The Vicious Transparency of Time (Session 2)

Hello and welcome to the second session of the seminar, the vicious transparency of time instructed by Rezny Garistani. Today we have one presentation. Or maybe, maybe we won't have it. we won't have it okay we have a lecture and also i wanted to make an organizational announcement about the presentations that we will do uh ahead further uh all the presentation that you have already signed in to should be recorded before the session and uh sent to me uh

on wednesday or thursday which is to say uh before before the class so we would have the time at least one day to watch it um i think that's it for now if you have any organizational questions please write me rather please thank you very much Sorry, a little bit of an allergic kick today. So thank you everyone. So we will continue, you know, our seminar.

I think that we can go over Kant. And I was, before the class started, I mentioned that we are already behind, because I just looked at it. Even if I go over some of the aspects of Kant with regard to the question of time, still some will be left. I still want to finish that text that I was reading for you. after that we have to also make a transition a kind of a transitional phase moving to a cell so yeah that that takes time um so uh now that you have read those texts that i mentioned uh you

you know, Krauss and Kitcher's texts. Let's just start to see if you have any sort of questions. And as I said, I have said routinely in my classes, just even the most thing that you think that they are just like, you know, very trivial questions about clarifications, things that you might not think that might be truly relevant. It's just a sort of very small sort of question. Please do ask these sort of questions because I know that not everyone has a familiarity with Kantian jargons, right?

Or for that matter, philosophical jargon. So I appreciate any sort of questions moving forward. let's hear from you i mean any sorts of thoughts any um you know complaints philosophical or otherwise go ahead mr slav um i have a sort of clarification question with regard that i've been preparing the presentation for Krauss text, I will share my screen for a while. So I wanted to ask if it is a writer's analogy in the context that I have linked the idea of

the way Krauss uses Kant's schemato categories in a way that Reza, you use the concept of time as insider as you can see on slide uh yes so you know is there replacing the idea of these categories and schematta and i have also pinned them to diachrony and synchrony this is superb this is magnificent yes this is really good you see uh obviously i mean this is the whole uh kantian uh dilemma that Kant specifically thinks that time, the form of intuition as a form of intuition,

is mostly, if not completely, only applies to particular content of representations, right? And not to other sort of stuff. But the more you look into... you know kind of like Kant's transcendental hylomorphism you see even pure concepts of understanding have time the specter of time in the backdrop haunting them right and that's actually quite an interesting this is I'm going to share a diagram today you know the the game of find Waldo, right? So you have to, this sort of a striped man in the striped dress or clothing.

It's essentially, when you look at Kant's threefold synthesis, or the entire account of transcendental hylomorphism, from pure concepts of understanding to imagination, whether reproductive or productive or to the intuitive, the intuitive manifold and sensibility, you see that you can, there's always time present, right? It's just that it has, it has different, takes different sorts of forms, either of diachronicity or synchronicity, succession or duration, or for that matter, the absolute form

of time as a backdrop, as a unitary horizon that is assumed implicitly for forms, transcendental forms to have that sort of applicability. As a form of transcendental conditions. Yes. Yes. That was a spoiler to my presentation. This is very good. This is really good. Excellent. Yeah, I mean, reading Kant, don't trust Kant, just because he says time is only, you know, pertinent to the content of representations, particular content. This doesn't mean that

time is not other places in his account of transcendental deduction and transcendental island for example it's just that you have to do detective work to find waldo namely time yes it's kind of archology yes Thank you. Absolutely. Thoughts, questions moving forward? Please, I mean, don't be shy. Actually, I have a question. Sure.

I've been rereading the passages about time from transcendental aesthetics from Kant and there is a strange passage B 54 it says that time is certainly something real namely the real form of inner intuition and then that it therefore should be regarded not as object but as a way of representing myself as object and its empirical reality remains a condition of all our experiences oh okay so i just

missed one point there it says that first it says that time is a form of inner intuition then that it is real because this is how we perceive some alteration that occurs and then because we can perceive alteration that is why time is a condition of all our experiences so just on the first glance if we just read this passage it seems that the continuation the sequence is as follows first we have a condition of time time allows alteration or perceiving the alteration and then the this allows us for experiencing something

Is it like this straightforward or is the story more complex? No, I think even in Kant the story is more complex than that. I mean, he has a sort of passages. He just wants to highlight a very specific sort of thing. So you should understand that inner sense, right? Or inner x, inner x, and x can be inner experience, inner intuition, inner sense, inner perception. right depending on the sort of uh magnifying glass that you put on the whole transcendental scheme right um time plays primarily a role in perception right perception as as a certain sort

of representational, right, requiring a certain sort of representational mechanism that pertains to a particular object. Namely, it has a particular representational content, right? So that's the canonical story, that succession, duration, that sort of stuff come into play first and foremost through the idea of perception you know in fact the constitution of the perceived object a particular object a perceived object now perception is not experience

in a general way right because perception as I mentioned pertains to a particular representational content a particular object a particular percept experience is generalization of empirical cognition writ large right so perception is empirical consciousness pertaining to a particular content, whereas experience is empirical cognition. So when we are saying that something is of empirical cognition and experience is that sort of thing, we are talking about a cognitive act.

We are not merely talking about the form of intuition and sensibility pertaining to a particular object, but also the acts, namely judgments, constitutive of any sort of cognition, be them empirical or not. Right? So essentially Kant wants to make a point that even though experience and perception are different, the form of time, the influence of time, carries over from perception to cognition,

and hence from mere empirical consciousness to empirical cognition writ large. okay so they are not of the same nature it's not like we have a manifold of uh determinations of time and this this uh we do have them however precisely because of that experience being cogitation of some sort, right? Empirical cogitation, empirical cognition. It is not merely that of the intuitive manifold, right? But the influence of time of the intuitive

manifold transitively carries over generally, the most general sort of way into empirical cognition. In fact, the role of time, classical orthodox Kantianism, the role of time only pertains to that of the empirical, whether in consciousness or cognition, namely experience. But that is the whole point that Manzislav was talking about, that Kant is a goddamn liar, and is lying about this because the role of time actually once you start to do the archaeology of the transcendental diagram transcendental schema you see that the the role of time is far more than

of the empirical in fact it is the backdrop for the empirical to be transcendentally constituted okay i hope i will clarify this throughout the seminar thank you absolutely no it we you see it's really interesting that can't by definition is uh inheriting working in the lineage of hylomorphism And Hegel would have hated that. That's why the whole idea of Hegel hating Kant.

Because hylomorphism to Hegel, and it is correct to an extent, is a species of master-slave dialectic. And Kant tries to abolish that. Kant knows, even though he's not familiar with any sort of that sort of master slave, but he knows a kind of connotation of Aristotelian islamorphism, right? That has been haunting philosophy since the Middle Ages. That he, the whole idea of interaction between form and matter, right? Or content needs to be mediated by a form of technicity.

It is not as if the master form impinges its influence over the poor slave matter or stuff, but rather a level of technicity intervenes and makes this possible. and this technicity as you see is the is the backbone of the transcendental schema distilled in the very idea of eschemata and eschematization eschematization is a form of art technique that allows to bridge the gap between form and content pure concepts

right and sensory stuff uh michael you wanted to say something no actually um you answered my question so forget it what was the question oh i was primarily concerned about the the section that lika uh mentioned um because in my edition it says now changes are possible only in time right before that statement and uh from what we were talking about it seems that that's not true for kant in reality that like that that that's not just a methodological consideration for him it's like also has weight in other regards yes it has ways in other regards yes absolutely

but as i said can't for some reasons essentially want to make at least in transcendental aesthetics, right, wants to give us an account of the constitution of perception, right, and then only later, rather belatedly, say that whatever holds the form of laws and principles hold for perception carry over to experience and from experience to cognitions

perception for him is I mean, we should understand where he's coming from and what he wants to do, right? So he wants to essentially create a three-four assault on the sort of philosophies that have come before him and all of them have basically built their philosophies on various accounts perception how perceptions are possible one you can say a cartesian philosophy right another one

you can say Humean lock British empiricists where perception is created bottom up by way of bundles of sensations and impressions the bundle view which is the classical empirical view and then most importantly Leibniz and his influence of rationalists on rationalist metathesis, German rationalist metathesis of Christian Rolf and Klausius. So he wants to create a reconciliatory but also a critical account

of perception that borrows elements from all of these three, you know, philosophical lineage, but also be able to, by way of it being critically built and constructed, showing and exposing the shortcomings of the previous accounts of perception and hence experience. thoughts uh i had some thoughts uh regarding the comments you made on

how form and matter needs to be mediated by a form of technicity so uh like my question would be like is it time somehow like a technology of perception then time yes in in a sense it's not um it is i would say that it's not technology of experience but it is a what you might call to be a form of technicity right that enables perception and enables experience yes in in that sense but i'm not sure if kant wants to uh make such an account for him

the technique, the technicity is really, you know, is the bridge between understanding and sensible intuition, which is imagination, particularly the role of eschemism. And in eschemism, you see that the reason that eschemism is such an obscure and occult sort of concept in Kant is precisely because it is a form of technicity, art in a techne sort of way, that is built upon the technicity of time. So this, yeah, I guess it's very like what would be the difference between a form of

technicity and a technology, I guess. That's what maybe unclear to me. So you see, when, I mean, when we are using, I mean, the reason I was saying that the word art, art in the ars, medieval sense, right? Ars, A-R-S. It is obviously a Latin translation of techne, and techne, at least going back to the Greeks, it is not really technology proper. I mean, technology is a form of techne or technicity, but techne implies something more general, in fact, more cognitive it's more cognitive rather than you see when we are talking about technology we

are really talking about at least in the common sense today we are talking about certain sorts of manipulable know-hows right know-hows technically is not merely in the in its greek form it's not merely a know-how but also it is a know what. So it has both epistemic connotations and practical connotations. There is this book, highly, highly torgid. Let me find the title of this.

And particularly, if any of you who are into art and the whole history of technicity, This is the best book that I actually can recommend. One second. It's... It's... It's a book by Staten on Technicity. Let me just get

It's called Technotheory, a new language for art by Henry Staten. S-T-A-T-E-N And it really goes into the historical evolution of the concept and sees tekne as ultimately being cognitive in nature, right? For something to be cognitive in nature means that it does share components. It accommodates components of know-whats, right? Knowing what is the case and know hows, knowing how to do something. Right. And for example, in Plato, the idea of techne, whenever we see techne, particularly in the, you know, analogy of the divided line,

technique is always play an intermediary role between one class of forms or of formal and a class of sense or of appearances, right? uh so for example mathematics or mathematicals in the analogy of the divide lines are introduced as a form of technique and we can actually talk about this in the history of mathematics and mathematics is not merely the manipulation of forms, right?

Simply know-hows, but also they have an epistemic implication. For example, think about how mathematical models and science being applied in non-arbitrary sense. So mathematics is in that sense, technological uh structuration in the in the sense of techne as being pertaining to both know-hows and know-whats sorry can you repeat the name of the book i didn't care

Henry Staten Technetheory, T-E-C-H-N-E, Technetheory, a new language for art. Thank you. Absolutely. Luca? Yeah, hello everyone. I just had a small question. It was still in my head after the last meeting, and i have read the text as well and the idea that something can be both constituted and constituting consciousness is also is for me almost a form of this kind of how do you say almost impossible like almost a joker card in the game you know

know what felt like or maybe all of this text that i have that you have sent us and i have read them uh it feels that maybe there is a form of not blindness to something but that everything is very much about human consciousness experiencing time and being constituted by time but without maybe idea that there is something that there is possibly a time without human consciousness or subcutivity? Or maybe that's just how I read it in a certain way. Right. No, you see, as I mentioned, neither for Kant nor for Searle, it is not as...

So the real important question they won't ask within the context of their own philosophies, They don't want to say or negate, affirm or negate whether there is a time without human. Because a time without human would be a metaphysical account of time, essentially not of the consciousness. Right. um that would be open to pure speculation right of a of fundamental speculative philosophy that is not really their business at least respected to their own the goals of their own projects but rather they want to give a critical account of how consciousness is being constituted

right and within the constitution of this consciousness there is a certain sort of generality what you might call the principle or laws of consciousness through which if we are able to in fact talk about other sorts of consciousnesses other than us humans homo sapiens they should be modeled by definition there is no other way to go around it they are always going to be modeled on this principles of consciousness and not others

right because then you lose the grip on the critical philosophy because then you can talk about other sort of consciousnesses right uh but then what would be those sort of consciousnesses and in fact both Kant and Husserl within that tradition of critical philosophy want to show that whether you know it or not when you are talking about other sorts of consciousness is outside of the human, you know, ambit of consciousness, they are blindly modeled on human consciousness, not the particular conscious that we occupy, we accommodate,

but the laws of the consciousness that we have extracted from the very particularity of our own consciousness. So it's a modeling thing. And they really want to highlight that this sort of important point that it doesn't matter whether there are other consciousness outside of us or not. Might be, might be not. But that is not really the point. The point is that if we are going to go to talk about other sorts of consciousnesses. They are implicitly modeled on what

we take consciousness to be. Which is actually a form of the unconscious. It's an unconscious in two different ways. One, as you say, the whole idea that consciousness being constituted and constituting create a form of unconscious, a blind spot, right? And that's the whole point that I'm going to talk about later on. But also in a different sort, it creates a blind spot. When we are going and speculate about other sorts of stuff, other sorts of intelligences and consciousnesses, we are blindly modeling them on this consciousness and not others.

okay thank you i think i got that clarified a little bit please do ask i mean i know that right now we don't have enough material for me to unfurl this uh you know the the what you might call to be the gordian knots of consciousness of course of course exactly i just wanted to say that just there is a small sense in all of these papers that time is a form of god touching human consciousness in a way just a bit of this kind of circling towards itself a little bit yeah i mean yes i mean

that are of course you see uh that that sort of uh time that we are talking about is called absolute time right and absolute time usually is being attributed to nature itself right as as as a god and that's parmenides really uh you know uh a dimension of reality that is by itself right And you can only, for Parmenides at least, you don't, reality doesn't exist in time, but by virtue of time, right?

That's Parmenidian view of time, and that creates an account of the absolute time. Great, thank you. Absolutely. So, yes, let me share my screen. can you do it uh yes let me i have forgotten how to do it but i'm going to do it it's a green

the green button yes yes um yeah uh one sec um okay nope something that did something incorrect but oh okay yeah for some reason if i try to do that um okay okay never mind one second um sorry um okay

Do you have my screen? Yes. Okay. So, as I said, Kant's account is essentially belongs to Hylamorphism. hyalomorphism, right? This is a species of hyalomorphism. However, it is not Aristotelian hyalomorphism. It's called transcendental hyalomorphism. Transcendental precisely because there are mediating phases between form and matter, right? And there are always moments

of constitution there is an interaction essentially it's transcendental precisely because the nature of form and matter the is an interact interactive for that every time that you know one imposes on another or influences the other there is a moment of constitution and this moment of constitution is what you might think about as an as a new input so the output of the system becomes a new input for the system to be worked on right and then it creates another output which again another

constituted movement which can be channeled back into the system to be constituted further sorry reza can you do it full screen because yes yes i'm going to can see yes okay can you see this yes thank you so As I said last session, so we have a, you know, a tripatriate regime here of subject representation and object. Right. We don't know what object yet is because object doesn't mean anything in the diagram of transcendental hylomorphism other than it being transcendentally constituted.

Right? Meaning that object doesn't mean shit in this diagram without the rest of the diagram, without the representation, namely the combination of the representing act and the represented content, right? And the subject and the relation that the representation holds to the constituted object and the constituting subject reference and reflexivity why

why not otherwise why not the object is constituting is doing the constitution because that wouldn't be transcendental that would be a species of uh rational metaphysics because then wolf his teacher wolf was his teacher yes but that would be yeah that's essentially the moment when can't uh leaves pre-critical philosophy behind because if object is the constitutive you essentially fall back on various forms of pre-critical philosophy that the object

as Salaras would have said it or their stuff whatever reality might be or objects might be, impinge their form upon the subject as if the subject was mere blank slate, tabula rasa, right? But the whole idea that it is transcendental precisely because it's the mind that imposes a structure on the stuff out there and this is stuff are the ones

which pertain to sensations or stuff they're not even object the whole point is that the object is being constituted is not given if object the object is only given at the level of sensations but sensations in the jargon of german philosophy do not denote its givenness meaning pre-constitution of its structure of its whatever it might be Yes, Matislav?

I just wanted to add that perhaps this idea of pre-critical conception of time may be likened to Descartes' understanding of time as mere supostate, I mean, when you are constituted by object. Yes, yes, yes. And of course, you see, there are various ways to, so various ways to, at least, maybe not various ways, at least for Kant, there is only one way to overcome pre-critical philosophy. but then, for example, Meirsov wants to show that in overcoming pre-critical philosophy, Kant relapses back into the classical story of correlations.

And then Meirsov attempts to not undo the movement to pre-critical philosophy, but rather resolve the situation. by introducing nomina or reality as independence into the whole schema. I think that, for me at least, this is something that I will get back to later, but I think that philosophically, the strategy is interesting,

but it is one of those cases that you are creating a great, exciting solution for an essentially ill-imposed problem, right? Maybe you should actually get rid of nothing altogether, as we Sarah did, right? to create an account of object and objectivity that is not fully of the consciousness. It can be represented to the consciousness, but that which is represented to the consciousness or being represented to the consciousness

might not be all of consciousness. And that husserl's distinction between the noemata and transcendent objects, not transcendental, transcendent object. essentially you can think about objects of science as transcendent objects because they have dozens of properties or features which are not of the consciousness even though they can be represented to the consciousness so that you know subject object representation

you can see that this can be transformed transformed uh hence the squiggly arrows to another sort of diagram, you know, as the one that opened up by transcendental aesthetics in Kant. I'm saying that transformed here, subject is not really a perceptive self, object is not first order appearances, they are not to be confused with one another, it's just that I'm saying that once you do the proper transforming, that would be an equivalent class of concepts for subjects and objects. So what is the aperceptive self? A perceptive self

traditionally in rational metaphysics is understood as a substance right hence when we are talking about something is substance it means that persists through time but also it's a substance its nature is substantive but that perceptive self for Kant is transcendental and it's constitutive. Its nature is simply being undergirded by its

capabilities, not merely by its capacity. Capacity is something that is passive, by its ability to deploy representations and in fact for Kant the perceptive self ultimately is a rational agent and it's the rationality of its agency is really distilled in its ability to deploy concepts. For it to be able to deploy a concept, it means that it is able to track the premises

and the consequences of the concepts doesn't so deployed. Meaning that when I use, for example, the classical Szilardian Brandoamian sort of stuff, that when I deploy a certain sort of concepts, it immediately entitle me to certain sort of consequences and premises of that sort of concept, like concept of red, blue or something. And hence it deprived me of certain other sort of entitlements. So a perceptive self is not substantive here anymore.

And it is being distinguished by the sort of activity, by the sort of function it displays, namely deployment of representations, both in the sense of representing acts, which have the quality of takings. I take this item to be read. It's a form of judgment, right? or I have this feeling, is a certain sort of position taking, right? And represented objects to be able to adjudicate

the content of the said acts. Right? A perceptive self here is activity. And precisely because it is a perceptive, not perceptive, because it is on the extreme side of the spectrum. It is not merely working through a bundle of perceptions, but it is rather constitutive, primarily of any sort of perception that you can imagine. So hence the classical line that there is no perception without a perception.

In fact, this is the part that was introduced by Wolff and Klausius of Ration Metaphysics, the role of the perceptive self. The difference between their account and Kant's account is that the perceptive self here is not a substance in time. But rather, it creates a consciousness. This function is to constitute a sort of consciousness through which it can seize its inner states

and itself appearing in time. uh before i move forward uh questions heckle i can't see all of you so you instead of raising your hand you can simply uh you know turn on your mic and uh ask me anything you would like okay if nothing then on the other side of the spectrum we see the first order

appearances these are what you might call to be first order appearances um you can you can think about it um because it's a very complicated story here in kent so the outer sense is what you might call to be the relations of uh you know uh of of stuff uh having dozens of perspectival spatial relations with one another right it's always from a perspective and space function as an

as a receptacle hence outer sense that that yields that uh that um that create the seed of perspectival awareness of stuff. I'm saying stuff, because these stuff need to be organized for there to be something called an appearance, right? Just think about the Plato's allegory of cave. You know, so you have, you know, all sorts of things on the divided line or on the cave.

You have like, you know, fleeting specters, right? Fleeting specters on the cave, on the wall of the cave. These fleeting specters are too erratic to be called appearances. And in fact, as you see in the analogy of the divided line, they are not considered to have anything of objecthood. They are mere as fleeting specters. So they need to be organized. And here we have sensations which pertain to stuff, sensory stuff. We are not calling it even matter at this point. We can use the word stuff for this.

And by that, it means sensory stuff. And this sensory stuff need to be organized. The first form of organization is the one afforded by the form of a space as a form of intuition, right? As I said, it enables to have the space, what you might call to be Aristotelian toad teeth. This such is. This such is. And Salar's story, you know,

is really has this sort of stuff, you know, that there is a, there is a, for example abolish or a ball like mass of fuzzy grayish next to a column of greenish dust and so stuff here i'm saying greenish ballish because there are not concepts here

These are this suchs, you know, perspectival sort of imagine when if you were seeing from the eye of a rudimentary AI, it doesn't see the concept of a tree or see the tree as a concept, right, as a concept of a tree, but it sees this suchs of a stuff, right? So we have that sort of thing and that's stuff being organized by outer sense. Then in conjunction with that, we have another level, another, you know, working out, organizational working out of the sensory stuff, not only by outer sense, but also by inner sense.

so inner sense plays as i mentioned a dual function one is reporting this sort of stuff organized stuff to the mind as awarenesses of impressions but also creating the impression of stuff by relation of successive succession and duration right like for example um time t1 there is this sort of abolish of grayness time t2 the abolish

of grayness becomes a columns of grayishness right so it creates a certain sort of rudimentary what you might call to be a temporal organization again fully perspectival perspectivality here is because we are merely we are emphasizing the idea of perspectivality because we are in the realm of intuition, manifold of intuition. We are not, a perspectivality is the quality of perception, of concepts. Concepts are a perspectival. Judgments are a perspectival.

But rudimentary encounters with a stuff are perspectival. and so here there is an we want cant in transcendental aesthetics essentially wants to tell a given account of the constitution of perspectivality perspectivality being understood as a form of rudimentary organization of stuff into appearances simple as that so hence we can talk about the first order of appearances as sensory as being thus and so organized perspectively to yield a semblance of an appearance right

then obviously mere you know existence of first order appearances doesn't mean anything for the idea of consciousness because thus and so organized my sensory stuff, namely first order of appearances, ultimately should be reported to the mind such that we no longer have impressions, first order appearances, but also have the awareness of thus and so impressions. So here at the center, second order inner appearances,

doesn't so report it to the mind. So the first order, what you can simply call impressions of stuff, sensory impressions, right? The second order of appearances pertains to awareness of impressions, meaning dozens of impressions being in so-and-so ways reported to the mind. You can call them inner states at this point. Inner states, here at this point, we are talking it in a very rudimentary organizational level. It is not, we are saying inner state as if I could introspect into them. no these are we are talking about a very very low profile level of consciousness

an early moment in the constitution of consciousness but it is not any sort of full-fledged consciousness that enables us to introspect into the content of the these inner estates hence there is an element of unconsciousness here thoughts the stuff so again if you were going into translating the first diagram to the second diagram then

you can actually think about uh first order appearances and uh second order of appearances in terms of so second order of appearances you can really think about intuitions, a manifold of intuitions, right, as the intuited act, but also of the intuited object and the intuiting act. Now, the intuited object, that which is being intuited, right, requires itself some sort of rules. These are intuition rules, usually come in form laid out in transcendental aesthetics by form of forms of intuition in space and time right

that create a certain sort of organization perspectivality to sensory stuff put stuff in perspective into perspective literally that's what they do putting the stuff into perspective and then you have concept rules concept rules are not really uh intuition rules they are not like you know the main difference between the two is that the intuition rules are perspectival as i mentioned but the concept rules are not perspectival they transcend perspectivality right you can use concepts in a general sort of way

and of course you see that time being at the center of the basically being the main component of inner sense because inner sense essentially has the form of time as its formal condition it radiates outward in the fact that inner sense has a dual function of reporting awareness of impressions to the mind second order appearances, but also in organizing on top of the spatial perspectival organization,

a temporal perspectival organization of impressions. now here again you have inner sense is as the foundation of inner x inner x you can say it being a transcendental object That, depending on the level of organization that we are trying to frame this transcendental object, can appear in the guise of inner experiences, inner senses, inner intuition, inner perception, so on and so forth.

here inner as i mentioned simply like an inner estate for which there is a rudimentary awareness yes sorry some people are asking questions in the chat oh yes please i sorry my chat box was uh maybe they want to ask them uh the questions like with their voice no uh kind of uh sorry which one i okay i see the question by juan torah uh is the phenomenological

time does the phenomenological time not imply a kind of dualism in the idea of consciousness of uh one um what sort of dualism do you have in mind I think more in sense for one, maybe one bipolar, understand of work or one, one is this one theory in the mean theory, the cycle. psychological classic um um they understand of meaning in mind a dualism is very con controversial

maybe today i know but in the tradition of psychology is uh i think i don't know cannot really define it dualism but is evident is two parts from that not really coincided it yes i mean majority i mean there is a i mean in the as you mentioned uh today's um understanding of dualism is a kind of like a bastardization or misinterpretation of dualism per se. Not all dualism are dualistic in the bad sort of way that people are talking about. So there is, in fact,

a lot of, you know, dualisms in philosophy which are not dualism in that negative sense, are dualities. The duality without dualism, yes, it is at a stake. And the difference between the two is that dualism is when you have two terms that are separated from one another, right? And it seems that they are, they can be defined separately from one another, right? And then it creates a certain sort of dualism that basically commits you to a certain sort of various position based on which term you are actually subscribing to. Whereas duality is where that

the terms are being defined in relation to one another, right? Precisely because there is a mechanism that enables the what you might call to be the correspondence or the correlation between the two terms for example think that you know in mathematics for example, we have dualities everywhere between objects and categories. Objects and categories are dualities, they function precisely because you can actually talk about terms in a constructive

relation to another term, right? But dualism, and that's why majority of dualism are a species of metaphysical dualism, is because the terms are fundamentally are separated from one another, and hence remain underdefined. unless you essentially as i mentioned you start to over define one term to the impoverishment of another and that's really the curse of you know negative dualism but yes in in that sense i would say that yes there is an element of duality in fact the whole idea of transcendental hydromorphism is a form of duality.

Not duality of form and matter. That is a form of dualism, at least in an Aristotelian species. uh delshad uh you want to uh i have to i can't see the text i can read it sure should i um the question is about inner sense does the inner qualification has geographic or epistemological meaning does it have location or epistemic accessibility connotations

It doesn't have any sort of geographic thing. Yes, it has epistemic connotations. But as I mentioned, when we are talking about epistemic connotations, we are talking or conscious. elements of conscious rather than epistemic content here because as i said uh inner sense is is foreclosed to introspection namely um what you might call to be explicit epistemic inquiry of the sort if they also meant that sort of thing but yes they have an epistemic accessibility

connotation precisely because there are second order appearances awareness of impressions because impressions by themselves are uh don't have any awareness right uh there are just organizations of sense and that's the story that can't wants to say that sensations no matter how much organized uh at the level of pure appearances there is no awareness attached to them right there is no even the most rudimentary level of consciousness or awareness i'm using the word awareness here rather than consciousness to imply a very sort of larval consciousness, right? Awareness. And awareness is precisely

shows a certain sort of accessibility, but an accessibility that at least in its larval form is not predisposed to full epistemic introspection. There is no judgment that you can talk about awareness of impressions. There are the seeds of possible judgments of perception. are the seeds if i can't want to stay away because if they they were implying a kind of

epistemic connotation in a kind of full-blooded sort of way then the whole idea of transcendental deduction would the story would end here really but obviously it doesn't end here the question of by what right Kant wants to say that yes they do carry with them a rudimentary awareness a certain sort of access to the mind but this access itself is too rudimentary for it to be understood in terms of full-blooded epistemic access

I think we also have a question from Maria, but I want to use my moderator authority and ask just my small question uh first uh uh it's about uh the dualism that we uh talked about the dualism and duality i want to ask how do we call the type of relations that we see um that we see with representations on your diagram how do we call this type of relation

that we see also in sellers when something like a symbol of language is affected both by its environment and by the concept rules. There we don't simply have two elements that are kind of intertwined, but we have an object that is affected from two sides is there a name for this relation don't know i mean maybe some one uh you know something no i mean look uh lika when we are

talking about duality as i mentioned duality doesn't mean that doesn't um when we are saying duality doesn't mean that there are only two things and only two types of relations are um at work here duality is essentially means that two terms are constructively related okay and and through the construction through the intermediation between these two terms working together you can construct all sorts of gradients of other terms and relations so it doesn't tell us that there are only the exhaust by two relations so two forms of relationality right but rather it allows us that between the demarcation problem

provided by the by the duals you can create various sort of relationships and exactly what transcendental isomorphism is about. You can see that tertiary entities and elements crop up. I know that there are some questions and stuff. Let's have a rest, right? And then coming back, and then maybe keeping the question for the end part so I can actually finish the diagram, read some of this stuff, and that will be the lecture. Then we, the basics. Next session we

have to go through the more nitty-gritty stuff with regard to these sorts of things, how they work. okay shall we go back uh there in uh uh yes but like yes one one i know they should actually put a very good uh thing from brandon dualism it is a distinction for which we have no way to constructively relate them to one another. That's dualism. And that's why I said dualism is usually, is something that always tends to die on the altar of metaphysics.

Precisely because you can't make the constructive bridging. but Kant's uh he can do that he can bridge do that bridge between as I said as I said that he his dualism as I said dualism his dualism is a form of duality and in fact uh you know the whole idea that for example someone like Pete Wolfendale sees uh transcendental hydomorphism as a form of transcendental computationalism is precisely for him to understand everything in Kant within the computational logic of dualities how they interact the interactive model

okay uh five to seven minutes or ten minutes and then we get back let's make it seven minutes okay seven minutes okay Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. I'm ready whenever you are.

Thank you. I think we can start.

Sure. So just, I mean, yeah, I saw some of the, some of the questions and I will try to get to them. I just want to first go through this diagram so we can see, as I mentioned, possible ways possible places in this diagram uh where actually time has an influence when where time plays actually a part even though uh rather uh obscured right rather than not traditionally uh you know uh attributed to him uh given given that you know the major uh role

that time plays is really transcendental aesthetics uh by way of inner sense uh so the inner sense as you see that you have in the intuited and you have intuitings right And the point is that, you know, coming back again to the act and objects, that intuitives, intuitings, right, do take the form of, you know, kind of quasi-takings. their form of takings in fact

they are applied to thus and so organized manifold of intuition primarily organized by uh you know space and time as form formal conditions and then um so on the we have also corresponding to these of this you know two two uh the dualities that we have here we have a synthesis b and synthesis a now the whole idea as i mentioned And the idea of synthesis here is really about the constructive ways that how the terms of this diagram are being essentially relating to one another.

From one extreme end of a spectrum to the other extreme end of the spectrum. Really here, understanding and sensibility, right? So precisely because it's a species of hyalomorphism, even though it's a transcendental hyalomorphism, there is always an act of synthesis. And the synthesis is always coming from a higher level, right? just as i mentioned that example that every output of the system becomes a new input to be worked on so synthesis is also like this the synthesis is always

being introduced by the system by the transcendental system itself Synthesis B pertains to intuitions, so they're purely empirical sort of synthesis. Synthesis A can be both empirical and non-empirical, but the thing, the difference between synthesis A and B is really that synthesis A are a species of pure understanding. or understanding in general applied to the materials or the inner states made available by inner sense

that's where the whole idea of perception and experience ultimately come to light through synthesis A. We see that understanding in different guises starts to integrate and synthesize the sort of rudimentary basic awarenesses available at inner sense level. In fact, productive imagination is just understanding. Understanding that plays a synthetic function with regard to the sensible content.

And all forms of syntheses, by definition, whether there are synthesis A or synthesis B, They have rule-like procedural characteristics. They are essentially of rules, whether they are concept rules or intuition rules. Or concept intuition rules. Remember that there is something in Kant called sensible concepts.

Sensible concepts are empirical eschemata. Eschemata related to empirical content. And yes, the apprehending, as I mentioned, so inner sense and outer sense do in fact have an apprehending function. but the thing is that inner sense is not merely

uh you know it's it's function is not merely apprehending right that's why it i said that it has a dual function and we are going to say that what would be the different sort of function of that right that's something that Matislav asked his last question on the chat box so the what inner sense ultimately does and that's when time really become important, right? Remember that it reports, turns impressions to awareness of

impressions, right? So reports impressions to the mind. And you not only have impressions, but awareness of impressions. It does something other than that. Remember that the outer sense had to do, has something to do with the idea of a perspectival organization, a spatial perspectival organization of sensory stuff. And I said that the same way that the outer sense affords a certain sort of perspectival encounter with sensible stuff, the same thing is being done by inner sense, affording

a perspectival sense in time a temporal perspective perspective with regard to sensory stuff and that's when not only enough gives the mind awareness of impressions but awareness of awareness of awarenesses of impressions what is really the significance of this remember uh the idea that

put forward by empiricists like Locke and Hume right particularly Hume's separability principle let's see what it is The idea that everything that is different is distinguishable and everything that is distinguishable may be separated. According to Hume's separability principle, awareness of a complex as a complex is possible if and only if its components are distinguishable.

The immediate collary of the separability principle is an integration principle. The idea that the impression of a complex is the same as a complex of impressions. Or that representation of a series is a series of representations. The awareness of a sequence of is a sequence of awarenesses of and so on. But as Kant showed against Locke and Hume, not only does this schema lead to Locke and Hume, not only does this schema lead to conundrums and confusions, it also undermines any serious attempt to distinguish.

the impression as an act from its object and content. Awarenesses of something from awarenesses of something as. You see, in its really basic function, inner sense, as I mentioned, creates awarenesses of impressions, of the form of impressions and reproductions of those impressions, like I, O, impression of an object B time one, impression of object B time two, like a reproduction of it, right? Now, this, according to Hume, is a complex of these impressions and reproductions, namely simple awarenesses of impressions is sufficient for us to have time,

Right? Namely, the awareness of this being impression and the other being a reproduction or an anticipation. That is not working according to Kant. The successive impressions are the same. is different from the impression of succession. Having a bundle, complex bundle of impressions at the level of inner sense is not really time. So inner sense has an occult capacity

that is able to generate awareness of awarenesses. Namely, it is capable of not only having successive series, but having the impression of succession. A mental awareness that is fundamentally organizational. creates perspectival temporal awareness of impressions being held together

thus and so synchronically or diachronically. before moving forward uh michael um i was just wanting to connect the separability principle um as you're uh kind of speaking about it and as it's like kind of listed here um as being kind of similar to in the kitscher paper Leibniz's petite perceptions in the discussion of the ocean and how like hearing the roar of the ocean you're able to infer that there's like smaller parts of that perception goes off those small particles and yes yeah and I thought it was kind of interesting that he kind of

basically makes the same mistake that we're talking about Hume and lock making with the inseparability principle uh in that he's like kind of um uh ontologizing the aspect of time there which we could say is rather epistemic and not um it's it's not really not you're not able to make that leap as they kind of do absolutely absolutely yes uh yes uh the givenness uh you know, of the series, series being given is doesn't translate to its givenness, you know, as being successive or having dozens of temporal quality. For temporal quality to be established at the level of sense, level of innocence, innocence ought to introduce

not only awareness of impressions, but awareness of thus and so awareness of impressions. But then there is something really bad happens here. What is really the whole idea here that, you know, that, so temporality, namely, the awareness of awareness of a successive series, that you always need a meta-awareness for those awarenesses to be thus and so yielding a temporal awareness, right?

But that creates a complete regress, which means that Kant's idea of time at this level falls apart ultimately. In order for you to have time, you always need to generate another level of meta-awareness on top of your meta-awarenesses. Hence, there is an infinite regress within which time becomes impossible. Temporalization becomes impossible. So, and the awareness of awarenesses works like this,

you know, these are awarenesses of impressions and reproductions of awarenesses, right? you can say that a b1 instead of saying that i o impression of an object b1 or b2 you can put an a here a here is just like a kind of a template for a meta awareness right a new mode of awareness on top of those awareness of impressions are being reported to mind but being thus and so temporally reported to the mind so like a silarzian coating device it's a meta pointer or more accurately a meta representing awareness so essentially inner sense

does the job of meta representing within the meta representational structure then you have, we can see an emerging nested structure. The metal representing A can be represented either as impression, so when we say that AB1, it says IOB1B1, meaning that awareness of awareness of an originary impression or completely in a reproductive one ab2 which is i quotation i ob2

quotation b1 and the same thing with b2 creates a meta-awareness of those awarenesses and hence apparently miraculously supposed to create what was uh can't have deemed insufficient in hume's account it is capable of in cancer story to yield the impression of succession right rather than merely the succession of impressions it is capable of creating the awareness of the complex rather than merely a complex of awarenesses

and then you can think about this that just as you have originally impressions or their reproductions, you can also introduce anticipations, and all of them can have meta-awarenesses of their respective category, meta-awarenesses of impressions, meta-awarenesses of reproductions, and meta-awarenesses of anticipations. But as I said, this opens up the black hole of infinite regress. You never know when in fact you end up with the impression of succession rather than mere

succession of impressions. In fact, temporalization here it stops to work. And that's Husserl's point of entry to the role of time and temporalization, giving a different account of temporalization. it does not require meta-awarenesses establishment of meta-awarenesses

for those awarenesses and meta-awarenesses for those meta-awarenesses of awarenesses ad infinitum just love has a question yes yes small clarification question that with regards to today's reading Is it eligible to link meta-awareness, of which we are talking about, with what Krauss defines as figurative synthesis of sheer succession?

Yes. Yes. You see, the idea of figurative synthesis is that it's essentially a threefold synthesis, right? And that's you have the apprehension and reproduction and essentially production or synthesis and concepts, right? But the thing here, what happens here is that, so either you go the Orthodox Kantian route and you only say that, well, you know, meta-awarenesses, at least the sort of meta-awarenesses that are responsible for temporal organization

of mere awarenesses of impressions available at inner sense can only be generated by inner sense itself, right? or going with a kind of like a more sophisticated, you know, commentaries on Kant than saying that no, in fact, we shouldn't hold inner sense responsible for the creation of such meta-representings or meta-awarenesses, but that requires the intervention of other faculties,

and hence the bigger picture of the threefold synthesis, of the figurative synthesis. But then, if that is the case, then the role of time in Kant no longer is only held for manifold of intuitions which means that time has a presence in concepts as well and how concepts now concept rules constructively being related to intuition rules But then that would opens up a far worse sort of scenario that then it seems that it lays

Kant's philosophy exposed to a kind of a far more serious intrusion of time or time consciousness rather than merely being contained at the level of inner sense. so uh let's go back to the diagram and then essentially that's if we are going to go to the threefold synthesis right the figurative

synthesis sort of a story, then we see like in the yellow part, we see that the rule of time was in the canonical Kantian story, the rule of time was unfurling, radiating out from the inner sense, right? But now we see that the rule of time trifurcating like a three forks to different sorts of areas where the role of time, at least in Kant, then is completely underdefined and underdetermined. One is the role of time

in a perspectival takings as, and the other one is the role of time in perspectival takings of objective validity and of subjective validity. Right? And then correspondingly, the role of time expands over the whole dominion of signification. That is the danger here. not only the signified right not only the reference

but also syntax and sense in in fria's sense of signification right and again accordingly the role of time then seeps into not only cognition and cogitatum that which is being cognized in terms of a stuff but also noema, noemata, which are kind of like roughly Husserlian transcendental objects, right, that they have both abstract definitions and a certain sort of generality,

meaning that they cannot be, they are not mere exemplification of a particular sensible content, They are just general X's, right? But also transcendent objects, meaning features of an object which are not actually being constructed by consciousness. They do not belong to the consciousness, even though they can be represented in consciousness. and not only to various forms of cogitatum, a stuff, noemata and transcendent objects, but to the act of noesis itself. And then the whole bunch of, you know,

things that at the very least, we don't have a specific Kantian way of telling how time plays a role in this sort of stuff like syntax you know what is the role of time in syntax you might be able to provide the role of time according to cancer story for semantic content but as i said if we can't contain if we cannot contain the rule of time to the inner sense and have to branch out literally then rule of time applies to syntax as well

to sense and syntax rather than mere you know reference and semantic content and then we see that Kant doesn't have any sort of theory of time that can essentially describe or give a proper critical account of time in relation to this sort of new areas. And that's all Kant's own doing. It has nothing to do with poor Hume, Locke, or other people. It's just the way that Kant tries to pinpoint the role of time.

As a transcendental ideality. When I'm saying the time, as I mentioned, we are not talking about metaphysical time as a transcendental ideality. and then i mean there are so many great you know uh uh, parts that can't, you can see that can't understand that, you know, that rule of time is quite actually more pervasive than he at least sketches it out. Um, I mean, for example,

I mean, there's a lot, I mean, I'm just, these are just a bunch of arbitrary, uh, you know, kind of, random, you know, excerpts, you know, from Kant. You know, he says that by means of outer sense, we represent to ourselves object as outside us and all as in a space. Inner sense by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state gives to be sure no intuition of the soul as an object, yet it is still a determinate form under which the intuition

of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relation of time. A, 22, 3, B, 37. And then just a couple of other, uh after this it says something to uh to the extent that um um let me find the well basically i can't find the exact uh go to my um computer

turn off the screen sharing um where it says that 833 so that time is nothing other than the form of inner sense now here it's actually he's not merely talking about inner states i.e of the intuition of ourself and our inner state, right? Then another part, he says, time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us. Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense,

for time cannot be the determination of other appearances, but on the contrary determines the relation of representations in our inner state. whatever our representations may arise whether through the influence of external things or as the effect of inner causes whether they have originated a priori or empirically as appearances as modifications of the mind they nevertheless belong to inner sense and as such all our cognitions are eventually are subject to the formal conditions of inner sense namely time

right so he has that sort of thing but but precisely because he knows that, you know, like, as he said, everything that is, like, pertains to cognition, as both the cognizing act and the cogitatum is subject, eventually subjected to time. It's just that, so he knows that, you know, kind of how pervasive the question of time is. It's just that the way that he has formulated the idea of temporalization, right, makes it challenging, if not entirely problematic,

for us to imagine the truest scope of how time, or how pervasive time is with regard to diagram of transcendental hyalomorphism and hence perception experience and cognition be it empirical or not So yes, yes, yes, we have only 20 minutes.

I don't want to overwhelm you in one session. Let's hear any sort of discussions that you have so we can go through them. Yes, Patrick. Just a question about the graph and the structure of the graph. And maybe it's just because everything can't be happening over the same place in the graph. But is there a reason that it goes from top to bottom? Is there something about those parts residing on the bottom? And then I couldn't return to it, but the logic of truth then is sort of like that bubble is sort of behind the entire thing.

Yes, yes. So you see, the reason, essentially, I think I'm not sure if you saw this. I shared an essay that I mentioned last session by Riccourt on Hosserl, particularly the topic of questioning back, Rukfragen. The Rookfragen is overall part of Hossel's overall so-called methodological foundations, which should not be confused as foundationalism of the sort that Siddharth talks about with

regard to the myth of the given, at least the categorical given. precisely because it does not assume any sort of extra-linguistic component. That everything that you go downstream to the bottom, this questioning back or regressive inquiry, is always going to remain linguistic, right? And you can't escape it, but that's the whole point. The point of the questioning back is to show that ultimately the logic of truth is motivated

by laws of experience. And the bottom of all, it's motivated by inner time consciousness. And we are, of course, coming back to this toward the end, we're trying to unfold this to show that how time actually, you know, moves, pervades all of these. And would it be possible to create at least an account of time that can assume different guises and can adequately respond to the problem of how the problem of time plays a decisive key

role in each of these domains sense reference right signification writ large and ultimately logic of truth. Thank you. Welcome. Yes, so, and the reason is bottom-up, not only because of the questioning back, but it's just you can think about it as a kind of scraping the surfaces, right? as I when you see in the role of time and can is that circle that radiates out from the inner sense but as you start to really deform it as you move go and decompose subject and object to its own

respective agendas various forms of syntheses and those various forms of syntheses to the sort of mechanics and elements go into the building of them, then you see that circular form of time radiating from inner sense starts to take a different sort of shape. thoughts um i was just kind of looking back at this um work uh that you shared on discord um talking

about rook and frogget um and i was struck by this part which specifically talks about uh uh vickenstein's like meaning of as use and in reference to um a hustrell's intentionality and how um in in vickenstein you're not getting the same kind of like uh aboutness that uh hustrell is kind of you know has that like transcendent uh given uh that's uh at the base of those experiences and i wanted to or of those uh perceptions and i wanted to um ask if that's like a particular strength of uh wittgenstein or if in a sense it's like kind of present uh a little bit in hostal because we're saying that like there's not like an object here here at the

bottom of the of hostal's uh referencing back like the rook frog isn't like going it's not going back to like a particular transcendent object? No, it doesn't. That's the thing. You see, the whole idea of the Rupert Frag, as I said, it's methodological foundations, right? It's not foundationalism. So it is not supposed to, in fact, evaporate, thin out in some sort of atomic elemental objects, right? In the way that you see, for example, at least incarnate in protocol sentences, right? Sort of logical empiricist, you know, sentences that mirror some elementary core components of experience.

No, it doesn't yield any sort of originary objects, right? But rather it yields originally laws of experience. not objects but constitutive laws which are also kind of related to how we were talking about uh productive imagination um uh before uh in what sense can you uh elaborate a little bit uh yeah i forgot about what what did I say exactly? You may not have used those words particularly, but it kind of struck me as kind of

being similar to that in the previous seminar or in the previous talk that we were talking about like this kind of like constructive or constituating that you're doing in like conceptualizing here at this level. So I'm wondering if for Husserl, because the referencing back is actually constructive that like you were not like you know falling into like a simple foundationalism yes yeah yes definitely so in fact you see this is as we move forward we see that the role of time as i mentioned here uh for at least for for cans um is being highlighted through the framework of perception

and by virtue of that we see that imagination even though is independent of perception what serves perception and that is the you know the whole idea of transcendental productive imagination right they play the synthetic function for any perception to be possible in the first place right you know the creation of an image a build as a singular representation of a particular sensible content right now in Hossel

given, you know, that he sees the pervasiveness of the rule of time, he also provides an alteration to the accounts, the Kantian account, in the sense that the rule of time, the initial rule of time and temporalization is not being highlighted through perception, through the framework of perception, but rather through imagination. This is because imagination absolutely has zero transcendental synthetic function

in the service of perception in Hoselle. Imagination highlights the possibility of perception, in fact. That is a different sort of a story. That has something to do with one Hoselle doesn't see imagination to be transcendentally and synthetically serving perception, completely independent of perception but also that imagination points to the possibility of perception in the first place and that's the role of time in it how fantasy acts have a different sort of time consciousness,

the different sort of time in fact, than perceptual objects, you know, and perception in general. did you see there's like a a posited aspect to time then like that we're going to model something that a you have to kind of like impose onto the model this notion of like a past and a present of the model so that we can understand like movement Yes, yes, I mean, absolutely. So there is a, there is a, absolutely, there is a positive,

I mean, Jose's account of time is a positive account of time, right? And it is what you might call to be the lube of the entire system of the transcendental hyalomorphism, right? It lubes all the gears, right? And that's precisely because of its retensional and potential capacities. Okay. Sorry, I meant posited, not positive. Posited in the sense, I wouldn't call it positive, because the idea of positive is very usual. They say positive as for an object. For example, the role of time with regard to perception is positive, actually.

because the act of positing an object for perception as we have seen requires time and then time doing the positings usually positings is about an object the role of time in Husserl at least yes it does do that but as I mentioned it's constitutive it does the constitutiveness right in the sense that there are certain sorts of things in imagination in fact the whole imagination does not deal with positiveness you see you don't imagination is always as if right as if something was positive right haven't you noticed

that something is actually common between imagination and pure logic, that the reason that phantasmata can be shuffled around as if they could be applied to an object of perception, as if the signs could be applied to a sensible content or a reference, that there is a free play, a freeness about them. And this freeness is givenness by time, that it suspends positiveness such that possibilities can be applied to particularities

beyond the scope of mere perception. As if that was the case. As if when I imagine an elephant, a flying elephant, as if this was present, right? There is a positiveness. In fact, the whole imagination is built on the conscious absence of position. That's how it's different from hallucination. where imagination and perception impinge upon one another. I have a little question regarding that specific thing you said.

Sure. Because this idea of dreaming, yeah, it has been haunting me from the first session, But more than dreaming, I was thinking about the performative role of language and how these imaginations do in fact affect the real world and in such. If I'm going to try to not be that cryptic, but this idea of performative role of language and the idea that imagination does in fact play a constitutive role in reality. doesn't seem to be the case at least for the account you're giving or is it and in so if so then uh imagination is absent of position or does it imply a different position um i think there are

some uh areas like virtuality for example that are not yeah i'm not like said here you see in In Hosselle, so essentially Hosselle's job here is to make sure that imagination is not being confused with perception, right? But this doesn't mean that imagination becomes divorced from perception, but rather, you know, it finds its proper place, particularly with regard to logic and logic of truth. precisely because it yields a certain sort of freeness, you know, afforded by the role of time and by the role of, particularly by the role of suspension of a specific position takings.

You see, it's not as if, first of all, they are not divorced. They are, as we see in ordinary imagination, that ordinary imagination requires, it has a lot of exchanges with perception. We can, in fact, talk about perceptual fantasies, right? Or even, in fact, artworks, right? where basically perception and imagination are melding together, but this melding together doesn't require their functions to be confused or mistaken for one another. Now, what happens in imagination is that it's not as if it negates position takings, right, or positedness,

but rather suspends them. Suspends them such that there are, it allows for different sort of position takings, right? And then you see that you can have the same thing in the realm of syntax, in the sense of formal languages, formal logic, where precisely because of that sort of suspension of this content, You can work on the syntactical side, or in the case of imagination, with the phantasmata, with the phantasial side. But yes, it doesn't mean that it is really the negation

of all position-taking. It's not a vagary, so to speak. It has its own logic. It's just that logic doesn't take the shape of perceptual judgment, which are about a specific position takings. Like taking something as this. They are suspended. Suspended in a kind of like, Hossell says, suspension in the real form of suspension. Like hovering before me. hovering before me. And that actually creates a very good opening because it seems that if you go with Kant's account and particularly the role of imagination, how it plays a key role in perception,

every form of judgment takes a semblance of a perceptual taking or a perceptual judgment Husserl wants to show that first of all he calls these position takings right and he says that not all position takings have the quality of perceptual takings, which are, you know, about specific positiveness. For example, in terms of emotions, you have a different sort of position takings. In terms of imaginations, you have different position of takings. They have a quality

of judgment, but are not of the perceptual judgment. They don't have pathetic qualities, all of them. You see, perceptual judgments always are the sort of judgments that you take them to be true, thetically. Thetically in the sense that they, precisely because of their thetic valence of taking something to be true, a perceptual judgment, there is also a room for doubts, aesthetic doubt and so on and so forth. But there are other sorts of position takings and forms of judgment ourselves wants to show that they don't require, in fact, building upon the position of aesthetic judgments

taking to be true. It's just that I still don't know if there is such a thing as a, first of all, I'm not sure if I get correctly this ideothetic, but of any judgment that is not mediated by imagination. like is that what you're saying that there are perceptual judgments that no no i didn't say that uh no i said that not all judgments have the form of perceptual judgments okay but that means that

all judgments do get a sort of imaginative side so that they can be um he doesn't call it imaginative uh it says that they have the quality of position takings now you can think about imaginative position takings are certain sort of position takings where the content the particular content of the judgment is rather suspended or forestalled but of course imagination also comes in varieties of degrees and forms, such as when it is exchanging with perception, right, a perceptual fantasy, where basically you see that the suspensions become less,

as in contrast to mere free play fantasy. So, oneself wants to create a gradation, not only between perceptual judgments, right, but also between all judgments, such that there would be different sort of classificatory forms of position takings, not all having the same quality of perceptual takings. Yeah, I guess for me, at least the problem was in how you take this idea of image and I think it's taken more, not literally, but at least more restrictively. So that's why this idea of predation can take place, at least for me.

So, yeah, I get it. Yes, there is a work, I think I mentioned it last session. It's a massive tome and it requires a little bit of a commitment. It's called Fantasy, Image, Consciousness, and Memory. It's a series of lectures given by Rossello. And it's precisely on these gradations, various exchanges between imagination, understanding, and perception. And then you see that these gradations, compel Osserl to introduce new concepts when necessary, concepts that don't exist at all

in Kantian philosophy. yes uh i saw will's um think about reflection i think of reflection we have to it's a little bit too early to talk about reflection and reflective judgments and a whole idea of uh parabolism uh amphiboly particularly amphiboles of reflection but also reflection in the Hosselian sense, right? Phenomenological reflections and transcendental reflections. And also psychological reflections, which have the quality of,

they're being all kind of like natural attitudes, you know. They need to be separated, but I don't think that we have enough material to separate them and talk about them coherently without creating further confusion on this matter okay um so i think this is our uh seminar um a question sorry yes yes what should we read for the next session and uh what texts if any are recommended for presentations no no no text for i know that i have uh put i think a text

for the next session i don't know i'm not sure but let's not do that let me just actually send to that diagram that i made of transcendental hylomorphism and people who want to give a presentation the whole idea of find time in the diagram various form of time and in what guises time actually function or operate in a specific part of diagram a kind of like a you know philosophical find waldo exercise at home it should be a video yes definitely okay yes okay

excellent uh okay uh thank you uh very much everyone thank you for your excellent contributions i see you next week until then ciao take care thank you so much thank you bye bye absolutely my pleasure bye-bye