Brassier - Alien Theory - The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter (Actual Layout)

ALIEN THEORY The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter Ray Brassier Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement Philosophy Doctor of of University Warwick, of for the degree in Philosophy Department April ?001 Philosophy of

2 CONTENTS SYNOPSIS S ............................................................................................................ INTRODUCTION- MATERIALISM, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND NON-PHILOSOPHY WHY MATERIALISM? 6 PHENOMENOLOGY ............................. 6 ......................................................................................... 15 .............................................................................................................. 1. The empirical contingency of materialism's philosophical necessity .................................... 16 2. The transcendental necessity of materialism's MAN AS NON-MATERIALIST CHAPTER MATERIALISM CHAPTER :T OF MATE 1- MATTER: EN-STASIS/EK-STASIS IALISM HENRY: ................................... AS COINCIDENCE OF PHENOMENON AND PHENOMENALITY `THE HISTORIALITY OF THE ABSOLUTE': THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ABSOLUTE CHAPTER `ITSELF' OR IMMANENCE 3- DELEUZE & GUATTARI: `AS SUCH'? THE DELEUZEAN CRITIQUE OF REPRESENTATION CONSTRUCTIVISM CONTINUUM THE PLANE OF IMMANENCE PARALLELISM ........................... ...................................................... .................................................................. ABSOLUTE THE TRANSCENDENTAL THE HYLETIC ................... ..................................................................................................... MATERIALIZING MACHINIC 66 ..................................... VERSIONS OF THE UNOBJECTIFIABLE OF IMMANENCE HYLETICS ............................... ............................................................................... ................................................................. ................................................................................................ .................................................................................................... .................................................................................................. AND ASYMMETRY 59 63 ....................................................................................................... THINKABLE/UNTHINKABLE IMMANENCE ETERNAL SUBJECTIVE LIFE IDEALISATION 50 .............................. THE UR-IMPRESSION Two 49 63 PHENOMENOLOGY .............................................................................................................. IMMANENCE/TRANSCENDENCE: 46 ..................... .............................................................................................................. HENRY AND HUSSERL THE RELATIVE ................ ......................................................................................... MATERIAL 37 .................................... AS SUCH COMME TELLE OR TELLE QUELLE? AND MATERIOLOGY 2- MICHEL transformation IDENTITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE DECLI PART I: THE non philosophical .......................................................................................... 71 73 78 80 85 87 90 100 100 102 108 113 116 124

3 NOMADIC DISTRIBUTION HYLETIC IDEALISM TRANSCENDENTAL CHAPTER VERSUS EMPIRICAL MATERIALISM `IDEALISM' THE MATERIOLOGICAL `AS SUCH' AMPHIBOLY SUMMARY `NON-' `ITSELF' 183 ................... 184 AND TRANSITION 5- LARUELLE'S AND STATEMENT 194 ................................ 199 ............................................................................................ RAZOR TO NON-PHILOSOPHY ITSELF 206 .................................... ....................................... 211 212 ..................................................................... 213 ................................................................................................................................... THE STRUCTURE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL DECISION AS TRANSCENDENTAL THE NON-DECISIONAL CHAPTER .............................................................. HYLE AS FIRST NAME OF MATTER AXIOMATIC PHENOMENALITY 1. Theory and experience .......................... SYMBOL FOR THE IDENTITY OF UTTERANCE.... .................................................................................... ........................................................................................ ...................................................................................................... 2. The six-dimensions of Decision ......................................................................................... 3. The transcendental prosthetic ........................................................................................... 4. The non-thetic universe ..................................................................................................... 5. Non-materialism CHAPTER and gnosis ............................................................................................... 7- BEHOLD 245 ...................................................................... ............................................................................................................ THE NON-MATERIALIST 230 259 ............................................................................... HYLE AS NON-CONCEPTUAL THE ALIEN-SUBJECT NON-INTUITIVE AXIOM 218 ............................................................................ CLONING OF DECISION 6- THE RADICAL THE RADICAL DECISION METHOD SUSPENDING THE PARMENIDEAN KANT 161 ......................................... TO MATTER OF UTTERANCE PART II: THE NAME OF MATTER CHAPTER REALISM ................................................................................................. OF MATERIALISM PHILOSOPHICAL 154 ................................................................................................................ 4- FROM THE DECLINE ....................................................................................................... MATERIALISM `MATERIALISM'/ 142 THE NON-RABBIT ............................................................ ..................................................................................................................................... 264 . . . . . . . . 267 277 289 296 296 301 305 308 312 320 324 334 QUfNE .................................................................................................................................... LARUELLE ............................................................................................................................. 349

4 CHAPTER 8- PHENOMENOLOGICAL ELIMINATIVISM PLASTICITY AND FOLK PSYCHOLOGY NEUROCOMPUTATIONAL PLASTICITY AND EPISTEMIC CHAOS .......... .............................................................................. EPISTEMIC ENGINES AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL FUNCTION 1. The natural .......... ................................................ science of epistemic engines ........................................................................... 2. From epistemic algorithms to the transcendental function CONCLUSION- PHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHY IS THE WORLD THE WORLD IS CAPI'I'ALISM CAPITALISM, INFORMATION NOISE 405 40; 415 ........................ .................................................................................................. AND UNIVERSAL 390 422 .................................................................................................. GNOSTIC SCEPTICISM VERSUS EPISTEMIC REALISM CAPITALISM, ................................................ NON-MATERIALISM 376 383 .................................................................................... VECTOR CODING: FROM SUPEREMPIRICAL VIRTUE TO TRANSCENDENTAL A PRIORI 374 .............................................................. ............................................................ 422 427 430 435 441 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... WORKS BY LARUELLE Philosophie 1: Philosophie II: Philosophie III: ........................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................... ........................................................................................................................ ...................................................................................................................... ARTICLES AND ESSAYS BY LARUELLE SECONDARY a) articles: LITTERATURE ................................................................................... ON LARUELLE ............................................................................ .............................................................................................................................. SECONDARY LITTERATURE ON LARUELLE ............................................................................ 441 441 441 442 443 451 451 461 b) works :................................................................................................................................. 461 WORKS BY OTHER AUTHORS 462 ................................................................................................

5 SYNOPSIS The thesis tries to define and explain the rudiments of a `nonphilosophical' `non-decisional' theory of materialism on the basis of a or framework theoretical by provided the `non-philosophy' of Francois Laruelle. Neither anti-philosophical nor anti-materialist in character, nonmaterialism tries to construct a rigorously transcendental theory of matter by using certain instances of philosophical materialism as its source material. The materialist decision to identify the real with matter is seen to retain a isomorphy structural with the phenomenological decision to identify the real with the phenomenon. Both decisions are shown to operate on the basis of a methodological idealism; materialism on account of its confusion of matter and concept; phenomenology by virtue of its confusion of phenomenon and logos. the dissolving By `phenomenological' rigorously respectively and amlphihol_ies which are the result of the failure to effect a transcendental separation between matter and concept on the one hand; and between phenomenon logos and on the other, non-materialist theory proposes to mobilise the non-hybrid `matter-without-concept' or non-decisional concepts of a `phenomenon-without-logos' and of a in order to but non-unitary effect a unified The result is a materialisation theory of phenomenology to decision. phenomenon that unconstrained by the apparatus of eidetic disclosure; and materialism. of thinking that operates according to matter's foreclosure apophantic `materiological' That is to say, a transcendental licenses limitless yet one which theory phenomenological intuition of the plasticity, horizon or any is simultaneously of a transcendental theory of matter, uncontaminated by the bounds of empirical perception and free of all phenomenological circumscription.

6 INTRODUCTION MATERIALISM, SCIENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY Philosophy and Non-Philosophy This thesis will attempt to articulate something that we shall characterise as a `non-Decisional' `non-philosophical' or in materialism accordance with the theoretical framework provided by Francois Laruelle's 'non-philosophy'. philosophical' However, to explain by what we mean `nona it in materialism, and why no way constitutes an anti- is `non-philosophy' to the philosophical materialism, explain why expression by is in Laruelle indicative as used no way of an anti-philosophical stance. Thus, from the very outset, our attempt to communicate the powerfully original import Laruelle's of work through the elucidation of a non- immediately first by the proceed setting aside philosophical materialism must by 'non-philosophy'. the triggered expression possible misinterpretations Laruelle's non-philosophy is not yet another voice joining in the death the of philosophy. supposed clamorous post-modern chorus celebrating Yet neither is it a variant of deconstruction, petitioning the undecidable in

7 order to effect a destabilization or dislocation of metaphysical decision. Nonphilosophy is not an anti-philosophical doctrine but a theory for philosophy, a theory that, once applied to a philosophical material, radically reconfigures the structures of philosophical thought on the basis of that material. Far from seeking to terminate or to interrupt philosophical Decision', the Laruellean practise of philosophical non-philosophy constitutes a non-Decisional theory for Decision; a theoretical praxis which seeks to broaden the horizons of Decision and widen the conceptual possibilities available to by thought philosophical suspending the sufficiency of Decision as practised in its autonomously philosophical mode. Neither an autonomous philosophical position, nor an anti-philosophical alternative to philosophising for is the transformation and rather an organon per se, non-philosophy form, immediately Laruelle philosophical explanation of problems whose both their theoretical rigour and their suggests, simultaneously compromises ontological, ethical, aesthetic, or political pertinence. Accordingly, one of our central objectives in this thesis will to be to demonstrate how, although producing no substantive philosophical Decisions in and of itself -whether these be ontological, ethical, aesthetic, or political in 1The expression `philosophical Decision' designates an important technical concept in Laruelle's in delineation the this be course of We of notion philosophical a preliminary out setting thought. will in in its function theory detailed before 4, non-philosophical account of Chapters 2,3, and providing a Chapter 5.

8 character-, non-philosophical practise provides the `working philosopher' with a rigorous but non-Decisional theory for Decision. In operating upon Laruelle what will characterise as the `empirico-transcendental philosophical composites' of ontology, philosophical ethics, philosophical aesthetics, or philosophical politics, non-philosophy seeks to emancipate the rigorously transcendental, but non-ontological Identity2 of ontology, the non-ethical Identity of ethics.. etc. We shall see how, for every such composite structure . constituted by `the-philosophical-theory-of-X', of `theory' and of correspondence of `X' their wherein the elemental essence remains compromised through the bi-lateral philosophical envelopment, non-philosophical thinking will endeavour to separate both the relationless Identity and the unilateral duality of `theory' and of `X', an Identity and duality irreducible to their bilateral philosophical correspondence. More specifically, our aim in this thesis is to try to show how, operating on the basis of a `philosophy-ofmatter', non-philosophy help discover can materialism's non-materialist by developing duality Identity the essence unilateral and of `theory' and of `matter'. Conscious of the fact that such formulations must appear chronically introductory introduce Laruelle's this try to stage, we will novel obscure at 2 Again, the Laruellean characterisation of `Identity' as a non-philosophical concept will be explained

9 and undeniably difficult conceptual apparatus through a series of incremental steps, each one building on the one before in a succession of chapters presenting the reader with a gradually increasing degree of technicality. We hope thereby to allow the reader to become slowly acclimatized to an idiosyncratic but rigorously exacting theoretical vocabulary. In order to facilitate the difficult conceptual transition from the philosophical to the non-philosophical register, the thesis is divided into two `The Part I, Decline of Materialism As Such', comprises Chapters 1 parts. through 4 and will try to identify the conditions of the philosophical problem intend to treat non-philosophically which we Itself, in Part II, `The Name of Matter which consists of Chapters 5 through 9. That problem is the materiological3 amphiboly of matter and logos, or of phenomenon and hyle, both in `material in Michel Henry the as exemplified phenomenology' of and the `absolute hyletics' of Deleuze & Guattari. This amphiboly, we shall argue, leads to an fundamental indiscernibility between the theoretical postures of indiscernibility in idealism, an virtue of which philosophical materialism and materialism distinguishing incapable of remains itself from idealism. Consequently, `the decline of materialism in the name of matter' describes that movement whereby any philosophical materialism which accepts the in Chapter 5.

10 premise of a transcendental distinction between `thought' and `matter' must forsake the attempt to encompass matter in the concept and abandon the materiological register in order to initiate a theoretical posture whereby not only does materialism no longer presume to circumscribe matter by way of a concept, it is now matter which determines materialism through its very foreclosure to every concept. In other words, Part I argues that transcendental materialism achieves its most rigorous theoretical consummation at the point it its where necessitates own elimination as a system of discursive statements `about' matter. Part II, `The name of matter itself constitutes the non-philosophical half of the thesis. It implements the radical shift in theoretical posture in final Chapter describes Part I the the consequences recommended of and devolving from that change of posture. The materiological amphiboly of is by `first-name' `non-conceptual a or symbol'4 matter and concept replaced that enacts matter's transcendental foreclosure to thought within thought. It is `as `itself as `non-conceptual than matter such' or symbol', rather now matter its foreclosure determines defined, through materialism which as conceptually to conceptual thought. Where materialism implicitly presupposes that matter lifts the thought, premise of non-materialism with commensurate remains 3 For a preliminary definition of `materiology' cf. infra Chapter 1, pp. 59-62. ,

11 commensurability in order to universalise the parameters of materialist theory basis foreclosure the to thought. on of matter's Accordingly, the two-part structure of the thesis attempts not only to describe but also to provide a philosophically intelligible legitimation for the from shift a philosophical to a non-philosophical materialism, for it is on the basis of a philosophical problematic that the transition to the non- intelligible is treatment that philosophical of problematic rendered not only but also necessary. Thus, our hope is that the philosophical half of the thesis for legitimation toward providing a stringently philosophical goes some way its non-philosophical complement. Conversely, from a non-philosophical perspective, the philosophical insofar is the thesis materialism the as validated non-philosophically part of half first in the thesis the the empirical occasion or provides of articulated implement theory in of to a non-philosophical order material required materialism. In other words, foregrounding the latent dimension of both intrinsic the to antiand phenomenological amphiboly materiological phenomenological philosophical furnishes the with us varieties of philosophical materialism for mobilizing occasion required the resources of non- the equivocal circumvent will theory; which a mobilization philosophical 4 Cf. 267-277. 6, Chapter pp. supra,

12 idealism common both to the phenomenologisation of materialism and to the materialisation of phenomenology by constructing a non-phenomenological theory of the phenomenon which is equally and simultaneously a nontheory of matter. Accordingly, materialist attempt to show how the second half of the thesis will a non-philosophical approach can render the problematics of transcendental phenomenality and transcendental materiality, which are incommensurable, philosophically non-philosophically by commensurable effectively outlining a unified theory5 of phenomenality and materiality. Thus, having introduced the transcendental framework subtending the materiological problematic in phenomenological exemplification Chapter 1, Chapter 2 examines its in the work of Michel Henry, while Chapter 3 investigates its materialist instantiation in the thought of Deleuze & Guattari. Chapter 4 draws out the philosophically intractable consequencesof the materiological aporias delineated in the two preceding chapters, arguing that the theoretical conditions required for the resolution of those aporias it doing In Decision. the the prepares so resources of philosophical exceed half in the of the second transition to the non-philosophical stance pursued thesis. Chapter 5 describes the shift from the philosophical to the non- 5 `Unified' but not unitary. In other words, a non-dialectical theory, capable of simultaneously

13 philosophical register by outlining the structure of philosophical Decision as that which must be suspended in order to effectuate a non-Decisional materialism. Chapter 6 argues both for the a priori validity and the irrecusable necessity of that stance, introducing the organon of non-materialist theory whilst explaining why it possessesthe resources required for the simultaneous neutralisation and explanation -i. e. the dualysation6 - of those materiological amphibolies. It does so by extracting from them the non-philosophical notions hyle of a without concept and a phenomenon without logos. In Chapters 7 and 8 we use the work of Quine and Churchland as a philosophical material on the basis of which to expand on the latter two notions, exploring the realm of radical phenomenological plasticity concomitant with the non-materiological identity of phenomenon and hyle. Finally, our Conclusion will attempt to explain how, by accepting that philosophy and capital are bound together in a identification the relation of reciprocal presupposition, non-philosophical of philosophy `World-Capitalism' and capital as be may yet able to provide thought with the theoretical means whereby it can constitute itself as an instance of a priori resistance to intellectual commodification. Cf. duality `phenomenon' `matter' identity them. the of synthesizing and and without articulating Chapters 5 and 6. 6The being `dualysis' is introduced before in Chapter 5, and explained notion of non-philosophical Chapters 6 7. in `in the of and course effect' exhibited

14 Moreover, the fact that we are taking the fundamentally methodological character of non-philosophical theory as our starting point explains this thesis' twofold heuristic strategy: in treating the problem of philosophical materialism non-philosophically is to provide the our aim reader with a philosophical perspective on non-philosophy at the same time as furnish him/her we with a non-philosophical vantage upon philosophy. Accordingly, on the one hand, we'll be attempting to map the `quadrangular' delineated through the shifting patterns of allegiance philosophical space binding materialism to idealism, and phenomenology to realism, but also in idealism, to to to order shed and phenomenology realism, materialism 'matter'. `thought' between light the and on relationship some philosophical On the other, by applying a non-philosophical methodology to a specific its hope to explain and critically evaluate not only philosophical material, we functioning, but also the extent to which, through its suspension of `the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy'7, it succeeds in its stated aim of opening Decision to dimensional' `six a philosophical the of realms restricted, up 7 Cf. Chapter 5. 81n Chapter VI of Principes de la Non-Philosophie, Laruelle sets out a particularly complex in terms of a its He Decision. structure architectonic analyses `transcendental analytic' of philosophical and position hinge of the realms `vertical' presupposing reciprocally articulating axis or single dimensions layers the interleaved of `horizontally' distinct comprising donation; and three intuition and transcendence, ground and unity on the side of position, and those of affection, reception, is Decision then of The structure donation. and auto-donational complex auto-positional on the side of donation; the to reciprocal wit, in and the of position pre-supposition terms reciprocal of characterised Hence intuition. and of unity and of ground and reception; affection; transcendence and of articulation

15 hitherto unanticipated, perhaps even potentially infinite domain of conceptual possibility. Accordingly, conditions following Part I, which sets out the philosophical of materialism as a theoretical problem in a manner that presupposes no prior familiarity with non-philosophy, all of the fundamental Laruellean concepts we intend to mobilize for the purposes of this thesis will be introduced, defined, and explained in Chapters 5 and 6, the first two chapters of Part II, in order to be subsequently refined and expanded upon in Chapters 7 and 8. Why Materialism? Our goal is to articulate a non-Decisional materialism by effecting the non-philosophical transformation of that variant of philosophical Decision known as `materialist'. This choice of philosophical material is not arbitrary. The materialist Decision is one that we feel compelled to make on the intellectual grounds of probity. Yet this fact must be coupled with the recognition that non-philosophy refuses to indulge in ontological Decision. Non-philosophical thinking can no more be described as `materialist' than it be 'phenomenological'. The characterised as non-philosopher refuses to can the fundamentally six-dimensional structure of the space of philosophical conceptuality. Cf. Laruelle, 1996., pp. 281-370. Laruelle's non-philosophical analytic of Decision will be examined in detail in

16 add to what he regards as an excessive glut of equally contingent, unrigorous Decisions. Accordingly, equally we need to explain: 1. the empirical conjunction of philosophical circumstances in terms of which the materialist Decision appears to us as uncircumventable; 2. and why non-philosophy promises to provide the transcendental conditions in accordance with which the materialist Decision can be rigorously effectuated. 1.The empirical contingency of materialism's philosophical necessity First, an admission of personal conviction: materialism seems to us to be the only serious, intellectually reputable ontological option available to the in the wake of those theoretical revolutions that have defined our philosopher intellectual modernity. We have in mind here primarily the unquestionably epochal scientific inaugurated by Copernicus, Darwin, and revolutions Einstein, insofar as they definitively undermined the hitherto unassailable legitimacy of the kind of philosophical anthropocentrism harboured by JudeoChristian culture. But also the comparatively minor, localised more philosophical revolutions initiated by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, in whose human the to subjectivity epistemological privileges previously ascribed work were effectively terminated. Chapter 6, pp. 301-305. The consequences of suspending and reconfiguring in Chapters 7 8. be and explored structure will that six-dimensional

17 Closer to us in time, but just as significant as the remarkable breakthroughs in physics during the first half been the succession of equally last the of century, there have extraordinary advances in evolutionary biology in the latter half of the twentieth century; breakthroughs which, mobilizing new techniques of algorithmic modelling pioneered by dynamical systems theory and subsequently refined through developments in the fields of Artificial Intelligence and Artificial `complexity' theoretical Life, have via the emergence of the paradigm, given rise to the possibility perspective on nature encompassing what a single, unitary were previously considered to be incommensurable domains of phenomena9.Paul Churchland has persuasively suggested that a generalised thermodynamics may well provide the most amenable theoretical framework for this fundamentally monistic 9 Cf. physical "it perspectivel0: is [thermodynamics] that renders Parts I and II of Dennett, 1995, pp. 17-331. Stuart Kauffman (1993) provides the most fully realised theoretical articulation thus far achieved of the `complexity' paradigm in biology. However, the philosophical consequences Kauffman chooses to draw from his own scientific work (e.g. in Kauffman, 1995) are, in certain regards, almost diametrically opposed to those we are drawing from it here. Assenting to the irrecusable philosophical consequences of scientific research does not mean assenting to the individual scientist's philosophical interpretation of his or her own work. 10 Although made in the context of the eliminativist debate in the philosophy of mind, Churchland's suggestion provides a salutary corrective to claims made as to the putatively `antireductionist' implications of complexity by certain of its champions -Stuart Kauffman being the most distinguished does instantiable That them. not or multiply systems are substrate-independent self-organising among impossible it be in `irreducible' to provide a general the that they that would sense are physically mean Churchland Thus, the of physics. complex systems within parameters of physical characterisation from follow, does ) "(... it multiple instantiability per se, that no such general not writes: be follows in It is that the expressed cannot only required characterisation possible. characterisation the theoretical vocabulary peculiar to any one of the available substrates. It remains entirely possible that there is a level of physical description sufficiently abstract to encompass all of them, and yet happens, fund As is indeed it the there to a physical characterisations required. powerful sufficiently

18 physically intelligible such things as the process of synthetic evolution in general, and the Sun-urged growth of a rose in particular. And what is human knowledge but a cortically embodiedflower, fanned likewise into existence by the ambient flux of energy and information? "(Churchland, 1979, p. 151) Thus, subatomic particle collisions, spiral nebulae, and carbon-based sapience could all ultimately be explainable as systems of negentropic energy capture. Moreover, in binding together the physico-chemical and bio-organic realms at this abstract level of thermodynamic energetics, the substrate independent algorithmic modelling approach favoured by complexity analysts, abstracting from the scalar distinction between micro- and macro-logical levels of analysis, effectively promises to provide something like a `unified field theory' for the Neo-Darwinian synthesis in the natural sciences. A synthesis liquefying not only previously entrenched categorial divisions between the physical, the chemical, and the bio-organic, but also effectively neutralizing the distinction between `nature' and `culture' as such, thereby allowing for the hitherto irreducibly 1. naturalization of complex socio-cultural phenomenal Meanwhile, in the realm of physics, the `superstrings' paradigm offers the possibility of reconciling the quantum microcosm and the cosmological theory of sufficient generality to encompass the activity of all of these substrates, and any others one " (Churchland, The is theory thermodynamics theory think and entropy. general of energy of. might -the 1989, p. 46). Cf. also Churchland's `Is Thinker A Natural Kind? ' in Dialogue2l, no. 2: pp. 223-238. 11 Cf. for example Part III of Dennett 1995, pp. 335-521

19 macrocosm by supplementing the physics of four-dimensional space-time with seven higher dimensions. The hypothesis of 11-dimensional hyperspace promises at once to simplify the laws of nature and to unify all physical forces by reconfiguring them in accordance with a strictly geometrical paradigm12 That paradigm suggests that the apparently insuperable gulf between the sub- atomic realm governed by quantum field theory and the cosmological domain by ruled gravitational field theory is a consequenceof distortions engendered by partial perspective. The unified field theory required in order to bridge the gulf and reconcile these conflicting perspectives suspendsthe assumption of the inherently four dimensional character of space-time, and postulates that both the quantum microcosm and the gravitational have been macrocosm from the seamless, encompassing consistency of a fundamentally abstracted 11-dimensional physical field13. As a result, the methodological conception underlying the program of in longer be understood terms of a straightforward physical unification can no `reduction' through the uncovering of more and more process of physical `fundamental' 12 Interestingly, is instead It a question of supplementing the particles. (but thoroughgoing theory obviously non-Euclidean) proposes a superstring Perhaps `hyperspatialisation' in time. the thoroughgoing of words, other geometricisation of nature; or, the philosophical lesson to be retained from all this is that the `phenomenon' of hyperdimensional far be time. than that to turn of mysterious phenomenological more out space may well 13Brian Greene (2000) sets out an exemplary overview of superstring theory for the uninitiated. Michio Kaku (1994) also provides an extremely clear layman's introduction .

20 impoverished perspective concomitant with a four-dimensional physics by it to the requisite higher dimensional complement. Thus, physical adding unification of microcosm and macrocosm is a matter of dissolving incommensurabilities or inconsistencies at the restrictive four-dimensional level through a process of re-integration into the 11-dimensional whole. If superstring theory is of profound philosophical significance it is because it achieves a univocally consistent physical monism by revealing all incommensurability scalar across the material universe, such as that which from the that of galaxies apparently separates realm of quarks and neutrinos be four-dimensional to the and nebulae, result of a abstraction; a perspectival `illusion' engendered by assumptions about physical space that are ultimately As limited in the a result, parameters of phenomenological perception. rooted the consequences of superstring physics as far as the phenomenological parameters of mammalian perception are concerned are perhaps even more damning than those associated with traditional physical 'reductionism'. For the implication is that in order to attain an adequate conceptual grasp of the it is to a complete achieve necessary reality, physical of nature unitary from derived image the the perceptual theoretical suspension of world of intuition. In other words, physical theory has to effect a rigorously in inherent limitations imaginative the those mathematical circumvention of

21 physiologically rooted cognitive apparatus with which an aleatory evolutionary history has saddled us. Thus, the chief obstacle standing in the way of a proper scientific understanding of the physical world would seem to be that of our species' inbuilt tendency to information process via epistemic mechanisms which invariably involve an operation of subtraction from the imperceptible physical Phenomenology whole. remains a function of physiology14. Perhaps not least among the many startling philosophical consequences of superstring theory is the way in which it seems to provide a rigorously physicalist vindication of Plato: phenomenological perception be to would seem akin to that of the prisoner in the cave who mistakes flickering shadows for `the things themselves'. We are not making the foolhardy claim that all these scientific developments in and by themselves somehow `logically' necessitate or imply philosophical materialism. Nor are we suggesting that they are a priori incompatible with one or other variety of phenomenological approach.15What 14An explicit philosophical rationale for this proposition is provided below in Chapter 8 via an examination of Paul Churchland's work. Cf. infra, Chapter 8, pp. 383-389. 15 See for instance the `autopoietic' paradigm put forward in the work of H. Maturana & F.Varela, in irreducible intentional find to the reality of an attempt ground putatively phenomenological which we consciousness in an apparently thoroughgoing evolutionary naturalism. On our view, however, the trouble with such attempts becomes apparent when one realizes that the naturalization of intentionality division between inorganic; the cleavage organic and a moreover, of a new categorial at price comes form kinds `living things' -i. e. of organismic only certain of resurrects a vitalism: which surreptitiously for `stuff the possibility of to the appropriate qualify of material required composed organisms -, are is important But that the synthesis an philosophical consequence of neo-Darwinian sentient awareness. the difference in kind between organic and inorganic, between the biological and the chemical, is how insofar it it impossible to sentient, animate explain as makes ultimately untenable precisely

22 we are claiming, however, is that the combined upshot of these various developments can be boiled down to a single prohibitive injunction, which, it seems to us, phenomenology, insofar as it simply begins by presupposing an irreducibly human dimension of subjective individuation16, is singularly ill equipped to satisfy. The injunction in question is that of the impossibility of continuing to conceive of the human as if it constituted the unobjectifiable in terms of which the ontological validity of what the empirical exception define is be to sciences as objective nature gauged. This is not quite as banal or easily admissible a requirement for contemporary philosophy as some may initially think. Although many will readily concede the inappropriateness of Man's ontological designation as a zoon logon echon or a res cogitans, few biological `life' could be constituted through (and not merely have `arisen out of as vitalism evasively Cf. H. Maturana & F. Varela, but insensate inanimate it) chemical processes. and nothing puts Autopoiesis and Cognition: The realization of the living, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980; also The Tree of Knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding, Boston: Shambhala, 1992. 16 The very notion of `phenomenon' as that which shows or manifests itself to consciousness simply for datum irreducible intuitively the given philosophy. and apprehending subjectivity as an assumes Moreover, the fact that many phenomenologists have abandoned the use of the words `consciousness' is built itself hardly is, by to `subject' the simply apprehension subjective reference a refutation: or into the phenomenological definition of `phenomenon'. That phenomenology has moved from being an in is (Husserl), impenitent to transcendental so only one which subjectivity philosophy of explicit and impede does little fashion (post-Heidegger), the substance of our attack, to an elaborately camouflaged doctrine. In letter than the the of targets the rather project, phenomenological guiding spirit of which fact, the underlying assumptions of the project are rendered all the more dangerous for being so by Henry Michel `material the disguised. Even sort espoused of phenomenology', a putatively cleverly (cf., Henry, 1990), which seeks to identify the pre-intentional, sub-representational materiality of the in `Life' terms immanent dimension of phenomenological a radically phenomenon with -characterised into to ipseity-, transcendental the its afforded privilege question never calls absolute, auto-affecting of inapparent ipseity. individuated Henry's dimension an of phenomenology that subjective of already `materiality' -perhaps on account of certain residual hylomorphic prejudices inherited from Husserlfrom the the a priori only withdrawn a materiality not to of possibility countenance simply refuses For ipseity from but that an extended se. of subjective per also realm of ekstatic phenomenality, Chapter 2. Henry, infra, discussion cf. of critical

23 seem willing to admit that, after Darwin, it is no longer possible to continue to conceive of human being transcendentally, whether it be as Subjekt, Geist, or Dasein. Challenged by the philosopher to provide something like an `adequate' account of the phenomenon of human distilling sapience, the scientist, the various insights provided by evolutionary biology, Al, and thermodynamics, is in a position to put forward a perfectly precise response: human sapience, like many other instances of negentropic is energy capture, a based information carbon variety of processing system17,and nothing besides. The philosopher of course will immediately protest that the response is `inadequate' vis a vis the phenomenon in question because hopelessly it is But reductive. no more reductive than the claim that water is nothing but H2O; that temperature is nothing but mean molecular kinetic energy; or that the colour red is nothing but electromagnetic radiation with a determinate frequency. is `reductive' insofar All it truth spiking scientific precisely as dissolves the veneer of phenomenological familiarity concomitant with the limited parameters of anthropomorphic perspective. The real question the is is it has him/herself this: to what exactly about the ask philosopher 17Cf. for instance, Quine, 1960; Smart, 1963; Wiener, 1967; Sayre, 1976; Churchland, 1979 and 1989. In our opinion, Paul Churchland is the most sophisticated contemporary exponent of this sort of human information by human is the sapience: of physically encoded account materialistic vigorously

24 scientist's banal but remarkably well-supported statement that he or she finds so intolerably `reductive'? Is not part of the philosopher's unease concerning scientific `reduction' directly attributable to the unavowed wish that, as far as man is concerned, there always be `something' left over besides the material: ineffable, some unquantifiable meta-physical residue, some irreducible transcendental remainder? Nowhere is this unavowable philosophical longing more transparent than in the phenomenological project, which seems determined to stave off this putative `disenchantment' of phenomena by science by delimiting a dimension of radically unobjectifiable transcendence'8: that of the phenomenon's invisible phenomenality. It is with the inapparent `how' of the phenomenon's appearing, rather than the `what' which appears, that transcendental phenomenology concerns itself19. Yet the phenomenological `phenomenality' dangerously to conception of seems us so narrow and `transcendental to the as parochial render much-vaunted project of a brain in the form of neuronal activation vectors and subsequently processed via patterns of vector-tovector transformation. Churchland's work will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 8. 18 Or in in immanence, Michel Henry. However, the as we shall see case of radically unobjectifiable Chapter 2, Henry's invocation of immanence operates according to a logic of phenomenological idealisation which renders it ultimately transcendent. 19Similarly, Kantians claim that science itself remains constitutively incapable of investigating the objectivity of the object, and of uncovering the transcendental a priori conditioning the possibility of in its Kantian Thus, transcendentalism resembles predecessor phenomenological empirical actuality. this particular respect if not in others: it tries to provide scientific cognition with an a priori conceptual in subjectivity. rooted armature ultimately

25 phenomenological ontology'20 into an insidious form of anthropomorphic imperialism. If the concept of `phenomenon' is, in Heidegger's definition21, that of something `which shows itself in itself', a `self-showing' which `manifests itself in and through itself alone', then we require: 1. A rigorously theoretical, rather than intuitive, definition of individuation in order to explain what is to count as an individuated appearance, one which does not simply reinstate the metaphysical circularity implicit in Leibniz's maxim according to which, `to be is to be one thing'. 2. A rigorously theoretical, rather than intuitive, `appearance' or `manifestation' does which not surreptitiously account of invoke the predominantly optical22 paradigm of sensory perception with which we are familiar. empirically On both these counts, phenomenology -whether it take intentional human being-in-the-world its as starting point- seems to us consciousness or to remain wanting: it illegitimately universalises a paradigm of `phenomenality' constructed on the basis of intuitions about individuation and 20Cf. for instance Heidegger's claim that "Phenomenological truth is veritas transcendental is[j Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 62). 21CE Heidegger. 1962, pp. 51-55. 22The but it is being to to that sensory modalities, opposed other privilege vision as wrong not point that it is wrong to surreptitiously transcendentalise any empirical modality -especially one whose human in the those are of as contingency evolutionary perceptual and cognitive capacities are as mired body. Phenomenology is not sufficiently transcendental because it remains rooted in empirical in be disincarnate, try to Pure thought suggest transcendental as we shall should rigorously physiology. Chapters 7 and 8.

26 manifestation derived from our empirical perception of middle-sized objects23. Yet in exactly what sense, for instance, can the Big Bang, the Cambrian Explosion, or a 26 dimensional superstring (phenomena strictly unphenomenologisable precisely because they which are remain utterly in terms of our habitual spatio-temporal parameters), be said to unintuitable be things that `show themselves in themselves'? What are the parameters of this `showing'? To whom and for who is it supposed to occur? Whence does the mysterious faculty of intuition that is supposed to provide us with an immediately pre-theoretical access to the phenomenological essenceof these imperceptible rigorously entities originate? The standard phenomenological rejoinder to such questions, which in consists protesting that these, along with all other varieties of scientific `theoretical' being derives from that entities whose mode of object, are merely 4more originary' mode of phenomenality concomitant with our `primordial' pre-theoretical engagement with question-begging. `the things themselves', is hopelessly Belief in this pseudo-originary, pre-theoretical dimension 231n Chapter 7, we shall see how a non-philosophical materialism is thereby a nonalso -which phenomenology-operates according to a rigorously theoretical, and non-intuitive, conception of individuation and phenomenalisation. Non-materialist theory singularises its object of cognition by it it Identity-without-unity, according to the strictures of a nonwhilst phenomenalising as an cloning intuitive, or non-thetic phenomenality, thereby satisfying the two requirements mentioned above. Cf. infra, pp. 361-372.

27 of experiential immediacy is the phenomenological superstition par excellence. Briefly: the claim that intentional consciousness subtends a continuum of eidetic intuition running from tables and chairs at one end to transfinite cardinals and hyperdimensional superstrings at the other is grotesquely reductive. Just as the suggestion that objects of `regional ontology' such as leptons black holes have quarks, and as their ultimate ontological root Dasein's being-in-the-world (or the subject's infinite responsibility for the Other; or the auto-affecting pathos of subjective Life24) is an outrageous instance of anthropocentric idealism. If anyone is guilty of imperialistic reductionism far as as the extraordinary richness and complexity of the idealist is it is the phenomenological concerned, rather than the universe idealism is it is Husserl's as punitive as unmistakable: scientific materialist. "The existence of a Nature cannot be the condition for the existence of be Nature itself to turns a correlate of consciousness: out consciousness since Nature is only as being constituted in regular concatenations of full in 54 it 1913 116). When "(Husserl, 1982, was written p. consciousness. -a 240ne Husserl despite Significantly, Henry. here Levinas their and of critiques and will recognize Heidegger, and in spite of their silence concerning the relation between phenomenology and science (a indifference these index likely than of neither to respect), a cautious rather contemptuous silence more thinkers is prepared to give up on the fundamental premise that it is the business of phenomenology to latter if the `archi-originary' are conditions of phenomenalisation; conditions upon which, uncover the indeed `archi-originary', the phenomena investigated through scientific cognition are inevitably supervenient.

28 years after the publication of Darwin's On the Origins of the Species- this statement was already profoundly reactionary25.Now, 142 years after Darwin, Husserl's idealism is utterly indefensible of phenomenology's it be by those who approve -unless apparently boundless contempt for natural science26. The choice with which we are confronted is as clear as it is unavoidable: either Darwin or Husserl. To continue to persist on the course initiated by the latter is to plunge headlong into intellectual disaster and the ruin of philosophy as a credible theoretical enterprise. The future vouchsafed to philosophy by phenomenology is too dismal to contemplate: a terminally infantile, pathologically narcissistic anthropocentrism. The situation is too grave, the high too to allow for equivocation or compromise. stakes Once again, the issue seems to us to boil down to a simple matter of intellectual honesty, a blunt but irrecusable alternative that no amount of conceptual obfuscation or rhetorical sophistry can obviate. Either the 25Compare Lenin, writing in 1908: "A philosophy which teaches that physical nature itself is a [psychical -RB] product, is a philosophy of the priests, pure and simple. " (Lenin, 1972, p. 271). The magnificent verve of Lenin's anti-idealist invective in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism provides a salutary corrective to the Jesuitical sophistries propounded by his phenomenological contemporaries. 26Although he continually invokes science, it is important to remember that Husserl seems to have 19th century distinction between the exalted approached it in terms of the typically Geisteswissenschaften or sciences of the spirit (pre-eminent amongst which are logic and mathematics, but also including psychology, history, etc.) and the lowly Naturwissenschaften or sciences of nature (which would include physics and biology). Thus, if Husserl deemed physics worthy of philosophical consideration, it seems to have been solely on account of its rigorous mathematisation, a fact which Geisteswissenschaften. This Husserl honorary it the of might explain why sub-species render an would in it biology of serious an as unworthy philosophical attention, perhaps seeing regarded apparently if Darwin thus activity, and explain as why phenomenology proceeds sub-theoretical entirely empirical, had never existed.

29 philosopher insists that man is de jure irreducible to the natural ontological order investigated by science because the essence of human being is transcendence (subjectivity, Spirit, Dasein, etc.), in which case everything science implies concerning the ontologically derivative rather than transcendentally constitutive character of Homo Sapiens is not merely irrelevant but false; or scientific statements of the type "Man is a carbonbased information processing system" are true in the exactly same way -in which a statement such as "the earth is not flat" is true, not just `empirically adequate' or `factually correct'-, and man is not a transcendent exception to the cosmos but just one relatively commonplace material phenomenon among There is others. no longer any room within the bounds of a univocally physical natural order for a special category of putatively trans-natural being 'human'. called Thus, materialism as we understand it is nothing but the conviction that science -whether it be that of Copernicus, Darwin, or Einstein- is the formulator of truths endowed with a quasi-transcendental bearing, rather than the mere promulgator 27The `quasi' here being of empirical facts27. Consequently, either the used to index a crucial non-philosophical nuance vis a vis the transcendental status of scientific truth. For non-philosophy, scientific thought harbours a dimension of relatively autonomous, but nonetheless rigorously transcendental truth; one which is neither reducible to correspondence nor to coherence. Central to Laruellean thought is a reformulation of the notion of transcendental truth as adequation-without-correspondence. Non-philosophy as unified theory of philosophy and science provides an account of their Identity without unity and their Duality without difference, an account which tries to liberate the relative transcendental autonomy of scientific truth

30 philosopher accepts the irrecusable pertinence of scientific truth, and a fortiori, the scientific truth about human being; or he rejects wholesale the notion that science is in any position to formulate truths about man, in which case he subordinates scientific truth to a higher authority: to wit, the putatively unobjectifiable transcendence of human being. The latter option is, it seems to us, fundamentally indicative of the phenomenological stance in philosophy. Unfortunately, the popularity enjoyed by this stance among many contemporary philosophers -whether of a `continental' persuasion or notdoes not render it any less repugnant in our eyes. Accordingly, and in conformity with the injunction stated above, the philosophical materialism we shall be attempting to radicalise nonphilosophically in the context of this thesis will be characterised in terms of two complementary but nevertheless independent theses: univocity and naturalism. a). Univocity: The thesis of ontological univocity reconciles two fundamental, but apparently contradictory materialist imperatives: that Being know of no differences in kind (hence the destitution of all equivocal from transcendence that ontological such as which separates mind matter, freedom from from but ); it be that culture nature, necessity, etc. also from its subordination to philosophy, just as it seeks to emancipate the relative transcendental

31 untotalisable, that it remain unsubordinated to any overarching principle of transcendent ontological unity. If Being is multiple rather than One, it is because, as Badiou reminds us, God is dead and the One is not28. And it is precisely insofar as it tries to reconcile ontological immanence with ontological multiplicity that univocity stipulates that being always be said `in the same sense'29 of the untotalisable multiplicity of that which is30. The univocal ontological immanence required may be exceptionless precisely by fact the that it is consistently excessive (Deleuze); or, alternatively, virtue of one that is occasionally supplemented by virtue of its own constitutively excessive inconsistency (Badiou). Be that as it may, the crucial proviso favoured Cf. from its science. supervenience on an arbitrarily of positivistic autonomy philosophy chapters 7&8. 28We because One he like how happily Laruelle the this precisely concur with statements can shall see invokes is without-unity and without-Being. 29Clearly, the be implied here `sense' neither semantico-linguistic, nor must notion of invoked in `sense' hermeneutic. The the thesis of univocity ontological phenomenological, nor even in important Particularly this formal-axiomatic be than phenomenologico-hermeneutic. rather must formalisation is Badiou's the that of ontology via axiomatic set-theory mathematical only claim regard is sufficient to escape from the insidious reintroduction of hermeneutic equivocity into materialism, an idealist to reappropriation through the combined revulnerable equivocity rendering materialism `materiality'. Badiou the the criticizes concept of on of and re-hermeneutisat; phenomenologisation Deleuzean naming of matter as `anorganic Life' precisely because he believes it is a nomination which its to For into theory attempt transcendence will part, non-materialist univocity. equivocal reintroduces Decision to the theorematisation according transcendental of materialist and axiomatisation effect a from first `hyle' `matter' immanence cloned name or non-conceptual symbol as a or of radical `matter' first As remains meaningless or symbol name or non-conceptual philosophical materialism. indifferent Decision language The symbolic support as an only serves of philosophical uninterpretable. for the theoretically rigorous but strictly meaningless series of axiomatic abstractions effected on its basis. Moreover, this radically immanent, or non-Decisional nomination, de-ontologises univocity. For 289-295. 267-277 6, Chapter and pp. clarification, cf. 30Our definition of univocity here simply reiterates Deleuze's, although we shall later have occasion to 3. Chapter Cf. immanence. infra, idealization be Deleuze's of ontological criticize what we consider to Perhaps uniquely among `materialist' philosophers, Deleuze ceaselessly insists on the equation `immanence=univocity' as an uncircumventable sine qua non for any materialism worthy of the name.

32 required in order to maintain the univocal immanence necessary for a materialism concomitant with multiplicity is that the variously distributed instances remain comprised within the premise of untotalisable ontological one and only of being qua multiple immanent one `matter' qua anorganic Life; Badiou: `matter' Being (Deleuze: inconsistent qua void). Deleuze be the exemplary representative of this thesis31. will b). Naturalism: `Naturalism' as we understand it does involve not the dubious hypostatisation of some supposedly `natural' ontological realm in contradistinction to that of cultural artifice. Such an interpretation would it immediately render incompatible with the thesis of univocity. The naturalism we wish to invoke here is simply a thesis, which asserts the necessary interdependence of philosophy empirical fact that all philosophical and science. Taking as given the define to attempts conditions of for have be dismally thought to possibility scientific proved unsuccessful, we failures that these conclude are a matter of principle rather than empirical it is the presumption that philosophy is in a position to that circumstance, and footing for be There transcendental provide a science which must abandoned. Cf. for example Difference and Repetition especially pp. 35-42; or What is Philosophy?, especially pp. 44-49. 31Although Badiou's materialism of the inconsistent void is arguably even more vigorously antibe it here. Deleuze's, to than we will not able afford equal consideration phenomenological

33 is no first philosophy32. Consequently, although relatively autonomous vis a vis science, philosophical ontology can neither ground nor disregard the ultimately physical description of the universe provided by the natural sciences. W. V. O Quine and Paul Churchland will be our favoured philosophical proponents of naturalism in the sense that we have begun to give to the term here33. According to this definition, naturalism simply stipulates that, as far as science is concerned, philosophy can permit itself neither the privilege of legitimation nor the luxury of indifference. Yet if philosophy can no longer afford to busy itself with contriving sophistical exceptions to the natural physical order by shrouding the phenomenon of human sapience in a veil of pseudo-transcendental less mystery, still can it afford to disingenuously minimize the profoundly corrosive consequences entailed by the perspective of scientific naturalism with regard to the complacent naivety of our own phenomenological selfimage. 32Cf Quine, 1969, pp. 126-127. 33Although be deserves it here, be discussing Daniel Dennett's to mentioned work we shall not alongside that of Quine and Churchland as the third member of the philosophical triumvirate The in Weltanschaung `hardcore' the pantheon. analytical contemporary naturalist representing a broad synoptic sweep of Dennett's philosophical vision, coupled with his consistent ingenuity and tireless inventiveness, renders him in many ways the most eloquent and persuasive spokesman for the brand of philosophical naturalism we are invoking here. Cf. for example, Dennett 1978; 1987; 1993; & 1995.

34 In this latter regard, the recently touted prospect of a `naturalized phenomenology' 34, the offspring of an unholy alliance between an unreconstructed Husserlianism and some of the more conservative strands in contemporary cognitive science, remains, from our point of view, vitiated by its ultimately oxymoronic character. Given that, as far as the philosophy of mind is concerned, the most distinctive philosophical feature of the naturalistic has been its approach intentionality illusion; is there as a perspectival something spurious about it using as the philosophical excoriation of phenomenological basis upon which to reinstate the latter. This insidiously the reactionary equivocation result of an attempt strikes us as implicitly desire by to avoid the unsettlingly the overweening motivated devolving sceptical consequences deconstructive from hand the the one on Cartesian Husserl's phenomenology and/or post-structuralist critiques of (Heidegger, Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze, etc. ), and on the other, from the quasi- behaviourist and/or naturalist inspired attacks on the inviolable epistemic authority traditionally interiority to subjective attributed (Ryle, Quine, in theoretical the disingenuousness, primary blatant which one example of such a particularly the counter-intuitive be profoundly that costs at all to avoiding of simply seems motivation `natural scientific attitude' to consciousness, from the devolving the of application consequences that first-person features as `intuitively phenomenology destruction of obvious' of such especially the for data, the its to essay immediacy example see access its privileged and putatively pre-theoretical of in Varela the Pachoud, by Petitot, Roy, collection Introduction and the by Woodruff-Smith, as well as `Intentionality Woodruff-Smith, Cf. by Petitot Jean Phenomenology, al. et Naturalizing edited entitled 831999; in Petitot Gap', `Beyond Varela, & pp. Pachoud, the al., et Naturalized? ', and Roy, Petitot, 110 and pp. 1-80 respectively. 34For

35 Wittgenstein, Dennett, Churchland, etc.). Tip-toeing between what it doubtlessly regards as the Scylla of post-modem nihilism on the left, and the Charybdis of neurocomputational reductionism on the right, `naturalized phenomenology' hopes to inaugurate a middle-path, a third-way; one that would add a reassuring gloss of scientific legitimation to the aura of unassailable epistemic privilege which many, faithfully kow-towing to a Cartesian inheritance, continue to ascribe to phenomenological subjectivity. Against such reactionary philosophical protectionism, it is the business of a thoroughgoing naturalism to emphasize -rather than minimizethe corrosive power of scientific phenomenological reductionism both the tenets of vis a vis orthodoxy and the established parameters of socio-cultural by be That the task entirely contingent, exposing can achieved consensus. conventional character of the phenomenological self-image promulgated hallucinatory denouncing by interiority; the through the myth of subjective illusory by inveighing the authority against and access; privileged of character in taken first-person or separately the whether which, myths perspective; of liberal ideology through the which to subjectivist up shore serve combination, democratic capitalism convinces a stupefied population of consumers that freedom individuals, of choice, they are sovereign naturally endowed with interests freedom the interests a of with coincide the that subjective of and

36 free market economy35. It is by puncturing the persistent myths of first-person autonomy and of the irreducibility of consciousness; it is by excoriating the apparently inviolable ubiquity of the cultural privilege which folk psychological superstition has successfully arrogated to itself through the process of its enshrinement in the medium of natural language, that a virulently anti-phenomenological scepticism of the kind espoused by Quine, or an eliminative materialism such as that endorsed by Paul Churchland, suggesting as they do that a radical reconfiguration both of our own selfimage and of our vision of the world around us is always possible, can help undermine those phenomenological Ur-doxas36 which help perpetuate the cultural consensus manufactured by capitalism37. To sum up: philosophical naturalism, as far as we are concerned, entails taking the scientific world-view seriously, and accepting the insofar that profoundly anti-phenomenological consequences of world-view 351t is by tirelessly promoting the illusion of individual freedom that capitalism successfully diverts attention from the reality of the population's collective socio-economic enslavement, from its nigh-on total political impotence. Consider for example how the invocation of the consumer's inalienable `right to choose' is becoming increasingly synonymous with the notion of `freedom' tout court. Now that the capitalist axiomatic identifies `freedom' with the individual's freedom to keep consuming, philosophies defending the irreducibility of subjective interiority are also guilty of promulgating the myth of individual freedom by default, thereby furnishing the machinery of consumer capitalism with a useful ideological lubricant. 36Cf. the critique of the Ur-doxa by Deleuze & Guattari in What is Philosophy? ;a critique with which we wholeheartedly concur. Cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 80,142,178,206,207,209. 37Accordingly, instance Conclusion that of a priori will suggest non-materialism constitutes an our resistance to the commodification of thought by being tantamount to a form of transcendental Ur-doxas that are concomitant with the all-encompassing those phenomenological scepticism vis a vis Cf. 430-440. infra, World-Capitalism. pp. sovereignty of

37 it as necessitates expunging all vestiges of folk psychological superstition and anthropocentric narcissism from philosophy. `Phenomenon'; `consciousness"; `intentionality'; `Ego'; `meaning'; `sense-bestowing act': these are the folk psychological fictions which have provided the basis for an elaborately sophisticated, but Phenomenology is folk disastrously misconceived psychology theoretical transcendentalised. Belief edifice38 in the phenomenological mysteries, in the transcendental sovereignty of intentional consciousness, or in the irreducible reality of such denizens of the intentional realm `eidetic as intuitions' `qualia', or are now the contemporary faith in immortality the of the soul or confidence philosophical equivalents of in the ubiquity of phlogiston. "Consciousness", we might say paraphrasing Deleuze, "did not survive God"39. 2. The transcendental necessity of materialism's non-philosophical transformation At this stage, the reader will doubtless be starting to suspect that our into borne than a naive relapse of nothing more sophisticated convictions are dogmatic scientism. To which we are tempted to respond by pointing out that, 38And it should be remembered that it is on the basis of such subjective intuitions that phenomenology has had the temerity to try to suspend scientific objectivism by spuriously conflating science with the from the of scientific ambit subjectivity only withdrawing not sense; common of natural attitude from being far former. In latter this to the a mere the but regard, investigation, effectively subordinating Husserl's logical is the the toward of extension sciences caprice, Heidegger's contemptuous antipathy paternalistic condescension.

38 since the indiscriminate use of this epithet as a blanket term of abuse by irate phenomenologists convicts of `scientism' anyone who takes it trust that the earth orbits around the sun, or black holes and neutrinos on scientific who believes in the existence of -notwithstanding all phenomenological evidence to the contrary40-, then we can only plead guilty as charged. If `scientism' simply means refusing the obligatory subordination of empirical science to transcendental philosophy, then by our lights, there is not nearly enough `scientism' in contemporary philosophy. Nevertheless, although happy to assent to the charge of `scientism', do believe that the accusation of `dogmatism' is justified. Were we not continue to operate in an exclusively philosophical register, we to wherein is everything ultimately reducible to the level of a basically aleatory Decision for either or against science, the accusation would be pertinent. However, it is precisely on account of our wish to circumvent the apparently deadly impasse between materialist scientism and phenomenological idealism, and in order to provide the materialist Decision with a rigorously critical degree of theoretical validity, that we wish to effect its non-Decisional transmutation. 39C£ Deleuze, 1994, p xix. 401t might be apposite to remind ourselves here that as far as the committed phenomenologist is flimsy to a scientific dogmatism mired in the natural attitude dares to what concerned, contrary suggest, the earth does not move (i. e. the `archi-originary' earth subtending the `transcendental' corporeality of phenomenological subjectivity). Divine surprise! Thus, and perhaps appropriately, the believes is be flat. Phenomenological that the earth one who shall always wonders phenomenologist

39 That transmutation, interestingly basis of a theoretical discovery is to be effected on the enough, which realizes a philosophically contradictory, not to say non-sensical, feat; one which withdraws Man from the domain of that which is ontologically problematisable without reinstituting him as a transcendental exception. Neither Subjekt, nor Geist, nor Dasein, Man's non- ontological essenceis radical immanence41.And as radical immanence, "Man is not-in-question ", Laruelle insists, "because he is not-in-philosophy"42. For non-philosophy, the essence of Man is that of an immanence without-essence and without-being, ergo non-human, precisely insofar as the `humanity' predicated of the human has always remained within the parameters of the ontologically it But is as `Given-without-givenness' (Donneproblematic. `vision-in-One' (vision-en-Un)43; as index of a `humanity' sans-donation) or `human' shorn of all predicable attributes, a `humanity' devoid of all human recognizably characteristics, that Man is the unproblematisable par excellence. Consequently, it is precisely insofar as the `human' is invariably a transcendent, anthropo-ontological construct, that for the non-philosopher, shall never cease. Cf. E. Husserl, La Terre Ne Se Meut Pas [The Earth Does Not Move], French trans. by D. Frank, Paris: Minuit, 1989. 41Cf. Chapter 5. 42Laruelle, 1991, 36. p. 43 Hopefully. intelligible become during Chapters 6, 5 the these will course of and wherein claims all the postulate of radical or `non-Decisional' immanence will be discussed at some length.

40 Man is nothing human. Man is ontologically indifferent because he `is' in- One and without-Being. Yet it is also on account of that radical indifference that he cannot be said to be in-human or trans-human. Thus, the immanence of Man's non-ontological Identity unconditional him renders equally indifferent to the temptations of humanism and anti-humanism. As a result, the shift to the non-philosophical register begins has one rccogýýiýcd t hc philosophical philosophy, extraneously transcendent character of gesture rendering Man's being problematic. For once the non- Man is no longer of the order of an ontological problem formulated in terms of the human entity as constituting a Difference within, or Being ("What to, relative or Who is Man? ", "How is his being articulated or "). impredicable His given? transparency as Given-without-givenness makes him inalienable but the of non-ontological solution, the sine qua non preceding and explaining the articulation of every ontological problem. Accordingly, non-philosophy proceeds on the basis of the discovery that Man One-without-Being the as (l'Un-sans-l'Etre) is not an exception to Being; nor but fissure hole being; folding Being; in nor even a or or a placeholder of a last-instance functions immanent foreclosure the that as which radically rather determining all thinking `of Being.

41 Accordingly, for the non-philosopher, it is not Man who is transcendent or exceptional vis a vis Being, it is Being which is absolutely transcendent vis a vis Man. Yet if `the problem' as far as non-philosophical thinking is concerned is no longer that of trying to `think the Being of the human', still less is it that of trying to think the human `in terms of the foreclosure of immanence. It is rather that of trying to think according to (selon) Man's immanent foreclosure to the twofold transcendence of Being and of thought. The `solution' to that problem is the recognition that Man's immanence-without-essence and without-existence, his foreclosure to thought, can nevertheless become effectuated by thought. It is on the basis of Being's transcendence as occasional cause and material support that Man's radically becomes by transparency effectuated opaque non-philosophical thought, allowing him a theoretico-practical `existence'44 as transcendental clone or Stranger for philosophical thinking. the onto-cosmological order problematised in As a result, Man's ontological effectuation, his is for World, `existence' Stranger the simultaneously or clone as occasional 44Predictably, the non-philosophical translation of the concept of `existence' bears only a nominal Laruelle's Here Sartrean familiar Heideggerean use of a to the as elsewhere, or versions. relation familiar philosophical concept in an entirely new, unfamiliar conceptual context inevitably invites Stranger `existence' The the subject or non-philosophical of effectuation or misunderstanding. designates the complex structure of its theoretical articulation as non-thetic transcendence spanning the is All this transcendental of course of support. empirical clone and of unilaterality and unidentity 6, 277-289. Chapter For introductory cf. clarification, pp. this stage. unintelligible at

42 theoretical and practical in character, without constituting a synthetic unity or hybrid of theory and practise. The Stranger-subject (le Sujet-Stranger) of non- thought exists as the Identity-without-unity philosophical Dualityand without-difference of theory and practise. Nevertheless, bearing in mind that the subject of non-philosophical thought enacts this performative coincidence of theory and practise, it is possible to state that Man `is' only insofar as he exists as a theoretical Stranger for Being and for the World. Hence our continuously reiterated half Man's throughout the this thesis emphasis on radically second of inconsistent, non anthropo-logical, and ultimately alien existence as the transcendental Subject of extra-terrestrial theory. Accordingly, were we to distil the substance of this thesis down to a single claim it would be this: the more radical the instance of humanity, the more radically non- By thought. the possibilities of anthropomorphic and non-anthropocentric definitively Man's theoretically alien, non-human existence, emancipating non-materialist theory promises to purge materialism of all vestiges of phenomenological anthropomorphism.

43 It is this rediscovery of Man's irrefrangibly alien existence as a universal Stranger that prevents non-philosophy's `hypertranscendentalism' from gnostically inflected45 merely reinstating Kant's transcendental protectionism vis a vis man as Homo noumenon. In this regard, it would be a mistake to consign Laruelle to the long line of post-Kantian thinkers labouring to provide definitive a formulation of man's supposedly unobjectifiable essence. Such efforts are merely variations on the Kantian gesture of special pleading concerning the human; a gesture which, providing it did as a transcendental guarantor for the inviolable moral authority of religious faith, was always explicitly intended as a protective measure, designed in order to forestall the nascent threat of atheism harboured by the prodigious successesof scientific materialism46 45For an account of the relation between non-philosophy and gnosis cf. infra, Chapter 6, pp. 312-315; and our Conclusion, pp. 430-440. 46Kant explicitly withdrew religious faith from the purview of critique -distilling it down to its inviolable noumenal core in the good will qua categorical imperative- in the same gesture with which he delimited the bounds of objective knowledge: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the preconception that it is possible to make headway in metaphysics without a previous criticism of pure reason, is the ) Criticism dogmatic, that wars against morality[.. alone can source of all unbelief, always very which fanaticism, fatalism, free-thinking, the and superstition, which can atheism, sever root of materialism, be injurious universally; as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous chiefly to the 1929, Typically being handed hardly Kant, Bxxx-xxxv. to the allow of on public". schools, and however, and fortunately for us, Kant's critical operation was intrinsically double-edged. For it is through the very same gesture whereby Kant sought to render faith cognitively unassailable, that he Cartesian discourse theology, the transparent the terminated of sovereignty of rational undermined also for `noumenal' the the or critical-transcendental paved way sort of subjectivity, and ultimately Thus, in intend thesis. the this to course of set out elaboration we materialism whose conditions of fanatics fatalists, freethinkers, it like they of all and materialists, atheists, sceptics, or not, whether indebted Kant. Conversely, to we shall consider that the superstitious profoundly remain stripes idealists have found their true home in phenomenology; -more precisely, that the phenomenological

44 For the non-philosopher however, such attempts at special pleading condemn Man in the very gesture of Decisional transcendence through which they endeavoured to save him. Man as radically immanent phenomenon remains foreclosed to meta-physical inflation as well as to infra-physical reduction. If he is the non-redeemable par excellence it is only because he remains the already-redeemed, as indifferent to the promise of transcendental he is to the threat of empirical degradation. Philosophical redemption as attempts to immunize Man against the menace of material oblivion through perpetual reinjections of salutary transcendence only succeed in occluding his immanent foreclosure, his ultimate indifference to noumenal salvation as well as to phenomenal extinction47. Of course, for the philosopher, non-philosophy, which endeavours to think according to Man's foreclosure to Decision, necessarily appears as an impoverishment or diminishment of thinking conceived in terms of the for distinction between thing-in-itself the sense of transcendental the and caters of phenomenon elision reassurance that the latter so obviously crave. 471n saying this we do not, of course, intend to suggest, as Michel Henry does in his own phenomenologisation of radical immanence, that it is now as the latter that Man can be said to be is immanence invoked by immortal. The the non-philosopher not a radical and eternal by it is but which a non never a sufficient condition; sine qua a necessary phenomenological principle: itself yields nothing, produces nothing. We oppose the radical in-consistency of immanence as nonin in-consistent terms of a primacy-without-priority characterised condition ontological condition, an (Laruelle), to its phenomenological consistency as archi-originary ontological principle(Michel Henry). It is only by means of an empirical occasion that this inconsistent condition becomes effectuated in least from its foreclosure Apart that thought. guarantees nothing; of all effectuation, non-philosophical forestall danger in Life. Thus, the to immutable of a quasiorder phenomenological and eternal an insist it is is that radical to to say, crypto-religious- misreading, necessary phenomenological -which immanence as inconsistent condition is not so much eternal or immortal as foreclosed a priori to the

45 inviolable necessity of ontological Decision. But for the non-philosopher, the poverty, austerity and minimalism streamlining characteristic of the non-Decisional of transcendental thought remain the best guarantee of theoretical rigour, and, a fortiori, the best guarantee for the transcendental consistency of the materialist Decision. For the question facing the materialist is whether in the philosophical register furnishes him/her out a Decision carried with the theoretical means in required order for him/her to live up to the desired degree of conceptual in probity; other words, whether philosophy allows the materialist to do as s/he says and say as s/he does. Laruelle, for reasons we will elaborate on later48, believes that philosophical Decision falls short on this very count: the philosopher in the throes of Decision is never doing what s/he is saying or is doing. The problem of Decision then, is the problem of saying what s/he discovering the theoretical conditions according to which this performative doing in Decision becomes realizable. It becomes consistency of saying and by Laruelle realizable, suggests, only shifting from a posture whereby Decision constitutes an absolutely autonomous, self-positing act, to one wherein Decision becomes a relatively heteronomously autonomous, differance, between living dying. For an extended critique of the or even and ontological alternative, Michel Henry's phenomenologisation of immanence, cf. infra, Chapter 2, pp. 80-97.

46 determined experience; the non-synthetic unity of theory and practice. A non- Decisional theory is not anti-Decisional; it the suspends self-sufficiency of - Decision, transforming its absolute autonomy into a merely relative autonomy. The point is not to abdicate from Decision but to permit a radically transcendental determination of Decision, one allowing for Decision to be carried out under scrupulously exacting theoretical conditions. It is the general lack of theoretical scruple concomitant with the absolute autonomy of Decision in its philosophical register which the non-philosopher objects to, not Decision as such. Consequently, our belief in the necessity of a nonmaterialist universalisation of materialism goes hand in hand with the conviction that non-philosophical theory alone provides the conditions under which the materialist Decision can be rigorously carried out. It furnishes the indispensable transcendental supplement required in order to render the materialist Decision unequivocally consistent in word and deed. Man as Non-Materialist Identity Philosophy of Science and Ultimately, the pertinence of non-philosophical theory for the brand of in interested in here is but twofold, apparently reality materialism we are onefold. The superficially twofold pertinence concerns the relation of 48Cf. Chapters 5 and 6; but also for instance Chapters 2&3, how the try to show where we invariably form idealism. In favour in decision other words, a of materialism reinstates of philosophical the philosopher decides against idealism in a way that is still idealist.

47 philosophy and science on the one hand, and the non-exceptional status of Man on the other. If materialism as we understand it is implicitly predicated on the basically sound but unstated assumption that science and philosophy are and should be bound together in a relationship of reciprocal presupposition, then Laruelle's work is crucial because it promises to provide that unstated philosophical assumption with an explicitly articulated theoretical basis: non-philosophy promises to provide a `unified' but nonunitary theory of philosophy and science49. On the other hand, nonis philosophy equally important as far as the injunction forbidding the philosophical conception of the human as ontological exception is concerned. Man is no longer conceived of as a locus of transcendence, but rather as the immanence foreclosure to all anthropomorphic predication radical whose it for the a rigorously non-anthropomorphic theorising. renders sine qua non In the final analysis however, the superficial character of this doubleit is Man becomes that as radical ultimately apparent when one realizes aspect immanence that constitutes the last-instance according to which the double articulation 49Thus, of philosophy and science simultaneously attains its it deals between discriminate to with and science; philosophy a priori non-philosophy refuses them together en bloc as a single indivisible empirical datum. For non-philosophy, philosophy and basis is It that in this bound together on presupposition. a relation of reciprocal science are necessarily the naturalist of to generalisation tries and radicalisation a non positivistic provide non-materialism Quine discussion Cf. the and of to science. thesis according which philosophy supervenes on Churchland in Chapters 7 and 8.

48 transcendental validity as well as its non-Decisional legitimacy. For it is Man's non-Decisional essencethat provides an Identity-without-synthesis and Duality-without-difference a science. for all the Decisional hybrids of philosophy and

49 PART I THE DECLINE OF MATERIALISM AS SUCH

50 CHAPTER MATTER: I COMME TELLE OR TELLE QUELLE? "When, in its better moments, materialism abandoned its empiricist concept of matter, on the whole it never proved able to go beyond the hyle, the identity of thought and the real, of ideality and matter -the level of relative materiality or of materiality `as such'[comme teile] rather than of matter `itself' [teile quelle] or absolute matter. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 78) What would it be to think matter `itself or absolutely, as opposed to thinking it `as such' or relatively? Is it - pace Hegel- possible to conceive `outside' distinct from the of a matter concept, a matter every concept of is inevitably doomed lines Or to to think any attempt along such matter? into pre-Hegelian naivety? relapse Clearly, the very formulation of the question points away from Hegel and back toward Kant. For the Critical turn is inaugurated in the he `the Kant transcendental calls what acknowledges gesture whereby difference' between thought and thing, representation and represented, between difference ideal in-itself, the the or more generally, phenomenon and for knowing is the the that real and subject, representable which realm of

51 realm of that which subsists `problematically'50 or independently of the possibility of relation to the subject. Thus, from a quasi-Kantian perspective, one might say that whereas the ideal is intrinsically relational function of -a the relation to subjectivity-, the real be to confused with the empirical -not reality of the represented phenomenon- is simply defined negatively as the absence of relation. In other words, it is problematically or hypothetically defined as the in-itself: is that Yet which relationless or absolute. according - to Hegel it is this very difference between the ideal as relative and the real as absolute which turns out to be internal to thought itself. Subjectivity qua selfrelating negativity, self-sundering and self-synthesizing Notion, is nothing but the processual identification ideal identity of and real difference, the ultimately Ideal relation of relation and non-relation, relative and absolute. It is perhaps on account of its resolutely anti-Hegelian tenor, that Heideggerean phenomenology, at least as set out in Being and Time, seemsto have inherited something of Kant's transcendental-idealist legacy. From our `idealizing' its the tendency transcendental constitutively of point of view, 50For Kant the realm of the problematic is that concerning which the judgement of existence or inexistence is inapplicable. The noumenal realm remains problematic insofar as we can neither say of it that it is or that it is not, since for something to be posited as being it must first be capable of being limiting "The in is thus through a experience: merely an concept of a noumenon sensibility given ] What function is to the the our understanding curb pretensions of sensibility[... of which concept, is is is that to this through say, understanding a noumenon a negative extension; of concept acquires by limits it itself limited the through contrary, sensibility applying the term noumena on sensibility; not to things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets limits to itself, recognizing that it cannot know these noumena through any of the categories, and that it

52 methodology find its canonical formulation in the Introduction to Being and Time, wherein Heidegger defines expression phenomenology' phenomenology in the following way: "The be formulated may in Greek as legein to phainomena, where legein means apophainesthai. Thus, `phenomenology' means apophainesthai to phainomena -to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself. " (Heidegger, 1962, p. 58) However, this dimension of phenomenal self-showing is bound to that of the logos as realm of discursive apophansis: "The necessarily logos lets something be seen.[.. ]Discourse `lets something be seen' apo (from itself} [ Jthat is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the .. discourse is about. In discourse (apophansis), so far as it is genuine, what is drawn from is said what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, . in what it says, makes manifest what it is talking about[... ] This is the logos the structure of as apophansis. "(Ibid, p. 56) Heidegger's definitions here intrinsic link between showing and saying, or more exactly, the render between self-showing and self-saying in the transcendental structure of the phenomeno-logos, perfectly explicit. That transcendental bond between logos is dimension the through phenomenon and assured of apophantic disclosure for necessary the manifestation of the phenomenon as an " (Kant, 1929, B311-B312, the title them think therefore pp. of only under unknown something. must

53 phenomenon. A disclosure whereby every phenomenon is necessarily manifested as some-thing by virtue of its coming-to-presence against a pregiven horizonal backdrop of intelligibility: Dasein 's Being-in-the-World. - Moreover, Heidegger reminds us that "because logos signifythat as legomenon can also which, as something to which one addresses oneself, becomes visible in its relation to something in its `relatedness', logos acquires the signification of relation and relationship. "(Ibid, p. 58) It is in virtue of this constitutive structure of discursive apophansis that every phenomenon disclosed through the logos is intrinsically and indissociably related to every other through the overarching structural whole of which it remains an inextricable moment. Thus, from our point of view, the `phenomenality' of the phenomenon as laid bare in Heidegger's phenomenological analyses still intrinsically bound to the ideal realm of the relational, the intelligible, remains the meaningful, etc. Being-in-the-world is an essentially holistic and inherently Ideal phenomenons1 Thus, although Laruelle's hypothetical separation of matter insofar as it is phenomenologically disclosed `as such', through the logos, from matter `itself , independent of every horizon of apophantic disclosure, is necessarily 272-273). 51Interestingly enough however, chief among the many remarkable virtues of Laruelle's stunning de la (one in Difference, is its `realist' Les Philosophies Heidegger or explicitly anti-idealist of reading Cf. Laruelle, 1986, Chapters 3&4. `quasi-materialist') slant. might even say

54 a transcendental hypothesis, it is one which implies a rearticulation of Kant's transcendental agenda very different from that set out by Heidegger in Being and Time. For by distinguishing matter `itself from every phenomenological apprehension of matter `as such', it seemsto be suggesting that `matter' -even if only problematically or hypothetically- is not only a real instance distinct from every ideal sublation of difference in the Concept, but also an unphenomenologisable `in-itself ; phenomenon itself showing `something' from itself, nor which is even the neither a inapparent phenomenality of showing as such. Yet it is difficult to see how such a distinction distinction -a that apparently distinguishes itself from the distinction of ontico-ontological difference as such- could even be entertained as a conceivable hypothesis. Accordingly, in order to conceive of Laruelle's hypothetical from be teile teile separation of matter comme matter quelle we shall obliged to re-evaluate both the Kantian and the Heideggerean characterisation of the transcendental in terms of difference. Laruelle's hypothesis forces us to `itself to this transcendental the separation of matter extent which reconsider from matter `as such' is ultimately differential in character. For it may be that the transcendental separation of the comme tel from the tel quel has to be in immanence in terms transcendence, than terms and of rather conceived of

55 of Identity rather than Difference. Furthermore, it may be that although this separation-without-difference is effected in thought and has some effect on the World, it is neither realized through the power of conceptual thought alone, as Hegel maintained, nor experienced on the basis of my being-in-theworld as Heidegger believed, but rather proves to be the result of a separation that is anterior both to the transcendence of thought and to that of the World; one to which thought and World themselves are ultimately subject. These are the possibilities that we are particularly interested in elucidating here, along Laruelle. For our ultimate aim is to show how this transcendental with separation of `matter itself from `matter as such' must be conceived of solely according to an Identity of immanence proper to `matter itself, rather than in terms of a transcendent Difference between `matter as such' and `matter itself . Now, of the many fascinating avenues of philosophical exploration delineated in Laruelle's Principe de Minorite (1981), the most salient for our is his present purposes suggestion that the pursuit of these afore-mentioned possibilities necessitates a radicalisation of Kant's transcendental separation from from ideal, logos, in the the the of of real matter-in-itself phenomenal from the to the simultaneous withdrawal of matter effect such a way as idealized materiality of the representational object, and the subtraction of

56 thought from the reified ideality of the phenomenological subject. Only in this does it become possible to forestall both the Hegelian identification way real and ideal within of the domain of the Idea itself; and Heidegger's phenomenological idealization of the transcendental difference through Da's sein unobjectifiable circumscription of the ontico-ontological caesura between real and ideal. However, where Kant yoked the transcendental to subjectivity and `material into limiting the rendered notion of a noumenon' a purely concept, by definition devoid of cognitive import, our goal here involves freeing what Deleuze called "the prodigious domain of the transcendental"52 from the idealist in for formulate to the relativity order conditions a thinking nexus of `itself in of matter thinking the positivity of its unconditionally immanent Identity; a by simultaneously which, liberating matter from what Laruelle calls its `materiological' subordination to the logos and by emancipating cognition from the constraints of phenomenological presentation, would furnish us with the theoretical means required in order to access `matter itself -Va matiere in in Our this throughout, teile quelle'. as well as all subsequentchapters, aim be `non-philosophy' the how Laruelle's to be to explore used can show will 52Deleuze, 1994, p. 135.

57 diversely ramifying consequences of this twofold but ultimately indivisible theoretical gesture. In the first part of this thesis however, our preliminary investigation into the legitimacy of this distinction and the feasibility of such a gesture as far as the possibility defining `non-materiological of a materialism' is concerned, will focus exclusively on their tentatively sketched articulation in Laruelle's Principe de Minorite53. The specific feature of the work intend we to single out for analysis here can be stated in relatively simple terms: radicalising and generalizing his own earlier `machinic materialist'54 critique of philosophical idealism, set out in those texts making up his Philosophie I, 53Le Principe de Minorite is the key transitional work in the entire Laruellean oeuvre. It represents the pivotal moment where Laruelle takes his first philosophically unprecedented step away from the problematic of Difference governing his early works (that is to say, the theoretical problematic mapped out in the philosophical `quadrangle' delimited by the proper names Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze), grouped together by iiiiii under the heading Philosophie I, toward the articulation of what he will later come to recognize as the non-philosophical project proper, the beginnings of which are set out in those works of Laruelle comprised under the heading Philosophie II (for full details concerning this division, cf. our bibliography, pp. 441-443). From a heuristic point of view, its particular importance for us here, at a stage when we are trying to introduce the philosophical problem for which we will try to articulate the non-philosophical resolution, hinges in no small part on the fact that Le Principe de Minorite is still conceived and written as a philosophical work, operating on the basis of a recognizable philosophical stance, an assessment which Laruelle's own comments about the book explicitly confirm: see for example, Laruelle, 1991, p.208. Although complex and difficult (like everything Laruelle has ever written), it is not yet entirely alien in its basic premises and outlook, in the way in which Laruelle's later, explicitly non-philosophical works will prove to be for the philosophical reader. 54The attempt to effect a `machinic deconstruction' of the metaphysical and implicitly idealist theses of historical and dialectical materialism plays a significant role in several of Laruelle's works from Philosophie I. Thus, in his Nietzsche contre Heidegger (1977) for instance, Laruelle defines his in displacing terms three theses of and occupying, rather than materialism machinic version of both dialectical historical 1. those a materialist thesis and of materialism: of opposing and negating, form 2. libidinal the a syntactical thesis matter over every of representation; of primacy asserting form; independently 3. it determines differance a the of over contradiction which of primacy asserting 1977a, Cf. Laruelle, the the thesis primacy of materialism over syntactical. asserting proper machinic pp. 122-129.

58 and according to a gesture we shall see constantly reiterated throughout his non-philosophical work55, Laruelle in Le Principe de Minorite begins to discern in every variant of philosophical materialism (and fortiori a philosophical thinking per se) something like an intrinsically in idealist component, generally indexed by its persistent subordination of `matter' (or what he will also call `the real') to a `materiality' whose theoretical status for Laruelle that of an idealized and invariably remains transcendent abstraction. But what precisely does it mean to claim, as Laruelle does in Le Principe de Minorite, that all species of philosophical materialism are kinds idealism? it According Laruelle, to ultimately of materiological means basically that these materialisms "still subordinate in the last instance matter to the last possible form of the logos (logos or Idea of matter as such), instead of subordinating the logos of matter to matter, and initiating a truly dispersive becoming-real becoming-ideal ideality than of rather a continuous " (Laruelle, the of real. 1981, p. 107) What the initiation `dispersive of a becoming-real of the ideal' would consist in is something we will only begin to elaborate on in Chapter 5. At this stage however, we will confine ourselves 551n his indispensable Initiation ä la Pensee de Francois Laruelle, Juan Diego Blanco sees in the heart lying fundamental the trope the theoretical "radicalisation/generalisation" of all at operation of Laruelle's non-philosophical thinking. Cf. Blanco, 1997, passim, but especially pp. 90-96.

59 to an examination of the first branch of the alternative: the materiological subordination of matter to the logos. Materialism Materiology and Laruelle identifies three invariant features in every philosophical he list that takes to then to those conceptual confusions materialism, goes on be constitutive of the materiological idealization of materialism56 Materialism = 1. Primacy of immanence over transcendence. 2. Primacy of the real over the ideal. 3. Exteriority of being to thought. Materiology = 1. Confusion of real or ontic immanence with ideal or immanence. ontological 2. Confusion of irreversible or unilateral determination of bi-lateral by ideal the or reversible cothe real with a being the coreal ends up respondence, whereby is it ideality in the through which return constituted determine. to supposed 56Cf. Laruelle, 1981, pp. 77-78.

60 3. Confusion of the exteriority of the entity 'itself', as instance of unobjectifiable immanence, to all forms of presentation, not just thought, with the unobjectifiable transcendence of the entity's Being `as such' relative to intentional consciousness. Confusion, in other words, of the unobjectifiable immanence of the phenomenon `itself with the unobjectifiable transcendenceproper to the phenomenality (=Being) of the phenomenon `as such'. What is Laruelle trying to distinguish here? What exactly is being in these three instances of materiological amphiboly between ontic and elided ontological; real asymmetry and ideal reciprocity; exteriority of immanence and exteriority of transcendence? Basically, for Laruelle, each of these materiological amphibolies is a function of the idealizing -and crypto-Hegelian- elision of the transcendental distinction insists between he on upholdingan unobjectifiable -which dimension of real or `ontic' immanence, and an unobjectifiable dimension of ideal or ontological transcendence. Whilst the refusal to recognize the claim for its idealism, is for former Laruelle the materiology, symptomatic of of

61 part, is invariably indexed by a philosophically confused hybrid or mixture'? of ontic immanence and ontological objectivity. In other words, materiology mistakes the real but unobjectifiable immanence of the `thing itself, independent of its phenomenological presentation, for the idealized or transcendent reality of the object `as such'. More precisely, it operates on the basis of a variedly proportioned hybrid of real and reality, immanence and transcendence. It is this confusion of the phenomenon or entity's with the unobjectifiable transcendence of its unobjectifiable exteriority phenomenality `as such', its Being, that underlies the materiological confusion of real with ideal and the confusion of the latter's unilateral determination by the former with their bi-lateral co-determination. We will have more to say about the motif of unilateral asymmetry as far as the relation of real and ideal is concerned in the following chapter. For the time being, however, it is necessary to focus on this fundamental, distinction between immanence constantly reiterated unobj ectifiable ontic and lays behind What transcendence. this apparently unobj ectifiable ontological 57Laruelle contends that all philosophical thinking is intrinsically constituted through the articulation Consequently, hybrid an analysis of materiological thinking which shows structure. composite of a or how it operates on the basis of a typically philosophical `hybrid' or `mixture' (mixte) of real immanence and ideal transcendence is the fundamental precondition for the non-materialist `dualysis' intend For Decision to pursue. a preliminary examination of this materiological we of materiological hybridisation of real and ideal, cf. infra, Chapter 2, pp. 90-97; but especially Chapter 3, pp. 121-141. For general elucidation conceIfling the status of philosophical Decision in non-philosophical theory. by its hybrid for the or composite structure as occasional cause and role played and an examination of 218-258. dualysis, Chapter 5, in infra, the pp. non-philosophical cf. of process empirical material

62 obscure Laruellean contrast between the unobjectifiability of the phenomenon 'itself' nd the unobjectifiability its of phenomenality `as such'? The fundamental philosophical reference for understanding this Laruellean contrast lies in the `material phenomenology' of Michel Henry. Central to the latter is the distinction between an `en-static' dimension of real immanence and an `ek-static;' ideal transcendence; a distinction realm of formulated the by phenomenological Henry critique on of basis Husserl of and a particularly Heidegger. trenchant Consequently, following a brief recapitulation of that critique, the next chapter will try to show how Laruelle's transcendental separation of the tel quel from the comme tel must be understood in terms of a `non-phenomenological' radicalisation of Henry's phenomenological distinction58. 58As we shall see, the crucial non-phenomenological nuance in the Laruellean radicalisation of Henry's distinction concerns specifically whether the enstatic immanence Henry invokes is to be understood in terms of the phenomenality of the phenomenon `as such', or in terms of the phenomenon `itself. Although focusing specifically on the relation between Levinas and Laruelle, the comprehensive overview of the interface between phenomenology and non-philosophy provided in Hughes Choplin's De la Phenomenologie ä la Non-Philosophie also includes a succinct but useful precis of the Laruelle/Henry connection. Cf. Choplin, 1997, especially pp. 33-49 and 116-117. In contrast to Choplin however, the intent throughout our account of the relation between Laruelle and Henry will be to emphasize the profound discontinuity between the phenomenological and the non-philosophical invocation of radical immanence.

63 CHAPTER MICHEL HENRY: 2 MATERIAL PHENOMENOLOGY En-stasis/Ek-stasis In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics59, Heidegger famously identify to the transcendental difference between phenomenon and proposes in-itself with the ontico-ontological difference between the entity and its Being, phenomenon and phenomenality. He does so, moreover, by reading the schematising function of the transcendental imagination, its synthesizing intuition in the production of schemata as transcendental of concept and determinations of time -the appearing of appearances-, as an analogue for the temporalising function of Dasein's ekstatico-horizonal transcendence. However, Henry, in The Essence of Manifestation and subsequent difference Heidegger's the transcendental that alignment of works60, argues between intra-temporal difference the phenomena and ontico-ontological with temporalising phenomenality, wherein the latter dimension is originarily 59Cf. Heidegger, 1990. 60Cf. Henry, The Essence of Manifestation (English translation 1973, original French publication (English translation 1993, original French 1962); but also The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis 1990. Materielle, Phenomenologie 1985); and publication

64 anchored in Dasein's Being as ekstatico-horizonal transcendence, falls short of attaining the authentically transcendental and, Henry provocatively insists, constitutively atemporal essence of originary phenomenological Being. According to Henry, Heidegger, like Husserl before him, still operates within the parameters of what the former, following Husserl, refers to as a `Worldly' and transcendent phenomenological) (i. e. ontico-empirical than rather rigorously characterisation of the phenomenon's transcendental phenomenality; which is to say, its Being. The hallmark of such worldliness, far as as Henry is concerned, is the failure to acknowledge the radical asymmetry or heteromorphy between two fundamentally incommensurable modes of phenomenalisation: the ideal, or ekstatico-temporal modality of phenomenalisation through which phenomena first become intentionally apprehended and given for consciousness according to the horizonal ekstasis of World; and the absolute immanence-to-itself of en-static auto-affection as the real but non-intentional phenomenalisation; phenomenality, asymmetry the and veritable subtending heteromorphy or all non-representable phenomenological ekstatico-temporal regulating the relation essence of `substance' of manifestation. The between these two incommensurable modalities according to Henry is a variant on a classical but under appreciated Neoplatonic philosopheme: ekstatic transcendence

65 distinguishes itself unilaterally from distinguish not maintains, itself enstatic immanence while the latter does from the former in return. Accordingly, the phenomenological Henry `substance' of ekstatic visibility, its originary phenomenality, is woven out of enstatic invisibility, but enstasis is never revealed, never disclosively articulated within ekstasis, its invisible opacity absolves itself from reflexive illumination in the light of ekstasis61:"It is only as an un-seeing, in not relating to itself in a seeing, in not revealing itself through a seeing, and thus as un-seen, as invisible, that seeing " (Henry, 1990, 111) itself. effectuates p. Thus, according to Henry, the genuinely real, phenomenologicotranscendental condition for the ideal, intentional the structures of temporalising ekstasis through which phenomena become apprehended by in disclosure is immanence World the the the of enstatic of consciousness auto-affection as the ontological metaphysical) prima (but, Henry insists, definitively non- materia through which the phenomenality of the is originarily phenomenon is It phenomenological constituted. materiality as light invisible in the that which remains entirely occluded, of ekstatic in-itself the as real or phenomenality phenomenality absolute manifestation, condition 6I As for the structures of intentional ideality through which the be to Henry's the theme below, subjected will asymmetry of unilateral of mobilization we will see

66 phenomenon is grasped in consciousness. Consequently, Henry will argue, "'Matter', for material phenomenology as understood in its decisive opposition to hyletics, no longer indicates the other of phenomenality but its " essence. (I `always d, p. 58) Phenomenological `matter' then, for Henry, is the already' of radical transcendental Affectivity exteriority immanence as pure Affectivity-in-itself; absolved of the reference to the empirical instance. It is absolute auto-affection wherein of an affecting givenness and given are indivisibly locked together in the grip of archi- originary self-Impression. Henry and Husserl How does Henry arrive at these provocative We conclusions? will for initially to these puzzling claims now attempt provide some clarification by considering Henry's reconstruction of the problematic of formulated in his Husserlian `givenness' the of critique as phenomenological in (a internal the opening time-consciousness62 critique set out analysis of briefly We Materielle). Phenomenologie Henry's recapitulate shall chapter of it here, to that the main points of ask whether or not without pausing critique J I does full justice to the labyrinthine intricacies Husserl's text. insufficiently it by Laruelle that the remains grounds on a stringent critique equivocal. 62Cf. Husserl, 1964. rigorous and basically

67 For Husserl, the immanent flux of phenomenological subjectivity, which has as its locus the living present of transcendental consciousness, is self-constituting: it is at once that which does the constituting (or the giving), and that which is constituted (or given); the co-incidence of appearing and of that which produces appearing. This self-constituting character of the living is in the structure of auto-temporalisation accomplished present rooted according to the three modalities of temporal givenness: that of the `now' or punctual present; that of retention; and that of protention. But Husserl's account shows these three forms of temporal synthesis to be intrinsically fissured by a constitutive structural equivocation: they are species of noetic intentionality implying at once an intra-temporal distinction in the order of their logical consecutiveness; and a transcendental distinction between that is does through the that the constituted or given synthesis, and which which constituting, the giving, or synthesizing. Now, Henry identifies this latter distinction between synthesizing and synthesized, givenness and given, as one which is fundamentally in logico-temporal, But, than nature. phenomenologico-transcendental, rather he argues, an acknowledgement of the rigorously transcendental character of this distinction -insofar intrinsically it inheres as in the structure of logicoit incompatible the with transcendental synthesis per se- renders

68 consecutive structure of inter-articulation between these syntheses according to Husserl. For to characterise the inter-articulation of these modalities of transcendental syntheses according to an order of logico-temporal consecution be to relapse from a strictly phenomenological to a worldly would -i. e. empirico-transcendent, rather than transcendental-immanent- viewpoint: the synthesis of retentional giving would then be seen as something succeeding the present which it gives to intentional consciousness by retaining it, according to a temporal order of logical succession experienced by empirical consciousness. However, Henry is this argues, precisely does: Husserl he what accounts for the upsurge of the `now' in the consciousness of the living present through the retentive synthesis by which every `now' is constituted as in `having just invokes the taken the given, retained present as place'; and `now' continuous upsurge of a perpetually renascent -one which remains fundamentally unconstituted, heterogeneously inserted within the immanent flux of transcendental consciousness through the transcendent auspices of a in `impression'order to explain the origination of the retentive noematic in it `now' the given consciousness. present synthesis which will constitute as As a result, Husserl can only explain the genesis of these originary `acts' of by recourse to an already constituted synthesis: phenomenological synthesis

Im 69 "each constitutive phase of the flux only accedes to phenomenality insofar as it is itself constituted[....]it never phenomenalises itself as constituting and ] that which is ultimately constitutive remains `anonymous"'(Ibid, p.44) .. Thus, for Husserl, even at the level of absolute transcendental be insofar it is the consciousness, given can only given as constituted as insist Yet Husserl the time, to that givenness and given. at -,am. continues by be isomorphic, that they an unbridgeable given cannot are separated transcendental abyss, that the structures of the given cannot be projected back "It is thus evident that the phenomena their conditions: constituting onto which are constitutive of time are as a matter of principle objectivities other be in ]Similarly, in there time[.. than those constituted no sense saying of can been, have that they are successive or in they that the they them that now, are 1990, in Henry, 1964, " (Husserl, quoted simultaneous relative to one another. 45) p. Consequently, simultaneously two Henry argues, ultimately Husserl incompatible is forced claims: to maintain that absolute is the that unbridgeable and transcendental consciousness self-constituting, divide between constituting possibility of the constituting and constituted effectively forecloses the being given as constituting. synthesis ever In back the to the the Husserl traces given of genesis carefully other words,

70 originary noetic syntheses of givenness, only to collapse the genesis of givenness qua givenness back into the realm of the given. For Henry, this circularity marks Husserl's signal failure to explain the putatively auto-constitutive or self-giving transcendental consciousness. By continuously character of absolute shifting back and forth between the phenomenologico-transcendental and the worldly-empirical he tries to account for the origination of the constituting perspective whenever synthesis as such, Husserl compromises the rigour of his own categorical distinction between the realm of constitutive phenomenality transcendental temporalisation as givenness of the given- and the domain of the constituted phenomenon as that which is intra-temporally or empirically given. Moreover, as far as Henry is concerned, it is precisely becausethe business of transcendental phenomenology lies exclusively in uncovering the originary modalities of phenomenality according to the `how' of their `what' to the than as manifested according phenomenalisation, rather inability Husserl's that constituted phenomenon, to grasp the originary fundamental indexes phenomenological a upsurge of givenness qua givenness failure.

71 The Ur-Impression Coincidence Phenomenon as of and Phenomenality However, Henry maintains, the fact that Husserl's own account requires the origination of a perpetually renascent `now' in the appeal to an `Ur-impression' as something remaining heterogeneous to all consciousness of impression constituted as given through the `now', provides a clue to the authentically transcendental, sub-intentional condition for all ekstatico- intentional phenomenality: "Why impression is continuously there anew is something we have begun to understand: because nothing comes into being be it in the site wherein being first grasps itself in the pathos of its unless Parousia. Because the origin is a pathos, because the latter is always original in effect as such, nothing comesforth unless it be as an impression, which for that reason `is always there "' (Henry, ibid, p.49) Thus, Henry argues, Husserl's phenomenology of internal-time consciousness simultaneously its encounters own unarticulated condition and glimpses the veritable ontological in hypothesis `Urthe the essence of phenomenalisation of impression' as that which is irreducible to the consciousness of impression it is because `always in For Henry, the the already given'. constituted present intentional constitution articulated erroneous paradigm of givenness as through the three passive synthesis of transcendental temporalisation which

,q 72 prevents Husserl from seeing in the Ur-impression that through which the self-givenness of transcendental consciousness itself comes to be constituted; the archi-originary but sub-intentional or non-ekstatic paradigm of givenness in which the `how' of givenness and the `what' which is given finally achieve perfect phenomenological co-incidence. Thus, Henry maintains, a proper phenomenological comprehension of the Ur-impression demands that it be understood not simply as a `something' that is impressed (a quid, a what, a but phenomenon), also as a self-impressing; as an impression coinciding with the `how' of impressionality per se; the sheer phenomenality or Being of the phenomenon. More precisely, Henry suggests, the Ur-impression be must in indivisible `how' terms the the of understood co-incidence of ontological `what', the givenness and given, phenomenality and phenomenon. and ontic The self-impressing Ur-impression, to the proper is Henry, the selfsays itself in through the alone: pure phenomenological and given givenness of Being as absolute, self-constituting, immanence subsisting in-itself phenomenality, furnishing auto-affection; a sub-intentional hither the side of temporalised and on ekstasis with the living phenomenological This for the the non-punctual phenomenon. phenomenality of substance in Parousia the of an eternally absolute coincidence of givenness and given `living timeless the but provides present' unrepresentable self-impressing

19 73 ontological `material' basis the on of which the passive syntheses of intentional consciousness effect their constitutively temporal articulation of phenomena. `The Historiality Moreover, Absolute': the of Eternal Subjective Life for Henry, in contrast to Heidegger, Husserl's inability to recognize the originary en-static essenceof phenomenality cannot merely be the result of the failure to maintain a sufficiently rigorous distinction between ontological temporalisation and ontic temporality. According to Henry, Heidegger himself phenomenology fails to recognize that the fundamental issue for is no longer that of distinguishing between time and temporalisation, but that of acknowledging the radical asymmetry between temporalized and temporalising ekstasis on the one hand, and the atemporal The that their the enstasis constitutes essence on other. profound truth by in Henry Husserl the of reduction, suggests -one that glimpsed problematic Heidegger passed over inadvertently in his rejection of that problematic- , finds its authentic fulfilment in the recognition that, through the Ur- impression's absolute inherence-in-itself, ekstatic transcendence has, so to from been `always the transcendentally excluded reduced; already' speak, indivisible self-inherence of enstatic immanence.

74 Thus, for all its originality, Heidegger's attempt at grounding the transcendence of intentionality in ekstatico-horizonal projection, insists, Husserlian merely replays the amphiboly of Henry conditioning phenomenality and conditioned phenomenon through which the ontological essence of temporalising phenomenality is apprehended on the basis of the temporal phenomenon, and the former reinvested with all the features of the latter. In the final analysis, Henry argues, both the noetico-noematic transcendence-in-i münanence characteristic of the intentional structure of pure transcendental consciousness, horizonal the and projection Dasein's of fail "How are of ek-stasis: can standing-outside-itself ultimately species one to notice that[... J 'being-in' consciousness as intentional inherence already designates nothing other than the `There' of that `outside' which the notion of Dasein seeks to think - how can one not notice that, far from being different in the two cases, the sense of the word `being', of the `sein' in Bewußt-sein and in Da-sein, insofar as it tries to designate phenomenality as such, is precisely the same?" (Ibid. p. 109) Subsisting `beneath' temporal ekstasis then for Henry lies its authentically non-temporal ontological condition; enstatic auto-affection as "the irremissible, unsurpassable and irrefrangible embracing of life by itself, life's is how because divide is the in self-giving there of no which embrace

75 neither Ek-stasis nor its endlessproduction, but rather precisely this passivity which remains fundamentally enduring Ek-stasis, to alien enduring [le souffrir] as self- life in every point of its being: Impression. " (ibid., p. 57) But of Impression as absolute affectivity, as hyperpassivity, is in turn the ontological essence of the sub-jektum; auto-affectivity is constitutively subjective: "This originary self-givenness of givenness is the self-feeling [le s'eprouver soimeme] of absolute subjectivity, which is to say subjectivity itself as such[.. ]In the self-feeling of absolute subjectivity original Ipseity is born, the Self-same grasped in its internal possibility, to which every `self', even the most external, secretly refers. "(Ibid, p. 74) Consequently, for Henry, not only is phenomenological subjectivation Heideggercontra not temporal constitution; ndmentally finite on account of its ekstatico- the ontological essenceof subjectivity turns out to be atemporal and eternal at its very phenomenological root. Yet, because it can be indifferent between to the only characterised as metaphysical opposition the immutability of the eternal and the mutability of the temporal, auto- be by its Life affecting must understood as changeless precisely virtue of ever-changing-ness, Henry that, as writes so "When originary sensation does its is, is that that there and we say, not withdraw, something withdraws, like life. What is thus some not remains essence as auto-affection of

76 unchanging substance in the midst of universal passing away, like a stone at the bottom of the river historiality is [l'historial de the the of absolute -it l'absolu], the eternal coming into itself of life. Because this coming never forth, ceases surging that which remains is change, not dehiscence and escape outside itself at every instant but that which, on the contrary, in the feeling of itself and as the implosion of that feeling, attains to itself, grasps itself, increases itself frort üs own being. "(Ibid, p. 55) So, underlying ekstatic finitude, according to Henry, but on the hither between being becoming, lies the the side of metaphysical antagonism and immutable mutability of enstatic Life in the unrepresentable plenitude of its increase, in its increase. That unreifiable metastasis, eternal movement of constitutes temporalisation's radically `kinematicity', enstatic its originary, kinematicity it is this non-spatio-temporal non-spatio-temporal essence, and by by Henry is oblique of an way cryptically characterised which -perhaps impression's `historiality' in Heideggerthe terms to of absolute of allusion perpetual self-impressing. Now, the precise conceptual lineaments Henry's of philosophical detail in into delve for far to Heidegger too complex any us are relation to between link definite the however, the here. We shall, phenomenological note `always already' of auto-affectivity as non-spatio-temporal -but nevertheless,

77 according to Henry, historialising- essence of subjectivation, and what Heidegger in Being and Time designates as that dimension of `attunement' (Gestimmtheit; Stimmung) or `pre-disposition' (Befindlichkleit) which is a constitutive component for the `historial' (Geschichtlichkeit) character of Dasein's temporalized subjectivation. That link is important because the in describes between Henry terms the unilateral asymmetry of which relation the immanent reality of enstasis and the transcendent ideality of ekstasis is clearly neither that of a straightforwardly metaphysical opposition, nor one is logical Enstasis to priority. an order of merely coordinated according is (although indissociably the reverse clearly, constitutive of ekstasis always certainly not true). More fundamentally, it seemsto us that Henry wishes to root Dasein's Being (a-letheia) for the transcendence of non-latency as site unobjectifiable as spatialising-temporalising invisibility the with in dimension a Dasein's philosophically of latency, is that constitutive of self-forgetfulness63 which of Being's enstatic kinematicity. of (Lichtung), immanence concomitant with Being's archi-originary unobjectifiable finitude `clearing' In other words, Henry wishes to root the ekstatico-horizonal project (and a fortiori, the Dasein's by Heidegger to contestable privilege accorded

78 intrinsically futural in the Ur-ekstasis of Being-unto-death), in the orientation eternal pre-disposition of Affect as absolute immanence of Dasein's `always already'; its radically unretainable and unrepresentable past. Immanence/Transcendence: Two Versions of the Unobjectifiable Thus, underlying all ekstatic phusys within what Heidegger calls `the openness of the open' -that openness which coincides with Being's bestowal of presencing yet which is also inseparably conterminous with Being's autoits occluding withdrawal, self-withholding as unobj ectifiable transcendenceand subtending even the unobjectifiable withdrawal through which ekstasis is dispensed, Henry discerns enstatic immanence -the radically subjective root of phenomenality-in-itself- has from that as which always already withdrawn constituted presence. But even this formulation is misleading. For, as we said it is be the that above, clearly not case enstasis and ekstasis can contrasted as if they were two distinct metaphysical principles, with the former underlying the latter. If the unrepresentable immanence of enstasis constitutes the it the then thereby also constitutes of phenomenality, essence ectifiable unobj Thus, the transcendence withdrawal of presencing. of ekstatic unobjectifiable 63"Life is forgetful by nature, as immanence, which insurmountably expels ek-stasis and thus all 211) "(Henry, 1993, forms thought. p. of possible

79 ekstatic transcendence has the withdrawal of enstatic immanence at its root: they are distinct but indiscernible. And it is in terms of this distinction of indiscernibles that the unilateral asymmetry previously alluded to must be understood. Unobjectifiable transcendence distinguishes itself from unobjectifiable immanence without the latter distinguishing itself from the former in return. The fact that the essence of presencing, in its enstatic immanence, has always already withdrawn from presence, constitutes and explains that originary self-withholding through which ekstatic transcendence withdraws from all constituted presence64. Consequently, what we will specifically retain from Henry's critique Husserl Heidegger is this radical phenomenological reworking of the of and transcendental distinction between real and ideal in terms of the indiscernible difference between enstasis and ekstasis. Where Henry's phenomenological predecessors situated that difference between phenomenon and it Henry time temporalisation, phenomenality, and now rearticulates as distinct but indiscernible between instances two obtaining necessarily of 64Laruelle's for in de la Difference is Les Philosophies Heidegger the notable particularly reading of himself, Heidegger in it thesis to this albeit with the crucial very ascribes a version of way which proviso that, according to Laruelle's reconstruction, it is precisely because the unobjectifiability of is in `that being function Da is the the each case mine' rather as which of phenomenon of enstasis a than of its phenomenality as rooted in the Sein, that the immanence of the former can constitute the by it is ideal Thus, latter the situating ontological ekstasis. as real, non-ontological essence of its Being, `Da', that immanence than that the the the of rather entity or side of on unobjectifiable Laruelle implicitly sides with what he -at least in Les Philosophies de la Difference - decides to call

80 unobjectifiability; two radically incommensurable yet phenomenologically inseparable forms of the from withdrawal reified presence: that of ideal, ekstatic transcendence, and that of real, enstatic immanence65.Moreover, it is Henry's rigorously phenomenological and transcendental -rather than speculative and metaphysical- redefinition 'in-itself' the of s radically immanent subjektum, eternally withdrawn from intentional illumination, that Laruelle will draw on in his critique of materiological thinking even as he subjects the notion of radical immanence to a thoroughly critical, and nonphenomenological, process of purification. The Phenomenological Thus, whilst Idealisation crediting Henry with Immanence of a rigorously argued demonstration of the way in which unobjectifiable transcendencepresupposes unobjectifiable immanence, Laruelle maintains that Henry's immanence, his identification it phenomenologisation of of with absolute immediately auto-affection, compromises the radicality of Henry's own discovery. The hyperbolic66 pathos of Henry's characterisations of radical Heidegger's `transcendental realism' against what he takes to be the latent transcendental idealism in Henry's ontologisation of immanence. Cf. Laruelle, 1986, esp. Chapters 3 and 4; pp. 55-120 65Although, difference Henry's the transcendental partially of rearticulation as we shall shortly see, reiterates the structural amphiboly between given and givenness, constituted and constituting, condition and conditioned, which Henry himself had criticized in his phenomenological predecessors. 66Interestingly immanence in Henry's as well as of radical phenomenology post-Heideggerean enough, in Levinas's post-Heideggerean phenomenology of radical transcendence, the pathos of the hyperbolic is inextricable from the apophantic logic of the phenomenon `as such'. Consequently, those

81 immanence (the absolutisation of subjectivity, the transcendentalising of Affectivity, the ultra-phenomenological vitalism) is in fact concomitant with Henry's philosophical immanence with Decision to ontologise immanence. For by identifying ontological auto-affection, Laruelle Henry argues, surreptitiously re-idealises it: he re-envelops the phenomenon of immanence `itself in the insidious transcendence proper to the phenomenality of immanence `as such'. However, in order to rescue the baby of radical immanence from the sullied phenomenological bathwater of auto-affection, we require fuller a understanding of those underlying philosophical for idealization. Henry's mechanisms responsible Henry's phenomenological idealization of immanence has two ideological aspects: one infrastructural. or superstructural; the other substantive or The former aspect is indexed by the glaringly arbitrary `affectivity'; identify `materiality' decision Henry's to with character of an by deeply identification unconvincing which remains apparently gratuitous any philosophical difficult it just For Laruelle's. certainly seems standards, not initiator be Henry's the to to reconcile claim `material of a idealist as philosopheme classically otherwise an such with phenomenology' for to fundamentalists) (Husserlian a rational a return militating phenomenological conservatives like Henry thinkers and of the radicalism pathological rigorously against phenomenological sobriety `excessively `just they or that latter exaggerating', are Levinas, attacking the on the grounds

82 the above cited absolutisation of subjectivity, or with the more or less explicitly religious tenor of Henry's characterisation of Life as eternal subjective Pathos67. One cannot help feeling that, in the process of `desubstantialisation' and `de-hylification', `matter' has become so thoroughly and successfully spiritualised by Henry that there is no longer anything `physical' left about it. Perhaps this is Henry's goal. For after this remotely remainderless phenomenologisation of matter, the materialist hypothesis of an unphenomenologisable dimension of reality becomes effectively ruled out of court as an instance of pre-philosophical dogmatism. Thus, through a tour de force of tactical manoeuvring, Henry's pre-emptive idealization of the materialist wishing to contest the transcendental fundamental subjectivity of a resource in his agon with matter robs privileging of phenomenological idealism: the appeal to an a priori unphenomenologisable physical reality68 This surreptitious phenomenological imperialism renders it difficult to feeling is the that there escape something singularly disingenuous in Henry's choice of the term `material phenomenology' to describe his philosophical flagrant project; a quid pro quo which can only confirm the fears of those hyperbolic', are typically missing the point. It may well be that phenomenological thought is constitutively pathological. 67The fact that Henry has recently published a book entitled C'est moi la verite. Pour une philosophie du christianisme [I am the truth. For a philosophy of Christianity ] (Paris: Seuil, 1996), hardly comes as a great surprise.

83 who suspect that phenomenology's presumptuous relegation of all physical science to the `naive' realm of the natural attitude is invariably a prelude to disastrous varieties of the most anthropocentric idealism. Physicists, biologists, cosmologists, and other benighted denizens of the natural attitude may be forgiven for greeting with incredulity the revelation that `materiality' in its ultimate ontological essence, far from having anything to do with particle collisions, DNA, or spiral nebulae, is in fact synonymous with Eternal Subjective Life. Coupled with this (typically phenomenological) transcendentalisation of subjective Affect, Henry's decision to equate `Life' `Matter' with not only seems more than a little ad hoc; at a more profound level, it seems to us to be indicative of the manner in which the expression `material phenomenology' account of is doomed to remain forever oxymoronic on deep-rooted methodological phenomenological enterprise as such; assumptions intrinsic assumptions operating to the entirely independently of Henry's own superficial ideological prejudices69. 68Cf. our earlier comments concerning the parochial, dubiously intuitionistic character of the phenomenological conception of `phenomenality' in our Introduction, supra, pp. 24-27. 69Thus, anti-scientific prejudices of the most wearyingly familiar kind certainly play a fairly central role in the contempt Henry displays toward any suggestion that the physical sciences may have something to contribute to our philosophical understanding of materiality. And while he dismisses as "barbarism" the "belief that scientific knowledge constitutes the unique form of genuine, veridical, in March 1989, la La Recherche, 208, (Henry, "Ce knowledge" pp. que science ne sait pas" objective 422-426; quoted in Schmid, 1998), Henry seems entirely oblivious to the manner in which a `material have disregard in flagrant to teach that the sciences everything physical of phenomenology' carried out intellectual barbarism. form in fact be to tantamount a of about matter may

84 In this particular case, the methodological assumptions underlying this phenomenological idealization of immanence have their substantive root, their infrastructural basis, in the structure of the philosophical Decision through which Henry articulates his phenomenologisation of matter. In fact, the unilateral asymmetry governing the relation between enstatic immanence and ekstatic transcendence belies a particularly complex triadic structure, which we shall come to recognize as characteristic of all philosophical Decision as far as Laruelle is concerned70.For we have to bear in mind that, immanence Henry, is at once absolute, indivisible, autonomous; to according dyadic distinction it the coordinated and with which composes as constituting term reciprocally articulated with the constituted counterpart. Thus, enstatic hand, the auto-affection simultaneously constitutes, on one an absolutely invisibility; relationless, self-inhering between the the other, and on relation the invisible essence of appearing and its visible ek-sistence. It is at once the self-constituting, invisible, essence of phenomenality; invisibility by the constitutive coupling composed dyadic the and of phenomena and their immanence invisible-in-itself As the as radical a result, constituted visibility. between by is Indivision the relation surreptitiously sub-divided or absolute the visible and the invisible as a transcendent dyad or Division. 70Cf. infra, Chapter 5, pp. 218-230.

Im 85 The Relative Absolute Consequently, what Henry initially presents as a strictly unilateral asymmetry between the absolute self-inherence of radical immanence and the relative, ekstatic exteriority of transcendence, actually presupposes an bi-lateral ultimately symmetry, a reciprocal co-respondence between absolute immanence and relative, and transcendence. The fact that, for Henry, enstasis has to absolve itself from ekstasis, even as it constitutes the latter, renders it relative to ekstasis once again. For even in excluding transcendence from itself through its absolute self-inherence, immanence has to relate to it its it in that to absolute selforder achieve precisely as which must exclude inherence. Absolute immanence bears a latent, implicitly constitutive fact it by itself the that to transcendence expels very virtue of within reference it. As a result, Henry's phenomenology of absolute immanence does not in interrupting succeed the quintessentially philosophical (or quasi-Hegelian) (transcendence) the and nonthat relation of relation always posits circle (immanence); the ultimate relativity of absolute and relative. relation Crucially, it is in order to dispense once and for all with this `absolute' in the very notion of pernicious residue of ultimate relativity immanence, that Laruelle will invoke an immanence whose radicality resides in its foreclosure or indifference -rather than exclusion or opposition- to all

86 those instances of dyadic coupling which are variations on the originary dyad of immanence/transcendence: unilateral/bilateral; thinkable/unthinkable; absolute/relative; asymmetry/symmetry; identity/difference, and so on. If immanence is to be truly radical rather than absolute, Laruelle argues, then it be can neither thinkable nor unthinkable; nor even the differance between the thinkable and the unthinkable; it can only be that which is simply foreclosed foreclosure indifferent dyad that to the thinkable/unthinkable, or without becoming retroactively constitutive its immanence. of In other words, Laruelle insists, our nominal definition or characterisation of immanence in in is dyadic forms Decision its foreclosure to terms of no way of all description is immanence. It immanence of not our qua constitutive of immanence as indifferent that constitutes it as indifferent. To suggest the it is idealism: into thought that to for is, Laruelle, to maintain relapse contrary it is immanence if Thus, is always co-constitutive of the real. real, radical is it And that indifferent radical to characterisations. our must remain be definitions indifference which guarantees that our entirely adequate can becoming immanence instance) to (albeit only in the last without somehow constitutive determining or it. We shall return to these crucial points in foreclosed is immanence if it that Chapter 5. For the time being, suffice to say the between thinkable differance the and to the dyadic articulation or

87 unthinkable, this is not the same as saying that it resists it, expels it, or is otherwise obliged to absolve itself from that dyadic distinction. On the Laruelle insists, immanence's radical autonomy lets the dyad subsist contrary, by allowing it its own relative autonomy?1. Thinkable/Unthinkable The impenetrable opacity of Henry's absolute immanence, by way of is that which, contrast, by unilaterally absolving itself from the dilatory transcendence of ekstatic differentiation, effectively crushes dyadic couplings such as those of Its thought/unthought. being/becoming, absolute, phenomenon/phenomenality; unrepresentable immediacy forcibly flattening dyadic through together the terms mediation, coupled compresses them onto one another at the point of their indivisible, enstatic coincidence; for importantly immediation. Most in their absolute crushing them together dyadic from itself in the through mediation absolving our present purposes, becomes immediacy ultimately articulation thinkable/unthinkable, enstatic co-constituted by it: the absolute immediation of the dyad be immanence for Henry, thinkable as that, thinkable/unthinkable requires In idealism. is The thinkable. other result as unthinkable and unthinkable (i. by (i. ideal the thought) e. determination the real e. the of words, 71Cf. infra, Chapter 5, pp. 248-251.

88 immanence) is secured only through that of the real (immanence) by the ideal (thought). Henry's absolute immanence is constituted as unthinkable through thought, just as thought or the thinkable is constituted through unthinkable immanence. A consideration of Henry's reconstruction72 of Descartes' protophenomenological reduction in the Meditations should help clarify this point. In that reconstruction, Henry suggests that a transcendental distinction between the dubitability of constituted appearanceand the indubitability of its its sheer appearing, originary phenomenality, is crystallized in Descartes' "At ("At least, it the certe videre videor" very seems to me that I see"), wherein the videor, that originary upsurge of seeming which is irreducible to the seen, figures for Cartesian phenomenology as the self-appearing of appearances,the invisible in thought and unthinkable enstatic self-sensing of which remains the ekstatic exteriority intentional of representation: "Thought's primal (i. the sentimus nos videre e. the self-sensing that originally presents sensing, 's it is, it itself thought to self-appearing) appearance what and makes radically is hearing, touching, and that the to rules seeing, sensing opposed even understanding /insofar intueri); it is a seeing, as it is opposed to determinations inhabits in these and transcendental seeing general, which all

89 has its essence in ek-stasis. Thought's essential self-sensing is not merely different from ek-static sensing; it excludes it, and precisely this exclusion determines the concept of immediacy. " (Henry, 1993, 22). p. According thought's within to Henry then, enstatic immediacy at once constitutes absolutely immediate self-sensing, the transcendental element which thought has `always already' begun to think; yet it is simultaneously unthinkable precisely insofar as it constitutes consciousness' unrepresentable, unintelligible grasping of itself. Consequently, the enstatic essenceor originary phenomenality of thinking is simultaneously qualified by Henry as inhering constitutively in all thought, as the essenceof the thinkable, through which thought has always already begun thinking; but also as constitutively unthinkable, as utterly recalcitrant to exposure in the ekstatic cogitation, intentional realm of Yet that unthinkability is thought through the thinking it has made possible; just as thought `is' through its unthinkable ontological essence. And although the enstatic immanence of thought's self- is immediation the sensing absolute of the transcendent distinction between the thinkable and the unthinkable, that absolute immediation, that selfin it both thought: sensing, subsists and as constitutes thought's self-sensing but is immediate thinkable essence as also coincidence of and unthinkable; 72Cf. Henry, 1993, Chapters 2& discussion Ch. 11-40. The Descartes 1, through of continues pp. esp.

90 inseparable from, and ultimately co-constituted by, the intentional thinking or `transcendental seeing' within which the dyadic distinction between thinkable and unthinkable subsists. The result is that, for Henry, thinking simultaneously something separate and inseparable from auto-affection; is immanence is both thinkable and unthinkable. Moreover, it is thinkable as unthinkable, as self-sensing of thought; while its unthinkable essence constitutes the essenceof the thinkable as `transcendental seeing'. Immanence `itself' Immanence or `as such'? What are we to conclude then from Henry's characterisation of radical immanence as absolute immediation of the thinkable and the unthinkable? This primarily: that auto-affecting immanence as enstatic immediacy of the thinkable and the unthinkable, absolving itself from the dyadic distinction between thinkable and unthinkable, engenders a quasi-absolute idealism of is immediacy `reality' the only separableas of enstatic auto-affection wherein from inseparability its ideal the transcendence through of ekstatic real is immanence In posited as absolutely separate other words, real mediation. through its inseparability from the transcendent ideality of thought; is through transcendent thought's constituted putatively positing conversely, final immanence. In the analysis, real the absolute separation of real 3, pp. 41-102.

91 immanence is obliged to absolve itself from ideal transcendence by transcendent means. Thus, Henry's phenomenological immanence is posited as the absolute immediation of given and givenness; it is posited as absolute in virtue of a transcendent Decision through which the unilateral asymmetry between enstatic immediation and ekstatic mediation is surveyed from above, from seen a viewpoint of transcendent exteriority and circumscribed within an encompassing reversibility, an ultimately bi-lateral symmetry73. This is the price to be paid for the ontologisation of immanence. Immanence affects itself in order to phenomenalise itself, but through that auto-phenomenalisation, it is the phenomenality of immanence `as such', rather than the phenomenon of immanence `itself' that is manifested. Moreover, we have seen how this ontological idealisation of immanence has its source in Henry's phenomenologically motivated elision of the transcendental separation between the comme tel and the tel quel, thought and thing, description and constitution; a refusal which leads him to construe immanence as consisting in the auto-affecting `immediation' of 73Although implicit II, Laruelle's Philosophie Henry throughout an explicit nonabound critiques of in does Laruelle's immanence Henry's work appear not of radical philosophy philosophical critique of until Philosophie III, in Principes de la non Philosophie (1996). Moreover, although the main points have features Laruelle's draw here there, not attempted to we analysis of on certain of our critique 1996, Cf. Laruelle, its because technicality. it detail pp. of considerable non-philosophical reiterate any 116-125; 133-143; 228-231.

92 phenomenality and phenomenon; thought and thing; description and constitution. It is in terms of this phenomenological elision that we can understand Henry's attempt to trace the ekstatic distinction of thought and thing back to its veritable phenomenological condition in the indivisible enstatic being; his thinking coincidence of phenomenality and phenomenon, and and invocation of the asymmetry between their enstatic coincidence and their distinction. ekstatic It is this attempt to root transcendence in immanence, latter, leads in to an through the the which absolutisation of ekstasis enstasis, idealism of auto-affecting immanence; to the absolute ideality of an immanence which posits itself for itself through its own transcendent other (ekstasis). Henry conflates the phenomenon of immanence as radically foreclosed to transcendence, (but and separate-without- separation) separate with the phenomenality distinction immanence as absolute of that repels immanence the through leads latter The to of transcendence. an absolutisation the but reinforces transcendence, merely which an absolutisation expulsion of reciprocal immanence between transcendence; a and co-dependence intrinsically inscribed the circular structure of philosophical within reciprocity Decision as relation of relation and non-relation.

93 By way of contrast to Henry's ontologisation as immanence-to-itself -a self-relation immanence of absolute concomitant with the phenomenological idealization of immanence `as such', wherein the `to' indexes the enstatic immediation of immanence's self-inherence-, Laruelle's Principe de Minorite invokes a phenomenon of immanence which is "positively devoid [.. ] of relation to...self. This new immanence can be said to be ontic or real. Ontic, and not ontico-ontological: the objective entity, the one which appears as an object, is an ontico-ontological hybrid [mixte], and it is usually this hybrid which is mistakenly confused with the entity. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 125) Moreover, it is in terms of the unobjectifiable immanence proper to the phenomenon of immanence 'itself, rather than that hybridisation ontico-ontological of phenomenon and phenomenality, real and ideal, associated with the phenomenality of immanence `as such', that we itself; identity to the the a radically proper phenomenon of matter must seek immanent identity which is separate (yet without-separation) from that process of ontological idealization it whereby is confused with the hybridisation of phenomenon and phenomenality. phenomenological Thus, Laruelle's non-phenomenological radicalisation of the between thought and thing, phenomenon and phenomenality, separation comme tel and tel quel, wilt necessitate a reconceptualisation of unilateral

94 asymmetry wherein immanence's radical autonomy neither constitutes nor excludes, but rather gives-without-givenness transcendence's relative autonomy; a non-phenomenological giving which will transform the bilateral correspondence between immanence and transcendence into an Identity without synthesis or unity, and a Duality without distinction or difference74. Instead of the idealism of Henry's bilateral correspondence between immanence and transcendence; instead of the circle of auto-position whereby the indivisible immediacy of phenomenon and phenomenality simultaneously is by division the constitutes and constituted mediating immediate; as determined aims at unilaterally a separation Laruelle's whereby through which it is non-phenomenological a radicalisation phenomenon-without-phenomenality determines the Decisional or phenomenological mixture of Real the as given-without-givenness and phenomenon and phenomenality; determines Ideal the self-positing circle of given and givenness; unilaterally the Ideal self-giving by brid of real and ideal. A fuller account of the precise ramifications of Laruelle's position initially the specifically of baffling description of radical immanence as `separate-without-separation'- will have to wait until Chapters 5 and 6. Nevertheless, we are now in a position to understand how Henry's `material 74Once again, this is an anticipatory, but for the time being rather obscure, contrast. Further

95 phenomenology' instantiates the three structural amphibolies in terms of which we characterised materiological thinking in the previous chapter75: it deliberately synthesizes the real phenomenon of immanence `itself with the ideal phenomenality of immanence `as such'; it substitutes an ultimately bilateral co-determination of the ontologically ideal and the ontically real for the strictly unilateral determination of the ideal by the real; finally, it roots the in immanence transcendence the of ekstasis of unobjectifiable unobjectifiable enstasis only to render the ontological absolutisation of the latter inseparable from former. the constitutively Thus, Henry confuses the unrepresentability of Being qua absolute immediation of giveness and given, phenomenality and phenomenon; with that of the Real as given-without-givenness, phenomenon-without- invoking by Being's Consequently, unrepresentable although phenomenality. intentionality, exteriority vis a vis ekstatic Henry's `material phenomenology' Marxist thesis the asserting of radicalisation proposes a non-metaphysical Being's exteriority to thought, it is able to do the former only insofar as it has immediation in Being the and terms of phenomenon enstatic of characterised from far how, have the Yet radical vouchsafing seen we phenomenality. idealism indexes immediation ideal, of their an enstatic and separation of real 7. 6 Chapters in be and provided clarification will

96 ontological auto-affection. In fact, Henry's `material phenomenology' merely supplants classical metaphysical materiology, such as that of Marxism for instance, with a transcendental materiology. For Laruelle as points out, the Marxist thesis of the exteriority of Being to thought is itself the result of an idealist elision of the distinction between the entity `as 'itself, such' and the entity a confusion of the entity with its Being and of the real with the ideal: "Being never opposes itself to thought, the problem does not arise, it is the real that is capable of opposing itself to thoseforms of ideality=of being=of presence wherein one must include thought. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 78) In other words, whereas the vulgar versions of Marxist materialism posit the exteriority Being to thought at an entirely empirical or ontic level, on the of basis of a `weak' or empiricist interpretation and critique of the Parmenidean axiom76 for which Hegel and Heidegger, albeit in their very different ways, provide `strong' a or quasi-transcendental reading; Henry posits Being's `exteriority' as transcendental vis a vis the realm of intentional ekstasis, but does so in terms of the enstatic immediation of thinking and Being. Thus, whereas the pre-Heideggerean variants of materialism remain materiological 75Cf. supra, Ch. 1, pp. 59-61. 76Usually rendered in English as "It is the same thing to think and to be". The identity-in-difference of thought and being posited by Parmenides is interpreted by Hegel in terms of the becoming-substance of subject and the becoming-subject of substance through the self-sundering, self-synthesizing Notion; while Heidegger for his part interprets it in terms of the originary Austrag or Unterschied through

97 on account of an empiricist failure to recognize the ontico-ontological is to say, quasi-transcendental- status -which difference between ideal and real, the of phenomenality and phenomenon, thought and thing; for Laruelle, postHeideggerean materiologies such as that of Henry operate on the basis of a quasi-Hegelian `sublation' (releve) of that difference. Nowhere is the immense power of this `sublation' better exemplified than in the explicitly anti-phenomenological materialism promulgated in Deleuze's work (both with and without Guattari). Significantly in this regard, Laruelle's Principe de Minorite contains a powerful but indirect critique of Deleuze's `machinic' materialism. The latter, Laruelle argues77"consummates the logico-transcendental and synthetic tendency contained within Kantianism. Nietzsche 'sfour or five fundamental theses (identity of force and differential of relation; identity of force and of the subject of force; identity of force and of its effects, etc.) provide the basis for an absolute hyletics [hyletique absolue] which remains the hyletic form of absolute idealism. It is filiation find this that the ultimate avatar of the Man-machine, albeit along we which thinking is `enowned' to Being and Being `enowned' to thought. For a discussion of the way in which non-philosophy suspends the Parmenidean axiom, cf. infra, Chapter 5, pp. 259-263. 77The reader should bear in mind that here as throughout almost all his writings, Laruelle deliberately indiscerns Nietzsche and Deleuze, so that whenever he says `Nietzsche', he also means `Deleuze', and vice versa. This is more than capricious indolence or lack of scholarly rigour on Laruelle's part. Since the Deleuze-Nietzsche tandem is used by Laruelle to index a specific variety of philosophical Decision, which is to say, a transcendentally rather than historically determined set of abstract conceptual body identifiable historically invariants than of rather a structures -a system of a priori syntactical doctrine- the proper names `Nietzsche and `Deleuze' are used by him indifferently. Cf. in this regard

98 an obviously non-mechanistic one, that of the generalised industrial machine and of the cog-man [l'homme-rouage] (in a non-metaphorical sense), that of `desiring-machines', and of the `mach_in_ic' as synthesis of hyletic syntheses, re-affirmation of the affirmation of relations of force, etc[.. J. "(Laruelle, 1981, p. 79) The next chapter will set out a detailed examination of Deleuze's work, and specifically of his collaborations with Guattari, in order to try and clarify Laruelle's oblique critique of what he designates here as the `hyletic form of absolute idealism', and to show how, in spite of Deleuze & Guattari's virulently anti-phenomenological stance, the Decisional structure of their machinic materialism reinstantiates those three instances of materiological identified in amphiboly earlier the context of Henry's phenomenology. We shall proceed in two stages. We will first set out the preconditions for Deleuze & Guattari's materialist transvaluation of the transcendental in the Deleuzean critique of representation. Then we will try to show why Laruelle believes the price to be paid for Deleuze & Guattari's `machinic constructivism' becoming-matter -matter's becoming-thought and thought's is hyletic continuumwithin an all encompassing ultimately idealism. kind hyletic a of absolute the `User's Guide' to Laruelle's Philosophies of Difference (Laruelle, 1986, pp. 5-14), wherein the

99 rationale for this flagrantly anti-scholastic methodology is explained.

100 CHAPTER DELEUZE & GUATTARI: 3 ABSOLUTE HYLETICS Materializing the Transcendental The initiating gesture of Deleuze & Guattari's philosophical project in the attempt to effect a materialist transvaluation of the consists precisely transcendental. In Anti-Oedipus the relation between `deleuzoguattarian' Kantian Critical is the schizo-analysis and apparatus explicitly addressed: "In he Critical discover Kant the to what called revolution, set out criteria that knowledge distinguish legitimate immanent to to were so as a and illegitimate use of the syntheses of consciousness. In the name of a transcendental he denounced (immanence the the transcendent use of of criteria) philosophy these syntheses such as it appeared in metaphysics. In the same way, we must Oedipus. And its to that own metaphysics, wit, say psychoanalysis possesses that a revolution, but this time a materialist one, can only proceed through the critique denouncing by Oedipus and of the illegitimate use of the Oedipal in in the such a psychoanalysis, syntheses of unconscious as revealed defined the through transcendental to unconscious a way as rediscover

101 immanence of its criteria, along with a corresponding practise of schizoanalysis. " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972, p. 89) 78 Underlying this libidinal-materialist appropriation is the Deleuzean claim that, as far as the empirical realm is concerned, the business of a genuinely critical transcendentalism lies in articulating ontological actuality rather than ideal conditions real conditions of of epistemological possibility. Transcendental philosophy requires the critique of representation rather than its legitimation. Thus, for Deleuze, the transcendental is not a substantive philosophical thesis affirming the subordination of objectivity to subjectivity, ontology to epistemology, but rather a polymorphic method wherein subjectivity and objectivity are suspended as equivocal, pre- philosophical categories and immanence becomes the operative functional criterion. In order to clarify the full philosophical import of these claims, however, let's briefly recapitulate the Deleuzean critique of representation as in Difference and Repetition (1968) and The Logic of Sense (1969). set out 781n upholding the rights of transcendental immanence against the claims of metaphysical transcendence, Deleuze & Guattari accord explicitly with the strictures set out by Kant: "We shall entitle the principles whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; and those, on the other hand, which profess to pass beyond those limits, transcendent[ transcendental and transcendent are not interchangeable terms. The principles of ]Thus, pure understanding which we have set out above, allow only of empirical, and not of transcendental employment, that is, employment extending beyond the limits of experience. A principle, on the other handd, which takes away these limits, or even commands us actually to transgress them, is called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in disclosing the illusion in these alleged principles, then even these principles which are merely of empirical employment may be calledd, in opposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure understanding. " (Kant, 1929, A295-296/B352-353, p. 299).

102 The Deleuzean Critique of Representation Already in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense Deleuze is explicitly to liberate a rigorously striving transcendental but sub- representational realm from what he takes to be the extraneous and transcendent set of phenomenological theses with which it had been saddled by Kant and Husserl. Against both, Deleuze argues that "The error of all determine to the transcendental as consciousness is that they think of efforts the transcendental in the image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground. " (Deleuze, 1990, p. 105) A rigorously immanent deployment of the transcendental problematic, Deleuze maintains, should transform it into a philosophical method capable of suspending every Those transcendent presuppositions are empirical presupposition. remnant of in legitimated, Deleuze the apparatus of argues, grounded and spuriously representation, with opposition its four cardinal hinges: identity in the predicate, judgement, in analogy in the concept, in and resemblance intuition79. These representational `collars' at once shackle thought and predetermine the parameters of possible experience, confining philosophy within the bounds of a categorial grid excluding the anomalous and by difference incidences conceptual unsubordinated of uncategorisable 79Cf. Deleuze, 1994, for instance pp. 29-35; pp. 137-138.

103 identity, external to the form of opposition, independent of analogy in judgement, and unrecognisable by intuition. Moreover, the representational grid staked out by these categorial syntheses is itself ultimately grounded in the form of the `I' (cogito or apperception) as paradigm of identification, condition of opposition, model of analogy and locus of intuition: The `I think' is the most general principle of representation in other words, the source of these elements and of the unity of all these faculties: I conceive [through the concept], I judge [through opposition], I imagine, I remember [through resemblance], and I perceive [through intuition] though these as - four branches the were of the Cogito. " (Deleuze, 1994, p. 138) Thus, Deleuze, a keen reader of Hume, reminds us that the form of the Self as ground of representation is something that needs to be explained, incontrovertible Given from which all explanation must begin. To not an from assume subjective consciousness as something which philosophy must begin, as was once supposed of God, is, argues Deleuze, to yield too quickly to a latent dimension of crypto-theological superstition disguised beneath the lies Deleuze's philosophical audacity empiricist prejudices of common sense. in his willingness to try and effect the transcendental suspension or first the person phenomenological perspective, along with circumvention of the supposed indubitability individuation, as an extraneous of subjective

104 albeit particularly resilient form of dogmatic presupposition. This move is significantly more phenomenologically radical than the superficially similar but still rooted attacks on metaphysical subjectivism and the Cartesian theatre of representation80, for it effectively explodes the very kernel of subjectivity, subverting it at its originary root by dismantling the individuation through which it is constituted, rather principle of ontological than, say, merely questioning its substantive status as an ontologically highlighting separate realm, or the quasi-transcendental structure of aporia through which intentional consciousness as self-presence is simultaneously constituted and deconstituted at a point where subjective individuation has been discrete field". already given as a From a Deleuzean point of view, it little internalised theatre of matters whether one posits consciousness as an intentional relations to the world; as representation or an externalised set of long as the field of phenomenological investigation is delimited within the 82, it doublet' `empirico-transcendental Foucault the called space of what "the to vicious circle which makes the condition refer to continues perpetuate the conditioned as it reproduces its image. " (Deleuze, 1990, p. 105) 800f the few became the Heidegger, by initiated Nietzsche of one and which subsequently and sort incontrovertibly central strands running through much twentieth-century philosophy, common to thinkers as otherwise dissimilar as Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty. 81Cf. for instance, Derrida's deconstruction of the Husserlian `living present' as locus of transcendental consciousness in Derrida, 1973. 82Cf. Foucault, 1970, pp. 318-328.

105 So far then, it might seem as if Deleuze doing little were more than reiterating Henry's critique of the (Kantian/Husserlian) principle of empiricotranscendental parallelism. This impression, however, is misleading. Where Deleuze's materialization of the transcendental goes beyond anything in Henry's phenomenologisation of matter is in its explicit envisaged refusal to accept the form of the Self as absolute paradigm of all possible individuation83. If philosophical thought is to stop shamelessly reiterating the pieties of good sense and start undermining the orthodoxies of common sense, Deleuze insists, it must not shirk from positing a radical incommensurability between the individuated realm of subjective experience (whether it be that of intentional consciousness or that of sub-intentional enstasis) and the preindividual domain which conditions that realm while bearing no resemblance to it. Consequently, Deleuze cannot remain satisfied with Henry's predominantly negative characterisation of transcendental immanence as subrepresentational, un-conscious, and non-intentional. If it remains strictly incommensurable with the categories of representation it is because, pace Kant, 83The it teems with a-categorial determinations and anomalous be for Deleuzean importance Simondon's the cannot critique of phenomenology work of vital be, his Simondon, 1995). However (cf. trenchant may critique of ekstatic representation overestimated never for one moment will Henry envisage undermining the principle of the unity of the phenomenon figure individuation. Thus, Self the form the of a the whereas as of paradigm or abandoning of Deleuze's for Henry's Cartesianism the phenomenology, material main resource radicalised provides transcendental materialism finds what may well be its chief philosophical inspiration in a crossfertilization of Spinoza and Simondon.

106 differentiations; if it remains rigorously irreducible to the dimensions of consciousness it is because, pace Freud, it is cosmic, anonymous, and anorganic; finally, if it remains utterly heteromorphic vis a vis the form of the Self it is because, pace Henry, it is comprised of impersonal individuations and pre-personal singularities. This pre-individual, impersonal transcendental field sought for by Deleuze, constitutes the empirically inexhaustible realm of virtual singularities, `real without being actual, ideal without being abstract', distributed limitlessly the nomadically via productive, perpetually dynamic disequilibrium of an auto-differentiating, ontological 'heterogenesis': "Despite Sartre's attempts we cannot retain consciousness as a milieu while form the time to the at same we object of the person and the point of view of individuation. A consciousness is nothing without the form of the I or the Self. What is neither individual nor personal are, on the the point of view of contrary, emissions of singularities insofar as they occur on an unconscious surface and possess a mobile, immanent principle of auto-unification through a nomadic distribution, radically distinct fi°om fixed and sedentary distributions as conditions of the synthesesof consciousness.Singularities are the true transcendental events and Ferlinghetti calls them `thefourth person from being Far individual or personal, singularities preside over singular'. ' potential distributed in individuals they the genesis of a are and persons;

107 which admits neither Self nor I, but which produces them by actualising or realizing itse f although the figures of this actualisation do not at all resemble the realized potential. Only a theory of singular points is capable of transcending the synthesis of the person and the analysis of the individual as these are (or are made) in consciousness. We cannot accept the alternative which thoroughly compromises psychology, cosmology, and theology: either singularities already comprised in individuals and persons, or the undifferentiated abyss. Only when the world, teaming with anonymous and nomadic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities, opens up, do we tread last field " (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 102-103) the the transcendental. at on of The fundamental for components the kind of transcendental materialism that will be elaborated in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia are already in place in this passage: the decomposition of the phenomenological perspective on the world (= dismantling of interpretation, hinges the three subjectification, signification, and structural of Oedipal representation); the emission of self-assembling virtual singularities by means of nomadic distribution upon an unconscious surface (= inscription body-without-organs intensities/machinic the of molecular assemblagesupon impersonal the virtual actualisation of an or plane of consistency); `heterogenesis' through unconscious whose processual auto-differentiation or

108 the empirical realm is effectively produced as actual (=machinic construction of the real via connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive syntheses of desiringproduction). This last feature in particular will prove absolutely & Guattari's anti-phenomenological in Deleuze central brand of machinic constructivism, wherein the transcendental is reconfigured in terms of primary processes of ontological production engendering a real no longer circumscribed by the categorial syntheses of representation. Machinic Constructivism If the immanence of the transcendental method requires the dissolution of the phenomenological perspective invariably tied up with the viewpoint of subjective individuation (a viewpoint, Deleuze insists, whose derivative character as constituted via representational mediation it is the task of a transcendental-materialist critique to expose by uncovering the disintegrated impersonal ontogenetic realm of singularities and multiplicities be then to underlying representation), philosophical method as such ceases instrumentalisable through the agency of an ex machina philosophical subject immanence it from The transcendental of philosophical manipulating without. function become the that the of subject of real as a method method requires the machinic unconscious 'itself. In other words, it is not the philosopher qua

109 subject who thinks the real; it is the real which singularises itself as an impersonal event of thought to which the is philosopher merely accessory. Thus, the full force of Deleuze & Guattari's hypercritical hence anti-and representationalist- machinic constructivism becomes clear: in the materialist transvaluation of the transcendental, methodological immanence realizes itself through a limitless becoming-subject of the real in what Laruelle calls a `techno-ontological' or `hyletic' continuum: "It is this victory of method, its universal reign as a techno-ontological continuum, its becoming a thinking thought and a nature, simultaneously subject and substance, that we think under the preliminary title of [tile] transvaluation of the transcendental. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 18-19.) The deliberately Hegelian echoes in this Laruellean description of the `becoming-subject of method' emphatically be We should not misinterpreted. are dubious & Deleuze assimilation of not proposing some Guattari's thought to that of Hegel. If we invoke this Laruellean formulation here, it is in order to point to an illuminating between Hegelian the analogy in both Deleuzoguattarian and critiques of representational subjectivism: instances, it is not the philosophical subject who represents the real, but the The by itself the that thinks crucial subject. philosophical means of real difference being this: for Hegel, matter is internally animated by mind, and

110 the becoming-subject of substance already encompassed within Geist as absolute self-sundering or self-relating negativity, so that the apex of philosophical illumination comes with the realization that Spirit includes its distinction from nature within itself84. But for Deleuze & Guattari, mind own is a transcendent abstraction from matter, and the categorial distinction between `nature' and `culture' collapsed within the neutral univocity of an allencompassing mechanosphere, so that the highpoint of philosophical meditation necessitates an ateleogical or `machinic' becoming-substance of the philosophical subject through the restitution of univocal being as plane of immanence. However, in order for philosophical thought to accede to its genuinely impersonal or pre-subjective transcendental dimension, in conformity with the Deleuzean commitment to this rigorously univocal ontological immanence, both the representational cleavage between subject and object, and the intentionality phenomenological binding thought and thing, noesis and For instances disqualified be transcendence. of equivocal as noema, must Deleuze & Guattari, philosophy only attains an authentically transcendental 84 "The know limit: but its itself to knows Spirit itself the or negative of also not only self-knowing Spirit in This is how know limit the is which to externalisation to sacrifice sacrifice oneself. one's displays the process of its becoming Spirit in the form of its free contingent happening, intuiting its Nature, Spirit, is becoming last This Space. Being its Self Time it, of as and equally outside of pure as but Spirit, this is in its Nature, living Becoming; its immediate the externalised existence nothing the its the reinstates which movement and existence continuing of eternal externalisation Subject. "(Hegel, 1977, p. 492).

III it becomes able to set aside the categorial constrictions of stance when representation as well intentionality, as the equivocal structure of phenomenological transforming thinking into for as such a means mapping the unrepresentable (i. e. virtual) regions of the real. It is no longer a question of the philosophical concept adequately representing the real (i. e. materiality-initself or the unrepresentable); it is rather a question of the concept becoming a material segment of the real -material in the transcendental as opposed to is fully empirical sense-; a segment which commensurate and entirely defined. intensively than coterminous with materiality as extensively rather The development of this transcendental continuity between `thought' identified by immanence `matter' level the at of sub-representational and Deleuze & Guattari, with the attendant characterisation of the real as an intensive materiality, a continuum within which uninterrupted continuum of it is `smooth inscribed, is itself the thinking space' and whose philosophical philosopher's to task map via the suspension of representational transcendence, can be charted through the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia85, right up to What is Philosophy?. Thus, in Anti-Oedipus, the in is the terms the passive syntheses of characterised real of auto-production deliberate by to the (presumably desiring-production active contrast of way of 85Volume I: Anti-Oedipus , 1972; Volume II: A Thousand Plateaus. 1980.

112 syntheses of apperception in Kant): "If desire produces, it produces the real. If desire is something that produces, this can be only production in reality and of reality... The real follows from it, it is the result of the passive syntheses desire of as auto production of the unconscious." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972, 34) In A Thousand Plateaus this production of the real via the autop. assembling of the machinic unconscious has become a function of rhizomatic proliferation. Philosophical thought is a rhizome-thought: "For both desires the issue is never to reduce the unconscious or to statements and interpret it or to make it signify according to the tree model. The issue is to roduce the unconscious, and with it new statements, different desires: the rhizome is precisely this production " (Deleuze & the of unconscious. Guattari, 1988, p. 18) Finally, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze & Guattari explicitly form their transcendental equate materialism with a radical of intensities (i. e. of pragmatic constructivism: a virtual chaos of material impersonal individuations and pre-personal singularities) actualises itself in the philosophical concept as paraconsistent segment of the real, with the latter immanence (i. immanent the the or concept e. plane of serving as element of deployed): "A it is inseparable is set of concept a consistency upon which insofar immanence is that of on a plane produced or constructed variations (reality). it latter the chaotic variability and gives consistency as the crosscuts

113 A concept is therefore a chaoid state par excellence; it refers back to a chaos rendered consistent, become Thought, mental chaosmos." (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 208) The Hyletic Continuum It is now possible to begin to make a little more sense of Laruelle's claim that Deleuze & Guattari's machinic materialism constitutes a form of `absolute hyletic idealism'. If, for Deleuze & Guattari, intensive materiality becomes essentially auto-productive, self-constituting, self-synthesizing, then it is `materiality' as passive synthesis of (auto-)production, Laruelle argues, that has the power to "synthesize itself, to relate to itself by itself alone through an inclusive cut or difference. " (Laruelle, 1981, p. 78) This inclusive is cut epitomized by the Deleuzean characterisation of intensive materiality as inclusive disjunction86 of difference in degree and difference in kind, qualitative and quantitative, intensity and extensity, virtual and actual, etc87. 86For Deleuze's intensive difference as `inclusive disjunction' of virtual and actual, cf. account of Deleuze, 1994, p. 239. Although the expression itself first appears in Anti-Oedipus (co-written with Guattari) and doesn't occur as such in Deleuze's earlier work, the concept of inclusive disjunction is clearly present throughout Difference and Repetition, specifically in the form of what Deleuze calls there an `asymmetrical synthesis' or `pathos of distance'. 87Crucially however, this Deleuzoguattarian methodology of machinic constructivism as abstract, intensive, self-synthesizing process of transcendental materialization, simultaneously cutting across subject and substance, remains for Laruelle a variant on a quasi-universal structural invariant governing the constellation of contemporary theoretical problematics clustered around the philosophical motif of Difference: "We call infinite hyletic Flux, or hyletic Continuum, this process of the infinite synthesis and difference of opposites, the river into which all thinkings of Difference (including Heidegger, who flow. hyletic flux divides Same) This Difference in the and produces itself, it carries out on reinscribes itself cuts, divisions, an entire process of `differing', by means of techniques which it produces and

114 Moreover, Laruelle continues, in order to posit this co-incidence of matter (or `the real') and of its philosophical logos (or `the ideal') within the infinite hyletic continuum (or `chaos') transected by the philosophical concept, a non-representational form of materialism noted above) by phenomenologically transcendentally suspending must proceed (as we the validity of all given or representationally mediated instances of empirical transcendence, insofar as these remain subsumed beneath analogical and categorial relations of negation and exclusion. In other words, the passive syntheses (connective; disjunctive; conjunctive) of desiring-production through which the machinic unconscious produces itself can be identified basis initial the only on of an methodological reduction isolating the subrepresentational and pre-phenomenological domain of transcendental immanence. Thus, strange as it may sound, for Laruelle, Deleuze & Guattari's materialism operates on the basis of an idealizing transcendental reduction of the phenomenological and representational realms: "One cannot raise the law [hyletic] level to the of continuity of principle, of an auto productive instance enjoying absolute autonomy, of a transcendental, rather than empirico-legal, continuity, without reducing all external, exclusive or transcendent instances which co-belong to it, and with which, as Same or instance of Repetition =Reproduction, it is coextensive. Here is where transcendental philosophy ends up with Nietzsche and Heidegger after the neo-Kantian interlude: with the constitution of a universal a priori which is at the same time or

115 of synthesis which are simply traced from the given: unity of the object, unity of experience under laws, unity of the understanding, of its categories and of the I think, unity of the ego, synthesis of the imagination, etc.(.. )The for procedures constituting a pure hyletic flux as auto-constitutive or causa sui, are thus those of a transcendental reduction, but one which is classical, which is to say idealizing. It renders synthesis immanent to itself, relative to itself or absolute -and thus cancels the external, coded or reified forms of unity, reducing them to the state of continuous cuts." (Ibid, p. 79) Just what is meant by this last comment about the transcendental materialist reduction of all empirical instances to the status of `continuous become in cuts' will clearer the penultimate section of this chapter88.For the time being however, it is necessary to focus on the very specific character of the idealizing transcendental reduction through which Deleuze & Guattari isolate this absolute hyletic continuum. In fact, the absolute transcendental isolated is through this sphere materialist reduction none other than that of the immanence is be deployed. Concept the to plane of upon which philosophical simultaneously the material, the technical p. 18). 1981, " (Laruelle, becoming. [and] its the result of means,

116 The Plane of Immanence The plane of immanence is what remains after all empiricotranscendent instances of synthesis have been suspendedor reduced; yet at the it is `prephilosophical' 89, or that time same which must be `always already' in effect in order for the creation presupposed as of a philosophical Concept to take place: "The concept is the beginning of philosophy, but the instituting. " (Deleuze & Guattari, Guattari compare the instituting "groping experimentation" 1994, p. 41) Moreover, plane is its if Deleuze & of the plane of immanence to a form of involving "dreams, pathological processes, esoteric experiences, drunkenness and excess"90,it is because a reduction which necessitates the simultaneous `bracketing' or casting aside of the Self as subject of experience, of the Object as locus of cognition, and of the World horizonal backdrop, be as will more akin to a form of radical cognitive experimentation rather than to a rationally orchestrated program of methodical doubt; a form of cognitive experimentation aiming at the subversion of all fixed and stable epistemic guarantors, rather than an instance of epistemological investigation hoping to excavate an indubitable basis for knowledge. Only such experimentation is liable to succeed in instituting the 88Cf. infra, pp. 154-161. 89 "Prephilosophical does does but that not exist not mean something pre-existent rather something 41). " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, it. p. outside philosophy, although philosophy presupposes

117 unenvisageable immanence of that prephilosophical plane concomitant with the essentially anomalous image91of philosophical thought. Why describe this form of experimental reduction as `idealising'? Clearly, if the instituting of the plane requires the bracketing of all instances of transcendent synthesis such as that of Self, World, and Object, then this reduction cannot he equated with the kind of methodological voluntarism Husserlian characteristic of reduction. The latter can be described as idealising precisely insofar as it seeks to reduce the World and the Object on the basis of the transcendental Self; - the self as empirical instance is bracketed but not the form of subjective individuation as such. Husserl maintains basis individuation irreducible `given' that the as on subjective absolute and isolate it becomes both the originary givenness of the to possible of which World and of the Object. The thesis of the independent existence of objectively given in isolate is the originary to order suspended entities intentional syntheses through which those worldly be to objects come in and through transcendental consciousness. constituted as given By way of contrast, what is `idealising' Deleuzoguattarian the about form is instituted is to the that the of absolute not according plane reduction 90Ibid., p. 41. 91The by to those is `anomalous' image of contrast thought way or nomadic of genuinely philosophical in the images prejudices of good sense thought with conformity regulated of normative and sedentary and common sense.

118 consciousness as 'seif-giving'92, but rather through the philosophical Concept `self-positing' as or as a relative-absolute which pre-supposes the plane in and through its own self-supposing or self-positing93: "Philosophy is at once concept creation and instituting of the plane[ ]The plane is clearly not a .. design, program, end or means: it is a plane of immanence that constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts. Both the creation of concepts and the instituting of the plane are required, like two wings or fins. " (Ibid., p.41) Thus, the plane is instituted as limit or locus of absolute deterritorialization through the Concept that pre-supposes it; institutes itself as absolute limit it is pre-supposed as that which for or ground philosophy through its philosophical positing. The plane has to be philosophically constructed; yet it is also that which constructs itself through philosophy; it is at once `always already there' or pre-supposed; and something that has to be laid out or is is In the to constructed; which say, posed. other words, plane pre-supposed it `will but insofar has insofar it have been' `will posed; posed only only as 920n the be `self-giving', that transcendental consciousness absolute phenomenological requirement which is to say, self-constituting, cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 66-70. 93 "The but has it by defined its its is no endoconsistency and exoconsistency, consistency, concept it is its it itself time the it is created. as same object at posits and reference; self-referential; Constructivism unites the relative and the absolute. " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 22).

119 have been' pre-supposed94:"[... ]even the prephilosophical ' plane is only so called because it is laid out as presupposed and not because it pre-exists being laid out. " (Ibid., p. 78) As a result, the without plane of immanence isolated through this transcendental suspension representational of categorial synthesis and transcendence is seif-synthesising, self-constituting: relative itself, immanent to only only to itself. Moreover, if this plane of immanence is immanent only to itself95 rather than to the Self, the World, or the Object, it is because it lays itself out through the self-positing of the philosophical Concept; thus, there is a sense in which it, just as much as the Concept, must be be to also said self-positing, self-constructing. And it is via forms of cognitive 940ne experimentation involving a total suspension of the apparatus of will recognize here the distinctive temporality of the future anterior as index of the transcendental: for Deleuze, the time of transcendental immanence is the Aionic time wherein the immemorial and the unheard of, the unrememberable past and the unanticipatable future, coincide virtually. The plane of immanence is Aionic or virtual as that which simultaneously occupies the `already' and the `not yet'. Interestingly enough, the process whereby immanence is simultaneously posited and pre-supposed in the philosophical Concept is remarkably reminiscent of the interplay between positing and pre-supposing reflection as articulated in Hegel's `Logic of Essence': "Reflection thus finds before it an immediate which it transcends and from which it is the return. But this return is only the presupposing of what reflection finds before it. What is thus found only comes to be through being left behind; its immediacy is sublated immediacy"(Hegel, 1989, p. 402). Cf. op. cit. especially , pp. 399-408. As we shall see, if immanence is conceived of as that whose pre-philosophical immediacy must be posited and pre-supposed in the Concept, then its immediacy as unconditional exteriority for thought becomes the result of its having been `always already' sublated or conceptually mediated, in , accordance with a gesture of idealizing transcendence which is strikingly consonant with Hegel's absolute or `objective' idealism. 95Cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 44-49. We shall be highlighting the problematic character of Deleuze & Guattari's characterisation of immanence as `immanence-to-itself' below. Cf. supra, pp. 136-142.

120 categorial representation, a systematic disordering of all the faculties96, that the philosopher must seek out that point of indiscernibility unenvisageable `prephilosophical' between the immanence which thought has always already pre-supposed, and the initiatory crystallization of the Concept through which that unenvisageable pre-supposition can be philosophically posed. The hyletic reduction effected by Deleuze & Guattari is idealizing then because it reduces transcendence on the basis of an immanence which is irreducible precisely insofar as it is self-presupposing or causa sui 97; a selfimmanence that is fundamentally indissociable (becauseposited presupposing as presupposed and presupposed as posited) from the self-positing of the philosophical Concept. The hyletic reduction operates by isolating its pure transcendental residue in that point of indiscernibility between supposition and pre-supposition; Concept and plane of immanence. That point, that 96For Deleuze's account of the manner in which a discordant use of the faculties engenders an anomalous or nomadic image of thought, shorn of the dogmatic prejudices of good sense and the restrictive concordances of common sense, cf. Deleuze, 1994, p. 143. 971t is on account of this indiscernible coincidence of (or absolute hyletic continuity between) immanence as extrinsic ground for the Concept, and immanence as intrinsically pre-supposed in the Concept's self-positing, that the plane can function as an absolute, or self-constituting, hyletic residue. So it is with the plane of immanence or hyletic continuum as causa sui in mind that Laruelle writes: "As far as given synthesis is concerned, there is always some, and always too much, but the task of absolute materialism, which must, by virtue of this very fact, remain a hyletics, an identity of matter and logos, is to render that synthesis productive, capable of itself or cause of itself. The principle of an intensive rather than extensive material continuity is isolated through a reduction which one could with some justification entitle phenomenologico-transcendental because it isolates the residue of a matter -as hyle- in the instance of an absolute phenomenon or absolute objective appearance, and it identifies Being with that phenomenon as a whole. Within an immanent realm of this sort, the 79) The 1981, " (Laruelle, the p. remain exactly coextensive. phenomeno-logical and materio-logical plane of immanence is the hyletic continuum as absolute phenomenon; abstract or intensive materiality

121 indiscernible residue, is nothing but the plane as synthesis of synthesis; inclusive disjunction of positing and pre-positing. And this indiscernibility ultimately coincides with that between the supposition of thought and its unthinkable pre-supposition; for the plane of immanence is also characterised "at the same time, that which must be thought and that as be which cannot thought. It is the non-thought within thought [... J the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside [.. ] the not-external outside and the notinternal inside" (Ibid., p. 59). Consequently, the philosopher thinks on the basis of an unthinkable exteriority which lies at the heart of thought; an unenvisageable immanence upon which the anomalous image of is deployed in Concept. thinking the philosophical We cannot fail to notice here a triadic structure echoing that which we in immediation Henry's saw at work phenomenologised of thinkable (ekstatic intentionality of the videre) and unthinkable (absolute immanence of the immanence is The an absolute transcendental residue of videor)98. plane of the reduction of transcendence, but a residue posed as a pre-supposition for Concept; in the through the thinking a and self-positing of philosophical independently is that of the operation of experimental residue nothing Thus, in Concept. it is laid by the through the and out construction which as point of indiscernibility between the phenomeno- and materio-logical realms. It is the full body of

122 unthinkable is at once absolute limit and ground of deterritorialization, which is to say, deterritorialized earth or body-without-organs; and pre-supposition is internally which posited as unthinkable exteriority via the self-positing of thought in the Concept. Here we re-encounter that complex triadic structure which we will come to recognize as definitive of philosophical Decision for Laruelle: on the one hand, immanence as absolute deterritorialization, unthinkable Outside; on the other, philosophical thinking indiscernibility as reciprocal deterritorialization presupposition or reterritorialization, outside and inside, presupposed plane and conceptual of and Or hand, immanence full body Earth, the the supposition. again: on one as of limit of absolute deterritorialization, is of course the inclusive disjunction of the `not-internal' inside and the `not-external' outside; of relative supposition and absolute pre-supposition. While on the other, philosophy as indiscernibility of position and presupposition, thought and unthought, inside Deleuze For functions the as relation of relation and non-relation. and outside, insofar be immanence Guattari, affirmed as absolute exteriority only can and in Concept. In its from indissociable it is the other words, presupposition as immanence functions as limit of deterritorialized exteriority, or as Real, for thought only insofar as it has been ideally presupposed in the position of the the Earth; the Deterritorialized; Being as inclusive disjunction.

123 Concept; an auto-position according to indiscernibility between which the latter operates as point of is to say explicit mixture or hybrid of-which thinkable and supposition and presupposition; territorialization unthinkable; and deterritorialization; transcendence and immanence; relative and absolute; etc. Thus, if Deleuze & Guattari' s hyletic reduction is idealizing it is because it establishes an ideal, self-constructing or self-assembling immanence as that absolute transcendental residue wherein physis and nous, hyle and logos, coincide99. The plane of immanence is Being as abstract or intensive materiality; the smooth space of nomadic distribution upon which the Concept is deployed as the aleatory point of indiscernibility inclusively %-ýyý disjoining dialectically than -rather impersonal synthesizing- an philosophical subject and a pre-individual intensive substance. Consequently, the reduction through which the plane of immanence is laid out establishes the hyletic continuum as that absolute transcendental residue or irreducible sub-jektum basis the coextensiveness of the phenomeno-logos and the materioon whose logos in the philosophical Concept can be initiated. Having secured this transcendental coextensiveness, Deleuze & Guattari can proceed to map out 98Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 87-90. 99 "The " Physis. Nous has facets Thought Nature, immanence two and as as as and as plane of (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 38).

124 the rhizomatic lineaments of nomadic distribution insofar as it now governs the smooth space of abstract hyletic continuity between `phenomenon' and 'matter'. Thus, the plane of immanence transects the hyletic continuum; it `slices through the chaos' of intensive materiality100. As performed by Deleuze & Guattari, this methodological transection results in two fundamental features that we wish to focus on now. First, that of the between constitutive aparallelism smooth and striated, virtual and actual; the between representational extensity and non-representational aparallelism intensity circumscribed upon the plane of immanence and which can only be Second, basis the that the process of nomadic of of reduction. on apprehended distribution as operator of machinic conjunction through which the elements itself distributed the the constructed. plane and plane are of Parallelism and Asymmetry In Difference inscription concomitant 100 "The Heidegger's Deleuze Repetition the early recuses and of ontico-ontological privileging difference as Da-sein, along with the `being-in-the-world' of integrated structural as an 42). (Ibid., " like like p. is a sieve. a section of chaos and acts plane of immanence

125 whole and transcendent horizon of pre-ontological understanding' 01. He thereby jettisons both what he considers to be the residual phenomenological isomorphy or parallelism between transcendental and empirical, Being and beings, in the project of a `fundamental' ontology; and the ontologically equivocal subordination of the `regional' to the 'fundamental'. once the filters categorial of For Deleuze, representational mediation have been transcendentally suspended, the ontic realm ceasesto consist either of fixed, stable, self-identical phenomenologically entities amenable apprehensible series to of representation, shifting adumbrations (Abschattungen; esquisses) encompassed within or perspectival a unified horizon; there are only self-dissimilar, unrecognisable, unidentifiable eidetic dispersions of simulacra, shorn of all resemblance, whether it be to an different differences originary model or another copy; which are neither identical identity to themselves since they remain to relative another nor differences of differences of differences..., "demonic images, stripped of live "externalised have images that on resemblance and resemblance", difference instead."102 101 "The just but as assuming of on condition same attitude of refusing objective presuppositions, form), in (which appears when the another same ones are perhaps many subjective presuppositions 129) " 1994, (Deleuze, Being. Heidegger invokes a pre-ontological p. understanding of 102Deleuze, 1994, p. 128.

126 Conversely, for Deleuze, intensive difference, the Being of simulacra, is not `a' difference but the sheer differing of differences; the Disparate or Unequal-in-itself' 03. The latter surges forth as that by virtue of which a difference is `made' or produced'°4 and simulacra given in their differing, Deleuze, through an act of transcendental determination whereby a part says of the virtual itself. In Difference and Repetition Deleuze actualises distinguishes a complex triad of interrelated terms here: the realm of intensive differentiation Ideas singularities or whose renders the problematic in determinate; dimension differenciation a of extensity which virtual entirely is actually determinable; finally, `different/ciation' as the determination of the determinable by the determinate through the chiasmatic explication of virtual intensities in actual extensity, and envelopment of extensive actuality by intensive virtuality. Thus, transcendental determination occurs via the in intensive the the of envelopment and extensity simultaneous explication of extensive by intensity. The catalyst for this reciprocal is the circumscription of a actual and of virtual envelopment/explication circuit of problematic virtualities in an intensive spatium as field of functions individuating threshold individuation. It this spatium as as which 103Cf. Deleuze, ibid., pp. 222-223. 'make the in itself, the difference is expression as made, or makes must therefore say that difference' [faire la difference]. " (Deleuze, ibid., p. 28). 104 "We

127 the intensive determinant precipitating the process through which a part of the virtual actualises itself105. Consequently, although virtual differentiation determines actual differenciation, it is the process of intensive individuation different/ciating as integration of problematic disparity (i. e. as extensive integration of the Unequal-in-itself) which functions as the sufficient reason for the actualisation of the virtual' 06: "Individuation is the act by which intensity determines differential relations to become actualised, along the lines of differenciation and within the qualities and extensities it creates. The total notion is therefore that of indi-different/ciation" (Deleuze, 1994, 246). p. It is important to note then that, according to Deleuze, intensive individuation functions as the `sufficient reason' 107 for the process of in it is insofar this terms complex of conceived as precisely actualisation integration or chiasmic interpenetration of virtual extensity. Thus, Deleuze's conception `indi-different/ciation' process of Moreover, character. intensity and actual of transcendental is explicitly the site of ontological ontogenesis as in hybrid composite or `indi-different/ciation' as in the the interpenetration for locus virtual the of or envelopment chiasmic 105 "Intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. " (Deleuze, 1994, p.245). 106For 244-256. 1994, Deleuze, pp. the especially above cf. all

128 actual and of the actual by the virtual is the plane of immanence. The latter is the transcendental element of their chiasmic indiscernibility, of their perpetually circuitous exchange: "The plane of immanence at once comprises the virtual and its actualisation, without there being an assignable limit between the two. The actual is the complement the actualisation, Actualisation singularity, or the product, the object of but the latter has only the virtual belongs to the virtual. as its subject. The actualisation of the virtual is whereas the actual itself is the constituted individuality. The drops actual out of the plane like fruit, whereas actualisation relates it back to the plane as to that which makes the object subject once again. " (Deleuze, 1986, pp. 180-181). Consequently, communicates via a `wide' circuit every actualisation of exchange with of a present the virtual as heterogenetic totality or Aionic coincidence of an unrepresentable past and an future. At the same time, however, Deleuze also distinguishes unanticipatable the process of intensive individuation in terms of a `narrow' circuit of binding image its the the exchange actual of object and virtual counterpart as "unequal, odd halves"108.This is a circuit according to which individuation occurs as the process of temporalising crystallization through the actual or 107 "The reason of the sensible, the condition of that which appears, is not space and time but the Unequal in itself, disparateness as it is determined and comprised in difference of intensity, in intensity as difference. " (Ibid., p.222-223). 108 Ibid., pp. 209-210.

129 present object's integration of that virtual half of itself which subsists in the absolute past. Accordingly, it is through the actual present's integration of its own unrepresentable virtual image that individuation occurs as that processual crystallization through which the passing of the present can take place: "This perpetual exchange of virtual and actual defines a crystal. It is upon the plane of immanence that crystals appear. Actual and virtual co-exist, and enter into a narrow circuit brings back from which us continuously one to the ]The two aspects of time, the actual image of the passing present, and other[.. the virtual image of the past conserving itself, distinguish themselves in having limit, but exchange themselves an unsinkable actualisation even while in crystallisation, to the point of becoming indiscernible, each borrowing the " (Deleuze, 1986, 185). the p. other. role of Thus, according to Deleuze's account of the relation between virtual (as designates immanence the we saw above109) at once and actual, plane of the site for that point of indiscernibility or indistinction between virtual (past) but individuation; local in (present) the circuit of crystallization or and actual is limit, the unilateral or asymmetrical their that which also of unassignable distinction between virtual and actual in the large circuit wherein the virtual's integration individuating is the of problematic result of an self-actualisation 109Cf. supra, pp. 120-124.

130 differentiation. As a result, individuation as sufficient reason for the virtual's self-actualisation inscribes a circuitous loop; a relative asymmetrical between parallelism virtual intensity and actual extensity; a reciprocal coimplication whereby every actual differenciation of the virtual immediately implies a co-responding virtual differentiation of the actual. Crystallization as intensive individuation requires the initiation of a positive feedback loop from virtual to actual and back to virtual again, according to an ultimately autocatalytic process of ontological genesis. In this process, the plane of immanence describes an instantaneously reversible oscillation; inclining itself for that `transdescendence'l lo whereby the actual drops out from the boughs intensive `different/ciation' individuated fruit in the processual of as immediately direction its to the wide circuit of actualisation, only reverse of inclination in order to allow for that `transascendence' through which individuated actuality feeds back into the realm of virtual problematicity in the narrow circuit of crystallization via the intensive `in-different/ciation' for is actualisation. which continuously generating new virtualities As a result, the non-resemblance or heteromorphy between virtual and in be by Deleuze, to an ultimately grounded actual posited would seem immediately it Bi-lateral the reciprocity, and with reversible asymmetry. 110Cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 45. The distinction between `transascendence' and

131 circular reversibility Deleuze"', between conditioned and condition denounced by has been abolished. But Deleuze's reconfiguration of the problematic of transcendental genesis in terms of the ontogenetic production of that which is given as actual through the process of its ontological `indifferent/ciation', obliges him to posit the indissoluble co-belonging or co- incidence of virtual production and actual product; the complex or differentiated unity of intensive individuation and individuated extensity. Deleuze has maximized the non-resemblance between conditioned and condition by way of the unilateral disjunction between virtual production and but he has not managed to sever a more deeply rooted actual product, between them; a parallelism of which the autocatalytic circuit parallelism `virtual-actual-virtual' is the most explicit indicator. Thus, Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, his insistence on `starting in the middle', with the weed rather than the root, in accordance with a rhizome-thought''2whie}i engenders the plane of immanence as site for the `in-between' or inclusive disjunction of virtual and actual, production and product, substitutes an asymmetrical parallelism for the symmetrical `transdescendence' comes from the work of Jean Wahl. 111Cf. supra, p. 104. 112 "A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo[.. ] The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other

132 parallelism with which Kantian and Husserlian transcendentalism contented themselves. However, far from being the result of inconsistency in Deleuze's ontogenetic lapse some or approach, this parallelism is in fact the latent premise rendering that approach possible precisely insofar as it continues to conceive of the separation of transcendental and empirical, condition and conditioned, in terms of an essentially differential disjunction; a 'between'. Like Heidegger before him' 13, Deleuze affirms non- representational difference as `the between', rather than binding it to the distinction between hypostatised terms. Nevertheless, the articulation of that `between' in philosophical thought remains structurally supervenient on an empirically given term. And the empirically available term which rhizomatic thinking relies upon as its point of leverage must invariably also be, by Deleuze's own light, the transcendent product, the residue, of a process of transcendental production. Thus, it is because of the constitutive ontogenetic fissure between its two `odd, unequal halves' image its and actual -its virtual image- that the actualised, individuated fruit can serve as the explicitly composite or hybrid crystal around which the plane of immanence as disjunctive interface between intensive virtuality and extensive actuality can be constructed. It is the object as fissure, as `in-between', that relays the " banks in beginning its the that middle. and picks up speed undermines away, a stream without or end

133 narrow circuit of indiscernibility between virtual and actual in individuation, and the wide circuit of unilateral distinction between them in actualisation, thereby providing the complex chiasmatic locus, the empirico-transcendental intersection on the basis of which the branchings of intensive in- different/ciation can be pre-supposed in the philosophical Concept. Accordingly, where phenomenology maintains the isomorphic between the two branches of the empirico-transcendental doublet, symmetry Deleuze prizes the forks of the coupling as far apart as is conceivable the better to affirm their non-symmetrical heteromorphy; their inclusive disjunction. But however valiantly he twists and distorts the tines, however ingeniously he coils them around one another so that intensive virtuality and extensive actuality become wrapped together in a distended double-helix of reciprocal presupposition, he cannot shatter the parallelism once and for all. And that helical spiral through which intensity envelops extensity whilst 14 intensity is delineated by `infinite those movements" extensity explicates instantaneous immanence the the oscillation via which plane of effects between the self-actualisation of the virtual and the re-virtualisation of the actual. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p.25). 113Cf. Heidegger, 1969. 114 "The forth back infinite that and pass movements plane envelops Guattari, 1994, p. 36). Cf ibid, pp. 35-60. through it[... J"(Deleuze &

134 Nowhere does this instantaneous interchange, and a fortiori, constitutively the hybrid or composite nature of the plane as virtual/actual interface, become more explicit than in Deleuze & Guattari's account of the between relation smooth and striated space in A Thousand Plateaus. There they write that "we must remind ourselves that the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, tranversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a f JBut de facto do not preclude a dejure, or abstract, the space smooth mixes .. distinction between the two spaces. That there is such a distinction is what for fact do the that the accounts spaces not communicate with each other in the same way: it is the de jure distinction that determines the forms assumed by a given de facto mix and the direction or meaning of the mix[.. ]" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 475) Here, the de jure asymmetry, the non-reciprocity between smooth and facto for de is invoked in the to reversibility striated, order account i. in the their way which a smooth concomitant with empirical mixture; - e. `sedentarised'; becomes or the process of striation nomadic space striated and itself reimparts a smooth space. Since Deleuze & Guattari would vigorously

135 deny the accusation that they are simply tracing'' 5 or abstracting the de jure distinction from the de facto mixtures, presumably on the grounds that such a procedure would render the distinction into a transcendent, gratuitously ideality, reified we can only conclude that the empirical mixtures of smooth de facto included in de their the and striated, reversibility, are already a priori jure asymmetry as such. Which is to say that the former remains indissociable from the latter as a matter of principle; and these defacto striations of smooth from inextricable their space and smoothings of striated space, are necessarily de jure separation; their a priori asymmetry. In other words, the unilateral between disjunction sedentary striation and smooth nomadism; asymmetry or like that between extensity and intensity; molar and molecular; or actual and both is that to encompasses an overarching reversibility subordinated virtual; terms of the disjunction and guarantees their reciprocal communication at a level that is always transcendent to the terms themselves. And it is this transcendence, this distance of survey or overview, which guarantees the reversibility, the unitary encompassing of symmetrical striation and form the empiricoof subtle rendering also whilst smoothing; asymmetrical Guattari & by Deleuze possible. transcendental parallelism perpetuated 115For the distinction between representational tracing and rhizomatic mapping, cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, pp. 12-13. I

136 Moreover, it is the transcendence implied by this distance of survey or overview, the transcendence implied in this remove of unobjectifiable exteriority whereby virtual striated, are subject to reinjecting and actual, intensity and extensity, smooth and unitary encompassment, which is responsible for a subtler, more rarefied form of transcendence into the immanence which Deleuze & Guattari lay claim to. While the plane of immanence remains de. void of all reifiable instances of transcendence such as those subsumed under the generic rubrics of Self, World, and God, it nevertheless presupposes an unreifiable transcendence in the shape of a latent or unobjectifiable distance of form of transcendental 16; objectivation' a residual impersonal intentionality indexed by its definition as `immanence to itself . For this `to' is not as innocent as it seems; it is symptomatic of the procedure by which Deleuze & Guattari are obliged to synthesize construction and intuition' 17;the positing and the pre-supposing of the plane; in and through the agency of the philosophical Concept in a manner that reinscribes unobjectifiable immanence within an equally unobjectifiable 116Not to be hypostatisation). (i. empirical objectification e. reification; confused with 117 "But there is no reason to oppose knowledge through concepts and the construction of concepts within possible experience on the one hand and through intuition on the other. For according to the Nietzschean verdict, you will know nothing through concepts unless you have first created them- that is, constructed them in an intuition specific to them: a field, a plane, and a ground that must not be Constructivism but them. the their them that confused with personae who cultivate shelters seeds and " be it that to existence. an autonomous gives requires every creation a construction on a plane (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 7). I

137 but nevertheless `objectivating' objectivation transcendence'18. This is a distance of independent as of the reified form of the Subject as it is irreducible to the figure of the World as horizon intentional is It of ekstasis. the unobjectifiable distance implied in the philosophical Decision through immanence is posited as immanent in a gesture of thought. The which simultaneous positing and pre-supposing of the plane through the Concept reimmanence in the pure and empty form of transcendence as envelops delineated by the `infinite movement' through which the plane achieves its immanence-to-itself. Thus, the `to' indexes the plane's infinite movement of folding as described in the instantaneously reversible oscillation between infinite Without that that movement, without actualisation and virtualisation. immanence is no longer immanence to itself, for as Deleuze & folding, Guattari insist "Transcendence enters as soon as the movement of the infinite is stopped" (1994, p.47). Accordingly, it is through this instantaneous immanence is effectively oscillation that folded back upon itself in a movement that finite infinite in is that the speed of simultaneously envelops and enveloped 118For the immanence transcendence; between distinction and unobjectifiable unobjectifiable crucial latter from Real-in-itself, the index former the qua disentangling importance the of qua of and the 2, Chapter (or phenomenologisation), cf. supra, principle of an Ideal ontological objectivation especially pp. 78-80 and 90-96.

138 movement according to which the Concept achieves its own self-survey' 19. For although the Concept surveys its components without transcendence or distance, the infinite speed of survey which renders it immediately co-present to all its components "requires a milieu that moves infinitely in itself -the horizon" (Ibid., it 36). As the the void, plane, p. a result remains ultimately inextricable from the infinite `fractalisation', the oscillatory movement, through which the plane both folds itself and enfolds thought in the Concept: "It is this fractal nature that makes the planomenon an infinite that is always different from any surface or volume determinable as a concept. Every back by immediately turning the the plane whole of movement passes through itself folding by to folding itself or allowing movements other and also on and befolded by them, giving rise to retroactions, connections, and proliferations in the ractalisation the plane)" (Ibid., (variable folded infinity infinitely this curvature of up of Earth, indexes if the the Thus, 39). the plane p. Deterritorialized, the Outside, as an "infinitely folded up infinity", then the finite folding the Concept and the of the marks plane on singular surface of latter's latter by the former's the infinite movement; the and envelopment infinite folding finite for the juncture As and former. the by of the explication is both Concept fold and of finite, the constitutive infinite folding of the the of 119"The them traversing its [survol] in to endlessly components, in is relation survey of state a concept

139 comprised in the plane's fractal curvature; in other words, it simultaneously posits and pre-supposes it; constructs it and expresses it. And it is precisely insofar as it constitutes a fold that is also an enfolding of the plane, that the pre-supposing of the plane via the self-surveying Concept recomposes part of that objectivating (but immanence is infinitely unobjectifiable) transcendence through which folded back upon itself in this self-folding, fractalising curvature. It is the `to' in the formula `immanence to itself that expresses this unreifiable distance of objectivation, this movement of unobjectifiable transcendence through which the plane successfully purges itself of all reified transcendence in its infinitely self-folding fractalisation. Thus, in his `Reply to Deleuze' 120,Laruelle argues that as far as the invocation of immanence is concerned "The injunction to itself rather than to something else is certainly imperative, but it conceals an indetermination, an ultimate ambiguity. An 'to' `to itself', one which reintroduces the the amphiboly resides within of form pure of transcendence itself as distance or relation, as surface or universal plane, in the absence of reified instances of transcendence. The but theoretically amphibological concept of a plane of philosophically normal immanence signifies that the latter still orbits around the plane and as plane; according to an order without distance. It is immediately copresent to all its components or variations,

140 still orbits around the to (to itself) as axis of transcendence. Immanence thereby remains objective even if it is without an object, it remains an appearance of objectivity and gives rise to a new image of the Real and of thought. Instead of being absolutely faceless, unenvisageable, it takes facial aspect of a plane, of a topology, on the of survey and contemplation. " (Laruelle, 1995b, pp. 63-65) This objectivation of immanence is, according to Laruelle, intrinsic to the structure of the philosophical Decision through which Deleuze & Guattari, like Henry before them, unwittingly posit immanence as self-giving according to a subtly idealizing gesture of objectivation; instead of accepting it as already given or as given-without-givenness; as rigorously unenvisageable and necessarily foreclosed to all conceptual position and pre-supposition. Decision posits unobjectifiable immanence in a gesture of objectivating transcendence. To decide in favour of' unobjectifiable immanence as Henry does, or as Deleuze & Guattari do (albeit in very different philosophical registers), is to effect its transcendent ontological objectivation. And in the context of Deleuze & Guattari's materialist Decision to equate the plane of immanence with intensive materiality, the result is yet another materiological idealization itself. of matter Thus, in seeking to affirm at no distance from them, passing back and forth through them[... ] " (Ibid., p. 20-21). `matter' as

141 unobjectifiable affirming immanence, both Henry and Deleuze & Guattari end up a Decisional hybrid of matter `itself and `as matter such'; a Decisional composite of the materially real qua unobjectifiable immanence and of the ontologically ideal qua unobjectifiable transcendence. By way of contrast, that on the basis of which to release the identity of matter `itself from we shall be attempting its materiological intrication with `as matter such' is an immanence that is not only unobjectifiable but foreclosed to all Decision, unobjectifiable; - even to the Decision in favour of the a non-Decisional immanence that is not so much undecidable as radically indifferent to the Decisional alternative between decidable and undecidable; just as it remains foreclosed to the alternative between thinkable and unthinkable121.However, we shall have to wait until Chapter 5 to see in what way the discovery that this immanence is already given necessitatesreconfiguring the apparatus of materialist theory in order to invent a thinking that operates according to `matter's' immanent foreclosure to Decision. That immanence is amenable to a process of production, that it needs to be constructed, is the inescapable correlate of the Decision through which 120Written as a critical rejoinder to Deleuze & Guattari's What is Philosophy? Cf. Laruelle, 1995b. 121Rather than constituting the enstatic immediation of thinkable and unthinkable, as in the case of Henry. Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 87-90.

142 Deleuze & Guattari re-envelop the unobjectifiable immanence of matter `itself in the unobjectifiable transcendence of matter `as such'. Since that process of machinic construction operates under the auspices of nomadic distribution, it is to an examination of the latter that we now turn in order to grasp the ultimate philosophical consequences of Deleuze & Guattari's immanence. objectivation of Nomadic Distribution Without oversimplifying the complexity of their thought too drastically, it's possible to discern two fundamental chains of terminological hand, On & Guattari's Deleuze the through one work. equivalences running & Deleuze distributed `fuzzy have nomadic elements, what sets' of we Guattari refer to as `zones of continuous variation' : assemblage; rhizome; distribution, have On Concept. or the nomadic of surface a other, we plateau; field & Guattari Deleuze transcendental consistency: of machinic a call what both Yet immanence. these body-without-organs would of the or plane of distributing that be coordinates which as to principle a on supervenient seem is distribution the This distributed. distribution the principle of nomadic of the it Guattari & to Deleuze at refer synthesis. syntactical operator of machinic `aparallel `conjunctive evolution'; times synthesis'; as various `double for the These `nomos'. line'; process of becoming'; `abstract names all are

143 machinic heterogenesis through which intensive multiplicities are assembled. And whereas the extensive manifold remains representational and thus denumerable, the feature intensive quantifiable or multiplicities according to Deleuze & Guattari is their non-denumerability. characteristic Non-denumerable multiplicities are indexes of intensity `the Unequal in-itself : the multiple of `the Disparate'; as being ceases attributable to any transcendent molar unity when it becomes autonomously substantive as a flat multiplicity rhizome, a dimensions in heterogenesis of n-1 perpetual `and' to the through as power of continuous variation proper produced operator of conjunctive "What synthesis: characterises the non-denumerable is neither the set nor its elements; rather, it is the connection, the `and' belongs between between to neither, which and sets, elements, produced 1988, Guattari, & line flight" (Deleuze of which eludes them or constitutes a 470). p. Being as heterogenetic production, as rhizomatic becoming, is nothing but this process of differential coordination through which the non- denumerable is conjugated. `(A)nd' is the distributive tensor capable of of continuums virtual pure, releasing of and assemblage effecting machinic intensive variation. Instead of delineating the actual determinations of constant relations between between variables, or tracing variable relations

144 discrete, punctual constants, the abstract line122 of rhizomatic becoming heterogeneous conjugates variables by initiating flux a of continuous So variation. whereas systems of structural arborescence distribute variable between between in relations constants and constant relations variables, fixed, identity difference, sedentary coordination of and accordance with a for finite differences infinite differences of continuous variation substitutes difference and replaces a variability constant in extensity which remains intensive the to the constant with an ungovernable, power of subordinated differentiation abolishes the which constant, exceeds the sedentary distribution of identity and difference, and transforms the structural tree into a less `and' "In is than the atypical this a conjunction sense rhizome: in it the continuous variation. places possible conjunctions expression of all but is to The tensor therefore a constant or a variable not reducible either instance by the in value the each the subtracting variable variation of assures (n-1)" the constant of (Ibid., p. 99). In other words, every machinic ' b `a form: an expresses the simultaneously etc. c... and and conjunction of is it because ' b `neither continuously infinite disjunction: nor c...etc. a nor the function through the which that subtracting the value of the constant, so `a+b+c+... n' series 122 "There is constructed becomes `n-a+(n-a+n-b)+(n-a+n-b+n- found tree, in or root. those in structure, a as such a rhizome, are no points or positions

145 c)+... etc'. By establishing this perpetual disjunction across a series of elements that are continuously varying according to the constancy of the function `n-l', the `and' as tensor of machinic synthesis simultaneously infinite their effects exclusive conjunction. Accordingly, a continuum intensive of variation is a rhizome line between two determinate points and constituting a block of becoming passing that is neither a relation of identification, analogy, or similitude; nor the individual but is that reciprocal exchange of characteristics, rather an event distinct from, irreducible in to, the and entirely relation extensity of the two terms between which it passes. Through this process of machinic heterogenesis or double-becoming, say Deleuze & Guattari, the reciprocal deterritorialization of separate terms creates an autonomous zone of virtual indiscernibility or continuous variation: the becoming-A of B and becomingB of A does not result in another term C which would be a synthesis of A and B, but in an event of molecular transmutation, a non-localizable conjunction into both fixed identity terms the and carries each of which sweeps away intensive the continuity other; a nomadic zone of micrological proximity to irreducible from, distinct to, AB border the and remains proximity wherein B. between A distance the and either the contiguity or There are only lines. " (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 8).

146 Nomadic multiplicities `are' insofar as they are in perpetual heterogenesis through intensive variation. Thus, for Deleuze & Guattari, the `becoming' notions of and of `multiplicity' indistinguishable distribution, from one another. remain strictly inextricable if not `(A)nd', the tensor of nomadic expresses being as becoming precisely insofar as it is the operator of machinic construction, of rhizomatic conjugation, through which multiplicity bypasses the opposition of the One and the Multiple to become instead an autonomous ontological substantive;- but a substantive which in heterogenetic transformation: a state of perpetual subsists "A multiplicity is defined not by its elements, nor by a center of unification and comprehension. It is defined by the number of dimensions it has; it is not divisible, it cannot lose or gain a dimension without changing in nature. Since its variations and dimensions are immanent to it, it amounts to the same thing to say that each multiplicity is already composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis, and that a multiplicity is continually transforming itself into a string of other 249). doors " (Ibid., its thresholds to p. and multiplicities, according Moreover, it is also becoming as event that releases the hyletic impersonal intensive matter, the machinic phylum composed of continuum of individuations and pie-personal materiality, natural or artificial, is "The phylum machinic singularities: in is it both matter simultaneously; and

147 movement, in flux, in variation, matter as a conveyor of singularities(.. )" (Ibid., p. 409). Thus, the machinic phylum is materiality defined as perpetual flux, continuous variation, infinite becoming, nomadic distribution, etc. For if becoming constitutes multiplicity as an ontological substantive, conjugated in `and' the accordance with as tensor of continuous variation, then the latter, as is `materiality' of machinic operator synthesis, ultimately synonymous with is `and' intensively defined. for & Guattari, Consequently, Deleuze as as `the for Earth', the or proper names abstract materiality as are much one of `anorganic Life', `the Deterritorialized'. or This is important because it it have how & Guattari Deleuze ontologised matter, rendering reveals coextensive with the philosophical Concept, in and through the same by to they transcendental sought of which means reduction procedure of it purge of all representational mediation. Once again, we glimpse here the materiological amphiboly underlying Deleuze & Guattari's transcendentalisation of intensive materiality. Let us it, to of thinking, characterisation our that according materiological recall `as between matter and such' transcendental matter the separation confuses `itself, between disjunction matter as representational with an ontological residue, non-representational as materiality and phenomenon -i. e. extensityUnequal-inDisparate; the intensity; the transcendental e. production -i. or

148 itself. That is to say: materiology envelops the unobjectifiable immanence of the transcendental separation between the tel quel and the comme tel in the unobjectifiable transcendence of the ontological disjunction between the intensive and the extensive. In Deleuze & Guattari's case, that amphiboly is initiated through the very gesture whereby hyletic reduction engenders an instantaneously reversible asymmetry between the phenomeno-logos of intensity the on the representational extensity and materio-logos of machinic immanence. plane of It is this reversibility that makes of What is Philosophy? at once a filters Where the categorial materialist noology and a noological materialism. inaugurated a mediatory transcendencevis a vis the chaos of of representation intensive matter, the Concept `counter-effectuates' that chaos through the is infraConcept Because immanent its the auto-construction. own process of representational, it is no longer immanent to matter (i. e. to the Real); it is immanently self-assembling in and through materiality (the Real) as such (positing Thinking immanence). the plane of and pre-supposing represents the multiple; longer no it constructs it. It ceases being cogitative, legislative, Real in the in the qua of to self-effectuation participate order or reflexive, intensive materiality. For Deleuze & Guattari, philosophical thinking consists `apprehending' forging in pre-individual of capable concepts not so much

149 singularities and asubjective individuations, but of engendering the impersonal singularisation of thought by counter-effectuating an intensive in Concept, the thereby creating Concepts that are themselves chaoids, chaos haecceities, plateaus; "self-vibrating regions of intensity whose development avoids any orientation toward a culminating point or external end" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 22). Every Concept is composed of virtual singularities lines intrinsic to their of continuous variation according and conjugates compatibility, thereby rendering their grouping consistent and bringing about Concepts intensive (puissance) thought. the are of stabilization of power an distribution; plateaus of rhizomes: smooth, singular continuums of nomadic denote becoming. They nothing, signify nothing. represent nothing, molecular They are self-assembling, self-referential; positing themselves and their `objects' at the same time as they are created. They are virtual events: real being incorporeal being ideal being without abstract; without actual; without immaterial123. Yet given that Deleuze & Guattari insist that the plane of immanence is neither a Concept of concepts, nor a fundamental ground or principle of any Concept between is the and the then relation of nature precise sort, what for horizon `absolute is but the all Concepts the plane events, are plane? 1230n 15-34. 1996, Guattari, & Deleuze pp. all these points cf.

150 events'; - they inhabit and compose it without dividing or interrupting its indivisible continuity. Concepts are absolute, self-contained surfaces or volumes composed through finite movements executed at infinite speed; whereas the plane is the boundless interweaving and reciprocal enfolding of the many different finite movements or becomings making up its endlessly variegated, differential texture, 124. vet tlae vhe curvature' variation'. its fractal composition or `variable itself is always singular, indivisible, `pure It is the `absolute horizon' that makes "the event as concept independent of a visible state of affairs in which it is brought about"125;the Rhizosphere of infinite machinic consistency with which every finite becoming intersects in its rhizomatic consistency. Thus, the plane constitutes the Eventum Tantum; the infinite Event enfolding but never encompassing all others. It is the Deterritorialized; the event of the Earth's infinite becoming. This infinite intersects finite movement necessarily with all movements, so that the plane's infinite enfolding, its fractal curvature, is constituted through the absolute but finite surfaces or volumes which compose it. As a result, if `and' is indeed one among the many names which Deleuze & Guattari use to describe abstract matter, then it not only functions lines distribution the tensor the as of of nomadic whereby rhizome conjugates 124 Cf & Guattari, 1994, 39. Deleuze 137-139; p. and pp. supra,

151 continuous variations; it is also an index of the disjunctive synthesis through which virtual intensity and actual extensity are inclusively disjoined on the immanence. Consequently, if the plane of immanence is neither one plane of nor many, it is because the folding of the infinite - `the' plane- repeats itself in finite fold `this' `that' `Each' is `the' For every the or plane. plane plane. 4and' as distributive tensor entails that "Every plane of immanence is a OneAll. it is not partial like a scientific system, or fragmentary like concepts, but distributive -it is an `each"'(Ibid., p. 50). Thus, the plane's infinite folding is simultaneously the generating tensor of the conjunctive synthesis which intensive becoming; finite the the or produces and singular event continuum, fold generated by t hat tensor, that folding, so that the former is continuously form by its higher itself means of the own as repeating and recombining latter. The hyletic continuum of impersonal individuations and pre-individual itself through the machinic syntax of continuum/cut singularities constitutes (continuum/coupure) -disjunctive by synthesis- in-different/ciating an immanence which is always already different/ciated; an immanence which is intensity this that so extensity; and actual always a composite of virtual infinite continuum repeats itself in every finite cut as the absolute differing of the Disparate or Unequal-in-itself. 125Deleuze & Guattari, ibid., p. 36. But because the cut, the moment of

152 differing, is a means for this repetition, one passes in a continuous fashion from a singular continuum or cut ('an' abstract machine; `a' plane of immanence) to its absolute or Ideal form in the `and' as ontogenetic tensor of distribution ('the' plane; `the' hyletic continuum as One-All or nomadic Rhizosphere). Consequently, the `and' is at once the machinic phylum as Eventum Tantum, producing events, becomings, lines of continuous variation, but becoming, is also an etc.; event, a a variation which produced; thereby immediately re-producing itself through its product but always as its own Ideal, meta-immanent form. The `and' raises itself to its nth power as indiscernible it its Ideal the co-incidence of own repetition; marks principle of the hyletic continuum as One-All and of a continuum of continuous variation intensive immanence if Accordingly, haecceity. the matter of univocal as bypasses the opposition between the One and the Multiple, it is precisely because the plane is folded over itself: - infinitely self-folding; infinitely selfis its it because itself is immanent It to own metaobjectivating; causa sui. immanent, Ideal form. What makes it Ideal is the fact that the `and' as syntactical operator of itself the transcendental is on as always reconstituting continuous variation its identified is instance with basis of a syntagmatic ultimately which Guattari the & by Deleuze with syntactical condition; a conditioned endowed

153 power of transcending itself, not only toward but also as its own condition, thereby co-constituting the latter. Moreover, this ultimately transcendent continuity between becoming as infinite continuum and becoming as finite between Rhizosphere and rhizome, is established on the basis cut, of the hybrid in plane's e. empirico-transcendentalcomposition, and accordance -i. with that parallelism, that reversible asymmetry between actual extensity and intensity, virtual which we diagnosed earlier. The plane of immanence Ideal remains because it operates according to a logic of absolute self- immanence is longer relation: no attributive as immanence `to' a transcendent but universal, only becoming the this self-positing, at cost of hybrid presupposing of the transcendental and the transcendent self- is to -which immanence and unobjectifiable transcendence- , so that say, of unobjectifiable every continuous multiplicity, is becoming simultaneously every molecular dividing itself virtual and actual, molecular and molar, smooth and striated, interminably between these two states, passing from one to the other in a continuous circuit. As a result, Deleuze & Guattari's infinite hyletic itself is transcendental, to as as re-affirm continuum perpetually obliged unobjectifiably immanent, by means of its own Ideal repetition, its own is Ideal It transcendence. and self-positing126 causa sui: unobjectifiable 126It is this `auto-position' for absolute capacity de in Principe it himself Laruelle puts which, as

154 Hyletic Idealism Now at last, as well as beginning to appreciate the full import of Laruelle's characterisation of Deleuze & Guattari's machinic constructivism form `absolute hyletic idealism', perhaps we are also in as a of better a position to understand Laruelle's earlier cryptic remark127 concerning the status of all empirical instances as `continuous cuts' in the hyletic continuum. Every empirical instance, every finite cut, simultaneously indexes hyletic continuum; an infinite every concrete assemblage transcends itself as a continuous cut toward the infinite continuity of the plane of consistency. As a immanence bears all the topological hallmarks of a the result, plane of transcendental Möbius strip: a flat, single sided surface continuously twisting itself through 180° so that it op-poses its inner and outer face to one around another even as it renders both opposites virtually contiguous through the by single surface virtue of which they continue to flow smoothly into each other128.In the case of the plane of consistency, this infinite twisting whereby inner and outer face are adjoined without distance, coinciding on single Minorite, makes of the hyletic continuum the equivalent of a `transcendental Deduction in act' and hence a paradigmatic philosophical Decision (cf. infra, Chapter 5): "The limitless hyletic flux is doubtless perfect, it is at once (but this is not what is problematic about it from now on) hetero- and auto production of itself Causa sui. [It constitutes] a true transcendental Deduction in act because it synthesizes itself as `objective reality' (unity of the real and of ideal objectivity), legitimating itself and demonstrating its own objectivity to itself on the basis of criteria drawn from itself because they shift and transform themselves along with it. "(Laruelle, 1981, p. 88). 127Cf. supra, p. 115.

155 continuous surface, is constituted through the `in-different/ciation' whereby virtual and actual are disjunctively conjoined in an instantaneously reversible exchange;- or through the movement of becoming in which the intensive and the extensive, the smooth and the striated, are inclusively disjoined. It is through this infinite torsion, this perpetual transversal communication between virtual and actual, that every finite cut in the hyletic continuum comes to represent an infinite continuum for another cut, and every real division becomes a means through which the indivision of an Ideal continuity continuously reaffirms itself. Consequently, as Laruelle puts it in Principe de Minorite: "Precisely because the cut is only ever a means at the hands of Repetition [i. e. the `and' as tensor of disjunctive synthesis- RB], one passes in a continuous manner from empirical cuts to ideal or hyletic cuts, from the empirical and transcendent to the ideal [i. e. transcendentally immanent-RB] form of division. This continuity of processes is the Idea as such; Repetition is the Idea or Being effecting its relation to the data of Representation through the cut constituted by Difference. Division simultaneously divides itself and divides experience. It forms a continuous line that re-turns in itself and whose both ideal every point adioins an empirical surface and an of which surface, flow flux (still Being Becoming, ideal). through the the are pure cut, and and 128Laruelle in immanence discusses terms of the the the transcendental topology of plane of explicitly

156 experience whilst remaining irreducible to it, just as experience flows through the Idea, identifying itself with it, but precisely in an ideal mode. There is a prior identity, a precession of the Idea as the Same [i. e. the indivisible co-belonging ideal of empirical and cuts, and this prior -RB] identity is invested in experience as well as in the Idea. As a result, experience is no longer an ontic region opposed to the realm of the Idea, it is an ontico-ontological degree of the Difference/Idea complex, but one which is diluted, distended, depotentiated, disintensified' (Laruelle, 1981, p. 70). Thus, between the infinite Ideality of the ontological continuum and the finite actuality of the ontic cut, there is neither a straightforwardly identity representational nor a crudely categorial opposition; there is instead a hyletic indiscernibility; a machinic reversibility generated according to this Ideal contiguity of transcendental virtuality and empirical actuality on the plane of consistency. Perhaps the charge of idealism becomes readily comprehensible once we have understood how, within the ambit of Deleuze & Guattari's distinguishing machinic materialism, between the Idea of there can be no possibility continuous multiplicity of (i. e. the Rhizosphere) and its empirical actuality as exhibited in the heterogeneous, empirical manifold of rhizomatic Möbius strip in his `Reply to Deleuze', pp. 69-72. & Deleuze assemblages. Guattari's

157 materiology delineates the ontico-ontological disjunction between extensive actuality and intensive virtuality on the basis of a preliminary suspension, a methodological `sublation', of the representational distinction between the heterogeneous, empirical manifold of assemblages, and the homogeneous, transcendental continuity proper to the plane of consistency. In so doing however, they liquefy every singularity, haecceity, becoming, or event, into a is dissolved into Every ontological equivalence virtual with every other. event the universality of the Eventum Tantum; every cut in the phylum must also be indiscernibility This continuous. between One-becoming and All-becoming discovering discontinuous the manifold as possibility of a radically precludes index of a One that would never reconstitute itself as an All; or a cut that ideal be the to seamless, re-included a priori within would not prove infinite Ideal is It the the and phylum's machinic phylum. continuity of 'itself' its the separation of matter elision of relational continuity129, distribution `as such' qua nomadic sovereignty of matter disjunction n the inclusive as intensity, which of representational extensity and machinic inhibits the possibility of discovering an Identity proper130to matter `itself, independently of the Idea and outside the Concept; according to the 129As exhibited in the machinic syntax: continuum/cut/continuum/etc...; or virtual/actual/virtual/etc... invokes it 130Since the Identity in question is non-ontological no non-consistent-, and -non-unitary deconstructible, in `the any obviously proper' surreptitious privileging of `propriety' or of ontotheological sense.

158 foreclosure of its immanence devoid of transcendence; in its multiplicity without Being. In obscuring the purely transcendental separation of matter `itself from matter `as such' through the ontological disjunction between virtual intensity and actual extensity, in deliberately maintaining an empiricotranscendental hybridisation of immanence, Deleuze & Guattari effectively perpetuate a more insidious phenomenalisation of matter; one which is asubjective and anobjective, neither noetically circumscribed by intentional consciousness nor horizonally encompassed within being-in-the-world, but one which is nevertheless coextensive with that pure and empty form of immanence or `matter' objectivating transcendence through which is simultaneously in the Concept. Consequently, not posited and pre-supposed only are those three amphibolies which we characterised as definitive of in Chapter instantiated 1131 in Deleuze & thought materiological perfectly Guattari's materialism; - machinic constructivism transforms those into features. What amphibolies structurally necessary, explicitly constitutive in becomes deliberate Henry the was unintentional amphiboly work of in hybridisation the case of Deleuze & Guattari. Thus, machinic synthetic ideal, immanence deliberately with constructivism synthesizes real, ontic 131Cf. infra, Chapter 1, pp. 59-61.

159 ontological immanence; it explicitly replaces unilateral determination of the ideal by the real with an immediately reversible coincidence whereby every different/ciation virtual different/ciation of of the actual is indissociable from a reciprocal inthe virtual; immanence of matter `itself is in the unobjectifiable finally, the radically unobjectifiable methodically and systematically reenveloped transcendence of matter `as such' qua nomadic distribution. Accordingly, and in spite of the remarkable vigour and sophistication & Deleuze of Guattari's transcendental materialism, in spite of their it be invention, to would a experimentation and exhilarating commitment brand ideological in their to of machinic manner, oppose, a naive or mistake constructivism to the apparatus of Representation per se. Let us recall the Being "Repetition Idea is by Laruelle the that or we cited above: remark data Representation its through the cut constituted the to of relation effecting by Difference" 132.Remembering that, according to the account of Deleuze & Guattari's thought which we have just provided, `Repetition' as Idea or Being is none other than the `and' as tensor of continuous variation, and that the `and' in finds likewise the by Difference 4cut' constituted as expression latter is it the intensity that inclusive disjunction of as and extensity; we see 132Cf. 155. p. supra,

160 `Being' or `Idea' which is perpetually reinscribing and reincluding representational extensity within the immanence of the hyletic continuum as its unavoidable complement of disintensification depotentiation; its or actualised residue; its fallen fruit. Thus, it is the transcendental topology proper to the plane of consistency as Möbius strip which ensures that there is in fact but by only also right- a constitutive continuity -not representation and Concept; an a priori between hybridisation of representational extensity and machinic intensity; of representational striation and nomadic smoothing. Deleuze & Guattari abolish the structures of categorial analogy, its difference in the concept, in with equivocal circumscription of extensive form to to the order attain pure and empty of Representation through the Concept's rhizomatic counter-effectuation -its simultaneous positing and pre- intensive Difference Being, Idea. Machinic supposing- of as as constructivism ditches representation qua equivocal analogisation of the real, the better to Representation effectuate qua univocal analogue of matter. Thus, in an ambiguity characteristic of the transcendental varieties of localised, the thinking, objectively unified representations only materiological better dismantled, to the dissolved to the proceed and of matter are transcendental identification Ideal, that unitary continuity of matter with hyletic The disjunctive synthesis. guaranteed through an all embracing

161 continuum is the Idea of matter `as such' qua universal tensor of nomadic distribution. But this position and pre-supposition immanent of materiality in and through the Concept, this machinic phenomenalisation of intensive matter `as such' in terms of the differential syntax of nomadic distribution, of the `and' as tensor of machinic synthesis, is in fact Representation, or the Idea, in its highest form, Representation raised to its own nth power. It guaranteesthe intensive continuity between thought instantaneous reversibility and matter and establishes an between the reality of/in the Concept and the Concept of/in the real. As a result, machinic materialism appears not so much as the immediate negation of empirical realism, but rather its as transcendental sublation. Transcendental Materialism versus Empirical Realism Gs As far 'the transcendental materialist is concerned, empirical realism is forms those of pre-philosophical naivety a prejudice concomitant with in engendered accordance with representational common doxa. The phylum's phenomenological sense and infinite continuity is perpetually liquefying the reified stolidity of empirical actuality. Machinic constructivism doxas dogmas the of of empirical realism and actively pulverizes the infinite by movement continuously reinjecting phenomenological experience into the hypostatised stasis of representational extensity. As we saw above, 6

162 the discontinuity of empirical extensity is seamlessly re-integrated into the Ideality of the intensive continuum, but as distillate `disintensification' a -a `depotentiation'or of an infinite movement of actualisation. In the words of Laruelle which we cited earlier133:"Experience is no longer an ontic region opposed to the realm of the Idea, it is an ontico-ontological degree of the Difference/Idea complex, but one which is diluted, distended, depotentiated, disintensified" (Ibid. ). However, as Laruelle himself rather caustically points out in his `Reply to Deleuze', this indiscernible contiguity between the transcendental ideality of virtual intensity and the empirical reality of actual extensity on the plane of consistency, relegating as it does `experience' qua empirical distilled from the to the process of becoming, actuality status of a residue entails a set of empiriques]: "(d)isastrous consequencesfor `empirical data' [donnees devoid they of reality; not only are they are above all degraded, deficient or as a reification necessarily conceived of as or `actualisation' of becoming. Their reality is an illusion, an appearance, a deficiency of their auto position in and through the strip [i. e. the Möbius strip (just `auto' That is as one says posited which or plane of consistency-RB]. `suicided'), and posited by that which is more powerful than it, the möbian 133Cf. supra, p. 156.

163 form of all autoposition, is thus not posited in itself or by itself and is obliged to sever all continuity with its empirical 'double' or 'indication', or reckon it as a mere appearance. Such is the most general presupposition of all absolute idealism, and perhaps of all philosophy; an idealism which in this instance constitutes an equally absolute realism (`real without being actual; ideal without being abstract ). `experience' is in general, and from the very outset, 76)134. devoid reckoned as of all reality" (Laruelle, 1995a, p. What `reality' and which `experience' does Laruelle accuse Deleuze & Guattari of `suiciding' here? Representational reality? Phenomenological Everything hinges on whether the accusation of `idealism' is experience? made against machinic materialism - and, a fortiori, against philosophy - in a spirit of pious conservatism, on behalf of a representational realism and a phenomenological experience, or alternatively, in the name of an altogether 134Interestingly, Laruelle's arguments here anticipate Badiou's in The Clamour of Being; to wit; that Deleuze's transcendental reduction of representational extensity on the plane of immanence entails a derealisation of the actual. Cf. Badiou, 1997b, passim, but especially pp. 65-81. In other words, both Laruelle and Badiou argue that, for Deleuze, actuality as product remains intrinsically subordinate to intensive virtuality as realm of machinic productivity. However, although we have been arguing here, along with Laruelle and Badiou, that there is a very strong sense in which Deleuze's philosophy is ultimately -albeit unconventionally- idealist in tenor, we do not believe that this constitutes an unpardonable indictment in and of itself. The real question, it seems to us, consists in asking whether or not Deleuze's peculiar brand of idealism is necessarily a bad thing. For insofar as it excoriates a certain dogmatic phenomenological realism, an excoriation which seems to us entirely consonant with the pulverizing of phenomenological reality effected by the natural sciences, Deleuze's hyletic idealism strikes us as entirely honourable. Where we find that idealism problematic -which is also the reason why we find the ramifications of Laruelle's critique particularly valuable- is on account of the residual dimension of quasi-phenomenological presupposition entailed by the indissociable coincidence of his in far does in In Deleuze Deleuze's thought. enough not go virtual and actual other words, suspension of all phenomenological presupposition: there is still a residual phenomenalisation of matter 4as such' entailed in Deleuze's objectivation of immanence through the positing and pre-supposing of

164 unrepresentable `experience' `reality' and a definitively unphenomenologisable . Since -as will hopefully become perfectly clear in the second half of this thesis- Laruelle has absolutely no interest in providing reactionary apologias, whether it be for the good-sense of representation, or for the Urdoxas of phenomenology, it is necessary for us to provide brief a explication implicit but unstated series of argumentative steps which furnish the the of framework for understanding correct invoked by Laruelle in this why the `reality' and `experience' protest against `idealism' are neither representational nor phenomenological. First, we need to clarify `empirical expression Laruelle what exactly means by the data' (donnees empiriques) when he claims that the continuum's absolute auto-position deprives the latter of their autonomy and because it into turns the reality actual a reified remainder, a residue leftover from the movement of infinite becoming. Fortunately, Laruelle supplies us definition is he by `empirical data' with an explicit of what means -one which but neither representational nor phenomenological overtly non-philosophicalin a text from 1988 (also ostensibly `about' Deleuze)135-:"By `empirical data' the plane; a `machinic' phenomenalisation of matter engendered as a result of immanence's idealization as an empirico-transcendental hybrid or composite. 135The text in journal in issue La Decision 5 the number of philosophique, question, which appeared by `Letter', This is `Letter 1989, Deleuze'. by between 1987 Laruelle to written edited and entitled

165 I understand that which is posited by philosophical decision and by its sufficiency in order to affect the latter, in other words, that which is in the philosophical decision hyýmoans of which it is also interpreted" (Laruelle, 1988g, p. 102). How are we to interpret this definition ? Indisputably in this instance, degree familiarity some of with the non-philosophical context it presupposes is indispensable. Thus, for instance, we need to be aware of the fact that, as far as Laruelle is concerned, it is intrinsic to the structure of philosophical Decision insofar as it invariably instantiates an empirico-transcendental doublet that it incorporate or encompass a priori the empirical wing of the doublet as the necessary complement of factical contingency through which it its achieves own absolute auto-affection and auto-position. Accordingly, in this non-philosophical definition of `empirical data', the latter provide that initial leverage-point whose empirical presupposition is subsequently seen to way of reply to an unpublished missive in which Deleuze asked Laruelle "What distinguishes the One from Spinoza's substance?", is one of those texts which Laruelle classifies among his explicitly In an obvious allusion to Spinoza's experimental or `hyperspeculative' exercises in `philo-fiction'. in it by Deleuzean the to a axiomatic more geometrico , responds query elaborating a non-philosophical series of numbered definitions running from 1.1 to 15.2. In spite of its considerable formal austerity, this particular text remains remarkably helpful because it furnishes us with explicit definitions of all the basic conceptual components of non-philosophical theory (at least in the form in which these existed in Philosophie H. Philosophie III purifies and refines all these components further still, sometimes adding II's Philosophie for discontinuing but it does new ones, not make any significant retractions; -save residually philosophical identification of non-philosophy with science). The contrast - which we are trying to highlight here- between `the empirical' qua intra-Decisional ideality and `the empirical' qua data' `empirical defines 5.1 in definitions 5.1 5.2 qua and respectively. non-Decisional reality, occurs intra-Decisional component; 5.2 defines empirical data qua Decision itself as occasional cause or support for non-philosophical theory. Cf. Laruelle, 1988g.

166 have been retroactively posited a priori in and through an ultimately self- sufficient transcendental operation; - a structure we saw verified in Deleuze & Guattari's delineation of the methodological reduction whereby the actuality of the given comes to be seen as the result of a process of production -an but actualisation-; a process in which it is the initial presupposition of empirical extensity as enveloped in the plane of immanence -the suspension its empirical autonomy- which allows for the uncovering of its conditions of its of production and subsequentpositing as a component in the philosophical Concept. Thus, the aleatory contingency of empirical actuality is posited by the Deleuzoguattarian Decision, in order to furnish it with an exploitable resource; a pseudo-heteronomous component which Decision will always have Empirical already pre-supposed. actuality effectively serves as the `vanishing mediator' in the circle of reciprocal position and presupposition between plane and Concept; a circle in which the empirical immediacy of the have been `always is invariably transcendentally to already' understood actual intermediate; `sublated' the as or a posited as suspended and preserved; product of an actualisation 136. Consequently, if philosophical thinking for Laruelle is necessarily and constitutively 136Cf. idealist in character -or formally supra, pp. 127-130. idealising regardless of

167 whether or not it is recognized as explicitly or substantially idealist- it is because the intrinsically self-positing, self-presupposing structure of Decision Laruelle -what ('actuality', calls its `sufficiency'- guarantees that `empirical data' `the given', etc.), are always encompasseda priori as grist for the Decisional mill, so that they remain merely of the order of a pretext, an devoid exploitable resource of any real independence or autonomy, ready to be processed and integrated as a homogeneous structural component in the mechanism of Decision137. By way of contrast to this transcendental imperialism of Decision as in its practised autonomous, self-sufficient transcendental sufficiency or absolute imperialism mode -the auto-position whereby of the independence of the empirical is denied-, in the same text from 1988 which defends have just Laruelle the relative autonomy of a noncited, we instance by the effecting empirical representational, non-phenomenological transformation of Decision itself -ergo, of intra-Decisional `empiricity' as `occasional into definedan representationally and/or phenomenologically "By for `material theory: support or non-Decisional support' cause' or data the describe I ideal as those necessary are which or empirical occasion, 5, Chapter in detail in greater credibility of this account, which we shall return to depends on the plausibility of the claim that all philosophy, whether it recognize it or not, and later Nietzsche; the Hegel; (e. British empiricists; g. the regardless of its stated antipathy to the term 137Clearly, the

168 from material which thought extracts real a prioris, in other words, that which existing in the philosophical decision, has its condition of reality in something else or in the real as last instance" (Ibid. ) Once again, this definition of the empirical as `support' or `occasion' is neither representational nor phenomenological but explicitly non- (which is to say, at once rigorously theoretical and radically philosophical data have but heteronomous existence ideal the that their universal): empirical in Decision, have through their real or relatively autonomous and as posited existence -their unrepresentable condition of reality, as well as their in the unphenomenologisable condition of experience- immanence of the Real as radically unobj ectifiable last-instance. Since, at this stage, it is still too early to attempt to provide all the for this technical of exhaustive analysis an required clarifications necessary hope `empiricity', the to translation provide only we can of non-philosophical in has that the transformation occurred reader with an anticipatory sketch of the shift from the philosophical to the non-philosophical perspective; a sketch initial whose impenetrable obscurity will, aura of become hope, we is by Laruelle; broad, in which the very Heidegger; etc.) is ultimately transcendental generic sense used to say, essentially Decisional.

169 considerably diminished in the light of subsequent clarifications furnished in Chapter 5 of Part 11138. According to this sketch, where philosophical Decision invariably presupposes the autonomous, pseudo-immanent reality of empirical data, the better to dissolve the autonomy of that pseudo-immanent reality via the its ideal process of sublation in and through a self-positing transcendence; non-philosophy, in accordance with the radical autonomy of the Real qua n Given-without-giveness, realm now identified recognizes the relative autonomy of an empirical with Decision itself in its ideal, self-positing transcendence;- but does so the better to extract a set of real -i. e. nonrepresentational and non-phenomenological- a prioris from that ideal, transcendently posited reality and experience. These non-Decisional a prioris determine-in-the-last-instance the Decision's own a priori idealisation of by discovering the `real' or nonIn reality and experience139. other words, Decisional a priori for the `ideal', Decisional a priori, determines philosophical non-philosophy determination. It discovers the Real, radically for Thus, Ideal objectivation. where materiological unobjectifiable condition Decision undermines a certain restricted or localised form of representational 138 For for Decision nonas relatively autonomous occasional cause an explanation of philosophical Chapt, r 5, cspecially pp. 249-251. philosophical thinning, cf. 139 Cf. infra, Chapter 6, pp. 301-305.

170 objectification and phenomenological presupposition, only to replace these with a subtler, unobjectifiable phenomenological form of form of objectivation, a subtler, pre- the non-Decisional phenomenalisation; transmutation of materiological Decision into an empirical occasion extracts from the latter the non-objectivating, non-phenomenalising i 40 a prioris determining these ultimate residues of objectivation and phenomenalisation themselves. Obscurity notwithstanding, hope least have furnished to the we at inkling in in its the some reader with of manner which a concept which ordinary philosophical invariably usage remains representational and/or is (i. phenomenological, radicalised and generalised e. universalised) nonphilosophically it that achieves a rigorously transcendental theoretical so involves in is It this to the a change process crucial notice way which validity. from is instance that the the radically expanded empirical concept of of scale: of intra-Decisional an component whose representational and/or idealizing involves sublation of at once an phenomenological pre-supposition empirical 140This autonomy and an empirico-ideal hybridisation of the intra-Decisional between distinguish We delicate must point. a particularly Although the Decisional phenomenality. and non-Decisional phenomenalisation; phenomenologisation; theory are neither straightforwardly phenomenological, nor a prioris of non-Decisional hybrid in structure of in the or the empirico-transcendental which phenomenalising subtler sense Decision itself constitutes a phenomenalising principle, they are nevertheless `phenomenal-in-the-lastinstance' insofar as they are determined by the immanence of Real as `the Phenomenon-in-itself', or as is

171 transcendental; to that of Decision as such in its inviolable, self-sufficient integrity as an indecomposable structural whole. Thus, the non-philosophical definition of the empirical now encompasses the empirico-transcendental structure of Decision in its autonomous, self-positing sufficiency. But its autonomy as self-positing and self-giving is now merely conditional rather than absolute, for Decision is now given and posited as relative to the radical Real autonomy of a which is given-without-givenness and posited-withoutposition. Absolute auto-position is now heteronomously posited in its inalienable relativity to radical immanence: it has becomes relatively autonomous. Accordingly, if non-philosophy defends the inviolable integrity and it is insofar the relative autonomy of empirical, precisely as the empirical has been definitively now purged of every trace or residue of representational and/or phenomenological pre-supposition. Whereas the machinic materialist's critique of representational realism and phenomenological experience remains trapped in a double-bind, condemned to presuppose the irrecusable pertinence its in transcendental to that suspension of of empirical actuality order effect its for is the sub-representational and validity which uncovering prerequisite sub-phenomenological conditions of production; non-philosophy proceeds on `Phenomenon-without-phenomenalisation'. Cf infra, Chapter 6, p. 293; pp. 296-301; and Chapter 7,

172 the basis of a suspension of the empirical qua Decision that has always been already achieved; always already been inalienable immanence of the Real as Decision. Thus, non-philosophy realized in accordance with the ante-Decisional sine qua non for all presupposes nothing -certainly nothing empirical- unless it be the i. npredicable immanence of the Real as positedwithout-position. Moreover, if the empirical presents itself, it presents itself in terms of nothing more substantial than an entirely contingent occasion or support for thinking. It is purged of all representational and phenomenological concretion, of all factical overdetermination, the better to be retained as an empty invariant, a purely formal structure of position and pre-supposition now amenable to a potentially limitless variety of structural reconfigurations. Significantly then, there is a sense in which the (non-representational) `reality' and (non-phenomenological) `experience' of the empirical which Laruelle defends against the idealism of the continuum's absolute autoposition are those of philosophical Decision itself as an empty formal invariant; as an occasion and support for a potentially infinite series of nonrepresentational and non-phenomenological redescriptions through which the intraintra-Decisional `reality' tenor, substance, as well as of and character of p.360.

173 Decisional `experience' can be perpetually renegotiated beyond the limits of is what empirically pre-supposed and transcendentally posited as given within those ontological parameters governed by the sufficiency of Decision. For in the final analysis, the continuum's absolute, self-positing autonomy, the Ideal transcendental continuity through which machinic constructivism attacks the good sense of representational realism as well phenomenological Ur-doxas the as of experience, masks its amphibological empirico-transcendental hybridisation; its structure, and thus its ultimately empirical data the reliance on of representation and phenomenology; a reliance which localised their procures subversion at the cost of their global perpetuation. In order to clarify this latter point, let us reconsider those its through philosophical mechanisms which machinic constructivism effects critical subversion of representational reality and phenomenological experience. For Deleuze in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense141, the ruin of representation is effected in accordance with the Nietzschean logic Outside, Chance, dice-throw: the the as of of the unconditional affirmation of impossibility-, incompossible an or virtual whole -i. e. as a representational Chance in as the philosopher's counter-effectuation of chaosmotic results 141Cf. for instance Deleuze, 1994, pp. 198-200; & Deleuze, 1990, especially pp. 127-161.

174 event; an effectuation whereby the phenomenological `I' is cracked open and representational subjectivity exploded, releasing impersonal those individuations and pre-personal singularities that swarm through the cosmic fissure in the seif. ", '.t is this moment of Nietzschean affirmation -the auto- impersonal Chance as an incompossible whole through the affirmation of philosopher as purified automaton- which seems to coincide with the selfpositing of the philosophical Concept, its counter-effectuation of intensive in What 142. Philosophy? is chaos, Crucially, affirmation for Deleuze, it is because thought's dice-throw is an of the event's unconditional exteriority that representational be do deconstructed, to reality and phenomenological experience not need `inscribed' thought nor experience are necessarily within them: since neither subjectification, signification and organization are no more than superficial interruptions temporary overlays; sedentary arrests; infinite of movement; - both `thought' and `experience' are already outside143.Thus, if rhizomatic thinking deploys itself immediately and unproblematically in the element of libidinal intensities, it's because it's already operating outside, carried along by that movement whose infinite speed allows it to evade the tri-partite 142Cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 143"One pp. 159-160. But it. in in getting to outside getting succeed order will never cease returning to the question back, behind that by Movement itself, like the thinker's at happens or this. always occurs outside never 7-8). 1977, " (Deleuze, happen. it'll pp. blinks. Either is he never already outside, or one moment when

175 cloister of phenomenological subjectivation, linguistic signification, and corporeal organization. But in fact, things are not so simple, for as have we seen, machinic thought is not so much already Outside as in-between inside and outside; or `outside' insofar it is rather precisely as on the margin or cusp `between' between virtual and actual; smooth and striated. This problematises the machinic materialist's insistence that thought and experience are already in Delewe `the operating what calls great Outside' [le grand Dehors]; for if the thinking deployed upon the plane of immanence always starts in the `in-between' middle, virtual and actual, it turns out that this Outside is in fact hybrid always a or mixture intensity of nomadic and stratified (or `representational') extensity. As we saw above144,the immanence affirmed by the transcendental empiricist is constructed around that point of indiscernibility, that reciprocal exchange, between virtual and actual, so that the heteromorphy, or unilateral disjunction between nomadic intensity and stratified extensity, remains circumscribed within a unitary parallelism: the hyletic continuum's infinite movement encompasses at once the continuous distribution; variation of nomadic deceleration, the arresting of the and in movement stratified representation. 144Cf. supra, pp. 129-131.

176 What then are the consequences of this continuity concerning the between relation representational reality and phenomenological experience on the one hand; and the destratified thought and experience of the Outside on the other ? Since, for machinic constructivism, the distinction between `appearance' and `reality' remains intrinsically representational, it is not so denouncing much a matter of subjectivation, signification, and organization as but rather of effecting their transcendental circumvention illusory, by infinite the maintaining speed through which rhizomatic thinking accelerates beyond subjectification; and by perpetuating the infinite movement through immanence liquefies the plane of all eruptions of reified transcendence. which However, hyletic For things once again, are not quite so simple. between disjunction that the representation and unilateral continuity entails rhizome also necessitates their residual reciprocity, their constitutive hybridisation, so that infinite speed and absolute movement remain relative by the to stratic synthesis. slow speeds and relative movements captured Thus, the transcendental hybridisation through which the continuum is `absolute' the the that plane maintain a of movements constituted means constitutive reference to the relative movements of subjectification, to Henry, the relative remains absolute signification and organization: as with

177 that from which it absolves itself145. As a result, the absolute Outside continues to remain liminal, occupying the borderline between the signifying and the asignifying, between the subjectified and the impersonal, precisely on its account of unconditional, self-positing continuity. This is the price to be paid for that necessary reversibility, that inevitable complementarity "inseparable from whereby correlative all deterritorializations reterritorializations"146. remain In other words, Deleuze & Guattari maintain a transcendental amphiboly between, on the one hand, a `reality' and an `experience' construed in terms of representation and i. phenomenology: e. subjectified, signifying, organized; and, on the other, the impersonal, which asignifying, supposedly anorganic movements of a plane of consistency knows nothing of those processes of sedentary deterritorialized insofar it is But this as mixture of precisely stratification. exteriority and reterritorialized interiority, this hybridisation of absolute impersonality and empirical subjectivity, fatally occludes the unrepresentable `reality' of an immanence which remains foreclosed to all objectivation; just immanence `experience' it of an as obscures the unphenomenologisable that is foreclosed to organization, and subjectification, signification which Laruelle accuses Deleuze & Guattari of idealism. 145Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 85-87.

178 It is in order to preclude the possibility transcendental hybridisation, that Laruelle, by an irreversible unilateral duality phenomenologisation, or way of contrast, will inaugurate `between' immanence; one that remains definitively Conceptual of such empirico- a radically autonomous foreclosed to all representation, pre-supposition; and a relatively autonomous empirical instance, constituted by the philosophical hybridisation immanence of and transcendence as such. The latter will serve as the occasional cause on the basis of which to effect the non-Decisional separation `dualysation'-the of the machinic materialist's Decisional mixture of deterritorialized exteriority and reterritorialized interiority. Using this strictly unilateral separation between the radical autonomy of Real immanence and the relative autonomy of empirico-ideal transcendence as its basis, non-materialist theory proposes to maintain a distinction between the empirical and the transcendental that would neither reinstate an ontological dualism of subjective ideality and substantial reality; dualism in the self-positing Idea147. the that nor effect ontological sublation of The latter move invariably prefigures the collapse of the separation between matter `as such' and matter `itself in 146Cf. for instance Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, 147This the hyle as ontological Idea. We have p. 509. particular dilemma constituted a problem which, in one form or another, plagued much postKantian philosophy. We have in mind here Schelling's account of the development of post-Kantianism

179 already seen how hyletic idealism typically dissolves the distinction between matter as empirical datum and matter as ideal a priori ontological reconciliation by effecting their in the hyletic continuum as self-positing, self- presupposing Idea. Moreover, to the extent that it ends up reaffirming that is a sense in which Deleuze & Guattari's materialism in albeit a particularly abstract fashion- with a certain thread uniting an otherwise utterly sublation, there remains consonant - underlying anti-Kantian disparate set of philosophical problematics: like Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, each in their very different before them, Deleuze & Guattari unequivocally reject the premise of an ways irrecusable transcendental separation between thinking being. This and transcendental separation, lest we forget, is emphatically not ontological148, for Kant - through a concatenation of gestures he himself only dimly appreciated- effectively terminated the epistemic privileges Cartesian of subjectivity and the apof"iüs of ontological dualism -which is to say, the dualism of subject and substance- in the same move whereby he prepared for the separation of matter `itself from `as matter such'. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the ontological elision of Kant's transcendental distinction invariably results as set out in On the History of Modern Philosophy. Cf. Schelling, 1994, especially pp. 94-185. But cf. also Miklos Vetö's reconstruction of the post-Kantian problematic in Vetö, 1998 and 2000, passim. 1480n this very point, cf. Allison, 1983, pp. 3-13 and passim .

180 in one or other variation on the theme of absolute idealism149.In Deleuze & Guattari's case, the result is probably the most philosophically sophisticated - hence, the most dangerously seductive- version of absolute idealism thus far (one achieved which, despite the oft-cited exoteric divergences, retains a certain esoteric affinity with that of Hegel150): it argues for the virtual indiscernibility, the inclusive disjunction, between the Ideal continuity of `as such' and the Real discontinuity of matter 'itself. matter Since Being as continuous variation, infinite as `itself from the separation abolishes of matter becoming-matter perpetual hyletic continuum, the Idea of matter in the of thought and becoming-thought of matter, it no longer makes sense, according to Deleuze & Guattari, to protest that there is immanence an irreducible to Conceptual pre-supposition, or a matter irreducible to Conceptual counter-effectuation. In aligning ourselves with this form the of pre-philosophical worst sort of protest we surely appear guilty of 149positivism, for idealism. be an absolute considered as empirical example, can 1501tis Deleuze long litany to difficult that to the separate serves supposedly of everything reiterate not from Hegel: the attack on the reactive character of negation; the critique of opposition as the difference-in-itself; inversion the the relation; of all externality on emphasis of representational it be Nevertheless, to remind ourselves of a transcendence.. teleological useful might etc. suspension of . Hegelianism; in Deleuze's deliberate of of excoriations tone remorseless comic exaggeration certain of for Hegel the taskmaster in Deleuzean humour the as punitive of caricature a certain mischievous interminable labour of the negative; despotic suzerain of mediation; shameless apologist for the Christian State; as well as in the Deleuzean execration of the dialectic as ultimate avatar of pious be to diversionary This allowed bad not the should smokescreen rest. conscience, and all ressentiment, doctrines Hegelian Deleuzean between of the and obscure the possibility of a subterranean concordance Hegel, 15-34, 1994, Guattari, & for Deleuze Compare with Concept. pp. the self-positing example Hegel between interesting the and 1989, pp. 67-78. For an extremely relation attempt at articulating ideological free is in intercessor, Deleuze using Kant as an of superficial notably a manner that

181 naivety; the kind of naivety which Husserl denounced in the transcendental realism which he took to be concomitant with the scientist's `natural attitude', and which he dismissed as phenomenologically `counter-sensical' 1ýI Curiously then, and in spite of their avowedly anti-phenomenological materialism, Deleuze & Guattari would seem to invite the assent of phenomenological idealism when, presumably invoking the intensive power (puissance) of the Concept rather than the `sense-bestowing' (Sinngebung) power of consciousness, we imagine them arraigning the non-conceptual insists realism which on upholding the transcendental separation between `as matter such' and matter `itself as a species of transcendental idiocy152. Nevertheless, it is this idiocy, we wish to suggest, which ultimately indexes the unobjectifiable immanence of matter itself. However, lest the non-philosophical idiocy concomitant with the distinction between matter `as such' and matter `itself collapse back into prephilosophical stupidity by way of an arbitrary Decision in favour of a hypothetically posited 'in-itself, how the transcendental we must explain condition on the basis of which we are articulating that distinction precludes prejudices, cf. Juliette Simont's Les `Fleurs Noires' de la logique philosophique. Essai sur la quantite, la qualite, la relation chez Kant, Hegel, Deleuze Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997. , 151 "The countersense only arises when one philosophises and, while seeking ultimate intelligence being has its itself the that the the as a certain about whole world sense of world, never even notices `sense' which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field where sense is bestowed[... ]" (Husserl, 1982, p. 129).

182 the transcendent positing and presupposing of immanence through Decision. Specifically, the next chapter will suggest that as far as the transcendental separation of the tel quel from the comme tel is concerned, the only proper index of its ante-Decisional immanence resides in the performative consistency of material utterance (enonciation) and materialist statement (enonce); the rigorous, but non-logocentric co-incidence of materialist `saying' and `doing'. Greek in ICSIOý;, have the their Blanco Diego Juan root observes, and `idiocy', as 103. 1997, Cf. Blanco, `singular'. `the p. meaning proper' or 152 Both `idiom'

183 CHAPTER 4 FROM MATERIALISM MATTER `AS SUCH' TO ITSELF In the course of the last three chapters, we have been criticizing the materiological conceptualisation of matter `as such' on the basis of a hypothetical postulate: - the `transcendental realist' postulation of matter 'itself'. Yet how can we be sure that this postulation does not in turn reinstate a conceptual equivocation ? That we are not reinscribing `matter itself in a in invoking it in discourse ? What theoretical the very process of concept invocation be in the to to that order ensure of matter conditions need met `itself does into a materiological not collapse circumscription `as of matter ? such' In this chapter we shall attempt to define these conditions by le `Le de Minorite, 27 Le Principe Section entitled reel contre of examining )153. It idealism' (`The l 'idealisme' isme real versus materialism and material et is in the argument of this brief but particularly complex section that Laruelle tentatively outlines for us the necessary preconditions for a truly nonBy is of way to materialism. non-philosophicalsay, materiological -which

184 contrast to those circumscribing `constative' matter varieties `as such' through of philosophical Decision, materialism non-philosophical materialism, we shall try to argue, must constitute a rigorously `performative' material theory, enacting a set of theoretical operations determined (in-thelast-instance) by `matter itself now characterised as immanently foreclosed to Decision. Where the sufficiency of the materialist Decision against idealism invariably envelops the ünobj ectifiable immanence of matter `itself in the transcendence of matter `as such', thereby instituting an objectivating idealized materiality, a composite of real immanence and ideal transcendence; suspending the sufficiency non-Decisional materialism, of materialist Decision, will does immanence basis the not operate on of an which difference between Decision the transcendent materialism about presuppose a in it idealism; an accordance with operate shall words, and other -in immanence which is foreclosed to the transcendent distinction between ideal immanence transcendence. material and `Materialism'/ `Idealism' `Materialism' and `idealism', Laruelle reminds us, cannot be accepted Neither the their nor content, as ready made or pre-given categories. distinction between them is ever absolute or unvarying: - on the contrary, they 153Cf. Laruelle, 1981, pp. 103-109.

185 are varyingly fulfilled and exemplified according to the vagaries of doctrine. Consequently, Laruelle continues, rather than ask what `materialism' and `idealism' are `in themselves', as if they were determinate doctrines, we into immanent the transcendental conditions should enquire in accordance with which these philosophical categories are generated or produced. Thus, instead of treating `materialism' and `idealism' as determinate doctrines, Laruelle suggests we try to uncover the genetic a priori 154conditioning the `materialist' `idealist' doctrine. In of or production other words, rather than trying to identify the putative essenceof `materialism' or of `idealism' via an inductive in abstracting generalisation which consists empirical process of from historically insists doctrine, Laruelle on the ccnti 11, 11Lsystems of deducing those a priori conditions of theoretical transcendentally necessity of production determining the conceptual economies proper to `materialist' or `idealist' discourse quite independently of the particular system or doctrine `Materialism' produced. `idealism' gain a specifically philosophical and domains the of science and politics within neighbouring autonomy vis a vis being than discursive markers also circulate, when, rather which these heteronomously conditioned considered as 1541n Chapter 6, doctrines, they achieve an `non-conceptual ' `genetic Husserl'show this qua priori a we shall see -unlike dualysing ideal, be than rather than unitary or synthetic. to and turn real rather symbol' will out

186 autonomous `metatheoretical' status as immanent transcendental criteria conditioning philosophical doctrine. At the same time however, Laruelle points out that `materialism's' peculiar theoretical specificity comes from the way in which it not only indexes its own metatheoretical conditions of production, but also their a priori distinction from, and opposition to, the metatheoretical conditions 'idealism'. This to proper marks a crucial unilaterality in the economy of between the genetic a prioris proper to `materialism' and `idealism' relation respectively: the mode of theoretical production proper to `materialism' must its distinction from `idealism', that generate or produce own a priori of while the latter is not necessarily obliged to distinguish itself from the former155. Consequently, Laruelle in concludes, order to attain a rigorously transcendental criteria specifying the conditions of reality -as opposed to ideality or possibility- for materialist discourse, conditions precluding the identify `as idealization the real, such', we must materiological of matter itself distinguishes difference theoretical through a utterance which a genetic its intrinsically `materialist' a a vis meaningvis stated of priori as -regardless is modality of utterance which a priori `idealist'- again, regardless of the determines "One materialism's genetic utterance's meaning: simultaneously

187 difference from idealism, and a real, otherwise-than-materialist conception of difference their a priori and its power of genesis. Against the empiricist mistake, which consists in injecting into these categories an 'immediate' content which is in reality already mediated, it is a question of thinking them at once in themselves and in terms of what is more important than them, their relation, and more important than their relation: their absolute difference" (Laruelle, 1981, p. 104.). However, this genetic or `absolute difference' 156conditioning the a distinction between the conditions of theoretical production appropriate priori to `materialism' appropriate those and to `idealism', cannot be located at the level of the doctrine which it conditions; it cannot be identified as a `materialist' `idealist' or statement of any kind. But if it cannot be `materialist' `idealist' in its characterised as explicitly or conceptual content, it must remain intrinsically Thus, the genetic a priori 155That is to non-conceptual; is to say: a-signifying. which distinguishing `materialism' from `idealism' can say: it can, but for Laruelle this identification is not a prerequisite for the operational efficacy of idealism in the way in which it seems to be for all critical -post-Kantian- materialism. 15613ecauseLe Principe de Minorite remains a transitional work, preparing the non-philosophical perspective that will find its rigorous formulation in later texts, it is one in which Laruelle continues to operate within a predominantly philosophical register: hence the talk of an `absolute difference' between materialism and idealism. The critique of Henry's conception of `absolute immanence' in Chapter 2 already hilted at th way in vrhich, in Laruelle's non-philosophical work proper, the notion of `the absolute' comes to be identified with that of philosophical Decision as such in its pretension to pure, auto-positional and auto-donational sufficiency. In fact, as we shall see, it is by operating according to `matter itself asfirst name or non-conceptual symbol for radical immanence -one which is foreclosed to the transcendent distinction between `materialism' and `idealism'- that non-materialist

188 in those distinct but non-conceptual only reside or a-signifying modalities of utterance through which the conceptual significations of `materialism' or `idealism' are produced. Laruelle lists three varieties of categorial definition for `materialism' `idealism'; definitions that, he believes, fail to provide a satisfactory and account of this a priori genetic difference. The inadequacy of the first two, level the operating at still of empirical objectivity and conceptual content, hope) (we be immediately in the present context, thus should apparent further explication on our part. requiring no Laruelle passes them over further it is list here, However, to them comment. without useful not only in its immediate to the the third appreciate superiority of vis a vis order but in latter's the to ultimately also understand what way predecessors, form in large hinges of empirical part on a residual unsatisfactory character its from idealization predecessors. carried over objectivation and conceptual `Matter' and `Idea' Laruelle insists, cannot be taken as indexes of: , 1. Supposedly given objectivities such as techno-economic production ideology hand; the on the other. on one 2. Supposedly given conceptual significations, whereby, on the one hand, `materiality' features `Matter' the concept of of combines general theory allows at once for a unilateral duality -rather than an `absolute difference'- and an identity

189 abstracted from nature with empirical characteristics drawn from senseperception; while, on the other, that of the `Idea' combines general features `ideality' of abstracted from culture with empirical characteristics drawn from `inner sense' or self-consciousness. 3. `Discursive categories' which are supposedly produced rather than immediately given. Thus, in what Laruelle refers to as `structural Marxism' (i. e. Althusser157), `idealism' and `materialism' remain devoid of immediate conceptual signification, but are endowed with a `differential' meaning interplay through the complex produced of various theoretical and political `idealism' The meaning positions. of `materialism' and discursive as is differential determination the produced combination and categories via of these positions relative to one another. Thus, the difference between `materialism' `idealism' and is no longer articulated with reference to is it now objectivities, or conceptual generalities, or even statements as such: differential in to theoretical terms statement's relation characterised of a but devoid in themselves which nevertheless of meaning, elements which are determine the production of discursive sense. `Materialism' and `idealism' are determinable level longer they defined the are no sense; of reified, no at longer conceptually hypostatised in `idealism'. `materialism' and without synthesis, of intraconsistent systems of discursive

190 statement; they are now the result of differential signifying between relations a- modalities of utterance; the product of modes of discursive production which have no intrinsic meaning in themselves. This `structural Marxist' account clearly comes closest to grasping the necessarily a-signifying, non-conceptual character of the sought-for genetic a priori conditioning the intrinsic distinction between the modalities of `materialist' and `idealist' utterance. Consequently, Laruelle's objection to this structural Marxist account focuses on a single question: how can the sought-for genetic a priori be at once a-signifying and non-conceptual, whilst intrinsically differential and constitutively relational, which is to remaining dependent say: on an objectively ideal structure of signifying coordination between irreducible empirical elements? Although, the elements through which theoretical sense is produced are neither conceptual nor signifying in themselves, they remain empirically presupposed; they are already objectively given as subject to a determinate socio-economic articulation, and thus forms through already mediated various of conceptual presupposition. Structural relationality, Laruelle insists, reintroduces ideality, which invariably involves a residual dimension of transcendent objectivation and between The transcendental conceptual signification. separation real, a priori, 157Laruelle Althusser, 1997, but Althusser & Balibar, textual ; and cf. references, passim provides no

191 `materialism' and `idealism' as intrinsically distinct modalities of theoretical utterance cannot be confused with the ideal, a posteriori differentiation empirical and ultimately between `materialism' and `idealism' as distinct discursive modalities produced through relations of reciprocal determination. Thus, although in the structural Marxist account, the distinction between `materialism' `idealism' and is neither supposedly given as empirically objective, nor supposedly given as a conceptual signification, it nevertheless remains empirical insofar as it is supposedly produced as given being than transcendentally producing or giving. Moreover, as far as rather Laruelle is concerned, structural differentiation cannot but presuppose a ideality; it supra-conceptual continues to operate within an ultimately Ideal, objectivating differential Discrete continuum of relation. elements remain subsumed within an all-embracing differential "In continuum of relativity: the primacy of `relations' (of production, of force, of texts, of power) which for took we materialism, and which is one in effect, that is to say, an offshoot [j J difference Idea, in idealism, is transfer the there an and as of of only a (Ibid., Being ideality the the over entity" real, of ultimate primacy of over p. 106). 1996, pp. 161-224.

192 Thus, in structural Marxism, `materialism' and `idealism' lose their pseudo-absolute, empirically pre-given meaning as `theories in themselves', have to that self-positing absolutenessnow taken over by the differential only complex of politico-economic relation through which they are produced; a is relational continuum which autonomous and no longer relative to its terms because it is relative only to itself; which is to say, self-positing. But this latter feature, as we saw in the case of machinic constructivism, is invariably in idealism. in just index And Marxism as machinic of structural an hypostatised, longer if `materialism' `idealism' and are no constructivism, it is in doctrines to one another, perpetual opposition standing ready-made because they now form instead a chiasmic nexus, each alternately serving as interruption, relay or as continuum or as cut, as for the other. Of course, it is instance ideal transcendental the of this chiasmic nexus which now constitutes materiality, `materialism' the a priori dimension simultaneously hyletic of synthesis through which distinguishes and relates itself to `idealism'; as if, Laruelle maintains, in the complex differential nexus out of which `materialism' and `idealism' are temporarily crystallized; "the `materialist' side or aspect of the assemblage, continuous point dispersion of of limited idealist inhibited, the side idealism, simultaneously materialism and assemblage an system, continuous a reconstituted or aspect, and re-joined,

193 that is necessarily `idealist' precisely insofar as it is an assemblage. Idealist to the second degree, to the nth degree. Generally, in the systems of Difference, materialism is merely idealism in the nth degree, in the `andth' degree, infinitely intensified. In raising ideality to the level of auto production in this circular fashion, which is to say, to the status of causa sui (`will to power), they [the systems of Difference-RB] confirm ideality through itself, forms ideality " (Ibid., p. 106its impossible the genesis rendering of and of 107). It seems then that in structural Marxism just as in machinic dogmatic between `materialism' the empirical opposition and constructivism, `idealism' becomes transcendentally suspended or reduced. The difference between them is produced, not given; it becomes a relative, contingent, hyletic Thus, the production. result of abstract processes of aleatory product; for the transcendental materialist, the abstract materiality of hyletic synthesis is that theoretical supervenient ultimately praxis upon which all -whether differentials be determined through praxis in force of socio-economic infrastructural production, or constituted through collective assemblages of `materialism' in that the machinic phylum158- entails enunciation and `idealism' considered as systems of signifying statement become materially 158Cf. for instance Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, pp. 75-110.

194 equivalent at the level of a-signifying indifferently utterance; encompassed within an all-embracing continuum of self-differentiating hyletic production. One philosopher's putative `idealism' provides the basis for another's equally `materialism' 159. putative However, as we saw in the previous chapter, in absolutising abstract in in this materiality way, raising the hyletic continuum to the level of a causa into hyletic idealism transcendental materialism collapses sui, an absolute which effectively precludes the possibility of achieving a rigorously transcendental separation of `materialist' discourse from that of 'idealism'. It forecloses the possibility of discovering a genetic a priori which would distinguish the mode of utterance proper to `materialist' theory from that hyletic 'idealism'. In continuity, transcendental absolutising concomitant with idealism. from indistinguishable itself absolute materialism renders The Materiological Amphiboly Utterance of Statement and in how, it is latter to To appreciate this necessary understand point, Principe de Minorite as well in Laruelle's as later, explicitly non- but doctrine longer is `idealism' a a system or a no philosophical work, irrecusable it is the of thinking primacy that asserts which noological syntax: Relation; of the All 159Hegel infinite, as self-positing is It thinking a relation. famous being Marx the example of this particular syndrome. most and that

195 in proceeds and through the absolute, self-positing element of an infinite relational continuum. But just as for Spinoza the idea of a circle is not itself circular160, for Laruelle, the transcendental condition that explains the genesis of relationality, and by implication, ideality, can be neither relational nor ideal. Relational ideality cannot account for its own genesis unless it be viciously. More precisely, the Idea as causa sui occludes the possibility of a rigorously theoretical account explaining the genesis and structure of ideality in 161. terms relational non-ideal, non-relational Transcendental materialism deliberately suspends the transcendent, distinction between thought and thing, subject and substance. The empirical is if, however this: according to the versions of transcendental problem is infinite have been discussing here, Relation, Matter or materialism we hyletic continuity, then it is one with the Idea of matter, with its Decisional But then the criticalself-positing relationality. absolute, circumscription as transcendental separation of ratter `itself from 160 «A true idea (for is dissolved `as such' matter For (ideatum). is from different its ideal have is idea) a circle true something a we having for is idea idea the a circumference the something thing, not of a circle of one another; one and Treatise (Spinoza, body the body itself'. idea is on the is the a of and a centre, as a circle, nor Correction of the Understanding, VI, 33) Cf. Spinoza, 1923, p. 236. It is important to remember that Spinoza is not reiterating a banal categorial dualism of thought and thing. The idea/ideatum distinction is inter-attributive; and attributes, each equally expressing substance's infinite and eternal essence in a different way, are not categories. Although epistemically incommensurable, they remain ontologically indistinguishable. 161We insist the Laruelle his necessary how on will throughout work, non-philosophical shall see heterogeneity of transcendental theory vis a vis that which it is supposed to theorize. Thus, a transcendental theory of Decision cannot itself be Decisional.

196 along with the dogmatic-empirical distinction between subjectified thought and objectified thing. The result, as we know, is a form of absolute idealism in which there is no longer a real distinction, a radical separation, between `matter' and its Decisional circumscription in the philosophical Idea. More precisely, just as it posits its own presupposition, deliberately materiology reinscribes its own conditions of enunciation within the enunciated theory162. Like a serpent swallowing its own tail, it absorbs the real conditions of utterance for materialism within the ideal realm of materialist theory. However, in so doing, it insidiously subordinates the real, unobjectifiable condition for materialist utterance to the ideal, objectivating statements of materialist theory. It abolishes the representational codification of materialist doctrine, liquefying its hypostatisation in terms of signifying better the to render the distinction between the transcendent statements, ideality of statement and the immanent reality of utterance, the ideality of the enonce and the materiality of its enonciation, perfectly porous, not to say for functions that ultimately reversible, so every utterance as a statement it, Thus, Laruelle the utterance's aanother utterance and vice versa. as puts 162This distinction between utterance and statement, enonciation and enonce, roughly corresponds albeit at an entirely abstract, conceptual level- to what, in a completely different philosophical context, Levinas calls the distinction between ethical `Saying' and ontological `Said'. Cf. Levinas, 1990, especially pp. 16-20; 64-67; 78-86; and 239-253. However, whereas Levinasian `Saying' as epekeina tes ousias or `Good beyond being' is an index of unobjectifiable transcendence, the notion of `utterance' as used here obviously indexes unobjectifiable immanence.

197 signifying material immanence simultaneously serves as interruption and as relay, as cut and as continuum, vis a vis the statement's ideal, signifying transcendence. The materiality of utterance and the ideality of statement are hyletically synthesized, inclusively disjoined in the machinic phylum, flowing into one another in perfect intensive continuity. As a result, machinic constructivism effectively hermeneutical aporias of significational inscription. neutralizes the It successfully interminable circumvents an post-phenomenological negotiation with the metaphysical signifier predicated on the representationalist assumption of the linguistic sign's empirical reality by transcendentally suspending the dualism it does But so at the cost of of signifier and signified. equivocal effecting idealizing an distinction the sublation of real between the immanence of material utterance and the transcendence of materialist statement. How are we to prevent this slide from transcendental materialism to formulation the idealism ? The to the of a requires problem solution absolute between the distinction and relational phenomenality critical-transcendental `in-itself that would not surreptitiously resurrect the unobjectifiable realm of the transcendent distinction between thought and thing, subject and substance. Having seen how even an ostensibly anti-phenomenological instance of

198 materialist Decision involves a more subtle objectivation and phenomenalisation of matter `as such', it is clear that the solution to the problem can only reside in a non-Decisional reformulation of the criticaltranscendental distinction such that it would now obtain between the realm of phenomenality qua objectivating Decision and the unobjectifiable dimension `in-itself' the of qua ante-Decisional immanence. Thus, the sought-for genetic instance, the transcendental a priori, separating the conditions of enunciation proper to materialist theory from those characteristic of idealism is no longer intra-philosophical, which is to say, Decisional. Moreover, it cannot even be `material' in ideal that as characterised ontologically sense through which materialist Decision reinscribes its own putatively real ontological its idealizing the auto-position. own charmed circle of presupposition within Every Decision in favour of materialism qua system or doctrine, carried out in formally Decision, the remains presumed self-sufficiency of accordance with idealizing and hence ultimately indiscernible from a Decision in favour of idealism. The real precondition for a rigorously `materialist' enunciation idealist be `material', itself the circle of autoshort of reinstituting cannot position. Accordingly, the separating instance, the genetic a priori, now passes between `materialism' and `idealism' qua intra-philosophical Decisions, and

199 a non-Decisional immanence which is indifferent foreclosed to the or transcendent distinction between `materialism' and `idealism', but which nevertheless provides a real or non-posited presupposition on the basis of which a non-materiological theory can effect the non-Decisional positing of `matter itself as first name or for symbol163 non-conceptual the immanence unobjectifiable of the 'in-itself'. The Decline of Materialism What are the consequencesof this non-philosophical reformulation as far the relation between material utterance and materialist statement is ? does it In concerned what way avoid the materiological encompassment of the reality proper to material utterance within the ideality of materialist ? statement Crucially, in this reformulation, of `matter instead of itself' to perpetuating the the Decisional materiological subordination circumscription `as the subordination of effect such', we matter of first itself `matter as Decisionism to name or non-conceptual materiological for determinant is immanence for the that non-Decisional real which symbol 163This is `cloning') to (which to as opposed as a also refer shall we a real or non-Decisional positing an ideal or Decisional auto-position- of `matter itself'. Thus, our non-Decisional positing of the radical hyle as `first name' or `non-conceptual symbol' for radical immanence functions in such a way as to `matter itself `matter between as as well idealising such', as the and the separation of elision preclude in ideal immanence's transcendence. re-envelopment preventing real

200 Decision. The next chapter shall explain the function all of this nonconceptual symbol in the non-materialist axiomatic in considerable detail. For the time being, suffice it to say that it is as non-conceptual symbol for the immanence unobjectifiable of the `in itself', determining Decision without being determined by Decision in return, that the first `matter itself (or name the radical hyle, as we shall begin calling it in the next chapter) maintains the transcendental separation between Real immanence and Ideal Decision in such a way as to prevent the slide from transcendental materialism to absolute idealism. Thus, the genetic a priori through which the real conditions of for enunciation material utterance become radically separated from that ideal between the reality of utterance and the ideality of statement reversibility reversibility -that in accordance with which material utterance is perpetually reinscribed in materialist statement- is finally discovered when `matter itself is allowed to function as one among other possible first names for that unobjectifiable immanence in virtue of which utterance remains foreclosed to Decision, whether `materialist' 'idealist'. or Accordingly, transcendental its materialism attains rigorous performative consistency only when the asignifying immanence of material utterance becomes liberated from the Decisional hybridisation of signifying statement and a-signifying utterance.

201 `Matter itself no longer designates ineffable transcendence. It is henceforth immanently separated transcendent Decision a -without of separation- from its Decisional hybridisation with the idealized phenomenality of matter `as is It such'. a non-conceptual symbol for the unobjectifiable immanence of a radically a-signifying utterance; one indexing an unequivocal performative consistency of saying and doing whilst remaining semantically in-consistent; is foreclosed to to every form of conceptual or hermeneutic which say, delimitation. It follows that in order to purge itself of the materiological hybridisation of signifying transcendental materialism ideality and phenomenological intelligibility, should be prepared to effect its own discontinuation as a system of signifying statements. Materialism must be willing to ruin the conditions of its own idealized theoretical intelligibility; to its sacrifice sufficiency and autonomy as a self-positing, self-presupposing mixture of asignifying utterance and signifying statement in order to achieve its ultimate theoretical vindication by enacting the rigorously transcendental separation of matter `itself qua unobjectifiable foreclosure to first name for the reality of utterance's Decision, ontologically obj ectivated Decision. from matter `as such' qua

202 This is what we shall refer to Laruelle`the decline as of -following materialism'. It represents the culminating point toward which the previous three chapters have (we hope) been inexorably progressing. Materialism must first consent to its own liquidation as a Decisional category, deliberately itself doctrine that part of eliminating which consists of a system of or better its the to statement, constative secure ultimate theoretical vindication as form "In consistent of performative utterance: order to stay a rigorously faithful to its inspiration and achieve a definitive victory over idealism, liquidation first its to consent own partial materialism should -as category it should consent to the subordination of and statement-, its materialist is in itself that to material, relative or of utterance a process statements hyletic, then consent to stop conceiving of this utterance as an ideal, relative in decline The the name of matter, and of matter as of materialism process. hyle in the name of the real. No longer materialism, but a more secret knowing of matter, one which would no longer tread the luminous paths of in fusion limitless ideality the logos..., real and of the nor the amphiboly, the the hyle" (Ibid., p. 107) Here at last we find ourselves at the threshold of a rigorously nonDecisional theory of matter `itself :a `more That theory. non-materialist by Laruelle invoked once grasp knowing our within comes of matter' secret

203 both `materialism' `idealism' and the more exactly, materiological -or, hybridisation of `materialism' and `idealism' in the absolute autonomy of the hyletic continuum as self-positing, self-presupposing Idea- comes to play the for indifferent index, for role us of an material an empirical support a rigorously performative transcendental theory operating according to `matter's' foreclosure to `materialism' as well as 'idealism'. Whereas in materiological theorizing the ideality of statement invariably became coit the the through of constitutive reality of utterance which was produced, the statements of non-materiological theory now allow themselves to be determined by the unobj ectifiable reality of utterance -via the axiomatically intervention of `matter itself as non-conceptual symbol- without presuming to co-constitute the reality of utterance in return. We have now identified the necessary (albeit not sufficient) conditions for a transcendental theory of `matter itself'. More exactly: we have begun to delineate the conditions for a thinking operating according itself as `matter immanence of unobjectifiable to the foreclosed to Decision; the `of matter longer is for that thinking no conditions a in the sense of matter but `of its Decisional objectivation, attempting in the sense of being foreclosure to materiological to adequate matter's determination. It is important to emphasize how the basic parameters for materialist theorizing

204 have been transformed: instead of effecting a in matter conformity determination materiological of with the idealizing elision of the transcendental between `matter itself and separation `matter as such', we are about to reposition ourselves so as to allow the unobjectifiable immanence of material determine to thought through the non-Decisional positing of `matter utterance itself as its non-conceptual symbol. In other words, we have shifted from a (or Real) thought the wherein and posture materiality are co-constituting or amphibologically coextensive, to one wherein matter determines thought determining in Thought the thought matter return. without -specifically, philosophical or materiological idealization of matter- will provide the immanence `matter from the of unobjectifiable which empirical material itself is that thinking; unilaterally one shall extract a non-materiological determined by the immanence of material utterance. Instead of idealising thought, to the we shall materialise I of arbitrary strictures matter according thought in accordance with matter's necessary foreclosure to thought. It is here that a further nuance explaining the requirement of a is for theory non-materialist sufficient as well as a necessary condition indifferent intentional to is foreclosed if `matter' For to objectivation, needed. thought, then how is it possible even to construct a thinking that would `matter Clearly, foreclosure thinking? to operate `according to' that radical

205 itself as first name for the unobjectifiable immanence is of material utterance characterised by a radical indifference to thought which withdraws it from the order of the problematisable. Radical immanence is non-problematic: it does for thinking, it does not petition Decision, it simply has no need for not call thought. But since there is thinking, or since philosophical Decision is the immediate, empirically given form within which thinking is already operating164,non-materialist theory will use the Decisional hybridisation of thought and matter, the materiological amphiboly of unobjectifiable reality ideality, its but is That as occasional non-determining cause. and objectivating to say, non-Decisional materialism will use thought's transcendence, its hyletic by (exemplified the to absolute, self-positing sufficiency pretension continuum's absolute auto-position) as the contingently given empirical but determination by for the thought's non-sufficient necessary occasion immanence of material utterance. The unobjectifiable immanence of utterance but discursive does for theory objectivation, not need as necessary condition `always in has, form thinking the already' a sense, of philosophical since itself articulated statement, the latter within that amphibological mixture of utterance and be the the empirical cause, occasional used as can for support, a thinking-in-accordance-with the unobjectifiability 164 We will have of utterance in of the account this chapter's next to point particular concerning say more

206 taking that objectivating amphiboly, that Decisional hybridisation itself, its as object. The key difference is this: whereas materiological thought own hybridisation of unobjectifiable immanence and mistakes its objectivating transcendence for the Real (i. e. matter as Idea) because it believes that Decision is sufficient unto the Real, non-materiological thinking determines the Decisional mixture unilaterally of obj ectivating transcendence and immanence basis the unobjectifiable on of unobjectifiable immanence alone. It uses materiological Decision as the occasion for a non-materiological theory which lets the unobjectifiable immanence of material utterance determine or dualyse the materiological confusion of `matter itself and `matter as such' via the non-Decisional positing of `matter itself as first name for the unobjectifiable immanence which determines all Decision in-the-lastinstance. Philosophical Summary Transition and to Non-Philosophy Let's briefly recapitulate the movement charted thus far in the four chapters that make up the first half of this thesis. We saw how the transcendental hypothesis of a critical/problematic separation between `matter itself and `matter as such' was turned into an ontological dualism of enstasis philosophical Decision .

207 and ekstasis in the material phenomenology of Michel Henry and subjected to idealizing an sublation in the absolute hyletics of Deleuze & Guattari. Henry's discovery of a quasi-radical or `enstatic' immanence remains vitiated by its phenomenologisation. By absolutising immanence as pure autoaffecting ipseity continuously absolving itself from transcendent objectification, Henry renders unobjectifiable immanence relative once more to the ekstatico-horizonal transcendence from which it distinguishes itself. Henry transcendently posits the unilateral asymmetry between enstatic immanence and ekstatic transcendence within the element of Decisional transcendence. Thus, Henry re-envelops immanence in transcendencethrough the very gesture whereby he attempts to render it radically autonomous. In the case of Deleuze & Guattari, immanence is withdrawn from the realm of interruptions Self, ipseity the transcendent of and shorn of phenomenological World, and Object only to be absolutised in familiar a once again itself, immanent is immanence Thus, to only although philosophical gesture. its auto-constructing its positing and presupposing character, in and through the philosophical Concept with which it remains coextensive, renders the immanence of intensive materiality into a paradigmatic instance of absolute idealist auto-position.

208 Moreover, this materiological hybridisation of unobjectifiable immanence and objectivating transcendence in both Henry and Deleuze & Guattari is more than an idiosyncrasy of doctrine. On the contrary, it is a for their Decisional circumscription of materiality in necessary precondition and through philosophical thinking. Thus, in this chapter we tried to show how materiological unobj ectifiable thinking materiality by operates continuously reinscribing the of asignifying into the constative utterance interrupt in is It this selfto theory. order statements of materialist idealizing forestall this to presupposing circle of absolute auto-position and `as distinction between the constative circumscription of matter elision of the immanent the performativity of material utterance as radically such' and index of matter `itself , that we proposed the drastic reorganisation of the have Consequently, theory argued we outlined above. syntax of materialist that it is only what we call `the decline of materialism' as such which More the itself. the triumph precisely: of materialism promises to vouchsafe decline of philosophical materialism as such coincides with the rise of nonitself. materialist theory as non-materiological essenceof materialism In effect, the successful transition from the speculative materiological idealism of philosophical Decisionism `about' matter to a non-materialist 'itself, by determined-in-the-last-instance matter axiomatic entails replacing

209 the Decisional transcendentalisation of matter with a transcendental materialisation of Decision. Accordingly, in the second part of this thesis we be hybridisations `as shall using materiological of matter such' and matter `itself , as articulated in instances certain selected of philosophical from the empirical material which we shall extract or clone materialism, as the rudiments of a non-materialist axiomatic. Moreover, we shall do so through the non-Decisional positing of the radical hyle as non-conceptual immanence for the of material utterance. unobjectifiable symbol We are now ready to enter into the properly non-philosophical part of decline in this in to of what way this thesis, explain which we shall attempt materialism in the name of `matter itself promises an unexpected impoverishment, the materialist than of possibilities of an rather enlargement, function the in the of Focusing constantly reiterated theory. particular on begin following to in the `non-' thought, will chapter non-materialist prefix the in non-materialist which with the accordance methodology set out axiomatic detail in this Subsequent greater chapters will explain shall operate. hyle' `the between nonas radical new economy of non-philosophical relation hyletic immanence; the as for continuum unobjectifiable conceptual symbol for theory phenomenology of a unified support empirical occasional cause or

210 `the for locus Alien-subject' the nontranscendental and materialism; and as identity of utterance and statement. materialist

211 PART II THE NAME OF MATTER ITSELF

212 CHAPTER LARUELLE'S 5 RAZOR "The apprenticeship of radicality is an ascesis of thought rather than (Laruelle, 2000a, new position" a p. 76) Throughout the preceding account of materiological idealism, we have that the continuously maintained unobjectifiable immanence and objectivating ineluctable structural feature of materiological hybridisation of transcendence remains an every materialism predicated on an immediate, quasi-dogmatic faith in the sufficiency of philosophical Decision. Materiological idealism is an inevitable consequence of this spontaneous belief that philosophical Decision is sufficient unto matter. And it is by way in faith Decisional thinking that to this spontaneous philosophical of contrast delineated, invoked, have the possibility of a tentatively and constantly we belief in by matter; `of this that thinking suspending a non-Decisional theory the sufficiency of Decision, would try to proceed instead in accordance with a non-Decisional What foreclosure Decision. `matter's' to we call a positing of faith the spontaneous philosophical non-Decisional materialism will suspend in the sufficiency of Decision to determine matter, the better to let Decision be determined by matter.

213 None of this will be clear however, have until we clarified what we by `philosophical Decision' and what mean we mean by `non-Decisional' thinking. Thus, it is now necessary to explain more fully our Laruellean usage `non-' the of prefix, in the hope that this explanation will serve to clarify the in way which our non-Decisional positing of the radical hyle as first name of `matter itself marks a profound change of posture vis a vis the materiological hybrid immanent positing of matter as a of reality and transcendent ideality. `Non-' The crucial, all-pervasive165function of the prefix `non-' in Laruelle's thought provides the key to his entire theoretical enterprise. To understand by `non-philosophy' is Laruelle to understand what Laruelle what means in entails his rigorously idiosyncratic use of the prefix 'non-'. But that use can be Laruelle the through an account of structure which only properly explained `nonis `the Decision'. That the to to say, expression refers as philosophical philosophy' `non-Decisional be must understood essentially as meaning logocentrism, Over and philosophy'. and above metaphysics, representation, is insists, Laruelle Decision, the universal the ontotheology, philosophical by the invariant on variant every possible any and structural presupposed philosophical gesture as such, including the recent critiques or

214 deconstructions of representation and logocentrism themselves. Accordingly, if the singular import of Laruelle's thought is to be properly grasped, it is necessary that the `non-' in the expression `non-Decisional philosophy' be interpreted as the rigorous but anexact counterpart of the `non-' in the `non-Euclidean expression geometry' 166.By suspending167the spontaneous philosophical faith in the sufficiency of Decision -as expressed in what Laruelle regards as the latent `Principle of Sufficient Philosophy' implicitly in presupposed every Decision- Laruelle initiates a philosophically unprecedented type of transcendental theory, one which takes the myriad Decisions of philosophical ontology itself as its basic empirical material. In suspending the sufficiency of Decision, the Laruellean `non-' suspends a specific structural condition that has hitherto served only to delimit and constrain the possibilities of thought. Thus, the `non-' is lifting to the somewhat akin of a speed restriction. It expressesthe ascent168 165 E. g. `non-phenomenology'; `non-epistemology'; `non-technology'; `non-psychoanalysis'; `nonreligion'; `non-aesthetics'; `non-intuitive'; and perhaps most fundamentally `non-philosophy'. 166 Cf. Laruelle, 1989, pp. 99-129. 167 In a manner roughly analogous to the suspension of Euclid's fifth axiom concerning parallels carried out by Bolyai and Lobatchevski, then by Gauss and Riemann 168 Although our use of the term `ascent' in this context is intended to echo the Quinean strategy of semantic ascent which involves the shift from first-order talk about things -object talk- to second-order talk about object-talk, an unbridgeable gulf nevertheless separates this Quinean strategy of from Laruellean is, from (i. logical Decision) a metalinguistic ascent as strategic what e. possibility inalienable, index `metatranscendental' ineluctable nonthe of an ascent as perspective, character of logical (non-Decisional) reality. Furthermore, the non-philosophical suspension of the onto-logical a between distinction de-stratifies hierarchical the meta-language priori simultaneously neutralises and bounds discourse the incorporating within and object-language, thereby every variety of metalinguistic how discuss in its issues become These the next chapter when we of should clearer empirical material.

215 from the quasi-transcendental level of the ontological determination of exclusive conditions Decision), to a 'hypertranscendental'169 or non-Decisional of possibility for experience (the philosophical level determining the real equivalence of any and every possible ontological Decision Where Decisional thinking produces intelligible concerning experience. possibilities for cognition on the basis of that which is already empirically known as `real', non-Decisional thinking discovers un-intelligible possibilities for cognition on the basis of the Real as unknown. As a result, the Laruellean `non-' entails hopefully we will show-as an unprecedented change of scale vis a vis the intra-Decisional units of ontological measure. In Decisional thinking, the internal structure of Decision functions as a systemic grid governing hence conceptual coordination, and as the implicit ontological yardstick in accordance with which every variety of philosophical perspective -whether it be `materialist' or `idealist'- seeks to Laruelle's thought both radicalises and generalises certain aspects of Quinean physicalism. For an account of semantic ascent as philosophical tactic cf. Quine, 1960, pp. 271-276. 169 By `hypertranscendental' we mean the radically immanent but non-ontological instance capable of determining every transcendental instance of ontological determination. It should be emphasised however, that the term `hypertranscendental' is not one Laruelle has ever used or one he would be likely to favour precisely because he adamantly rejects any attempt to categorise non-philosophy as some kind of metaphilosophical enterprise. Such an enterprise would presuppose the validity of the eminently philosophical distinction between object-language and meta-language. But it is precisely these kinds of hierarchical division, Laruelle maintains, that are completely invalidated from within the unconditional immanence proper to the non-philosophical perspective. Laruelle refuses any attempt to conflate the real but non-Decisional dimension of transcendental immanence within which nonhe does He ideal, hierarchies the so, thinking of philosophy. metastructural philosophical operates, with insists, because what philosophers call `transcendental' is merely a transcendent, metaempirical construct.

216 limn the grain and texture of the real. But in non-Decisional thinking, the absolute sufficiency of Decision becomes relativised vis a vis a radically autonomous invariant, and hence the internal structure of ontological Decision subjected to variation on the basis ontological of its determination by that non- invariant170. Thus, the absolute sufficiency of Decision as in its spontaneous philosophical mode becomes practised relativised, - it becomes one among a potentially infinite manifold of equivalent but incommensurable ontological Decisions each of which has been determinedin-the-last-instance by a radically autonomous but non-Decisional invariant. By separating non-Decisional immanence from Decisional transcendence, Laruelle's razor discontinues the auto-positional and auto-donational circle of Decision, and suspends the hallucinatory sufficiency through which Decision continues to function as a syntactical invariant for all philosophising. In order to clarify this function of the `non-' in the expression `nonDecisional materialism' this chapter will provide: 1. a brief, general description terms 170This is of its key of the structure of characteristics of Decision in `auto-position/auto- a controversial point in our mobilisation of non-philosophical theory, and one with which we believe Laruelle himself would in all likelihood probably disagree, insisting that the cloning or determination-in-the-last-instance of Decision does not constitute an intervention within the latter's internal structure. Thus, cf. for instance Laruelle, 1989, pp. 247-249. We shall consider the question concerning the peculiar nature of non-philosophical `agency' in our Conclusion; specifically, the sense in which the non-philosophical cloning of Decision does or does not constitute an intervention within Decision qua World. Cf. infra, pp. 430-440.

217 donation', wherein the `auto-' expresses the absolute sufficiency of Decision. 2. an account of the link between the absolute sufficiency of Decisional auto-position/auto-donation and the structure of Decision as a transcendental deduction in effect. The latter explains what Laruelle takes to be the exclusive or totalising character of all philosophical Decision. 3. an explanation of how the razor allows for what we shall describe as a `non-Decisional cloning of Decision'. The radical separation effected by the razor between Decision and nonDecisional immanence allows the former to function as the occasional cause for a non-Decisional thinking wherein immanence's foreclosure to Decision becomes effectuated as a determination of Decision in accordance with immanence. Once this has been done, it should hopefully be easier to understand the entirely positive character of our attempt to effect a `non-Decisional' suspension of the hallucinatory sufficiency of materiological Decisionism. We shall see how the expression `non-Decisional materialism' must be for `non-auto-positional/non-auto-donational' the understood as shorthand `materiality' that radicalisation of materialism; one entails a generalisation of

218 beyond the restrictive confines of its viciously materiological circumvention within the circular ambit of Decision. Which is to say: a `non-Decisional materialism' expresses the shift from the Decisional idealisation of matter, to the non-Decisional materialisation of Decision. The Structure A non-Decisional Philosophical the of Decision materialism does not negate the materialist Decision but radicalises its basic possibilities by suspending its constitutive pretension to unconditional, self-sufficient unconditional sufficiency, the need for autonomy. this `auto-Decisional' But what is it in this materialism that warrants heteronomous, a non-auto-Decisional suspension of its spontaneous autonomy ? Laruelle's answer is, at first glance, extremely simple: the autonomy grounding the possibility of all materialist thought expressesthe materialist's faith in be the the that philosophical supposition nature of matter can sufficiently determined through implication, hence, by Decision, and a through thought, even in the limit-cases where it is decided that itself must `matter remain undeterminable, unthinkable or undecidable. This philosophical faith in sufficient determination finds expression in the two basic structural features of a Decision: it is positional) and self-positing (auto- Laruelle All (auto-donational). philosophising, self-giving

219 insists, begins with a Decision, with division traced between an empirical a (but not necessarily perceptual) datum and an (but a priori not necessarily rational) faktum, both of which are posited as given in and through a synthetic unity wherein empirical and a priori, datum and faktum, are conjoined. Thus, the philosopher posits a structure of articulation which is simultaneously epistemological distinguishes a and ontological, one which immediately given datum, it empirical whether be binds and perceptual, phenomenological, linguistic, social, or historical; and an a priori intelligible faktum through which that datum is given: e.g. Sensibility, Subjectivity, Language, Society, or History. What is crucial here is the way in which such a structure is immediately independent of yet inseparable from the two terms which it both differentiate. is basically fractional It to a structure serves connect and is difference differentiated term that terms their third two as a comprising and intrinsic immanent and transcendent to those simultaneously and extrinsic, two terms. Thus, for any philosophical distinction between two terms (or Dyad), such as, in the simplest possible case, knower and known, or perceiver immanent intrinsic is distinction to the the and simultaneously and perceived, identity of the distinguished terms, and extrinsic and transcendent insofar as it is supposed to remain genetically constitutive of the difference between the

220 terms themselves. For the division is inseparable from a moment of indivision (=One) guaranteeing the unity-in-differentiation Dyad distinguished the of of terms. The result is a composite structure wherein the condition that guarantees the coupling of the related terms -e.g. (and again in the simplest knowing the that binds knower and known, or the perceiving possible case) that binds perceiver and perceived- remains irrevocably co-constituted by the two terms it is supposed to condition and so implicitly contained within both. And because it is posited as given in and through the immediate distinction between empirical datum and a priori faktum which it is supposed to itself in this structure ends up presupposing empirically and constitute, through the datum which it constitutes, and positing itself a priori in and through the faktum which is posited by itl7l So insofar as the extrinsic genetic difference between condition and identity intrinsic is to the of the conditioned, all the already conditioned (or irrecusably Decision self-positing remain moments of a philosophical datum (or auto-donational): a given auto-positional) and self-presupposing being by posited a priori achieves empirical manifestation through some faktum which in turn is only articulated a priori insofar as it is empirically In datum, through other words, every and so on. some presupposed 171We in the relation of this account our at work of structure version saw a particularly sophisticated

221 philosophical Decision is a species of what Foucault called the 'empiricotranscendental doublet' 172,and as such remains a viciously circular structure that already presupposes itself in whatever phenomenon it is supposed to explain. Consequently, there is or set of phenomena in a sense which explanations of phenomena couched in terms of philosophical Decisions explain nothing because the formal structure of the explanatory theory, the explanans, already constitutes the content of the thing to be explained, the explanandum, and vice versa. Thus, a philosophical Decision is neither genuinely explanatory nor authentically theoretical vis a vis the phenomena it pretends to encompass: it is at once insufficiently heterogeneous vis a vis the phenomena in question and lacking in any rigorously theorematic consistency. At its most abstract then, a philosophical Decision is a Dyad of immanence and transcendence, but one wherein immanence features twice, its internal structure subdivided between an empirical and a transcendental function. It is at once internal to the Dyad as the empirical immanence of the datum coupled to the transcendence of the a priori faktum, but also external as that supplement of transcendental immanence required for gluing empirical immanence and a priori transcendence together. Every Decision divides immanence between the empiricity of a datum that it supposes as given between Concept and plane in Deleuze & Guattari. Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 116-124.

222 through the a priori faktum, and a transcendental immanence which it has to invoke as already given in order to guarantee the unity of a presupposed faktum and a posited datum. It is as a result of this Decisional splitting of immanence that philosophy requires the latter to intervene both as the empirical corollary of transcendence and as the transcendental guarantor for the unity of a priori condition and empirically conditioned or 'experience'. For crucially, in order to secure this coincidence of positing and presupposition, the reciprocal articulation of faktum and datum -the a priori datum positing of a and the empirical pre-supposing of a faktum- necessarily dimension petitions a of unobjectifiable immanence as already given (without-givenness), one which is itself neither posited nor presupposed. Thus, Decision simultaneously posits as given an objectivated immanence as dyadic division and assumes an unobjectifiable immanence as a moment of in already given order to ensure the indivisible unity of the Dyad. According to the complex structure of philosophical Decision then, the One as indivisible immanence is simultaneously internal and immanent, and external and transcendent, to transcendence. More the Dyadic precisely, division the between immanence and unobjectifiable immanence of transcendental Indivision is both constitutive of and co-constituted by the 172 Cf. Foucault, 1970, pp. 318-322.

223 transcendent moments of dyadic Division between empirical objectivity and a priori conditions of objectivation. The Laruellean razor then will `cut' into this complex Decisional mixture of empirical immanence, a priori transcendence and transcendental immanence, separating the radically indivisible immanence of that which is independently already given of all Decision, from the Decision which uses it to secure the bond between an empirical immanence which it presupposes as given and an a priori transcendence discontinuing the reciprocity which or reversibility it posits as given. By which Decision introduces between that immanence which is already given (without-givenness) and that immanence which is empirically transcendence of an a priori presupposed as given through the positing, non-Decisional thinking inaugurates an irreversible separation between the radical indivision of unobjectifiable immanence on the one hand, and the Decisional hybridisation unobjectifiable immanence, objectivating of transcendence and empirical objectivity on the other. What prevents this `cutting' from amounting to yet another Decisional it is fact immanence between that the transcendence constitutes a scission and has immanence basis Decision the not which of an suspension of effected on itself been decided about; an immanence which has not been posited and

224 presupposed as given through some transcendent act of Decision, but already independently given of every perceptual or intentional presupposition, as well from every gesture of ontological or phenomenological position. This is an as immanence that does not even need to be liberated from transcendence because it is precisely as that which is already separated (without-separation) from the Decisional mixture of immanence and transcendence that it functions as the inalienable sine qua non for the transcendental synthesis of immanence and transcendence in Decision. Non-Decisional immanence does itself from did Decision Henry's as phenomenologised version of not absolve itself it immanence. On Decision to the absolve as contrary, causes radical it, Decisional in the though to transcendent synthesis even relation absolutely its immanence immanence that transcendence as own sine petitions and of is Decision foreclosed to is It to than say: opposed rather qua non. -which between distinction dyadic indifferent the to radically immanence and instance for dyad Decisional transcendence as well as to every other such as it is In from distinguishing the relative. the absolute other words, the one radically indifferent to all dyadic couplings of the form: thinkable/unthinkable; decidable/undecidable; determinable/undeterminable. in briefly to important it is stave juncture, that order At this we pause but in objections. philosophical misguided automatic off advance certain

225 Thus, for instance, one of the most frequently reiterated philosophical objections to radical immanence is the one which tries to argue that in immanence characterising as unobjectifiable or non-Decisional we have unwittingly allowed it or by objectifiable objectifiable/unobjectifiable to become co-constituted once again by the Decision, reinscribing it Decision/non-Decision. or in the dyad Objections of this type are mistaken on two counts. First, whereas philosophical thinking seems to assume a fundamental between description and ontological conceptual reciprocity or reversibility constitution, non-philosophical thinking basis the of their operates on immanence duality. irreversible Thus, our characterisation of radical radically as unobjectifiable does not it constitute as unobjectifiable. Radical immanence is ontologically foreclosed; which is to say that it remains nonis it but because it because opposes or resists constitution constitutable not foreclosed or indifferent to the dyadic distinction between description and discursive foreclosure is that it that very our which guarantees constitution. descriptions of radical immanence are adequate-in-the-last-instance to it is immanence it. Moreover, that being radical constitutive of without foreclosed to it does that not mean conceptual characterisation is limitlessly becomes it On conceptualisable the contrary, unconceptualisable.

226 basis the on of any given conceptual material precisely insofar as it already determines our descriptions of it as being adequate-in-the-last-instance to it, without any of our conceptual characterisations or linguistic descriptions becoming co-constitutive or co-determining of it. Thus, where Decisional thinking posits and presupposes a reversible equivalence between immanence's indivisible reality and the transcendent divisions of its own linguistico-conceptual idealisations of immanence, non-Decisional thinking installs an irreversible duality between them, so that immanence's indivisible reality unilaterally determines all the idealised divisions of linguistico- conceptual usage. Second, the separation between the Decisional and non-Decisional is fail it is To is Decisional. to to itself dyadic, that to maintain say, which not in been has in effected already which that separation recognise the way immanence the as given-without-givenness nature of radical accordance with Accordingly, Decision. independently of all or posited-without-position, quite in the it is imperative that we appreciate the peculiar radicality of manner It from Decisional the the `non-' non-Decisional. the separates as razor which is not two distinct `things' that are being separated. If it were, we would still is to What the razor serves separate be operating within the ambit of Decision. Inseparable that (Decision) the its as and the realm of separabilityr 11.1. entirety L

227 which is already separated prior to the need for a separating act. In other words, the razor separates Decisional separation (scission, distinction, differentiation, division, etc.) from the Inseparable as that which is already independently separated of any separating gesture. Of course, it is intrinsic to the character of Decisional thinking that it incapable remain of acknowledging the fact that that separation is already realised, already achieved. It is precisely on account of radical immanence's foreclosure to Decision that Decision remains incapable of recognizing the former's radical, non-Decisional autonomy. But to insist that immanence's foreclosure to Decision amounts to another instance of Decisional division is to mistake immanence's non-Decisional suspension of Decision for an intraDecisional opposition to Decision, or an anti-Decisional annihilation of Decision. By now however, the reader should be beginning to appreciate in by `non-', foreclosure Decision, immanence's the to as expressed what way Instead be two these to of philosophical alternatives. cannot reduced either of `non-' Laruellean the promises an unprecedented opposition or annihilation, into It Decision. the cuts possibilities of radicalisation and universalisation of the charmed circle of auto-positional Decisional autonomy to a subjecting and auto-donational sufficiency, heteronomous process of radically determination. In other words, the reciprocal articulation or tri-lateral

228 between that which is empirically presupposed as given, posited a reciprocity priori as given, and transcendentally invoked as already given -which is to Decisional hybridisation the say: of empirical objectivity, objectivating transcendence and unobjectifiable immanence- is to be replaced by a nonreciprocal separation or unilateral duality between unobjectifiable immanence for the already given or as radically separate -without need an act of Decisional separation- and the entire structure of self-positing, self- hybridisation on the other. presupposing It is important that we note the way in which the ubiquity of the immanence functions `already' as such, as an as a marker of non-thetic adverb index of an unconditionally given `real', one which has always preceded the indexes `already' `realisation'. This for that of process any constituting need independently `given' is of every non-Decisionally or non-thetically which Decision. `givenness' through articulated operation of phenomenological Thus, the use of `already' in all these descriptions is effectively shorthand for non-Decisional'. But identified have already since we the defining in Decision terms of the structure of reciprocal articulation characteristic of whereby the a priori presupposes latter the its own empirical presupposition while posits its own a priori auto-position/donation, position via their mutual and complementary in `non-' the expression the then clearly `non-

229 Decisional' must itself be understood as an abbreviation positional/donational)', for `non-auto(- where the prefix `auto-' is now seen as perfectly condensing the essence of Decisional sufficiency. For if, as Heidegger's own `turning' in thought (Kehre) attests173, every philosophical Decision carries an implicit ontological charge as a `de-scission' (Unter-schied) wherein Being operates as the One-of-the-Dyad -the indivisible division which discloses and withholds, joins as it dis-joins- , then as Laruelle points out, the self-positing, self-presupposing transcendence articulated in the Decisional `auto-' will also express the essence of all ontological Decisionally deployed: "To the transcendence insofar as it is extent `transcendence ' or `Being' in a privileged that philosophy exploits dominant (... ) the and manner essence of transcendence or Being according to their philosophical usage (...) is the Auto, that is to say, the idea of philosophy's absolute autonomy in the form of a circle, of a self-reference such as becomes apparent in the dimensions ofAuto-donation and Auto position"(Laruelle, 1996, p.284) Accordingly, we can now begin to discern a chain of equivalences whereby the Laruellean `non-'=`non-Decisional'=`non-auto-positional/nonauto-donational'. Thus, the `non-' effects a suspension of auto-Decisional 173Cf. Much of Heidegger's remarkable Contributions to Philosophy revolve around a sustained meditation on the event of Being as Unterschied or `de-scission'. Cf. Heidegger, 1999, passim but especially pp. 60-71 for an explicit discussion of Decision and of the link between Being's `essential

230 transcendence on the basis of non-Decisional immanence. As a result, every term prefixed by the Laruellean `non-' will bear the hallmark of that which is unconditionally non-Decisional or radically in given and through immanence, rather than according to the double articulation of position and donation through the structure of Decision. Moreover, to the extent that the sufficiency of the Decisional `auto-` expresses the essence of ontological transcendence per se, the manifestation of a term in accordance with nonDecisional immanence shall effectively release that term's radically immanent non-ontological its essence, non-auto-Decisional Identity as cloned174 or determined-in-the-last-instance by radical immanence. Decision as Transcendental It is on account of this constitutively Method self-positing and self- presupposing aspect, Laruelle maintains, that every philosophical Decision recapitulates the formal structure of a transcendental deduction. In his article `The transcendental method' in Encyclopaedia175, Laruelle, having his reiterated conviction on the Universal Philosophical that the transcendental method represents a methodological invariant for philosophy swaying' as Ereignis and the `leap' or `crossing over' enacted by an `inceptual' (i. e. non-metaphysical) thinking between what Heidegger calls philosophy's `first' and its `other' beginning. 174The notion of non-Decisional cloning will be explained below in the third section of this Chapter, pp.245-258. 175Edited by A. Jacob, Paris: PUF, 1989. Cf. Laruelle, 1989c.

231 both before and after Kant formal features the functioning of whose -one can be described independently of any determinate set of ontological or even epistemological p1esuppositiolns- goes on to identify the three distinct structural moments which he takes to be constitutive of philosophising as such: 1. The analytical inventory of a manifold of categorial a prioris basis the on of the empirical reality or experience whose conditions of possibility one seeks. In Kant, this is the moment of the metaphysical exposition of space and time as a priori forms of intuition and of the metaphysical deduction of the categories as pure, a priori forms of judgment176. It corresponds to the moment of metaphysical distinction between conditioned and condition, empirical and a priori, datum and faktum. 2. The gathering together or unification local this of manifold of form into (i. a of universal e. categorial) a prioris or regional Unity by means of a single, unifying, transcendental a priori. Whereas the form of every categorial a priori function 176 Cf. Kant, 1929, B33-B116, of the a posteriori, pp. 65-119. remains a of experience, that of the

232 transcendental is no longer tied to any form of regional experience because it functions as that superior or absolute condition which makes experience itself possible. It is no longer the result of synthesis, but rather the pre-synthetic Unity that makes all a priori forms of synthesis themselves possible. This Unity is said to be `transcendental' then, because it is supposed to exceed experience absolutely, rather than merely in the manner of the metaphysical or categorial a relatively, prioris, local, which are always multiple, and tied to a specific form region or of experience. It transcends absolutely beyond the specific generic distinctions of the relatively transcendent, categorial a prioris that it ultimately grounds and unifies. Kant, famously, will locate this transcendental ground of the indivisible in Unity the of pure apperception. synthetic a priori Crucially, Laruelle points out, it is this very absoluteness is the transcendental compromised a priori which required of insofar as it remains tied in varying degrees, according to the form in to of metaphysically question, one or other philosopher transcendent empirical entity (e.g. Kant: the `I think' and the facultative apparatus; Husserl: the Ego of pure

233 phenomenological consciousness). Thus, the supposedly unconditional transcendence demanded of the transcendental remains fatally compromised precisely becausethe structure of transcendence invariably binds it to some reified, transcendent entity. 3. The third and final moment is that of the unification of these modes of categorial synthesis with this transcendental Unity, but now understood in terms of their constitutive relation to latter. is binding It through the the the experience offices of of the metaphysical a priori to the empirical experience that it Unity transcendental the conditions via conditioning the is itself. This, the of course, the stage possibility of a priori Deduction Kant's transcendental to of the corresponding is It the moment of transcendental synthesis, of categories'77. reciprocal co-belonging, immanence to one the guaranteeing in the terms of either conditioned, another of conditioning and Lebenswelt (Kant), the of or unity of possible experience (Husserl), or of Being-in-the-World 177 Cf. Kant, 1929, A95-A130 and B129-B169, pp. 129-175. In (Heidegger). Care as

234 any case it is that for which the moment of transcendental analysis functioned only as an enabling preliminary178. Laruelle's account of Deduction here deliberately invokes a Heideggerean resonance: Deduction constitutes the movement whereby the transcendent metaphysical scission of analytic division pivots back (Kehre)179 toward empirical immanence via the binding function of transcendental Unity and its indivisible synthesis. Through Deduction the motion from the metaphysically transcendent categorial manifold to the transcendental Unity which makes that a priori manifold possible is turned back toward empirical in the shape of a transcendental synthesis binding the a priori to experience the a posteriori, the logical syntax of the ideal to the contingent empirical congruences of the real. In this way, Deduction simultaneously circumscribes the empirical insofar as it is concerned with its a priori condition, and delimits the transcendent by folding the a priori back within the bounds of empirical sense and forbidding metaphysical attempts to loose it from its defined limits to the moorings as of possible experience. according 178Ibid., here better for be A 120-175. the exemplifying this as schematism case could made pp. unificatory function insofar as it is that which ultimately guarantees the categories' objective reality, over and above their merely formal or logical objective validity. 1791n The Philosophies from identify Heideggerean Laruelle Difference the shift will explicitly of Being as ontico-ontological Differenz to the event of `Enowing' as Unter-schied with the Decisional transition from metaphysical to transcendental difference. Cf. Laruelle, 1986, pp. 48-120. On the Heideggerean notion of `turning' -or more precisely, what Heidegger calls a 'turn ing-in-enowning'-, cf. for example section 255 in Heidegger 1999, pp. 286-288.

235 Yet not only does Deduction explain the empirical reality of but cognition, also the transcendental reality of its a priori possibility. So Laruelle is entirely willing to concur with Kant's immediate successors in ascribing an unparalled philosophical importance to the notion of the 180. But only if (as Schelling and Hegel rightly saw) the synthetic a priori function of the latter is de-subjectivised and de-objectivised, or generalised beyond its Kantian reification in pure apperception. If interpreted in the broadest sense as an abstract philosophical mechanism, then Laruelle sees in it that which is simultaneously both the means and the end of transcendental Deduction per se, so much so that one or other version of the synthetic a ideal logos Unity the the the of and real, of pre-synthetic priori as principle of (so long, lie heart be Decision to the of of all seen at very and phusys, can course, as one continues to insist, as Laruelle does, on an irrecusably transcendental dimension as constitutive of every philosophical gesture per se). It is this indivisible synthesis operated through transcendental a priori the offices of the in Deduction, this an-objective, pre-subjective and thereby superior (which is to say, transcendental) reality proper to the Unityin-difference of real and ideal which Laruelle will identify as the 180 See for example Vetö, 1998, pp. 61-85 and passim; Schelling, 1993, pp. 95-163; Hegel, 1989,

236 consummating moment Decision. of It constitutes the transcendental Indivision (=One) which is simultaneously intrinsic immanent and extrinsic, and transcendent to the fundamental Dyadic scission of metaphysical faktum and empirical datum, condition transcendental is fulfilled any empirical and conditioned: "The telos of the by Deduction and this constitutes the real: not in or contingent sense, but in the superior or specifically philosophical sense which is that of empirically real and of a priori the concrete synthetic Unity of the " ideal or possibility. (Laruelle, 1989c1, 697) p. Only now does it become possible to appreciate the full import of the Laruellean claim that Decision presumes to co-constitute the Real. For the `reality' of the Real in question at the level of Decision is neither that of the immanent empirically res, nor that of the metaphysically transcendent and ideal a priori (Kant: reality defined as coextensive with the bounds of real possibility through the objective validity of the a priori conditioning possible both. is but It that the reality peculiar to experience), rather which conditions the transcendental as ubiquitous guarantor unifying, and thereby constituting, the possibilities of thought and experience at a level that remains both for is Nietzsche the that presubjective and anobjective, so as valid principle p.209.

237 Deleuze for Kant and Husserl. This higher Unity and as indissociable from the Unity of experience, it only of Decision is not yields it, so that the latter is always structurally isomorphic with the former. Through the operation of Deduction, the Decision as indivisible division or One-of-the-Dyad is always coextensive with the a priori categorial manifold of experience. But this is not all. The philosopher reinscribes his/her own philosophical activity within the transcendental structure which renders the experience of that thought possible as a part of the real at a level that is simultaneously Decisional hybrid ontico-empirical and ontologico-transcendental (the or composite once again). More exactly, the syntax of Decision enacts or performs its own peculiarly transcendental reality in what effectively amounts to an operation of auto-Deduction possessing a tripartite is immanent Decision thought, at once an empirical event of some structure: being or some thing; but also a transcendent, onto-metaphysical thought of Being as Event; and finally that which transcendentally enunciates the Being internal is This Event Being. the thought architecture proper complex of as of to the Decisional `autos' as self-positing/self-donating circle or doublets81. 181We have & Guattari's in Deleuze Decisional the machinic this case of at work structure already seen is intensive Concept's at once materiality counter-effectuation of constructivism: the philosophical is forced to think from and the through philosopher which extracted state of affairs an empirical But 150-161. 109-124 3, Chapter Cf. Event. Being transcendentally productive of and pp. supra, qua for the the by Heidegger, of it is best the genesis conditions perhaps who reinscribes exemplified itself. Thus, the fundamental fundamental the ontology of structure project of ontology within

238 Two points need to be made here. First, the conformity with mentioned earlier, the characterisation of both radicalises in way which Laruelle, in the non-philosophical and generalises the ethos restricted Heideggerean/Derridean conception (and critique) of the metaphysics of presence, extending its scope beyond that of the `presence of the present' and domain narrowly circumscribed a of metaphysical thinking defined according to what, for Laruelle, remains an ad hoc, empirical (i. e. Decisional) definition of metaphysics. He does this by providing a non-Decisional identification of the `auto', one according to which it is identified with the essenceof Decision as auto-positional and auto-donational sufficiency. As a result, the range of for `auto' is both beyond applicability as a philosophical notion generalised its metaphysical definition in terms of the substantivity or presence of that which is a `standing-alongside' 'beside-itself beyond or what -, and Heidegger calls its thoughtful or essential redefinition as `the Same', as the belonging-together of positing/self-presupposing which differs182. Consequently, the self- structure becomes applicable that of auto-Decision for the tries to unpresentable conditions uncover even to the thinking that its in Time Being delineated own conditions of possibility, as encompasses philosophical project and explicated in Dasein's shift from dispersion in average everydayness to the properly meta-physical latter it is that Since for being. the its being-unto-death via appropriation of as ownmost potentiality Dasein 's own being comes into question for it, fundamental ontology as theoretical project is being-unto-death. in delineated the ultimately supervenient on existential ur-project 182Cf. Heidegger, 1969.

239 presencing or retrieve the constitutive dimension of self-withholding in every self-disclosure of Being. Once again we witness a change of theoretical scale in moving from the philosophical to the non-philosophical level of description. The auto- Decision is defined in terms of its abstract theoretical essence of nomy purely independently of any set of assumptions about what can and cannot count as instance of ontological an thereby becoming indifferently reification, both its to to presence, and applicable unpresentable presencing, so that the auto-logical structure of self-position and self-presupposition pertains even at the level of Ereignis/Enteignis as unrepresentable disclosing-withdrawal of Being. Thus, from a non-Decisional viewpoint, there is no compelling theoretical reason to prefer Heidegger's retrieval of the unthought essence concealed within the Parmenidean ro avzo ('the Same')183 as non- (unrepresentable disclosure and withholding metaphysical co-belonging of `auto' interpretation the as the to of ontotheological advent of presencing), identity substantial metaphysical (reified Both are entirely presence). invariant: Decision as auto-presupposing equivalent variants of a structural being. thinking and composite of 183For Parmenidean the between axiom link the indication of structure the profound of a suggestive deduction, cf. transcendental Kantian be') ('It is the same thing to think and to problematic of and the Heidegger, 1968, p. 243. The latter seems to support Laruelle's claim that all Decision recapitulates a

240 The second point that needs to be made concerns philosophy's theoretical status (or lack thereof), and the precise character of what many will doubtlessly see as Laruelle's own excessive 'theoreticism'. It is on account of this auto-Deductive structure (which is to say, on account of the Principle of the Sufficiency of Decision which it serves to articulate) that itself (la philosophy philosophie) for Laruelle is not a theory but rather an activity whose claim to theoretical legitimacy is only ever assured by its performance; a game the rules for which are always effectively guaranteed through the very operation through which their stipulation is enacted. For Laruelle, the trouble with this constitutively performative dimension of in Decisional Deduction, lies this philosophical activity; auto-enactment not in this performativity (far from it) but in the way in which the latter invariably basis the operates on of an unstated set of constative assumptions which themselves only ever become performatively legitimated. In other words, is it hybrid is theory a theory whose cognitive and practise: of philosophy a possibilities are compromised through an extraneous set of practical by hindered a exigencies, and a practise whose performative capacities are The theoretical philosopher, presumptions184. needlessly restrictive system of being thinking of Unity-in-Difference or and deduction the of transcendental on as a variant process of ideal logos and real phusys. 184-As loses its it traditional be begins [philosophy] to occasion, an used as a material and soon as finalities, all of which are based in a `spontaneous philosophical faith'. The latter forms a circle: it

241 in effect, never says what he/she is doing, does he/she is really nor what really saying. It is to this hybridisation of theory and practise, of the the performative, constative and of saying and doing, to which Laruelle objects, on the grounds that it needlessly constricts both the possibilities of saying and those doing, of of thought and of experience. Moreover, simply to affirm the differance between theory and praxis, constative and performative, as Derrida, for instance, seems to185, is to complacently re-affirm the philosophical Decision's constitutive, self-perpetuating embroilment in its own basically fractional, self-presupposing structure. By way of contrast, it is radical immanence as the already performed, furnishes Performed-without-performance186, the as which us with the nonDecisional essence of performativity. By using the razor to effect the nonDecisional separation or dualysation of these auto-Decisional hybridisations be for it, they that to to ethical, juridical, whether are external obliges one practise philosophy reasons better finalities but in to triumph and inversely, the these turn uses philosophy scientific, aesthetic, etc.; to affirm itself, on the basis of their subordination, as the only activity which is genuinely excellent, be it `absolute'. All this ethical or pedagogical, uncircumventable or prescriptive activity -whether `with this a view to experience', all of etc.-, all normative or auto-normative use of philosophy be latent teleology, must abandoned, which is to say, treated as a spontaneous philosophy's or explicit 1989, " (Laruelle, destroyed. limits henceforth than these rather within mere material and practised p.27) 185 Cf. Derrida, 1982. 186 "It is this Performed, in fetishes the sui causa the and of activity and of performativity shorn of general, which invests thinking itself as identity (within its relatively autonomous order of thought) of We too the say the theoretical not shall pragmatic. and of science and philosophy, and more generally, identity-RB] is latter [this hastily Realperformed that the the thinking with again once -confusing

242 of the constative and the performative, of performance and performativity, the basis of radical immanence as performed-without-performance, on we will identity the (without synthesis or unity), and the duality (without clone reciprocity or relation) of theory and praxis, or of the constative and the performative, thereby emancipating the non-Decisional essence of theory as radically performative, at the same time as we liberate the non-thetic essence of praxis as rigorously cognitive. Non-philosophy is at once a radically theoretical praxis, and a radically performative theory. Moreover, we shall see in the next section how it is precisely insofar as we are already operating in accordance with the immanence of the Real as `already-performed' that we help but cannot say what we do and do as we say187. Finally, it is the auto-Deductive character of Decision, its self- legislating sufficiency, fundamentally the which explains unitary nature of all philosophical Decision. Perhaps the most important consequenceof the autoDeductive structure described above is that the transcendental isomorphy between the a priori conditions for thinking and for Being excludes de jure directly in-One, but that it is so only in the last instance by the One as the Performed itself. " (Laruelle, 1996, p.215). 187We will also see later to what extent the non-materialist invalidation of the transcendent, phenomenological distinction between theory and experience, undermining as it does the quasisacrosanct status popularly accorded to a supposedly originary dimension of non-representational facticity or embodiment in much contemporary continental philosophy, resonates with the kind of militantly neuroscientific theoreticism espoused by philosophers like Paul Churchland. From a nonmaterialist perspective, with the exception of the radical hyle as Given-without-givenness, nothing, no residue of worldly, social, historical, or phenomenological experience is given without the intercession

243 the possibility of two Decisions (i. e. two Deductions) possessing an equally valid claim on the real. Philosophy as arena of Decision is necessarily the war of all against all. This claim seems to carry a peculiarly Levinasian resonance, but Laruelle seems less inclined to condemn war on ethical grounds as an indict it than to originary evil, on theoretical grounds simply because it presents us with an unnecessarily tedious and predictable spectacle: "Philosophy's both closure, within polemological multiplicity itself and in its own unitary or obliges it to exploit itself as a supposedly inexhaustible but fundamentally scarce resource. There is a scarcity of decision, one which is a consequence of its unity or circularity, its self- reference or self-sufficiency: all the various philosophies -the manifold of the Dyad- parcel out Unity, indivisible in itself, among themselvesas their unique booty, and this scarcity is identical with the war which they all reciprocally " 106) (Lat 1909, p. ueiie, wage on one another. Thus, Laruelle insists that the root of philosophy's unitary Decision: in lies there this could never syntax of auto-Deductive presumption be, as a matter of philosophical principle, more than one way of validly logos the the transcendental conditioning and phusys synthesis of effecting being to yield an ontologically a priori thinking and possibilities of or 8, the 7 Chapters 212-225, infra, where 1996, and Cf. Laruelle, Decision. and pp. of philosophical

244 philosophical experience of reality, because the formal Unity of Decision transcendentally conditions the structure of what for philosophy is equivalent to the real. All substantive ontological multiplicity hybridisation of articulated through the immanence and transcendence remains syntactically circumscribed by the transcendental synthesis of Decision. Consequently, however much multiplicity a philosophy lays claim to at the ontic, or even ontological level, the formal structure of Decision invariably necessitatesthat what philosophy affirms as being irreducibly multiple and singular, is always the result of a pure synthesis of transcendental Unity and a priori ideal multiplicity, of syntax and real experience' 88. Such synthesis invariably bears two distinct but inseparable characteristics. First, the character of indivisible synthetic Unity or the fact that transcendental synthesis must equal One. There can only ever be one in way which the ontological reality of experience is transcendentally constituted. Second, the characteristic that what is to count as ontically real multiplicity be defined will a priori function as a of real possibility or ontological reality at the transcendental level. Thus, what counts as singular, manifold, aleatory and heterogeneous according to the structure of Decision ramifications of these claims will be examined in detail. 188 Cf. in this ideal between Difference Laruelle's the metaphysical as regard account of relation syntax and as real transcendental experience in The Philosophies of Difference: Laruelle, 1986, pp. 3792.

245 is invariably the result of de jure indiscernibility a or undecidability between the possibility of real experience as a priori manifold at the ontic level and the reality of ideal syntax as transcendental Unity at the ontological level. And it is this hybrid or mixture of syntax and priori multiplicity, experience, of ideal unity and a of ontological reality and ontically real, which Decision affirms as coincidence of the indivisible immanence of the Real qua One and the unencompassable transcendence of the Ideal qua Multiple 189. The Non-Decisional Cloning of Decision At this stage, we must address an obvious philosophical rejoinder to the account of Decision that we have just delineated. What kind of validity are these claims concerning the auto-Deductive character of Decision supposed to have? Aren't they simply wild, reckless generalisations? Clearly, from a philosophical perspective, Laruelle's assertions strain our credulity. On what possible basis can he presume to claim that all philosophical 1891nChapter 3 we saw with reference to the case of Deleuze & Guattari how this Decisional synthesis or `sublation' of the One qua Real and the Multiple qua Ideal inevitably reinscribes untotalisable multiplicity as indivisible Unity. Cf. supra, pp. 149-153. By way of contrast, it is by suspending the sufficiency of Decision and irreversibly dissociating the moment of transcendental indivision from that of metaphysical division, unilaterally determining the latter on the basis of the former but never vice versa, that non-materialism will hypothesize that there are in principle an infinite number of possible ways in which the ontic singularity of a phenomenon may be ontologically constituted, - a de jure infinite number of possible Decisions capable of conditioning a priori the reality of experience. This is (hyper)transcendental dispersion, the non-materialist radicalisation and generalisation of the notion of an a priori manifold, one which would make it impossible to reinsert the latter within any horizon of Cf. infra, Chapter 7, pp. 361-372, for our account of the a priori ontological differentiation. fractalisation of Decisionally articulated instances of ontological unity.

246 thinking is Decisional and that every Decision invariably repeats the structure of a transcendental Deduction ? It may be however, that such a question misconstrues the explanatory intent of the theoretical posture presupposed in all these descriptions of philosophical activity, and consequently fails to appreciate the way in which Laruelle's account functions as a transcendental hypothesis constructed in order to explain the possibility of that activity. We have already insisted that is it is for theory not anti-Decisional: non-philosophy a and a practise heteronomously, Decision to the explain autonomy of philosophy, an attempt have is in Moreover, to terms. already seenthat say, non-Decisional we which the suspension of Decisional sufficiency on the basis of a non-Decisional immanence that is already given cannot be reduced to an anti-Decisional stance. Consequently, philosophical it cannot be confused with an immediately it is by On denunciation Decision. the contrary, of critique or heterogeneous immanence to in thinking as utterly radical accordance with Decision that we accessthe possibility of explaining Decision. Thus, the non-philosophical description of auto-Decisional sufficiency is neither a critique nor a deconstruction: it is an explanatory hypothesis. The but Decision, to delimit denounce, is to of to to or end all possibility point not functioning its description heteronomous which theoretical of provide a

247 simultaneously promises to untether the possibilities of thinking from the narrow ambit of auto-Decisional sufficiency. Accordingly, the Laruellean description of auto-Decisional sufficiency in terms of a generalised process of transcendental Deduction is an explanatory hypothesis that Laruelle is prepared to adopt to see if it will yield fruitful results in the attempt to illuminate the functioning of Decision. And it is in The Philosophies of Difference -a text which is roughly contemporaneous with the account of Decision put forward in `The Transcendental Method'- that Laruelle submits this particular hypothesis to a process of experimental non-philosophical it by disparate to applying a widely set of philosophies, thereby verification testing its range of applicability and explanatory coherence with reference to a heterogeneous assortment of philosophical methodologies and problematics190. Moreover, this non-philosophical hypothesis about the essence of philosophical thinking is transcendental. That is to say: it accepts the immanence between Decisional transcendence and non-Decisional separation for that better transcendental to of the effectuation a allow as already-given 190 Although testing Laruelle's of for and lack adoption systematic of examination a proper space we feel the Difference, that in The Philosophies for hypothesis we the auto-Deductive of philosophy habitually for as regarded are what to explanation coherent conceptually ability provide a unified, Deleuze, (Nietzsche, data incommensurable, sets of philosophical utterly disparate, not to say illuminating insights and Heidegger, Derrida) tend, when coupled with the variety of penetrating to hypothetical in experimentation, the process of analyses which characterise the results yielded validate the hypothesis' explanatory legitimacy.

248 separation in thought, an effectuation presupposed in its non-Decisional description of the essence of philosophy. For to theorize by means of the adoption of axioms, the construction of theorems and the experimental testing hypotheses is in to of explanatory already engage non-Decisional or nonAccordingly, thinking. the characterisation of Decision as autophilosophical Deductive which we have just provided is already non-philosophical, and the account of philosophical thought forward put by Laruelle in `The Transcendental Method', must, along with all of his works since A Biography Ordinary the of Man, be read as intrinsically and unequivocally non- in character. philosophical That the very identification of philosophical thinking as intrinsically Decisional is already non-philosophical, from is to a say, operating which be is for to clarified. transcendental perspective what now needs philosophy, However, we must warn the reader that in the course of this clarification we in theory describe be the workings of non-philosophical some obliged to shall he intricacy'91 degree that into detail, thereby entering or she of technical a Although tortuous. find to regrettable, say not convoluted, may excessively in is the present circumstances. that tortuousness nevertheless unavoidable the 191Some those following concerning details the the account of of all-specifically not -although 1411999, 34-38,162-168,225-228; pp. 1996, pp. theory of cloning- are drawn largely from Laruelle, 146; 2000a, pp. 56-75,226-238; 2000b, pp. 49-53; and 2000c, pp. 185-186.

249 The requirements of non-philosophical precision sometimes obviate the demands of philosophical clarity. The intelligibility of the claim that the non-philosophical description of philosophy is already transcendental requires an acknowledgement that the `perspective' of radical immanence (the vision-in-One) is already-givenwithout-givenness, prior to every auto-positional or auto-donational hybridisation of given and givenness, empirical and a priori, real and ideal. For the vision-in-One entails that the spontaneous philosophical presumption that every given presupposes an operation of givenness already be invalidated As and suspended. a result, the radical separation or unilateral duality of nonDecisional immanence as already-given and Decisional transcendence as is itself mixture of given and givenness already given-without-givenness: -it has already been performed (without the need for an act or Decision of by is Which the to the performance). say: real separation performed Laruellean razor is not between Decision and non-Decision but between the dyad `Decision/non-Decision' the and the alreadyphilosophical positing of from dyadic Decision duality nonseparating given or radically unilateral Decisional duality. But this means that even the absolute autonomy of Decision is Thus, immanence. to non-Decisional nevertheless relative-in-the-last-instance

250 the fact that the absolute sufficiency of Decision be can only posited-as-given by petitioning an immanence that is already-given renders that absolutely sufficient condition relative-in-the-last-instance to a radically necessary but non-sufficient condition. It renders the absolute, self-positing autonomy of Decision relatively autonomous vis a vis the radical autonomy of that which is already-given. Even the absolute autonomy of Decision remains relative to that radically autonomous last-instance which it petitions as already-given in order to effect its synthesis of ideal positing and real presupposition192 Accordingly, the autonomy of Decisional sufficiency is never just given as an absolute `in-itself in terms of the metaphysical dyad `Decisional transcendence/non-Decisional immanence'. It is also already-given-in-One or given-without-givenness as a relative autonomy - which is to say, given as an occasional cause or empirical support for non-Decisional thinking. Crucially, this heteronomous or non-auto-donational giving of Decision as an occasional cause -the non-Decisional donation of its absolute autonomy as a merely relative autonomy-, lifts or suspends its pretension to absolute, self-positing sufficiency, thereby reducing it to the status of an indifferent empirical 192 "Real immanence neither absorbs nor annihilates [Decisional] transcendence, it is not opposed to it, but is capable of `receiving' it and of determining it as a relative autonomy. Real immanence is so World does it the transcendence the that than of radical -rather not reduce absolute-whether it but, deny limit does it, it the gives contrary, on philosophically or phenomenologically-, or not albeit in accordance with its own modality: as that being-given-without-givenness of transcendence which, whilst remaining `absolute' or auto positional in its own register, acquires a relative autonomy with regard to the Real. "(Laruelle, 2000b, pp. 50-51)

251 material. Thus, the absolute autonomy of Decision known by -otherwise Laruelle as `The Principle of Sufficient Philosophy'- is suspended once it is understood that the supposedly unconditional sufficiency of Decision has already been given-without-givenness as no more than a relatively sufficient condition, an occasional but non-determining cause for non-Decisional thinking. Moreover, it is on the basis of Decision as empirical occasion that immanence's foreclosure to Decision can become transcendentally effectuated in thought. Consequently, the fact that Decision itself is already-givenwithout-givenness thinking as a potential occasion or material for non-Decisional to pretension absolute sufficiency -its reduced to a merely relative sufficiency-, already-suspended and explains how immanence's foreclosure to Decisional thinking may nevertheless become effectuated in thought on the basis of Decision. For with its pretension to absolute autonomy suspended,Decision as a relatively sufficient, but non-determining occasional cause becomes susceptible to determination by a radically necessary but nonsufficient cause: immanence as cause of determination-in-the-last-instance. And this determination of Decision as sufficient but non-necessary occasional cause, according to immanence as necessary but non-sufficient cause-in-thelast-instance, is performed by non-Decisional thought. This effectuation of

252 immanence's Decision's foreclosure to Decision in determination-in-the-last-instance non-Decisional thought, or through the non-Decisional immanence in thought, is what Laruelle calls `cloning'. effectuation of Here we arrive at the heart of non-Decisional thinking; that aspect of non-philosophy which is at once the most crucial but also the most difficult to far Decisional thinking is concerned. For doesn't this understand as as `effectuation' by thought of an immanence which is supposed to putative remain radically foreclosed to thought re-institute a reciprocity -and thereby a bi-lateral determination- between immanence and thought? In order to appreciate why this is not the case, it is important to immanence's `foreclosure' Decision that to remember simply means that it is from dyad, for instance, Decisional separate-without-separation every such as, the one distinguishing the thinkable from the unthinkable. Thus, immanence's foreclosure to the Decisional alternative between thinkable and unthinkable does not render it `unthinkable'. On the contrary: it is immanence's foreclosure to thought that allows it to use the Decisional hybridisation of the thinkable and the unthinkable -one which we have already seen exemplified in the work of Michel Henry193-as an empirical occasion from which to clone thought's transcendental Identity 193Cf 87-90. Chapter 2, pp. supra, determined-in-the-last-instance as by

253 immanence as that non-thinkable foreclosure which is simultaneously the already-thought. Accordingly, although Real immanence is foreclosed to thought as Decision, fact the that it nevertheless gives or manifests the thinking well as is inscribed in Decision immanence's which as an empirical occasion allows foreclosure to effectuate itself as thought; to clone itself as a transcendental Identity for non-Decisional (of)-thought'-; thinking -one which Laruelle will call `the force- but an Identity-(of)-thought is in its own turn which now foreclosed as transcendental, rather than as Real, to the Decisional distinction between thinkable and unthinkable which it uses as its material support. At this point, in order to minimize the potential for confusion, it is but important that non-philosophical we enforce a set of rigorous particularly distinctions empirical between occasion, immanence and qua Real non-Decisional foreclosure, thought qua Decision qua transcendental immanence's Real Cloning foreclosure. Real's allows effectuation of the foreclosure to Decision to become transcendentally effectuated as nonit but its Decision Decisional thinking on the basis of empirical occasion, as `thought' between dyad and does so without reconstituting a philosophical Thus, foreclosure'. `Real foreclosure' `transcendental `Real', or between and foreclosure thought, to Real's whether between distinction the all the radical

254 Decisional or non-Decisional, and non-Decisional thought's transcendental effectuation or cloning of the Real's foreclosure to Decision, is not a dyadic distinction between different, reifiable 'things'. Neither Real immanence, nor its transcendental effectuation, can count as philosophically distinguishable 'things'. There is only one 'thing': Decision as empirical occasion. `Between' Real foreclosure and transcendental foreclosure there is neither identity nor difference but an Identity-of-the-last-instance. The Real's foreclosure clones itself as non-Decisional thinking's transcendental foreclosure to Decision on the basis of Decision as empirical occasion. Which is to say, the Real clones itself transcendentally for thought force-(of)-thoughtidentityas an -as Cloning describes in the without-unity. way which the Real as an Identitywithout-ontological foreclosed Identity to all criteria of consistency, an discrete, numerical unity, can allow for a limitless number of effectuations without numerical reduplication194. By the same token, it is important that we do not apply the term `unilateral duality' when speaking of the non-dyadic distinction or Identityimmanence immanence Real between qua and of-the-last-instance qua 194This is (but immanence's describes Laruelle non-unitary or nonradically universal as what limitless de jure (without-givenness) its to a the give ontological) character as capacity already-given: for Decisions occasions as mere variety of reciprocally exclusive and therefore ontologically unitary thinking in accordance with the Real's non-unitary, non-ontological and non-consistent essence as an Identity-without-unity. Cf. Chapter 7, pp. 349-372; and Chapter 8, pp. 415-421.

255 transcendental. For it is the unilateral duality between Real immanence and Decision which becomes transcendentally effectuated or cloned as the unilateral duality between the non-Decisional clone and its Decisional occasion. Once again, in spite of appearances, non-philosophical theory operates with only one term: philosophical Decision qua empirical occasion. Instead of the Decisional triad of relations between empirical, a priori, and transcendental, we have a unilateral duality with only one term: that Decisional triad as an indivisible, empirical occasion. Neither the Real its nor transcendental clone constitutes a relational term. Consequently, the unilateral duality `between' Real and Decision is strictly indiscernible from is -or nothing over and above- its effectuation as the unilateral duality between Decision and non-Decisional clone. But its effectuation requires the occasion Decision: the Real's foreclosure to Decision does not need to be thought of -it is radically indifferent to all thinking- but if (and only if) Decision occasions it, that foreclosure is transcendentally effectuated or cloned as non-Decisional thought. Only on the basis of Decision as empirical occasion does the Real's radical foreclosure to Decision becomes effectuated as non-Decisional thinking in order to become transcendentally determining vis a vis Decision. Thus, the Real as foreclosed or as separate-without-separation from Decision is cloned as that force-(of)-thought is separate-withoutwhich

256 separation or foreclosed to the Decision that serves as its empirical support. Because the Real's foreclosure to thought simply means that it is the but necessary non-sufficient condition for all thinking, the non-Decisional operating according to the Real's foreclosure requires for its thinking but Decisional the thought occasion of manifestation as a contingent nondetermining factor. Accordingly, the inception of non-Decisional thinking's force-(of)-thought foreclosure Real's that the occurs as which effectuates determination, bi-lateral inauguration the of a reciprocity, a cowithout between the latter and the former. This point is important enough to be worth labouring: the radical bet een ww separation immanence but is Decision cloned as not reduplicated and Identity between duality thought's and the non-Decisional the unilateral its Real hybridisation thought empirical Decisional which serves as and of determine is Real to force-(of)-thought the it is that For able this as support. Decision without Because Decision's Decision being able to determine the Real in return. non-Decisional Identity, its transcendental is clone, determining functions it the Real, identical-in-the-last-instance with the as Real `through the (rather than which') instance, the organon, as which Decision. determines unilaterally

257 In what way then do these extraordinarily convoluted explanations serve to mitigate the charge of arbitrariness levelled against the Laruellean Decision? To the extent that it is predicated upon the account of mobilisation difficult but remarkably sophisticated theoretical apparatus, and on the this of invocation of this non-philosophical force-(of)-thought, it would be premature dismiss Laruelle's non-philosophical identification of the autoto simply Deductive essence of philosophical Decision as a gratuitous instance of philosophical generalisation. On the contrary, that identification seems to us to constitute a rigorously transcendental, albeit non-Decisional, hypothesis for the explanation of philosophical thinking. Although contingently occasioned by the Kantian paradigm of Decision, Laruelle's account constitutes a non- Kantian universalisation of Deduction. It sees the Kantian apparatus of Deduction `in-One' . It invokes the non-Decisional perspective upon `the `the of vision-in-One' -the reduction philosophising concomitant with history of philosophy' to the status of a contingent empirical material- in than transcendental a to rather universalisation, order effect an authentically for hypothesis the Kantian the as a paradigm metaphysical generalisation, of explanation of philosophising195. 195 Compared to many of the currently available attempts to provide a universal schema which would Heideggerean by for instance, the in its history `the essence-as exemplified, encapsulate of philosophy' `history of metaphysics as forgetting of Being', the Levinasian alternation between ontological State thinker between and Deleuzean infinity, sedentary the totalisation and ethical contrast or even

258 This is the non-philosopher's force-(o f)-thought, it is and as the latter that an instance of Decision, in this case Kant's, serves merely from which a transcendental Identity is extracted, as an occasion one which will assume the status of a non-thetic axiom, or axiom given according to the One (i. e. without self-givenness) on whose basis a set of transcendental theorems can be elaborated in conformity with their determination-in-the-last-instance by that transcendentally axiomatic theoretical Identity'96. Consequently, the Laruellean procedure in dealing with philosophy be can seen as a variation on the following injunction: general non-philosophical `Let immanence be given-without-givenness. What follows for ' Cloning injunction be in this to allows philosophy? satisfied a limitless depending instance is Decision to assume the variety of ways, on which of its being-given-in-One transcendental through status of a axiom or withoutinstance, Laruelle's In this givenness. particular non-philosophical hypothesis for the purposes of providing a theoretical explanation of philosophy's Identity assumes the following form: `Let the Kantian distinction between What be deduction transcendental given-without-givenness. metaphysical and follows for philosophy? ' The result in this case is that the apparatus of degree far displays Decision of Laruellean greater a anarchic nomad-, the account of philosophical theoretical probity: it offers us a genuinely sophisticated, versatile and enriching explanation of philosophising. 196Cf. Laruelle, 1999, 140; 83,162-185,240. 1996, pp. and p.

259 Deduction is radicalised and generalised beyond the context of its narrowly Kantian application, in order to serve as a hypothesis universally valid capable of generating a legitimately theoretical explanation of the in phenomenon question: the philosophical Decision. Suspending the Parmenidean Axiom Doubtless, the persistent repetition of the `non-' prefix in Laruelle's invites the suspicion that an entirely negative mode of determination, or work has been for a species of conceptual via negativa, substituted positive Such suspicions, although understandable, are nevertheless characterisation. fail in `nonbear in Laruelle They to the the mind which uses way misguided. 1 as a kind of auxiliary classifier or index for non-auto-Decisional radicality, dimension of positive characterisation already one which always unleashes a immanent in the terms and concepts to which it is applied. In this respect, its function is best understood as akin to the lifting of a speed restriction or the it is blanketly from to floodgate. Far term the which negating raising of a disqualifies it a affixed, actually suspends or precise set of conceptual (i. the determinate thinking autoe. through species of which a strictures kind) superimposes certain systemically structured positional/auto-donational conditions ineradicable the simplicity onto of a phenomenon whose

260 parameters of immanent manifestation are as conceptually uncircumscribable as they are phenomenologically unencompassable. Thus, although it seems to deny, like Zarathustra's No197,Laruelle's `non-' is ultimately a No that performs the Yes. What it suspends is the selfimposed constriction of philosophical thought's auto-Decisional sufficiency, the charmed circle of its auto-positional and auto-donational autonomy. The dissimulates that sufficiency actually an affirmation of the cancellation of from its frees Decision that absolute selfwhich radically unconditioned; it in by being by Decision conditioned without conditioning sufficiency return. Accordingly, non-Decisional thinking reaffirms the ineradicable immanence of the phenomenon `itself' by suspending the hallucinatory hands Decision. its the of attempted phenomenologisation at character of in be Laruellean function As a result, the summarized razor might of the following way: it allows for the radicalisation and generalisation of every is Undecidable instance last basis that Decision only the a of on philosophical Decision; determining irreversibly Decided is a it because every the already last instance that is Undeterminable only because it is the already Determinate irreversibly determining or cloning whatever remains philosophically 197Cf.Gilles Deleuze,Nietzscheand Philosophy, London: Athlone, 1983, pp. 171-186.

261 Determinable. Thus, the razor is the organon for the non-Decisional determination of Decision. Consequently, the razor provides us with that non-materialist force(of)-thought through which we intend to clone matter's non-Decisional Identity from the Decisional hybrids of unobjectifiable immanence and objectivating transcendence. By suspending the illusion of absolute autonomy through which the materialist Decision believed itself sufficient to determine hybridisations transform the we matter, materiological of `matter as such' and `matter itself into for the non-materiological cloning of the an occasion hyle for foreclosure to as a non-conceptual symbol radical matter's radical Decision, for its non-materiological Identity as separate-without-separation. Moreover, implicit in this non-materiological use of Laruelle's razor is Parmenidean discontinuation less the than axiom a or suspension of nothing that we saw to be latent in the auto-Deductive structure of every philosophical Decision. That axiom posits the identity-in-difference, belonging or mutual pre-supposition of thinking the reciprocal co- Logos Being, and and Phusys, in the form of the Same as Decisional `auto'. Every Decision, viewed transcendentally in terms of its pretension to absolute sufficiency as autoDeductive synthesis of the real and the ideal, or One-of-the-Dyad, effectively it the Parmenidean the reciprocal posits the axiom: recapitulates structure of

262 co-determination of thinking and Being. But in lifting this axiom, a nonParmenidean thinking foreclosed a priori subordinates all thinking to a Real which is now to the dyadic distinction between thinking and Being, thereby suspending the Decisional determination of the Real in favour determination of a of Decision according to the Real's foreclosure: "Instead of supposing that thinking co-determines the Real as Being, it is the Real -but Onedetermines thinking through foreclosure (which is to say: as which without any reflexion whatsoever of the one in the other) rather than merely unilaterally or without reversibility. The formula for their relation is the following: `the One and thinking, or the One and Being, are identical but only in-the-last-instance. "' (Laruelle (ed.), 1998, pp. 150-1). By severing the bi-lateral reciprocity that allowed for the reciprocal determinability, continuous reversibility and hence the merely synthetic or disjunction between thinking and Being, the Laruellean razor opens unitary up the possibility definitively of discovering Real a without ontological Unity, a Real shorn of every vestigial residue of ontological consistency. Accordingly, it is the Real as JIL'orccloscd to those dyadic synthesesof thinking Identity Being Real the and as an which guarantee ontological consistency; foreclosed to Decisional unity, rather than as auto-Decisional synthesis of ideal unity and real multiplicity, its through universal giving of which,

263 Decision as a determinable occasion, indexes a genuinely unencompassable, inconsistent utterly manifold of radically indivisible divisions'98. Thus, in Chapter 7 we shall see how this non-Decisional cloning of the Real as separate-without-separation uses the Decisional hybridisation of identity and duality, of real indivision and ideal division, in order to engender Identitieswithout-unity which are simultaneously dualities-without-synthesis; each being irreducibly individual generic, without radically universal without being ontologically individuated, and no longer circumscribable within the horizons of objective disclosure'99. For the time being however, having (we hope) somewhat clarified the function of the Laruellean razor qua instrument for the non-Decisional further if this let's Decision, of elucidation provide we can see cloning of important but undeniably difficult idea by putting forward a concrete between distinction Decisional it, the material our as using of exemplification `matter as such' and `matter itself with 198 Cf. infra, Chapter 6, pp. 312-313. 199 Cf. infra, Chaptcr 7, pp. 351 3 -'2. began. which we

264 CHAPTER 6 THE RADICAL HYLE AS FIRST NAME OF MATTER We are now ready to see in what way the Laruellean razor can allow us to use the Decisional distinction between `matter as such' and `matter itself as the basis for their non-Decisional separation. In other words, we are going to use the Decisionally posited distinction between `matter as such' `matter itself as and itself in the occasion for a non-Decisional positing of `matter its radically immanent Identity as already-separate or separate- without-separation. Because it is carried out in accordance with the radicality of immanence unobjectifiable -the vision-in-One as given-without-givennessthis non-Decisional positing of `matter itself envelops four distinct but indissociable aspects: 1. A radically performative200 aspect as the identity-(o f) -utterance through which the radical hyle is posited as a non-conceptual itself. for `matter symbol 200 The 1985, in Laruelle, discussed is dimension thought explicitly of non-philosophical performative 155-158. (ed. )1998, Laruelle 231-235; & 204-225 1996, pp. 169-171; 198-202; 1989, and pp. pp. pp. However, it is important to remember that all of Laruelle's works subsequent to Principes de la Non-

265 2. A radically subjective201 aspect in the Alien-subject of the nonDecisional theory through which this positing is performed. 3. A radically axiomatic202aspect in accordance with which nonmaterialism posits matter's non-intuitive and non-conceptual Identity. 4. Finally, a radically phenomenal203aspect in the dimension of non-intuitive or non-phenomenological phenomenality proper to the register of theorematic descriptions following from the axiomatic positing of the radical hyle. This latter aspect is particularly important with regard to countering but certain spontaneous shortsighted philosophical objections to the nonmaterialist suspension of the materialist Decision, viz., that it represents a inconsequential, impotent peculiarly sterile, and ultimately way of operating. For it is in virtue of this dimension of non-intuitive phenomenality that the non-materialist axiomatic endows thinking with an unprecedented universal Philosophie, i. e. those in which he effects the non-philosophical axiomatisation of a specific philosophical material -exemplified in Laruelle, 2000a, and 2000b- are nothing but detailed and extended descriptions of this non-Decisional performativity in effect. 201For Laruelle's account of the non-philosophical subject as a transcendental Stranger (Etranger) for the World of philosophical Decision, cf. Laruelle, 1995, especially Chapters I and II, pp. 60-169; 1996, Chapter III, pp. 95-143; 2000a, pp. 249-285; 1999, pp. 146-148; and Laruelle (ed.) 1998, pp. 64-66. 202 The theme is Decision transcendental omnipresent throughout axiomatisation of philosophical of a Philosophie III, but cf in particular Laruelle, 1995, pp. 138-143; 1996, pp. 240-242; 1999, §2.1.6., p. 140; 2000a, pp. 71-98; 2000b, pp. 74-78; and Laruelle (ed. ), pp. 33-35. 203Although 'nonimplicit in the the a the of notion non-philosophical project, premises of always intuitive' or `non-phenomenological' phenomenality has only recently been explicitly thematised by Laruelle. Cf. Laruelle, 1999, § 3.1.4., p. 141; 2000a, pp. 231-235; and 2000c, pp. 186-187.

266 scope. Non-materialist thinking posits the Identity of `matter itself as foreclosed to Decision; which is to say that it foreclosed to conceptual circumscription posits the Identity of matter as being intrinsically or as without- it But is as a result of this foreclosure that non-materialist theory is concept. discover to able and to operate within unheard-of parameters of phenomenal descriptions for phenomenological `matter -which itself , unconstrained by is to say, neurophysiological the bounds of The -possibility204. non-materialist axiomatic engenders modalities of theorematic description for `matter itself qua hyle incommensurable radical which are each at the level but insofar phenomenally equivalent as all are phenomenological determined as adequate-in-the-last-instance to phenomenon-without-logos. the radical hyle as Thus, its cognitive capacities unhampered by the twin constraints of empirical physiology and human-being-in-the-world, the Alien-subject of non-materialist theory accessesa genuinely transcendental dimension is to of say, rigorously universal or extra-terrestrialwhich `more is This 'experience'. that secret non-materialist gnosis as phenomenal knowing of matter' which was hinted at earlier by Laruelle himself205 Lastly, and before we proceed, it is important to remind the reader that, as we describe in turn each of these three aspects of the non-Decisional 204Cf. infra Chapter 7, but especially Chapter 8, pp.415-421.

267 positing of `matter itself, he or she should note the way in which, at each stage of the description, this non-Decisional procedure engenders a transparent -but obviously non phono-logocentric206- coincidence of saying and doing. In other words, at each stage of the description, we are doing what describe we and describing what we are doing. This is the simplest index of what we mean by a thinking in accordance with radical immanence. The Radical Hyle as Non-Conceptual Symbol for the Identity Utterance of Our non-Decisional cloning of materialist Decision involves releasing matter's non-materiological Identity as transcendentally foreclosed to the hybridisation `matter materiological of as such' and `matter itself. But since foreclosure Decision its foreclosure to conceptual to matter's also entails circumscription and symbolic representation, the operation of cloning will necessitate suspending the materiological faith in the sufficiency of conceptual circumscriptions matter. `of representations In and signifying other words, we are about to discontinue the materiological amphiboly of utterance and statement; the amphiboly whereby the unobjectifiable 205Cf. supra, Chapter 4, p.202; and Laruelle 1981, p. 109. 206Because Identity its this non-Decisional character, of non-auto-positional and non-auto-donational of saying and doing -or of statement and utterance- cannot be equated with the phono-logocentric unity of signifying speech and phenomenological sense as deconstructed by Derrida via his reading of Husserl. Cf. Derrida, 1973.

268 conditions of utterance are perpetually reinscribed within the objectivating ideality of statement207. For by suspending the sufficiency of materialist Decision we suspend the sufficiency presumed in any and every conceptual of matter `as such'; which is to say, every discursive symbolisation circumscription of matter `itself by means of signifying statements. Accordingly, the non-Decisional cloning of materialist Decision will `of matter symbolisations necessitate subordinating all those conceptual inseparable from Decisional the are putative sufficiency of matter's which determination to the non-Decisional positing of an improper first-name or non-conceptual symbol enacting matter's foreclosure to conceptual determination Instead via the of matter's supposedly-sufficient symbolisation. materiological conformity hybridisation in of ontological concept and signifying symbol, description linguistic Decisional the and amphiboly of with foreclosure in its is it to conceptual matter now ontological constitution, linguistic symbolisation and first-name or nonsignification, matter as determine transcendentally conceptual symbol, that will -or give-withoutits own nomination and symbolisation. givennessThus, it is important to bear in mind that in suspending the Decision, in faith also we the of sufficiency spontaneous philosophical 207 Cf 194-199. 4, Chapter pp. supra,

269 suspend the presupposition that all thinking is necessarily sustained by the complex, tripartite structure of the philosophical logos. That structure effects the transcendental synthesis of thought, word and thing: conceptually posited ideality and linguistically presupposed reality are reciprocally articulated and synthesised through the petitioning of the logos as the already-given Unity of thinking, speaking, and being; the identity-in-difference linguistic position, philosophical presupposition, and ontological logos as Decisional donation, or identity-in-difference of conceptual manifestation. Thus, the `autos', absolute auto-position/autoof thinking Being, and performs an disclosive function in linguistic is the sign ontologically which necessarily incorporated. It is this onto-logical unity of conceptualisation and its is furnish This that to thinking with sine qua non. supposed signification is the presupposition which sustains the philosopher's spontaneous his irrecusable in the the signifier as well as empirical reality of confidence trust in the co-constitutive reciprocity between language and Being. It is this amphiboly of thought and language, concept and sign, which has been suspended along with the sufficiency of Decision. The onto-logical the within enveloped remains unity of conceptualisation and signification Decision that we philosophical auto-donational/auto-positional structure of have non-Decisionally level the to of empirical suspended and reduced

270 occasion for a thinking in which the amphiboly description of and constitution is no longer operative. In separating `matter itself from Decisional hybridisation its with `matter as such', we effect an irrevocable separation between matter as the already-constituted determinant of description, and description as a mere determinable occasion. This separation of description and constitution involves the positing of a non-conceptual symbol enacting matter's foreclosure to ontological constitution. The nonconceptual symbolisation of matter reduces the amphiboly of concept and sign, the reciprocal articulation of philosophy and language, to the level of a neutral, non-constitutive symbolic support208for thought; one from which it is possible to clone a radically performative term or symbol which will enact, designate than rather or refer to, matter's foreclosure to conceptual symbolisation. Thus, the non-materiological identification of matter as from the mixtures of name and concept, already-separate-without-separation in the the of performative and constative, consists the axiomatic positing of a 208 "There Being language: logos, is to two and ether of say, as as which uses of are paradigmatic faktum for philosophy, as language endowed with the power of disclosure and transcendence; or as symbolic (which is to say, irreducible to the logico-linguistic signifier) whereby it serves as a support for pure theoretical representation, but no longer as faktum. The status of language shifts from that of horizon, instrumental circuit for thought, polysemic or disseminatory resource, to that of functioning as dimension `mere' longer the of a enjoys a supposedly originary continuity with support, one which no The words, the statements, and even the themes of philosophy give rise to now inert, philosophically sterile symbols, but symbols that are combined or assembled according to a priori of all possible rules which are those of pure theoretical of the theoreticity representation, theory. "(Laruelle, 1991, p. 201) theoreticity.

271 first-name or non-conceptual symbol which enacts the foreclosure through which matter determines Decision in-the-last-instance209. The radical hyle is the first-name or non-conceptual symbol that have chosen in order to designate matter's foreclosure to the hybridisation of conceptual symbolisation Moreover, it is clear that in this Identity of `matter itself' and linguistic we materiological nomination. particular instance, our cloning of the hyle devoid sa of all ontological consistency and hyletic continuity has been occasioned by our earlier descriptions of the hyletic continuum infinite, as self-positing synthesis of unobjectifiable materiality and objectivating ideality210. Thus, the radical hyle is our nonfor the unobjectifiable immanence of `matter itself in conceptual symbol its foreclosure to ideal continuity and ontological consistency. And it is as a nonsignifying symbol cloned from the hyletic continuum qua Decisional hybrid of ontological constitution and linguistic nomination that the radical hyle is non-Decisionally posited or given-without-givenness in its foreclosure to the 209 "A first leastit is in in is the thought also -here at general, order of name not only posited-as-first the object of an act-of-position but one that is determined-in-the-last-instance by its 'object', and hence Such [its in this to adequate object] as given-without-givenness or posited-without-position. manner first names are not ancient proper names now philosophically treated as also being first (in the first, '. 'axiomatic) They intrinsically identically and the proper and manner of are philosophical devoid of all ontico-metaphysical primacy. Here the name is only proper(to) itself but in the manner of fall does identity to this it in-the-last-instance, not use, an and one which, according only given to within the purview of a deconstruction. "(Laruelle, 2000a, p. 72) 210 Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 113-161.

272 idealised consistency of conceptual symbolisation as well as to the idealised continuity of ontological objectivation. Accordingly, the radical hyle211is neither a symbol nor a name in the conventional philosophical sensesof those terms. It does not `stand in', via a designation relation of or reference, for some putatively extra-linguistic or supra-conceptual reality. Likewise, it is not a metaphysically proper name, in the sense of a sign bearing an exclusive or intrinsic proprietary relation to some absolutely present entity or transcendental signified. But neither is it an instance of the differance or cross-contamination between signifier and On thought thing. the contrary, the radical signified, word and object, and hyle enacts its own foreclosure to the materiological amphiboly -which includes the differance -between signifying transcendence and transcendental signified. Whereas differance qua Undecidable remains bound to the itself from it as a metaphysically absolves which metaphysical opposition indeterminable oscillation between empirical signifier and transcendental foreclosed is hyle to the the the non-Decidable as signified, radical philosophical dyad `decidable/undecidable' whose validity differance Identity it. disrupt Hence, in the the to to of continues presuppose even order 211Hence the fact that between instancein be distinguish this very customary we refuse to -as would its use and its mention by adorning it with inverted commas. The reason being that this is a language which we distinction the the of use signifying validity of philosophical which presupposes have already suspended.

273 hyle radical as non-conceptual symbol is that of the non-Decidable as already- decided determinant for the undecidable differance between signifier and signified. The radical hyle is the non-Determinable as the already-determined determines the onto-logical amphiboly of description and constitution. which Thus, the radical hyle can be understood neither as a nomination of `matter' qua transcendental signified, which is to say, transcendent metaphysical reality; nor as a conceptual materialisation, in the manner for instance in which the Deleuzoguattarian Concept counter-effectuated an intensively defined materiality212. It is neither an empirical conceptualisation is It transcendental the matter nor a of materialisation of concept213. a nonfor `matter itself in conceptual symbol its Identity as already-manifest- differance foreclosed to the materiological a priori without-manifestation and that tries to substitute an undecidable mixture of statement and utterance for the hyle's radically immanent Identity as that which is already-uttered or uttered-without-statement. Accordingly, instead of Deciding that `matter itself is immediation it is because the of materiality as enstatic unconceptualisable distinction thing thought which exclusion the and of excluding ekstatic -an 212 Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 108-124. 213Although it is by Decision that foreclosure hyle's to materialist to the radical operating according being the The that Decision point occasion. empirical qua we effect a transcendental materialisation of

274 reincludes the unthinkable within thought214; or Deciding that it is conceptualisable but only via the sublation of the distinction between `matter `matter itself -a sublation which as such' and renders thought and materiality co-constitutive215; we clone the radical hyle as a first-name for `matter itself now considered as already-given, already-manifest, and foreclosed to the distinction between the conceptualisable and the unconceptualisable. This non-Decisional positing of the radical hyle as non-conceptual for `matter itself in symbol its Identity as already-uttered constitutes the `first in inception the ultimation' of a non-materialist axiomatic. The radical hyle is non-Decisionally presupposed as given-without-givenness through an act of axiomatic positing; it is posited-without-presupposition first-name for as a immanence. Consequently, hyle the radical radical enacts the immanent Identity of material utterance as already-uttered, an Identity-(of)-utterance be `matter' the which cannot conflated with materiological nomination of as a ideality, mixture of objectivated reality, objectivating and unobjectifiable immanence; a hybrid which, as we saw in Chapter 4, perpetually reincludes the unobjectifiable immanence of material utterance within the objectivating transcendenceof materialist statement. non-philosophical materialisation of Decision constitutes a radical universalisation of the philosophical materialisation of the concept. 214Cf. Chapter 2, pp. 87-90. 215 Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 154-161.

275 But this means that the act of non-Decisional positing or first ultimation described above, whereby the radical hyle is posited-without- first-Harn the position as e of-fmatter, is immanently determined-in-the-lastinstance by the radical hyle itself. If this is so, it is important to see why this does not repeat the auto-positional and auto-donational sufficiency whereby Decisional positing thinking its posits own presupposition. For in this instance, the of the radical hyle as already-given is merely contingently by is Decision. Which the the to say sufficiency occasioned of materiological that this positing is itself determined by the radical hyle insofar as the latter has already-given Decision as an occasion for thinking and been cloned as an Identity for thought on that basis. In other words, the act of non- described above remains materiological positing -the axiomatic ultimationhyle immanence the the of non-constitutive or non-determining vis a vis itself qua `matter in Thus, the which manner considered as already-given. the its hyle determines on symbol a non-conceptual own naming as radical be `as its basis sharply such' must materiological nomination of occasional differentiated from the manner in which, for instance, the plane of immanence is presupposed as given through the self-positing of the philosophical Concept216.For in the latter case, the presupposition of the plane via the 216 Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 116-124.

276 Concept and the positing of the Concept basis the on of the plane remain co- constitutive, whilst in the former, the fact that the radical hyle is alreadyforeclosed to constitution determines its nomination foreclosed as without that nomination determining or constituting that foreclosure in return. Accordingly, the non-materialist ultimation of the radical hyle as nondiscontinues the materiological auto-position through conceptual symbol which the obj ectivating transcendence of materialist statement reinscribes the unobjectifiable immanence of material utterance. The materiological between has been reversibility nomination and constitution suspended and level first The to the reduced of an occasion. ultimation of non-materialist thinking is itself determined (in-the-last-instance) -i. e. non-Decisionally from by hyle despite fact Decision the the that materiological clonedradical deciding have been if it `we' to clone the speaking as were who were we Identity of the hyle from Decision. `We' are, but only as the nonbeen determined has `decision' Alien-subject already philosophical or whose in accordance with the Kyle's foreclosure. Decisional thinking has already been given as a mere occasion and determined or cloned as a non-Decisional is latter foreclosure. And hyle's the the non-Decisionally effectuation of itself. hyle by determined the radical posited through an axiomatic ultimation Consequently, the conditions for this non-Decisional positing are immanently

277 determined-in-the-last-instance by the radical hyle itself. For it is the radical hyle which immanently determines the conditions for its basis the cloning on by Decision of effectuating itself as this radically subjective force-(of)-nonmaterialist thought. The non-materialist's force-(of)-thought in consists enacting this performative nomination of the radical hyle as first-name for the Identity of `utterance itself ,a in immanent that the nomination consists coincidence of doing. By in immanence the and saying operating accordance with of the hyle is (without-statement) that as which already-uttered and alreadyradical performed (without-performance) materiological hybridisation by virtue its foreclosure to the of of utterance and statement, non-materialist thinking cannot help but say what it does and do as it says. Moreover, as we mentioned above, this performative concomitant with doing consistency of saying and the non-materialist's force-(of)-thought is radically in subjective character. The Alien-Subject For although the radical hyle is foreclosed to thought -whether phenomenological or materiological, Decisional or non-Decisional-, that foreclosure is transcendentally effectuated on the occasional basis of the materiological Decision immanent as an Identity for non-materiological

278 thought. It is cloned as a non-materialist force-(of)-thought. And this force-ofthought is synonymous with the radically immanent subjectivation of nonmateriological thinking. Although `the Stranger' (l 'Etranger) is Laruelle's for designating the universal subject of term preferred non-philosophical theory, we shall mark its occasional specificity here by referring to the immanent radically subject of non-materialist thinking as `the Alien'. The is intended to invoke neither an empirically determinable quality of name foreignness, nor visions of some phantasmatic speculative hybrid, but rather radically transcendental and therefore rigorously a unenvisageable exteriority217; an exteriority which is identical with the non-materialist's force-(of)-thought. Whereas `the Other' as paradigm of phenomenological alterity in later Levinas218- is an absolute alterity of the the exemplified work of infinite intentional 217 In transcendence simultaneously consciousness, but by constituting that token deconstituting and one which is still order to diminish the aura of gratuity surrounding our choice of nomination, it might be apposite to recall one of Laruelle's most spontaneous, but also most suggestive, characterisations of non-thetic transcendence (the precursor to the non-auto-positional transcendence of the Stranger-subject) in one of the interviews contained in 1991's As One (En Tant Qu'Un): "Non-thetic transcendence is `the Alien', an absolutely faceless monster, a rigorously faceless alterity"(p. 224). The `non-thetic transcendence' in terms of which Laruelle characterised the non-philosopher's force-(of)-thought throughout Philosophie 11 prefigures the non-auto-positional transcendence or distance in terms of which he will characterise the Stranger qua transcendental clone in Philosophie III. More recently, Laruelle has sketched the basis lineaments of a unified theory of philosophy and science-fiction the of a on -or philo-fictionradically immanent Identity of alterity which he sees as science-fiction's defining affect and which he qualifies as that of the Alien-without-alienation. Cf. Laruelle, 2000d and infra, Chapters 7 and 8. 218 Cf. for instance, Levinas, 1990.

279 phenomenologically posited and presupposed as given through the offices of Decision, the unobjectifiable transcendence of the Alien-subject constitutes a non-phenomenologisable exteriority, one which is given-without-givenness because it is the transcendental effectuation or cloning of the radical kyle' s foreclosure to the apophantic logos. Thus, the Alien-subject is foreclosed to the phenomenological delimitation of absolute alterity as infinitely other intentional it is because foreclosed to consciousness not only to all relative intentional apprehension but also to all Decisional dyads of the sort latter The serve merely conscious/unconscious, objectifiable/unobjectifiable. its as occasion or empirical support. Consequently, rather than Alien-subject the consciousness, constituting an alterity-to- constitutes a radically unobjectifiable merely its Where in for World the entirety. of auto-Decisional sufficiency exteriority Levinas's phenomenological paradigm of alterity centres around the absolute transcendence of the infinitely Other as epiphenomenal trace and ethical for the reader which transcendence with reasons which, enigma -an absolute is now beginning to become familiar219, remains relative to the immanence of Alien-subject itself-, it the from intentional the which absolves consciousness discussions in of intrinsically `absolute' our the relational as critique of the notion of 85-87 2, Chapter (cf. and immanence pp. Henry's as well as Deleuze & Guattari's versions of supra 5, Chapter (supra Chapter 3, pp. 176-177), as well as the account of Decision as absolute-auto-position pp.218-245). 219Recall the

280 effectuates a radical transcendence not `to' but for the phenomenological in its realm entirety which serves as its occasional support, and this precisely insofar as it remains rooted in-the-last-instance in the immanence of the hyle. That is to say: the Alien's non-Decisional transcendence is given-withoutin givenness or cloned accordance with immanence and on the occasional basis of Decisional transcendence but as a radically subjective force-ofthought which is now Alien for the World of Decisional transcendence;Alien for the Decisional realm wherein phenomenological ideality and is It materiological reality are ultimately coextensive. a non-auto-positional and non-auto-donational immanence that transcendence rooted determines it, but in the non-Decisional by occasioned the Decisional transcendencethat merely overdetermines it. Thus, the Alien as subject of non-materialist irreducible to every variety of Worldly theory remains it be phenomenologically alterity, or it how however, defined. At time the same we shall see materiologically functions as the rigorously transcendental prototype -or more precisely, delineated for those versions of unenvisageable somewhat clumsily xenotypein but the more adventurous varieties of misprised alterity groped after speculative science-fiction; - insofar to they continue as misprised precisely heterogeneous juxtapositions incongruous predicates of empirically rely on

281 which remain `figurable' through the empirical imagination and therefore ultimately envisageable by consciousness220.Not only does the Alien-subject remain unenvisageable as an ethical enigma for phenomenological it consciousness; remains 'unfigurable' even as a monstrous, trans-categorial hybridisation of terrestrial predicates. The Alien-subject's force-(of)-thought constitutes immanently an transcendental, but non-phenomenological transcendence; a transcendence which is foreclosed a priori to the parameters being-in-the-world human of Operating in and to the ambit of terrestrial experience. the radical hyle's accordance with foreclosure to the materiological mixtures of objectivating phenomenality and unobjectifiable it basis hyle its those the materiality, uses mixtures as an occasional and as Unknown but determining cause, in order to clone un-intuitable axioms for the phenomenal description of `matter itself from the realm of phenomenological empiricity. However, before proceeding with instances of the aforementioned descriptions, deduced by the Alien-subject from the radical hyle's nonin is important it the foreclosure, to way what specify phenomenological irreducible Alien-subject to the phenomenological the cloning of remains 2201n Chapter 7 instance `non-rabbit' discuss the the of an entity-without-unity as example of we shall cloned from the World of thetic-auto-position. The `non-rabbit' provides the rigorously cognitive `xenotype' for a recurrent trope in Lovecraftian fantasy: - that of the unnameable, unenvisageable 'Thing'.

282 presupposition of subjectivity. For whereas phenomenological subjectivity is merely supposed-as-given presupposition, fashion, in via a mixture of a priori the Alien-subject accordance with positing and empirical is given in a stringently the radical hyle's transcendental foreclosure to all phenomenological givenness, as the subject of its own theory. That is to say: it performs its own cloning in accordance with the positing of the radical hyle its as non-Decisional cause and on the basis of materiological Decision as its empirical occasion. Accordingly, the Alien-subject enacts its own theoretical it For is explanation. nothing but the immanent description of its nonsufficient hetero-deduction or as an instance of thinking necessarily determined by the radical hyle but contingently occasioned by Decision's empirical existence. Thus, there is nothing either irrecusable or even necessary about this instance of thought's transcendental subjectivation, as opposed to the manner in which phenomenology subjectivation, requires some residue of transcendental degree ipseity (supposedly non-Cartesian or of some minimal for in the post-metaphysical nature) as an uncircumventable prerequisite by Although phenomenological occasioned possibility of phenomenality221. 221Typically, `metaphysical denounces subjectivism' much post-Heideggerean phenomenology (supposedly running from Descartes to Nietzsche), the better to render the phenomenon of individuated sentience ever more irreducible to the vulgar prejudices of egological substantialism, from the possibility of divorced is to of principle matter as a which say, ever more unobjectifiable and

283 Decision as the transcendental effectuation of the hyle's determination of Decision, the Alien-subject remains foreclosed to the ambit of the phenomenologisable precisely insofar as the latter remains encompassed Decisional the within structure which serves as its empirical support. As the transcendental determinant for the phenomenologically experience that serves as its occasion, the Alien-subject with some putatively necessary circumscribed be cannot confused structural feature intrinsically conditioning the possibility of that empirical experience. On the contrary, the radical exteriority through which the Alien-subject determines Decision remains extrinsic to the relatively autonomous reality and consistency of Decision, and to the domain of phenomenological experience encompassedwithin it. Thus, the Alien-subject is a radically extrinsic determinant for the domain, intrinsic feature it. than phenomenological rather some absolutely of That domain, and the Decision through which it is articulated, continues to determinable enjoy a relative autonomy as an empirically occasion222.For although the Alien-subject transcendentally effectuates the hyle's integration into the body of the natural sciences. Most recently for instance, Jean-Luc Marion has sought to effect a bold and ambitious crystallisation of what he sees as the central phenomenological problematic running from Husserl and Heidegger through to Henry and Levinas -that of the phenomenon's phenomenality or givenness- by attempting to emancipate ipseity's originary, prefrom la donation] de donation' [1'adonne the `the devotee in its subjective givenness of passivity as `Ego', Husserlian `I Kantian Cartesian the think', and even the the constrictive grip of cogito, Heideggerean `mineness' [Jemeinigkeit]]. Cf. Marion, 1997, esp. Book V, pp. 343-373.

284 determination of phenomenological Decision, this is an entirely contingent effectuation, occasioned by the fact that materiological Decision has already been given-without-givenness as a mere support for non-phenomenological thinking. Moreover, this non-sufficiency of the Alien-subject, concomitant the non-phenomenological donation of empirical contingency with as an but occasional non-determining cause for thinking, is irreducible to the phenomenological presupposition of facticity. For the phenomenological facticity is subject, a transcendentally constitutive factor, whereas for the nonphenomenological subject, occasion is a determinable empirical material. And `experience', the that whereas phenomenological subject remains a subject of is to say, encompassed within the ambit of Decision; the Alien-subject is exclusively the subject of transcendental theory, that is to say, the heterogeneous determinant of Decision and of phenomenological experience hyle Thus, Decision. the the as radical with ambit of as circumscribed within its determining cause and phenomenological Decision as its occasion, the its Alien-subject transcendental that to the guarantees non-sufficiency proper its is effectuation at one with explanation. 222Cloning Decision, the in its foreclosure Real to relative the the of autonomy radical guarantees the of Decision the autonomy radical relatively autonomy of qua empirical occasion, and transcendental as that which effectuates the Real's foreclosure for Decision.

285 Accordingly, there is a sense in which, although not causa sui, the Alien-subject is self-explanatory. As we mentioned it `exists' is above, or effectuated as the radically immanent performance of its own theory. It is constituted as the non-Decisional separation, the performative dualysation, of `matter itself and `matter as such' that we have just described and enacted. Once again, however, non-philosophical precision demands that we complicate this schema. For in fact, rather than simply separating `matter itself from `matter as such', the structure of the Alien-subject enacts the non- Decisional separation between the radical hyle as non-conceptual Identity of `matter itself, and the materiological mixture or hybridisation of `matter itself and `matter as such' -which is to say, the hyletic continuum described in Chapters 3 and 4 of Part I- ;a hybridisation now reconfigured as a strictly determinable between hyletic Duality the continuum as empirically unilateral Alien-subject the occasion, and for determinant transcendental as that Identity Alien-subject As the the the of spans structure of occasion. a result, the radical hyle -but an Identity which is now shorn of the presupposition of its Alien-subject Duality the and of ontological unity-, and the unilateral distinction dyadic longer duality constitutes a which no occasional cause -a because the Alien-subject transcendentally determines the hyletic continuum in accordance with the radical hyle without the continuum either determining

286 or constituting it in return. It is as this coincidence of an Identity-withoutsynthesis (or `unidentity') and a Duality-without-distinction (or `unilaterality') that the Alien-subject's foreclosure to its occasioning cause the hyletic continuum- transcendentally effectuates the radical hyle's foreclosure to ontological Decision. In light of its unusual difficulty, it is worth pausing a while longer to recapitulate once more the complex structure of the Alien-subject, in the hope that reiteration might provide a modicum of clarification. This is crucial to it is in Alien-subject the the that enterprise, since our entire name of described far has been so also performed. everything The Alien-subject's non-ontological `existence', its effectuation as the hyle Decision, to a cloning of matter's amounts and of radical separation foreclosure to Decision as the unilateral duality between the Alien-subject's own positing of the radical materiological Decision- hyle, hyletic the and continuum -the has that occasioned that positing. which as Remember that `matter itself is ineffable, longer transcendent some no longer is hyle for `thing' that the an attempt no radical us, and philosophical for but ineffable to conceptualise the merely a non-conceptual symbol in is foreclosure Decision, foreclosure to now effectuated which a matter's the Alien-subject's nonof the through positing thinking non-materialist

287 conceptual symbol enacting that foreclosure. Accordingly, the Alien-subject is nothing but the unilateral duality between that symbol's foreclosure to conceptualisation, and the conceptual symbolisations that have occasioned the non-Decisional positing of that foreclosure. Or again: it is at once the nonDecisional positing of the radical hyle's non-conceptual Identity, and the Duality between that non-Decisional Identity and the Decision which has it. occasioned Thus, with its pretension to absolute, self-positing autonomy hyletic the continuum enjoys a merely relative autonomy as the suspended, indifferent material support for the Alien-subject's effectuation of the hyle's foreclosure to ontological continuity and conceptual consistency. In other idealisation words, the materiological of `matter itself' become as foreclosure Alien-subject's the through effectuation of matter's materialised to idealisation. Which is determination of `matter itself' -materialised-, say that materialism's transcendental determined become itself transcendentally as but now as a mere occasion for describing matter in accordance with significantly, to matter's foreclosure to determination. Even more Decision this transcendental materialisation of materialist between the form in `exists' the of a radically subjective separation occurs or immanence of matter's non-ontological reality and the transcendence of

288 materialism's ontological ideality. For it is the structure of the Alien-subject which articulates this unilateral separation between radical hyle and hyletic continuum. Accordingly, where the philosophical subjectivity within materiality, hyletic continuum incorporated but only at the cost of reincorporating materiality within the ambit of philosophical subjectivity223,it is by separating the radical hyle from the hyletic continuum qua selfstructure of philosophical presupposing latter. Materialism the materialises repressing subjectivity; rendering philosophical philosophical inscribing unobj ectifiable that the Alien-subject subjectivates matter philosophically non-materialism materialises subjectivity by by subjectivation empirical. In other words, where materialism it in Decision subjectivity surreptiously hybrid qua immanence, phenomenologises matter of objectivating non-philosophical by transcendence and materialism materialises hybrid dualysing by through the structure that separating or phenomenology Decision to the Alien-subject, the the thereby phenomenologising reducing of level of an empirically determinable occasion. Thus, in non-philosophical is instance the radically subjective. materialism, materialising Ultimately, if the Alien-subject remains incommensurable with every phenomenologically grounded paradigm of subjectivity -whether 223 Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 154-161. it go by the

289 name of `Dasein', `Life' or `adonne' it is this on account of radically - function materialising as that which separates`matter itself in its foreclosure to phenomenologisation from the materiological hybrids of unobjectifiable materiality and objectivating phenomenality. Significantly, the radical hyle's foreclosure to materiological conceptualisation is mirrored better cloned-or in terms of the Alien-subject's foreclosure to, or radical exteriority for, the World. is by It phenomenological virtue of this radical exteriority that the Alien-subject is able to describe the radical hyle according to its foreclosure to materiological conceptualisation in ways that fall outside the human-being-in-the-world. Thus, the Alienphenomenological parameters of for functions locus the as a radically counter-intuitive or performative subject itself, `matter non-phenomenological axiomatisation of an axiomatisation that generates a radically immanent but intrinsically abstract or theoretically determined phenomenalisation of `matter itself'. The Non-Materialist Axiomatic In Chapter 4224,we cited three versions of the distinction between `materialism' and `idealism' -and by implication, three varieties of definition for the concept of `matter'-, and argued that all three were insufficient `as idealisations because they relied on intuitive or semi-intuitive of matter

290 idealisations that led to a basic indiscernibility between the theoretical such'; postures of materialism and idealism. Implicit in this argument was the suggestion that every intuitive or semi-intuitive conceptualisation of matter `as such' should be abandoned in favour of a stringently theoretical and therefore non-intuitive definition of `matter itself ; one carried out on the basis of a rigorously transcendental separation between the theoretical idealism to proper postures materialism and respectively. Let's quickly remind ourselves of the way in which these intuitive or idealisations first The two straightforwardly of matter operate. semi-intuitive itself with `matter conflate `matter as such' by way of a spontaneous hybridisation of concept and empirical intuition, whilst the third, and more idealising sublation of concept and sophisticated, proposes an absolutely intuition, or of matter `as such' and matter 'itself, by identifying `materiality' ideal determination its differentially continuum of within an produced with signifying relations. Thus, `:raffe: itself' cannotbe characterised in terms of: 1. A supposedly given objectivity such as techno-economic production. 224 Cf. supra, pp. 188-190.

291 2. A supposedly given conceptual signification whereby the concept `matter' of `materiality' combines abstracted from general nature features with of empirical characteristics drawn from senseperception. 3. A supposedly produced rather than immediately given `discursive category'. `Matter' remains devoid of immediate conceptual signification, but is endowed with a determinate theoretico-discursive `differentially' potency on the basis of the produced signifying force that it comes to acquire through the complex interplay of various theoretical and political positions. The meaning of `materialism' as discursive is category produced via the differential determination combination and of these positions relative to one another. It is by way of contrast to these variedly proportioned materiological hybrids of empirical intuition, conceptual symbolisation, and signifying ideality that we intend to use our non-Decisional postulation of the radical hyle in its immanent Identity as non-conceptual symbol as the first ultimation in a rigorously non-intuitive materialist axiomatic. Thus, having carried out our first ultimation of Elie radical hyie through the auspices of the Alien-

292 subject, we are now in a position to begin formulating axiomatic definitions deducing transcendental theorems which have likewise been positedand without-presupposition by the Alien-subject in accordance with the radical hyle's foreclosure intuition. to conceptual symbolisation Consequently,rather and phenomenological than being supposedly sufficient conceptual determinations, or supposedly sufficient phenomenological intuitions of `matter itself, both axioms and theorems will be determined as adequate-inthe-last-instance by the radical hyle as that which enacts matter's foreclosure to all determination or intuition. That is to say, rather than conceptually hyle, it, to the radical or phenomenologically apprehending corresponding these definitions and descriptions are now simultaneously non-conceptual determined by the adequations and non-phenomenological manifestations, in-the-last-instance225. it but hyle to only as adequate radical In Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Laruelle provides us with a matrix he from immanence ten reminds what selected of characterisations of radical definitions226 limitless by variety of possible us must remain rights a strictly We will appropriate eight of them here, modifying them slightly for our own `matter for founding theory of our non-materialist axioms purposes, as the 225With the is Decision belief that Determination Sufficient Principle of suspension of the -the by is Real between bi-lateral thought replaced determine Realand the the correspondence sufficient to becomes truth Identity-of-the-last-instance transcendental adequation-withoutonly, and an 89-92. 2000b, 239-241; 2000a, Cf. Laruelle, pp. and pp. correspondence.

293 itself . All eight are instances of axiomatic position -rather than conceptual constitution- performed by the Alien-subject and determined-in-the-last- instance by the radical hyle itself: 1. The radical hyle is the phenomenon-in-itself as Already-Given, the phenomenon-without-phenomenality, supposedly-given immediacy of rather than phenomenon the and phenomenality. 2. The radical hyle is the Already-Imprinted prior to every supposedly original imprint. 3. The radical hyle is that in and through which we have been Already-Grasped rather than any originary faktum or datum by which we suppose ourselves to be grasped. 4. The radical hyle is the Already-Acquired prior to all cognitive is intuitive that than merely which acquisition, rather or supposed-as-acquired through a priori forms of cognition or intuition. 5. The radical hyle is the Already-Inherent forcings substantialist 226Cf. Laruelle, 1989, pp.41-45. before all the those inherence, all conditioning of

294 supposedly-inherent models of Identity, be they analytic, synthetic, or differential. 6 The radical hyle is the Already-Undivided rather than the transcendent Unity which is supposed-as-undivided by philosophers. 7. The radical hyle is the Already-Full anorganic body within which we see and assemble all of the universal figures and a priori dimensions through which every figure or body in the world is assembled, constructed, and supposed-as-full. 8. The radical kyle is the postural Identity of thought as AlreadyAchieved rather than a conceptual unity supposed-as-given through synthetic position. It is that real, postural Identity through which thinking is already fi°ee of the posited, ideal norms of transcendent exteriority, of the rules of speculative figuration and imagination, of the constraints of the World and the codes of philosophy. According to this axiomatisation, both the phenomenological and the materiological idealisation of `matter itself are immediately discounted. With axiom 1, we see that the radical hyle cannot be conflated with the phenomenologically presupposed immediation of phenomenon and

295 phenomenality (Henry), while with axiom 7, we see that it cannot be confused with the materiologically presupposed anorganic body-without-organs of intensive materiality (Deleuze & Guattari). `Matter itself has been radicalised and generalised qua radical hyle in a manner that is simultaneously irreducible to the norms of phenomenological intuition and to the codes of materiological conceptualisation. With the suspension of materiological it is `matter itself hyle determines-in-thenow sufficiency qua radical which last-instance the syntactical a prioris and transcendental codes governing philosophical conceptuality, as well as the modalities of phenomenological intuition and the parameters of phenomenal manifestation. Thus, the nondimension immanently transcendental of materialist axiomatic engenders an hyle's twofold character to the radical non-intuitive phenomenality according as a phenomenon-without-logos this dimension of non-intuitive axiomatically and a matter-without-concept. We shall call or non-phenomenological phenomenality determined according to the radical hyle, the non-thetic 1,7 in the And ramifications of axioms order to explore some of universe. for 8 and non-materialist thought, we will thinking-in-accordance-with in the which way consider the radical hyle's determination of Decision between distinction theory the engenders a non-thetic universe within which inoperative. is and experience

296 Non-Intuitive Phenomenality 1. Theory and experience Phenomenology reconfigures Kant's transcendental difference between phenomenon and thing-in-itself in terms of the distinction between Thus, Kant's and phenomenality. phenomenology abandons phenomenon hypothesis delimits the parameters the thing-in-itself that of as which critical bounds from by being human the transcendentally of separated cognition of it does so on the grounds that the immanence. Ironically, phenomenal postulate of the thing-in-itself form of metaphysical represents a residual dogmatism. But without the implicitly `in-itself, hypothesis the of sceptical leaving is lost, the kernel the only the radical, corrosive critical philosophy of degenerates husk. Transcendentalism idealist its reactionary complacency of human harmony for into a pious apologia the pre-established whereby `the themselves', things to now access consciousness enjoys unconditional identified solely with intentional The critical phenomena227. between phenomenon and `in-itself is parallelism between phenomenon asymmetry by the transcendental replaced and phenomenality. Thus, intuitively are phenomenality and phenomenology, phenomenon for given Ego to the pertaining or is consciousness itself in which with one never object existing then things whatever, Lere ", dd'; physical real any has worlds, any to are nothing consciousness y tic 227"An

297 together in the immanent indivisibility intrinsically of an pre-theoretical immediacy. Non-materialism, parallelism between however, the dualyses immanence of the the phenomenological phenomenon and the transcendence of phenomenality into a non-phenomenological separation between the immanence of the radical hyle as `the phenomenon-in-itself, or the phenomenon-without-phenomenality; and the transcendence of phenomenological Decision as the phenomenality which the latter now determines-in-the-last-instance. Moreover, by effecting this non- dualysis phenomenological of phenomenon and phenomenality, the Aliendestratifies latent hierarchy the through which the subject structural phenomenological Decision implicitly subordinated the ontic phenomenon to its ontological phenomenality. Since it is this subordination, ratified through the hierarchical parallelism constitutive of Decision as empirico- between distinction doublet, the to transcendental which also serves enshrine the pre-theoretical immediacy of phenomenological experience, and former dualysation the the theoretically mediated philosophical experience, of implies the dualysation of the latter. For since the indivisible parallelism of immediacy the pre-theoretical phenomenon and phenomenality constitutes into that into be and to my experience the experienced motivations constituting them must extend able

298 `experience' to proper as characterised by phenomenology, whilst their distinction is a function of philosophically mediated `theory', then the phenomenological presupposition of an indivisible parallelism between ontic phenomenon and ontological phenomenality also enshrines a hybridisation of phenomenological experience and philosophical theory. Thus, in a complex gesture that should be familiar to us in light of our earlier analysis of philosophical Decision228, phenomenology posits the a priori distinction of phenomenon and phenomenality, whilst presupposing their empirical immediation. That is to say: it posits their indivisible pretheoretical i.-mmediacy t hough presupposes that their a gesture of theoretical mediation, and theoretical distinction is already articulated in hybridisation dualysing by Accordingly, the of phenomenological experience. is their to the of say, presupposition which phenomenality, phenomenon and intuitively given, indivisible immediacy, the Alien-subject also dualyses the immediacy amphiboly of phenomenological experience qua pre-theoretical The Alien-subject theory now qua conceptual mediation. and philosophical hyle between duality the the phenomenonthe as radical articulates unilateral in-itself, a phenomenon which is foreclosed to theory, rather than predimension theoretically Decision of theoretical, and phenomenological as 109 106 1982, J"(Husserl, Ego[... respectively). and pp. of each

299 determinable phenomenality. Thus, the Alien-subject enjoys a non- phenomenological existence as the transcendental theoretical determination of empirical phenomenality according to the phenomenon's foreclosure to theory. As a result, the Alien-subject's transcendental exteriority, its nonphenomenological transcendence as the determinant for phenomenological Decision, constitutes a cloning, determination-in-the-last-instance a of in Decision terms of a theoretically determined or nonphenomenological intuitive phenomenality. The Alien-subject exists as the (practico-)theoretical hyle's determination the of phenomenality; an effectuation effectuation of distinction by but for the transcendent phenomenology one which occasioned between the pre-theoretical immediacy of phenomenological experience and the mediation of philosophical theory is no longer operative or pertinent. That distinction has been reduced to the level of an indifferent empirical support. However, the Allen-subject is not merely being in the theory, sense of philosophical the subject `of non- distinct or a subjective agent instrument. Its from theory non-phenomenological qua objective separable irrecusably is theoretical and existence essentially by virtue of being determined or cloned according to the radical hyle as an effectuation of nonintuitive phenomenality. 228 Cf. Thus, the Alien-subject 218-230. 5, Chapter pp. supra, `lives' or `experiences' this

300 non-intuitive or non-thetic mode of phenomenality as incommensurable, unintuitable and unintelligible parameters of for the phenomenologically human-being-in-the-world. The Alien-subject articulated `of non- materialist theory experiences a phenomenality-without-phenomenology, phenomenality also more is which more rigorously genuinely universal fundamental or archi-originary, a but than every species of phenomenological Where lived the experience. experience attributed to the phenomenological is immanently at once subject lived and transcendently surveyed at one by immediacy is the philosopher whose experience of pre-theoretical remove immediate `lived Decision, through the experience' simultaneously posited as of the Alien-subject remains unconditionally performative, non-reflexive, and insofar it is theoretically constituted, rather than a as non-thetic, precisely hybrid of theory and experience. spontaneously presupposed Accordingly, for the Alien-subject of non-materialist theory, the is the hybridisation to theory, say, which and of experience phenomenological reciprocal presupposition and co-positing of empirical immediacy and in immediacy (empirical and transcendental mediation posited experience of through theory, thcorctical in and through empirical mediation presupposed in the empirico-transcendental parallelism which experience) as articulated binds phenomenon and phenomenality, becomes the basis for a radically

301 immanent or non-thetic theoretical experience (rather than `of an experience theory); one which is equally and simultaneously a radically experiential theory (rather than a theory `of experience). 2. The six-dimensions of Decision Moreover, as far as the internal structure of phenomenological Decision is concerned, the empirico-transcendental parallelism binding phenomenon and phenomenality remains inseparable from the abstract structural isomorphy between the phenomenological dimensions of identifies Laruelle the transcendental that as the six a prioris experience and invariants of all Decision229. That structural isomorphy yokes together three distinct pairs of doubly articulated or reciprocally presupposing a prioris for dimension Decision donation. Thus, the comprises of positional position and three structural moments: 1. The Transcendence or conditioned, a priori between condition scission and faktum and a posteriori datum. 2. The Plane or latent horizonal frame within the parameters of is division the carried out. which NonPrinciples The VI in Chapter Decision of of sets out his transcendental analytic of Philosophy. In light of its extraordinary technical complexity, and for the purposes of coherence, we dimensional focussing the a here, only on have considerably simplified and schematised that analysis 1996, Laruelle, Cf. Decision. fundamental ignoring components of the equally other, prioris and 285-288 281-346, but pp. pp. especially 229Laruelle

302 3. Finally, the moment of Unity as indivisible contraction of the dyad of Transcendence and Plane, the Unity through which a determinate entity or thing is crystallized as objective noematic correlate of position. This last is the moment whereby position itself. posits The donational dimension in turn comprises three corresponding moments: 1. Affection donation the as of an empirico-regional datum, the initial, transcendence the putatively real of extra-philosophical given. 2. The Reception of the formal codes of the philosophical as such in its specificity vis a vis all other forms of experience or as for ideal thinking, paradigmatic given regulative or normative horizon for the cognitive processing of experiential data. 3. Finally, Intuition dyad Affection the of as unity of Reception, synthesis of the regional, extra-philosophical and given for form the the paradigm as universal philosophical and of is This through the which moment reception of experience. donation donates or gives itself.

303 These three reciprocally paired moments the invariant of position and donation are hinges through which every Decision framing the structural phenomenological parameters of experience is articulated. Thus, an extraphilosophical Affection is posited through meta-physical Transcendence, Transcendence is given as extra-philosophical Affection; while meta-physical pre-philosophical Reception is posited through an ontological Plane, while this ontological philosophical Plane is given as a pre-philosophical Reception; and Intuition is posited through a transcendental Unity while transcendental Unity is given as philosophical Intuition. The Alien-subject exists as the de-hybridisation or dualysation of these six reciprocally dimensions Decisional presupposing of auto-position determination loop bi-lateral It the circular of suspends and auto-donation. through which the positional a prioris are constituted as a function of a corresponding a priori donation, and the donational ones constituted as a function of a corresponding a priori position. The Alien-subject simplifies or irons out these multifarious foldings and doublings whereby the cardinal hinges of phenomenological position doubled up within enfolded and heteronomous or unilateralising autonomy, donation and remain reciprocally It effects a radically one another. determination of this bi-lateral Decisional the non-auto-positional/non-auto-donational or cloning extracting

304 from essence each of these auto-positional/auto-donational a prioris. It Affection from Transcendence, Reception from Plane, and Intuition separates from Unity, cloning these bi-lateral dyads as unilateral dualities. Thus, it determines or articulates them non-phenomenologically as Identities-withoutDualities-without-distinction. and unity Asa hierarchy the result, sedirnented structural whereby Decision superimposes a phenomenologising frame for every phenomenon, an for horizon for every every entity, and objectivating conditions ontologising into immanent is desedimented an and steamrollered out unstacked, object, continuum or theoretically of non-intuitive determined phenomenality independently the thought conditions of consciousness, of operates wherein is language, independently function and experience of the conditions of words independently given of the conditions Through their of perception. immanence dualysing the of elemental separation within unilateralisation or the Alien-subject, the meta-physical Transcendence of extra-philosophical Affection, the ontological Plane of pre-philosophical Reception, and the transcendental Unity of philosophical Intuition attain their non-auto- Decisional -which is to say, non-phenomenological- Identity as unilateral dualities, as the simultaneity without-distinction. They identity-without-synthesis of lived-in-One are by dualityand the Alien-subject and

305 experienced non-phenomenologically through its unilateralising structure as a Transcendence free of its constrictive relational residue of meta-physical scission or ekstasis; as a Plane devoid of the counterpoises of ontological horizonal ground and enclosure; and as Unity without synthesis or objectivity, as the transcendental Entity = x, the immanent noumenon or thing-in-itself, definitively shorn of the ontological apparatus of categorial determination. 3. The transcendental prosthetic The Alien-subject's immanent medium of phenomenal manifestation is that of this non-intuitive phenomenality determined in accordance with the insofar it is for hyle. It Alien the as exists as phenomenological realm radical determined in accordance with the non-phenomenological essence of dualysation Alien-subject Thus, the the as of effectuation of phenomenality. from frees the thinking non-materialist and phenomenality phenomenon from intuition the codes of as as well parameters of phenomenological dualysing by Moreover, the auto-positional and materiological conceptuality. Decision this articulating and auto-donational structure of phenomenological functions Alien-subject dimension the as a of phenomenality, non-intuitive theoretical vehicle providing for cognitive unprecedented opportunities furnishes it fact, a the with In axiomatic non-materialist experimentation. theoretical function organon whose might be likened to that of a

306 transcendental prosthetic. As organon for the non-materialist axiomatic, the Alien-subject uses phenomenological Decision its as occasional material in order to construct theorematic descriptions of `matter itself determined-inthe-last-instance by the radical hyle; thus, it uses phenomenological Decision in a way which phenomenological precludes the possibility intuition that the parameters of become constitutive or determining for a transcendental theory `of matter. In effect, the Alien-subject amplifies by intervening directly at what is, from a philosophical cognitive capacities least, `metatranscendental' level of the phenomenological the perspective at synthesesconditioning the possibilities of experience. However, it is this transcendent distinction between `experience' and `theory' in their phenomenological acceptation that becomes inoperative from `utopian' Alienthe the perspective of when viewed radically external, hold long it distinction Such to tenable as was possible so subject. a was only (i. between division to e. pre-Decisional) some putatively pre-theoretical on a dimension immediacy theoretically articulated and a realm of experiential immediacy for the the experience of specifying ontological pre-conditions (i. e. a Decision). But it is the very possibility of such a distinction that becomes untenable once the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy has been Alien-subject the transcendental stance of suspended and the rigorously

307 effectuated. There can be no such thing as `experience-in-itself before the advent of phenomenological Decision, just as there can be no such thing as Decision-in-itself, virtue given independently of the radical hyle, unless it be by of philosophical theoretical, intuitive Subjectivity, remains, illusion. Experience defined in terms of pre- phenomenological immediacy, of Consciousness or like Perception, Language, History, or an auto- positional, auto-donational ontological construct, the product of a Decision. Thus, it is possible to provide a non-materialist generalisation of Kant: the Alien-subject as organon for a transcendental determination that is real-inthe-last-instance but non-phenomenological reduces all phenomenological level itself Idealism. Phenomenological to the of empirical ontology ontology item data for becomes non-materialist theory. of empirical a contingent now That is to say: whereas for Kant, the ideal conditions for the possibility for for ideal the possibility of the objects of the conditions experience were also for experience230, non-materialism the real, non-phenomenological conditions for the reality of a theory of experience (i. e. for the determination of hyle) in Decision the now radical accordance with phenomenological determine the phenomenological conditions of empirical experience (i. e. of insofar a these as encompassed all are as etc., consciousness, perception,

308 function of Decision). `Consciousness', `perception', `language', `history', and all those other Decisionally circumscribed generalities supposedly intrinsic to the possibility of what we think, see, feel, and hear, are empirical idealisations, convenient speculative fictions gratuitously erected and maintained on the basis of philosophical Decision (the latter being a rigorously universal structure which, as we shall see later, ultimately encompasses capital and the apparatuses of socio-economic production231). But through the Alien-subject these generalities, along with the Decisions by means of which they are sustained as hybrids of empirical presupposition and ideal positing, can be dualysed and reconfigured as unilateral Identities. 4. The non-thetic universe Accordingly, every phenomenological Decision reconfigured in terms donation dimension the of non-thetic a prioris of and position unleashes a of immanent transcendental continuum of radically unconditional possibility, a from definitively the philosophical moorings that untethered virtuality now tied it to empirical Non-materialism actuality. refuses the ontological constraints that obliged Deleuze to postulate a merely relative asymmetrical parallelism between virtual and actual, one whereby every actual 230,,We then likewise in are the general possibility of experience assert that the conditions of have for they this that objective reason conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and 194, A158/B197) (Kant, 1929, judgement" in p. validity a synthetic a priori 231Cf. our Conclusion, infra, pp. 422-430.

309 differenciation of the virtual immediately implies a virtual differentiation of the actual, and hence the initiation of a positive feedback loop from virtual to back to the virtual again, according to actual and an autocatalytic process of ontological genesis232.By reducing every Decision, and thus the entire realm of phenomenological experience concomitant with it, to the level of a neutral indifferent and symbolic support for the Alien-subject, the non-materialist installs axiomatic a strictly irreversible and aparallel asymmetry between the dimension empirical of phenomenological experience and the non-intuitive xenotype which the Alien-subject clones or effectuates using Decision. Accordingly, dimension the by the Alien-subject effectuated of non-intuitive phenomenality constitutes a rigorously transcendental dimension of virtuality; one wherein possibility is no longer a function of The Alien-subject's transcendental exteriority vis a vis the empirical actuality. empirical realm which its its serves as occasional support precludes In Philosophy the reincorporation within ambit of empirical possibility. and Non-Philosophy Laruelle calls the dimension of radical virtuality concomitant with the Alien-subject's non-intuitive phenomenality `the non-thetic horizon before in is "is lived latter The the project, or advent of a universe'. the form of a manifold of singular points of transcendence, a manifold of 232Cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 129-131.

310 affects of universality, now apprehended as the phenomenal content of that `objectivity' [... I it constitutes a manifold of real, which science calls primitive transcendence, shorn of all external Unity and of all finality[... ] a manifold of radical or individual possibles. Thesepossibles are well and truly but devoid of position, devoid of space even if it be pure, universals, and devoid even of intensity. The hybrid of the particular and the universal is broken, science [i. e. non-philosophical thought-RB] finally accedes to a liberated from its limitation in the particular, and even from its universal limitation in the `individual'. Precisely because the universal now derives from the individual in the rigorous sense and no longer co-determines it, it is beyond its restricted and transcendent forms. This is the most universal experience of the universal or the possible: latter longer is the when no by hybrid " its to condemned go way of own self-representation or states. (Laruelle, 1989, p. 200) The non-thetic universe is the transcendental dimension of nonintuitive phenomenality effectuated through the existence of the Alienit Affect invariant form, its In the of subject. comprises simplest, most Transcendence without horizonal enclosure, the Reception of a Plane without ontological ground Intuition the and of Unity a without objective determination. It is by virtue of its effectuation of the non-thetic universe that

311 the Alien-subject functions like a transcendental prosthetic amplifying the possibilities of thought and allowing for a non-phenomenological universalisation of materialism; a universalisation whereby materialism is allowed to access matter's non-phenomenological exteriority as thing-initself, finally Entity from the parameters of phenomenological as released intuition and the codes of materiological if Thus, the nonconceptualisation. thetic universe can be said to correspond to the Alien-subject's dimension of transcendence as unilateralising noetic duality, then the strictly is its Entity that the correlate, which of exteriority noematic unobjectifiable the Alien-subject experiences as the non-intentional for correlate or unilate is Entity hyle. The foreclosure the the the non-materiological of radical transcendental xenotype for radically phenomenal matter's unobjectifiable exteriority cloned from but a exteriority, the phenomenological hybridisation of obj ectivating phenomenality and objective phenomenon. This is the rigorously cognitive prototype for the non-phenomenological exteriority hinted at or evoked, but only ever caricatured, in the hyperbolic constructs of Lovecraftian fantasy and science fiction233. 233Cf. for instance the short-story -favoured `Through PlateausThousand in A Guattari & by Deleuze

312 5. Non-materialism and gnosis The non-materialist axiomatic represents a variant of what Laruelle `the calls vision-in-One'. The latter, Laruelle insists, is a third kind of knowledge that is almost the opposite of Malebranche's vision-in-God: it remains radically singular, finite, and non-paradigmatic234.Non-materialism reduces or suspends what Laruelle refers to as the `Greco-unitary' epistemological paradigm and ascribes to it the status of an occasional material or empirical for support an an-archic Gnosis cognition235. can never become epistemically or gnostic model of normative or paradigmatic precisely LJ;,;aus:, itremains radically singular and ontologically unencompassable in each and every instance. Laruelle's `One' -i. e. radical immanence- never reconstitutes an `All', and the radical hyle which nonmaterialist thinking from hyletic the clones continuum as philosophical hybridisation of singularity and multiplicity is not merely another version of the body-without-organs. Similarly, the non-thetic universe cloned in foreclosure is to accordance with matter's ontological unification not simply immanence. Since what Laruelle refers to as the another version of plane of the Gates of the Silver Key' in H. P. Lovecraft HarperCollins, 1993, pp. 505-552. 234 C£Laruelle, 1991, 19. p. 2351n his brief but poetic rumination Omnibus I: At the Mountains of Madness, London: its highlights Jacques Lacarriere constantly on gnosticism, militantly an-archic, anti-authoritarian aspect. Cf. Laccarriere, 1989. Jonas's (1991) classic study, for

313 `the One-without-Being' (l 'Un-sans-l 'Etre) never under any circumstances instance constitutes an of ontological unity or totality, there be can never one One but only an indenumerable plurality of Ones, an unencompassable nonontological manifold of 'indivi-dualities': Identities-without-unity which are Dualities-without-distinction. simultaneously of radically indivisible releases their unilateral The non-Decisional separation immanence and radically transcendent division duality: unobjectifiable indivision is now the division. Immanence's that causes or engenders unencompassable condition uni-laterality brings forth a radically dispersive manifold of utterly discontinuous universes. This unilateral duality of indivision and division be be Decision. Identity Duality through and cannot synthesised cannot Multiple. into One Decisional the the the and synthesis of reintegrated Identity-without-unity unilateral separation as Their Duality-without-difference and Difference, between Unity bilateral the and onto'logical reciprocity precludes a reciprocity perpetuated through the unitary structure of philosophical Decision and one which invariably leads to the ontological reinscription of multiplicity as unity236. Thus, the manifestation of a non-thetic universe of theorematic itself `matter duality hyle description for the radical of engenders a unilateral its part, underlines gnosticism's profoundly anti-anthropocentric character as religion of an alien god,

314 and materialist Decision; duality a that forecloses the possibility of reinscribing matter within Decision. Nevertheless, and despite philosophical appearances, the hypo-thetical positing of matter's foreclosure to Decision remains perfectly compatible with the scientific-materialist assignation of a univocal ontological consistency to matter. It is not an ontological thesis about the constitution of matter but a transcendental hypothesis enforcing the distinction between matter's description and its constitution, specifically one discontinue to the philosophical amphiboly of phenomenological seeks which description and ontological constitution. The guiding hypothesis for nonis thinking materialist simply that matter's univocal ontological consistency has be decided to about which non-materialism nothing say- cannot on the basis of phenomenological evidence since it is multiply instantiable in a incommensurable registers of phenomenal manifold of phenomenologically description. In this sense, non-materialism to purge transcendental materialism is a critical hypothesis that seeks its of residual phenomenological empiricism. That this critical hypothesis also constitutes a gnosis of matter is has that be gnosis that understood one once appreciated only something can description than of ethicorather represents a species of practico-theoretical indispensable but synopsis. (1992) scholarly Filoramo nevertheless prosaic a more provides while

315 dogma. Non-materialist gnosis is an-archic insofar as it dualyses ontological every unitary ontological arche or principle according to the rigorously unilateral irreversible and order of the non-materialist axiomatic. As by the Alien-subject, the gnosis of `matter itself' performed in the onsists articulation of a non-intuitive universe for the theorematic description and phenomenalisation of the radical hyle; a universe of theorematic description whose conceptual codes and phenomenological dimensions -as circumscribed through the Affect of Transcendence, the Reception of the Plane and the Intuition of Unity- unilateralised-, are simplified, is to say, unidentified and which thereby engendering an an-archic, paraphenomenological chaos wherein thought is loosed from the conditions of intentional linguistic freed from the signification, strictures of consciousness, words are from liberated the armature of ontological coordination. and entities Gnosis allows ontologically extraterritorial individuals -Alien- fixed from but irreversible in the to manner an orderly subjectsproceed ideality transcendental to a of empirical phenomenological organisation chaos237 of unencompassable cognitive 236 Cf. in possibility. And by reducing 243-245. Chapter 5, 3, 154-161; Chapter pp. and pp. particular 237Non-philosophical `chaos' is falls the disorder purview of within which something nor neither mere dyad the former Whilst dynamics. philosophical the unitary remains encompassed within non-linear `order/disorder', the latter, for all their unpredictable complexity, are mathematically well regulated Gleick, (cf. invariants homothetic systems of phenomena produced through the recursive reiteration of dispersive designates `chaos' or that 1998). For Laruelle, by way of contrast, the term unencompassable

316 phenomenological Decision to the status of idealised empirical fiction. noninvites individuals to submit transcendent materialism ontological generalities to a set of precise, systematic (but non-systemic), yet utterly heterogeneous variations, thereby extracting from the latter an immanently transcendental and radically universal dimension of phenomenality which remains strictly incommensurable with the phenomenological realm which supports it. More interestingly perhaps, through the non-materialist axiomatic, the Alien-subject operates directly at what a philosopher would call the `metatranscendental' level at which the phenomenological parameters and determinable, thereby cognitive architecture of all cultural software remains suspending the contingent epistemic armature which an aleatory evolutionary history, allied to a random set of sociocultural practises, have grafted onto the intrinsic plasticity intuition, whether empirical priori, of our neurophysiological and a posteriori, Perceptual apparatus238. or phenomenological and a is now entirely incorporated within the Decisional ambit that serves hyle. descriptions for Alien-subject's the the of radical merely as the occasion Accordingly, this non-intuitive generalisation of matter coincides bounds beyond the the of with materialism's non-Decisional universalisation inconsistent immanence's in radically accordance with manifold of unilateral dualities manifested Identity. Cf. infra, Chapter 7, pp. 361-372; Chapter 8, pp. 419-421; and also Laruelle, 1992, passim. 238Cf. Chapter 8 be the of work explored via theme will the plasticity of neurophysiological where Paul Churchland.

317 anthropocognitive. For the charmed circle of philosophical auto-position perpetuated a reciprocity between the empirical and the transcendental whereby matter and thought remained either co-constitutive or co-extensive. The price for the spontaneous sufficiency of philosophical circumscription of `matter itself within materialism was a the restricted ambit of conceptual position and phenomenological donation as delineated according to the arbitrary empirical vagaries of the philosopher's speculative imagination. Thus, implicit in materiological Decisionism is an uncritical faith in the sufficiency of the philosophical imagination, one that seems to disregard the latter's entirely arbitrary character. Yet if the history of philosophy teaches us anything, it is that the philosopher's speculative imagination is always limited. In other words, implicit in the speculative materialist's empirically in confidence the sufficiency of Decision is the quasi-idealist assumption that an arbitrarily selected epistemic apparatus is sufficient to grasp matter `itself', irrespective of the biologically delimited parameters of human sapience. By doubt lights, to this239. our natural science gives us every reason Consequently, there is a sense in which, philosophical appearances notwithstanding, the asceticism of non-materialist theory and practise accords indulgences do than the of speculative more readily with natural science 239Cf. our brief comments concerning the philosophical ramifications in theory our of string

318 philosophical materialism. For it is in accordance with its refusal to subordinate science to philosophy that non-materialist thinking, on the basis of matter's radical autonomy, now recognises science's claim to a relatively absolute autonomy which is the equal of philosophy's, and that it attempts to reconfigure the apparatus of materialist theory in such a way as to grant the latter a measure of transcendental independence vis a vis the limits which an empirically overdetermined set of cognitive faculties impose upon the imagination. speculative That footing science stands on an equal with philosophy, that is logicmerely part of the abstract wing of philosophy -like mathematics or the empirical sciences, is a central tenet of philosophical naturalism, and specifically `naturalised the epistemology' of formulated by V. V. O. Quine by Churchland. The Paul try to two chapters will next and championed fundamental the to components of the non-materialist recapitulate and clarify the by them central of with certain comparing and contrasting stance brand doctrines the of vigorously naturalistic which characterise philosophical Churchland. Quine in the and work of materialism exemplified Our aim is to show how two apparently irreconcilable, not to say Kantian leading the problematic trajectories out of contradictory theoretical Introduction, supra, p. 21.

319 Quinean naturalism and Laruellean hypertranscendentalism- display an degree unexpected of theoretical convergence by virtue of their shared antipathy to phenomenology. Thus, Quine's is an anti-phenomenological naturalism, while Laruelle's is an anti-phenomenological transcendentalism. In the following chapter, we will see how the hypertranscendental register of Quine's theory not only accords with anti-transcendental and non-materialist it but how radicalises and generalises also anti-phenomenological naturalism, inscrutability its those the theses of of reference, of certain of -specifically indeterminacy translation. the of and of relativity, ontological

320 CHAPTER 7 BEHOLD THE NON-RABBIT This ehaYt,r ýýill discuss the reýation between individuation, theory, and experience, and will examine the way in which these concepts are intertwined in the work of Kant, Quine, and Laruelle. More precisely, we will be foregrounding the theme of individuation but only in order to use it as a lens through which to focus on the way in which the relation between theory is by these three thinkers. experience understood and By `individuation' we mean the problem which can be summarized in the question: how is it that something comes to be counted as `one' ? In this regard, Leibniz's famous claim according to which "That which is not is it being" But being is tradition. not a encapsulatesan entire ontological one it immediately having `something' thereby to think counted without possible `one' thing as ? Taking this question as a starting point, in our aim look here is First, individuation issue to twofold. at one of considering the largely (but traditional to this unstated) conceptual equivalence way which between `being' and `being-one', or between entity and unity, has figured as Second, for to suggest some of ontology. an uncircumventable precondition be in or that challenged the ways the might precondition of assumption which

321 In undermined. order to do this we will chart a trajectory through three distinct theoretical stances concerning individuation. We will begin with the Kantian account, according to which an invariable transcendental paradigm for objective individuation is available. Then we'll move on to consider the Quinean sceptical, more stance, whereby far from being universal and individuation paradigmatic, hence epistemically is actually a matter of linguistic convention, relative, and ultimately ontologically indeterminate. Finally, we will conclude by trying to elucidate the Laruellean suggestion that determination link transcendental the the singular can sever only a strictly of between entity and unity, thereby guaranteeing the de-objectification and dephenomenologisation of the singular. We would also like to suggest that the first and second of these theses concerning individuation can be roughly correlated with certain more inkling in the less to of some give order generic philosophical postures, or in Laruelle's own non-philosophical stance constitutes which peculiar way but Quinean Kantian the postures, and neither a negation nor a synthesis of like their radicalisation and generalisation. something Thus, in the first section of the paper, we will how Kant, the see idealist, mobilizes an invariant transcendental criterion guaranteeing the in the In individuation. way the examine shall we second, objective unity of

322 Quine, the materialist, undermines the assumption that any such which transcendental guarantor for individuation In the third and final exists. however, hope to show how Laruelle section, we idealist and the materialist -circumventing schemas- effectively both the generalises Quine's materialist subversion of objective unity by radicalising Kant's transcendental Accordingly, method. transcendental it is by way of a concurrent radicalisation of determination and generalisation determination that the Laruelle-inspired of empirical or non-philosophical under- materialism we here link between to to the articulate proposes sever are attempting presumed entity and unity. Consequently, the `non-rabbit' mentioned in the title of this chapter is have but We `not-rabbit' `anti-rabbit' unity. an entity without not an or a already how seen the prefix `non-' -whether in `non-rabbit' `nonor has It be is to a very understood negatively or privatively240. not philosophy'`non-Decisional', for which, as we specific technical sense as an abbreviation `non-auto`non-auto-positional' for in is turn shorthand and saw earlier, donational'. Thankfully, for present purposes, these somewhat cumbersome locutions can be usefully compressed into the far more economical `nonhere. Thus, the is in `non-thetic be it of that one thetic': question rabbit' a will 240 215,91,2160. 21cn 233n 21113 c NY. Cf. supra, Chapter o ý, ý1ý ýý0 and

323 key claims we would like to make in this is chapter that although a `non-thetic is rabbit' effectively unobjectifiable, it is neither ineffable nor inconceivable. We now know that neither objectification nor phenomenologisation can presume to exhaust the entire available spectrum of immanent phenomenal manifestation. So not only does a `non-thetic rabbit' remain entirely immanent, precisely articulated within the bounds of conceptual thought, it also remains available to perception; - albeit only with the crucial proviso that the empirical the human sensory apparatus become parameters of theoretically reconfigured in accordance with certain transcendental strictures (we will return to this latter point in the final section of this chapter). Hence the use of the word `behold' in the title of this chapter: the is immanent, in non-rabbit entirely entirely manifest, spite of the fact that is neither a unitary nor intentional an phenomenon. In this regard, the in is this to clarify and to overarching aim of exercise comparative analysis but difficult the elucidate crucial io phenomenality'. phenomenological manifestation sum definition defined in up notion of very briefly: `non-phenomenological a in Husserl's case, the designates a mode of of phenomenality terms of its immanence to intentional designates it in Heidegger's (the an case, early) consciousness241,while 241Cf. for instance Husserl, 1982.

324 defined in terms of an ekstatic structure of apophantic mode of manifestation being-in-the-world242. Dasein's transcendence through ontological articulated The non-phenomenological definition, however, refers to a non-intentional, defined non-apophantic, and non-worldly mode of phenomenal manifestation its immanence `in' in It theory. terms refers to a constitutively of exclusively theoretical intrinsically it is because So an mode of phenomenality. devoid of apophantic theoretical phenomenon - one, moreover, entirely intelligibility, intentional unity or worldly horizonality by virtue of its become the manifest non-rabbit will only constitutively theoretical status theoretically or the to non-intuitive, strictures of a non-empirical, according determined phenomenality, as opposed to those of consciousness, sensibility, being-in-the-world. or Kant here, there's a complex In all three of the thinkers under consideration But perhaps most individuation, theory and experience. interrelation between Cartesian basically the significantly, all three are concerned with undermining notion that there exists some immediacy kind of essentially pre-theoretical be thingenjoys to there a such `consciousness' through which -supposing have If they anything `things themselves'. privileged access to phenomena or 242Cf. Heidegger, 1962.

325 in at all common, it's this basic refusal to have any truck with the homely phenomenological faith in the pre-theoretical experiential immediacy of `the things themselves'. Kant, for instance, denies the fanciful notion that we have privileged introspective access to the contents of our own heads. As far as the investigation into the conditions of possibility for experience is concerned, introspection provides no more of a solid basis than wand dowsing. The transcendental difference between phenomenon and in-itself cuts all the way into the subject: empirical consciousness is just as conditioned, just as determined, as every other kind of objective phenomenon. Moreover, as the ultimate for ground apperception its precludes maintains the possibility formal, a identification with of transcendental synthesis, pure impersonal and objective status which the personal subject of empirical is it immanent transcendentally to never experience consciousness; although "The inner it to transcendental in sense: external remains given experience, be [... J is therefore entitled objective, and must unity of apperception distinguished from determination is a the subjective unity of consciousness, which Consequently, 157). B139, the (Kant, 1929, inner p. sense" of is is investigating Kant into neither experience whose conditions of possibility the `lived' experience of phenomenological consciousness, nor the putatively

326 private realm of subjective qualia, but the universal cognitive experience whose structures are mapped out in the theories of Euclid and Newton. Kant is laying out transcendental conditions for the possibility of a single, universal but ultimately impersonal objective experience as theoretically by Euclid articulated and Newton, rather than as phenomenologically apprehended or `lived' by a conscious subject: "There is one single represented as in thoroughgoing experience in which all perceptions are and orderly connection, just as there is only one space and one time in which all modes of appearance and all relations of being or not-being occur. When we speak of different experiences, we can refer only to the various perceptions, all of which, as such, belong to one and the same general experience. This thoroughgoing synthetic unity of perceptions is indeed the form of experience; it is nothing else than the synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with concepts. " (Kant, 1929, Al 11, p. 138). For Kant, this `synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with basis for the transcendental the universal cognitive concepts' provides experience whose invariant features are delineated in Euclidean geometry laws in invariants Newtonian These the and constitute universal physics. into together one conformity with which all possible appearancesare woven

327 unified, cohesive whole. Moreover, Kant claims that "The unity of apperception is thus the transcendental ground of the necessary conformity to law of all appearances in one experience"(Ibid., follows that pure apperception, the A127, p. 148). If this is so, it indivisible integer of categorial judgement and transcendental synthesis, is the formal principle grounding the synthetic unity of appearances,and ultimately the universal, impersonal, and objective principle in which the nomological consistency of all appearances finds its basis. Which is to say that pure apperception is in fact the subject of Euclidean and Newtonian theory: it is the transcendental guarantor for the possibility in the of nomological consistency of appearances as set out geometry and physics. possibility Thus, Kant is attempting to define conditions of for experience in accordance with a specific set of theoretical invariances law like through and necessary strictures which carve out certain is Pure the the of that wellspring apperception, structured. experience which between divide bridging hinge the is the empty the cardinal synthetic a priori, logical necessity of the analytical a priori and the contentful empirical contingency of the synthetic a posteriori. In doing so it ensures the does how But then pure transcendental isomorphy of theory and experience. between link theory, and the experience, to articulate apperception serve individuation?

328 To answer this question, it is imperative bear in mind Kant's we distinction between combination or Verbindung crucial as function of the transcendental imagination, and unity or Einheit as rooted in the pure understanding. Thus, Kant writes: "Combination is representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise out of the combination. On the contrary, it is what, by adding itself to the representation of the manifold, first makespossible the concept of B131, p. 152)243. The synthesizing the combination"(Ibid., function Kant ascribes to the transcendental imagination would not be possible, he argues, unless that combinatory activity was rooted in an essentially pre-synthetic or indivisible integer of transcendental unity proper to the pure understanding. This unity, of course, is provided by transcendental apperception. And it is precisely insofar as it first makes possible the a priori combination of the manifold in pure intuition that apperception provides the transcendental ground binding together subjective individuation and individuated objectivity. This is why, as Kant famously maintains: "the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience"(Ibid., A 158/B 197, p. 194). Because apperception is indissociably correlated with the pure and empty form of objectivity in 243For a brilliantly innovative reading of Kant exploring the ramifications of this fundamental

329 general - the transcendental object =x-, it yields the isomorphic reciprocity between representing subject and represented object which grounds the possibility of empirical experience. It is thereby the universal synthetic principle out of which both subjective and objective individuation crystallized. For although `unity' is one of the categories of quantity and hence one of the twelve determinate modalities finally apperception are which furnishes of objective synthesis, it is the qualitative from unity which objective synthesis originarily arises as a mode of categorial judgement. In this regard, pure apperception is the ultimate determining instance for individuation, and the schematism and the principles of the pure understanding merely provide supplementary details concerning the a priori structures of spatio-temporal combination into which appearances which have been individuated through apperception become woven in order to already produce an intra-consistent network for cognitive representation. It comes as no surprise then to find that Kant's account of individuation is basically hylomorphic. Pure apperception is the indivisible formal paradigm of unity stamping an essentially amorphous manifold of its individuating spatio-temporal presentation with be It a would seal. for in however, that to as mistake, regard unity as merely subjective character, distinction between Verbindung and Einheit, cf. Alain Badiou, `L'ontologie soustractive de Kant' in his

330 Kant repeatedly insists, it is from the indivisibility of pure apperception that the representing subject and the represented object both derive. Thus, Kant's individuation account of necessitates a transcendental isomorphy between subjective and objective unity. In fact, subjectivation, objectivation, and individuation all become virtually indistinguishable processes inasmuch as apperceptive synthesis exhausts the possibilities of phenomenal far As is Kant be to manifestation. as concerned, something is to be an object of possible experience, and pure apperception is the ultimate transcendental determinant for all possible experience. Consequently, although Kant's transcendentalism critically undermines the idea that consciousness is the domain of a privileged pre-theoretical immediacy - for that idea conflates conscious experience of phenomena with experience of `things-in- themselves' -, not only does Kant fail to critically examine the link between it by identifying he the notions of phenomenon entity and unity, reinforces bond indivisible both transcendental to the thereby subordinating and object, between subjective and objective unity. In short, the Kantian rabbit-entity is individuated, it is familiar: an objectively one with which we are all perfectly by locatable in dimensional time three and physical phenomenon persisting its reference to an entirely-determinate system of spatio-temporal coordinates, Court Traite d'Ontologie Transitoire: Badiou, 1998, pp. 153-165.

331 objective contours fixed through a stable set of spatial boundaries and a homogeneous segment of temporal continuity. What then can we conclude about the between individuation, relation theory and experience in Kant ? We have already mentioned how, because of its universal, impersonal and objective character, the unified experience correlated with pure apperception is that whose invariant, law like features are jointly delineated by the theories of Euclid and Newton. Clearly then, Kant's entire transcendental project is intimately bound to the presupposition of an immanent, already constituted system of scientific theory. The substantive character of the synthetic a priori judgements whose formal possibility Kant is trying to uncover is, to all intents and purposes, defined by Newton and Euclid. The empirical immanence of an experience whose universally features jointly described in Euclidean Newtonian necessary are geometry and for defines Kant the seeksto which physics parameters of possible experience provide a transcendental ground. Borrowing from Deleuze a useful schema Guattari, and we might say that the transcendental and the synthetic a priori, in doubly together articulated and critical philosophy and science, are wedded Critical Kant's Thus, a relation of reciprocal presupposition. project for immanent theory of experience, scientific presupposes an empirically

332 he then tries to provide an a which but priori nevertheless transcendentally immanent epistemological footing. However, as subsequent scientific developments have all too clearly shown, this relation of presupposition remains fatally one-sided. It is Kant's transcendental philosophy which presupposes the empirical immanence of scientific theory and a scientific delineation of the synthetic a priori in the shape of an already extant system of apodictic mathematical and scientific truths; not, as Kant mistakenly believed, empirical science which presupposes basis. This one-sidedness is a consequence of the transcendental a Kant's And transcendent transcendental character of unmistakeably a priori. internal to the the extent which coherence of the critical project as a given whole hinges on the 1st Critique's crucial distinction between the transcendental and the transcendent244,this is deeply problematic for Kant. More than one commentator245 has remarked how, by simply tracing from the transcendental conditions superimposing the presumed unity of pure apperception onto the synthetic empirically conditioned, and Kant the merely constructs a redundant, empirical manifold, combinations of 244 Cf. Kant, op. cit., A295-6/B352-3, pp. 298-299. in 245Dufrenne, Deleuze recent have made this particular criticism almost ubiquitous and Foucault less been it had explicitly or more but Vetö to Miklos already which reveals the extent years, Fichte, Haaman, immediate formulated by many of Kant's contemporaries and successors: e.g. literature on Schelling, Hegel. Cf. Veto, 1998. In view of the now elephantine proportions of secondary Kant, many more names could doubtless be added to this list.

333 2nd order abstraction which, far from explaining them, simply reproduces the formal features of empirical generality at a higher level. Consequently, the supposedly transcendental reciprocity between critical philosophy and the scientific mapping of experience is only operative from the perspective of the former. The trouble with Kant's transcendentalism can be summarized in the following way: in principle, the empirically immanent bounds of possible its law like features as laid out in the theories of Euclid experience, universal, and Newton, are supposed to be transcendentally girded, necessarily rooted in the constitutive structures of cognition by those forms of a priori synthesis in immanence in fact But the they are not, as grounded of pure apperception. the discoveries of Lobatchevski, RiemannandEinstein (among others) showed Kant's transcendental girding was too to only clearly, revealing what extent flimsy, makeshift, and expedient, its foundations far too shallowly excavated. Kant's critical project remains trapped within the ambit of the empiricotranscendental doublet as circumscribed through the structure of philosophical Decision. It is only by presupposing science as empirically is Kant that given be to the empirical comes able to posit the a priori conditions through which constituted as given. transcendental a priori Because of this Decisional structure, Kant's in floundering extraneous metaphysical ends up

334 transcendence: neither rigorously transcendental, nor authentically immanent vis a vis the empirical domain of possible experience mapped out in scientific theory. Quine Interestingly enough, this relation double of articulation and between is reciprocal presupposition philosophy and science also one of the features Quine's in striking of most work, albeit reconfigured a vigorously naturalistic, anti-transcendental synthetic distinction246 fashion. Quine's demolition invalidates the Kantian of the analytic- conception of the transcendental and liquidates the very notion of the synthetic a priori. For Quine, truth is immanent and disquotational247,while reference remains a in kind between is difference intra-theoretical thus, there no relation; strictly in degree difference fact, logic truths truths of measured of only a of and is Consequently, there no terms of their susceptibility to empirical refutation. judgement fact, logic between bridge and and essence and existence, gap to justification experience; and no for transcendental a positing whatsoever isomorphy between representing and represented through the good offices of 246Cf. Quine, 1961, pp. 20-46. 247 "Where it theory seen in and terms 'true' given is of a to couched a sentence makes sense to apply killed 'Brutus To from within that theory, complete with its posited reality... say that the statement Brutus that to in 23' is is say true, effect simply Caesar' is true, or that `The atomic weight of sodium is killed Caesar or that the atomic weight of sodium is 23. " (Quine, 1960, p.24).

335 a synthetic a priori. Quine's dissolution of the analytic/synthetic distinction necessitates abandoning the idea that the possibilities of empirical experience be delimited through certain a priori epistemic structures possessing an can inviolable formal necessity. As far as Quine is concerned, there simply are no purely a priori formal structures constraining the bounds of possible is Which to say that the possibilities of scientific theory are experience. being continuously reconfigured in accordance with real occurrences in the fixed ideal in than to rather eternally world, according structures the subject. Thus, although Quine's empiricism basis the operates on of a body immanence defined in terms of an already extant of presupposition of he in initially Kant's, to theory, refuses the analogous a manner scientific Kantian dissociation of philosophical epistemology from science in the shift to a transcendental epistemological register. This is Quine's thesis of the reciprocal containment of epistemology denial With the of and ontology248. dissolution distinction the the synthetic a priori goes of and analytic/synthetic the idea that there can be a first philosophy providing transcendental grounds for scientific theory. Not only does philosophical epistemology presupposes provided the states microphysical of ontology scientific ontology -ultimately by physics; the epistemological investigation into the genesis of scientific

336 ontology must be carried out within the conceptual framework provided by that fundamental physical There can be no transcendental ontology. bracketing or suspension of the natural scientific attitude. Thus, the fundamental methodological presupposition underlying Quine's empiricism is the espousal of an uncompromisingly ontology. And the holds that there can be no difference in the world that physicalist would not physicalist ultimately prove reducible to some physical difference explainable in terms of the distribution of elementary particles. As a physicalist Quine insists that "nothing happens in the world, not the flutter of an eyelid, not the flicker of a thought, without some redistribution of microphysical states." (Quine, 1981, 98) Consequently, p. although epistemology can investigate the process of formation, it do from included theory scientific must so a vantage point within that scientific theory. The ontological framework provided by the physical for latter investigates basis the the the sciences provides epistemology even as for immanence former. Quine, Thus, the genesis of science's empirical functions like a kind of transcendental presupposition for epistemology. Where Kant sought to epistemology, Quine ground grounds scientific a ontology naturalized in transcendental epistemology in the transcendentally immanent ontology provided by physics: "my position is a 248For for in Quine's importance fundamental thought, an exemplary and an account of this thesis'

337 naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I seephilosophy and science as in the same boat -a boat which, to revert to Neurath 'sfigure as I do, so often we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no first "( Quine, 1969, pp. 126-127) external vantage point, no philosophy. It is this idea that the boat of empirical science functions as an inalienable presupposition for philosophy it functions that other words, as -in ideal, than a real, rather condition of possibility- which permits us to qualify it with the otherwise resolutely un-Quinean epithet of 'transcendental'. But note that what we are calling `transcendental' here, in the context of Quine's boat, is Neurath's to allusion neither the wood from which the ship's planks have been hewn, nor any specific feature concerning the shape and structure fact is Kant's It the that philosophy those this mistake. simply of planks: was begins as `always already' inscribed within a complex global network of intricately interrelated conceptual presuppositions. There is always some fundamental theory of the world keeping the possibility of philosophical investigation afloat. Without it, philosophy could not even begin to operate. Moreover that global web of belief, that intricate network of first-person is irreducible to the perspective of conceptual presupposition, exposition and defence of Quine's philosophy in its systematic consistency, see Roger Gibson's,

338 subjectivity. For although the fabric and tissue of the web are woven -via intricate micrological processes of probably unimaginable complexity- in the course a vast and ongoing collective cultural enterprise, it is scientific praxis that constructs and articulates its interconnecting nodes. Scientific theory furnishes the abstract logical filters, syntactical connectives, and conceptual joints which ensure the cohesive articulation of the whole. And science, as an impersonal theoretical praxis intrinsically embedded within a collective sociocultural is too variegated, heterogeneous and complex a enterprise, be to phenomenon ascribed a unique and invariable essence.The structure of individual irreducible to the sum of scientific scientific praxis remains subjectivities that compose its parts. Thus, science as abstract, impersonal be To phenomenologically encompassed. socio-historical structure cannot bracket the theory to to try to of our global ground science, or reduce attempt world, painstakingly accumulated through millennia of collective cultural is to the in individuated to try whole reduce only not subjectivity evolution, the sum of its parts; it is to believe that one can generate the whole, along basis intricate the inconceivably its of of one on articulation, structural with in Quinean try to its microscopic parts. From a ground science perspective, to Enlightened Empiricism. C£ Gibson, 1988.

339 subjectivity is not just to indulge in asinine philosophical solipsism; it is to commit a rudimentary category mistake. Accordingly, for Quine, it is science that functions as an irreducible for philosophical subjectivity, and not the reverse. In this regard, sine qua non it may be that Quine's doctrine of disquotational truth, his intra-theoretical account of word-world correspondence, and his commitment to the methodological primacy of a physicalist ontology, although all resolutely in inspiration, anti-Kantian amount to something like a reconfiguration of the immanence, its transcendental than notion of rather simple obliteration. What is certain is that it is Quine's radical empiricism and his physicalism that indeterminacy his doctrines: two of translation of most provocative underlie dismissed both doctrines frequently One out of sees and ontological relativity. hand, largely by those failing to appreciate the way in which they are Quine by the quasi-transcendental methodological primacy underwritten his to presupposition ascribes of an unequivocally physicalist ontology. Nevertheless, it is this methodological presupposition that provides the According behaviourism. to the basis for Quine's theoretical epistemological latter, a scientific theory is primarily a structurally intraconsistent system of far the focus empiricist as the analysis of epistemic sentences, and appropriate instance linguistic is publicly is of as utterance philosopher concerned

340 observable behaviour. Consequently, a rigorously naturalistic epistemology will, as a matter of principle, forgo all references to subjectivity, whether it be in the shape of appeals to phenomenological introspection or latent mental processes, in order to recast epistemology in a explicitly behaviourist mode. It be then will seen to consist for the most part in a study of the relation between patterns of sensory stimulation and dispositions to overt verbal behaviour as in observable a particularly sophisticated species of biological organism - i. e. homo sapiens. More precisely, it will seek to establish a correlation between the various modalities of sensory input and the various patterns of linguistic output by those organisms. In the context of a behaviourist exhibited epistemology, the cognitive subject is merely the functional black box input relaying and output, and the precise nature of the between input linguistic mediating sensory and mechanisms between output, or stimulus and science, remains a matter for neurophysiological investigation rather than phenomenological speculation. The startling and far-reaching consequences of Quine's in become behaviourism the test case of radical epistemological apparent translation. The radical translator has to decipher what is presumably an instance of ostensive definition in the case of an entirely alien language. Thus, the alien utters the phrase `Gavagai! ' while ostensively indicating a passing

341 rabbit. But as far as behavioural evidence is concerned, the translator is no more empirically justified in concluding that the alien is indicating an individual rabbit, than he would be in concluding that the native was actually pointing to an undetached rabbit-part, or a temporal segment in the history of instantiation the a rabbit, or of rabbithood, and so on. The alien's behavioural disposition to utter the phrase `Gavagai! ' and point a tentacle whenever a hops by be the same whether he `means' to indicate a rabbit, a will rabbit Consequently, Quine or an argues, rabbit-segment, undetached rabbit-part. there is nothing in principle to prevent a pair of rival translators from for translation the two alien of conflicting manuals mutually constructing tongue, both of which would be completely compatible with the totality of the alien's speech-dispositions, providing a smooth sentence to sentence incompatible both between English entirely and alien sentences,yet mapping ', `Lo, ' `Gavagai! inasmuch translates a rabbit! with as one with one another, '. `Lo, it an undetached rabbit part! while the other translates with is is translation Quine that Now the point, radical not argues, lack to that evidence enough we epistemologically underdetermined and is is It `really' translation that discover what the alien ontologically means. fact discover of is indeterminate and that there nothing to about meaning, no be for to `means' wrong translator or the right the the matter about what alien

342 about: "The discontinuity of radical translation tries our meanings: really sets them over against their verbal embodiments, or, more typically, finds nothing there. "(Quine, 1960, p. 76) If `Gavagai! ' doesn't mean anything, Quine insists, it's because `Lo, a ' doesn't rabbit! mean anything either. There simply are no such things as `meanings' For the truth is that indeterminacy of translation begins at home. . Thus, Quine's epistemological behaviourism and his principled disqualification of the `first person point of view' applies even in the case of language: habitual our own native we could suspend our practise of homophonic translation when conversing with other English speakersand, by systematically utterances reinterpreting `there's such as words and sentential constructions, a rabbit' being as `about' construe rabbithood or facts the available empirical undetached rabbit parts while still respecting all behavioural predispositions. about Moreover, this holds even in the case of the individual speaker: I the that conclude and own utterances could systematically reconstrue even my Or, is it I and `rabbit' true stages. or rabbit parts of rabbit actually as use word it `I' `I' interestingly, refers the actually that use as word perhaps even more hostility Quine's to the phenomenological superstitions to some other entity. is not first in `the uncompromising: utterly person point of view' enshrined

343 even my own utterances can have any determinate meaning for me. The assumption that speakers enjoy privileged access to their own phenomenological states is no more than a widespread but scientifically unwarranted cultural prejudice. Since truth is disquotational and the reference language's scheme governing a ontological commitments remains relative to a translation manual, the ontological commitments of my own assertions inscrutable even to myself remain This is Quine's doctrine of the inscrutability of reference, which indiscernibly into that of ontological relativity. The latter provides shades off the basic theoretical underpinning for the thesis of translational indeterminacy. It states that ontologies are not fixed and absolute but aleatory different different have theories ontological commitments will and relative: insofar as the range of bound variables over which the sentencesof a theory in kind to to the stand of entities required must quantify will vary according be for in true. to the theory the those of sentences order variables as values of Rabbits and undetached rabbit parts are alike, Quine suggests, insofar as the the within their sense makes existence or non-existence only question of far is important it that But to as as stress context of the relevant world-theory. `what there fact be the Quine is concerned, there can concerning matter of no to The theory. according is' independently criterion of any and all really

344 which rabbits afford greater epistemological convenience as theoretical posits in the context of our own particular world-system remains an instrumental it one: so happens that we, as biological organisms striving to organize the flux raw of sensory input, have so far found it simpler and more profitable to formulate our accounts of those sensory stimulations and successfully predict their future occurrence by explaining them in terms of rabbits rather than undetached rabbit-parts. Beyond this purely instrumental criteria and the immanence of the world-theory we happen to inhabit, there is no higher court of ontological appeal, and ultimately no answer to questions about whether the world `really' consists of rabbits or rabbit-stages since "it makes no sense to say what the objects of a theory are, beyond saying how to interpret or is "(Quine, 50) Accordingly, 1969, in there that theory p. another. reinterpret independently in the the to of world carve up which no right or wrong way best available theory, and what counts as the `best' theory for an organism is function of adaptational efficiency. simply a Moreover, given that Quine believes that the best ontology is that of believes the he that best that offers physics the also unified science, and it the for the projected unification of natural sciences, widest-ranging avenue follows that, as far as Quine is concerned, physics should be afforded pride of By the heart systematically world. the of system scientific our of place at

345 reconstruing and reinterpreting quantificational predicates, apparent divergences in the ontologies of the various sub-systems of science can be eliminated, thereby maximizing the potential convergence of those discrete scientific regions with a view to a seamlessly unified, universal physical theory. Whenever possible, Quine maintains, we should strive for physical reduction, least or at re-identification: - substituting frugal a ontology of for luxurious bodies objects our microphysical ontology of and substances, favour in these microphysical objects eliminating of regions of pure spacetime, and ultimately abandoning the latter in order to replace them with bounds the of corresponding classes of quadruple numbers as specified within arbitrarily adopted coordinate systems, thereby arriving at the austerely minimalist ontology of pure set theory. Given that our own scientific system of the world already exhibits this high degree of functional plasticity, it would be churlish to impose fixed ontological When translation. the process of radical parameters onto its that be it to assume more convenient may confronted with an alien it that less and own, our with coincide or more ostensive practises is Quine's do. that like in point individuates things the world very much we they always will warranted, although such assumptions are pragmatically remain ontologically indeterminable insofar as they exceed all possible

346 epistemological, which is to say behavioural, evidence; the only empirically legitimate evidence as far as Quine is concerned: "Such is the quandary over `gavagai'. where one gavagai leaves off and another begins. The only difference between rabbits, undetached rabbit parts and rabbit stages is in their individuation. If you take the total scattered portion of the spatiotemporal world that is made up of rabbits, and that which is made up of undetached rabbit parts, and that which is made up of rabbit stages, you come out with the same scattered portion of the world each of the three times. The only difference is in how you slice it. And how to slice it is what ostension or simple conditioning, however persistently repeated, cannot teach. "(Quine, ibid. pp. 31-32) Thus, what the indeterminacy of translation really boils down to is an indeterminacy of individuation. Although the total scattered portion of the is spatiotemporal world comprising rabbits, rabbit parts and rabbit stages, ultimately `one and the same'249, the fact remains that at the local level, there be will always a greater number of undetached rabbit-parts present than single history in the temporal of a segments rabbits, an even greater number of 249Although, is `one it the from Quinean to that same' and remains say a perspective, strictly speaking, problematic insofar as it erroneously suggests we might have some means of accessing this scattered individuation habitual independently practises of ostensive of our portion of the spatiotemporal world it's this inhabit. As happen to shortly, see the we'll as nested within overarching world-theory we feasible becomes possibility of gaining theoretical access to a pre-individuated ontological realm which in the context of Laruelle's work, in spite of the fact that it remains a strictly incoherent notion for Quine.

347 rabbit than undetached rabbit parts present, but conversely, only a single rabbithood present whenever a multiplicity of rabbits, rabbit stages or rabbit parts are present. The truth is that this incommensurability at the global level of that which ostension counts as one remains inscrutable at the local level of behavioural equivalence for ostensive indication, in other words, inscrutable level the at of the way in which ostension count something as one. This is because, for Quine, there is no 'thing-in-itself, nothing left over once you've subtracted the how of ostensive individuation from the what which is being supposedly pointed to. There simply are no facts of the matter i. - e. no behavioural, and ultimately no physical facts `intend' to about what we single out when uttering `Lo, a rabbit !' and pointing, or to tell us whether indicating we are rabbits, rabbit stages,or rabbithood. Individuation is indeterminate, and the reference of our singular terms inscrutable, argues Quine, because there are no entities there for us to scrute in the absence of a global theory fixing the conventions for ostension and it's determinate for individuation Unless the specifying criteria of entities. determined in the context of an overarching background theory, reference is indeterminate and being inscrutable. Hence the famous Quinean formula: `to be is to be the value of a variabýe'. Reference as a basic ontological relation between word and world cannot be construed in a transcendent and extra-

348 theoretical fashion, because only the presupposition of physics fundamental and all-encompassing available immanent, the provide as the most system of global ontology can empirically legitimate condition of possibility for defining that relation. And herein lies the potent anti-phenomenological thrust Quine's of radical empiricism: if practises of ostension and criteria for individuation are relative to theory, so are all those perceptual or `experiences' phenomenological epistemological subject subsequently attributed to the function as a of those theoretically grounded Change the translation manual and the customary and conventions criteria. homophonic habitually equivalence whereby your utterances are rules of familiar lexicon fixed in English, the their of standard reference mapped onto conformity with the conventional criteria of ordinary usage, and you beingfurnishings the of your own phenomenological effectively reconfigure in-the-world. Rabbit-stage qualia will be substituted for rabbit qualia. Accordingly, Quine's epistemological behaviourism and his sceptical stance toward the conventions of propositional attitude ascription and the in discourse, the folk trappings crystallised as psychological of ontological indeterminacy of translation250, provide us with as an explicitly materialist Quine's indeterminacy of of translation as a reductio course, there are many who view the doctrine not could behaviourism, that counter-intuitive a profoundly such protesting epistemological first-person incontrovertible phenomenology Appeals be of to the obviousness possibly correct. less-question interesting An and in invariably figure largely altogether more protests of this sort. 2500f

349 variant on what was most valuable in Kant the transcendental critique of the supposition that we possess unmediated access to our own first-person phenomenological awareness as though it were something immediate `inand itself, and the latent implication that there simply is no `experience in-itself since experience is conceptually defined and `always already' theoretically articulated. It is this idea of a transcendental suspension or bracketing of the realm of phenomenologically defined immediacy in its entirety, coupled with the possibility of a subsequent theoretical reconfiguration of what counts as experience, which links Laruelle's work to that of Kant and Quine. Laruelle Laruelle is interested in clarifying the notion of a transcendental for presupposition philosophical thought. In other words, he's interested in immanence the transcendental that, we suggested, was clarifying notion of already operative in the thought of Kant and Quine. But unlike Kant, Laruelle is trying to define this notion of transcendental immanence in terms of a real he ideal for Quine, And rather merely presupposition experience. unlike body identify to this of refuses real presupposition with an already extant both he is because This that thinks empirical science. Kant's synthetic a begging critique comes from Donald Davidson, a philosopher much influenced by Quine. In 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' Davidson criticizes Quine for holding on to a `third dogma' of

350 priori, as rooted in pure apperception, and behaviourism, as rooted in his physicalism, Quine's epistemological are ultimately equivalent gestures of transcendence, that is to say, philosophical Decisions about what should inevitable count as an presupposition for philosophy. Thus, what Laruelle is is for a precondition after philosophy that is real without being empirically determinate and capable of assuming a transcendental function without becoming ideally transcendent. The question then is: can we discover this real but non-empirical presupposition, this unconditional immanence that is by having to make a always already presupposed philosophy, without Decision its by immediately For about character? philosophical characterizing its own precondition philosophically, Decision institutes a vicious circularity whereby philosophy's minimal precondition or sine qua non always turns out to be already philosophical. But is there some ultimate presupposition for be to that turn thought posited as presupposed out would not philosophical through Decision? We know that Laruelle believes he has discovered this non-Decisional it defining the for that authentically as philosophising, and precondition ineliminable sine qua non for all philosophical thought is a matter of ideal transcendence immanence the of every residue of purifying notion of the he mirroring as sees empiricism; the dualism of conceptual scheme and sensory content which

351 and empirical determination. For the philosophical presupposition of transcendental immanence, whether as ideal (Kant) or as (Quine), real invariably renders it immanent to something. Thus, for transcendental qua ideal synthetic a priori Kant, the is immanent to possible for Quine the transcendental qua real physical theory of the experience, while is immanent to empirical science. Accordingly, in order to safeguard world immanence's autonomy and prevent its contamination through transcendent ideality and empirical reality, Laruelle must achieve a seemingly impossible feat: he has to separate immanence qua immanence from immanence qua transcendental without differentiating Immanence must be capable of fulfilling them as two distinct 'things'. a transcendental function without becoming transcendental. The function of the transcendental entails a relation be (Kant), determination (whether this constitution of conditioning one of (Husserl) or production (Deleuze)), a relation that would compromise the in Accordingly, immanence Laruelle the order not seeks. radical autonomy of determines, it immanence transcendentally to that to render which relative Laruelle will carefully distinguish immanence as a necessary but negative its from determination, for the relation of condition, as sine qua non is insofar this determining as condition effectuation as transcendentally Kantian dualism of concept and intuition. Cf. Davidson, 1984.

352 contingently occasioned by the empirical instance that it necessarily determines. Immanence is a necessary but not a sufficient determination of because it philosophy for the condition requires the supplement of philosophical thought as a contingent occasion in order to fulfil its necessary determining transcendental function vis a vis immanence is merely philosophy. Consequently, whereas posited-as-presupposed through Decision, Laruelle will separateor dualyse the two moments of philosophical Decision, so that non-Decisional immanence is first presupposed -without being posited- in its radical autonomy as immanence, which is to say, as foreclosed to Decision, the better to be occasionally posited -without being determining but foreclosed transcendentally nevertheless presupposed- as a Decision. for philosophical condition Quine, Laruelle the Kant gesture of separates and unlike Accordingly, presupposition from immanence from that of position he time the separates as same at its transcendental effectuation. First, immanence is Decision foreclosure in its to (without-position) empty as utterly presupposed it form whether content, of predicative transparent, every and void of any and be empirical or ideal. It is presupposed as the minimally necessary than a rather for condition, empty thought, or as a negative precondition positive, ontologically sufficient is Which to or substantive state of affairs.

353 it is that say presupposed as foreclosed to the advent of ontological Decision concerning that which is or the way in which what is (i. e. foreclosed to the possibility of articulating the distinction between essence and existence). Second, and only by virtue of being presupposed as this necessary but nonimmanence is (without-presupposition) condition, sufficient posited on the basis for Decision, Only Decision. transcendentally of as necessary occasional be basis immanence Decision the posited of philosophical can occasional on become thereby transcendental and positively effectuated as a necessary as for Decisional thought. condition What are the consequences of this delicate procedure? The most important for our present purposes is that whereas the Decisional mixture of immanence's hybridises invariably conceptual position and presupposition it Laruelle to its definition with manages characterise ontological constitution, is `itself Immanence definition a foreclosed to constitution. as as well as definition for has instance or that need no simply radically autonomous constitution. Immanence `itself remains foreclosed to conceptual independent the therefore of symbolisation and ontological predication, and Decisional mixture of description and constitution. We might immanence invoking in that be to tempted say almost fact for that it the once it not `itself , Laruelle is defining were substantively,

354 immanence is thought in and by itself, it can no longer even be characterised as substantively immanent to itself. This is what separates Laruelle from Deleuze and Henry251: the conviction that once immanence has been purged of every residue of transcendence, it is no longer possible to say of it, as Deleuze and Henry do in their very different ways, that it's immanent to itself, because that `to' still maintains a modicum of reflexive folding, a doubling up, a residual intentionality252. If immanence is to be unconditional it must remain non-thetic: neither immanence `in' itself nor immanent `to' itself, but rather non-thetic-immanence 'itself. Moreover, it is through this intransitive `bracketing' or suspension of intentional relationality and reflexive doubling, that the non-thetic suspends the premise of unitary ontological consistency. Because the Laruellean invocation of immanence is no longer defined as an identity `to' something, immanence Identity it itself, becomes the to without of an not even is immanence Laruellean the the or radical unity. consistency and without One-in-One, the One-without-Being (l'Un-sans-l'Etre), rather than the l'Etre de (l'au-dela the One-beyond-Being or transcendence or absolute as Laruelle immanence Accordingly, the of what non-thetic epekeina tes ousias). 251Cf. immanence define Henry both Deleuze philosophically Whereas 2 3. Chapters and and supra, (Decisionally) as an absolute, Laruelle defines immanence non-philosophically (non-Decisionally) as the radical. 252 Cf. Laruelle 1995a,and supra, Chapter 3, pp.136-141.

355 `the One' calls or `the Real' becomes an index of radically singular but non- consistent Identity, an identity shorn of the presumption of ontological unity. And it is this suspension of thetic positing, of intentional correlation and transitivity, which the `non' in `non-thetic immanence' imparts to thought insofar as it begins to t?:in' T as aruelle puts it, according to, or on the basis immanence its of radical as real, yet non-ontological, presupposition. This has four very important consequences as far as our consideration of the relation between individuation, theory, and experience is concerned; consequences which we shall now proceed to elaborate on in turn. First consequence: immanence -which is to say, the radical hyle-, through its foreclosure to Decision, causes253the phenomenological World to distinguish itself as absolutely transcendent in relation to it, while it remains However, World's thetic transcendence. to that unilaterally without relation the latter provides the empirical occasion for a transcendental clone that hyle's duality between the the non-thetic unilateral articulates or exists as immanence and the thetic transcendence of the phenomenological realm. This transcendental clone is a non-thetic model of thetic transcendence. In other (or its has (non-intentional) immanence unicorrelate as words, non-thetic late, as Laruelle says) not the World of phenomenological transcendencebut

356 the radical, non-phenomenological of the Alien-subject; exteriority an unencompassable exteriority which exists as a fathomless well or abyss of non-thetic transcendence into which absolutely everything drops: subjectivity, objectivity, and all extant horizons of phenomenological disclosure. Yet we know it is this dimension of non-thetic transcendence, the Alien-subject as effectuation of the radical exteriority of the hyle's foreclosure to phenomenological Decision, which provides the vehicle for non-materialist thought. separating Thus, Alien-subjectivity the radical hyle is articulated qua as a unilateral phenomenon-in-itself duality from the distinction between phenomenological phenomenon and phenomenality. Of importance for here is in hyle's the the transcendental particular us way which for thought -a modelling contingently modelling or cloning as sine qua non by (practico )theoretical World's the transcendenceengenders a occasioned in immanent instance Thus, than subjectivation. of phenomenological-rather being transcendentally effectuated or cloned as Alien-subject, the radical hyle becomes the subject of transcendental theory according to its foreclosure to phenomenological consciousness and without becoming immanent `to' subjectivity or consciousness. 253 "Causes-only-in-the-last-instance"; i. e. according to a novel, non-metaphysical characterisation of the notion of cause as neither formal nor final, neither efficient nor material.

357 Consequently, from a Laruellean perspective, the radical exteriority through which the Alien-subject of non-phenomenological theory comes to be is constituted neither an empirical fact given `in' experience, nor a necessary for the givenness `of experience: it is a radically transcendental precondition and therefore exclusively phenomenological theoretical organon for the determination of experience; an organon devoid of every residue of determination intra-worldly phenomenological or experience. This last point is particularly crucial: the non-phenomenological does subject not `do' theory it if were already a pre-existing agency pragmatically engaged `in the as independently being instance for to theoretical the and of a world' prior its `being' is its is that theory, exclusively of articulation exhaustively world; theoretical, and it is nothing apart from that theoretical effectuation254.The is for Laruelle immanent Subject the articulation of only authentically in effectuated the structure of the transcendental clone suspending, modelling, is It World's the transcendence. thetic the and ultimately reconfiguring World as structure of phenomenological transcendence in toto that is now 'object': or support theoretical to the occasional merely a status of reduced for theory. material 254 Cf. Laruelle, 1999, pp. 146-147.

358 Second consequence: through this dimension of non-thetic transcendence which radical exteriority or constitutes the structure of theoretical Laruelle subjectivity, effects a transcendental dilation of the empirical realm; like Quine but for very different reasons, discontinues the one which, possibility of presupposing judgement, and experience a distinction phenomenological fact and essence, a posteriori between and a priori. In form the pure and empty emancipating of the transcendental, Laruelle extends the bounds of empiricity beyond the phenomenological parameters of what it's possible to define as empirical relative to a subject. Which is to say that becomes indifferently just rabbits and rabbit-parts, empirical: - not everything but the a priori criteria of individuation for rabbits and rabbit-parts. Once the has been Alien-subject the transcendental effectuated, viewpoint of rigorously `visionlatter's the then according to radically universalising perspective qua in-One', all phenomenologically rooted distinctions between proximity and expropriatory distance, or between a proprietary (so-called) concrete (so-called) transcendence immanence objective abstract a and subjective become completely invalidated. Everything is at once univocally concrete or indifferently immanence its in and non-thetic phenomenal equivalently is Which to in its say transcendence. non-thetic abstract or utterly excarnate that according to the Alien-subject's radically non-worldly theoretical

359 perspective, there's no distinction in phenomenal or perceptual status between being hit by a brick and constructing for Cantor's continuum a proof hypothesis. Envisaged according to radical immanence, `seen-in-One', or a bunny-rabbit has exactly the same phenomenal status as an axiom of set theory, and a particle accelerator has exactly the same phenomenal status as a toothache. Third consequence: a thinking operating on the basis of non-thetic immanence isn't about anything: it's non-intentional, intransitive. It is (as Beckett famously remarked apropos of Finnegan's Wake) that `something' itself. Because transcendental theory is Subject without being dependent on any empirically given instance of subjectivity, non-materialist thinking is in dependent intentional a conscious subject nor on an neither grounded includes Like Kant, Laruelle the subject of consciousness within the object. realm of empirically determinable objectivity. So Laruelle's non- depend does transcendental theory on a subject of not philosophical version of consciousness because it remains rooted in the foreclosure of radical immanence as the non-conscious cause that determines that theory-in-thelast-instance. Moreover, and by the same token, it has no intentional object basis those itself it because the a priori of occasional on either constitutes theories of objectivation -i. its function Decisionsas which e. philosophical

360 empirical material255, rather than relative to an already objectivated or determinate empirically phenomenological field. This is why it operates in an exclusively transcendental as opposed to phenomenological register: it relates to theories of objects rather than to objects themselves, the point being that from the viewpoint of radical immanence, the possibility of establishing a distinction between `objects' and `theories of objects' phenomenological becomes completely invalidated. That distinction is now supplanted by a transcendental Identity of phenomenological-object and objectivating-theory that is itself radically phenomenal (non-phenomenological) or non-thetically immanent in-the-last-instance. In this respect, Laruelle can be seen to be radicalising the combined Kantian and Quinean critiques of the idea that our experience is of things-inthemselves, defined independently of theoretical mediation. There are no pretheoretical experiences of rabbits-in-themselves, only an experience Laruelle in But another respect, constructed through theories of rabbithood. thing-in-itself: the reinstates vigorously for this is exactly what non-thetic defined being it how, have is. immanence We ceases once already seen thing-inthe it becomes to limiting redefine possible concept, privatively as a itself positively as an unconditionally 255 C£ Laruelle, 1996, pp. 32-34. immanent phenomenon, or as the

361 256. It is this philosophically oxymoronic definition phenomenon-in-itself =X of the Real that serves as the impetus for the Laruellean shift to a nonis that to takes register; philosophical say, one which conceptual accounts of objectivation themselves, rather than objects, as its empirical material. And it is radical immanence's unconditionally positive phenomenal transparency as the phenomenon-in-itself (which Laruelle also calls `the One' or `the Real'), kind defined the than of negatively noumenal opacity characteristically rather it but in-itself by the the to unknown philosophers, which makes of ascribed determining cause in accordance with which the Real qua phenomenonwithout-phenomenality be limitlessly redescribed using philosophical can theories of phenomenality index. This process of as a merely occasional business is theory. the of non-philosophical redescription Fourth consequence: the redescription at issue involves thinking the Identity -but an identity-without-unity- duality-withoutDuality and -but a distinction- of the Real qua phenomenon-in-itself or immanent cause of thought, and schema individuating Ideal or the objectivation phenomenological qua of by indexed the for the scattered portion of the spatio-temporal world Chapter supra, hyle definition the phenomenon-without-phenomenality, as radical of our earlier la Nonde Principes in 6, p. 293 and pp. 296-301. Laruelle himself makes this point explicitly but Philosophie: "The Real is rather like Kant's `thing-in-itself': unknowable and even unthinkable, (it is the by transcendence than foreclosed immanence by rather difference: is it a this constituted with kind; the vision-inthird the in of Other), cognition or One rather than the an experience and consists One." (Laruelle, ibid., p. 271). 256 Cf.

362 `Gavagai! ' or `Rabbit! ' occasioning occurrence. In other words, the nonphenomenological redescription of phenomenologically articulated cognition strives to construct a theoretical clone of the "Gavagai! " occasioning by producing the concurrent Identity (without-synthesis) and occurrence Duality (without-difference) of the latter's indeterminable reality "thing" individual as a pre- its or phenomenon-in-itself, and phenomenologically determinable ideality as individuated entity. Thus, the non-phenomenological to will strive articulated rabbithood of phenomenologically redescription liberate the or pre-individual rabbity-occurrence's non-ontological257 in its is the terms to of radically essence, non-thetic say, character, which immanent Identity (without-difference) but determinate (without-unity) transcendent Duality and radically proper to the rabbity-occurrence as simultaneity of a unobjectifiable reality and a phenomenologically is it In ideality. a question of determinable or objectivated other words, dualysing the hybridisation phenomenological individuating of duality in terms individuated a unilateral of phenomenon phenomenality and whereby an individual-without-individuation hylomorphic dyad of individuating now determines the form and individuated matter as the individual-withoutor matter-without-form, a of unidentity and unilaterality 257`Non-ontological' insofar as phenomenology tends to identify `being' qua `essence of

363 individuation, and a form-without-matter, or individuation-without- individual. It is Gilbert identified Simondon who, in his seminal work258, originally the fundamental circularity in all hylomorphic accounts of individuation. That circularity derives from their retroactive imposition of the individual back characteristics of constituted unity onto the pre-individual individuation. conditions of ontological Pre-individual being will never be conceptually conceived, Simondon argued, so long as the only available theoretical schema is that of the basically Kantian model according to which the unity of the concept is mirrored in the object and that of the object in the isomorphy level the thought thing the thereby and of at presupposing concept, he diagnosed individuation. However, Simondon the problem, not only of also suggested an alternative: "The individuation of the real external to the subject is grasped by the but in individuation the subject; of cognition subject thanks to the analogical it is through the individuation of cognition rather than through cognition individuation the that alone is beings those which are not subjects grasped. of but the known be the Beings can subject, through the cognition of 2. Chapter Cf supra, manifestation' with transcendental phenomenality. 258 Cf. Simondon, 1995.

364 individuation of beings can be grasped only through the individuation of the subject's cognition" (Simondon, 1995, p. 34) Thus, the only to way to grasp pre-individual singularity, Simondon is suggests, through the pre-individual singularisation of thought. Simondon's philosophical quest to articulate the conditions for a thought of pre-individual being provides us with a useful (albeit tangential as far as Laruelle himself is concerned) way of delineating some of the novel conceptual possibilities by non-phenomenological thought. The latter furnishes us with the opened up relevant methodological transfiguration apparatus required in order to effect the of transcendental cognition demanded for the successful former. What individuation the the theoretical realization of grasp of as preindividual ontological process demands is a suspension of phenomenological intuition, dissolution a hylomorphic intentional of synthesis of correlation, individual dualysis and a of the individuating phenomenon and function it is (insofar the temporalising of phenomenality as phenomenality Laruellean The individuates the temporal phenomenon). which singularises or discontinuing by transformation the all vestiges of relevant apparatus effects merely analogical individuated equivalence cognition phenomenological and correlation or representational individuated being, between individuated isomorphy as well between as all consciousness and

365 individuated phenomenon. This severance is to be effected through the medium of non-phenomenological cognition as articulation of unilateral duality rather than unitary synthesis between individuation Thus, by way of contrast to the unitary and individuated. intentional consistency of phenomenological adumbrations (Abschattung), this duality is effectuated in thought according to the radical inconsistency of the phenomenon `itself individual-without-individuation. an as And instead of phenomenologically presupposing the intuition or `perception' of the individuated phenomenon as encompassed within a unitary horizon of intentional adumbration, it is the phenomenological phenomenon as hylomorphic synthesis of individuated individuating phenomenon and phenomenologically phenomenality which is dualysed as a unencompassable unilateral duality, dispersive a in accordance with the phenomenon `itself as singularity, without-individuation. `itself qua individual- Thus, the inconsistent transparency of the phenomenon individual-without-individuation determines or dualyses individuated phenomena as identities-without-synthesis and dualities-withoutdifference. In this regard] In order to grasp let's consider once more the case of radical translation. the `Gavagai! ' occasioning occurrence without familiar in that the ostensive practises or presupposing alien shares our own

366 that it subscribes to our conventional criteria for individuation, we would have to become capable of accessing the `Gavagai! ' prompting event in its heterogeneity. This would entail achieving some pre-individuated ontological I kind of cognitive access to the -occurrence without presupposing a determinate individuating schema; in other words, accessing it as equally and simultaneously comprising rabbithood, rabbit-parts, rabbit-segments, and so feat Such a of cognitive redescription requires the effectuation of a nonon. intentional or non-unitary syntax -a unilateralising syntax or uni-tax- at the level of the non-phenomenological theory which takes the phenomenological hybridisation of individual and individuation its empirical material, the as better to extract from the latter the or unilateralised -occurrence's dispersive identity, its unidentity and unilaterality as phenomenon-in-itself: but transcendental the rabbit-part, nor neither rabbit-object nor rabbit-segment determinant, the non-individuated precondition, for these and all other rabbitindividuating indivi-dualisation Thus, the schemas. of non-phenomenological individual-without-individuation) (the its in cause accordance with cognition (the its dualysation support de-individuation in empirical of the or results rabbit-individuating schema) individuating phenomenon and as unilateral duality of individuated Non-phenomenological phenomenality. the theory ' grasps to non-materialistsay, which is LLIIi --occurrence in

367 its non-thetic universality theoretically determined independently of any and every empirically according to a mode of non-intuitive, phenomenality, a phenomenality or determined determinate modality of intuition perceptual or phenomenological manifestation. Moreover, if the invariant putatively or pseudo-transcendental parameters of phenomenological individuation remain entirely arbitrary and if there are as many possible modalities of immanent contingent, and phenomenalisation as there are possible transcendental redescriptions of individuation, it is because the indivisible immanence of the phenomenon `itself -the radical hyle- remains heterogeneous and phenomenologically individuation. potential modes of individuation, any given commensurate with a radically unencompassable manifold of That is to say, any given schema for phenomenological hybrid of individuated in dualysed be individuating accordance phenomenality, can phenomenon and with the Identity `itself qua the phenomenon of individual-without- individuation in a. limitless variety of mutually incommensurable ways, leading to an unencompassable manifold of alternative modes of

368 individuation is to say, of entification and phenomenalisation- each of -which them identical-in-the-last-instance with the individual `itself 259. To understand this notion of a transcendental phenomenalisation entails manifold of registers of making sense of Laruelle's conception of an immanent but theoretically malleable manifold of basically in-consistent Unfortunately, however suggestive, Laruelle's indications in this space-times. frustratingly regard are sketchy260. Nevertheless, in light of the foregoing account, there are a few positive claims we can make concerning the nature of this malleable, inconsistent space-time within which the non-thetic or preindividuated rabbit gaily capers and gambols. Given the immanence of the 'itself, phenomenon is its cause-in-the-last-instance, and given the which various phenomenological schemas of rabbit-individuation, its which are empirical support, a non-phenomenological modelling of `rabbithood' will from to the thetic schematisations strive extract or clone a non-thetic xenotype of the individuated rabbit-phenomenon which serve as its empirical support. The complex its this transcendental clone spans structure of xenotype as indivision immanent and unilaterality as radically unidentity as radically 259Cf. this be interesting the 6, 312-314. It Chapter to of status whether ask would pp. supra, transcendental manifold of modalities of phenomenalisation is to be regarded as potentially or actually infinite. To the best of our knowledge, Laruelle himself leaves the issue unresolved. In this regard, some kind of dialogue between Laruellean non-philosophy and Cantorian set-theory seems necessary. The latter would prove a fascinating albeit profoundly difficult enterprise. 260 See for instance the tantalising but inconclusive 210-214. 1992, in Laruelle, pp. remarks

369 transcendent division. Which is to say that the non-thetic or non- phenomenological essenceof the rabbit `itself spans its radical immanence as individual-without-individuation and individuation-without-individual. Thus, the rabbit xenotype comprises the pre-individuated phenomenal its radical transcendence or non-consistent essence of the rabbit's identity as simultaneously rabbit-part, as immanent rabbit-segment, Mwfy rabbithood, and so on. As a result, the -occurrence's non-thetic indexes its but xenotype singular pre-individuated nature as inconsistent Entity=x; immanent but theoretically a unobjectifiable phenomenal entity has been from the retentional and protentional syntheses of subtracted which temporal presentation, as well as from all intuitive forms of spatial presence. It is as coincidence of an identity-without-unity difference, of a singular -occurrence indivision constitutes duality-withoutand a and a universal division, that the dispersive singularity, neither a homogeneous in space nor continuous through time. In Theory Laruelle Identities261, of characterises this theoretical in Decisionally circumscribed spatio-temporal phenomena reconfiguration of in be is latter The fractalisation. to understood terms of a process of a priori terms of the proliferation discontinuous inconsistent, and mutually of 261 Cf. Laruelle, 1992, Part II, pp. 133-232

370 incommensurable phenomenalisations of the `same' occasional phenomenon: its reiterated `irregularisation' as determined by transcendentally homothetic a invariant rupturing the spatio-temporal consistency in accordance with which intentional consciousness continuously reinscribes phenomena within the horizon of a potential phenomenological unity262.Yet paradoxically, it is the phenomenon `itself phenomenological through its transparency, invariant which but conditions inconsistent this non- fractalisation. Accordingly, insofar as the severing of the bond between entity and unity is inseparable from the theoretical effectuation of the phenomenon's inconsistency as fractalising a priori, it is the latter's non-phenomenological inconsistency which guarantees the transcendental equivalence or universal translatability263 of all these mutually incommensurable instances of spatiotemporal phenomenalisation. Thus, it is as a direct consequence of the dimension of universality proper to non-intuitive phenomenality insofar as it Decisionally inconsistent immanence's that all univocity, radically effectuates 262 Cf. Laruelle, ibid, 263 The idea pp. 153- 232. languages for the translation of all philosophical of non-philosophy as universal medium into one another is a recurrent theme in Philosophie III. In Principes de la Non-Philosophie, for instance, Laruelle writes: "It is thus through this theoretical usage, through this transcendental theory basis this the being (these of languages total), on and and at once general of private philosophical be in terms translation language, posed can identity the that problem ofphilosophical of non-linguistic 'into-the-One-in-theis 'into' to languages say, one another, which of a translation of philosophical last-instance', rather than in terms of a translation between philosophies carried out under the Descartes, 'into' Kant of is Non translation this of philosophy ultimate authority of philosophy. Descartes 'into' Marx, of Marx 'into'Husserl, etc.; which is to say, under the condition of the vision-inOne as un-translatable Real. "(1996, p. 273) More recently, the topic of the non-philosophical

371 circumscribed spatio-temporal phenomena can be subjected to a process of theoretical fractalisation rendering them at once stringently individual and universally translatable. Consequently, and as we suggested earlier264, non-phenomenological theory could be said to function like a kind of transcendental prosthetic for conceptual cognition, emancipating it from the functional specificities of the human sensory apparatus and the constraints of empirical sensibility, the better to provide it with a rigorously theoretical mode of cognitive access to the authentically universal realm of pre-individual phenomena. Moreover, in providing this non-phenomenological amplification of cognition, a non- determined materialist axiomatic according to the radical hyle as Identity of the phenomenon `itself might for organon radical translation, be said to operate somewhat like a universal allowing creatures with otherwise utterly disparate sensory modalities and incommensurate individuation criteria to by communicate via a cognitive vocabulary shorn of all contamination empirically overdetermined phenomenological conceptual `indivi-dualisation' schemes. of Thus, phenomenality the non- through transcendental theory liberates the phenomenal target of cognition (e.g. the translation of philosophy has provided the theme for an unpublished conference paper entitled 'Translated From the Philosophical'. Cf. Laruelle, 2001. 264Cf. supra, Chapter 6, pp.305-308.

372 from its circumscription within the -occurrence) determinate basically a set of anthropocognitive empirical ambit of perceptual modalities. What then is a `non-rabbit'? It is the transcendental coincidence of an individual phenomenon that longer no presupposes an individuating logos, and an individuating matter that is no longer posited on the basis of an individuated concept. More it is the unilateral duality precisely, of an unobjectifiably immanent has that one phenomenon, not been posited by means of an individuating phenomenality, and a unobjectifiably transcendent phenomenality, one that has not been presupposed through an individuated phenomenon265.It is a xenotype: an unenvisageable, unfigurable yet radically immanent theoretical phenomenon. But what then is non-materialism that it is able to reconfigure the parameters of perception in so drastic fashion a as to allow for the apprehension of such phenomena? A transcendental adrenochrome266. 265Thus, immanence dualyses and the of unobjectifiable phenomenological amphiboly non-philosophy 89-92. 2, Chapter Cf. identified pp. earlier. supra, unobjectifiable transcendence 266'Adrenochrome': mythical hallucinogen, of reputedly terrifying potency, supposedly synthesized from the living body's pituitary gland. The aftermath of an adrenochrome binge is described in Hunter S. Thompson's Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas (London: Paladin, 1972): "The room looked like the foot The ten was mirror involving disastrous gorillas. and whiskey experiment site of some zoological with amok hanging ran but that attorney my when together afternoon evidence of shattered, still -bad floor bathroom ]The [... lightbulbs sixabout was hammer, the the the coconut all and mirror smashing inches deep with soap bars, vomit, and grapefruit rinds [... ]crude pornographic photos, ripped out of

373 In the next Chapter, we will materialism use Paul Churchland's eliminative as the basis for further exploration of the hallucinatory ramifications of non-materialist thought; specifically, the way in which the philosophically unprecedented degree of phenomenological plasticity it allows ultimately engenders a transcendental chaos of epistemic possibility. magazines like Whores of Sweden and Orgies in the Casbah[... ] were plastered on the broken mirror with smears of mustard that had dried to a hard yellow crust... and all these signs of violence, these strange red and blue bulbs and shards of broken glass embedded in the wall plaster... No, these were not the hoofprints of your average god-fearing junkie. It was too savage, too aggressive. There was evidence in this room of excessive consumption of almost every type of drug known to civilized man since A. D. 1544. It could only be explained as a montage, a sort of exaggerated medical exhibit, put together very carefully to show what might happen if twenty-two serious drug felons -each with a different addiction- were penned up together in the same room for five days and nights without relief. "(pp. 167-172).

374 CHAPTER 8 PHENOMENOLOGICAL PLASTICITY EPISTEMIC AND CHAOS "Our epistemic situation I assert, is one in which even the humblest judgement or assertion is always a speculative leap, not just in its assertion denial, but its background in framework the over in which also conceptual that judgement is constituted, in preference to the infinity of other conceptual frameworks that one might have used instead." (Churchland, 1989, p.278) The claim that there is no difference in kind between perceptual judgements and theoretical judgements plays a crucial role in Paul Churchland's eliminativist program. Bluntly put, Churchland's argument runs follows: as if one accepts the rigorously beings as a particularly human naturalistic conception of information processing sophisticated species of if there exists a univocal continuity, rather than a categorial system267,and divide, between so-called concrete perceptual immediacy and supposedly abstract conceptual mediation, then in principle the nothing precludes be basic transformed that or revised can capacities perceptual possibility our 267Among the human to are for Churchland's sapience approach naturalistic unrepentantly precursors figures such as Quine (1960), Smart (1963), Wiener (1967) and Sayre (1976). For a summary of the Quinean approach, cf. supra, Chapter 7, pp. 334-349.

375 simply by reconfiguring the conceptual frameworks within which they are nested. In other words, there is nothing intrinsically natural or necessary the world we perceive or the way in which we perceive it. Both about are ultimately theoretical constructs. The critique of perceptual immediacy (or sense-certainty, as Hegel it) is called certainly nothing new in philosophy. Where Churchland differs from philosophers like Hegel, Wittgenstein, or even Quine (by he has whom been influenced), is in rooting the mechanism of theoretical certainly firmly in the physical structure of the brain, rather than in selfmediation consciousness or sets of discursive practises. According to Churchland's neurocomputational physicalism, it is the brain, not the mind, which represents the world. And insofar as the brain is just one part of the physical world representing another, there are no differences in kind between the neurological representer, the neurocomputational representation and the input is different three electrochemical which represented: all are merely informational in homogeneous It transfer. moments a physical continuum of is because of this uninterrupted material continuity that, for Churchland, the brain itself comes to figure as an abstract theoretical mediator, an essentially Churchland's before informational But locus examining plastic processing. of

376 in favour arguments of phenomenological plasticity in greater detail, we need to recapitulate the basic premises of the eliminativist program. Eliminativism Folk Psychology and Eliminativism is routinely dismissed as a particularly virulent, wildly implausible brand of rabidly neurocentric reductionism. But contrary to popular prejudice, Churchland's reductionism does not entail the claim that cognitive structures are neurologically hard-wired. The driving idea behind Churchland's eliminativism is quite the reverse: almost all of the brain's cognitive capacities are learnt, and next to none of them are hard-wired. However, Churchland's is not a Humean `blank-slate' epistemological for he high-level the empiricism, readily acknowledges existence of certain epistemic invariants or neurocomputational metastructures ('ampliative information layers' he them) the processing coding as calls conditioning function; metastructural invariants whose functioning could be characterised as a priori low-level to the relative high-level Such synthesize268. input data they serve to structure and neurocomputational a prioris remain a for prerequisite sophisticated cognition. 268`For `connectionist' Processing' Distributed `Parallel [Churchland's or many reason then, this Humean According to Humean empiricism, we are concept empiricism. model of cognition-RB]is not a forever tied to immediately given peripheral sensory simples. According to connectionism, by contrast, limitations layers the of is to transcend the whole point of a hierarchy of ampliative coding precisely `look perspectival teeming It the and is noise to to try past' our peripheral sensory coding. idiosyncrasy of one's peripheral sensory input representations to the more stable and more predictive

377 Nevertheless, although deeply so embedded within the brain's neurological configuration as to count as nominal invariants, even these neurocomputational a prioris are acquired rather than innate. Which is to say that they have been gradually inculcated during the formative stages of the development by virtue of its continuous immersion in organism's a vast sociolinguisitic habitus; a conceptual habitus which has in turn been shaped long over stretches of socio-cultural evolution. Like Quine then269. Churchland maintains that there is merely a difference in degree rather than in kind between a priori and a posteriori, or between the abstract, metastructural invariants that condition the structures of information processing, and the structured or processed data themselves. And as a result, for Churchland, even those epistemic structures that seem most neurologically ingrained are the result of a complex process of exogenous conditioning exercised by a bewildering variety of factors and influences extending well beyond narrowly limits. factors include fluctuating These neurophysiological environmental forms' that lie beyond the mercurial sensory surface, stable forms that are always only partially and imperfectly reflected within that sensory surface, universal forms that might be differently but quite Plato ]I that in seeing with agree manifolds[... sensory successfully reflected variety of alternative a `abstract further is learning, I it first the that is the precisely and agree goal of past the ephemeral forms' that allow us to make any sense of the relentless flux of the ephemeral. The principal difference between me and Plato concerns the location of those forms (they are inside the head) and their genesis in deeply by the de course of process, sublinguistic they novo, a within us: are gradually sculpted 281-282) 1996, "(P. Churchland, M. interactions the pp. extended environment. with 269Cf. supra, Chapter 7, pp. 334-339.

378 conditions, changing socio-historical custom, and accelerating technological evolution. Accordingly, if the brain is a neurocomputer, Churchland maintains, then it is a flexible, massively parallel distributed processor, rather than the kind of chronically inflexible serial processor privileged by classical Al. The brain favoured by Churchland is that of a the model of complex, non-linear system; a neurological network capable of spontaneous self-regulation by tuning into new patterns of sophisticated cognitive discrimination without the benefit of prior programming; radically reconfiguring its own cognitive in parameters order to adapt to new input and unexpected circumstances. It is this capacity for spontaneous readjustment in the face of the unanticipated and the unforeseen which endows the human brain with its high degree of functional plasticity. Moreover, Churchland suggests, the brain's remarkable for capacity cognitive plasticity tends to be overlooked by philosophers who mistake neurocomputational expediency for neurological necessity, thereby be to the to severely underestimating extent which many of what are assumed basic features of consciousness are in fact a function of determinate varieties of neurocomputational processing; processes which -once have again- themselves been learnt. Thus, if consciousness is a neurocomputational its be take to then necessary conditions, phenomenon, what philosophers

379 constitutive features, or contingent invariable characteristics, may in fact be entirely properties, representing little more than a tiny fraction of the range of cognitive possibilities available to the human brain. Accordingly, if there are no invariable phenomenological facts about the world, Churchland continues, it's because underlying all such facts are just varying neurocomputational encodings of electrochemical information. This is the point at which Churchland most emphatically rejects the notion that natural language possessesany kind of uncircumventable epistemological linguistic hard-wired in brain270, Not the only are structures not status. language itself is neither a constitutive cognition. basic feature human of nor even a Language as a medium for social intercourse has engendered a humans in the themselves terms and world around theory understand of which them. That theory is folk psychology271. As a theory, folk psychology desires, beliefs, by quantifying over272propositional attitudes such as operates following Churchland Moreover, hopes, fears, intentions, argues, wishes, etc. Sellars273,not only did the theory's longstanding practical successas a social instrument for publicly predicting human and explaining communal behaviour precede its adoption in subjective self-description, thereby Lepore, by Fodor, others. and brand Chomskyan championed of cognitivism and the in Psychology' `Folk 271For folk-psychology cf. Churchland's of view of a canonical expression P.M. Churchland & P. S.Churchland, 1998, pp. 3-15. 270Pace Chomsky 272 Cf. 343. 7, Chapter p. supra,

380 its conditioning now automatic use in first-person introspection; it is this universal adoption of folk psychological discourse in subjective reports which, more than any other factor, has subsequently and illegitimately it endowed with, a quasi-sacrosanct status, lending it an aura of incorrigible authenticity which obscures its theoretical status and entirely conventional origin: "a spontaneous introspective judgement is just an instance of an habit of conceptual response to one's own internal states, and the acquired integrity of any particular response is always contingent on the integrity of the acquired conceptual framework Accordingly, (theory) in which the response is framed. introspective one's own certainty that one's mind is the seat of beliefs and desires may be as badly misplaced as was the classical man's dail " heavens flecked turns the Y. sphere of visual certainty that the stagy (Churchland, 1989, p. 3) As a result of folk psychology's socio-cultural institutionalisation, the laid hopes, fears, to intentions, desires, beliefs, claim etc., wishes, panoply of in introspective judgement, have -along with all the other phenomenological inviolable discoursefolk taken in aura an on psychological entities mobilized in that to claimed once similar a manner reality, objective of subjective and it Churchland Nevertheless, flatness suggests, behalf the the earth. of on of 273 Cf. Sellars, 1997.

381 be that conscious beings are the least well placed to may understand consciousness, that they have least access to information about the theoretically structured processes underlying perceptual immediacy; much in the same way in which, prior to the invention of the telescope, inhabitants of the earth's surface were the least well placed to appreciate either the true character of the earth's shape or the reality of astronomical motions. Consequently, Churchland argues, there are perfectly good scientific grounds for insisting that, just as the earth is not flat, denizens of folk psychological discourse such as beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., may not actually exist, and that as a result, folk psychology is an entirely false theory, and hence ripe for 274 elimination. A crucial nuance in Churchland's eliminativist argument needs to be introspective here. does deny Churchland accessper not privileged underlined beliefs, desires, be deny he does to the that and seat of not our minds seem se; intentions, or the authenticity of our phenomenological experience when we lay fears, hopes, Churchland claim to experiencing wishes, etc. is in in behaviourist the which perhaps way emphatically not a philosophical 274Churchland 1. folk-psychology: the for basic significant the three of elimination reasons cites incapable is folk for coherent a either theory providing of psychological which number of phenomena discovery, illness, damage, (brain artistic scientific mental prediction explanation or successful in the develop, its failure with accordance its to 2. or change theoretical stagnation, evolve, creativity); isolated increasingly its a 3. vis character anomalous and evolution; rapidly accelerating rate of cultural discourse irreducibility of the its to emerging the the conceptual natural sciences, corpus of vis cognitive neuroscience.

382 Quine is. What he does deny however is the putatively pre-theoretical immediacy attributed to such phenomenological experiences and to the introspective j udgemenis associated with them. In other words, it is not phenomenological seeming which he questions, but the reliability of that seeming as an evidential for guide gauging the actual cognitive processes through which that seeming is produced. Consequently, Churchland wishes to drive a critical phenomenological incorrigibility articulation wedge between the legitimate incorrigibility of experience qua authentic seeming, and the pseudo- folk in the trappings the theoretical of psychological used description and of those processes through which that is is The eliminativist's contention that phenomenological seeming produced. folk psychology's cultural enshrinement, its unrivalled social investiture as has human for descriptive the privileged sapience accounts of medium used intrinsically for in theoretical an construct mistaking an artificial resulted By feature explicitly of all possible phenomenological experience. necessary discourse folk as a theoretical psychological character of underlining the socially enforced construct, eliminativism both the to undermine seeks has folk theory infrastructure linguistic a that the psychological of assumption it is the that proprietary entitlement to characterisations of consciousness; and only possible medium for phenomenological description: "Our self-

383 understanding, I continue to maintain, is no different in character from our understanding of any other empirical domain. It is speculative, systematic, corrigible, and in principle replaceable. It is just not so specifically linguistic have as we chronically assumed."(Churchland, ibid., p. 112) Neurocomputational Plasticity Thus, Churchland proposes to replace the dominant folk psychological theory of sapience, according to which consciousness is seen as an intrinsically linguistic medium structured through the `sentential dance' of propositional attitudes, with a new theoretical model drawing on the resources of connectionist neuroscience, in which cognition is understood in terms of resolutely non-linguistic patterns of neuronal vector activation275 According to this new paradigm, the internal kinematics of cognition find in expression activation patterns across populations of neurons, rather than in sententially articulated propositional cognition in reside vector-to-vector attitudes, while the dynamics of transformations driven by learned inferences in deductive than configurations of synaptic connection, rather from by logical governed entailment one sentential structure to relations of is brain's basic So the activation the another. unit of representation while 275For in 41-42 in pp. neuroscience cf. particularly a useful precis of the vector activation paradigm Paul Churchland's, `Activation Vectors vs. Propositional Attitudes: How the brain represents reality' in P.M. Churchland & P. S.Churchland, 1998, pp. 39-44,

384 its fundamental vector, computational operation is the vector-to-vector transformation, as performed on those configurations of neuronal activation. Crucially, according to this paradigm, a `theory' is no longer to be linguaformal system of propositional attitudes connected to understood as a by logical is longer linguistically It relations a of entailment. no one another judgements beliefs is `such the that case' or and such encoded structure of that `if x then y' articulated within the sentential parameters of propositional ascription. attitude neurocomputational A `theory' configuration it is a determinate partitioning manifold of reiterated is now a network brain's or specific in vector activation space. More precisely, into brain's a vector activation space of a typically to divisions relative sub-divisions and protoLypicai inputs. Interestingly, according to this neurocomputational there that a exists the presumption theoretical cognition, reduction of theory individual between kind a in and difference concept an significant space just vector both of partitions be prototypical are abandoned: must degree (concept) lesser substructural of (theory) or endowed with a greater complexity276. Consequently, Churchland continues, that concepts/theories distinct the sheer quantity of to is according brain human embodying of capable the

385 this neurocomputational paradigm will be gargantuan: "If we assume that the human brain is a multilayered network of interconnected units, we can uniquely specify its current position in conceptual space by specifying the individual strengths or weights of its myriad synaptic connections[ ..]That configuration of weights can be directly represented by a specific point in a multidimensional space, a space with a distinct axis in each of the brain's 1014 synaptic connections[. ]For .. human brain, therefore, this `weight a space', as it is called, will havefully 1014dimensions with at least 10 possible Its positions along each. volume is almost unimaginably vast functionally distinct positions 101014 least -at [i. e. 10 to the power of 100,000,000,000,000 distinct concepts/theories-RB]" (Churchland, ibid., 1989, pp. 231-232)277 However, it is important not to conflate weight space with vector space. While the weight configuration 276"This determines the partitioning of uniquely footing: does the theories concepts and entire on same a theory is just a account put single highly structured prototype"(P. M. Churchland, 1998, p.283) 277Interestingly, this `unimaginably basis fact. For is the the of empirical made purely on suggestion vast' space of conceptual possibility referred to above is defined by Churchland in conformity with the physical structure of the brain and on the basis of the range of individually specifiable synaptic configurations -i. e. distinct patterns of neuronal vector activation or individual representationsavailable within the finite parameters of human neurophysiology. So while it is certainly true that there may be some fundamental physical constraints delimiting the range of possible perceptual experience for humans, nevertheless, Churchland insists, even within the bounds of those physical limitations (e. information is the human in to ear's the g. the able process organism which constraining manner limited auditory range, the eye's limited capacity for registering electromagnetic radiation, etc.), that further this Moreover, augmenting obtains. vast space of as yet unexplored conceptual possibility have to fact human is huge continue will that the and modalities sensory already space of possibility intervention. technological undergo profound physical modification and amplification as a result of Thus, even those basic constraints which organic structure imposes upon our processing of physical information are neither definitive nor irrevocable.

386 vector space, only the latter, Churchland reminds us, is to be identified with the theory or conceptual scheme in terms of which the brain "People world: react to the world in similar ways represents the because their not underlying weight configurations are closely similar on a synapse-by-synapse but because their activation spaces are similarly comparison, partitioned. Like trees similar in their gross physical profile, brains can be similar in their functional gross profiles being highly idiosyncratic in the myriad while details of their fine grained arborisation"(Churchland, 1989, p.234). Thus, it is by acquiring a determinate configuration in synaptic weight space that a brain comes to achieve a specific prototypical partitioning of its vector it is And this partitioning activation space. of vector space, rather than that is index for the configuration of synaptic weights, which neurocomputational the theory in terms of which the brain representsthe physical world. Moreover, since, for Churchland, a theory simply is a specific partitioning incoming sensory stimuli of vector activation space, and since all are afferently processed through a specific configuration of vector coding, there can be no difference in kind between the perceptual processing of boundaries the information the organism via of physical going on at sensory the nervous system's afferent nerve endings, and the conceptual processing of depths in the information the cerebral of going on symbolically encoded

387 cortex via the same nervous system's `higher' cognitive functions. Perception and conception are neurocomputationally continuous; which is to say that they run seamlessly into one another, conjoined through the univocal informational continuum linking electro-chemical stimuli to neurocomputational processing278. But if sensory perception is on a par with theoretical conception, it follows that the parameters of perceptual sensitivity will be supervenient on the discriminatory prowesses of our neurologically embodied theoretical frameworks279. Consequently, not only is all observation theory-laden; it is constitutively theoretical; so much so that a change of neurocomputational theory transfigures the parameters of our perceptual capacities along with those of our cognitive frameworks. Thus, Churchland maintains, we can by framework the theoretical the change what we perceive changing e. -i. prototypical partitioning determines that the of our vector activation space- information; in such manner which our nervous systems process perceptual basis it individuates for instance, the of rabbits or undetached on as, whether 278"The is in the the at the absolute sensory role play no weights need where network only place for input into is transduced vector a coded periphery of the system, where the external stimulus first However, layers delivery the occasion on which transforming to the at of weights. subsequent is it downstream through have a the system, these preconceptual cognitive on effect at all any states that produces one set of partitions on changeable configuration of synaptic weights, a configuration layers the the activation-vector of neurons, one set out of millions of alternative relevant space of it is happens input that first gets the In to that signal thing possible sets. other words, the very 189). 1989, " (Churchland, different in p. possible ways. conceptualised one of many

388 rabbit-parts280. In other words, far Churchland is concerned. as as phenomenology is a function of neurophysiology. Accordingly, concomitant with the brain's almost inconceivable neurocomputational density is an extreme phenomenological plasticity. Just domain the as of cognitive possibility is no longer coextensive with the linguaformal narrowly ambit of sentential structure and propositional form, the realm of phenomenological possibility is no longer necessarily fixed once for in and all conformity with the morphological specificities of the organism. Thus, contra Fodor, Churchland insists that perceptual processing is not physiologically is immutably to encapsulated, which say, specified and insulated from theoretical penetration281. Apparently incommensurable be function to as an analogue of the other: the made perceptual modalities can physiological modalities of perception are neurocomputationally continuous; that is, fluid and endlessly transformable: "In recent centuries most humans have learnt to perceive speech not just auditorally but visually: we have learned to read. And some have learned to perceive speech by touch. they but hear it., have learned just to And Braille. to see music, not some of us read Now, the the have learned nor eyes to neither sight read musical notation. we is brain 279Specifically, discrimination the that fine-grained perceptual on the range and degree of its space. activation in vector the of partitioning prototypical with conformity capable of effecting 280 Cf. 340-348. Chapter 7, pp. supra, 281 Cf. Churchland, 1989, pp. 255-279.

389 fingers were evolved for the instantaneous perception of those complex structures and organizations originally found in auditory phenomena, but their acquired mastery here illustrates the highly sophisticated and decidedly supernormal capacities that learning can produce in them. And if these capacities, why not others? "(Ibid, p.265)282 Accordingly, not only does the neurocomputational perspective lead to an appreciation of the constitutively theoretical character of perceptual immediacy and insight into those neurocomputational processes through which phenomenological `seeming' is produced. It also describes the ways in which `seeming' be theoretically perceptual can neurocomputational manipulated through intervention, and thus how, by amplifying the human organism's perceptual capacities via technological prostheses, the parameters become be that we reconfigured so of our phenomenological seeming can phenomenological begin become "we to such mutants or perceptual aliens: by [... J augmenting when we change our sensory modalities mutants or aliens deep-sky instruments, them with unusual such as phase-contrast microscopes, forth. And the long-baseline infrared so and telescopes, scopes, stereoscopes, 282 Churchland's thesis be between interpenetration' seen as `diachronic could perceptual modalities of `transcendental' Repetition the or in Difference Deleuze for called and what an empirical analogue `discordant' use of the faculties: "The transcendental operation of the faculties is a properly In consequence, the sense. a common to their of rule under exercise paradoxical operation, opposed harmony, discordant form each in since faculties the harmony between a of the the only appear can its difference its it and own with the confronts the which to violence only other communicates

390 metamorphosis is complete when, after years of professional practise, we learn to see the world appropriately and efficiently with these new senses. This learning requires both that we suppress certain habits of processing `natural ' to the naked eye and to the familiar world of middle-sized material objects, and that we learn to process the retinal data in novel ways, ways that are appropriate to the unfamiliar features one perceives by these novel means (e.g. interference patterns, diffraction rings, dark nebulae, fusion planes, temperature gradients, etc.). "(Ibid., p. 259) Vector Coding: From Superempirical Transcendental Virtue to A Priori Nevertheless, in spite of appearances, a transcendental dimension is in Churchland's also operative seemingly wholly empirical or naturalistic it is is how To the this necessary to case, understand modus operandi. between Churchland's two-tiered the vector activation relation appreciate is intended it folk to linguaformal the accounts or psychological paradigm and displace. On the one hand, : hurchland explicitly or empirically posits the the the grounds of what on model activation vector explanatory excellence of he calls its `superempirical virtues' (conceptual simplicity, explanatory unity, faculty from to is one ]There is divergence from the others[... communicated therefore something which 145-146). 1994, "(Deleuze, form pp. does a common sense. the other but it is metamorphosed and not

391 theoretical cohesiveness). On the other, that excellence is implicitly or metaphysically a presupposed as though its function were that of transcendental a priori. Thus, although Churchland's PDP (parallel distributed processing) model of cognition remains explicitly representational -with propositional being attitudes representation supplanted by it vectors- is one wherein longer no operates under the normative aegis of truth-as- activation correspondence. In lieu of truth, Churchland proposes to discriminate between theories on the basis of what he calls the `super-empirical' virtues of ontological simplicity, conceptual coherence, and explanatory power: "As I it see then, values such as ontological simplicity, coherence and explanatory brain's basic for the are among power most criteria recognizing information, for distinguishing information from noise"(Ibid., 147)283. But p. as a result, Churchland is obliged to ascribe degrees of neurocomputational adequation between representation and represented without reintroducing a substantive difference between true Churchland's 283 "Ceteris false kinds of and by For representation. is lights, to say, there are no substantive, which own better it is if [i. is part of the most unified e. an explanation] paribus, an activated prototype have formed ]networks the simplest or most unified partitions across that conceptual configuration[... knowledge better to novel cases. do their that their activation space are networks at generalising much have because for they Very briefly, they do better at recognising novel situations what they are in the subvolume same that cases novel will catch gradient similarity unified generated a relevantly that catches the training case."(P. M. Churchland, 1998, p. 286)

392 ontological, differences between theories: all theories, including folk psychology, consist in a specific partitioning of a brain's vector activation Yet there is a noticeable tension between Churchland's insistence space284. that theories are to be discriminated between solely on the basis of differences in degree of superempirical virtue, rather than in representational kind, and his conviction that the PDP paradigm which reveals this underlying neurocomputational univocity common to all representations exhibits such an in folk degree the realm of psychology of superiority vis a vis elevated latter's As the the to a result, elimination. as necessitate virtue superempirical it is between for that the entirely a matter claim eliminativism oscillates case to the to that the a priori point seem argument and of empirical expediency285, PDP invoking by folk the paradigm's psychology necessity of eliminating intrinsically eliminativism's metaphysical superiority. metaphysical avowals presumptions, of empirical It is humility this tension its and between unavowable in to greater examine which we now propose detail. like any other theory, is a family of learned vectorial prototypes, prototypes ongoing of future manipulation and reality, that sustain recognition of current reality, anticipation of 15) 1998, Churchland, (P. M. p. reality" issues fail to reduce are empirical 285 "Whether FP [folk-psychology]is false and whether it will from development, not theoretical from flow and research experimental whose decisive settlement must 10) 1998, Churchland, M. (P. p. any arguments a priori" 284 "FP [folk-psychology],

393 Thus, on the one hand, since such `folk-semantical' `truth' notions as those of `reference'286 and no longer function as guarantors of adequation between `representation' and `reality', as they did in the predominantly folk linguaformal psychological or acceptation of theoretical adequation -which latter the sees as consisting in a set of word-world correspondences-,there is an important sense in which all theoretical paradigms are neurocomputationally equal. They are equal insofar as there is nothing in a configuration of synaptic weights or a partitioning of vector space per se is `better' to theory than another. All are could serve which explain why one to be gauged superempirical exclusively virtues; in terms viz. according of what Churchland calls their to the greater or lesser degree of its they to to the adapt successfully enable organism efficiency with which environment. In other words, if all `theories' are instances of vector activation, and if the vector activation paradigm -to which all other theoretical paradigms Churchlandto reduce according `truth', then we are obliged dispenses with the notion of theoretical to judged be theories that stipulate is Reference integrity. uniquely 'reference' is real any without of notion is because there by no by belief, else, fixed neither by networks of anything nor relations, causal nor fashion like the in descriptive the to anything term world that each connects single uniform relation 276-277) 1989, (Churchland, pp. that common sense supposes" 286 "[... ]the folk-semantical

394 pragmatically287 in terms of the greater or lesser degree of adaptational efficiency with which they enable the organism to flourish. Thus, Churchland is perfectly explicit in explaining why he considers the vector activation paradigm of cognition to be `better' than its folk psychological rivals, and his neurocomputational pragmatism proposes a perfectly precise formula for gauging theoretical excellence. Global excellence of theory is measured by straightforwardly pragmatic virtues: maximal explanatory cohesiveness vis a vis maximal empirical heterogeneity purchased with minimal conceptual One theory is `better' than another when it affords greater expenditure. theoretical cohesiveness along with greater explanatory unity whilst using fewer conceptual means to synthesize a wider assortment of data. But the trouble for Churchland is that it remains deeply unclear in precisely what way the extent of an organism's adaptational efficiency, as by the revealed degree to which its representation of the world exhibits the be `read superempirical virtues of simplicity, unity, and coherence, could ever its brain's In what senseprecisely are off neurocomputational microstructure. theoretical virtues such as simplicity, 287"[... ]if unity, and coherence necessarily I think we must the activity, as aim or product of cognitive we are to reconsider from ]That the board[... is, if to more its the away move we are right across reconsider applicability direction than in formulations the rather pragmatism of naive of scientific realism, we should move the from far is Jit the principal is truth or that instrumentalism[... primary either obvious positivistic finely be tuned function the Rather, to its [cognitive] more ever would appear product of activity. " 149-150). (Ibid., behaviour. the p. organism's administration of truth

395 concomitant at the neurological level with an organism's reproductively behaviour? Churchland simply states that the aforementioned advantageous virtues are already a constitutive feature of the brain's functional architecture in the way of argument regarding how and why it is without offering anything that a neural network's learned configuration in synaptic weight space is constrained as a matter of neurocomputational necessity by the imperatives of unity, cohesion and simplicity288. Perhaps Churchland's reticence in this is in For a matter of caution. regard order to make a case for the neurocomputational necessity of superempirical virtue, Churchland would latter information demonstrate indeed theoretic to that the are strictly need intrinsic to the vector coding process, as opposed to extrinsic constraints in imposed the the course network on regulatory considerations contingently interaction its ongoing of particular line of in However, the pursuing this environment. with Churchland argument, immediately finds himself between two peculiarly unappealing alternatives. a choice with confronted The first alternative follows inescapably from the fact that, by Churchland's own admission, the process of informational transduction via by demarcated the is incoming brain physically stimuli processes which the 288Indeed, Churchland frequently adduces empirical data that would seem to imply the opposite: viz. his discussion of the ways in which a network can stop learning by becoming trapped within a merely local minimum in its global error gradient. Cf. Churchland, 1989, pp. 192-194

396 boundaries of the organism289.Beyond those boundaries lies `information-initself . Thus, if Churchland tries to integrate the superempirical into virtues the neurocomputational process by pushing the brain's vector coding activity beyond the physical boundaries of the organism so that they become out features constitutive of the world, he is forced into the uncomfortable position having of to claim that the physical world is neurocomputationally is The result constituted. a neurocomputational transcendentalism: the brain but be by in because the the world cannot conditioned represents world return the latter will `always already' have been neurocomputationally represented. We end up with a thoroughgoing neurocomputational idealism whereby the brain constitutes the physical world without it being possible to explain either how the brain comes to be part of the world, or even indeed how the world brain. have the originally produced could Alternatively, instead of trying to achieve a neurocomputational brain's by the coding vector the projecting virtues superempirical of reduction Churchland the an of notion abjure the can world, environing activity out onto information-in-itself between boundary absolute physical and as already in the to allow brain's by order the prototypical vector partitions coded brain, `into' thereby pre-constituted a the allowing to reach physical world 289 Cf. 387. 278, footnote p. supra,

397 physical reality to play an intrinsic role in neurological activity. But in widening the focus of his epistemological vision in this way, Churchland will be obliged to abandon the representationalist dualism of brain and world and to forsake his deliberately neurocentric perspective in order to adopt a more global or meta-neurological -which is to say, meta-physical- vision of in materialism; one which `materiality' is endowed with a far greater degree independent functional Clearly however, of abstract, substrate univocity. with the shift to a non-representationalist materialism and the abstract, functional definition of `matter' as that which is capable of encompassing a heterogeneous variety of incommensurable physical processes,the categorical distinction between processor and processed, network and world, becomes lies heart distinction is Since the that this the at of very entirely redundant. Churchland's commitment to neurological reductionism, and the one that Churchland for his eliminativism, we cannot expect arguments underwrites all first. the than find this second alternative any more appealing to Thus, Churchland cannot effect a neurocomputational reduction of he idealism, and a neurological engendering without virtue superempirical into brain the of realm wider the neurocomputational cannot reintegrate superempirical virtue without abandoning eliminativism altogether. former two these the for of Nevertheless, let us, the sake of argument, put

398 difficulties manage a for the moment and suppose that Churchland were to aside successful but non-idealising neurocomputational reduction of superempirical virtue. The trouble then is that in arguing that simplicity, unity and coherence are constitutive functional features of the brain's Churchland is but from one slippery step away claiming that neuroanatomy, brains represent the world correctly as a matter of evolutionary necessity; i. e. is have `true' Unfortunately, this they that representations. necessarily "Natural had Churchland to that the abjure: sworn sort of claim precisely beliefs, has brain does true towards tends so or not care whether a selection long as the organism behaviour"(Churchland, reliably exhibits reproductively advantageous 1989, p. 150) Consequently, everything hinges on whether the superempirical virtues are a precondition by-product of the organism's reproductively or a former, on the basis of what implies the Churchland behaviour. advantageous idealism, all brand whereas latent be of neurocomputational a appears to latter, the to to (i. point seems evidence290 evolutionary) e. available empirical less less representationalist stridently hence towards neurocentric, a and latter, that the successful From the of perspective version of materialism. a as characteristics these indeed do to superempirical tend exhibit networks

399 matter of empirical fact is uncontroversial; but it is a fact about cognitive ethology, which is to say, a fact which makes sense only within the macrophysical purview of evolutionary biology and in the context of the between relation organism and environment; rather than fact a obtaining within the microphysical or purely information theoretic ambit of the brain's neurocomputatio nal anatomy. That the macrophysical fact has a microphysical analogue, that the ethological imperative is neurologically is precisely what we might expect having suspended the premise of encoded, an absolute representational cleavage between the micro- and macro-physical dimensions, and accepted the extent to which these must remain not only but bound by together physically conterminous, reciprocal presupposition. Thus, considered by itself, the neurocomputational encoding of superempirical virtue Churchland's account neurocomputational Churchland. For to not enough vindicate is is idealist the predicated on representation is the premise that necessary precondition for determines-in-the-lastfunction that neurocomputational adaptational success, instance evolutionary ethology, whereas it seems to be adaptation which in Consequently, the some of absence and efficacy. grounds representational facts to how to pertaining macrophysical non question-begging account as 290Monod, 1974; Kauffman, 1993,1995; and Dennett, 1995, all provide instances of such supporting

400 evolutionary ethology are ultimately supervenient on microphysical facts brain's functional the about neuroanatomy, it seems that the superempirical Churchland invokes in order to discriminate between theories virtues remain extra-neurological characteristics; characteristics which must reveal themselves only in the course of an ethological analysis of the organism's behaviour cognitive within the world, rather than via a neurological analysis brain's the microstructure. of Accordingly, the tension between eliminativism's avowals of humility its latent empirical and metaphysical pretensions reveals itself when it becomes apparent that the pragmatic or superempirical virtues in terms of between be discriminate Churchland theories to cannot proposes which in for They terms. seem to exceed exclusively neurocomputational accounted in it is And trying the the neurocentric remit of neurocomputational economy. from drift begins Churchland to them that to accommodate away unwittingly the rigidly for the naturalistic rationale empirical premises that provide eliminativism towards a metaphysical stance wherein the vector coding begins transcendental the to take a priori. a of characteristics on all paradigm As a result, the tenor of the argument for the elimination of folk psychology imperative. from to that that of empirical assessment of metaphysical shifts not and efficacy, that representational On the take grounds adaptation the whole, we claim evidence.

401 For presumably, were Churchland in correct maintaining that the superempirical virtues of ontological simplicity, conceptual coherence, and explanatory power are, as he puts it, "among the brain 's most basic criteria for recognizing information, for distinguishing information from noise", then framework baroque, incoherent a conceptual as as and as obfuscatory as folk is psychology supposed to be would have been eliminated as a matter of evolutionary routine, and Churchland would be spared the trouble of militating brilliantly so for its displacement. If superempirical virtues were already endogenously intrinsic specified and to the brain's it be then neurocomputational microstructure, would presumably a matter of neurophysiological wholly impossibility for an organism to embody any theory lacking in these virtues. Paradoxically, it is the eliminativist's former intrinsically in brain's that the the are supposition encoded cognitive for degree the the that extent ends up considerably narrowing microstructure between distinction theories and ultimately undermining the of superempirical Churchland's folk Thus, the although psychology. strength of case against trenchant critique of philosophies which insist on transcendentalising folk psychology as an epistemological sine qua non strikes us as entirely folk it, is fear that, whatever else psychology wrong with admirable, we the reverse, to be reasonably uncontroversial.

402 be cannot as chronically deficient in the superempirical virtues as Churchland in order to render the argument for its elimination requires incontrovertible; deficient certainly not enough to explain why eliminativism insists on dramatic degree such a ascribing of superempirical superiority to the vector activation paradigm. Thus, even as it continues to insist that all theories are inasmuch display lesser degrees neurocomputationally equal as all greater or distinction, insinuates that the vector coding eliminativism of superempirical is nevertheless more equal, more pragmatic, more superempirically paradigm What folk than of cognition. psychological paradigms all previous virtuous Churchland Given to that to this seems superiority? claim radical underlies Quine's accept by theories that thesis empirical are underdetermined held be the the vector activation paradigm cannot of superiority evidence291, it in increase the in efficiency with which to reside any precisely quantifiable For information. to human to according the process organism enables Churchland, there can be no absolute -which is to say, theory neutral- measure of superiority when degree the of adaptational we compare efficiency By incorporate. transforming by they theories the bestowed upon organisms as the goalposts theory empirical it data to moves the explain, every purports 291Cf. for example Churchland, 1989, pp. 139-151.

403 far as adaptational efficiency is concerned292.Thus, it is perfectly possible to envisage the possibility `subtler', of or more `refined' versions of folk psychological theory discriminatory capacities, endowing organisms conceptual with all the enhancements and additional explanatory advantages of the PDP paradigm favoured by Churchland293. But if this is this case, it suggests that, for Churchland, the putative superiority of the vector activation paradigm is `meta-empirical' in a sense is more than pragmatic and quite irreducible to those super-empirical which in Churchland discerns terms theoretical excellence: a sense of which virtues is transcendentally a priori which and meta-physical rather than merely holds is Churchland PDP Which to that the say paradigm as super-empirical. irrecusably superior to all available linguaformal alternatives simply because he implicitly furnishing it is that a genuinely capable of alone supposes universal explanation of cognition, one which metaphysically encompasses but instances the Thus, theories activation; of vector are equally all all others. 292Thus, Churchland invokes Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity to underline the extent to which describing the observable bring "new theories often them a novel and proprietary vocabularyfor with displace vocabulary" the observational old that even or augment can world, a vocabulary (P.M. Churchland, 1998, p. 18) 293Churchland himself frequently uses the argument that Ptolemaic astronomy could have happily by data epicycle virtual piling `explaining' astronomical and accommodating recalcitrant continued 767. 1999, Churchland, instance, for Cf. p. upon virtual epicycle.

404 vector activation theory of vector activation is more equal because it is revealed as the properly transcendental precondition for all the others294. Accordingly, the PDP paradigm is at once the latest in historically a embedded empirical sequence; and the latent precondition for a rigorously a priori explanatory account of the veritable character of the succession of paradigms encompassed in that sequence. The vector activation paradigm is the universal prototype of which all other models of cognition are merely instantiations. In Hegelese, we might say that the latter are instances of vector coding in themselves, but not yet in and for themselves. For Churchland he has found the veritable material instantiation of what that explicitly claims Kuhn called a `paradigm'295: this is precisely what a network's prototypical partitioning of vector activation space is. And we should also bear in mind that a paradigm in Kuhn's sense -just as in Churchland's meta-physically transformed sense- is more than just an empirical datum; it is a quasitranscendental faktum296.Thus, a network's prototypical vector configuration is at once an empirical fact, and the precondition for anything's coming to defines it is fact, for that a priori the parameters which count as an empirical 294Perhaps the is the additionally neurocomputational paradigm properly transcendental potency of language in than loosely be it fact by rather to that the natural clothed continues compromised stringently encoded in vector algebraic dress. 295Cf. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure Press, Chicago University Chicago: Revolutions, Scientific of of 1962, and Churchland, 1989, p. 191.

405 for all judgement. perceptual neurocomputational In words, Churchland's like operates an empirico- other paradigm of cognition transcendental doublet: it is at once given empirically as an intra-historical datum; but also, and in the very same gesture, posited as an a priori, supra- historical faktum which furnishes us with the genuinely universal explanatory for precondition our ability to recognise and explain that historical sequence for of paradigm shifts what they were: changing configurations in synaptic Which is to say that, in spite of its considerable intraweight-space. philosophical radicality, eliminativism is ultimately instance an of like Decision philosophical any other. Epistemic Engines and the Transcendental Function We have seen that there is an entirely positive or constructive dimension to Churchland's eliminativist program, one that describes how `phenomenological mutation' can be effected technologically, through the use What individual level the the we wish organism. of of empirical prostheses at to focus on now is the possibility of radicalising and generalising this if it What by theory. way of non-materialist particular aspect of eliminativism were possible to effect a more rigorously universal instance of level by Churchland the of at that than envisaged phenomenological mutation 296For dyad faktum/datum the as an account of Decision, cf. intrinsic to the structure of philosophical

406 the individual brain? A global as opposed to empirico-regional phenomenological mutation would have to be effectuated by intervening directly at the transcendental level of the philosophical Decision via which Churchland chooses to subordinate folk psychology to his own neurocomputational perspective. Where the eliminativist Decision empirically informational the presupposes and metaphysically posits continuum whereby neurocomputational non-materialism determines conception phenomenological perception, proposes to radicalise and generalise eliminativism by discontinuous is to transcendental, and nonsay, radically which cloning a neurocomputational determinant for phenomenology at the global or its hybrid Churchland's level as transindividual neurophenomenological using be determinant the transcendental That call shall we we what will occasion. function. Thus, what we wish to propose is a non-materialist universalisation of the materialist paradigm terms of information in that views the phenomenon of sapience primarily final focus the do To chapter this on will we processing. Mind, Plasticity Realism Scientific the of 1979 Churchland's and work of be is to for a supposed the Churchland what rudiments sets out wherein universal -which is to say, non-neurocentric or substrate-independent- 218-223. 5, Chapter pp. supra,

407 definition of cognitive activity. By examining Churchland's naturalised hope to effect a non-materialist we version of epistemic universality, radicalisation/generalisation of the information-processing paradigm in terms of which materialism proposes to define cognition. 1. The natural science of epistemic engines The challenge for a rigorously articulating a universally valid naturalistic materialism lies in model of epistemic activity free of anthropomorphic parochialism. But `universally valid' is just a euphemism for `normative', and philosophical orthodoxy stipulates that it is precisely the (universally necessary) characteristics of cognitive activity that normative idea be for Accordingly, the of a normative accounted naturalistically. cannot be How to oxymoronic. yet rigorously naturalistic epistemology would seem then is the claim to universal epistemic validity to be accommodated within a framework? purely naturalistic In Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Churchland offers as a provocative itself that science response the suggestion is capable of for notion a the constructing resources necessary with providing philosophy of epistemic philosophers 297We have Thus, like naturalistically minded before him297, Churchland approaches cognition via the normativity. other Dennett. Sayre Wiener, Smart, Quine, and figures such as already named

408 mobilisation of a conceptual vocabulary drawn from information theory because he believes the latter provides the resources for a rigorously naturalistic yet universally valid or normative paradigm of sapience298.That is vocabulary attractive because it operates at a level manages to circumvent anthropocentric prejudices of abstraction which about supposedly necessary and sufficient conditions for sapience;- conditions usually based on folk psychology and/or the assumption of entrenched categorial divisions between organic and inorganic, animate and inanimate. Thus, in the closing Scientific Realism Plasticity the pages of and of Mind, Churchland sketches 298At this juncture an important heuristic point needs to made. As Kenneth Sayre points out in his useful entry on the subject in Routledge's recent Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, many philosophical appropriations of information theory remain fraught with confusion and misunderstanding. In its most obvious manifestation, the confusion consists in recklessly assimilating Shannon's strictly mathematical or quantitative definition of `information' to its semantic or qualitative counterpart as used in everyday discourse. Cf. Sayre, `Information Theory' in Volume 4 of The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, general editor E. Craig, London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 782-786. But while acknowledging the extent to which philosophical mobilisations of information theory remain illegitimacy important distinguish between believe it is to the of the wholesale problematic, we localised deployment legitimacy tactical the theory, of or of a merely and misappropriation of a Churchland's do believe its Accordingly, mobilisation of a vocabulary not we vocabulary. portions of drawn from information theory amounts to a misappropriation. Terms such as `information processing', `transmitter', `receiver' and `noise', are deployed with considerable skill and economy in order to illuminate a philosophical argument. The fact that in appropriating those terms for philosophical fashion less loose in Churchland them relative to the or metaphorical and more a employs purposes, degree of literal precision with which they are applied within the ambit of scientific theory does not be he Since to his invalidate that providing a stringent never pretends vocabulary. use of automatically be its his information not and should theory, vocabulary cannot philosophical use of application of judged by the austere standards of rigorous scientific exactitude. Consequently, and since we see no difficulty, in issues we justification for of often overwhelming mathematical real embroiling ourselves Churchland's chosen forgo the technical of pertinence will a systematic analysis concerning lay Churchland for can is uniquely among philosophers of mind, regrettable, vocabulary. Perhaps this claim to having the requisite conceptual apparatus which would permit of a rigorous or nonthe folk Unlike information cognition, the of model theory. psychological metaphorical application of Shannon's least) facie strictly (prima with consonant perfectly at seems paradigm neurocomputational is in A information. weight-space definition synaptic configuration of mathematical/quantitative literal, than it metaphorical, in rather that entirely of an admits attitude radically unlike a propositional

409 the rudiments of a thoroughly naturalised version of normative epistemology by alighting on the notion of `informational characterising in terms of their entities reservoir' susceptibility as a way of for registering information regardless of their standing vis a vis the categories of animate inanimate, or organic inorganic. and All entities, Churchland and suggests, irrespective of the details of their physical constitution, can be considered as informational reservoirs and situated within a universal informational in degree terms the continuum of of efficiency with which they absorb information. `Information sponges' are those that score highest within this continuum: informational "One need only suppose the overt behaviour of such be function informationtheir to of a systematic sponges bearing states to have outlined a conception of the internal activities of fauna that owes nothing to our usual cognitive concepts, and which natural places us on a continuum with animals, trees, and ultimately even beaches."(Churchland, 1979, p. 143) Accordingly, be the naturalisation of epistemic normativity may brought about by identifying the entirely abstract, substrate independent realm those to which via processes corresponding algorithms of computational but from information their environment to absorb only not able sponges are physical quantification. Cf. J.R. Pierce (1965) for an extremely clear but also technically precise

410 also to modify behaviour according to the information registered. These algorithms `epistemic are engines' : abstract functional mechanisms between informational input and behavioural mediating output in such a way as to allow entities to learn from their environment. The naturalisation of epistemic normativity, Churchland continues, will be achieved in the form of `natural a science of epistemic engines', variety of algorithmic and will proceed by cataloguing the mechanism through which `information sponges' become able to spontaneously modify behavioural output by successfully extracting a surplus value of information from registered input. All that is for this, Churchland insists, is a certain plasticity in the functional required relations between sensory input and motor output299. Those functional relations must be able to change as a `more or less' determinate function of certain sensory consequences engendered by their prior occurrence. Thus, a specific kind of motor response will be made either more or less likely to recur when prompted by an identical input as a function of the positively or negatively reinforcing inputs that the initial response elicited: "What this will layman's introduction to information theory. 299This reference to motor output does not indicate that Churchland has already presupposed those locomotive capacities which are characteristic of organisms. The algorithmic function will correlate environmental input and behavioural output even in the absence of all recognisable sensory and/or by former instantiate beaches the Even thermostats motor capacities. epistemic algorithms; and (shifting later by in differences temperature; the conditions registering registering climactic ambient input informational beach, bird footprints, ) In remains the the sand, registering of case of a etc. insufficient to engender a significant behavioural output. Nevertheless, the beach still instantiates an here". "Stay language in be formulated as: natural algorithm; albeit one whose epistemic content would

411 produce is a sequence of functional relations betwixt input and output, a sequence wherein the modifications from element to element are themselves the output of a second-order function, a function whose inputs are actualised stimulus response pairs from the first function, plus whatever `reinforcing' states their actualisation elicits. "(Ibid., p. 143) Epistemic engines `learn' via a process of blind mechanical recursion hardwired takes which pairs of stimulus-response function plus their positive or negative reinforcement as the first-order input for a second-order function, in turn provides the input for a third-order function, and so on. whose output Accordingly, Churchland's natural science of epistemic engines is an attempt to delineate the iterative algorithmic mechanisms whereby entities are able to construct models of their environment -'internal' representations of the worlddistil information and from input signals without the benefit of putatively `higher' cognitive powers and in the absence of all appeals to consciousness, intentional states, propositional For what this nested sequence attitudes, etc. instrument is functional a self-correcting measuring relations engenders of which calibrates between discrepancy degree the precise of cognitive distilled is discrepancy That behavioural input as output. and environmental input its for has function that actualised the output of the second-order stimulus-response relations paired with their positive or negatively

412 fine-grained A reinforcing states. more calibration of the discrepancy and an information additional extraction of are achieved when that second-order in in turn results output a motor response coupled with a reinforcing state that input for function. The process is reiterated until the the third-order a provides finally its behavioural achieves consistently system positive reinforcements of is it has to to say, until achieved the responses environmental stimuli; which its degree environment. of representational adequacy vis a vis optimum As a result, for Churchland, epistemic engines provide a universally for through the which process valid exemplar -a normative paradigmBy filtered from is information winnowing out environmental noise. cognitive the information latent in all background noise, epistemic engines provide an background from "information the in can emerge which example of the way 'noise' in which it is buried once the more prominent regularities in that `noise' have been discriminated from and subtracted the incoming this the Churchland of Moreover, 149) pertinence "(Ibid., continues, p. signal. recursive algorithmic in be to evolution epistemic restricted not need process its from derives force salience universal its genuinely individuals; normative independent characterisation as a substrate development. of epistemological to Accordingly, Churchland insists, the science of epistemic engines promises "the for paradigm of phenomenon provide a rigorously naturalistic account

413 articulation, and of cumulative tradition, and even the possibility of intellectual revolution"(Ibid. ) However, psychological whereas the myopic formulations of parochialism folk to endemic epistemic normativity encourages their imperialism exclusionary vis a vis alternative cognitive possibilities, the independent substrate character of naturalised normativity incommensurabilities level the at of individually encompasses incorporated epistemic Thus, regimes. once naturalised and grounded in the rigorously universal algorithmic machinery of epistemic engines, epistemological normativity becomes perfectly compatible with cognitive discontinuity: "Within the framework of a well chosen first regime the iterative process of winnowing for lengths indefinite information of time. can continue out ever more subtle On the other hand, the primary initial the that strongest receives regime be long in to the the turn most revelatory of not run out may reinforcement from deviations It the that the subtlest regularities. residual may turn out be [... J it that larger no may to and again chaotic and more get reality start find to [the is reinforcement sufficient will creature] capable regime of which is lines [what a Faced these needs one] along anomalies with chronic stick hardwired system for reacting to such crises, where the reaction consists in dismantling whatever hierarchy [... J is already in place. The creature can

414 then begin from scratch with a new basic regime[ penetrate reality ]that may allow it to ... deeply more than did the basic regime it has just "(Ibid., 150) overthrown. p. In subsequent work, Churchland will apparatus whereby a fruitless or inefficient identify the `hardwired' epistemic function can be dismantled with a reconfiguration of synaptic weights. Thus, although this for sketch a natural science of epistemic engines predates Churchland's espousal of the PDP paradigm by some years, there is an important sense in it which remains perfectly consonant with it: epistemic engines can be seen as the forerunners of prototype vectors300. Moreover, if, for Churchland, epistemic engines are precursors to prototype vector partitionings, then they, like the latter, must be seen as the ultimate determinants for epistemological discontinuity fully and phenomenological mutation within a naturalised epistemology. Yet at the same time, it seems that in embracing the PDP has dimension Churchland the to the aspiration of paradigm, partially abjured intrinsic independent to the notion of an that seemed substrate universality 300Significantly, in discussing the relation between the perspective adopted in Scientific Realism and his later neurocomputational stance, Churchland points out that the book was deliberately conceived and written around the final chapter `Sentential epistemologies and the natural science of epistemic Churchland However, 900-903. 1998a, time Churchland the Cf. puzzlingly same at pp. engines'. for latter by in that the that calls stating chapter undercuts the universality ascribed to epistemic engines 900), there (our brain based, whereas "naturalized, cit., p. op. emphasis, a sub-sentential epistemology" in based be brain that chapter. be that need engines epistemic seems to no suggestion whatsoever in delineated the interest the Indeed, from our point of view; the peculiar program epistemological of

415 epistemic engine. For although the space of phenomenological possibility concomitant with neurocomputational plasticity is enormous, it remains entirely neurocentric, which is to say, empirically overdetermined. Consequently, from our point of view, it is precisely insofar as the algorithmic machinery of epistemic engines allows for an entirely abstract or meta-empirical dimension of phenomenological plasticity, that the shift from a natural science of epistemic engines to a neurocomputational perspective Churchland's signals from retreat the quasi-transcendental, substrate independent domain of epistemological universality to the empirically constricted realm of neurocentric provincialism. 2. From epistemic algorithms Our non-materialist to the transcendental function radicalisation of epistemic normativity will Churchland's dyads that dualysing by the philosophical constrain proceed in to rigorously for a uncover order epistemology a universal search transcendental, and thereby genuinely algorithm for cognition. independent universal substrate From a non-philosophical dyadic two perspective, epistemic Churchland's of universalisation attempted structures circumscribe information-in-itself on noise information or function: that of registered and the behavioural input on output and the one hand; and that of stimulatory independent, neurocentric non to its from a substrate derives aspiration in primarily question chapter

416 other. We shall dualyse both and separatethe identity of `noise itself' rom its epistemological hybridisation with information, as well as that itself from `input of its behaviourist hybridisation with output. Instead of positing noise as given a priori in and through the empirical presupposition of information, registered we presuppose it as already given-without-givenness, or as 4noise itself using information Churchland's epistemological hybridisation of and noise as our occasion. Likewise, instead of empirically presupposing stimulatory input through the a priori positing of behavioural invariant input as already-given-without-givenness output, we presuppose an or as a radical constant on the basis of Churchland's behaviouristic hybridisation of input and output. On the basis of these two dualysations we in in terms of which two to those eight can posit additional axioms addition hyle the radical earlier301: we characterised 9. The radical hyle is Noise-without-information, noise itself in its foreclosure to the epistemological calibration of the discrepancy between information and noise. 10. The radical hyle is the Unknown as unvarying input, the Unknown as the radical perspective. 301Cf. 293-294. 6, Chapter pp. supra, invariant limitless engendering

417 transcendental in its cognitive variation output on the occasional basis of an empirically variable epistemicfunction. Thus, by way of these two axioms, non-materialism posits-without- presupposing the radical hyle as that last-instance which is also the transcendental determinant for Churchland's sought-after universal epistemic function302. It is in accordance with the radical hyle as that invariant which is `noise itself, genuinely that we can clone a rigorously transcendental and thereby function universal for materialist epistemology using the algorithmic machinery of the epistemic engine as our empirical variable. Where the epistemic algorithm calibrates the cognitive discrepancy between input by filtering information from sensory and motor output environmental function, is to say, a transcendental which noise, we clone a non-epistemic by determination for that the separatingof epistemic algorithm, algorithm without-separation noise `itself in determining-in-the-last-instance informational output in all its Identity empirically its distinction from as radical invariant variable calibrations input. noise-laden of That transcendental algorithm now constitutes an authentically universal, nonepistemological function becomes `itself wherein noise determinant for all epistemically calibrated information. the ultimate

418 In other words, instead of using epistemic enginery to constantly re- informational extract an surplus value from environmental noise, we use the former as the empirical occasion from which we clone a transcendental function wherein noise `itself in its foreclosure to information determines every conceivable epistemological ratiocination of information and noise. The empirical discrepancy between information and noise as calibrated by the has been radicalised epistemic algorithm epistemological dualysedas a unilateral or non-i. e. separation between noise `itself qua determinant for a rigorously universal or non-epistemic transcendental function, and noise `as in its epistemological such' ratiocination information. vis a vis This radical is but separation effectuated as a universal non-epistemological algorithm basis is Noise the of qua radically unknowable constant=x cloned on whereby data in form the of a epistemic enginery qua empirical variable or occasional transcendental function. The transcendental function effectuates the is It basis the epistemic variable. of unknowable constant on the occasional the determination of empirical cognition in accordance with noise's function Whereas the foreclosure to all epistemic ratiocination. epistemic known information between difference and unknown; noise, and the calibrates that identity the function the as unknown of the non-epistemic effectuates 302For Laruelle's account of non-philosophical cloning as effectuation of a transcendental function, cf.

419 which determines the known. Thus, the transcendental function is the varying effectuation of cognition under the unvarying condition of the unknown. Moreover, whereas the epistemic algorithm is by the empirically at least co-constituted determinate pairings of input-output function through it is instantiated, hence which and at least co-determined by its empirical substrate, this non-epistemic or transcendental algorithm unilateralises its epistemological substrate as a merely occasional it cause; unilaterally determines it as an entirely neutral or indifferent material support. As a result, the transcendental function is effectuated as the non-hylomorphic duality of form it `exists' an uninstantiable and an uninformable material; as the strictly duality determinant determinable transcendental unilateral of and empirically is identity-without-synthesis duality-without-distinction It the of material. and `itself noise in its epistemological foreclosure and noise as epistemically it is information. Accordingly, its through empirical admixture with calibrated Noise's the transcendental that autonomy radical as an effectuation of function enjoys a relatively radical autonomy or independence vis a vis the its function that dependence the serves as epistemic of absolutely relative empirical occasion. Laruelle, 2000a, pp. 275-280; 2000b, p. 76; 2000c, pp. 184-185.

420 Thus, where the natural science of epistemic engines encompassed discontinuity cognitive at the empirical level, the transcendental science of non-epistemic functions gives rise to an unencompassable manifold of discontinuity cognitive at the universal level. A non-materialist epistemology uses the epistemic algorithms furnished by a fully naturalised epistemology in order to clone a series of radically universal, non-epistemological functions and engender universes of unintuitahle cognitive variation; universes wherein the frequencies of information, the codes of cognition, and the parameters of in Noise phenomenality are reconfigured accordance with as unknown, or as phenomenon-in-itself, in order to be reconstituted independently of the bounds of perception and beyond the remit of stimulus-response functions. For the transcendental function is lived-in-One: it is articulated as an Alienfunction Universe The transcendental of cognition; an alien manifests subject. basis by is determined the that of an epistemic an unknown constant on one longer is is The no a phenomenological plasticity which result variable. neurocomputationally calculable; a cognitive mutability whose variability it is because exceeds even the vast space of neurocomputational possibility invariable inconsistent and in Noise phenomenon, yet radically as now rooted epistemic transcendental of unencompassable chaos303 manifested as a 303Cf. 315. 237, footnote p. supra,

421 discontinuity from final In the the epistemic analysis, the transition variation. in embraced Churchland's philosophical naturalism, to the epistemic inconsistency defined by non-philosophical materialism, is the move from into universal chaos. empirical anarchy

422 CONCLUSION PHILOSOPHY, CAPITALISM, NON- MATERIALISM K is the World What is non-materialism good for? What does it change or manifest that a spontaneously practised materialist Decision could not change or far manifest more efficiently? What effectiveness does the effectuation of have? final isn't In thinking the the non-materialist non-materialist analysis, theory we have been labouring to formulate a sterile, fruitless, and ultimately intellectual indulgence? pointless These are perfectly valid philosophical objections; and ones against which non-philosophy is defenceless. Nevertheless, if non-philosophy is defenceless against such philosophical objections, it is because it does not having their itself defend them, pertinence suspended to already against need does it is to To not why understand non-philosophy understand and validity. lack its `effectiveness', in terms itself or justify of to philosophically, need thereof, as defined in accordance with the criteria of philosophical efficiency. in foregoing some regards undeniable, Thus, although all the criticisms are

423 there is also an overriding sense in which they are strictly worthless. Nonphilosophy is rigorously pointless, sterile, useless, and everything else which philosophical teleology deems reprehensible. Non-philosophy is a- teleological, which is to say, intrinsically ineffectual, so long `effectivity' as be to continues measured philosophically in terms of thought's effectiveness vis a vis the putatively extra-philosophical reality of the world. Yet this is the very standard of `effectiveness' which non-philosophy refuses. For in suspending the Parmenidean axiom, non-philosophical thinking suspends the philosophical conflation of reality `as such' with the Real `itself and thereby the postulate of dyadic reciprocity between thought and the Real (which Laruelle calls `the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy'). It idea the that philosophical Decision constitutes an immediate suspends intervention vis a vis the Real and that Decision is at once constituted by, and 'itself. by More Real the suspending the conflation precisely, constitutive of, of reality `as such' with the Real 'itself, non-philosophy suspends the `as `itself independent is Real there that such', or as of reality no supposition defined through philosophical Decision304.For even in those cases where it the `realist' be to autonomy of to acknowledge claims and perfectly pretends by it is be-, `reality' that of way still may an extra-philosophical -whatever

424 Decision that philosophy Decision. decides that reality Extra-philosophical characterised. Consequently, `reality' whether is `realist' exists independently of always or philosophically `idealist' in tenor, philosophical thinking begins by identifying extra-philosophical reality with the Real 'itself, in order to secure the premise that the Real is to say, -which is realityalways already philosophisable. Accordingly, non-philosophical thinking can be characterised in terms indissociable immanence two the that of operations: acknowledgement qua Real `itself is philosophical (without-separation) already separate reality from the extra- Decision; through posited and presupposed and the is the that always already at everything unitary presumption suspension of least potentially is There something that remains philosophisable305. foreclosed for philosophy; which is to say, there is a non-philosophisable instance which philosophy but presupposes remains incapable of `the been have Laruelle, is This calling with along we, what acknowledging. Real' or `immanence' qua Given-without-givenness. 304As instanced, for example, by Henry's conflation of immanence `as such' qua absolutely 892, Chapter Cf. for foreclosed pp. thought. qua supra, `itself immanence radically unthinkable with 92. first The things are two not 305"Not are which is that news. my good everything is philosophisable, delineation for science the of a This is thing. allows what the same and one are which science, and man knowing is but the of way only which one A perhaps, supremely paradoxical project of philosophy. 246) 1991, " (Laruelle, p. decides doing to is philosophise. one when what one

425 Thus, instead of immediately presupposing that thought philosophy and world are necessarily bound together in and reality, a unitary dyad, instead of presupposing the identity-in-difference philosophical of thinking and being, non-philosophy suspendsthat presupposed immediacy on the basis of the unilateral duality whereby the Real in its foreclosure to is already separated (without-separation) from philosophical philosophy Decision as dyadic hybrid or unitary synthesis of thinking and being, philosophy and world, ideality and reality306.By acknowledging that there is a radically autonomous, non-philosophisable Real that is already separate from extra-philosophical reality, this unilateral duality suspends the autopositional and auto-donational sufficiency whereby Decision presumes to World's Real the the philosophically circumscribed reality. within reinscribe Yet it is through that suspension that Decision `itself qua reciprocal in its finally is being radically manifested of thinking and hybridisation immanent, which is to say, intrinsically in For Identity. non-Decisional from as `itself Real extra-philosophical radically separate acknowledging the former latter, the the `as that, remains unlike recognising and such', reality foreclosed to philosophical 306 Cf. L%eV1J1V (tc suspension of 230-245. 5, Chapter pp. supra, constitution, philosophical to determination), sufficiency the non- simultaneously

426 neutralises and legitimates Decision. Thus, it is via the transcendental suspension of philosophy's conflation of reality with the Real that the philosophical postulate of a bi-lateral reciprocity between philosophy and extra-philosophical reality becomes transcendentally ratified. Consequently, non-philosophy Decisional `brings forth' Identity or manifests Decision's immanent, non- dyadic as synthesis or identity-in-difference of the philosophical and the extra-philosophical. And in so doing, it acknowledges the relative autonomy of philosophy's auto-Decisional sufficiency as absolute, self-positing Transcendence; which is to say, as World. Nonidentifies philosophy philosophy with Decision, and Decision with the World. Accordingly, for non-philosophy, suppressing or shackling Decision's philosophy philosophy, self-positing/self-presupposing is the World. Far from the non-philosophical suspension of finally sufficiency makes manifest is immanent `at Identity that one' with the as which philosophy's radically World. It provides a rigorously transcendental deduction of the philosophical Decision's objective validity vis a vis extra-philosophical reality307.Thus, by is Real the that the philosophisable, non-philosophy premise suspending the denies that the than presumption philosophical acknowledges rather by it is As is World's extra-philosophical reality a result, philosophisable. 307Cf. 234-237. 5, Chapter pp. supra,

427 withdrawing the Real from the ambit of philosophy that non-philosophy grants philosophy everything; which is to say, reality or the World. The World is Capitalism The consequences of this non-philosophical identification of philosophy with the World are far-reaching: "It is no longer possible to posit `history', or `society', or `the economy', `capitalism' in a straightforward or fashion and abstract as though they were objects devoid of a superior ideological representation, which is to say, objects devoid of their possible philosophisable meaning. "(Laruelle, other things, non-philosophy 2000b, p. 142) Accordingly, amongst utterly reconfigures the relation between philosophy and capital. `Capital' can no longer be naively posited or immediately presupposed as though given independently mediation. its Decisional of So long as it continues to be posited and presupposed in and through the auspices of philosophical Decision, `capital', along with all other instances of putatively will independent or `concrete' extra-philosophical reality, been have subjected to a superior, meta-empirical always already ideological gloss; an a priori, ideological investiture. Thus, instead of idealised, extra-philosophical positing and presupposing capital as an already together, capital and philosophy reality, non-philosophy manifests or gives double their to independently of their auto-Decisional givenness, according

428 articulation or reciprocal presupposition as an identity-in-difference, an indivisible unitary dyad. As a result, in universalising philosophy Decision, qua non- philosophy universalises capital qua object of philosophy. More exactly, by dualysing Decision qua self-presupposing hybrid of philosophical ideality and extra-philosophical reality, ontological fundament and ontic region, and thereby their releasing identity-without-synthesis and duality-without- distinction -their unidentity and unilaterality-, non-philosophy constructs a but unified non-unitary theory for the relation between the philosophical and the extra-philosophical; which is to say, for the relation between philosophy Where Marxism and capital. proposed. a philosophically restricted -which is to form in Capitalism, intra-Decisionalthe the of of capital universalisation say, non-philosophical World proposes to universalisation of philosophy qua in the that capital of universalisation philosophical radicalise and generalise form of a unified theory of philosophy qua World and capital qua Capitalism. The result is the transcendental universalisation of that empirical is of the to uni(-)versalisation non-philosophical say, which universalisation; Capitalism qua World. Accordingly, capital's genuinely transcendental, nonit is Capitalism; and is as unidentity identity as not merely philosophical unilaterality World-Capitalism: of philosophy and capitalism, or as

429 "Just as philosophy is not merely one form of thought among others but rather one that lays claim to a foundational position and a legislative authority over all other thought, and thereby one for which a specific status be must set aside -even if only with respect to that claim 's entirely symptomatic reality-, we must (it is not just a historico-factual because hypothesis is which universal acknowledgement) posit capital as a is simultaneously an encompassing uni-versal; as a self-encompassing which be Capital to said phenomenon of every economico-socio308phenomenon. -a `economic' and/or social, historical, etc.- gives rise to capitalism when, in all factually longer it is and empirically within society and considered no rigour, becomes a uni(-)versal and history, hypothesis as is, for its part, the form to that ]Just Decision[ according the was philosophy as philosophical .. which `every thought knowledge is philosophisable', or economico-socio-historical capitalism. "(Ibid. phenomenon is a similarly, phenomenon `every of 146-147) rp. its delineated identity, via Thus, just as philosophy's transcendental cognitive all encompassing as (non-Decisional) hypo-thetical universalisation Sufficient Principle form the of in the of phenomena and manifested Philosophy, is not itself philosophical, capitalism's 308Laruelle deliberately writes `economico-social' rather identity, transcendental in `socio-economique' than the customary

430 delineated via its hypo-thetical universalisation as encompassing all socio- economic phenomena and manifested in the form of the Principle of Sufficient Economy, is not that of capital. By suspending its spontaneously philosophical, auto-Decisional manifests or `brings forth' position/presupposition, non-philosophy capital's radically universal, non-Decisional identity as Principle of Sufficient Economy. But this universalisation of Capitalism capital qua is strictly inseparable from that of philosophy qua Decision, so that the uni(-)versalisation of capital occurs in the form of a `unidentification' of philosophy and capital, or as the `fusion' of the Principle Sufficient Philosophy of and the Principle Sufficient Economy in the form of World-Capitalism. a Gnostic Scepticism versus Epistemic Realism As a result of this uni(-)versalisation of philosophy, in `acting' upon philosophical Decision, non-philosophy `acts' upon the World. More fusion forth in bringing this of philosophy and uni(-)versalised specifically, World-Capitalism; `acts' crucial a albeit with upon capital, non-philosophy the transformation to sense of of a amounts which nuance non-philosophical the word 'act'. Thus, if non-philosophical thinking `acts' upon World- is to intrinsically is the it non-Decisional -which Capitalism new, according to dominance concomitant the a social; dominance the over economic of order to mark this constitutive

431 say, non-empirical or non-spontaneous- paradigm of agency articulated in the operation of cloning. Non-philosophical practise is not an empirical intervention in the World effected by way of Decision; it is a transcendental effectuation of that which since this foreign is is an effectuation to the World by way of cloning309.And that suspends World-Capitalism's self- legitimating authority and all-encompassing potency, the better to reconfigure the bounds of cognitive possibility in accordance with the unknown, it is the manifestation of a radically sceptical force-(of)-thought. Cloning is an instance of transcendental scepticism. Thus, where philosophical materialism oscillates between the stances far of complacent quietism and agnostic cynicism as as the superstitions of phenomenological realism are concerned, the rigorously an-archic sceptical is `act' ferried the through uncompromisingly of cloning charge phenomenological `reality' anti- Just is the to as anti-idealist. say, resolutely -which by identified longer is World way of a gratuitous, no of the Worldthat idealising of phenomenological empiricism, spontaneously Capitalism is no longer identified by way of an immediately apprehended, it Paradoxically, `materiality'. but also objectively codified, socio-economic is by unilateralising the World's isation hypo-thetical of capital. the universal with idealised material reality that non-

432 materialism emancipates matter's Real foreclosedphenomenologically -and Identity. That radically inconsistent Identity provides the fulcrum for a transcendental scepticism vis a vis the bounds of epistemic normativity, and the basis for a cognitive practise which encourages the proliferation of a universal epistemic chaos310 Thus, non-materialism does not seek an indubitable phenomenological foundation for cognition by transcendentally reducing the world of the natural attitude, as Husserl sought to; on the contrary, it latter's `principle of all principles'311 along with the realm of the undermines phenomenological indubitability in its entirety simply by acknowledging the fact that the World qua phenomenological Decision has `always already' been is to say, unilateralised, in accordance with the radical suspended, which hyle's foreclosure, hence and given for as an occasion the non- phenomenological reconfiguration of cognitive experience. Consequently, if 309This `foreignness' being the non-thetic Universe, which the Alien-subject clones as a transcendental function or effectuation of the World. 310 Cf. supra, Chapter 8, pp. 420-421. 311 «[ ]seeing essences is an originary presentive act and, as a presentive act, is the analogue of . r7 No . theory can make us err with respect to conceivable im..... aoainina and not of sensuous perceiving Po, oL... ý legitimising is intuition that source of a the principle of all principles: every originary presentive `intuition' personal' in (so in its to to offered us actuality) speak, cognition, that everything originally is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is have if intuition Common-sense 44) "(Husserl, 1982, received such an ever rarely can p. presented there. his it by Husserl titled for furnished modestly high-flown the with one apologia as elaborately `principle of all principles'. Bluntly formulated, the non-materialist credo is simply the denial of is `presentive here: perceiving all sensuous Husserl acts'; there are no originary appeals to everything legitimate intuitions' `originary since nothing presentive theoretically construct; mediated already a

433 non-materialism constitutes an instance of transcendental scepticism, it is primarily vis a vis the realm of phenomenological immediacy and the subsequent objectivation of 'material reality'. The intra-philosophical positing and presupposing of an extra-philosophical `material' reality by way of Decision is the merely phenomenological idealism. insidiously rarefied Transcendental scepticism most instance of discontinues materialism's crypto-phenomenological idealisation of the Real qua matter `itself in terms of the reality of matter `as such'. Thus, if non-materialism can be qualified as `sceptical', it is in the strictly active or pragmatic constitutes a rigorously sense concomitant cognitive with cloning but non-epistemological insofar as it For practise. `scepticism' is an entirely positive peculiar to this non-philosophical cognitive dimension which falls outside the purview of the epistemological distinction between `dubitable' and `indubitable', `doubt' and 'certainty'. The `non-epistemological' by non-materialism accords scepticism exemplified knowing the authority of epistemological suspends which of with a paradigm Decision and uses the known in order to proceed in a rigorously cognitive (the hyle) (the the towards fashion from the unknown nonunknown radical by `intuition' to `immediately us presented' they do not exist; nothing being. it is be as presented accepted simply as what circumstances should ever under any

434 thetic Universe)312. Epistemic Decision, by way of contrast, `progresses' under the aegis of an epistemological arche or foundation from the known toward the known by constantly striving to minimize the distinction between the known and the unknown. This suspension of the authority of the known determination and of cognition in accordance with the sovereignty of the unknown constitutes a rigorously an-archic or non-epistemic model of is cognition; one which entirely consonant with the most radical unknowing. In other words, it is a gnostic, rather than epistemic, paradigm of cognition. And as that knowing which accords with the most radical unknowing, gnosis is transcendental scepticism. Thus, scepticism as we construe it does not consist in doubting the known on the basis of a presupposition that one can discriminate between knowing and unknowing; which is to say, know that one does not know. Gnosis, or transcendental scepticism, does not attempt to distinguish between knowing and unknowing; it acknowledges the unilateral duality separating the Identity knowing between difference from the the epistemo-logical unknown of and unknowing. It is knowing the the to or unknown; according determination of the known in accordance with the unknown's foreclosure. Moreover, gnosis 312 Cf. 418-419. 8, Chapter pp. supra, a priori instance of an-archic rigorously a constitutes

435 cognitive experience insofar as the Alien-subject scepticism313 simultaneously unilateralises World and the all-encompassing dominion Capitalism, At this juncture, Information of this transcendental the absolute authority of the of Capitalism. Universal Noise and a non-philosophical materialism must confront an insuperable apparently objection: to wit, that for all its putative `radicality', non-materialism amounts to nothing more than an impotent contemplative mysticism; a reactionary and terminally self-indulgent theoreticism. In order to circumvent the charge that non-materialism is merely another form of solipsistic quietism, it is necessary to explain why, philosophical appearances form transcendental notwithstanding, scepticism constitutes a of cognitive be to activity which may prove more virulently corrosive vis a vis the absolute authority of World-Capitalism than those spontaneously philosophical instances of supposedly revolutionary intellectual agency. While it is certainly true that gnostic scepticism would be an intervention for the empirical at political militant substitute exceedingly poor is Thus, "I the from derives sceptic `sceptic' examine". skeptomai, meaning skeptikos or `doubts'. in than Decisionto simply judgement one who rather examine, order one who suspends -or hairein: 'to (from `decision' `choice' hairesis Greek or Interestingly, given that the simply means in is `a-heretical' the that, scepticism decide'), `to although non-Decisional one could say choose' or dualysing Thus, the in or heretical is the sense. it non-auto-Decisional radically auto-Decisional sense, hairesis, the nonand instance non-auto-Decisional Decision or radical of constitutes an cloning of is There 1998b. Cf. Laruelle, in a heretical character. Decisional positing of `matter itself' is radically heretic. the identity the and discovers sceptic transcendental of the in non-materialism sense which 313The Greek

436 intra-Decisional level which targets the effectiveness of global capital, it or might provide the latter with that indispensable transcendental complement it in which requires order to postpone its inevitable reintegration within the seamless, all-encompassing informational circuit of World-Capitalism. Nonis the transcendental encryption of materialist Decision in such a materialism latter to the way as render undecipherable according to the epistemic codes furnished by World-Capitalism. Whereas the empirical universalisation of between distinction material power capital as global capitalism perpetuates a force, informational the transcendental uni(-)versalisation of capital as and World-Capitalism identifies production and cognition, material power and force, by suspending the intra-empirical informational or philosophical distinction between the physical and the psychical, or between material power and cognitive force. Moreover, by suspending the phenomenological distinction between the conditions of material production and the conditions of cognitive discourse; by discontinuing the epistemic distinction between force, as capital the of informational uni(-)versalisation material power and World-Capitalism, along effectuated serve to informational codes of the scrambling chaotic with Alien-subject, the may of through the transcendental scepticism provide phenomenologically materialism with a necessary complement hermeneutically noise. undecodable undecipherable, of

437 Accordingly, transcendental scepticism is the unleashing of universal noise in an attempt to puncture the politically enforced bounds of epistemic meaning and to wash away the socially sense. Thus, for instance, since phenomenology is a phenomenological function manufactured horizons of of neurophysiology and neurophysiology is now subject to biotechnological regulation, there is a perfectly valid empirical sensein which phenomenology qua system of enforced Ur-doxas socioculturally constructed, politically is determined more or less directly via the abstract apparatuses of mass consumer capitalism in accordance with the logic of what Deleuze & Guattari have called a `generalised machinic enslavement'314.The populace is epistemically conditioned diet a staple via of manufactured information disseminated through magazines and newspapers, opinion-polls but and market-research; also phenomenologically enslaved via a process of immersion in film continual advertisements, and television, video, computer information Epistemic games, etc. is experience sociologically is politically encoded; phenomenological `revolutionary' The conditioned. left's continuing inability to recognize the extent to which World-Capitalism directly regulates 314«[ ]it by labor human a generalised through replaced were is as though surplus alienation (children, doing the furnish work any without that surplus-value one may machinic enslavement' such labor less ]capitalism )[... of quantity on a operates retired, the unemployed, television viewers, etc. the bringing transportation, into models, urban by of play modes than a complex qualitative process " (Deleuze feeling system. -every semiotic media, the entertainment industries, ways of perceiving and & Guattari, 1988, p. 492)

438 the basic parameters of all phenomenological `experience', along with the epistemic codification biotechnological of all intervention physical information, by means of at the level of the human organism and socioeconomic interne nntion at the level of consumer consensus,is not only an instance of empiricist myopia; it is ultimately a constitutively political failure. Yet it is a failure which transcendental scepticism may yet help circumvent through the Alien-subject's unilateralising force-(of)-thought; an intrinsically sceptical force which constitutes an instance of a priori cognitive resistance to those epistemic norms and informational codes via which a triumphant World-Capitalism maintains the structural isomorphy between material power and informational force, thereby its ensuring quasi- transcendental dominion over all cognitive experience. A transcendental human beings are simply scepticism agrees with eliminative naturalism: information it But carbon-based processing machines. also recognises the of necessity reductionism radicalising cross-pollinating that born assessment of evolutionary in insight insight; transcendental an which consists with and generalising Marx's identification of the material infrastructure as the ultimate determinant for the ideological superstructure315: World-Capitalism 315 This, in is now the global megamachine determining a priori the 2000b. Laruelle, Cf. Non-Marxism. Introduction Laruelle's to a nutshell, is the aim of

439 cognitive parameters within which the phenomenological micromachinery of individuated organically sapience operates. By acknowledging the fact that political intervention can no longer afford to ignore this insight; by recognising that empirical agency alone is incapable of circumventing capital's all-encompassing universality as World-Capitalism, transcendental instance scepticism constitutes an of a priori political resistance. By way of conclusion, we will characterise this a priori y there cognitive and political form of in immediately terms three resistance of pragmatic consequences: 1. The construction of rigorously meaningless, epistemically better Decisional the the to uninterpretable utterances, unfold is force circle whereby utterance's unobjectifiable material perpetually reinscribed within objectivating statement's horizons of significance316. 2. The short-circuiting informational the of between relay force. material power and cognitive 3. Finally, the engendering of a mode of cognition that far instance as noise of universal an constitutes simultaneously is knowledge concerned. the commodification of 316 Cf supra, Chapter 4, pp. 194-199.

440 This threefold emancipation of thought from artificially manufactured horizons of phenomenological meaning, as well as contingently synthesised inconsequential by be but to of cognition, codes may prove a small, no means liberation. toward political step

441 BIBLIOGRAPHY Works by Laruelle Philosophie I: 1971 Essai Phenomene Difference. l'ontologie de Ravaisson. et sur - Paris. ilinskiec . 1976 -Machines Textuelles. Deconstruction et libido d'ecriture. Paris: Seuil. 1977a -Nietzsche contre Heidegger. Thesespour une politique nietzscheenne. Paris: Payot. 1977b de l'Ecriture. Paris: Aubier-Flammarion. Le Declin - 1978 - Au Dela du Principe de Pouvoir. Paris: Payot. Philosophie II: 1981 - Le Principe de Minorite. Paris: Aubier. 1983-1985 - Pourquoi Pas La Philosophie ? Paris: journal published by the author. 1.1983a Terminee, Retour Impossible'. Mission `Descartes, - 2.1983b de PHistoire de la Philosophie'. `Les Crimes - 3.1984a de la Decision Philosophique'. `Theorie - 4.1984b Sans Qualites'. `Le Philosophe -

442 5.1985a `Le Mystique, Le Pratique, L'Ordinaire'. - 6.1985b `Metaphysique du Futur'. - 1985 - Une Biographie de l'Homme Ordinaire. Des autorites et des minorites. Paris: Aubier. 1986 - Les Philosophies de la Difference. Introduction critique. Paris: P.U. F. 1989 - Philosophie et Non-Philosophie. Liege-Bruxelles: Mardaga. 1991 - En Tant qu'Un. La non-philosophie expliquee au philosophes. Paris: Aubier. 1992 - Theorie des Identites. Fractalite generalisee etphilosophie artificielle. Paris: P.U. F. Philosophie III: Etrangers. democratie, hommes, des Science des 1995 - Theorie Kime. Paris: non-psychanalyse. 1996 - Principes de la Non-Philosophie. 1998 - Dictionnaire Paris: P.U. F. de la Non-Philosophie. Francois Laruelle et Collaborateurs, Paris: Kime. Kirre. Paris: l'humanite. Du l'Etranger. de Ethique crime contre 2000a F. U. P. Paris: Non-Marxisme. 2000b - Introduction au

443 Articles and Essays by Laruelle Note: page references for some of the articles below were unavailable. 1973 - `Le Texte Quatrieme. L'evenement textuel comme simulacre', in l'Arc. Jacques Derrida., C. Clement ed., 54, pp. 38-45. 1975 - `Le Style Di-Phallique de JacquesDerrida', in Critique, 334, pp. 320-339. 1976a - `La Scene du Vomi ou comment ca se detraque dans la theorie', in Critique, 347, pp.418-443. 1976b - `Heidegger et Nietzsche', in Magazine Litteraire de Paris, 117, 12-14. pp. 1978a - `Pour Une Linguistique Active (La notion de phronese)', in Revue Philosophique de la France et de l 'Etranger, 103, 419-431. pp. Transcendantale', de la Methode Transvaluation `La 1979 in Bulletin de la Societe Franaise 1980a - Irrecusable, introduction de Philosophie, 73, pp. 77-119. Irrecevable. Un essai de presentation', F. Laruelle Levinas, Emmanuel ed., Pour to Textes Paris: Place, pp. 7-14. 1980b - ibid., diaspora', la de `Au Dela du Pouvoir. Le concept transcendantal 111-125. pp.

444 1980c - `Homo ex Machina, in Revue Philosophique de la France et de l 'Etranger, 105, pp. 325-342. 1981a - `Reflexions sur le Sens de la Finitude dans la `Critique de la Raison Pure', in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 35, pp. 269-283. 1982a - `Comment `Sortir' de Heidegger et de la Difference en General', in Cahiers de Philosophie. Heidegger (Exercice de la Patience), 3-4, Paris: Obsidiane. 1982b - `Projet d'une Philosophie du Livre', in Cahiers Obsidiane, 5, Paris: Obsidiane. 1983c - `Une Nouvelle Pensee Plutöt Qu'une Nouvelle Mythologie', typewritten text, presented as part of unpublished proceedings of the colloquium `Avons-Nous Besoin D'une Nouvelle Mythologie ?' M. Frank, Forget, F. 1983, June 2-3 Paris, held at Goethe-Institut, with F. Gaillard, F. Laruelle and E. Morin. 1983d - intense' 1'ethiqwý technologique De `Etho-techno-logie: en milieu Morales. de Sciences de Philosophie in Annales de l Institut et Ethique et Technique, Bruxelles: Universite de Bruxelles.

445 1985c `Programme Pour Une Critique de la Raison Technologique', in Le Cahier du College International de Philosophie (summary of two years of lectures at the College International de Philosophie, 1983-1985 Paris: Osiris. , 1986a - `Pour Introduire a 1'Inenseignable (La critique de la raison pedagogique)', in La Greve des Philosophes. Ecole etphilosophie, Paris: Osiris. 1986b - `Questions Ecrites'[apropos of A. Renaut's `De la philosophie comme philosophie du droit (Kant ou Fichte ?)'], Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de Philosophie, 80, pp. 122-123. 1987a - `La Verite Selon Hermes. Theoremes sur le secret et la communication', in Analecta Husserliana, 22, London: Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 397-401. 1987b - `La Philosophie Devant l'Intelligence Artificielle', in Le Cahier du College International de Philosophie, 3, Paris: Osiris, pp. 146-148. 1987c - `Pour Une Science de la Decision Philosophique', in Le Cahier du College International de Philosophie, 4, Paris: Osiris, pp. 25-40. 1987d - `Reponse' (to S. Valdinoci and P.J. Labarriere), ibid., pp. 60-66. 1987e - `Programme', in La Decision Philosophique, F. Laruelle ed., 1, Paris: Osiris, pp. 5-43.

446 1987f `Theoremes de la Bonne Nouvelle', ibid., 86-94. pp. 1987g - `Variations sur un Theme de Heidegger', ibid., pp. 86-94. 1987h - `L'Essence de la Science: Une description non-epistemologique', in La Decision Philosophique, F.Laruelle ed., 3, Paris: Osiris, pp. 5-37. 1987i - `Biographie de Solitude', ibid., pp. 101-104. 1987j - `Abrege d'une Science Humaine de la Philosophie', ibid., 105-111. pp. 1987k - `Octonaire de la Suffisance Philosophique', ibid., pp. 113-117. 19871 - `Exercise sur Peguy: `Une philosophie qui ne vient pas faute eternellement", ibid., pp. 119-124. 1988a - `Lettre' (apropos of J.Proust's `Problemes d'Histoire de la Philosophie: L'idee de topique comparative') in Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de Philosophie, 82, pp. 116-118. 1988b - `Pour une Critique Reelle de la Raison Pedagogique', in Le Cahier du College International de Philosophie, 5, Paris: Osiris, pp. 83-86. `Non-Heideggerienne" d' Deconstruction ?a possibilite `Sur 1988c une de International College Questions in Heidegger. ouvertes. Philosophie, Paris: Osiris.

447 1988d - `Du Monde Comme Methode', in Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Le psychique et le corporel, A. T. Tymieniecka ed., Paris: Aubier. 1988e - `Introduction a la Vision-en-Un', in La Decision Philosophique, F. Laruelle ed., 5, Paris: Osiris, pp. 41-61. 1988f - `Controverse sur la Possibilite d'une Science de la Philosophie', (debate with J.Derrida), ibid., pp. 63-76. 1988g - `Lettre ä Deleuze', ibid., pp. 101-105. 1988h - `Du Noir Univers dans les Fondations Humaines de la Couleur', ibid., pp. 107-112. 1988i - `Variations Leibniz', ibid., pp. 113-124. 1988j - `Lettre Ouverte aux Professeurs de Philosophie' (with S.Valdinoci), ibid., pp. 125-126. 1989a - `De la Revolution dans les Simples Limites de la Science', in Le Cahie du College International de Philosophie, 7, Paris: Osiris, pp. 111-126. `Non-Analyse" de Generalisee d'Analyse Concept 1989b - `Le ou , in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 43, pp. 506-524. Philosophique in Encyclopedie Transcendantale', 1989c - `La Methode Philosophique', 1: L'Univers 'Vol. dir., Jacob Universelle, A. Paris: P.U. F., pp. 693-700.

448 1989d - `Marges et Limites de la Metaphysique', ibid., pp. 71-80. 1989e - `L'Unite de 1'Homme et de la Science', in La Decision Philosophique, F.Laruelle ed., 7, Paris: Osiris, pp. 33-52. 1989f - `La Liberte du Penseur et la Communication Universelle', ibid., 77-88. pp. 1989g - `Ce Que 1'Un Voit Dans 1'Un', ibid., pp. 115-121. 1989h - `Prolegomenes a Toute Science Future qui se Presenterait Comme Humaine', in La Decision Philosophique, F. Laruelle ed., 9, Paris : Osiris, pp. 7-37. 1989i - `Debat' (with L. Ferry, proceedings of debate entitled `La nouvelle in de l'humanisme' held Lyon, April 1989), Villa-Gillet, querelle at ibid., pp. 39-64. 1989j - `Biographie de l'oeil', ibid., pp. 93-104. 1989k -'Mon Parmenide', ibid., pp. 105-114. 1990 - `La Cause de 1'Homme: juste un individu', in Analecta Husserliana, 49-56. Company, Publishing Reidel 29, London: pp. de la Decision Critique la des Phenomenes et 1991a- `La Science Phenomenologique', in Analecta Husserliana, 34, 115-127. Company, pp. London: Reidel Publishing

449 1991b - `1'Appel et le Phenomene', (apropos of J-L. Marion's `Reduction et Donation'), in Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 1, pp. 27-41. 1993a - `Le Concept d'une Ethique Ordinaire ou Fondee dans 1'Homme'. in Rue Descartes. College International de Philosophie, 7, Paris: Albin Michel, pp. 70-82. 1993b - `Essai de Traduction `Non-Philosophique' d'un Texte de Leibniz', in Oü en est la philosophie ?, intro. by J.Ladriere, Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Catholique de Louvain. 1994 - `Le Concept d'une `Technologie Premiere", in Gilbert Simondon. Une pensee de l'individuation et de la technique, (College International de Philosophie), Paris: Albin Michel, pp. 206-219. 1995a - `Reponse a Deleuze', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, Deleuze, Badiou, Althusser, des Contemporains. La Non-Philosophie Wittgenstein., Sartre, Russell, Husserl, Kojeve, Derrida, Fichte, Paris: Kime, pp. 49-78. 1997a - `L'Hypothese Essai bibliotheque', la livre le et Non-Borgesienne. sur Legueil. Jutta Stuttgart: in (Published german)

450 1997b `Qu'est-ce la Non-Philosophie que ?', introduction - to Initiation a la Pensee de Francois Laruelle, J-D. Blanco, Paris: 1'Harmattan, pp. 13-64. 1998a - `Theorie du Dictionnaire Non-Philosophique', introduction to Dictionnaire de Non-Philosophie, F. Laruelle et Collaborateurs, Paris: Kime, pp. 10-24. 1998b - `De la Non-Philosophie Comme Heresie', in Discipline Heretique. Esthetique, psychanalyse, religion, Non-Philosophie. Le Collectif, Paris: Kime, pp. 7-23. 1999 - `A Summary of Non-Philosophy', trans. by R.Brassier, in Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy. Volume 8: Philosophies of Nature, Coventry: Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, pp. 138-148. 2000c - `Identity and Event', trans. by R. Brassier, in Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy. Volume 9: Parrallel Processes: Philosophy Philosophy, University Science, Coventry: Department of of and Warwick, pp. 174-189. 2000d - `Alien-Sans-Alienation. Programme pour une philo-fiction' in Philosophie et Science-Fiction, ed. by G.Hottois, Paris: Vrin, pp. 145-156.

451 2001 - `Traduit du Philosophique', unpublished Secondary Litterature conference paper. Laruelle on a) articles: Aguilar, T. 1998 - `Badiou et la Non-Philosophie: un parallele', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, La Non-Philosophie des Contemporains, Paris: Kime, pp. 37-46. de Almeida, D. 1998 `Nous, les Non-Europeen', - in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, Discipline Heretique, Paris: Kime, 64-87. pp. Bernard, L. 1989 - `Compte-Rendu', (review of Laruelle's Le Principe de Minorite), in Revue Philosophique de Louvain, 82, 583-584. pp. Brachet, T. 1988 - `Precis de Non-Psychanalyse', Philosophique, in La Decision 5, Paris: Osiris, pp. 85-90. Brachet, T. 1989a - `(Non)Psychanalyse et Non-Psychanalyse', in La Decision Philosophique, 7, Paris: Osiris, 93-103. pp. 105-110. ibid., la Non-Psychanalyse', de pp. Brachet, T. 1989b - `Methode l'Autre', de Humanisme 1'Homme, de Brachet, T. 1989c - `Humanisme 4-5. Osiris, 9, Paris: pp. in La Decision Philosophique,

452 Brachet, T. 1995 `Les Philosophes Ne M'interessent Pas...36 Variations Kojeve', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, La Non-Philosophie des Contemporains, Paris: Kirre, 145-165. pp. Brachet, T. 1998 `La Psychanalyse: Une Autre Dialectique ?', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, Discipline Heretique, Paris: Kime, pp. 103-112. Decan, M. 1987 `Lire in English la Lettre Volee', in La Decision Philosophique, l, Paris: Osiris, pp. 72-82. Dennes, M. 1989a `Variations 1'Etre-en-Jete', in La Decision sur Philosophique, 7, Paris: Osiris, pp. 113-115. Dennes, M. 1989b - `De 1'Un-ä-1'Autre', in La Decision Philosophique, 9, Paris: Osiris, pp. 115-117. Dennes, M. 1995 - `Fichte et la Non-Philosophie', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, La Non-Philosophie des Contemporains, Paris: Kime, pp. 107-124. Derrida, J. 1977 - `Entretien', in F.Laruelle, Le Declin de l'Ecriture, Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, pp. 252-253. sur

453 Derrida, J. 1988 `Controverse sur la Possibilite d'une Science de la Philosophie', (debate withLaruelle) in La Decision Philosophique, 5, Paris: Osiris, pp. 63-76. Diaz de Kobila, E. 1989 `Philosopher en Argentine: la defense de la vie Comme programme', in La Decision Philosophique, 7, Paris: Osiris, pp. 7-19. Encrenaz, P. 1979 - `Discussion', (apropos of Laruelle's `La Transvaluation de la Methode Transcendantale) in Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de Philosophie, 73, p. 107. Ferrero Carracedo, L. 1977 - `F.Laruelle: Mas Allä de Heidegger', in Anales del Seminario del Metafisica, 12, Madrid: Universidad Autönoma. Ferry, L. 1989 - `Debat' (with Laruelle, proceedings of debate entitled `La Nouvelle Querelle de L'humanisme' held at Villa-Gillet, Lyon, April 1989), in La Decision Philosophique, 9, Paris: Osiris, pp. 39-64. de `La Transvaluation Laruelle's (apropos Gouhier, H. 1979 - `Discussion', of la Methode Transcendantale') in Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de Philosophie, 73, p. 101.

454 Grelet, G. 1998 `Un Breviaire de Non-Religion', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, Discipline Heretique, Paris: Kime, pp. 182-216. Henriot, P. 1979 `Discussion' (apropos of Laruelle's `La Transvaluation de la MethodeTranscendantale), in Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de Philosophie, 73, p. 117. Jacob, A. 1979 - `Discussion', ibid., pp. 106-107. Kahn, G. 1979 -'Discussion', ibid., p. 104. Kaufman, P. 1979 -'Discussion', ibid., pp. 108-110. Kieffer, G. 1998 - `La Non-Philosophie: mode d'emploie', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, Discipline Heretique, Paris: Kime, pp. 24-38. Kofman, S. 1977 - `Entretien', in F.Laruelle, Le Declin de l'Ecriture, Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 260-261. pp. Labarriere, P-J. 1987 - 'D'un Autre Un', (reply to Laruelle's `Pour Une Science de la Decision Philosophique') in Le Cahier du College International de Philosophie, 4, Paris: Osiris, pp. 52-59.

455 Lacoue-Labarthe, P. 1977 `Entretien', in F.Laruelle, Le Declin de l'Ecriture, Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, pp. 267-268. Leboeuf, M. 1998 `La Peinture Telle-Qu'elle', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, Discipline Heretique, Paris: Kime, pp. 137-168. Lemelin, J-M. 1987 `Pour Une Posture in Radicale', La Decision Philosophique, 1, Paris: Osiris, pp. 45-49. Lemelin, J-M. 1988 - `La Passion de la Verite ou l'Indifference de 1'Un', in La Decision Philosophique, 5, Paris: Osiris, pp. 91-99. Leroy, L. 1995 - `Derrida et le `Non-Philosophique' Non-Philosophie, Restreint', in Le Collectif, La Non-Philosophie des Contemporains, Paris: Kime, pp. 81-105. de Une Biographie Laruelle's (review `Compte-R 1986 D. Letocha, of er_du' - l'Homme Ordinaire), in Canadian Philosophical Review, 6, pp. 111-117. 1'Un', la Science a de 1'Histoire la Science `De en Maclos, V. 1995 des Non-Philosophie La Collectif, Le in Non-Philosophie, Contemporains, Paris: Kime, pp. 7-34.

456 Marion, J-L. 1991 `Reponses a Quelques Questions' (apropos of critical symposium on Marion's Reduction et Donation), in Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 1, pp. 65-76. de Mecquenem, I. 1987 `La Quete de l'Originalite et la Perte des Autorites Philosophie', in La Decision Philosophique, 3, en Paris: Osiris, pp. 81-84. de Mecquenem, I. 1989 - `L'Etrangete Comme Paradigme', in La Decision Philosophique, 9, Paris: Osiris, pp. 81-90. Merleau-Ponty, J. 1979 - `Discussion', (apropos of Laruelle's `La Transvaluation de la Methode Transcendendantale), in Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de Philosophie, 73, & 115-119. 100-103 pp. Moulinier, D. 1998 - `Jouissance: Transformation d'un Concept', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, Discipline Heretique, Paris: Kime, pp. 88-102. 113-136. ibid., Larmes', `Du Rire Nadot, L. 1998 pp. au Nancy, J-L. i9i7- l'Ecriture, de Decl Le in in F. Laruelle, `LilLretien', Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, pp.245-246.

457 Nicolet, D. 1987 `Wittgenstein Disciple de Freud', in La Decision Philosophique, 3, Paris: Osiris, pp. 85-96. Nicolet, D. 1995 `Philosophie Non-Theorique', in Non-Philosophie, Le C:oiiectit, La Non-Philosophie des Contemporains, Paris: Osiris, pp.223-234. Patoz, V. 1998 - `Pedagogie et Non-Pedagogie', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, Discipline Heretique, Paris: Kime, pp. 39-63. Petit, P. 1985 - `Compte-Rendu' (review of Laruelle's Une Biographie de l'Homme Ordinaire), in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 39, pp. 465-467. Petit, P. 1988 - `Sartre, le Roman et les Limites de la Philosophie', in La Decision Philosophique, 5, Paris: Osiris, pp. 77-81. du Roman', Aventures les Dernieres Sartre `Adieu: 1995 P. Petit, ou in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, La Non-Philosophie Contemporains, Paris: Osiris, Renaut, M. 1985 - `Compte-Rendu' 189-205. pp. (review of Laruelle's Le Principe de 5, Review, Philosophical in Canadian Minorite), 227-229. pp. des

458 Saint-Girons, B. 1979 `Discussion' (apropos Laruelle's `La of Transvaluation de La MethodeTranscendantale) in Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de Philosophie, 73, pp. 105-106. Salbert, L. 1998 `Le Genie en Exil', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, Discipline Heretique, Paris: Kime, pp. 169-181. Schmid, A-F. 1979 `Discussion' (apropos of Laruelle's `La Transvaluation de la Methode Transcendantale) in Bulletin de la Societe Francaise de Philosophie, 73, p. 110. Schmid, A-F. 1987 -`Les Animaux-Plus-Que-Philosophes. Essai sur L'irreversibilite du vecu', in La Decision Philosophique, 3, Paris: Kime, pp. 51-74. Schmid, A-F. 1995 - `Le Probleme de Russell', in Non-Philosophie, Le Collectif, La Non-Philosophie de Contemporains, Paris: Kime, pp. 167-186. Sibony, D. 1989a - `Remarques sur Science et Inconscient', 23-31. Osiris, Paris: 7, Philosophique, in La Decision pp. 53-75. ibid., 1'Etre', 1'Un `Reflexions pp. Sibony, D. 1989b et sur 89-92. ibid., `Allegements', 1989c pp. Sibony, D. -

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