The Ends of Medially When Machines Start to Think

Ezequiel Dixon- It's my pleasure. I would actually say good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. Ezequiel Dixon- Welcome to the second installment of the School of Social Policy and Practice Speaker Series on Controlled Societies, Technocratic Forces and Autologies of Difference. The Speaker Series is supported by Provost Excellence for Diversity Fund Grant, the Christ Lab for Digital Humanities and the School of Social Policy and Practice. This afternoon, I have the esteemed honor, and privilege, and pleasure, and excitement to introduce to you all Luciana Parisi. Luciana Parisi is a reader in cultural and critical theory, chair of the PhD program at the Center for Cultural Studies, and co-director of the Digital Culture Unit at Goldsmiths

University of London. Her research is a philosophical investigation of technology and culture, aesthetics, and politics. She has written within the field of media philosophy and computational design. She is the author of Abstract Sense, Philosophy, Biotechnology, and the Mutations of Desire, and Contagious Architecture, Computation, Aesthetics, and Space. She is currently researching the philosophical consequences of logical thinking and machines. Dr. Parisi is one of the world's leading scholars on algorithmic reasoning, and her book Contagious Architecture, she provocatively pushes the limits of how algorithmic thought is conceived. According to Parisi, algorithms are much more independent than the more traditional understanding of algorithms as mechanical operations that are contingent

on human intervention or design. Algorithms are actual entities that consist of finite operations of calculation as well as incomputable data sequences. For Parisi, it is the actuality of incomputability that provide instantiation of the imminent cognition of algorithms. That is operating between the space of finite algorithmic operations and the computability of the world's infinite complexity of information are manifestations of form speculative reasoning that are imminent to computation. Needless to say, I'm a huge fan. Her talk today is titled, The Ends of Mediality, When Machines Starts to Think. And at this point, I will stop thinking because I know you all don't want to hear my voice and my thoughts. I want to know you one of you are excited and ready to here in Tianzm. So without further ado, I'll turn it forward.

Thank you very much. This is very flattering. Thank you very much for inviting me. And I have to apologise for not being here at lunchtime for the prize live presentation, which I really want to share some of my work with you. Unfortunately, I had a problem with my flight this morning. So I'm really sorry I wasn't here this morning. I hope we can reschedule and have a conversation about the work that you're doing in the world. I find it extremely interesting. And also, it's a great opportunity for me to share my work and enter dialogue with people that enrich my work as well. So thanks again for the invitation. I'm really excited to be within this series, because of course my work does deal with the question of control and how to address the question of control for politics

in a constructive way. So I delve into my, I don't know why there is this thing at the top. This is just something that maybe, no. Go there. And then I'll have to. Sorry. Thank you. If you just click the three dots, it should say hide. Hide. Hide video panel. Sorry, it's unfortunate because it was right here and you also saw that.

Let's put it there. Okay. Sorry. So as intelligent machines use infinite amounts of data at increasingly faster speeds, the question of what have the means of communication become at the dawn of the 21st century above all involves what control has become in the aftermath of computation. In means without ends, George Organdran argued that the mediatic regime of contemporary capitalism is tapped into the very communicativity and linguistic being of humans. After the Society of the Spectacle for Agamben, the capitalist expropriation of language through the mediatic apparatus corresponds to the alienation of the very essence of communicativity.

Paradoxically, the cybernetic regime of constant communication keeps human beings separate from what unites them, i.e. human communication. The expropriation of the common, i.e. this commonality of language, this commonality of communicability, at once for Agamben denotes a violent destruction of political unity, but at the same time reveals the possibilities for counteracting it. The alienation of language reveals that humans can, for the first time, according to Agamben, experience the very linguistic essence, i.e. not simply the content of language or proposition, but language itself, the very fact of speaking, the medium of speaking.

So what language discloses, according to Agamben, is namely the medium without content, empty out of particularities. There is nothing behind the medium except communicability itself. the made doing, the feedback function, the procedures of mediation described by mathematical theories of communication, cybernetics and computation. For Agamben, this historical moment of pure communicability defines the neoliberal emptiness of communication, but also, as I said, the starting point of politics. While society or the societal spectacle involved a war of images, The war of communication, for him, defines the alienation and the commonality of language

and is at the very center of what is called controlled society. Agamben, therefore, for me, sets up parameters for a kind of critical theory of the medium, critical theory of the medium of control, from where my talk will depart. So for Agamben, the war over communicability is carried out outside the image of time in just this pure operationality of the machine, based on this simultaneity of points of view that neutralizes any quality, any property, any political project. It's almost like a point zero communication for him. The sanctions, the end of the history of the human, and especially the human being as a rational object,

a subject able to articulate reasoning. So this regime of, in this regime of communicability, this becoming surface of communicability, the experience of the human corresponds to an experience of being generic. So what has become generic in this regime of communicability is the matter of thought itself. So how thinking operates. It's externalized exactly this faculty of the human, beyond the human, or beyond the subject that was articulated during the enlightenment

as being the one who has the faculty of thinking. And this has happened precisely because of the regime of communication through cybernetics and computation for Agamben, the regime of mediality. So for Agamben, however, this possibility of experimenting this intellectual potential or following Spinoza, this idea of the potential intellectus which means um uh intellectual the freedom of the intellectual the freedom of thought um uh concerns or corresponds to the power of thinking so um for example this kind of potentiality

is also what can be found what marx has called the general intellect so the general the expression the political expression of the general intellect is the the capacity of thinking itself for the kind of surfacing of thinking um but for agamben in order to understand the political possibility of this coming to the surface of thinking through the regime of mediality through communication communication technology, one is to reject the false political choice between means and ends. And namely the idea that finality must override means and the mediality must conform with

ends. Instead, Agamben argues that being into language itself is pure mediality. This purr means that the kind of being into a mean is the reducible condition of human beings. This doesn't work anymore. I'm going to tap the mouse on the camera. Oh, sorry. that. So for Agamben, mediality is itself political. So the kind of emergence of the cybernetic regime of communication has to do with the becoming political

of the medium, of means itself, without or beyond the model of means having to conform to ends. So means being just an instrument, in other words, for pre-supposed ends, for truth that had to be just applied to a mean. The end of the regime of the spectacle for Agamemnon and the emergence of communicability demarcates the capacity of the medium itself to be political without a tooth behind it, without the content behind it. So political mediality. implies that there is no predetermined finality, no ends that drive the experimentality of

being in its being and mean. All experimentations of human actions and all experimentations of human thought. To experiment with the power of thought is a language experiment which involves according to modalities of free use, the use of what is common, i.e. language, communication. It's also for him a point of indifference between appropriation and expropriation. It's a moment also what is called in other writings, the moment of exception, where the paradox of appropriation and expropriation of capital precisely allows for an intervention. It precisely allows for a kind of political usability of the meeting. So while for a bit

Agamben, the triumph of the spectacle reveals the possibilities of politics within operationality, i.e., within the very use, instrumentalization, mediality, communication, pretty much are all the same, have got the same kind of connotation and temptation of using, of instrumentality. One may wonder whether the nature of this experimental, of this endless possibility that the means give us, the endless possibility of the medium, has changed with the automation of communicability and arguably the automation of thought. As Google's open source software library TensorFlow has released its artificial intelligence

on the net, one can no longer deny that communicability, usability, and mediality are computationally re-addressing the realm of thinking. the question of a politics of mediality is therefore a question of matter, if you want to follow a argument, if the question of politics of mediality is a question of the matter and power of thought, then we have to ask ourselves what kind of critical work can be done with this thought? In fact, it's a thought of the medium, it's the thought of the machine. So obviously, it's about provocation towards Agamben has to do with the provocation for

the fact that language itself does not just reveal the essence of the human. So the mean of communicability is telling us something else in terms of what is possible to think what is possible to communicate who is speaking as well um so current debates seem to shift towards two main positions in view of a critical thing how do we critically assess automation today or this automated thinking today so on one end we have a negative critique of automated communicability for instance the collective that can manifest the cybernetic hypothesis is online you can it is very interesting on the other hand you have a

political proposition which rather embraces uh mediality embraces automation for political ends so embraces full automation for political ends the cybernetic hypothesis also sides with another debate that you might be familiar for those of you working in the field of digital humanity which which has to do with the crisis of knowledge. The idea of the crisis of knowledge, the crisis of critique, whereby truths and laws and kind of hierarchies of knowledge will be replaced by a mediality of data correlation and matching, gathering ad hoc evidence. In its post Kantian articulation,

this argument about the impossibility of critique And the crisis of knowledge exactly maps onto the kind of capacity of neoliberal capital, and especially neoliberal capital within the form of controlled societies, to de-territorialize norms, to kind of relativize truth. So central to this position, however, if we follow Agamben, is precisely the question of how do we define this relation between means and ends? I think that Agamemnon is right to identify the problem of politics with the problem of rethinking instrumentality, rethinking the relation between ins and ends.

But for me, the question is how to rethink of this question within automated communicability. And these two positions, the cybernetic hypothesis and the full automation hypothesis, So I wrote some of the people that might be more familiar with the work of Fennin-Higley or other acceleration manifesto of xenopharmies. I can talk about it more in a second. So while on the one end, the cybernetic means of communicability are seen to be locked within prescribed ends that increase the variation of efficiency or the kind of management of

complex results. On the other hand, the political proposition for repurposing automation for political means for a future common that includes machines is more closely concerned with the consequences of the finality of automation. But what is important to highlight here is that the question of mediatic communicability cannot really be thought outside the 1940s experiments in automated reasoning. They were already at the core of cybernetics intelligence, cybernetic models of intelligence that, as we know, have a model of intelligence which is more physical, based on feedback.

And the computational experiments of artificial intelligence, instead, had more to do with logic. So these two, in the 1940s, the kind of combination, the kind of connection, historical connection between the work in cybernetic works in computational logic, made possible the transformation of the mean of communication into something that we call intelligent. Okay, so for me, since the World War II communicability has changed the nature of reasoning, investing into forms of control defined by the means of communication, i.e. by algorithmic rules.

In order for us to think of a politics of mediality, one should perhaps be careful not to just mirror the idea of the network, of a network politics, of thinking, of counteracting control through a politics of the network, but perhaps venture towards the critical vision of reasoning, a critical vision of reasoning itself through the medium, which kind of highlight this kind of what and other people have called the schizophrenic condition, a condition that cannot be reconciled, whereby the human intelligence has been hosting a kind of becoming inhuman of intelligence

itself, precisely through instrumentality. So for me, the question is really to rethink instrumentality and the relations through this mentality for human culture and because of human culture. Because obviously human culture is one of the few cultures, one could argue, that has used this for this mechanized reason in a way that no other species has done. I mean, although I sympathize with other modes of thinking about it. So I just want to go and talk about saponetic policy. So I just want to give you a bit of flavor of what is the argument of cybernetic hypothesis. Mediality is found the organic unity of language

into shattered bits and bits, emptying our communication of content, a kind of neoliberal suspension defining this paradoxical state of purposeness, purposiveness, a political condition which the means have no aims, and the aims have no causes. And I'm really referring here to big data, the kind of method of analysis, the method of organizing, classifying information through this big machine, or this kind of increasing machine, or computation machine of big data, whereby data just straight away retreat and transmit it.

There is no point, centralized point of control or kind of rule in terms of law or truth that can stand or can decipher the data before they are actually moved. So there's this kind of immediacy of retrieval and transmitting. And that's the kind of, interestingly, you see this kind of method of doing, of thinking, or creating. You see it in design. You see in logistics, in security, this kind of ubiquitous method of using data ad hoc as a when can be re-aggregated in a particular situation, but there is no knowledge, no fundamental criteria, parameter of truth

that actually allows for this data to be measured a priori. Okay, so it's a process that comes after the data is already working. So that's what I mean by purposeless, the fact that there is this kind of aimless, is aimless because it's got no finality. That's what Agambe was already describing. You know, there's no pre-supposed finality. That's why we live in a controlled society for him or to his length can be understood as a society of means without ends. My point is that it's exactly to rethink this relation between means and ends if we rethink of instrumentality differently.

Because the thinking of means without ends just has left us in this paradoxical condition whereby as governance or the governance of data allows for data to be reconstituted that talk ad hoc as a when uh the counter politics of that we cannot just mirror the method needs to create another method so for me it's really about pushing the critical work of the medium rather than using the medium repurposing the medium in the same way as it is purposed on us so aimlessly purpose on us or to us i don't know if i make myself myself free but that's that's the work i'm interested in doing so the cybernetic hypothesis

is exactly saying that is saying okay we we actually so the question they ask how can we have a political proposition for a digital subject or for a political commonality because the question is about what is the common so the common is the means for agamemad is the means of the means is communication and communicability that kind of potentiality of that where politics needs to be resolved from in this regime. But the question is, how can we produce a position for a subject or a common if the means, like the instrument, tech net, we use are the same as those used by capital? So they are refusing this kind of possibility of thinking of commonality through communication,

because the commonality is already bonded by governments. an illusion that we are bonding as you know you know see this is a bad trivial uh if we just think about google facebook amazon you know whatever kind of hub service provider we think the illusion of bonding of being in the same event and and we know that because when there are security issues so uh you know i always refer to the to this what happened the face on facebook when there was the last attack in Paris, you know, the kind of the mediality of that kind of event and the kind of bond, the kind of universal bond of the experience of being commonly, everyone

under attack obscured completely the political issue. So that's the power of this that one, I think the cybernetic hypothesis group is really cleverly, you know, is actually identified because it says what governance works on today is just experimentation protocols. Again, it's not one protocol, one law, one rule. It's experimentation protocol. The protocol is adaptable. It's adaptable to data retrieval. Data retrieval is where we get the nuance of how we actually can redefine the problem. So it's a logic. It is an open logic. It's not a logic that is closed.

So they say, the formation of a new empire actively piloted or still conduct of police. I check and predicts behavior. So that's what protocol, experimental protocol is doing. They also argue that the possibility of politics needs to move beneath and above the sport, the mediality, the communicability, the cybernetic communication one has to re-indicate autonomy the autonomy of the common and and for them is is really about trying to fight against this uh this kind of uh monopoly on autonomy because of course autonomy in the content uh classic or you know the kind of modern sense

autonomy the fact is the fact uh for freedom uh but it's not just freedom from from it's freedom towards so for them is about the freedom towards is really about um counter using the means of control so it's freedom towards um you know for them i mean very much like a gang of mokudar it's a messianic call for the people to come and this is for those of you are familiar also with the word or the idea of the people to come a subject to come the invention of a subject that's even for calls and we need to invent the subject for this politics for this uh the the kind of the for this moment of uh reconstitution of governance through uh data through the liberal

economical subject so for them uh one um has to counter use the needs of control of control so they talk about fog light tactics obfuscation impersonality neutrality difference uh the uh things but for them the the ends of control are already predefined in the means so So that's the kind of one, because for them, the control, or cybernetic control is already giving us a sense of social bond and also a sense of identity, a sense of belonging, a sense of place, which hides, for them basically,

as opposed to a government, it hides the racial agenda bias of search algorithm, database category, software function, that are instead already scrubbed within these categories. So there is an end already. That's the point. It's not means without end. Actually, the end of cybernetic control is precisely to reinforce this model, these categories through data. But nonetheless, you cannot become complacent the complacent or complacent or embrace the paradox as a political possibility. That's what they're saying. So control cannot also, so you can use the method of control to counter that control. That's what I'm saying. So, X in the cybernetic hypothesis,

as a totalizing image of living and social collectivity, therefore, becomes an opportunity to escape towards and escape towards to to become three four three uh four something uh uh a point of non-return so they i guess um for them the point of no return will be a point of non-negotiation with the models of, for instance, if you think about the manual, I don't know if you know this manual, it's called Obfuscation. It came up with MIT not long ago by Finn Branton and Helen Nissenbaum.

It's called Obfuscation. It's just a manual for counter tactics in the age of control. I mean, That's exactly how they talk about it. And they say that the kind of means of counteracting control that you can use are basically provide false information when signing out to social media, generate avalanches of false personal data, information pollution, you know, which is a guerrilla tactics. You know, we know that this is creating layers and layers and layers of information and obviously the trickling, that kind of information is very much at the very core of computational logic because, you know, so it's a war between, in their views, a war between sophisticated

artificial intelligence, they use a computational logic that is an open dynamic computational logic and creating layers and layers of false data, polluting the system so that the system can break down. But we know this doesn't happen. That's something the cybernetic hypothesis knows because they are aware of the fact that the system, that the system of governability itself is paradoxical, is open, is mutable. And to more layers of encryption, there will be more layers of encryption. The fight of, as Agambe said, the war is the war of communicability, the war of information, not just the war of appearance. It's not just about embodying a

position, but it's really about working through throughout the code, working through the source, rethinking the source um so it's an interesting position so we have this one or one end um and as i say they they uh you know they they they advocate for this messianic position and then on the other hand we have the automation opposition i don't know if any of you is familiar with the work of uh 20 negring uh i think like doing i don't usually i think for politics is uh it's interesting the discussion that is coming uh at least in europe um uh and i thought uh so-called autonomous was wrote you know wrote this book with the macular empire i guess some of you

are familiar with that and i'm linking to the accelerationist manifest which is a kind of response or reply back to the crisis of reason the class of critique the classes of political project i'm not subscribing to this for me the question is really to see whether the relationship between means and how it is articulated properly. So question here, and as I said, for the cybernetic hypothesis, really the question was about ends are already described in the mediality. There is no way that we can even be complacent. The only way is to create a parallel world of an exodus that we draw from mediality,

because it becomes saturated you can pollute as much as you know you just do the work that's already been done anyway so that's the whereas the automation hypothesis um negri wrote a response to the acceleration in my sister that you can also find it online which is on uninomada is a website that you find if you google search so for him instead the information is the most valuable form of fixed capital because it is socially generalized through cognitive work and social knowledge um for for agamem the algorithm machinery the centralization combines a complex system of knowledge now defines the abstract form of the general intellect this is something familiar to

what agamem has already said you know that mediality is the expression could be the political expression of the general internet the general internet being not just this form of labor attached to the assembly line of industrial capital but actually the labor attached to the creative intellectual thinking work of capital yeah whereby the machine is able to absorb not just the physical function but the cognitive function so you know they're both operate you know addressing this this question of Cora Bennett , Co competition auto automation of cognition. Cora Bennett , In terms of Cora Bennett , This figure of the general

Cora Bennett , Okay, so Cora Bennett , So for for for maybe we can definitely really potentiate the needs of network capital towards the angle autonomy of 12 the answer of autonomy and freedom I the means of capital for him are not one with capital that's what I am very interested in subscribing instead because the question of we always readdressing technology or in terms of control of governance or in terms of capital locks technology the potential technology or even the kind of philosophical,

but also social, rethink of technology away from a totalitarian image. You know, the totalitarian image of technology taken on by capital or taken on by governance. Of course, critical work needs to debunk that. But the debunking is not enough. For me, the debunking has to be associated the somehow the effort after the debunking is the reconstruction so how do you reconstruct technology tech net away from these images this totalizing image of vector capital which you know the cybernetic policy no technology is locked within that we can't do nothing with it

or we really need to really rethink of a model of computation or cybernet no cybernet for them is absolutely out of the question because they're both locked within you know military machine on one end and captain machine on the other so there's no way that we can do anything with technique whereas for maybe obviously you can you can repotentiate the means because the very idea of autonomia since the 60s come from the fact that you can use the radio tv any technology for social lines you extend the medium from the factory into the social on one hand it depicts a mode of governance you know the kind of the the extension of the governance of of of the factory

into the social uh but on the other hand also you know the means of appropriation of the radio is for community politics and for other politics uh is obviously uh quite important so that's where is coming from i think um so what i for you what it kind of points out is the possibility the political possibility of instrumentality that's what is interesting to me um um yeah the political of instrumentality i to redirect the means of the track of the teleological circularity of of your capital, the fidelity of money, we get more money. So on this, for the full automation model,

you can add ends to the means. The means can be repurposed for other ends, for social political ends. OK, so what is my question in relation to this? So, I guess, whilst one cannot deny the opaqueness of rule-based interacting networks, it is no longer possible to resign oneself to these epistemological limits of human knowledge and the impossibility for critique beyond this kind of irrational, almost irrationality of algorithmic operation. While Negri's vision of expropriating the potentiality of this dynamic automata seems to ultimately imply that machine are, after all, passive instruments to be believed by political force.

Whether this political force can be emancipatory or cynical, that's what it's implied in this model. But one can no longer overlook that the new nature of this seemingly non-logical communicability that algorithmic automation seems to embody. In other words, rather points to the fact that it's not just sufficient to disengage or divorce technology from capital. And then think of technology or instruments to repurpose them for social means. What is left behind? What part is this technique doing?

What is it as itself being an actual being, as itself being a manifestation of, yes, okay, you can say it's nonetheless has been invented and designed by humans, but the question of autonomy needs to be addressed also in relation to the machine. because we know that the machine is operating autonomously but we have programmed them to do that because automation doesn't just mean uh that reiteration of function it also means capacity of decision independent capacity decision so that's what they are leaving behind that's a question that they're not directly addressing so i want to suggest that the critical view about the political consequences of the use of machines on behalf of machines may benefit instead from a

pragmatist articulation of instrumentality that allows intelligent machines to become not only repurposed but become transformative of the very idea of techno-capital and transformative of social practices uh through and with uh this automated cognitive function the question is can automatic cognitive function um rather not just being uh repurposed for community uh or for kind of specific social ends but can what what are they telling us about the transformation of the social

and the transformation of the political possibility of the social. How can we think through them and rather than ignoring that instrumentality is not just a tool? So that is my question. Okay. So, I think that this, So algorithmic automation, we know that generally speaking involves the breaking down of continuous processes into discrete components whose functions can be constantly reiterated without help.

Automation ensures that initial conditions can be reproduced at infinitum, as for instance the the Turing machine, an absolute mechanism for iteration based on step-by-step procedures. So this is the classical general question, idea of understanding automation. But since the 60s, if one goes and looks into the books closer, the nature of automation has undergone a dramatic changes as the result of the development of computational system to store, retrieve, and elaborate on data. across a network infrastructure of online parallel and interactive system. Whereas previously, automatic machines were limited by the amount of feedback data that

they could collect and sort, algorithms now directly process vast amount of information as they get retrieved. So text and image match them to sensory inputs, reshuffle them in a growing network data set and finally decide which output to do so algorithmic automation is therefore designed to analyze and compare option run possible scenarios or outcomes perform reasoning through problem solving um steps um which are not contained with the within the machine within the program of the machine already that's the thing it's not a storage of axiom that the machine has to check whether the things

are working or not i will say to my student it's no longer space all this in 2001 where a uh i had to i don't know if you guys are familiar with where all the artificial intelligence and in order not to fall into contradiction with the axiom already described within it as to kill all the humans because the problem of error the the possibility of error uh was not included within the deductive logic of the machine it was an error had to be eliminated it was a non-stream light function and this is what has precisely changed after the post 1960s with automated machine so um the increasing volume of incomputable or non-compressible

data within online distributive interactive systems reveal that the incompleteness of the logical reasoning is not the fact that error, the fact that error cannot be accounted, cannot be accepted, that incompleteness is rather essential to computational thinking and that probability, either very statistical calculation of probabilities, no longer conform to a final state, or to reach a final state but instead includes um patternless data set uh that can be learned by the machine as they are processed so there is the question is this incredibly complicated to give an image you know the network doesn't do it because there are species and species and

species of algorithms whose function may be limited but together they do things that none of them is already prescribed to do and the dynamism of this intelligence okay is network but nonetheless has to do with the capacity of this of this algorithm species to act upon and to kind of elaborate upon on contingent data. So it's not pre-programmed, it's contingent, as when it emerges, as when it is retrieved. So there is no, you know, there's no program behind it. The program is just to act upon the contingency.

So it's a kind of contingent mode of computation, rather than being a kind of formal model of computation. Yeah. So always a formalism of another kind, you can also argue. Okay. So, where does this idea come? Where did I get this illumination from? This idea of incompleteness, the importance of incompleteness and incomputability for machine thinking, for me, comes from the work that, the experimental work that was done in what is called algorithmic information theory. I was just mentioning before that algorithm information theory since the 60s will come over but then in the 70s and 80s with for me Gregory Chaitin who popularized the use

of the application of algorithm information theory is crucial because it brings together exactly computational logic and cybernetics. That's what algorithm information theory does. where you know the what is behind the revolution of big data and the idea of actually being able to retrieve and organize and transmit information as it when it comes in the system i is not pre-programmed the aim the aim of the machine are not pre-programmed so it's a it's a sense of the means of computation are active are acting not through the end of aims it's not the end of aims but

is a transformation of the aims because the aims are tailored to act upon elaborate adapt counteract contingent data so the the endless finality if i want to go with aristotle categories finalities become contingent but that's the weird result at least i mean i might be wrong but that's that's the kind of model that i'm working with so cheating um drew on this on this uh on both uh um the limit of computation i this model that i i discussed before and of formalism of the kind of classic automated machine,

bringing together in completeness in logic, patternless data, and what it calls discrete infinities. So it brought together Shannon's theory of communication. For those of you who are familiar with Shannon, Shannon argued that noise is central to communication. there is no message that passes through a machine or goes from input to out without the redundancy of noise its function is a different conception of noise that being a good thing so for being obviously noise is against information then you need to get to negative to really use information within systems for Shannon and that's why charting uses China not being there

And noise is not a patternless information. That's what it means. It cannot be compressed into a discrete unit or cannot be compressed into an integral number. It's got infinities within it. And for him, Shannon, I don't read it in this mathematical theory of communication. I don't read the individual, but the noise is central to communication. and in computables are central to communication. Randomness is central to communication. Patternless information is central. That kind of contingency, that kind of not pre-programmed information, the very fact that exists information, and the more you retrieve data, the more information exists, is central to communication.

So that on one end. And on the other hand, a transformation in logic. I don't know if you're familiar with Godel, but the idea of Godel of the limit of an axiomatic model or universal mathematical language would put forward the idea that actually, it's impossible to have a universal mathematical language because every mathematical language will be incomplete because we will not be able to account a priori for the existence of X, Y, Z. So it brings these two things together and it comes out with this idea of experimental axiomatics. So he argues that, okay, one in deductive reasoning,

the logic that we're used in computation, when and as we wanted to mechanize reasoning, has shown that it's limited to the, if we just operate on the level of deductive logic, where premises and results, so results are contained in the premises. So deductive logic is a very linear mode of thinking, whereby every kind of postulate already contained any possible manifestation of that postulate. So it's truth, basically. So whatever happens is always to be measured against truth. So the system measurement is completely molar or completely determined by given quantities.

It's not appropriate, it's not statistics. It's deducted. And experimental axiomatic for me is the fact that actually in the process of algorithmic systematization because what algorithms do, algorithms compress data. And they're there to kind of give data a kind of category, or a kind of taxonomic classification. So for in computation itself, because it's determined by rule of behavior, what computation does is that the scope is to compress and compress data

so that data can be going this category or that category. So you can have these results or that result. But since it's saying the process of computation is impossible within this large system of interactive system of data, it's impossible to contain. It's supposed to have one formula, one algorithm for all this data, What actually algorithms do is to approximate or experiment with data. But nonetheless, this experimentation doesn't mean that they don't work. Actually means that they work experimentally. I mean, the two are, one could argue inductively,

but induction as a method has to do always with moving from particulars to gen. So, whereas what he's trying, it seems to me that when he talks about experimental axiomatic, he wants to include indeterminacy of fallibility within the system of reasoning. So the system can get wrong. So the idea of the truth, which is achieved, can be reassessed. That's what he means. That there is no one truth. So it's not inductive, because inductive will go, it's like deductive in a way, in terms of method, because you can add the stuff from the general and then impose the general frame on any particular,

or you start from particular, but which you determine, you know, you use one tool. You still have, you know, it's the same, it's the two phases of the same column. But actually for him, instead, is the fact that it's experimental Because by running other computation, this truth can be reassessed. So it's contingent to the particular. So it's a question of also scale. It's scale towards the particular. It's not just cannot be generalized, but can be run over and over again under different circumstances and will give you different truths.

So for me, what is important is that this experimental axiomatic does not coincide with the failure of conceptual cognitive structure at the triumph of this uncontainable contingency. So for me, the critique, OK, so if one can go with this vision, You can end up saying, okay, so computational system actually have failure within them. Or they're super particular. People talk about granularity. The granularity of data is about particulars with particulars with particulars.

So there is no way that you can have a general image or a general picture. But actually, what that's critically, what that means is that we are left in a world, again, we go back to Agamben, of means without end, if we do that. So critically, it's problematic for me, because we go back to the fact that the aim is always already in the process of being achieved as a way. There is no aim, there's no finality. Actually, the very processuality of contingent data annuls your neutral analysis finality. So you are really back into the political,

into the world of mediation per se. Okay. So to put it differently, the limit of computation and the dominance of the problem being computable in interactive distributed systems they do not simply coincide with the failure of cognitive structure with the failure of reason versus the triumph of use or events versus the trial for means instead in computables are now part and parcel of a computational logic and conceptual architecture which is imbued with pattern of misinformation which extends and exceeds the apparent purposeless means of capital,

where reasoning has been just completely emptied out of its aims. Even if we do not yet know what the thinking aims of computational means may be, it is no longer possible to assume the means and no logic and that technique has no reason perhaps this is what negri emphasis on the emancipatory gesture of new forms of instrumentality beyond capital may imply however what it does is that he overlooks the possibility that automation has already developed a quasi autonomous mode of thinking perhaps limited to experimental logic you know in the case of what chatham describes for us But the question is that what are the political implications beyond this network image of

capital or beyond this kind of just social repurposing of the machine? So when talking about the instrumentality of thinking, it is not simply the deductive logic computation or the cost and regulation of patterns that define control. importantly the acceleration of automated intelligence points to one could call the alien logic emerging throughout machines use of rule processing operationality are machines who are using they are not just implementing reasoning through rules they are using the rules um It is possible to suggest that within controlled society, technologically implies a shift from

didactic to experimental axiomatic within and beyond the means to ends of means without ends of the liberal capital. This shift is accompanied by a new degree of autonomy motivation, which does not simply involve the execution of tasks, the performativity of data, setting up plans without human control. More importantly, the advance of experimental axiomatics points to a transformation of one of the bastions of reason itself. Here, the means of thinking itself are not set to execute truth or inductively retrieve and transmit data. Instead, I suggest that automated means of reasoning are also generating hypotheses.

They are finding the best explanation, making new meanings without a wise reassessing parameters according to new circumstances. So, automatic cognition includes a new forms of intelligibility, a new form of the intelligible. There's not just a new form of sensibility, but also new forms of intelligibility. And I'm also referring to the work done by affect theory in terms of cognition, for example. Cognition the student types of sensibility but i think that one is to also add this other layer of intelligibility um geared not simply towards the optimization solution but the production of new axiom codes and meaning so um one of the uh one of the um uh one way of making uh either the

the distinction between the kind of experimental logic that can be used by capital and the regime of inductive data, which big data are the example now, is perhaps a re-articulation of the relation between means and ends. They could start for me, as I suggested before, but with the pragmatist proposition. And this is where I'm going to end my talk today. that instrumentality is central to a collective and political reorganization of the social. And I'm specifically referring here to John Dewey's work.

John Dewey wrote this wonderful essay, The Logical Experience, where he talks about instrumentality as the central question of technology is to, or even of thinking, is to re-elaborate the relationship between means and means. So, of course, they say critique by Horkheimer, Marcuse, all the critical theory, European-German theory where, you know, this mantle due, because they were thinking is pragmatism obviously was pragmatist for capital but actually the one has to suspend

the suspicion um and really try to work through what was it trying to do because that project or rethink the instrumentality the pragmatist for a regular citizen that is still unaddressed and it's what i think we need today we need to think what are these means at this end is that really can we really is it sufficient to just leave a political to just propose the collective and imagine a collective society through means only and because ends you know are just linked to this kind of teleological model of capital or government which as we know within at least the machine is no longer active so are we dealing with what is no longer active with the idea or

or the ideology of what we think is acting. I guess this may be a question. OK. So I started with the computational infrastructure of communicability, with this premise, sorry, with the premise that the computational infrastructure of communicability resonates with what Agamben defines as the radicalization of the societal spectacle extended to this plane of pure mediality. This involves, as I said, the complex paradox of mediation as an ontological condition on the one end, neoliberal, sorry, a condition of one end, neoliberal control corresponds to the devolution of content for communication procedures.

On the other, the political possibility of inhabiting a space without depth, of means without aims. Nevertheless, as this model of means without ends has come to coincide with this network image of control able to manufacture truth, mediality of communicability is increasingly caught within this capitalization of any data foreclosing the foreign and internal counter-quality. Similarly, it has been argued embracing this paradoxical condition and the means of capital to activate the politics of mediality also risks foreclosing the internal perhaps autonomous

activity of technology, in this case of algorithms, of elaborating their own logic for their own use of data impacting aims of an alien kind, they need to be addressed. In short, it seems crucial here to realign the dynamism of means with that of aims at all count for a sheer usability of the means that is also supported by an indeterminacy of unplanned use. What I mean is that are ulterior aims, unplanned use of this one, the one is to look at. Okay. Okay.

I just want to go straight to do it. So, and then I am just one, less than one page. One possible way of addressing how indeterminate aims or experimental aims can be related to means can be found in the American pragmatist view of instrumentality. According to John Dewey, a pragmatist understanding of instrumentality involves not simply the establishment of an effective succession of states in a particular reasoning, but the capacity to enter a process of achievement. Instrumentality here stands not for the implementation of ideas into tools

or for mere mediality without causality, but can be defined as a productive activity, a doing in which the achievement of ends coincides with the means elaboration of thinking, of their logical thinking. I think for pragmatism, instrumentality is concerned with the means by which ends can be achieved, it poses non-ontological distinction between human and machine thinking, and concerns rather a generality of reasoning that may include automatic cognition and its capacity to generate thought.

For Dewey, thinking is itself an intelligent medium. And similarly, machines are intelligent techniques. And yet this commonality does not imply that aims and ends are the same, or their thoughts and things are the same. They're not of the same kind. The two activities do not have the same consequences. So there is an autonomy of activity of the means and the ends, but nonetheless a complementarity which is not symmetrical is obviously asymmetrical or diffraction or fractal but nonetheless um one has to recognize both the autonomy and the complementarity and not the end of one and the superposition of one over the other that's

that's what was important thing um so instrumentality is an experimental inquiry for which new ends can be achieved through new means or through old means and vice versa. The means and the ends cannot be eliminated from reasoning because reasoning is always exposed to what is not yet known. It's an inquiry into the ends that comes from the practice, i.e. from the practical thinking, i.e. from the instrument, as a practice. Instrumentality therefore is concerned with how the matter of thought can be shaped the change by entering a new environment. From this standpoint, data are not simply abstracted from their use, but rather used as means. So data themselves

becomes means, is the mentality of knowledge, things by which we know rather than things that are already known. Data are not given object for building knowledge, truths of belief. Instead, the data for Dewey are incomplete and as a consequence they can contain suggestion on meaning. He talks a lot about suggestion rather than an object meaning. That's what data are. They are experimented with in order to achieve more reliable science, more evidence. The object of knowledge is something with which thinking ends or the the instrument the activity of the instrument can achieve um all knowledge therefore requires experimentation from means to ends in short for doing one can

argue that the matter of thinking coincides not simply with the means of thought as agambe would have said but with the experimental elaboration of ends where general communicability as the devolution of particular content is found not in nameless means but in how ends of particular means become impartial and impersonal so in a way you you are you are still trying to argue for a generality because the problem of staying within a regime of particularity of data sets doesn't allow for a reconfiguration of thinking of the matter of thought beyond human thinking.

So in order to extend it, one has to work through a generality. So, whilst true communicability is entrenched in practical means, the mechanics by which it works, the consequences of this knowing how imply the generation of ends and the achievement of a general knowledge within the experimentation of particulars. Far from mediality being defined as a nameless drive of function after function, of task after task, perhaps this pragmatist view of instrumentality can help us to rethink computation of the computational means and ends for the invention of a new politics beyond this image or network control so computational

communicability becomes an end involves an experimental determination of ends instrumentality therefore becomes itself a practice of logical thinking which accounts for an elaboration of contingent data so it's a way of rethinking the relation between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge so if we are saying that practice the practice of doing research or collecting is devoid of causality or events, we are forbidding, we are precluding means to achieve their own ends and to express their own meaning. And we go back to the platonic

model of distinguishing pure ideas from implementation. Thank you very much. Thank you for your talk. I'm wondering, in this view of means and ends, where are we looking from? In other words, are we thinking of these questions in the instrumentality from the point of view of individual actors or are we standing at an Archimedean position and looking at it

from the outside? Because the reason I'm asking this question is that there seems to be more and more instrumental rationality rather than less because if you, I mean, you know, in neoliberalism, I'm thinking of the studies which ask students, you know, what is their goal in university in life and from in the 60s, they used to say that, you know, it's to find myself to learn more about myself and discover my, you know, self-discovery and now they're more, you know, answering that I want to get a good job and I want to make a lot of money. So in the way that we at least phenomenologically experience our needs and goals, it seems like we are much

more means, I'm sort of ends oriented rather than, you know, the pure means and, you know, means driving more means and that kind of thing. So I'm wondering is, and then you mentioned of Negri and I'm thinking of the kind of Negri thinking of constituted power and constituent power that you know it's all constituent power and things you know should not be constituted and they should always be in flux but from the point of view of you know my being in the world I am trying to consume concrete things and build things and constitute things that I can then manipulate and exchange and so forth. So basically where am I looking at in this

conception? What is my subject position in order to understand the world in this way? No, Tode, thank you. That's a very useful question for me to explain. So thank you. you. Where are you looking from? I guess the perspective is very, it's obviously very important, but the perspective is mediated. It's mediated through the apparatus of image, of the spectrum, of manifested image, but in this case it's mediated by algorithmic language and algorithmic logic. So for instance, in terms of, just to give you an example, in terms of method, that was something I was going to refer to my whether where I there at lunch time

uses this model of the Gabriel Tard of the monad and he says okay in order for us to do research through you know let's look at the word self-organization how many people have used it in this lapse of time how can we not impose a framework but actually work from a monadic perspective so the monadic perspective what does it allow is that the overlaps points it never is not just an aggregation of data out of which there is one subjective position or one perspective over but actually they are all simultaneously engaged in their space of research so it's not one actor you know you obviously will argue

with this theory it's a series of of of or it's a network so what does constitute the perspective the point of view is implicated all these other layers that overlap on top of each other so there's never this kind of ecclesiastic model of the perspective or a subject position but i understand the problematic and the limit of that insofar as instead uh what we have in this kind of you know that's why i agree with the cybernetic hypothesis to some extent because obviously we are intertwined in this kind of the perspective the bond is is it's a program program that's the social body the the sorry the the perspective onto the world is programmed already within the machine in its variability

because it's a but you know you can find you can occupy all these layers it's totally fine that's what's the problem with governability or we constitute the power constitutive power today has to do with uh if if you could argue is an agglomeration of moderns you know because you can change perspective but that's why it's so effective in what you are you said when you've mentioned the instrument it says more instrumentality with rationality because you know it's not the instrumental rationality that we were talking about you know that adorno come and describe i.e. you know that there is a clear ideology and there is a clear means through which that ideology is transformed into conduct into behavior a response we know that response

but now the you know the the i mean at least that you know also this series is inspired to the idea of control and control breaks down the subjective constitutive architecture into malleable fragmented bits, aggregation, granularity, particularity, where you don't have this constitutive position, but you are programmed into the fragmentation, into the disaggregation, re-aggregation of data. So you could argue that's an extension of instrumental reasoning. That's all it. Fine. I mean, I think that's the argument that the cybernetic of what is doing.

We were used to that kind of vulnerability. Now, you know, we have this. So no matter how much you pollute the system, you are in it. That's exactly how it's open. The constitutive power, that's how exactly operate. My provocation, my doubt towards this email, this kind of critique, critical reason is that, what if, you know, the kind of model, instrumental model that is used in especially you know education or you know I work in university as well that the question is it always exactly task tasking so the net the computational model that we are embedded within as staff as students as well is exactly the

result so it's optimization efficiency results that we know doesn't work we know that the machine is that breakdown there are always uh there are always by the ability within the machine and so my question is is it is it the instrumental is an ideology of the tech net or is the tech net or is the tech net in its possibility of instrumentalizing itself and therefore or creating material motives from what they are radiologically they thought for. Where is the limit? You know, if you look historically, the development of artificial intelligence from the 50s to the 80s changed massively.

And this change has also to do with the fact that epistemological knowledge is not a finished product. you know that the machine can only do what we can do and we are using it in a way that are delimiting its capacity to think otherwise it's almost like when you think about science is okay that they're more you know there's euclidean model and there is the topological model with the topological model we found out gosh you know there's much more to the world it's like it's much more epistemologically real to the world than we used to know But it doesn't mean that Euclidean model doesn't work anymore, but it means there is other, you know, there's a question of the limit on the rules. So the question for me, in the most extreme perhaps radicalized way, is that one has to

rethink automation critically, not in the sense of a constituted power, but in terms of what is it constituted? What is it possible to do? If it was operating with a logical deduction before, and I was operating with experimental logic or abductive logic so politically what does it mean this in terms of the the the point of view you see it looking at us are the humans becoming uh um as a carrier of the logic they don't know they don't understand if we don't understand it we better try to understand it rather than using in terms of for some universities that i know or some kind of institutions or knowledge use machines just to efficiently implement something but not creatively or not critically so the question

how do we use them critically that's i guess i'm trying to work out okay thanks there are questions i think shall i do the chair it was first and then and then you're second yes so yes you first Thank you for this fascinating, quickly and widely moving talk. I wonder if I understand you correctly and you stating that the site of the intervention now is going to be at the level of the algorithm, sort of creative use of the algorithm. Whether you're sort of pointing to the obsolescence of language and advancing your own ideas in a way. Because I'm thinking of sort of, you mentioned theory,

but I think about a different pragmatist, James, who says the theoretical works. And so if language is no longer sort of a privileged realm as an historic opposite of mediality, then how do your ideas become extremely separate from their modes of communication in a kind of recursive way that's interesting to me, or should we brainstorming algorithms that can do this, that can sort of come from the nodes of incommensurability or sort of incompatibility that isolate as a source of creativity and critical response to data. Thanks, that's a brilliant question. Thank you so much. Okay, I'll reply this from Wins. one and you can add the language as there's no end to language yeah because

language is a code you can understand me like pretty clear understand it so know if you know his work where it's a German one of the most interesting German philosophers of media Hitler and you know if that is this he goes back takes the the kind of computation algorithm goes and go back to you know uh the the the very understanding of the cosmos of the morse code you know most called as a language so you know code has always been at the very core of communication um in the idea of the capacity of synthesizing you know we see today in a very trivial way where we text message we just use two letters instead of

your language the compression channel will stay the same the same you know the capacity of communication and the mathematical theory of communication has to do with the fact that the channel has redundancy but the redundancy can be reduced to uh to concern that you eliminate letters okay so that's one so you can have this expansion of or historical understanding of language in terms of codes but But then what about grammars? What about rules? And obviously you have, you know, one and the other thinking operates through grammar. Yeah, so Chomsky, you know, in that case, but then you have also computational cognition, philosophical idea where you have the grammar of thinking, you know, there's always subject having a compliment.

And the grammar has been transplanted in first order computational intelligence that operate symbolically. And there is a symbol that corresponds to a neuron that corresponds to this rule. So you have this kind of grammatic understanding of language through computation. But then the language, for example, I'm just trying to get this parallel between machine and philosophy, because that's what I think. I think it might be, we can find other ways, but it's hard. And you can have then, Bittgenstein comes, yeah? Bittgenstein, and they say, well, actually, forget what I said before in the philosophical tractors. It's all about use. The usability, the mediality of language

is what constitutes language, not the formal rule. And yet parallelism, you have the development of interactive algorithms that in the artificial intelligence is, OK, the modality of thinking actually is in usability. You have user-centered design, you have all sorts of extendedization of the language in use. So you could argue that. But then there's also a question that obviously, you know, if you look at the educational programs for primary school coding, it's part of the curriculum, rightly so. One could argue, but one could also argue, not rightly so, because you, Instead of learning how to think,

yeah, it's just the massive shift. Instead of thinking of how to think, you take a code that is a representation of that so compressed that you are between others. So the way they are developed, educational transmission of knowledge, educational model of thinking is embedded by and through the machine thinking. This is the machine that has to think in such a synthesized way. So it's a question, they say, well, then what has language become? And you can have poetry that can use rules, codes, algorithms. You can think of models, methods of knowledge that are asymmetric, that don't come

to that cross-disciplinary in this way. And that because in culture, this is already happening. But within our obviously models of knowledge, we think I am concerned that in primary school kids don't know how to think and they want tasks and they will, you know, the task, task begets task. You know, even Heidegger, this critique of cybernetics in this wonderful essay called the end of philosophy, you know, where he's talking about, it's all about task begetting task, the function begetting function. You know, we need to instrumentalization is to be a poor and critically opposed in favor of poiesis.

So you have poiesis, which is this more artisan craft model of knowledge that you have also with today, you know, the tendency of Baker's lab, you know, though this kind of community working with technology, replacing technology for usability outside the domain of technical expert but then my question that would be fine we can do all that but then what is instead the thinking of the machine we can we just use it without I'm not rethinking together what is actually also doing it the sheets like this is like this is like a print galaxy Gutenberg you know a renaissance of knowledge transmission at least for

others my job woman not a scientist or the capitalist for a man I think my job at least is to ask this kind of question to take it on rather than just put it aside as always technically to the point is in casting okay let's think that never easy why do we have to leave it as a negative thing that we can't touch that would just suppress us so that's i guess yes yes thank you so much i want to ask you about what the term alien logic it's new okay let me try this stuff so um i really agree with you uh if i understand your critique of Agamben and Negrim

be commanded in that way. So the Agambenian version, right, you think too much about means and this means the ends are the building of beings, right? And in hard version, you have too much focus on just repurposing the for certain ends that you can do the split plot and also missing that ends are the way you can't simply represent. And I saw you offering alien logic as something that's and third term in that because it also poses the problem of alienation and logic. And I heard you saying, tell me if I'm wrong, that something that happens when we get algorithms that can think for themselves, let's use the kind of reifying vocabulary here, can think

for themselves. They're working with things after the computability theorem, which says, well, we can't compute all numbers. Incompleteness, then happens during. You can't compute all numbers, but there are certain kinds that are computable. And here's the math that will pull us that. The computer comes out of this idea that things aren't complete, but you can do stuff. That's very much complication. But that's never been a problem with French for a computer. I was thinking when you were talking about, we don't know what they're doing anymore with algorithms. They're working on themselves. They're creating data that we don't understand. I was thinking about what Jonathan Neumann says. early in the 50s about the automaton. He says actually, you know, automatons are basically algorithms. They're a description of the process, which is quite simple automaton, would require a

greater description than the automaton itself. It's more complex to describe the thing than the description that's inside. Right? So I wonder if that might be something, I don't know if that is alien logic. I just wanted to talk about this just a little bit because it seemed like you were talking about it's not logic anymore and we use the phrase logic right yeah and I want to know about alien because I feel like maybe there's another way to see this where there's thought and thought and thought is alienated into so many articulated structures that thoughts going on in a way that's no longer human in the present but can't totally dissociate it from labor relations human So, okay, so this is the two terms I wanted to talk about because I think very much I really, really agree with really kind of everything you're saying. I just wanted to know why that phrase and did Shaitlin also say alien logic?

No, I am improperly using that. Thank you very much. Can I ask you that's in spirit? And it's actually kind of an addition to that. You can choose to not address this, but because the alien aspect of it was interesting to me because there are so many assumptions inherent in that. And the concept of contingent logic, of building on contingent processes, is also, there's an assumption, a teleological or a topological assumption that nothing is ultimately alien. that there will actually be some kind of an appropriation, if you will. I use that term in the Marxist way, because that has always been the logic of capital,

so to speak, from a Marxist perspective, from a Eurocentric Marxist perspective. The capital and the logic of the machine will figure itself out. It will take difference that is alien and make it part of its own productive process. And the critique of that I mean, I think it's a very important thing to think about the way that we're going to be able to do that. And I think that's a very important thing to think about. And I think that's a very important thing to think about. And I think that's a very important thing to think about. And I think that's a very important thing to think about. And I think that's a very important thing to think about. And I think that's a very important thing to think about. And I think that's a very important thing to think about.

history. And that when capital gravitates towards the other parts of the world, which is about 85% of the world, probably more actually, then there are certain complicated interminglings of the logics where the logic of capital is interrupted, but not necessarily defeated. It's not this Marxist defeat, but it is an interruption, a complication, which is alien in a very alien way. It is not alien to the logic of capital necessarily, but it is alien to the purpose of capitalism, when capital can exist without capitalism. And to me, that was what I thought you were going towards for a second, but I think, if I may be pertinent, isn't that where I think

this model fails to take into account the real possibilities of resistance. It is not in the repurposed logic of the system, of the process of contingent mapping. And a little aside, once a map becomes contingent, then you're also talking about boundary conditions, shorter and shorter boundary conditions to make it more and more specifically contingent till the map becomes a landscape. And so you know the virus exactly the virus of the system is that it is not that therefore representation language doesn't become a representation it is and there's no I do want to I wonder why did not actually make that leap of how

contingent this is on the fact that this is all European machine code what's what happened to that logic? Thanks, thank you very much. Very excellent questions. That really helped me to think through. So thank you, really. Okay, so my challenge is exactly to rethink logic. So not the end of logic. My question is to if the rational project, the European project or enlightenment was to, was based on the active logic. And then we have a view of practical knowledge there. And the foundation of West of Petaphysics are based on the separation

between theoretical and practical knowledge, where theoretical knowledge is ideas that do not have to be implemented. They don't need proof. And practical knowledge is about the proof of the function only. My question is, what happens when the proof of the function is developed? its own logic so it's not an implementation of the pre-asimology you know embedded with an idea of reason in terms of law the law the truth presupposition axioms that go and govern particularities but rather is how historical uh even unintentional uh or accidental or even

purpose for purposeful instrumentalization of certain practices instead develop their own logic so i'm not so if i may answer that the the western model of the end of cry the classes of reason the crisis of logic the class is the crisis of a project that has been precisely not interrupted but overflown fortunately by an alien condition for me the alien or one you could argue is the alienation that marx talks about but that's not enough for me because what does that do for me It says that there is an impossibility of thinking otherwise, that actually the abstraction

of labels, the abstraction of force, of intellectual, physical, domestic, affective work, whichever we want to call it, is such a way to reiterate calculus. Whereas for me, the alienation, because I did this work before that is in the background, that is uh in my uh work with the science fiction um feminist writer of the 80s uh especially octavia battler the idea of of alienation comes from air concept of xenogenesis which means origin alien origin so for me you know it's alien origin what that doesn't mean it's about we don't

need to just complain for the end of we need to think where the origination of something has actually happened so she uh you know recounts obviously the experience of you know post-mobile world or you can come to weekend cali but really what she's talking about 80s segregation in america i guess you guys know more than me but i i um you know i in terms of inheritance of culture because i don't care from that culture uh so i read i've read the bio but it's not my inheritance in terms of culture um specifically yeah we have another inheritance which is to do with the mediterranean which is another kind of in any terms of segregation but that's it so she's trying to say the the future is here there is

already an island origin an ontology we need to rethink so for me the alien logic is an ontology it's the the the provocation of the actual historical moment in which once reason becomes mechanized and becomes implementing the instrument it starts to do its own thing it starts to originate its own being its own process so how does the human relate to that is that it necessarily becomes you know a kind of uh not a host of otherness i know because it's not the otherness is always reconciliatory it's not just but it is it's from it from issues in the sense that it has to completely you know transforms the kind of structure needs to transform the structure

the cognitive perceptual structure of the being so so labor cannot think itself without machine similarly you know the the you know the kind of alienation of the of the western logic is a point of origination of infection and contamination but not negative infection constructive that has changed the the structure of governability it's a struggle you talked about resistance I talk about struggle so it's a struggle to the sense that there's this proof but it's also exactly but it's also the other tools but then some people say how do you stop where do you stop the proofing you know so everything can be really really reasons it'll be like data everything can be released on

the re-envaded but then at some point you have to have an axiom that's an interesting experimental axiomatics because it's been that's a matter because a moment in which the struggle becomes clear that an affirmation of another logic must be constituted. So it's, you know, the flow of constitution is to be interrupted with some kind of constitutive power. So that's what I'm, at least that's what I'm verging towards, you know, and for those of you who know my work, I've always been more on the level of moving through macro politics through the alliance of the particular but i think that this alliance the particular politically at this moment in history you know if you are voting and you know we have already experienced that in italy when it's calling i guess it's

another time for you but you know it's that kind of thinking instead of a generality across particularity you know thinking of a project common commonality what is this commonality you know the you know to some kind of alien constitution a bit so it's not just alienation of and through capital which means for me a radiation capital with one two and all the the end of capital because there is no end of capital uh you know but capital cannot be the totalizing horizon for politics so that's my i don't know if we can talk more later but that's where i will go the inspiration for the alien yeah i think that's a great

Thank you.