The Vicious Transparency of Time (Session 5)

Hello and welcome to the fifth session of the seminar, the vicious transparency of time instructed by Reza Negaristani. Reza, please take it away. Reza, please take it away. Reza Negaristani Thank you so much, everyone. Thank you so much, Lika. So, yes, I did listen to and watch, you know, the presentation like an hour ago, less than an hour ago. It was really great. It was magnificent. Thank you, everyone. Today, I'm going to continue the stuff about the Husserl's time diagram.

But now, against the backdrop of Zaha Vee's essay and also John Findlay. So as I mentioned, Findlay's paper has struck me as absolutely profound, even though he's making a lot of mistakes. From the nitty gritty point, from the point of details, I thought that Zahavi's essay was far better than Findlay but from the, what you might call to be stereoscopic view, you know, I thought that Findlay really nailed

some of the main problems here. in any case let's open I know that last session I said that you know I was just reading stuff and I asked you if you have questions so I'm sure that there are questions and if you can somehow you know recontextualize those questions within the context of the presentation so we can actually deal with two problems with one solution that would be great so the ball is in your court my dear

friends Felipe you are not supposed to be here love you you should say it to me This is a problem of time, right? You know, I was talking about dark. You're not supposed to be here. It's a temporal question. uh but this love uh you have a question i see and and oh yes uh one had a question at the end and i actually stayed by the way but you actually signed off um yes i have not as much question but more a remark concerning the previous uh previous session

it's uh it's uh connected with the essay by leotard which is called obedience in this essay he actually discusses what we have what have been brought up on the previous session namely sound perception in the context of hustle and kant he starts from this connection the link between Latin word audiere and English word obey. And I have had an insight, so to say, in this transition because in Ukrainian and Russian, Lika won't give me a line, but that words

and are should be actually translated descriptively as like uh to hear to what was said to one and to do accordingly to what has been said and heard and then i have uh recall that in portuguese we have all also this uh differentiation between eskutar to listen and to over to hear and over is close to obey like obedience. And then I thought that, well, it's that the word obey should be actually translated like to be materially conditioned by time in one's hearing, act or acting.

I thought that this is important to bring up because it, in a sense, it shows up, it shows that shows the early forward reflection by means of language of humans attitude to towards time actually right yes so obedience as a form of uh self-organization or being self-conditioned by uh materially conditioned by time That's actually a very interesting sort of, I mean, you see, when we are talking about linguistic idioms, right, and particularly in different languages, we shouldn't actually get so overexcited about that there is a conspiracy theory about time here, right?

But nevertheless, I think that they are somehow in linguistic idioms. And there has been work done on this sort of run, at least for the problem of a space rather than time. That how they project certain sorts of conceptual discontinuities. What is important for me from what you said is just like it has this sort of stuff that's, you know, so there is a hearing and there is an obedience, if I'm not mistaken. It's nearly physical listening and conscious apprehension of what is.

Right. You see it already, I mean, in what you might call to be in what you might call protocols of rules following. Right. Rule following in an explicit sort of way, you know, at least in a kind of sense of Plato, right, in Critalus. that I need to hear a certain sort of law in order to obey it, right? This is the point that Plato, Socrates in Cretilus, Plato tries to make. Of course, that goes a long way, saying that,

you know, that what is the nature of this law or rule? Well, different people say different sorts of things, and ultimately they agree that to understand a law, for example, a norm about, you know, who is the best tanner, the one who makes the best leather in town, right? Socrates says something to this extent that, well, you know, you have to always pay attention to forms. And his interlocutor says that, but who knows the best knowledge of the form of tanning,

letter, making a letter, right? And they both agree ultimately that this knowledge can only be acquired by its practical use. That you are not supposed to ask a tanner what is the best letter, but the consumer of the leather right and then the consumer of leather and there are so many consumers of leather right it's just not one there might be one tanner in town but so many consumers of leather such that they have

different perspectives and different encounters with a bad or good letter. If you think about this, this transition from a craftsman into Maos, the forceman, the formsman, to the consumers, meaning the practical use in a pragmatic sense, and then to the one who listens to all of this dialectic between the crafts,

so-called craftsman or craftswoman and the uses. You see that there are fundamental temporal discontinuities here. Like, if we had this understanding that, according to Husserl, everything, according to the law of motivation, and it's an intertwinement with time itself, not as a metaphysical posit but as time as the constitutive

factor and self-constituting factor of all consciousness every sort of claim about a norm has a dirty pause or the stamp of time on it then you can say that where did or when did the time of nomos start or the time of law starts and the time of uh nomos ends law here being objective or conversely. So in in these accounts of people trying to arrive at the

an understanding of an objective norm, an objective norm is not a fact really. Objective norm is a principle that is capable of deriving facts, right? We are not talking about different timestamps of facts in the universe. We are merely here talking about different temporalities of arriving at a fact by virtue of, you know, does and so forms of consciousness with regard to what is at the stake, what is to be done, what ought to be practiced, who is practicing it, so on and so forth.

And then it strikes us really hard in the face that there is a time discontinuity between the institution of norm and following of the norm. from a Rossellian perspective this is a fundamental gap yes actually Lerotard puts the question the main question uh in this uh essay like is it happening Yes, yes, yes. That's a good point. Yes. No, I mean,

as I said last session, that this is not, you know, a course that we are going to take ourselves words for what they are but we are going to challenge them at the end at the end it's not time yet though yeah what three sessions left i would say that um this whole idea of time continuity given to us by way of what you might call to be adam brady retention in Husserl's time diagram as the self-constituting stream of lived experiences the absolute time

flow flow here is not metaphysically understood but for only phenomenologically has repercussions and carries its transitively carries its own implications with with regard to norm following, essentially from a lower level to upper level, right? It's just that there is something in Hosserum by virtue of the mode of the givenness of self-constituting time consciousness, inner time consciousness, that does not really work so well

for us to move from this lower scale of time, inner time consciousness, to explicit time consciousness in the same way that I would say that, look, I need to follow a norm in so far as a norm has given to me in the past. that there is a fundamental asymmetry from the content of time, time in the Husserlian sense, at the level of the Husserlian time diagram to time of what you might call to be

objective time of following norms. By virtue that I only follow norms precisely because they have been given to me. But how, because of ourselves, lower scale inner time consciousness, doesn't really say that much about when and how we can say on an upper level, upper scale, objectively how a norm and when a norm is given to you. This is a magnificent sort of philosophical puzzle.

I mean, I don't want to sit on it for too long, but what I want to ultimately point out, if there is no smooth bridging, smooth transition between the absolute time flow of the inner time consciousness, which is pre-reflective and the sort of reflective performative uh you know uh architecture of norm following a norm positing it appears if this transition is lacking it appears and for good reasons that all norms can

can be understood teleologically, as if they are arriving from the future. That's been predetermined. Yes, great. Thank you. Are you thankful? Yes. Juan, my apologies for waiting. Essentially, you have been waiting for too long. No problem, no problem. I have maybe two questions.

Which is the difference about just imagining and remembering? Mere fantasy, yes. Yes, this is one. I understand. We have these two moments, like you say, that given us. I don't know. This is very difficult for me to explain. Because we have, in the first time, Husserl had two models of temporality. We had a temporal object is perceived by a way of a present apprehension

of a not temporal content, the no apprehensions. Then this is composed by the primal impressions, retentions, and and pretensions yes um and then a little later um have another model models about the um and um i understand extended consciousness that contain another consciousness and so on. Yes, I like this question from Sahabi's theory about the...

he said, we are then forced to posit yet another form of time consciousness to account for the givenness of this duration and unity. This is very interesting for me to listen. Another thing is about Husser positions or Husser's distinctions about subjective time and the absolute flow. Yes. Yes. I mean, this is something puzzling to me. And yes, yes, I noticed that. So essentially, Zavi's trying to say that Luke, and this quite actually in tandem with Paul

Levingston's essay about the mode of givenness, the manner of givenness in Husserl, right, You see, that's not, this is, you know, as a recovering Szilardy and I have to say this, that the myth of the given, right, is a fundamentally flawed sort of thesis. in the hand of wrong people,

it can actually do more bad stuff to philosophy than right. Just like Sainz-Rethel's, right, the thesis of real abstraction, what is in common between them is something about the foundations, right? Not all foundations are given to us in the same manner. Right? You cannot talk about the given without the manner of givenness. Right? And if we conflate the manner of givenness, we are essentially doomed to abuse such theses, which are in their own way are completely fundamentally modest and consequential.

and all these sort of what you might call to be foundationalist or anti-foundationalist claims. And something happens here with Husserl's too. Husserl wants to, as Dan Zavi talks about it, to distinguish the manner of givenness. exemplified by the mode of presentation, such that when we are saying, talking about the absolute time stream or stream of lived experiences, so to speak,

the Ocell's time diagram is given, to all consciousness by virtue of it being self-constitutive and constituting. This is, of course, a thesis about a manner of givenness. It's just that happens that someone within the representationalist camp would ask yourself that, you know, how do you justify it, right it's not he can't he doesn't need to justify it because it is doesn't make epistemic claims of the sort that are you know uh embedded within this the critique of the myth of the given

um what we should understand is really zahavi tries to say that look this is not actually about object consciousness, right? That consciousness sees at some sort of inner core, a very atomic elemental core, which is this sort of Husserl's time diagram as object consciousness. But no, it's just manner of its givenness is different. And hence, it cannot be brought under the dominion of representational content as if we were talking about regular objects. In fact, it is not an object in any sort of sense. But this opens up a fundamental problem far more interesting

in a sense that we can say that perhaps transcendental ego is motivated by a manner of givenness which can never be treated as a fact. What does it mean it cannot be treated as a fact? It is not an object of empirical or naturalized inquiry. literally the object of this inquiry if you think think of it as scientific uh i don't know uh axiomatic uh empirical sort of inquiry then you are not actually

inquiring into the constitution of subjectivity per se but rather you are already having set your mind to tackle the subject as if it were an object. And hence, falling back in that diagram that I made for you on the reflexive, referential side of how a representation as an act, an object can have a dozen so relations with subject and object. This is not what Husserl wants to talk about.

In fact, Husserl wants to release us from the confusion ensued by problematizing subjectivity and consciousness for that matter. in the same way that we problematize subject-object relationships, reflective referential symmetry in Kantian transcendental hydomorphic sense. I want to say that maybe, yes,

Kant and Husser both are against objectivism, like today's positivism in science. But I want, I think there we have to clarify that phenomenology is not a description of experience or a real immanent component of conscience. And you say, phenomenology is a description of a correlation between the constituting, constituted, but there are no objective, the givenness.

But this is more in science from time conscience, I understand. Yes, in a sense that you see, essentially phenomenology is a science, according to Hossel. It's just a science of essences, right? Why is he calling it a science, though? Well, it's actually quite important. As I mentioned, every science is built upon a systematic method or system of methods, right? uh essentially hossel wants to say that the science of phenomenology the science

and the logic of essences which undergirds the sort of manner by which phenomena disclose themselves to us cannot be achieved by the sort of methods made by by sciences methods essentially targeted arriving facts empirical facts nor can it be achieved by psychologistic or psychological sort of attitudes where essences can simply be understood as invariances among you know psychological or natural attitudes

with regard to the world. So I want to say that to talk about time, to talk about time in in that sense that i've been talking about for uh pre in previous sessions as the inner time consciousness cannot have uh the same characteristics of these two sorts of methodologies that i just mentioned but rather we should develop a different sort of methodology a methodology according to its own needs. What are its needs? It's just that, um, reductively speaking, metaphorically, as I usually do, um,

you know, um, coming back to, uh, TV series, Dark, wait, that I mentioned, or, or this mythology is about time travel and stuff. And this is actually something that I've noticed that other analytic philosophers are quite actually find it very interesting. They don't bulk at it. Is that if time, just think about this, if time is a serpent that bites its own tail, right you you can't actually start to talk about time of the serpent

as a fact as a set of facts about the serpents and the temporal extensions within which the serpent exist or some other sort of vocabularies everything that you have to talk about would be only within the circle the circle understood non-metaphorically and rather systematically and methodologically is phenomenological reflection the idea of phenomenological reflection is first and foremost to suspend the idea of world

both in the you know kind of like uh non-objective world objective world or any sort of world in the sense that world always carries with it the world of facts this is not what phenomenology wants to talk about because that would be an empirical observation an empirical reflection right and also it doesn't want to talk about other sorts of things but rather it want essential this is this is the whole idea of the epoche as I mentioned last session the idea of doubt

understood in the full Cartesian sense that if you are within the circle of time and the self-constituting time flow, you cannot talk about, you cannot doubt this time cycle or this self-constituting time flow or time stream of lived experiences by virtue of facts or naturalistic idioms or physicalistic idioms or even mentalistic idioms. It's just that you are in this sort of stuff.

The only way to move forward within this extreme theoretical horizon of time as the manner of givenness is by suspending all metaphysical assumptions and merely step by step moving from the suspension of the metaphysical to the bracketing of what you might call to be the phenomenological sets which reveal some essential insights. Now essential insights when it comes to time

are not actually Platonistic, eidetic insights in the way that we are talking about forms and so on and so forth, what writers are about motivations. Husserl ultimately understand this sort of loop from which we cannot as subjects break as a certain sort of what you might call to be

a subject developing a methodological form of inquiry into the very mode of givenness that enable its own subjective and self-conscious, conscious and self-conscious subjectivity. That this method of inquiry cannot be found anywhere other than the very reflection that makes this subjectivity.

It cannot be found in nature. It cannot be found in the system of facts or anywhere else. It would be a myological confusion to actually try to find the laws of essence and the laws of motivations of subjectivity in nature, as a system of facts, so to speak, as a system of facts, meaning empirically. So Husserl wants, essentially, this is why I said previously that Husserl in that sense is a critical philosophy with a massive unaccounted speculative dimension.

And that's why he's not Kant. He's not as drab as Kant. Within his idea of critique, there lies a vast continent of speculative philosophy. I mean, this is the whole idea of really time diagram. What is time diagram really? How did you arrive at the time diagram as absolute flux of the extreme of lived experiences? Obviously, it is not something that was an object of introspection, so it's not psychologistic. And this is not an empirical fact either.

Ultimately, the real question that I think Zahavi should answer is as simple as that, that, you know, when does self-manifesting, self-constituting, a stream of, you know, lived experiences, the self-constituting time, consciousness end and reflection begins, right? obviously if we were trying to talk about this

in a sense that well you know this time the time diagram in the wassallian system which i'm going to uh by the way um talk about it in full today uh in terms of certain sort of empirical fact representational content then that would be not really a self-constituting self-manifesting part of subjectivity right it would be an empirical fact and hence methodologically outside of the purview of what inner time consciousness is uh an inner time consciousness couldn't be also an object of introspection because that would

render you know uh inner time consciousness as absolute uh a stream of uh lived experiences a psychological entity rather than an eidetic entity, rather than a form. The only solution that Husserl wants to provide is that say that if this is the case, then for us to inquire, question back about the very constitution of our subjectivity and objectivity,

we cannot go and found a method that has been informed by representationalism or by but rather we should found a method that is peculiar to this very subjectivity and time consciousness agents we are. Thank you for the answer. Absolutely.

What time is it? Oh, let's go for seven, eight minutes. Lecture, no question asked. And then we will open it to the questions. Love you, see you in seven minutes. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. One, I'm going to, of course, talk about this, hopefully, next session. You see, so, as I said, phenomenology should be strictly understood as a method, as a system

of methods, right, that corresponds to the very specific mode of givenness. This mode of givenness is neither empirical, representational, or psychologistic. Having the characteristics of, being psychologistic means that having the characteristics of natural attitude that we do hold when we are reflecting about ourselves. It's essentially a methodology that tries to diagonally cut between these two methods. and being as specific to the very particular mode of givenness

that is a very constitutive factor of our own experiential subjectivity. now this is becoming hard this is becoming a little bit a certain sort of a slippery slope in a sense that if Husserl posits or makes such a time diagram right as a unit of the self-constituting self-manifesting stream of lived experiences what would

you can ask Husserl what is then this diagram is it representation Is it a product of introspection, namely psychologistic attitude, natural attitude? I would say that I simply would say that it's a model. But then a further question arise that if it is merely a model and not a representation, nor an outcome of naturalistic or psychologistic introspection, then isn't it a model in itself

encapsulates a moment of reflection, melodologically distinct and systematized, meaning that against Zahavi's words, there is no way out of the circle of reflection Even when we are encountering the original moment, which is self-constituting and constitutive with regard to the time diagram.

as i said where does you know the self-constituting stream of lived experiences end and where does when does the reflection begin i think that the question is fundamentally clear reflection never ends because it has always begun and in that sense so why am i talking about this sort of stuff i mean aren't they these stuff

gibberish? Well, of course, I mean something by that. Think about the human, right? When we are reflecting about the constitution, the most elemental constitution of the human, which is really as ourselves would have said it the extreme of lived experiences the absolute time flow flow not to be understood metaphysically as a becoming or anything but just like a makeshift word that we are using for now

what do we see in fact what do we see when we look at the human to its inner core sapience so to speak sapient intelligence what we see according to Osel is that for does and so X to be capable of having such and such

capacities and faculties it needs to have this sort of self-constituting and constituted and constituting temporality. As the originary unit of consciousness, self-consciousness par excellence, so essentially we are really, when we are deeply reflect on the human, we are ultimately, or sapiens, we are

ultimately thinking about time, not time as a metaphysical entity or objective time, but really time that is constitutive, the self-constituting of which we are made of and by virtue of which we can represent an objective realm or objects. But obviously, the first repercussion of such thesis is that that human

is a blind object of its own methodological reflections. So, And so long as these methodologies of reflections are not being systematized, brought to light, and brought to light of critical philosophy or critique, we cannot

actually say anything noteworthy about what the human is. The consequence of this is simple. That you really cannot as Rousseau would have said see the human merely through the lens of critical philosophy but only through a certain sort of synoptic again to use Salarsian vocabulary

even if completely unjustified as a synchronization or coordination between a speculative philosophy and critical philosophy. Unfortunately, whether you like it or not, the very fact of human reflecting upon itself is more of a speculative thesis rather than a critical one. to the extent that for it to be able to recognize itself as herself has with his subject and the uh you know

the self-constituting and the constituted stream of, you know, inner time consciousness. This requires a mode of givenness which can never be brought under the canonical edifice of critical philosophy. it can move along it it can it can coordinate itself with critical philosophy but it is not really the object of critical philosophy per se thoughts before i move forward then i give my lecture

and one one thing that i actually wanted to say this i mean i've waited so long for this right to give the punch line so many so-called representationalists of different breed and different creeds, either of naturalistic creed or empirical or I don't know, all sorts of varieties, such as cellars, for example.

think that sapience simply by that i mean sapience as an intelligence as you know intelligence is a very big word here i mean it intel when i always talk about intelligence i mean intelligence as intelligence of philosophy as pure self-reflection Essentially, understanding the time that is self-constituting makes me possible to begin with, such that I can have referential and reflexive relations with objects and my own

self-subjects. The problem with these sort of philosophers is, I would say from a Hossalian perspective, is that they think that intelligence such as sapiens can simply be instantiated by virtue of thus and so system of processes in nature. What Husserl wants to say is fundamentally

a different sort of thing. Said yes, but that is not actually, that's a trivial fact. What can be instantiated in nature as opposed to not, right? According to Boltzmann, anything can be instantiated in nature, including Boltzmann brains. conscious or sentient or sapient entities in an extremely almost unobservable duration of time.

That doesn't make a justification for who we are, according to Boltzmann and according to Hosell as well. Merely just because you have responded to the conditions of possibility of sapience in naturalistic sense in the scientific image of man, this doesn't mean that you can actually be capable of talking about the sort of intelligence we are, right? The problem for Husserl is simple. It's not as if what they are doing wrong is wrong, right?

The explanatory framework that they are positing is fundamentally right. But the framework which they are trying to describe, namely sapiens, is fundamentally misguided. can you please try to turn on your camera sorry sorry sorry sorry sorry my apologies my apologies okay sometimes it just turns off for for a moment then everything's back but this time Sorry, sorry, sorry, no, sorry, sorry, my apologies.

What Husserl wants to say is something like that, that look, understanding the truth, the essence of how we are as this sort of intelligence is, requires for us to adopt a different sort of methodologies. to deal with this specific sort of intelligence we are. And by virtue of the fact that the sort of intelligence we are is not merely reducible or even correlated to natural facts, psychologic facts, but rather to a very specific moment

which is inner time consciousness as being constituting and the constitutive, make us a different sorts of intelligence. And the methodology required to talk about the sort of intelligence ultimately is irreducible. not at an ontological level. That's the most important one. Not an ontological level, but an epistemic and methodological level to the sort of epistemic and methodological claims

that science has about the human, the sort of intelligence we are, and the sort of methodologies that they do apply to arrive at their own facts. Human absolutely is not, in Husserlian sense, an object of natural sciences. Arriving at that sort of conclusion means that you have conflated the method of arriving at facts

and arriving at phenomenological ideatic insights about the subjective foundation of who we are, right? So in a sense, sapience for Husserl is this sort of Gordian knot. And only science tries to cut like Alexander the Great, the Gordian knot, rather than solving it. Precisely because sapience is a knot of motivations and motivated reflections.

For me, to have thus and so self-constituting modes of givenness, that are only available to the very constitution of the subject and not the constitution of an object, and hence in kind is different, means that I am motivated to think about myself in kind rather than quantity. The very fact that this intelligence of ours takes itself to be different from other sentiences or intelligences in kind rather than quantity is a fundamental phenomenological insight.

and that's i would say that that's sort of truth cannot be reached by a wrong sort of methodology of reflection and motivation their intertwinement so to speak thoughts i think i have one and the only i mean it's not yet well formed so i'm just gonna try like

question because I was remembering the time of the world and the objective constitution of time, the grounds of objective time and this whole punchline that you have just said about sapience as fundamentally needing a different methodology, phenomenology and motivations. I'm not sure if there is also a punchline towards this formation of intersubjective time. Is this something that you're planning to also throw? Yes, yes, of course. Yes, absolutely. Yes, yes, yes. Yes. Okay.

I mean, this is why I wanted to give the rest of that sort of diagram made by Hossel, right? Essentially to probably not actually do what you asked of me, but rather say that, well, look, you know, there are these sort of philosophers, there are these sort of scientists. who have their own takes on Hossel's diagram, right? And they have arrived at different sorts of intersubjective scientific, namely objective scientific claims about the sorts of, you know, appearances we can see.

and the application of such modes of appearances to scientific observations. You see, scientific observations are not actually perceptions in Horsalian sense or any sort of time constitution. They are fundamentally different. But nevertheless, I want to, yes, I do plan to bring up the issue of intersubjectivity through this idea that, look, ultimately many claims about time, time asymmetry particularly, description of physical phenomena, are intersubjective, right? Because obviously

they need to be objective in order to be, you know, they need to be intersubjective to be objective in a sense. But it's just that not all of them are actually correct. That doesn't make the realm of intersubjectivity as a precondition for objectivity in the Lomar sense that we talked about wrong, but rather that we should understand that, look, just it's a kind of platonic insight, actually, you know, just because everyone follows, everyone wears their panties on their head,

right instead of actually having it between their legs that doesn't make it objective right that there is something here that is actually quite interesting the transition between the the inarticulated level of you know self-constituting self-manifesting stream of self-consciousness to another inarticulate level, then articulated for me as a subject, and then being objective by way of being articulated in intersubjective. That even these transitions are not actually bulletproof, right? They're prone to errors.

In fact, majority of the sort of errors that we see in the canon of science and physical sciences with regard to intuitions of time are derived from precisely that sort of stage of transition. I'm not sure if this is going to make a lot of sense, but what I'm trying to arrive at here is that because I was at first I was going to be part of the Lombard's presentation and something that struck me because I've already read Zahavi's text so I made a connection between this whole, let's say, layers, scales, moments of constitution.

And I was thinking that, yeah, I think I get better now this idea of different mythology and different outcomes of such mythologies, in the sense that there is no need for, I don't know, this is probably badly worth it, but there's no need for truth, let's say, in at least in this time in constituting reflections and this system of pasts, I remember how was the term actually, but this, yeah, like systems of past, there's no need for it to be a

correlative with empirical facts because any sort of order of time will do and any sort of order can be intersubjective objective i think that is yes yes one of the reasons maria you see let me, I mean, Sophie, who's my German translator, is not available today. Let me, Freya, I'm going to, this German board, one second, I'm going to send this to Freya on chat box, and this is exactly something that Osell always has when he talks about reflection.

particularly in his later works. And this is actually quite a very interesting sort of idiom. One sec. Fria, would you be able to pronounce this in German for us? um just the pronunciation it's their uninterested to shower what do you take it um i don't know what the to shower is uh i just i'm just missing the word now but it's obviously uninterested in the yes i'd say the spectator probably for to shower yes yes

an uninterested spectator. Right, you see, so there is a paradox I mentioned that Zahavi actually doesn't talk about. So Zahavi essentially says, well, you know, this is the mode of reflection, and it's not the mode of reflection, that time-consuming flow, a stream of lived experiences, such and such. And yes, methodologically, it should be treated differently than how we talk about objects, methodologically treat objects, or psychologically from our natural attitudes,

you know, treats the objects of introspection. He wants to make that point. But as I said, when does, you know, this exposition of the stream of time consciousness, inner time consciousness, as a stop and reflection begin. There is actually none. I would say that any source, according to Honsell, late Honsell, any sort of things that we do actually talk about with regard to the constitutional factors

is under a certain mode of reflection. Rousseau doesn't want to say that, look, the arrival at the inner time consciousness as what you might call to be the primordial moment of subjectivity and subjectification, has been arrived by dozens or methods that we have in science or in psychologistic introspective methods. He wants to say that no, we have this sort of method by virtue

of the method being paired and intrinsically being correlated with something like, how Freya pronounced it, a disinterested spectator. That is a sort of phenomenological method that we are interested in. So what is actually a disinterested observer or spectator? I gave you some clues last week.

Essentially, a disinterested spectator is not as if it is occupying in some sort of la-la land. where it is, you know, beyond the purview of the transcendental ego and critique and speculation in philosophical sense, but rather the idea that, you know, the disinterested ego is disinterested in metaphysical claims. number one two in

how it relates with the world so it's a double disinterestedness Phenomenological method as a neutral, neutralizing or forestalling method is a doubly disinterested method. One, in a sense that it doesn't follow MIMO. I don't know if you know what MIMO is. It's a term coined by Lawrence Sklar. what i'm going to talk about extensively in next few sessions in the 80s mimo simply means

metaphysic in metaphysic out right in the sense that look guys if you actually get metaphysical consequences most probably is because you have already smuggled a metaphysical premise before the consequent relation right it's just not as if you're miraculously getting metaphysical consequences it's precisely because you have a smuggled metaphysics in your methodology so Hosea wants to get rid of that the MIMO formula metaphysics in metaphysics out Two, he doesn't want to deal with this idea that, well, you know, this is just natural attitude of the sort that we have been talking about.

Precisely because the ego that we are talking about as a subject of such reflection, from a logical reflection, is not interested in the world. as a system of facts, not a system of predicates, but a system of facts. So system of facts out. Literally, a disinterested spectator

should not have a world. It's a worldless, homeless in a sense. But you should also be very careful at the level of methodology with regard to MIMO dynamics, metaphysics in metaphysics out. Maria. I wanted to ask after I saw in Finley's text that Husserl maintains some Cartesian structure, like Coglito-like, is this an interesting spectator and the most important part is where it sits, whether it's in self-affection, in reason, in imagination.

and why metaphysics, I understand why metaphysics might arise in at this moment but how to get rid of it. Right so yes Husserl is absolutely Cartesian in a sense I mean there is no doubt about it is that he's amplifying the Cartesian revenge on Kant. I don't know how many of you have ever watched my seminars on Kant. I always say to my students that, look, it is not Hume that Kant is trying to dethrow.

Hume cannot be dethrowing. I mean, it's just Hume. It's Descartes that he wants to dethrone. And I generally don't think that Kantian, what you might call it, as a very species of a very specific sort of metaphysics can do away with Descartes. I think that Husserl understood this from the historical philosophical perspective that, no, Descartes is absolutely the sort of...

the Cartesian subject is exactly the sort of subject that we are inhabiting. It's just that we need to amplify, we need to explicate it, we need to, you know, kind of distinguish between, you know, bloated Cartesianism from deflationary kantianism and so on and so forth and that's exactly what sel is trying to do but nevertheless as i mentioned last session is that uh for sel there was one single thing that he noticed that he cannot actually get rid of with regard to the cartesian cogito is doubt doubt

I'm going to talk about this next session. I mentioned this a little bit about about the science of probability and so on so forth last session but I don't want to move forward but yes so So, it's not as if Husserl is moving against Descartes. We should understand that he really wants to preserve Cartesian subjectivity. within the ambit of a different methodological inquiry which is not cartesian number one

and number two he does not want to create even the impression that the sort of subjectivity is solipsistic by nature. In fact, Hoselle wants to introduce subjectivity as a fundamental form of situatedness. so what is actually interesting about situatedness i mean i know that people who are into embodied

mind and stuff misconceived idea of situatedness but that is not herself's fault you see you're situated in the world and by virtue of the situated you have a certain sort of constrained upon you know uh your cogitations and imagination and so on and so forth right it's just like almost being perspectively confined to a very local level that's one meaning of situatedness Another point, another wing of situatedness that Husserl actually wants to talk about

is a subjectivity fully understood, particularly by the interface of internal time consciousness, inner time consciousness is nothing but the situatedness of the world in subjectivity as a manner of givenness not as a given datum but as a manner of givenness the subjectivity is not anything but a perspectival, determined form of perhaps a belated self-reflection

of world upon to itself. I know that many philosophers after Husserl took this this side of formula very seriously and of course we have a great example in 21st century, Gabrielle Catrin right, that's essentially Gabrielle Catrin I want to say that you see there are two sides to Husserl I mean, and you should understand this, the situatedness of subjectivity is sort of double situatedness, like double intentionality of time constitution, right?

that one, you are situated in the world and many people like Valera and kind of inactivist mind philosophers or scientists think of the situation of the subject in the world. But that is not exactly the Ossalian formula in food. It is also the situatedness of the world onto the subject. And all of this situatedness, so to speak, is given in a very nebulous diagram, which

is Husserl's time diagram, you know, the stream of lived experiences. The stream of lived experiences I mentioned has an inarticulate, highlighted content and ever more progressive, intentional content.

And ultimately, this sort of tension between these two sorts of content, understood in the horizon of situatedness, so to speak, top down, bottom up, is what motivates us, according to a cell, to reflect about the sort of creatures we are. There is nothing else to it. Well, when I'm saying that there is nothing else to it, I really mean that this is the ultimate story

of being motivated to be thus and so intelligent and none others. My apologies. Give me two minutes and we'll come back. I start the lecture and then we call it the day. Fortunately, we have a you know, next week we don't have a class. So you can actually go through the text, some of this stuff, you know, rewatching the lectures and I will come back with a few number of diagrams as conclusive remarks.

and some of this stuff that we have been talking about and how we can actually take these elementary marks to some sort of philosophical theses, whose connections with these sort of elementary remarks is not at first what prima facie is given, okay two or three minutes i will be back

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Sorry. Before I actually start, you know, just regular jokes in my classes, how many of you have

drank yerba mate? yeah it's a fad in america and my god is the best fad ever there is one uh that i've been drinking it's called enlightenment right enlightenment and i and pete uh wolfendale came here, I think, was it two months, two months and a half ago. And I mean, this is Pete Bolfeller, right? I said, Pete, do you want to drink this thing? I said, no, I don't like caffeine and

this sort of stuff. But look at the tag. It says enlightenment. I said, yes, yes, I actually kind like enlightened man maybe i should try it he has been addicted to this thing is the best absolutely the best so So I hope that I was rather clear about what I wanted to actually say. At the very least, highlighting, you know, this idea that, you know, you can't actually, from a Husserlian perspective,

We can actually go and reflect about the human in terms of sapiens, in terms of reflection upon natural facts, constitutive of the human, or the natural psychologistic attitudes, which are the products of introspective of human unto itself for itself is a fallacy because given the sort of methodologies that are required

for these respective methods of inquiries, you know, naturalization and, you know, in introspective psychologistic sense, they ultimately miss something fundamental about the nature of the human. It's manner of givenness to itself. And really, Hossel is in this sense, speculative philosophers of intelligence, that not all

modes of intelligence can be simply studied or rather exhausted by the methods of science or psychology, right? But rather, the method of reflecting upon the intelligence of the sort of thing we are require a different methodology proper to the mode of givenness of human to itself. questions before i move forward

diego i see that you are scratching your handsome beard so many times it means that you have a question no no no i don't have any questions but perhaps i was thinking about the what you said about the relationship between Hursalian philosophy and the Cartesian tradition. And regarding this self-centered experience of the world, And perhaps it is also useful to remember that one of the other great references for Husserl is Leibniz, in particular, the monadology.

I mean, this subjective or the subject for Hooser is more or less a monad, meaning in a non-metaphysical sense that our experience of the world is experienced from here, from my point of view, and is absolutely unaccessible for any other. subject. And in combining Leibniz and Descartes, you have these, or you can plan or you can better understand what solipsism is for Husser and what solipsism is not. So there is this kind

of solid season in the sense that my point of view is inaccessible for any other, and the world is kind of given an experience or an experience and live the world from here. this is not exchangeable for the point of view of any other subject that is constituted as something or someone in front of me there so so there is this kind of special incompatibility that is more and mental incompatibility if you like i mean that the problem is not that the

other can come to me and displace me from my sight and then see the world from the special point of the world that I am occupying right now. But the point is that it is impossible to see the world through his own eyes. That's the main idea. But Nevertheless, Husserl is able to go from this kind of solipsism to a kind of realism. I mean, since there are other person in front of me, it is possible to co-perceive.

I mean, we both of us are able to perceive the same phenomena. that is the thing and that constitutes the primal or the more primitive stratum of a common nature and that that is very interesting because that is very important for whose phenomenology of space but also for whose phenomenology of time I mean the problem is how is history possible and how is my experience of time is not to be dissolved in my own subjective experience but how it can be related

and yes related to others experience of the world not not present but past but in the past or for another matter future there is a reflect self you see uh i think that uh this is a great entry to some of this discussion about intelligence and reflection, imports, significance of Osel with regard to these questions, is that, so Osel, as you said, you know, there is a certain sort of bottom-up way to say that, well, you know, that there are things that distinguish, but ultimately

are historical, and there are certain things that are top-down, not top-down in a Kantian sense, or diagrammatic sense, but nevertheless are essential, namely eidetic, but are not historical, even though they are intertwined with historical motivations of consciousness. So he wants to kind of address both of these questions, and ultimately the question, I don't want to spoil the whole story here leads him from the question of reflection

as something always already being there to self-reflection as the characteristics of philosophy itself. The philosophy is the organon of self-reflection. So we have philosophy of intelligence that somehow coincides with the intelligence of philosophy as the organon of self-reflection. seeing both of these moments in one particular encapsulation

which is self and the other the very constitution of objectivity yes that's it and the thing or the point that i was pointing out is just that yes um there is this kind of cartesian matrix in who's all philosophy but who's all is overcomes a or his work he tries to do specifically in the in the cartesian meditations and in some in in the second part of the logic is to overcome a cartesian skepticism by way not i mean we already know that

the cart overcome the gap or between my experience of the world and the real world through a benevolent God. And that is a step or that is a bridge that seems for Husserl and not really for anyone who perceives himself as a philosopher, that is, I mean, it's tricky. So what Husserl tries to provide is a radical, first of all, a radical interpretation of Cartesian accepticism and solipsism. He takes this to its very ultimate consequences just to prove how

is it that there is a world. Yes, absolutely. even if I take it to its very very very good what I'm going to find is the world yes yes superb insight I mean this is something that uh goes along uh what I mentioned I think it was the first session second session that uh you know uh there are certain sorts of philosophers in history of philosophy for them a skepticism is not a way out but a way in right that's it

yeah that that is exactly what was certainly a skepticism is not for him in contrast with uh Descartes a way out but a way in. And I genuinely, I, but this is a different class, a different seminar, probably next year, that I genuinely think that this is also the case with Hume. Hume has a very, Hume is extremely misunderstood in terms of, you know, because people want to always settle on that issue of empiricism, right?

But human skepticism is a fundamental source of kind, particularly skepticism about how how imagination corresponds with time itself, you know, images, vivacity and so on and so forth. It's a different sort of a sub, but yes, Husserl absolutely has this sort of a vector that, and this is something that Heidegger really didn't understood in my idea, that Husserl entires, entire philosophical life was somehow based on this primordial battle of good versus evil

in philosophy, getting out of the solipsistic account, right? And Heidegger just really doesn't understand Husserl at the end of the day, I would say, precisely because he's re-inscribing. Not only he dissolves Husserl's specific methodologies to challenge the sort of solipsism and skepticism out, but rather he's just like flattening them out by virtue of one simple fact being in the world right

and of course something really we should talk at some point i mean i'm not going to talk about it but any of you who can bring it would be much cherished, who sells reading of Heidegger's text and saying that it has been utterly bastardized. by the way i don't i don't i i have uh at this point in my life i think that you know look uh i never wanted to be a rationalist yet i became a rationalist

from a Delusian, Nietzschean strand. And I didn't want to become Hosselian, and yet I became one. And I didn't want to become a Carnapian, and yet I became one. So there would be a phase, most probably, according to Hosselian pretensions and anticipation, that I would become a Heideggerian. So I do not want to say bad things about that again. yes and i would like to add that even if you you find after going through solipsism skepticism about the existence of the world and going through it even if you find that there is a

a world a real world so to say and world as a system of facts or as a system of predicates no no no or or nature that is the nature nature yeah that is the concept that that that who's only uses to refer to that there is something uh to be co-perceived by me and by the others outside my own my own umwelt yes that this is the important difference even if i'm i find a world or a nature that exists there in front of me and it is not reducible to my own inner experience, there is a gap between the way I perceive it and the time or the way the time is

given to me in my umwelt, the surrounding world that I experience from here, from my own point of view and the world and the history and the world that has its own time. And its own history. That is essentially what I would say that if, I don't know, I mean, I don't know how much you actually are going toward that sort of extremist view that somehow I do hold. where basically for me sapiens is an irreducible you know philosopher objects of philosophy where basically you cannot actually

reduce it to what you might call to be morsel and bits of a natural world but that does that mean that you're treating intelligence in a solipsistic manner and I think that that's for me is is at the very least for me is is a fundamental insight. It's a question of methodology in a sense at the very least that um the question of solipsism arise precisely because you're conflating two different methodologies right the methodology that ought to be

only applied to this sort of manner of givenness in time constituting and constituted a stream of lived experiences and to the very, you know, contents of representations, objects of representations. And that, if you actually avoid this sort of methodological confusion, just by the virtue of the fact that you are merely talking about subjects, sapiens, intelligence, intelligence of philosophy or philosophy of intelligence

doesn't make it solipsistic. Right? That's the whole point, I think. Freya, I have noticed that you have been kind of also um yeah i don't know i feel like there are some things that always uh slip through my mind but they're just not really um you know well thought through but i feel like especially but this is probably also my my simondonian influence i find this obviously this concept of humans are sapiens really interesting also um in regard you know how how Simonon is very Nietzschean in this way, how he takes, well, the concept of human not to be

as something fixed, but rather as something that is in transit, you know, when he is talking about the human as a bridge. And then I was also thinking about how maybe this is a really good point in the reflection to also bring into the consideration Bernard Stiegler's take on Husserl and I don't know much about it but I just know that he also I had no idea I had no idea that Stiegler has had some stuff about Husserl what is that? It's been ages since I read it but I don't know I have to look up the the name of the book actually but he's also talking about the concepts of retention and pretension and he's also I think he's adding the concept of tertiary like the third layer of

tension basically and this is due to the fact that he thinks that humans nowadays also have a memory which is formed by the way we interact with memo techniques you know like technologies which shape our memory and therefore I think I find it really interesting to talk about the concept of humans maybe also in the context of evolution that yes that sapiens aren't something or that maybe human consciousness is not something that is always working in the same way. But yeah, as I said, this is just what's been bugging me, but not really.

Please do, if you actually find the Stigler text. I think I just remembered it. It's the first volume of Symbolic Misery, I think. Okay, okay, okay, okay. I will definitely check this out. Thank you so much. I mean, I mean, if I'm not mistaken, so from a Simondonian point of view, there is a continuity between the nature and sapience in the sense that we have been talking about

by virtue of technique, right? Because technique is essentially in a sense natural but retroactively always technical. all. If that is the case, it would be something like this, that the sapience right is locally self-constitutive

and intelligence and in in that sense intelligence by intelligence i really don't mean sentience or any like you know you're a smelly socks being sentient or rocks you know an object oriented sort of philosophy being intelligent i mean really uh sapient so sapience has a certain sort of local constraint that in the sense that sapience is always can only be sapience locally in the sense of a salian way or kantian way or perhaps even hegelian way but always this localization of sapience reflecting upon its own undergirdings

is being done against the backdrop of a global expansion which is the technical objects in nature, right? Technical essences in nature. I don't have anything against this. This is what if I want to actually make a very bad sort of comparison here, it would be kind of a Wittgenstein thesis, right? Or proposed Wittgenstein thesis that, look, you can actually have private language. And hence, private reflections and thinking about yourself in

terms of private language. But you should understand that this private language is only locally, but ultimately is modeled globally on a global language, namely intersubjectivity. And in that sense, sapience is exactly like that. I think that Husserl tries to ultimately change the localization problem, which is the local problems of subjectivity and sapience to the global problems, without actually somehow conflate between the methods of inquiry,

demanding of such reflections. so time is it oh do we have the time for one brief question from maria yes yes maria is always welcome um yeah i mean i hope this doesn't take that much time but um i was uh giving it some thought to the

inner structure of time consciousness and this uh deterministic consequence of how his So deterministic. Yeah. Yeah, right? Like when we are talking about deterministic, we usually are talking about causal factors. I'm not sure if you were mentioning specifically causality. But it was given the framework that Mr. Slav pointed out to this idea of norms. norms are like they came from the future that was one of the conclusions that you give upon this take and I was reflecting on this sort of idea and the question is written so I'm going to just read

it but isn't the nature of the inner structure of time consciousness a claim for the necessity of relation I mean because of the structure of retention primal impression pretension and as such any time consider that norms are generative and not determined. It's not about the point of origin but rather what it comes to be next because, specifically because of the existence of pretension. And I think this has to do with some things that you have been talking right now but I just don't have the frame to actually point at that. But I think that there is a fundamental, not only generative but also relational aspect in positing this inner structure of time consciousness

as retention and pretension that i think uh doesn't need to that this structure does not need to account for uh any sort of determinative uh stuff i think that that is yeah yes absolutely it doesn't no no no you see this is something that uh i i mentioned that you know one of the things i want to do hopefully is to actually say that well you know this is what jose says about the time diagram and so on and so forth the constitute self-constituting constituted inner time consciousness. And it is essentially what is that,

it is an intuition for me, intuition of a deep level, right? This intuition is not an objective intuition of any sort of way that we can actually say that this intuition is somehow, in some way, is responsible for the same sort of causation that we observe. The structure of these two are fundamentally different when we are actually seeing a causal connection right a causal network so to speak we are not actually um

merely uh as it were uh resorting to the structure of the inner time consciousness no that is not correct. We are codifying the sort of observations that we have, and these are recodified perceptions, so to speak, more or less in scientific sense, and we start to predict a certain sort of phenomenon and hence prediction here by prediction here I don't mean prediction forward but also prediction backward because majority of scientific discoveries are

made out of retrodictions right but nevertheless the the structure of retrodiction prediction is different from the structure of retention, protention, or even the structure of what we call to be anticipations and preensions. That is something that if we make that sort of assumptions somehow in a very hasty manner make the bridge between these two, you immediately arrive at this sort of, you know, philosophers of science in 20th century, where basically

think that time anastropy, time asymmetry, is something that is objective. Well, I'm not saying that it's not objective, but the way that they are trying to talk about it is that they're saying that it's something objective precisely because it has as its foundations elements of time constituted lived experience right that the sort of appearances that we see in the physical world by way of observation and not

a stream of lived experiences are always objective precisely because they are not only supported by the organon of the observation, but also by the undergirding of microstructure of adumbrative perceptions. Now, what they are actually, the wrong thing about this sort of move is that that sort of intuition that is already within Hossel time diagram and, you know, a stream of lived experiences cannot be so easily translated to intuition at the level of

objective time and observations. I don't think that they have any sort of connect obvious easy connection with one another and hence any sort of conclusion that you smuggle from one level to another is most probably wrong there is this book highly suggest i'm actually going to uh probably read some parts of it next session by Lawrence Sklar, if you know him. He's a very famous philosopher of science, particularly physics and time. Particularly what I am actually having in mind is a book that he

wrote is called Physics and Chance, Lawrence Sklar, S-K-L-A-R, that actually deals with many confusions in the sort of smuggling back and forth, you know, kind of, you know, surreptitiously getting one premise from one level to introduce it to another level then introducing a consequence from one scale to another one such that it will cause more confusion I don't think that these things these sort of general statements can be held

as a matter of facts, whether for a logical or, you know, as a matter of psychologistic or for the matter of empirical facts without the sort of inquiry and the scrutiny that should go into them. And then once we actually scrutinize them, I think the majority of them fall apart right away. Yeah, I wasn't trying to...

No, no, I'm just simply saying. No, no, absolutely not. No, Maria. Actually, by the way, you made a number of questions at the end of your presentation, which I thought were absolutely fantastic. If you can actually kind of write them down, pose them at the beginning of the next session, that would be magnificent. Because of the way that I noticed that you have a certain sort of skepticism about this whole thing. it's just it hasn't it's been it has been bubbling up but it has been boiling yet essentially i want to you know push you toward boiling it yeah i'm feeling that that sense of

starting to bubble too so yeah yeah thank you for that remark actually Absolutely. Love you. So, oh yes, this diagram thingy. So I was continuing from the past session where Lika told me that I should shut up. I was saying that furthermore in this diagram, the retention and pretension are not past or future in respect to the primal impression but simultaneous with it according to Rousseau and as a result the now phase again

quotation by Wissell, the now phase of the object as a horizon, but it is not made of the retention and pretension, but of the past and future phases of the object. And we also gave this interpretation that, look, one of the most important things that you should understand this in contrast with Brentano's presentism, is that T0, T1, T2, and so on and so forth, they are not actually discrete now moments that are either elapsing or receding, sinking off or unfolding in time. But rather, you can think about these as the certain sort of threshold,

phenomenological thresholds that are continuing and hence making discrete data. Like literally T0, T1, T2, T4, T5 doesn't exist on this cycle. It only exists by virtue of you assuming a phenomenological threshold that enables for something to sinking off or running off in the past. Past here, we're merely using this word for the lack of a better word,

out of pure convenience and also the future running towards. There is no reference to past and now. But essentially, the idea is that there is a threshold, this phenomenological threshold that is at the level of the stream of lived experiences, without which we could not actually posit discrete moments such as T0, T1, T2, T3, T4. in a sense Husserl is kind of a subversion of Brentano's time diagram and the committed presentism

that Brentano has whereas presentism requires a discrete wholeness of every moment being of now of now this now moment and similitudes of now moments that you have that might receive or might unfold are essentially can only be diagrammed within the threshold of continuum that makes a diagram itself namely the interweaving between the horizontal vector the vertical vector and the m vector

the diagonal one that weaves them together in terms of the the amplitude of retentions now Now, retention and pretensions are just not simply intentional objects or intentional acts, but something which enables the cognition of intentional objects and acts. The something is defined by Husserl as in Husserl's word, absolute streaming of inner time consciousness, and is to be understood as parallel to the subjective time of phenomenal impression.

Thus, for us to disentangle the circularity of consciousness and intentionality in respect to time, Husserl distinguishes between perceptual subjective time of temporal discontinuity, this and continuity. Distinction implies that there are two kinds of intentionality, one directed through the act towards a given object, and another which is continuous. Again, in Husserl's word, like a river that flows for consciousness to occur, then temporal intentionality, unlike common objective intentionality, is twofold.

This peculiarity is referred by Husserl as double intentionality and is explicable in cognitive terms as occurring in memory and recollection. As I have mentioned before in the previous session, recollection and anticipation are related though distinct from retention and pretension. Essentially, there are correlates of retention and pretension on a different level in the sense that Dieter Lohner was talking about in his essay. They are kind of like proto objects for me.

Right? So unlike retention, pretension, recollection and anticipation constitute an intentional act. That's also an important point. Lika, how much time do we have? I think so 20 minutes. OK, if we have 20 minutes, I can actually talk a little bit more. So we did kind of, you know. Talk about the structure of kind of, you know, retention configuration of the time diagram.

Now. I want to show this diagram. It's actually a diagram that is in ourselves manuscripts, right? So we have retention, but we don't exactly know what pretensions are, right? I mean, thinking about retention is kind of intuitively easy, precisely because you can analogously think about it in terms of memory, even though that analogy is really wrong. But nevertheless, you can have a sort of mental imagery of what these retentions are, right? But

pretensions, what are the pretensions? You know, I want to actually talk about them diagrammatically again so so as you see here there is a horizontal line Fossel used, you know, these sort of diagrams essentially to somehow explicate his analysis of temporality. consistently, you know, for Husserl, a horizontal line in diagrammatic lexicon,

which Husserl takes it as a certain sort of supporting figure in the diagram, right, is meant to represent our flow of perceptions in the present. so you see there is i mentioned this already that you know these diagrams are not actually representations because otherwise it would what what the fuck is is trying to do here there are not also objects of introspection there are models of intelligence phenomenologically by way of epoche, by way of bracketing, and hence securing

a disinterested observer or spectator arriving at such models. So these are not any sort of models that you see today, like model of intelligence by way of empirical machine learning and stuff. These are fundamentally models that have been that essentially their core encapsulate the very methodology or system of methods that has gone to them. And what is the system of method? It is a system of epochal, thermological epochal. so here the horizontal line is a supportive line

right it represents a flow of perception in the present it represents don't have too much confusion about my or certain deployment of certain sorts of vocabularies here represent present stuff as i said we are merely deploying such vocabularies within the context of model it is not as if you are saying that it really represents it would be utterly misunderstanding of yourself if we say that, oh, well, you know,

this horizontal line represents in this sort of drab, peace-poor Kantianism. So Yes. It's meant to represent our flow of perception in the present. It represents the ever arriving now. And again, now is out of convenience. Now, in this very diagram, this line begins with the experience at point E1.

and continues through E in order to represent our retentions as they sink away or run off. Rousseau adds diagonal lines which originate at this line of presence and proceed downward away from the horizontal line of the present. For example, we see a diagonal line originating at point E1 and a slanting downward. This signifies an impression that originates perceptually at point E1 and then sinks away as a retention,

while our current perceptions continue to flow through E2, E3, and so on and so forth. Therefore, the point E1, 2, you know, this one, found on the slanting line starting at E1, represents our retention of experience that took place at E1, but that is retained at E2. In the lower half of this diagram, then, which here represents a realm of retention, the superscripted numbers indicate the current moment in the present,

while the subscripted numbers represent the retained moment of originary experience. Fria, how do you say it in a salient sense in German or Sorry, what do you mean? The originary impression. ah um i don't know it was also mentioned in the loma text right yes um uh i think the the first is it is it was it that no no the other one the other one uh or or something yes yeah i have to

look it up i don't remember it now i'll look it up and write it in the text superb thank you so Orsprüngliche Eindrücken? Perhaps? Eindrücken would make sense, yeah. That means impression. Orsprüngliche Eindrücken. You know, this is the reason that all philosophy should get rid of itself of the language and just do philosophy in English language. So we don't actually fret about these words, but thank you so much. So as I was saying, in the lower half of the diagram, then we have the realm of retention.

The superscriptive number indicate the current moment in the present, while the superscriptive number represents the retained moment of originary impression in the case in this case a moment in the past past in this diagram not past as any sort of temporal part of the temporal continuum So, also in this diagram, we find vertical lines, lines perpendicular to the line representing our perceptual flow in the present. Such vertical lines indicate the connection we have with our retention in the current moment.

therefore they are representing the extension of the living present beyond the point actually what the the i i have it here it's called or impression that was basically the word uh original impression for example the vertical line between the current moment at e2 right this one and the retained moment E1, E2

this represent the link that exists at the moment E2 between the now moment E2 and the retention of the moment E1 These lines, therefore, represent a link with pretensions in our flow of originary experience. Right? Yet, at this point, we must, you know, come back to ourselves deliberations and follow how he integrates pretension into this sort of diagrammatic model.

of inner temporality or inner time consciousness. Husserl begins this discussion in Bernal manuscripts by examining how pretension and retention relate to one another. Specifically, Basically, he wants to add pretension to this analysis of now. He says, but we are missing a label for the pretensions that would take place at point E2. Thus, we will extend the vertical line E12 to E2 upward and this way label the pretensions which make up the missing intentionality, comprising with the lower line a unified consciousness.

So in this sort of way, we see that the line from E1-2 extend to the unimpressional point E2, upward to a new, that is, potential point, which can be called E2-3. Or, sorry, E3-2. In this way, Husserl causes the area above the horizontal line of the present to represent the real of pretension.

The point E23 accordingly indicates my pretension toward what I will experience in the future moment of E3, a pretension which is experienced now at this very moment of E2. With this example, then we can see how the symbolization or signification of pretension, palace or cell symbolization of retention. Subscripted numbers, subscripted. Numbers still indicate the point of originary experience.

although now that point is the future and subscripted numbers or superscript sorry superscripted numbers indicate our experience now the now experience of that pretension so in a sense uh before i'm moving forward and i think that we are running low on time and we'll take it next session uh to talk about this diagram and how it actually retain relates to the idea of motivation affectivity and objectivity what was that ultimately wants

to talk about here is that uh you see it's not as if retentions and pretensions on this diagram can be ontologically differentiated right they cannot be epistemologically differentiated either why because for us to actually epistemologically differentiate a past now from a now now to a future now we need to have a certain sort of

objective intuition of time asymmetry essentially in a sense the time asymmetry has has a duplicitous character the intuition of time asymmetry one is the one that usually people forget when using the idea of time asymmetry in the philosophy of science particularly with the second law of thermodynamics, is the idea that, you know, that the asymmetry of time, time moving in one direction as opposed to the other,

implies an epistemic asymmetry in the sense that I know knowledge of the past, right? But my knowledge of the past in comparison to the knowledge of yet to come, future, is nothing. This is the epistemic arrow of time asymmetry, and it's only reserved for a very specific sort of time asymmetrical descriptions of a system. You can actually smuggle this sort of time asymmetry, aka epistemic time asymmetry, into any sort of Husserlian time diagram,

precisely because it's only reserved for observations that require reproductions and predictions of the future rather than the act of perceptions themselves it's just like Nick Lanz or all these sort of you know edgelord time edelords, so to speak, these days, and we have it in history of philosophy. I would say that, you know, Schopenhauer is one of them. is that they do confuse most often the distinction between the epistemic time asymmetry

and the intuitive time asymmetry. These two cannot be translated to one another without massive amount of presuppositions such that you say that you know time by virtue of its always being in one flowing in one direction is edgeless you know when land talks about this sort of stuff it means future right future is better more expansive more open than the past whoever resides in past is just you know

uh it's not really intelligent intelligence resides in future precisely future gives possibilities of time. But it just, really, that is just like a cringeworthy sort of, you know, assumption, in the sense that there is no real obvious correlation between time asymmetry in the level of phonological intuition and time asymmetry as an epicymmical asymmetry, right? That intelligence, by virtue of being in the future, always knows more, right, than the one that has merely abided by the past.

These two are fundamentally the sort of different claims, and they cannot be confounded. Epistemic time asymmetry and, you know, this sort of intuitive time asymmetry. Now, what Wessel wants to talk about is actually something far more interesting than both of them, in the sense that epistemic time asymmetries are somehow modeled are intuitive time asymmetries that we have at this level of time diagram. even though the nature of the asymmetry at the level of this rudimentary time diagram at the

level of inner time consciousness is fundamentally in not only in quantity but also fundamentally in kind differs from sort of other sort of time asymmetries that philosophers of science or other people are talking about he wants to say something extremely interesting in the sense that luke all pretensions could as well be retentions. That there is a fundamental continuity here. And this continuity is not something that

its content is given to us. Its form is given to us. We are not talking about the content of time asymmetry here. We're talking about the very form of intuitive time asymmetry. Yet, as I will tell you, Ossel actually does for a very very big part at least in the Bernal manuscripts mistakes the difference between two when he talks about you know inner time consciousness in the sense that this whole

continuous transition between retentions and pretensions as being dozens of retentions he sometimes uses the word modification, but sometimes he uses the word change. I can't remember. I will recover the German words. One simply means that the relation between retention and pretension is actually change in content. The other one, which is a modification, means that the relation between pretension and retention

is actually modification in form of temporal continuation, right? Now, the reason I'm saying that this is actually quite a very, very topsy-turvy sort of topic is that if he actually claims that this is a change in content, that is actually a very fucked up sort of claim, precisely because then he has to encounter with two sorts of ways that he has been explaining the time diagram. He can say, well, yes, it's a change in the hyaluronic content, in the sensuous content, right? But Hosell also in the same manuscript, he says that the hyaluronic content disproportionately

intentionally plays a very insignificant role as opposed to the intentional act, the constitutive role of intentional act. So he cannot say that because that would precisely put him under the acts of Kant and Hume and so on and so forth. The content of retention and pretension is not what is being changed for something to be a retention or pretension, but rather it is the form that is being modified, but how a form of temporality can be modified and how it can change its content. That is a question for you to think about. I don't want to hear from you for the next two weeks. Thank you very much and bye-bye. Bye-bye, Reza. Take care.

Thank you. Love you. uh so um who's going to present next session diego yes yes me sorry diego juan and noah yes excellent i mean uh i'm just absolutely astonished the quality of the presentations throughout this class. I mean, I just, you know, it's not my job to always, you know, remind you how good you are. That would spoil all class.

But absolutely, it's been nothing short of astonishing. any question before uh we conclude and we reconvene not next week because of thanksgiving and week after i will come back with some diagrams quick questions quick thoughts things that maybe you think that we should actually talk about now that you know we have five sessions and we have only three sessions

left probably i will add another session at the end no no absolutely not heidegger please just do it no no no it would be you know it would be me when i am old when i have you know in my past i have said fuck heidegger but then at my old age according to time travel you know paradox i become the most staunch heideggerian uh you have to you have to give time time for it to be time I will introduce Heidegger one time

and you have to answer it yes can you please say once again what was the name of this Sklar Lawrence Sklar S-K-L-A-R okay and I mean he has two books. I think one is about physics, time and physics, and one is physics and physics and chance is the one that is really famous for and magnificent, magnificent work. Okay, thanks. You see, philosophers of science, and for that matter, scientists actually, philosophers

of science actually think better than scientists, right, in philosophical sense, I would say. but the more you actually look into the philosophy of science particularly with regard to the pre-neal questions of philosophy such as a space and time what we are talking about they seem to be quite blindsided by some of the very, you know, puzzling enigmas of how do you arrive as at such descriptions of physical phenomena, right? There was a very short span of time

from probably Mack to Boltzmann and Schrodinger, where scientists did better job than philosophers in the sense that they understood the implications that, look, it's not that we are merely talking about this scientifically, but this sort of scientific descriptions obviously have some sort of correlation with a certain sort of, you know, descriptions that we are phenomenologically deploying. And they noticed that, my God, the correlations are actually more interesting in their discontinuity rather than their continuity. But that age has completely a foregone age.

Neither philosophers of science in my... view or scientists want to actually deal with pre-neal questions of philosophy. They tend to grab a bag from a very specific history of philosophy and smuggle it to the future, to the advantage of their own theses. that's why I actually even though I always liked philosophers of science precisely because they are the greatest bullshit detectors in philosophy so to speak but they're also

you know when you really think deeply about the philosophical questions you see that most probably they are the bullshitters in their own specific sort of way. The reason that I actually did recommend you to read John Findlay's text, and those of you who have taken my previous seminars, you know that I have talked in praise of Adolf Gurenbaum at length,

and I generally think of him as a fantastic sort of philosopher of science. Findlay shows how naive Adolf Gurenbaum is, trying to actually, thinking the question of time with regard to physical, you know, theories of space and time in physics, or that if there is any sort of a specific certain correlation between these two that you can simply traverse at will. Right. So should we end the session?

Yes. thank you so much everyone love you thank you enjoy your weekend absolutely love you thank you and ciao ciao