The Vicious Transparency of Time (Session 7)

Hello and welcome to the seventh session of the seminar, The Wishes Transparency of Time, instructed by Reza Nuguristani. Reza, please take it away. Thank you so much, Reza. Hello, everyone. I hope you're doing well. So this is the seventh session. I would like to go over, just talk about a little bit more. I know that I tried to kind of wrap it up too quickly last session about the idea of the unconscious, the conscious, salient as the unconscious within a specific sort of framework.

I want to actually work on that, but also something that I rushed early on, and that was talking about pretensions, right? So today I'm going to talk about headless temporalization. That's why is that? Phantasmata are temporally headless. in the sense that they are bereft of all axis of stabilization that exists in experience

and that creates a massive sort of puzzle this puzzle ultimately as we are going to talk about leads to one of the most enduring puzzles of time. That would be the problem of self-recognition, understood cohesively as the recognition of the other. Probably we cannot actually go and cover every aspect of it. today but uh there is another session and as i mentioned we're going to do another one after the

holidays uh quite informal um you know as a discussion and talk about uh some of the you know these these sort of problems but uh yeah with that said uh thank you um everyone. I saw, you know, Lucas and Pian's presentations, extremely informative. So, let's open up to the question for our great presenters. Questions for any of them?

Is Jan here? No. Luca is here. Thoughts about the presentations? If you have watched the presentations, nothing? It's strange that nobody has questions because the presentations were magnificent.

They were really great, yes, yes. And poetic in a way. Yes, they were really good. I have questions, I have questions. Particularly, I mean, like literally question in the sense of clarification, particularly with regard to Jan's table comparing Gosell and Freud, right? I mean, okay, if you don't have questions, let's talk about then, you know, just a theme, which would be, you know, the sort of dynamic exchanges and conflicts between consciousness

and unconscious in the work of Husserl and Freud as influenced by Brentano. I think I've got something. I think that it was interesting to see also in how the presentations um uh filled out that uh like the distinction that there is uh between freud and haserl whereas like for haserl um the unconscious the word that is used for it uh in the text at least is uh like a horizon intentionality like there's a horizon of consciousness which like can be like uh

reincorporated or uh you know kind of you can reflect on it um whereas for freud it's like this mechanistic kind of depth of uh the unconscious it's like you know it's it's it's something below the surface you know kind of in a way inaccessible in its entirety right right well i mean that that comes to that uh the sort of uh you know divide that hossel's uh approach to the unconscious transcendental whereas freud is energeticist i wouldn't call it materialist really in my previous seminar on freud i've mentioned this to everyone that look

the recognition of Freud as a chief materialist, white, the sort of legend that has been growing around Freud as a certain sort of materialist is quite actually questionable and problematic. precisely because Freud is a personalist, number one, but with an energetist sort of impulse that, of course, he has got it from, you know, since, you know, the essay on, you know, scientific principles of psychology and moving forward, but he relinquishes majority

of those sort of biologism, mechanism, and so on and so forth, precisely because it's not respectable during his time to introduce himself as a mechanistic materialist or biology sort of thinker. This sort of recognition of Freud as a materialist thinker is actually a British invention majorly forward during the 1950s and 1960s onward, but it's not really Freud. But I would say, yes, if we want to kind of vulgarize a little bit Freud, it would be vulgarized in a nice sense, you know, in the Roman sense, you know, for the people, vulgate, right?

rather than a perjurative certain sort of sense. Yes, Freud has always had this sort of anti-philosophical knee-jerk reaction in his entire career. But so has Husserl, kind of. Except that Husserl fundamentally works in the vein of philosophy. Whereas Freud wants to invent a science alternative to philosophy, and that would be psychoanalysis.

And now, ultimately, as you said, the difference between the unconscious in these two thinkers come down to this whole idea that, for one, the unconscious cannot be anything but consciousness itself. That would be Husserl. Whereas for Freud, he doesn't want to say that the unconscious can never be consciously grasped, but he wants to introduce the unconscious under the rubric of a new class of psychic phenomena.

which are under the radar of consciousness working behind its back right but of course again as i have mentioned this in the previous seminar i mean wittgenstein's critique should be taken quite seriously wittgenstein's critique of freud but most importantly, I want to point out to three distinct works and three distinct authors, which I actually take as the greatest critics of Freud. That would be David Archer, Frank Schiaffi, and Jacques Boverice. And there is a commonality between

in these criticisms. So you know that Freud had that, as I have mentioned this, Freud has this, you know, during one of his lectures, he introduces the unconscious to his students by way of a certain sort of black boxist, black boxism sort of allegory. sort of allegory. He says that, look, there is a chamber, a cube on one side, and it's totally dark. And then there is another chamber next to this cube, another cube, which has a little bit of a dim light in it. And at the corner of it, there is an observer, an observer, right.

and then he says that between these two chambers one completely a black box and the other one not so much precisely because it has a daemon in it an observer there stands a gatekeeper a daemon that permits as its own whim, the flow of information from the first chamber to the second one and second one to the first one. And then he asks his students, where do you think the unconscious relies in this allegory? And of course,

majority of people, of his students, reply that the unconscious is the first cue, first chamber, completely dark. uh freud says no the unconscious is actually that gatekeeper that demon that that controls the flow of information between these two chambers um so he essentially introduces the unconscious not merely as something of which we are unconscious as an adjective, but the unconscious, a noun, that which prevents

selectively, so to speak, at its own opaque whims, the flow of information between the first chamber and the second one. And hence, in that sort of way, the unconscious supposed to have its own unconscious language, right? But the criticism levied against Freud is that how can, in fact, we are able to speculate and talk about the unconscious as a noun rather than an adjective in such a way, precisely because if the unconscious is such a thing that at its own whim controls the flow of information to the conscious and so on so forth, back and forth,

then there is no way that we can actually talk about the unconscious in any sort of scientific or philosophical way. and this is with kind of science criticism that look you can't have the sort of new class of phenomenon called the unconscious which affects consciousness by way of repression and traumas and all sorts of stuff hysteria and things, and then pretend that as if, by some miraculous reason, the unconscious has a very

sophisticated tongue, right, or language, which is that of the consciousness. That I think is actually quite a very interesting sort of criticism, precisely because it exposes Freud's unconsciousness as a form of homunculus fallacy in philosophy. Homunculus fallacy is the idea that there is a dark agent, right? And you see, the dark agent usually being in the canon of naive materialism is being introduced as the language of mechanistic processes.

You can actually overextend it and say, well, it can be economic processes, right? Like Sondretto, real abstraction. You can see it all over materialism, in fact, that there is this sort of dark agency. But how can it be fucking dark agency? Because what is agentic about it, right? And hence, there's a species of homunculus fallacy that you are creating a certain sort of paradox, whereby you are saying that, well, these are mechanistic, pure mechanistic processes as such, but also attributing a semblance of agency, like a little human being in your brain.

to them. Hence, Avancolos. But I think now I can tell this theory of thinking finally. What's it about? It is a very simple idea that Bjorn has there. He talks that He talks about a child, a child who is experiencing some kind of unwelcomed emotions. For example, fear. So he has this content in him, which is fear.

And the child is in communication with his mother. where she experiences what beyond calls reverie he explains that this means that the mother recognizes the fear in child and she somehow she thinks through this fear and this this is being recognized by the child which consequently leads for him to understand that this fear is not that bad as he thought.

So this is kind of a strange idea. We may think about it in the sense of communication of just two persons, no matter who are they. and in this communication what happens as I see it is that first we have a person who is experiencing fear like he has an idea with a certain content then he stumbles upon just just a plain sentence

Oh, there is nothing bad in it. Come on. So he stumbles upon some black box, the same idea as he was thinking about, but it is emptied. And when he sees it, he says, Oh, come to think of it. Yeah, there is nothing bad in it. So in Beyond's interpreters, there are a lot of mystics among them. They understand this whole idea in a mystical way that somehow another person thinks through your own ideas.

But first, this is actually what really happens in philosophy all the time. You just see that your idea is being continued by some other randomly encountered philosopher. uh but what is interesting is really is that agency and who is and who really does this uh this uh this thinking through especially in the second example when uh when you when when this uh this uh empty box that you encounter it's it's may have some process in it

but it may not have it uh you just somehow but but you just somehow grasp it as a an already happens process and you you accept it uh yes uh yes no i i completely understand look the the problem as i mentioned freud it's not as if ussell would not want to introduce the unconscious whatever that means for ussell in terms of processes he just that's not his his job really It's not his concern. However, for Freud, he wants to attach to the realm of processes

a certain sort of pre-reflective agency, right? But the thing is that there cannot be that sort of pre-reflective processual agency at all. That would be a fallacy. That would be a homunculus fallacy, right? Precisely because in Bjorn's, you know, example, what we have is an allegory of the constitution of agency par excellence. The recognition of a semblance of autonomy. And you see, autonomy is not something that is there by virtue of processes, but is something that is autonomy

in so far as being recognized. And that would be the understanding of the constitution of agency. Yeah, I like this example also because it's, we can see that eliminativist theories, they are not really wrong. so no they're not absolutely not it's just i always think of these yes absolutely like dan i just think that he's absolutely not wrong he's just one of the most philosophers that all of his answers are answers to ill-posed questions yeah that he is not even wrong

at the end of the day right you know in english we say that a guy is not even wrong bit yeah but yeah just to reiterate so uh for for a recognition to happen it doesn't uh require this uh inner processes to actually happen um i mean they they should happen they should happen precisely because you see i don't think that any of these people even who sell i mean working in the transcendental framework would disagree that for such and such, you know, intentional activities, they should have a certain sort of, you know, physical support, right,

a structure in a mechanistic sort of way that afford them, that afford them, right, Just like William Bechtel says, you know, in Mental Mechanism in his book that, you know, we are humans of thus and so dignity and freedom, not in spite of mechanisms, but by virtue of the right sort of mechanisms. But the problem with these sort of greedy materialist or naturalistic philosophers is that they want to actually see a semblance of agency already at work in those mechanistic processes.

That's a fallacy. That's a 101 homunculus fallacy. Okay. We need to get into the lecture. We are far behind. We can still add questions as we go. Let's have five minutes break, not even seven minutes, five minutes max. Come back, lecture time, questions, discussion, and then goodbye. Five minutes.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

Thank you. Thank you.

By the way, I don't know, just in case that you want to read these books, I really highly suggest that. First one is Witgenstein reads Freud by Jacques Bouverie. That's the first one. this little gem, absolutely one of the greatest books on Freud ever written. It's Consciousness and the Unconscious by David Archer. The problem with this book is that it is literally,

it's just pure weaponry, critical weaponry, meaning that you can use the lines of the argument and criticism against any sort of greedy form of materialism in any sort of way. This is David Archer. And then this highly complex book by Frank Schiaffi is called Freud and the Pseudoscience. Shiofi, the great thing about Shiofi is that he's not just, you know, a historian or philosopher of ideas. He knows everything at the outskirts of the most extreme outskirts of analytic philosophy

and the most extreme outskirts of continental philosophy. yes uh michael um would it be more appropriate to kind of attribute uh to husserl uh more like uh fantasy or image consciousness as being um more kind of what we're looking at rather than this like unconscious energetic um uh like dark uh we were talking about before like dark kind of aesthetical like there's this agent that is like out to get me um because i feel like that in freud like we're finding a lot more of like this idea of like you know like

the it's me but with a knife to my back right yes um and with postural it seems more like that it's it's it's more trying to recapitulate what is seen as being like precluded by being a conscious being as being in a sense accessible, like you can reflect on such things? Yes. I mean, you see, this is one of the most fundamental achievements of Husserl. Hence my, you know, line that Husserl completes the circle of German idealism. in the sense that the unconscious for the Husserl is nothing but the consciousness. It's just that consciousness

has a very specific quality about itself and that it sleeps. Not like literally sleeps, but it always has a sleep face co-constituted and co-present with its wakefulness of being fully conscious of its own self, right? And the problem of the consciousness being the unconscious in our cell turns ultimately to a fundamental puzzle that look if humans sapiens right

is of the nature of consciousness and consciousness being thus and so then human can never actually that is that is a really dangerous sort of way that's far more radical that Freud, human cannot actually present itself to itself other than by way of at best similes or metaphors. And hence, in the inadequacy of representation of human to own self, there lies the problem of the other that other is just literally

another name another temporalization horizon for my own self being inadequate to represent my own self in the realm of phenomena And this is, to me, is, of course, it's just like, you know, when I started to read, you know, a few years ago, particularly accelerated before the pandemic, because I had nothing else to do. I noticed that this is actually go hand in hand with what I actually tried to achieve

in, you know, my earlier works like labor of the inhuman. This is, this is what it is. This is the whole idea that, that the human is fundamentally a form of inadequacy of representation of itself to itself. What is inadequate is not being ontologized. Rather, only transcendentally understood. And hence, it is under the dominion and the labor of self-transcendizing, right? Of the ego in a salient sense. Which means that

we do strive to negatively derive the figure of the human, the enigma of the human. That would be eidetic variation, right? You know, creating, I mean, deriving the eidus, the form, the essence of the human by way of its variations. But that would be a negative sort of labor. But Husserl wants to say that, no, there is actually a positive component to humanity that cannot be negatively derived because it's positive. And that is actually that inadequacy,

that unconscious, constitutive of whatever figure or entity can call itself sapience. And that always comes back in a circle of forever deja vu, back to time. Questions before I start? um lane uh what is this you have had some sort of criticism what is it let's spill the beans

well at the presentation i made for this class um at the end i've uh quoted russell jacobi who's this yeah of course jacobi yeah goddamn jacobi yes and i think um i found him quite interesting in regards to um kind of criticizing of playing placing the perception and the rationality at the starting point of how you understand reality and consciousness yes um because he's going all the line like frankfurt's school critical theory that there's nothing that is immediately given but that everything from the very beginning is mediated yes um

and i think that's for the whole class so far it's what i'm i really find joselle's theory quite interesting from the perspective of doing music myself i see yes because for this it's quite productive but from i think from his um theoretical concept i struggled so much of getting to this idea of saying that we are all rational in the beginning because i i just don't get where where a human being should be rational uh yes and for most you see of course you know that is actually quite an interesting point i mean at least with can you get a certain

sort of impression i wouldn't call that it is real but i would say that you get the sort of impression that look we are all rational right and celebrate the rationality uh then that makes as sapiens, right? But I think, as I mentioned when I started to read Hossel, that I think that there is a certain sort of puzzle here, that this rationality is actually given in a bad sort of way, right that any sort of you going back and reflect upon this rationality you are falling into a certain sort of ideological dogma that is not fully transcendental in any

sort of way but rather you know you might as well call yourself materialist rationalist right that that there is something rationalist about nature that made us thus and so. And now I can actually see it. And I think that it's a vicious sort of transparency, right? About the nature of rationality. And hence, I wanted to say that ultimately, this conundrum with rationality once, we begin to criticize it, not in a negative sort, but reconstruct it critically,

it appears to be always vicious. Right? A certain sort of vicious transparency that has an opaque nature about it. That opaque nature cannot be called rational anymore yeah i think so far i've tried to understand it a little bit like if i read husserl i can accept it if i say it's like in laurel's term an axiomatic it's given without givenness this whole rationality i can accept it as the axiomatic

for his whole theory as a starting point and then i can follow his theory and see all of the problems that come out of it but i cannot accept it as actually something that's real Yes, yes, no, no, no, yes, absolutely no. I mean, look, I'm not Laruelian, let's put it that way, even by the farthest stretch. But yes, I think that there are actually quite sharp slivers of criticism in Larwell about this whole sort of scenario.

It's just that I generally do think that, and that's, you know, what's so added, and I think that Kant also had it, no matter how much we try to associate this sort of Prussian rationalism to Kant, right? that there is that reason and rationality are just not things. Yes, I mean in Szilard's canon you might read it as okay if there are not things then there are rules but actually there are not even rules, right? Because that creates a certain sort of infinite regress of rules,

even in the best possible scenario. And I know that this sort of regularism has been criticized by people like Brandon. But I don't want to actually address that aspect of the criticism, but rather I want to say that yes there is a fundamental ambiguity side by sideness in the word ambi with regard to the nature of the unconscious and the constitution of conscious rationality that they can never be separated. And that is actually what allows us,

what motivates us in a salient way, motivation, right? From deep time as a vector of arriving and behaving thus and so, that motivates us to, in fact, criticize the nature of rationality rather than merely adopting it as a datum. I think that motivation is really important. I think that, you know, this is, I mentioned last session, that look at Sellars. It looks like, you know, of course, Sellars is, I wouldn't call him a Hegelian thinker.

Absolutely, he's not. is a very specific sort of Kantian revisionist. And within Kantian revisionism, it appears, perhaps wrongly or rightly, that once the conditions of possibilities for reason or transcendental deduction or transcendental condition are met, then everything is inevitable. Like everything, we could go on and do the same sort of inquiries about ourselves. But that actually, I find it fundamentally naively naturalistic.

Just because you have the means of representation doesn't make you a sapient, an agent of inquiry. right? I think that there is a fundamentally a different dimension to this question, and that is the question of motivation. And when we are talking about motivation, we are absolutely also talking about the unconscious, which is not given to us as a datum, but it's manner of givenness, manner of givenness in a precise German wording, its manner of givenness

is something from which we can never recover. Because it's a constitutive factor for all our inquiries, skeptical or otherwise. Who raised hand? Juan, was it you? Oh, Luca, yes. Yes, I raised my hand when the discussion was still about this diatomy, I would say. And I just wanted to add that the moron's text is also, I think, great because it doesn't,

it makes somehow visible that unconscious both for Freud or for Husserl is not something that is how to say deep and in blackness and somehow away totally from the conscious. Inaccessible, yes. Inaccessible, yeah. When you read understanding of horizon or landscape, it somehow doesn't feel that it is a horizon or a landscape in total darkness without the shreds of light of the consciousness. And I think it's basically because of this cogito is beforehand a rationality type of enlightenment that made possible of understanding of the unconscious to be.

Absolutely so. This is a very, very great point. Even Husserl, he starts from this and maybe he's not understood directly and immediately because he still carries this kind of Kruvitoist attitude a little bit. And then it somehow falls apart. Also in the unconscious, when he starts thinking of how unconscious is connected. I would disagree on that point. because you see, so obviously Husserl, you know, Cartesian meditations, right, one with earlier works, we should understand what is actually the problem of phenomenology.

I mean, what motivates to develop a system or a science of phenomena, right? So Husserl wants to complement Descartes' meditations. And to that extent, he has, he doesn't, he cannot actually posit something, something other than cogito as a speculative guarantor to save the problem of solipsism for any possible cogito, right?

That's actually really quite interesting, right? Precisely because in Freud, we see that, you know, the problem of solipsism for cogito is actually being almost in a very sort of nonchalant way being resolved by positing another entity other than cogito. That would be, you know, the unconscious in the Freudian sense. Bahusel wants to actually create a different sort of, a little bit more sophisticated sort of scenario, where basically cogito, by definition, cannot be solipsistic

by virtue of the fact that cogito itself, namely the consciousness, is the unconscious, if understood from a different perspective. The other, encountering the other, and encountering itself in daylight, not at night. That was a joke on vampirism and so on and so forth. And I think that this is actually, from my perspective at least,

this is actually quite a very sort of magnificent philosophical achievement. Because, you see, I do believe, even though I have criticized Ockham's razor, I do actually believe that when you can explain something with what you have got, then why do you feel so impelled to posit a third entity, right? That would be O'Kam's razor. Why do you need to actually posit the unconscious as something other than the consciousness of cogito? Why not actually reformulate the cogito as its own unconscious?

That is, that is a very, that's, I would say that it's the height of goddamn sophistication. lane yet isn't um he proposing to to use the instincts who sell so he has something that's like the unconscious for um freud which is also a third term somehow he just like um the excess or how it is um affecting our consciousness just works differently i think but in a way the manner of givenness the manner of givenness right the manner of givenness and

that manner of givenness when the moment that we start to say manner of givenness in hosselian parlance you're actually talking about inner time consciousness the time being the constitutive factor of intentionality is at once that which constitutes intentionality and rationality, but also when it sleeps, when it sinks back in, it becomes the bane of consciousness and rationality. right it becomes it becomes that vicious transparency as a special form of darkness

but not as if there were there were ever an unconscious outside of consciousness working behind its back no consciousness works behind its own back within time, within the headless temporality, which is called imagination. So... God, I am having a brain meltdown today.

So, to remember that last session, I said that, you know, the double consciousness of imagination is self-transcendence within immanence. consciousness transcends itself within its own imminence and becomes other than itself in its own transcendence that is in inducing a form or rather a semblance of my own perceptual activity I am for myself in a manner that is other than how I actually experience myself.

Now, whether I fantasy hearing a melody or seeing a pink elephants, my consciousness is primarily somehow directed towards the imaginary objects as such it is a melody that i hear it is a pink elephant that i see as with as with any experience of intentionality or towardness not aboutness towardness directedness really i've highlighted this that you know just

absolutely do not use the word aboutness if you are talking about intentionality intentionality is about directedness and hence the laws of motivation what motivates consciousness in the first place, to be the consciousness of something, to represent something as such, right? So we are in a deep pre-Kantian idea. Whereas Kant gave us a system of representations and conditions of possibility, we are now actually trying to talk about what does motivate us?

thus and so, I will call them creatures, entities, to have representational capacities, or being impelled to represent the world and themselves in thus and so in the first place, right? I am not explicitly directed towards the imagined act of hearing, even though I may, as with any kind of experience, attend directly in reflection to my imagined act of hearing a melody, in which case the imagined act becomes the object of my consciousness.

As a lived experience, self-consciousness intrinsically belongs to the imagination. For example, as I sit here during teaching this class and imagine myself as an English-speaking teacher, this flight of fancy takes the significance of a wishful evasion from my current boredom.

Even though this act of imagination is discontinuous with my perceptual experience, nevertheless, it is nested within the broader horizon of other possible experiences, perceptual or otherwise. and yet in spite of the discontinuity between imaginary consciousness and perceptual consciousness a fundamental continuity remains untouched, unscathed, namely that in both instances

looking at my students, looking at my peers, giving myself to acts of my imagination are lived experiences of which I am aware. And as such are constituted in and through inner time consciousness. I can always be called back to a perceptual awareness of my surroundings and become explicitly aware that I was having a reverie, a daydream. Acts of the imagination in and through. Which imaginary objects are given to consciousness are constituted imminent time objects.

Yet, for some reason, Husserl does not regard the embedded character of the imaginants or so-called quasi-perceptions. perceptions. If we want to go back to earlier phases of Husserl's, which is kind of Brentonian, where acts of imagination are always being introduced as quasi, namely inauthentic, according to Brentano. Remember what I said, that Brentano really thinks that imagination is an inauthentic act, right? So Husserl in his midlife, philosophical life,

calls imaginary acts always with quasi, quasi-percept, quasi-sensation, quasi-experience, so on and so forth. Even though we entertain this, but you should take it that this is, a quasi-percept doesn't mean that it's inauthentic. So quasi-percepts within imminent time consciousness on the model of an inner consciousness. The imagined act of hearing a tune is not an inner object of consciousness. In fact, if an imagined act was based on an inner perception,

it would forfeit and forego its character of presentification or representing in a salient sense by virtue of having a basis on an inner perceptual act and thus being based on something that is present. Even though the imaginary act is a self-affected change or modification of my own consciousness, I am conscious of myself as imagining in a pre-reflexive

and non-objective manner. Both dimensions of consciousness as imagined consciousness and as imagining consciousness within the two-sidedness of consciousness are given in different yet inseparable ways. As experiencing itself, as actually imagining is incompatible with the unreal yet lived character of hearing. a melody namely quasi perception as constituted imminent object in this sort of way double

consciousness is contemporaneous without being simultaneous with self and this is where Hossel says the imagined ego is at the same time and one with the absolute subject and yet different from it consciousness exists on two planes without coinciding and it is this non-coincidence that structures the unity of consciousness as a distance within itself, as its own distance grasped contemporaneously,

but not simultaneously. The freedom of the imagination is the freedom of alienness. strangeness otherness I become finally for myself questions before I move forward nothing

so that case probably uh let me see uh how i should move forward um i know that we had two diagrams of pretension i didn't explain them it's probably a little bit late to actually move in that direction. So let me actually go on and see, you know, what happens.

So you can say that this constitutive incompatibility of consciousness with itself leads to a fundamentally sort of eccentric and remarkable implication for ourselves conception of time consciousness. The full significance of which even alluded ourselves thinking earlier on.

even if you know in the early manuscripts and lectures uh there comes an occasional sign at testifying to the possibility of something really strange can be found in the organon of consciousness really a strange meaning really of the strangeness of the otherness. Husserl in his early manuscripts, for example, there is this passage that he says, what about a fantasy understood as their presentification,

representification of a present? It grants a possible present, but not an actual present. and accordingly not an individual present but that's really a strange do you know the enigma how it's trying is becoming unfold here like in acts of fantasy or remembering we have actually a present which is not really a present

it is never a present it's not either a past or a future either not only is it not a present but it's an empty present bereft of all sort of reference to an object imagine a creature an alien life form had this sort of consciousness time consciousness so to speak where it is capable of

creating a non-present present an empty present also in the sense that it does not refer to an object don't you think that sort of time consciousness would eventually foregoing all our Sotelian teleological stories would allow this creature to actually deploy something like an empty sign, a symbol and thus achieve the unattainable

the organon of logic because what is logic if it is a non-present present and also an empty present that every sign can be redeployed, recontextualized precisely because it doesn't have a goddamn object that is in present this is it so Husserl's time consciousness is ultimately a theory of logic a grand story

in the Platonistic sense albeit bastardized about the possibility of forms of signs and the power of signs. The organon of desemantification and resemantification, you cannot desemantify a sign unless a sign already does not refer to a present object, nor can you re-semanify a sign applied in a different context within the organon of logic

unless in perpetuity the reference is withheld that the very act of deploying of a sign is of empty intentionality. incorporated to the very nature of consciousness itself by way of time give me two minutes i'll be back

Did you just understand what Reza said? Empty signs? And I think that it sounds too easy. It sounds good, but it sounds too easy. I don't know, Lika, I mean, it reminded me, for example, a little bit of how Agamben writes of the coming being, the being that is whatever, right? Somehow this alien that Teresa wrote,

talk about now feels like having aesthetic experience or falling in love, right? Out of the language or not yet signifiable. I don't know how you understood it though. I mean, maybe I'm just trying to push my own propaganda. It is your propaganda. Well, yes, it works. Now I think about it.

You know, my example in all this Husserlian themes was about, yes, about myself, experiencing myself as all i always have some some vague ideas some empty objects uh with myself and i do not really know what how they can be manifested and my example was that for all my life i wanted to do

something first then uh this something appeared to me that oh i actually want to write something then uh some some time passed and i thought oh uh that thing that i want to write and want to do is actually right to write philosophy and then then i wanted to write philosophy very bad idea it's a bad idea but this is how it happens though then i ah philosophy i see yeah no i'm saying that uh decision to actually engage

like you have a great idea and then you say oh i'm going to do it philosophically that's a bad idea in fact engaging with philosophy is bad idea doubly so um so remember now that diagram that i shared earlier on with you you know uh the time trifurcating, right? So it was the time of Kant, right? That would be the time radiating out from inner sense according to the diagram of representation, namely the represented,

its relation to the object, which would be reference, and then the representing act, the representation has a representing act and representing represented content with regard to object which we call reference and then its relation to a subject which we call reflexivity right not to be confused reference and reflexivity are not to be confused and then we said that look when you're actually analyzing this relation of time within the organon of representation then it looks like time is not actually radiating out but it's trifurcating in moving in three directions and each of these are their own times self-transcending times

imagine you thought that oh having one time is bad well how about you get three own times And each of these times, even though our contemporaneous, they are not simultaneous. They are not registered at once in the consciousness, but rather they are the constitutive genetic moments of what we call consciousness. and now within this sort of Fregean revolution where we have sense and reference you know the revolution of logic

Husserl wants to think about it philosophically as I mentioned earlier on Husserl absolutely is a logicist philosopher. But not in a naive sort of way that people use logicism as if they are, you know, calling name of God in vain. he wants the reason that he's logistic precisely is for two reasons

one logicism is the ultimate weapon against psychologism thinking about phenomena within natural attitudes and human psychology or self wants to completely abolish this he has to resort to logicism but there is actually a better way that logicism can serve him so greatly why is that precisely because logicism if you really think about it in terms of sense and reference, in Phrygian sense, is ultimately,

is a story about three incommensurable generals, three forms of time. one which is of the reference with regard to a content of experience presented to us right and is always there as present and the other one is a sense a time that bestows upon us the faculty of having a certain sort of technology, logical,

by way of which we can recontextualize the use of our own science, the vocabulary of agency or time. And the third one would be recalibrating or renegotiating the relation between reference and sense, how we are capable of informal logic, for example, recontextualize, not arbitrarily,

with freedom, you know, freedom is not arbitrariness, but with freedom to apply signs to different sorts of contents, namely reference. You see, that technology is not a technology of perception or experience, but that of imagination, and hence the headless time thoughts you have been all so silent and jesus christ what is this

okay go on maria uh you are at work. A stupid question, sorry about my work, but I'm free now. I wanted to ask a stupid question. What is an empty sign? As I understood, it is not a simulacrum. It is something beyond that. Is it the only thing which is not a simulacrum? So we have different sort of the idea of empty sign from the early history of philosophy to, I don't know, pragmatism or logicism, right? So empty sign, if I want to kind of compress all of these sort of connotations together,

you might say that empty sign is a blank sheet, right? A blank sheet. where you can actually make any sort of marks that would be an empty sign you see here here where is my goddamn paper Look, this is a, it's not really blank, it's grid, Baker.

I couldn't afford blank sheets. You see, it's a blank. There's no content here, right? When I make these sort of markings here, they claim a territory on this blank sheet. virtue of claiming the territory they have a significatory importance right they most probably

don't mean at this point right they don't signify anything what but why they do uh but but but if you actually start to connect connections yes how they are being connected to one another on this blank sheet then they mean something and it's not because of the sheet itself it's because of the marks i have made upon it Can I also intervene? Yes, yes, please.

Yeah, that's why when you said this alien and so on, this is why I thought of it as an aesthetic experience or falling in love experience that is kind of out of language that you cannot still draw connections to, right? or can it be taught as such? Also, it reminded me a little bit of this Agambenian turn of whatever, you know, something that you cannot still language or connect immediately to. I mean, I wouldn't call it Agambenian. You see, the idea of language is not a matter of that the language is totally given to us or something that is not given to us at all.

Language is really the organ of making connections on a blank sheet of assertion. You know? A duplicitous form, a duplicitous, two-faced form of manipulating a blank sheet. That's what language is, right? I think Peirce truly understood the meaning of language. Charles Sanders Peirce. Sorry, I mean, yeah, I mean, love, yes. That's another good example. Yes, I mean, some would agree, but I mean, no,

I don't think that is good to call upon Agamben to teach us anything useful about language. Maybe love, maybe anti-vaccination, but definitely not language. I was thinking more in the sense of having this whatever experience when I said aesthetic experience or something that you cannot really connector as you said empty signs or like right right you know brentano has had an idea that was actually a smuggle to even herself but mod in a modified sense uh proteresthetist

associations or originary associations in the sense that look when we are actually We make merely making marks here at RL. These are absolutely meaningless, right? On the blank sheet of assertion, but start to create a sense of connections. Then they contextualize. Then they become by virtue of those connections, significantly. Hence, if something becomes significatory, it means that has a connection both with the subject and a content as an act and as an object.

And that's exactly what Hosea wants to say, that look, what is really important is that time motivates. inner time consciousness, not time as a metaphysical entity, but inner time consciousness motivates those and so connections between the marks such that you can have a universal language where you not only capable of changing the nature of this manipulation of the science systems,

but also determining how and why they can actually refer to a concrete content. That would be language. And that would be essentially the first full-fledged theory of anti-psychologism. The language is not, is not of the psyche. language ultimately is of the unconscious is of the consciousness

but it is motivated by that those unconscious elements in a Hossalian sense not Freudian sense to embark upon such connection such acts of signification, so to speak. Thoughts, Luca, anyone? I just had to have this small remark about motivations and signs and so on. somehow even I mean Husserl a little bit kind of avoids the the fact that there must be some form

of contingent uh introduction of care in the in the frame and then in the picture in the desire also to to kind of you see when uh for example Husserl talks about care and affection obviously these sort of uh you know vocabularies are fundamentally loaded in our time in our time but i would say that jose would wants to say uh that as i mentioned earlier on that look any definition of consciousness or self-consciousness is by virtue of its constitution is always going to be a semblance, a metaphor, a simile.

And by extension, any sort of idea that we can give about the other is also a simile, a metaphor. But that is not a negative sort of thing. you know why precisely because aren't we the only sort of intelligences so to speak we know of we can cast our spell upon to the unknown world and say that there are aliens

out there right they might actually think like me i can never actually in true faithfulness to my own transcendental ego forgo with the idea that there might not be intelligences like me you see do you understand the meaning of that sort of thesis the time consciousness insert a very brutal form of humility into the system of consciousness that impels you to recognize

even though they don't might not exist the possibility there would be in a modal sense Thus and so intelligences you can communicate with. By virtue of that communication, you see yourself as fulfilled. the question is are these intelligences content do they have the transcendental unity of a perception or their connections and how they do uh draw connections we can never talk about them

you can't you see the thing is quite careful actually wasel does not want to say how they might actually behave or how they might think but he might he he really want to say that by virtue of inner time consciousness by virtue of this sort of consciousness which we are inhabiting they are impelled to at the very least entertain the possibility of thus and so intelligences but anything other than that other than entertaining the possibility of an other would be an armchair

speculation or science fiction not all science fiction are like that I mean what's that picnic at the roadside I mean it's a very good sort of science fiction right it's a very humble sort of science fiction that look ultimately what we actually see of the aliens or intelligences like ours would be their junkware, their alienware, the junk that they have left at the road of our labor to inquire about the meaning of our own consciousness

and thus humanity. This is because they don't believe in humans. I think they have prejudice. Aliens have prejudices about us. We don't have prejudice about aliens. Fuck aliens. And I also, I mean, I don't talk now forever. And I think it's so beautiful, Reza, what you said before. This whole sentence of the aliens and so on. like the whole thought it was really beautiful but i don't want to sound like now

the aliens we are searching for are in ourselves and so on but like yes yes we are searching a semblance of our own ego out there but not just that we are motivated i think there's what has constituted us to begin with exactly yeah but isn't that what Margaret Mead says, you know, this famous story of the broken femur that was healed. Isn't this alien? We are thinking we have a capacity to think about aliens because at a certain moment, a human alien has healed another one, and then we exist upon this contingent form of care, and then we start seeking for new aliens and so on and so on.

Right, right. But I mean, I actually want to give a more radical version of this. which would be the story of humanity or sapience. I mean, I don't want to use the word humanity, but for the lack of a better word in English, let's use that word. Yes, I mean, like literally, humanity is search for the laws of motivations which are alien to the consciousness of humanity. Right? That's the Hosellian scenario here.

And that's when you think about this, that my God, almighty Lord, the fact that we are actually thinking of ourselves as dozens of creatures, being, having this sort of characteristic so given to us, that is anathemic, anathemic to the very idea of humanity. Humanity is always a headless temporalization forwards. precisely because it falls under the rubric of phantasing and phantasmata

of a present that is not actually a present it's an empty present and thus it can be reapplied to any sort of possible presence in the past or the future that's that makes it quite a fundamental thesis that you know human is an enigma is a sign of logic they can be recontextualized can be reapplied

manipulated positively and perhaps even negatively but nevertheless that is what humanity is so uh okay uh let me get some water for myself um continue with the lecture and then I think we are good. Talking about the headless temporalization, that's what I want to talk about. Lika, I need to send you my book.

Because it's called Not Giving Up on Humans. Yeah, interesting standard. Yes, Strogatsky is anti-scientific for some reason. They didn't like the whole system of science, how it was established in the Soviet Union, I think. They rejected science for the sake of mystical entities.

And those entities were interpreted as religious Christian ones in the end by Tarkovsky and Strogatsky and they themselves. why in the end i really tried to read them but i didn't enjoy it russian literature is not to be enjoyed it's only to be read i am a big fan of russian literature to be honest with you i think that I have a ranking system in my mind about various forms of world literature. I would say that

I've always said that actually Russian literature unfortunately comes at the top. I would say that the next tier would be, I don't know, either French or British. I would say French, not the avant-garde movement, but rather the classic writers like Emile Zola, my god almighty then British I actually within the realm of classic literature not genre literature two different sorts of things I think that within the classic literature

or literary fiction America sadly occupies the last position but within genre literature Americans absolutely you know are the best no I mean Russian literature is truly truly you know this I have heard from so many people that oh Russians don't have a goddamn fucking philosopher, right? Who gives a damn about this? Well, everyone ultimately engages in philosophy in a different sort of way. I think that if you think that Tolstoy,

Dostoevsky, Torginev, or even, you know, contemporary Russian writers don't do engage with philosophical issues then just then why are you actually talking about literature right no i think that there are absolutely beasts the beasts of literature i mean these people there is nothing that can i mean that's a escape is just a goddamn I remember that Nabokov said that this little shit, meaning Dostoevsky, can't even write one single sentence without implicitly referring to something as obscure as faith.

Yeah, that is true about Dostoevsky, but he's a magnificent sort of writer. Nabokov is a bourgeois writer. Yes. We don't like him. Petit bourgeois, petit bourgeois, faithist writers. Right. So, Lalita is a good book, but other are the worst books in history. I mean, look, I am not going to say this, but I'm going to say this. War and Peace is still to this day my greatest work of literature ever created on this wretched planet of ours. I mean, Tolstoy, my God. I know that you Russians have been forced to retold Stoy and don't like it anymore.

But to me, it's absolutely a miracle. It's a cosmological novel. It's strange that you said that American philosophers, they don't have any connection to nature, to the natural phenomenons. I don't think so. Because, uh, uh, Henry Torah, for example, or, or, or even in the history of philosophy, Santayana, he's not originally American, but his, uh, metaphors are all filled with wind and. Yes. Yes. Unfortunately, Americans can, all they can accomplish is by the way of metaphors.

Right. But metaphors are quite, actually a reactionary sort of linguistic entities. Do you know why? Because you cannot overextend the bounds of a metaphor. Otherwise, you are in the realm of bullshitting, right? So that is the whole point. I mean, if you really want to know who is actually the greatest English philosopher or philosopher in my opinion is David Hume writes in plain English which I absolutely love

and my God is there any person who has ever managed to conclusively reply to the objections of none other than David Hume. None. Absolutely none in the history of philosophy. Hume is a beast, a chimera. And it's so great that finally the greatest philosopher writes in goddamn plain English rather than German. That I actually take it quite personally.

I hope we'll have the seminar on him. Yes, and by the way, if you want to hear more about this sort of stuff, December 17, I, foreign objects, you can go log in and register. I'm going to give a lecture about Boltzmann, that chapter in intelligence and spirits on time. It's called Boltzmann's Time Drift. And then in January, I'm going to actually give my first series of lectures on Hume called The Scandal of Time. At Farai No Objects as well?

yeah that's unfortunately for a foreign object okay i love him yeah no i mean hume absolutely one jesus like i don't think that philosophers ever understood the problem of empiricism a la Hume. And the misunderstanding of Hume led to this utterly buffoonery in philosophy, which is called the conflict between rationalism and empiricism. But if you read Hume

without any sort of prejudice, then Hume is also the greatest rationalist and the greatest empiricist. Truly a remarkable man. Well, I mean, perhaps not totally a remarkable man. He betrayed Jean-Jacques Rousseau, right? Those of you who know and read about the gossips, that he got entangled in that sort of extremely unfortunate a scandal that Jean-Jacques Rousseau was his close friend,

almost got canceled by the Brits. You know, you don't bring a French man to the British society because Brits, unfortunately, are almost like jackals. And Hume was not a jackal, but unfortunately he brought Rousseau to Britain and they ganged up on him and absolutely created the worst sort of a scandal. I mean, you can read the exchanges of letters about Rousseau and Hume. It was a very unfortunate event, but Hume is absolutely majestic, absolutely majestic.

So, In perceptual consciousness or present, present, presenting, consciousness actually experiences itself and the so-called its intentional object. A perceptual act is temporarily constituted in terms of the threefold declension of an original time consciousness.

consciousness. Time consciousness, in other words, is not actually a specific form of intentionality. Rather, it is the foundation for intentionality as such. As evidenced by Russell in his analysis of different forms of intentional consciousness as different forms of temporalizations of consciousness. That is to say, what Hosell captures under the heading of different characterizations of consciousness. The actual lived experience of perceptual consciousness

is constituted temporally in and through an original or originary time consciousness. Its threefold structure of temporalization springs from the axis of an original impression in terms of which the intuitive, the intuitivity of experience, the force, or in human sense, the vivacity and immediacy of experience is originally constituted.

yet by contrast an imaginary consciousness is not itself actually experienced even though it is lived but from a distance so to speak indeed if we if it were the case that our imagined seeing our pink elephant was actually experienced as a perceptual act of seeing, we would strictly speaking no longer imagine that we see a pink elephant, but instead be under the spell what we might call a hallucination, a delusion, an illusion.

but if an imaginary act of consciousness along with this corresponding so-called irreal not inauthentic irreal in the sense of non-presencing irreal objects is not constituted as an actual experience of consciousness it means by implication that temporality of such imaginary acts cannot be based on the wellspring of an originary or primal impression.

The source point of temporality becomes then suspended or neutralized in a wassailian sense, modified in its temporality and in this manner, deprived of its original meaning of actual givenness. Yet the manner of givenness will be retained. The temporalization of the imaginary is, that is to say, headless, acephalous, acephalic. which means it is bereft of an ever-renewing,

a stabilizing axis of temporalization. Now, Husserl expresses the matter in the following passage. He says, while at the head, the living process receives new, original life at the feet. Everything that is, as it were, the final exquisition of retention synthesis becomes steadily sedimented like a fossil. In the case of an imaginary consciousness,

We are now faced with what Husserl calls the really strange, strange phenomenon. Or really, really a strange situation of temporality bereft of an actual present. It is in terms of a headless temporalization, an acephalic temporalization, the fluctuating givenness of imaginary objects, and therefore in truth, the so-called quasi-object is constituted.

An imaginary object is originally constituted a retensional change and modification and potential indeterminateness without passing through or emerging from the wellspring of an original re-impression. the reactivation of an imaginary object is in its reconstitution as an image a phantasmata or phantasm in which we have an equally remarkable

redoubling of consciousness produces an image fantasy as opposed to pure fantasy. Feature of a reactivation of a past without an assignable present. The imagination differs from remembrance in which case we have the emphatic sense of the intentionality of the imagination gives to consciousness not only an imaginary object as not now but also its own quasi-perception.

Imaginary consciousness. Time. as an empty cipher, as not now. As Osel repeatedly asserts in his later lectures, in the imagination, we do not have anything present. Indeed, not even something present of consciousness itself. The consciousness in that very enigmatic moment of

entwinement becomes finally its own alien doppelganger. Consciousness has always been An unconscious motivation of itself. Thoughts? I hope that you understand the metaphors here.

We are saying acephalus temporalization, and then we are also already introducing time as a hydra, a hydraic entity, you know, a dragon with so many heads. You cannot actually cut one of its heads without making even more heads, right? so there is a fundamental sort of paradox here that time actually is headless ultimately but within the consciousness becomes hydraic a dragon of many faces and many heads

so i think you kind of explained it in the end how you make this twist from headless to multi-headed but could you extend this a little bit because in the first case with ezephalos i was thinking of bataille and i think like there's no way of saying that the Hydra is at Cephalus because it is just multi-headed. Yes. That would be the vicious of transparency of time in the sense that... So remember that we moved from perception to imagination

in a Hossalian sense, in the sense that imagination for Hossal is actually the condition of possibilities, possibilities, all possibilities of perception. Whereas for Kant, it would be a different sort of, essentially imagination serves perception as an image, as a bildung, right? So in this Husserlian sense, Husserl wants to say that, look, the fact that we have How does and so perceptions as a transcendental ego rest upon the fact that imaginations, a specific form of temporalization, self-timing, and self-experience is headless.

It doesn't have a content. It is a cipher. Right? A cipher needing to be applied to a content. That is actually imagination, right? But then he wants to say that by virtue of all this, when we make the full circle from imagination back to experience and back from experience to imagination, we see ourselves as entangled within the problem of time where we cannot ever say where time begins, where time, like Augustinian puzzle, at which point we can say that it is time that is experienced

or that it is experienced which is timed. our self wants to annul this Gordian knot by saying that no all of such questions are given to you by the laws of motivations given to you by the inner time consciousness at work within imagination fantasy and within fantasy time is headless but the headlessness headlessness of time in that sort of Hosellian understanding that you know that time is headless precisely because it doesn't have

a reference in an actual world gives rise once it's translated from imagination to perception and perception to experience full-heartedly, it becomes a hydra. A hydra that we cannot actually fight. It is our name. It is the human. thoughts

i can only think about three heads of time and not about the multiplicity so there is the The first head is the time of discontinuity. This is a time of perception or what is being also called body in those body-mind dualisms. So, discontinuity, where either we have an object or we do not have it. Either we see a tree or we do not see it.

The second mode of time is the mode of continuity, where we have a vague idea. and as time passes it can somehow become a clear one i wouldn't call this continuity i would call it constancy constancy like for example the fact that we actually do recognize a pattern is because of a constancy of time right pattern it is not it is not a uh i think it's uh this case is not a pattern it's just

this case no no i'm i'm merely making an example imagine that the fact that you are you see reza as an agent and not merely a bundle of empirical facts is because of a certain constancy of time right it's a constancy or double constancy as uh or so would call it uh in the sense that you see me in time but also outside of time as this reza not others i think this may be another level because yeah it's just that uh it's it's strange that i i can recognize i can recognize a clear

a clear distinction between discontinuity of an object uh and it's given us and a continuity of it but then uh then uh i see the best way to think about this don't think always about a perceptual object right so think about this i don't know i think about it i i wanted to think about the tree okay think about this tree uh you are seeing it right now here and now and then two minutes later someone is going to cut the shit out of it right that wouldn't be a tree right

you don't put your eggs in the basket of perceptual continuity or constancy that's what one self wants to say that object doesn't actually matter what matters is how a reference sorry a sign a sign in a frigian sense or actually in sense relates to reference right uh that that that is actually quite important

that there is a certain sort of subrosa flow of time that we haven't taken to to account but when you were talking about imagination and this multiplicity of the pink elephant yeah yeah you were talking you were not talking about perception yes you were talking about this uh multiple ways of uh multiple ways of of encounters of encounters with a so-called original impression or object yeah yeah there would be so many other ways

yeah do you know the meaning of that in pragmatism modalities yeah yeah yeah that's what modalities are modalities are cyphers of time that we can the fact that we can say that look a basic brandonian uh modal injunction right I mean Brandon always uses the word lion and leopard I'm not going to use that it's just cheesy I have my own example you know

So the example, my example is intelligence and spirit. You know, you have a box of matches, right? So you take a match out of the box, and you hit it against the this frictional surface on the side of the matchbox and then lights up right now I say that okay think about this if you actually do the same thing

in Mars, on Mars surface, or Venus surface, what would be the consequence of your action, right? Taking a match and light it up, does it actually, you know, light up? No, it does, actually because people are so cheap these days they put oxidizing agents matchbox so wherever you actually light it up you will light up

uh this is a kind of a model analysis so to speak i don't know how just it connects to what we were discussing but i have in the sense that look when we are talking about time we are not nearly also talking about our time but all the book all talks about times are talks about possible worlds and hence modality and modalization right that's the most important fact

we usually call a fact a fact if it has if if it obtains a certain certain sort of premise and consequence relationships within a range of modalities such that for example if I actually get the safety match and light it up precisely because the oxidizing agent in the head of the match, it doesn't matter.

On Earth, on Mars, on Pluto, the match is going to be ignited. It's going to light up. It's just that the match will light up, but the wooden stick is not going to burn up. And hence, it creates a certain sort of different scenarios of causality cause and effect according to the modalizations that is available to us and this modalization is coming by inner time consciousness

talks Juan, Lane, Fria, Felipe, my dear friend, Nima, Luca, all of you, all of you. well I asked it in the chat but uh I just wanted to check if um um what you you're uh saying um if it would be a ground for uh uh legitimating uh goodman's uh grew paradox um as as an account of possibility you know emeralds are grew before time t is this what you're saying

that we can model emeralds as grew in this account? I would say if we are going to go purely human on this scandal of time, you would say that the real problem is not actually as if we have grew problem. Right? But rather, how are you going to define the sort of statements and claims timed, stamped from now on, such that the group becomes green or blue?

You see, there is something fundamentally actually scary here. it's not that what is past the retention aspect that is creating such dilemmas for us but rather if you become a skeptic of the retention side of things, namely of the past occurrences of thus and so qualities within certain sorts of time sets, you can by virtue of that sort of skepticism extend the skeptical vector to the future

in the sense that you can always ask yourself, is it actually an emerald I am looking at? Or is it green grass? Or is the green eyes of the sweetheart that I am looking face to face? You see, the group paradox is a very conservative form of skepticism. once you unbind it by way of time, a lot of human or self, all of that sort of retentional understanding of the paradox

can easily be smuggled to the future claims and the statement that can be put forward about the claims. that is the scandal of time that the future is never now future is never now that is a fundamentally a skeptical claim future is never now thoughts uh i know that we are

above our time but a couple of questions and then we call it a day do we have any presentations for another session i can't even remember what was the reading material for the last session there weren't any good good maybe you shouldn't have presentation master session um i have one go go please so you just said like the future is never

now but um what about um future perfect um and the whole idea of that would be a modelization that would be a modalization uh lane when we are saying a future perfects just like past perfect is it's a mode of modalization and modalization always fall in the under the laws of modalities hence unconscious or conscious comparison or comparative study of various modalities of experience,

imagination, and time. Future perfect doesn't exist. Right? It only exists as a mood of modalization. That I would say that, look, Socrates becomes the martyr of philosophy, right? And I am actually saying this while Socrates is going through the tribulation, the trial.

That really doesn't mean anything. Of course, from our understanding, from our perspective into time and history, it is future perfect, right? or is past perfect symmetrically. But it's precisely because we are making a very modalized sort of judgment about what happened to that sort of individual we call Socrates in that very specific moment. but look if you really want

to be the unconscious defender of rationalism you can say you can create a fan fiction about that look Socrates never died Socrates name is with us even today wouldn't it be so great you see it all comes back to the mode of the modalization that we are actually ascribing to such events and modalization itself is it comes under the rubric of

self-transcendizing or self-transcendentalizing mode of time consciousness that we are by virtue of we can actually entertain various modalities of what could happen and what could not happen and by virtue of that we derive facts we are in the business of time travel i agree with this on the whole part of imagination and thinking about futurities. But at the same time, we have future perfect in finance.

We have it in models. And there is a certain way of how future is closing. Look, yeah, sure. Okay. Now, that is a different sort of stuff. you know we are making a future bitcoin contract right is being fulfilled right his absolute time of bitcoin according to land the dark lord of philosophy right it's all good all good all good But ultimately, at that point, you should ask yourself that, am I not making the fallacy of modernization?

in the sense that I act like an asshole goddamn prophet that always tells you after all the unfolding of events in the world, and that's what prophets do usually, Muhammad does that, you know, Jesus does that. I said so. It's ad eventus. It's an ad hoc judgment about time, but how the goddamn we know that this is going to be fulfilled, this contract, right? I mean, the contract is pure contingency. I mean, I really genuinely believe in Eli Ayash's idea of contingency

in the realm of contract is pure absolute contingency from an information theoretic perspective and also the idea of contract i don't think that a market can be said to be fulfilled in any sort of you know future perfect it would be only as at as an ad eventus event like we look back forward like a good muhammad and say that i told you so i told you so right it's really that but that is not really the contract itself the contract is pure contingency in market

i mean price is pure contingency put a limit order there right see what will happen to your limit order or a stop loss right you you can never say that it's a future perfect right but rather that it was fulfilled and because it was fulfilled, I now see that I have a rational inclination toward how market moves. But this rationality is insufficient, precisely because it's an species of ad or post-eventus

prophecy like all sorts of market analytics that come you know doing candlestick shit right it's always a certain sort of a very interesting and sophisticated form of prophecy it's always looking back to the contingency and modalize it. Look, guys, I told you, I told you, I swear to God, I told you that the market is going to crash tomorrow morning. You didn't listen to me. It's too late now and too early.

yes maria and luca let's go with maria first um i wanted to ask uh that was unfortunately we have a finite set of modalities at least in natural languages And those are shared and conventional. Those are not eccentric, which means that how does Husserl think that we are monads if we share our modalities and agree upon their meaning? Maybe the modality of being or is is highly eccentric.

Yes. I mean, Husserl doesn't want to go to that sort of extent. essentially wants to say that look your experience by virtue of being an experience is constituted by subrosa or undercurrent modes of modalizations that that that's that would be the individuation of subjective individualational subjectivity simply means that you have been modalized but this modalized remains an unconscious fact of your individuality right that's what Husserl wants to say

he doesn't want to overextend the conclusions from the fact of modernization a la individualization to future decisions of a subject, right? That's not his business, because as I said, you know, really wants to underline this fact that we have to, if we want to actually talk about time and the constitution of subjectivity and our particular individualization, we have to carry out an epoche and a bracketing and a suspension such that we have a semblance of better understanding of where we are coming from

what motivates us to be intelligences of this sort and not others he doesn't want to overextend the line of credits about time and they inquire into the nature of modernization that is not its job really Delshot Delshot has been so silent one

geo i mean so many names here i can actually bring up it's really important to for us to understand that look by virtue of the modalization problem when we are talking about ourselves as humans whatever it might mean

we are always under the spell of time bias the vicious transparency of time right and and in that certain sort of way the fact that we cannot totally in an abstract or theoretical way touch upon the other, is the repercussion of us not knowing who we are as humans. That ultimately, if there is a moment of pure enlightenment,

that enlightenment requires us to be aware of the nature of our own time consciousness by virtue of understanding who we are ultimately understanding what the other actually means as a problem of reference and reflexivity already embedded within the constitution of subject. And yet, we are buffooning around

trying to make recipes for other people without even understanding in the slightest bit what is that motivates us to reach for the other is the ultimate philosophical question i think you see that question is the question of transcendental condition after descartes

it's either solipsism solipsism comes with a great cost or transcendence, which comes at a greater cost. Either way, you have to somehow take your side. Is it the other I'm talking about? Or it's I myself that I am talking about? or rather it is I myself talking about overextended to the other or rather that the other is constituting me.

All these inquiries go through their own undercurrents of time consciousness. there would be different sorts of times for each of these inquiries and in each and every sense of how we approach the understanding of time constitution we become closer and closer to who we are and who the other might be. Thank you very much.

Moment of silence. very beautiful thoughts thank you thank you so much so i guess next session would be our official uh you know uh last session but as i said uh i would like i mean those of you who are willing to and are interested Well, definitely I'm going to, you know, talk to Lika about her availability and also the new sensor. We can actually make an informal session probably at, I would say, at mid-January so we can

think and digest all these sort of materials and then come together and just talk, no lecture, nothing, but just talk, discuss the questions, the clarifications, so on and so forth. any questions before i should go just just a formal question what was the deal with the essay again uh at the end of the seminar okay so essays uh absolutely the essays cannot be more than I'm not going to read goddamn 3,000 words, 5,000 words of an essay.

So essays, yes, 10,000 words, quite brief, clear, talking about a very specific sort a problem that we have touched. And yes, I will, I mean, this is how my class is usually, I can send you, you know, the comments, right? But if you are actually thinking that it's more productive to your time uh i will talk to you about uh you know a certain sort of date that we can actually schedule and then i will talk to you for 45 minutes about your essay whatever is

good for you and um do you want us to send your proposal about what we're gonna write before no no no no i'm not i'm not i mean who am i to actually decide what you should write right no you have to write so you can be humiliated at the end of the day uh no absolutely yes please do write you do not need to ask anything from me i will read everything and we will reconvene in our own time. Yes, writing an essay is mandatory, Delshad, yes.

Delshad was worrying about it for a long time. No, I mean, Delshad doesn't need to ask me this. I mean, I'm pretty sure that Delsa among us is like real, this is actually real stuff. I always use this as a metaphor of time. So the American planes come over Iraq and deliver these pamphlets, propaganda of war, so to speak, right? right? And then comes a time of insurgency in Iraq, where basically the insurgents,

this pamphlet, to the forces of the United States of America, it says, you might have all the watches, but we have all the time. Dalshat is actually living in all the time, not in the time of watches. so uh yes let's put an end to this torture and reconvene next week

okay thank you thank you love you and take care of yourself ciao