff and I said, fuck up complication. Unfortunately, this is one of those times that it complicates the fucking situation because there are so many other kinds of factors. And it's really hard to say which one of them. Probably not. It's probably... One of the greatest thing is about Stegmuller's peace book and also his friend, Joseph Sni, Joseph Sni, Joseph Sni,
is a really great book, extremely difficult, Joseph Sni's book. They show that it's not really about one concept, but a family of resemblance concepts. Sure, I understand your point about Stegmuller and my question is then the problem is to explain the role of syntax, the role that syntax or the normative part of talking, you know what I'm saying, the normative part of talking or taking the world plays in the scientific theory. That's the problem of maybe a skeptical something like a Rorty skepticism. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, absolutely. Yeah, yeah. Go on, go on.
The point would be that to understand the relation between even the scientific as the Solarsian would put it, the similarity or friction between scientific image and what do you call it, a manifest image between two images of humanity that human has of itself, the link between these two even then must be explained in this criterion, the criterion of syntax or taking the word as this kind of- Yeah, absolutely. Yeah, no, I mean, this is, I mean, obviously, I don't know, probably some of you have written, read, who is that guy? um it's called talks about uh as i say the poverty of the space of reasons
Kenneth Westwall has actually attacked Solarzians particularly right-wing Solarzians precisely on this issue it's called the poverty of the space of reason yes absolutely but i mean look and essentially keep it in the family. I mean, Szilardons are good people. You don't want to alienate them, right? Great people. But yeah, I mean, sometimes they talk out of their depth, as I must say. I think Westwall is total Carnapian.
is far more Carnapian than we. He has, unfortunately, has a very short temper. So with Solarzians, particularly the left, the right wing Solarzians. Well, I mean, look, I mean, these are really, this is the problems of philosophy. None of us are going to be right or wrong. But that does not mean that we cannot strive to weed out bad arguments from our or our rival's arsenal. And there are so many bad arguments here, both on the side of Karnak fanboys and Selaar's fan robots,
and so on and so forth. Yeah, I mean, it's just really sometimes I think that if we want to address all these philosophical questions, then perhaps we shouldn't do philosophy, right? Because the task of philosophy should be modest, step by step. Unpack your concepts one by one. Not goddamn the whole house. No one wants to see you washing your dirty laundry in front of people, right? Washing your dirty concepts in front of people. No, you have to do this stuff one by one. That's a modest task of philosophy
and that's going to be extremely fruitful. Proverbs. no one shall wash his dirty concepts in front of people. I would be a good bombshell to round up on, I think, unless anybody has more questions. I think that would be it, I think. OK, so who's the next victim? I think that everyone has actually talked. Or not? Delshad also talked. I think that's it then. So is there anyone who wants to, out of? So we have a prior sort of a-
Oh yeah, Arma wants to get into the wildland. Okay, he won't be my friend. Well, I think- But he's the only, sorry, go ahead. I was gonna say, Zenobio and Kasia are like slated to present next week, I believe. So if it's okay, we should stick to that. Yeah, sure, sure, absolutely. And I think that was it. And sorry for extensive chit chat, computation chit chat, but I mean, sometimes it's just absolutely necessary to kind of diverge from the discussions. I mean, a class that always sticks to the script
is no fucking class. It's just like, but Cronenberg's actually, coming back to Cronenberg again, Cronenberg hated Hitchcock precisely because it's a, this guy actually makes movies out of a script in a precise way. How the fuck can he make a movie and not get bored? Maybe he was just, you know, following a stepwise procedure of- Stepwise procedure, yes. you know your own goods on the paper a stepwise procedure unless you have to do it yourself yeah i mean maybe maybe what works for philosophy doesn't work for anything else i mean that's okay dear friends uh wish you great weekends thank you very much love you thanks bye bye