Brassier - Speculative Autopsy (Postscript from Object-Oriented Philosophy - The Noumenon's New Clothes)

POSTSCRIPT: SPECULATIVE AUTOPSY RAY BRASSIER

Nr;"5o..ISso> t$pecUat....eRealisrnneedStotJeginbya...:uv theintermnent an::I p::,.1t1as dab!lta OW< whe1har SpaaJenw Roobm r-.. eiusts. Thts queslO:ln comes five )'9111'5too lateto be�tul.an::loenetalylakeslheformota�t·dowrlrathl!f thanabonaf'Qe<µ;15ll0rl$pacula!JV8Rell�IS�thetopc ot a1t1nvn;100okswoesa1armplSWVfll'S1t�?"ess.an::lthe� ,.,iotali98s!onelortl"O:lmrgrmnogrllphlliserrtiededn !he - or oillp::C:y o! -"'ftlllosophypul"O!ls. l! hasbeoome 8IOITT11d'orr..,l!rd"lnoc111"0.11"chooolo\IV.QB:V"l!Pl">l'.tho"'51.8 ll"IS.an::lewnhis!ory llhillse<ossadno!IOr\8lbcuOll>esw�h ,_,an::llS�!hecmU.,!hemaolctSl:u""1Clnr1thegrowrig cal!JlenT"'lh��o.Spoo.Je11110Rotillsrnis1he �olsowmlp;ostdoc1a"'l-sh!p'>Ollm"l"'1helkv!od Sl81esn...._1thesbeenrho..., bjBctoTsernesu••-lorga­ a1uwu ..1....... we1asgrad.Jam1ho""""'Paus.Tt...q,1tu11 11"0STlll!"""1testsBh6adconcmror.;i1rotlroHd!han::lcisebl1Y 01Spoa.M1....eRoolisrn,11 hosl<ng!llrc<jpa!l!Ml !he"11.,smn:·:e le!lttoa!ll'gt111 1lf�lhonrrns1ornscr1 .:s. Glal\lrm Hor min. ·The C1,,.,001 s101a 01 SpowlotMl Ramm'.., �A.JoJrr>OlolSpocWIMlRool<smrlJ(X>1.3),XI Has SpeclAa!Ml Realism passed the e)(JS!eoce test? Gfallam Harman has oerta1nly served as its 1ndefaugable mdwife. No dot.tit rmdesty forbade him lrom ment1011ng that he is OOIMlr$SO!llng edrtor of the 'thriving txxik series' he cites. and the self-vdunteered editor of the new SpeoJlative Real­ ism section of the popular PhilF'apets website.' His dBlm ab::>ut p::15tdoctoral fellowships ard semester-Ieng 1..1!\lefSl!y COIXSes 50\.llds i.i 1rrµessively academe note. flagging the

1nst11ut!C7\al recog11111on that is generally accept ed as the seal of ntellectual respectability. Yet here a note of cautlOn 1s n order. S1rc:e Ayn Rancfs ObjectMsm and L. Ron HOO­ bard"s Scentobgy have also succeded 111 socu1rg toeholds 1n Amencan university progrttmmes. Academic recognt.on IS not CQn"1)el1rg by 1tsetr lllleSS 'M3 are tokl the names of the fellowshps and 1nst1tu110ns 1n question. Mo-eover. a sceptic m19ht be lorg1voo for queryirg the rehab1hty of e witness testifying to Sperula11ve Reahsm"s 1ndub1table e)(lstence from w11hln the pages of a pubhcet1on whose ortloal sU:imle •S "A ..lou'"nal of Spec:UatlVEI Realism·. And 1f existe-ice is to be maesured 1n terms of biogs. books. and Google hits. then SpeciJetM! Reahsm Jags woefully ff!r behind Bigfoot. Yeti. and the Loch Ness Monster. all of whom have passed Htirm1wfs "existence tes!" with flying cdours. Of course. no one has ever delllOCI the 1»11stence of tolk abcut Sperulatrw Realism. To ask whether Sperulauve Realism deserves to be treated as a coheslVEI phllosophcel rmvement 1s not to deny the tl)(ISlence ol books. artides. and university co.sses that do µit that. The real cvestlOrl is· Is this talk. and the currency of Harman"s Sperulatllle Rea•sm b!"a"ld.' surtJc.ent lhet...n:i1Sno!"""""<kylne<maprlOCl""'OI��-· rom.tu:a....,satvramgnizod,,.,lhodolo;n,eyngnlor"""cnwtille o.mn;iUY<l.ghnror,,.,tcncUUl')(Coring"IJ'lClhcrwnoslorpl"Jlosojlt1• C81f:O!"lor1Sl'l<Opso-1mt!OO"telec:1""'p.bl<:onthe_.,...8'1811a1:18 op!Ol"IS-....,ero:our�cn!GSIGdperrru1.t11oons..IT!OO�-& .... -.rc>1�woul::l1he""""'":;pe0.Jlet""r9!llism-ber...,.; bul ti0g0woul::lbeO<llq"ledlo-pro,ectcnon�savens.80C>Offi pr1n'9dbl'•'-"'11'"1lnt:u"sol�WO.tepm.ISIC.�1S1"""11hllt :>rl'lpr1l01""5woul::l....,.e..-°"""'*'t"'Yab:iul-�ret\.ced to ,,...kelng �·But 11 woul::llwdlynwt"'. snat8tlanlcnwoul::I

to JUS!lfy the clam ti;:it 1t Q.Jaifles as a rti�osoptvcaly significant movement? In order to a-iswer this QRStton. 1t 1s necessafV to dsen�le l-i<wTna1's daims on behalf ol Spec'-'at1ve Real­ ism lrom the phdosoptucal daims of the v.:.ious thr*ers who are now. for better or wase. associated with this� mCMel'T'lerlt. The dJSparate rtiilosophical tendencies that have beef1 <rc:u>ed tooether as Soeculat1ve Realism all emeroed from the Slt:d1sciploe known as 'Continental rtillosoptr/. It is prJTia"1ly trose interested 1n the Contnental tradmOfl-whose ni.nt>ers ewe cenainly not negligtile. sirce they o:mpnse schol · ws 'Mll1mg 1n such f'lek:ls as comparative literature. cwt theory. media and o...iltu"al studies. cwchitectll'e. and other hU0'9"Nties d1sophnes-whose interest has been piqued by SpecUat1..e Realism. The novelty attrtiuted to the latter 1s taken to resde •n the W<f'l II suwise<ty challenges the core tenets ol Cont1reital orthcdoxy. These tenets are encapsUated 1n the tEifm ·corre latlOOlsm·. ongnally caned by Guentn Meil!assoux in his book AftE!f' Fn1rude.! The reiec;tlOfl of co<relatton1sm IS supp:ised to be the corrmon denomnator binding 'Speci.Aa11ve Realists' togethel'. despite their many evident d11lerences 1,.,.,.llbfbe-nto1,.,.worksorspao.Jo1M1r""*""'.indttsmp..C81oon �s...-.jorfaltme::!Mt,.,.m..rent��oftt·...,WOfl<s.owr.;ti l l """o:rnf'do1 n .('0n1,.,.,__.,...,...,orot'!')cts:Qan1.6turl>.indRa:Xa Ft>losop;ry'"LB-y;r(.G.iiafTU\..-.JN.�l..:1$).ThsSpewiorM> r...,. ea--rti ""'*""1a>dMar,..olsmlMeb:un1< fl>-J>"<= 2011]. 21.) WNio1""'9!,.,.�trllgllfdk:<!,.,.wor�orOwnlmMal�ardi... -""Qin:. two ot ,,.,. supposed 'IOU'ldels' or Spe:Uat...., l?ealsm. I <XI rct sh.Ye 1-WmY>'s o:in-..0 ab:IY! t,.,. ""'""1Y 01 01,.,.,. ....;.ks""'"''"� b&ng,,.,,.ketedln:krths�.D"..tx.Jlhs-.... .,.o�Of"""<ty As1or'D"IOl>li<"dtho•ntulectuel�'.!hlst581ssl<bostlr>ltloPR...,.,.15..-.:I p..-n'*5ts..nolphkJsoplw's.&t1alongtt'-"°"lwrs3llt oc•rryOU1thls1eisl<. Hamarica;becrl!dtedw1tl\.,._,1ngamwg<1<We.ptoiosoplly·mi:;r.l<a!.-ig 3. Q.Med!tssw>c.Altwfnr<><» AnfssoyC<llheNflcess>ryoJ��n g<ll"CY.lr.R.Br-(LondonandNlrNYot�:Contn.un.2008)

The questlOl"I then arising 15 whether antH:cxrelationism 1s indeed a sufhc1ent cond1t1on !or Speculative Realism. I do not think 1t can be. This is not to d1srnss the salience ol Mellassoul<"s d1ag1051s of correlatiornsm. A favourite p\oy among those who wish to rubbish Me1l�SSOOl< and Specula­ tive Realism rmre generally is to deny that there 1s any such thing as correlationism. or that 11 has ever been prevalent 1n Continental philosophy. This 1s plainly false. It is true that the term has been rruch abused by those who. following Harman. see ant1-correlationism as the defining lea1ure of Speculative Reabm. At its most eKtreme. this allows the accusation of "correla11onism" to become a way of caricaturing rival philo­ sq:ihical positions and short-c1rcu1ting debate. I do not believe that correlallonism 1s the unm1t1gated "bad thing" which 1t seems to be for Harman (and to a lesser eKtent MedlassouK). and I have learned the imi:ortance of defending the "good". epistemic formulation of correlationism lrom its "bad". sceptical version.' Nevertheless. I stil th01k 1t patently false to deny that correlationism names a charactenst1c tenet of Continental philosophy. Correlationism 1n the "strong" versl0!1 targeted by Medlassoul< 1s simply the denal that 1t makes sense to postiJate things-in-themselves and 11 is easy to find passages by numerous Continental lum1nanes (not to mention analytic anti-realists) unequivocally proclairn1ng the r.onsensioahty ol the Kant.an on S/Ch' 4. Myr....-eiollll1ke lwsd'llncl""'v""'ted""fd""""'10IM<M•as••:•" "'Nin.IUrb:u"ld(Basirq;tol<e· �. 2007), whe<e I loo�"' oh 5 ln2006.whle�m11J>"9P"11"ett>a�nalman..isoipt!OfNth./�"'1. o..r,..,vea�all5101suchpawigo<Oladoclmo-nl"'1lftled"Co< reiot'°""" Tt>l!Evdar.ce"ltleallSedq.l.o alonslromFichuo.Schellng.Hegel. Sc:l'>opeMa>e<. NimlSJ:t>ll. HuSS<H"l Heideqger, as - BS lrom Cer""P. Gluroe.

Does this mean then that anyone w1ll1ng to countenMCe things-in-themselves counts as a Speculatt\le Realist? Oe!l'ly not. II this were the case. Speculative Realism would count among its proponents analytic thnkers such as David Lewis. Michael Devitt. David Armstrong. Timothy W�l1amson. Theo­ dore Sider. and othern too numerous to mention_ Anti-cor­ relatiorusm 1s simply too tenuous a cntenon to be counted a sufflaent condition foc incluslOr'l under the bamer of Specu­ lative Realism. Might there be a more pos.t1ve criterion of inclusion? It 1s highly doubtful. Consider the philosophical d1r­ ferences between H!l'man's Object -Oriented Ontology. Gra"lt's neo-ideabst Naturephdosoi:fiy, Me1llassoux's speculatt\le mate riaism. and my own Sellarsian transcendental nall.rahsm. The ftrst insists that o�y obfects exist. The second defends a dynamc ontology of powers. The third proposes that the Absolute 1s not what 1s but wtiat could be. The last claims that th1rimg 1s errbedded in a nature to wtiich 1t ISlogicaly (thoulji not causally) 1rreduc1ble. What 1s theor common feature? The !act that each stakes out a poSltion with regard to the in-1tselr? But so do the analyuc philosophers mentioned above. And the differences that prevent these analytic think ers lrom being grouped tcgether as proponents or a smgle school are surely as signihcll"lt as those that di111de the alleged orooonents al Soecula11ve Realism. Harman savs there are things-in-themselves but they can only be all Uded to. not known. Grant and Me1lassoux deny that the 1n-1tself C«lSISts ol things. b.Jt afflrm thought's purchase upon the Absolute I claim that we can know things-in-themselves. but not Gi:o:Jrnan. F\Jt....-n. McOowel. a-d BIMdom. TllOSI! wflo Ille 10 ....1 that correl<na-smcloosno'aodhllSr-.evere"•UlOwoUddoweltoc:l"«lo.th<!

through contact with the Absolute. since knowing takes time. What then i.nites us other than the sociobgical fact that our work tends to be dassirted as part ol the Continental trad1 !Ion. while that of Lewis. W1lhamson. Sider et al. 1s classified as ana\yt1c? It IS true that the philosophers taken to represent Specu­ lative Realism share an antipathy to a cena1n philosophical sensib1hty characteristic of post-Heideggenan Continental philosophy: the fet1sh1z1ng of fin1tude. voiced with a rnari­ nered p:irtentousness that is the unlortlX'late consequence ol anglophone wnters self-consciously apng transliterated Franco-Gerrnari. But impatience with the rhetoric ol fin1tude and distaste foc excessively mamered prose hardly amounts 10 a corrmon philosophical agenda. Deleuze and Bad1ou can be credited with reiect1ng the pathos or tinitude lorg beloce the advent of Speculative Reahsm. The..- numerous lolowers share at least this mJch with Speculative Realists. In fact. the only uneqU1vocally positive corrmonahty uniting Speculative Rea•sm's founding members is their participallOrl in the 2007 workshop ol the same name. Yet when Alberto Toscano and I coorganized this small wockshop. found111g a new movement was the furthest thing from our mnds.' Whateve< affinities connected the part1c1pants. they were too 1rchoate to be 11.Jrned into a doctnra OOod. let alone a rnovement. Perhaps they would have burgeoned in phdosoptncally fruitful ways had they not been �ematurely petnrted by branding. Be that as it may. 1t 1s not insigruticant that even 11 they have not yet disavowed 11 publicly. none of the other workshop par!lcipanls 6 1rd91!d.Toscano·s�l�""'"'ctt>ornnkso1$peculatrva -.. mxhag<W1Sth<wllhBs�aSQfteofponodcaMOiarcetohrn

has invested 1n the label in any th ing hke the way that Harman has.' This 1s unsurpnsng wheri one oonsiders the extent to whlCh the label itself propagates philosophical arrbguity. For even 11 we grant that Speculative Realists share some sort of com­ mitment to rea•sm---desptebeing reahstsabout very different things-in what sense 1s this realism supposed to be ·specula­ tive"? Of the tour aleged ·rounders" ol Spewlat1ve Realism. only Quentin Medlassoux espouses the term "speculative·. He does so to dist1f19,Jish his materialism from metaphyslcal or scient1stic doctrines of the same narre. As used by Me1llas· soux. the term "speculative" is to be l.Xlderstood 1n the Hegelian sense to mean the kind of thinking !hat is not content with determining its si.qect-matter extrinsically by �ing hxed predicates to 1t. but instead aDows subject and predicate to switch roles so that the predicate can become subtect and the subject become predicate. This reversibility 1s of coixse the hallmark of dialectical thinking. of which MejlaSSCM..J x 1s a bnliant practitioner. His "speculative' mater1ahsm renders him far closer to BadlOU and 2:1�ek than to the Speculative Reahsts with whom he continues to be associated. Indeed. nothing could be less 'speculative' in Meillassoux"s sense than Har­ man's Object-Onented Philosophy. And while we may be more sympathetic to matenahsrn that"I Harman 1s. neither Grant nor I endorse 'speculation' 1n Medlassoux's sense. Stripped of the spec1hcphilosophical mewing that 11 has in Mellassou x's work. 7. larlHeml!C<lGrilnld!dwmeasho<1nu0<1.ict'°"10Speo;lauveR...., Tor TJ..,f'M>$op!W"sMC>gOZ.-.en20Krseel.H.Q-aru.'Speculm"""RQIM ='.Tll<l�"s�50(2010).58-9.-e<.wnh1ypc.al�r anaoomont.Gr.,,tdldnotordxlot...ownwork"'1ho;boel twopage..,rvoy. ltl-ft<nl111"too.B)'heno1or.ge<rosmi.diu:setor1ha1erm.hehascenan'y,.., 1 use<1ntoch8rliC!e<IZ<tt"OSowr>worksn::o N«lorth.o1monerhasMeiliisru:<.

the term 'speciJative' is reduced tons ordmary Bqectrval sense. meaning 'col'ljeCtural. lancilul. unsubstantiated by evidence or !act'. Prehxed to an •1-dehned 'realsm', 11 becomes the a•t:i. ror a doctrine that WlShes to spare itself the trouble of 11JS11hcat1on. Ultimately. neither commonalities nor shared avers1011S sulhce to clearly demarcate Specul11t1ve Realists lrom other pt"ulosophers. Considered as a pl'ulosophiCBI movement. SpeOJ­ lative Reahsm 1s vitiated by its fatal lack of cohesiveness Whether we try to dehne 1t negatrvely by what 1t rs against or pos1t1vely by what 1t 1s !or. weexdude too httleand 1ndude too rruch . Harman1ust1fles his brand1ngol Speculative Rea•sm asa 'un1'-"'!rsally recognized method of conveyng 111format1on while cutting through 1nformat1onal clutter'.' The problem 1s that those he has enlisted as the brand's representatives diverge on so many fundamentals that the noise generated bybund•ng them together far exceeds any possible nformationalcontent this grouping ITllQh l have hoped to provide. In the absence of even a mininal positive criterion of doctrinal cohesweness. all that 1s left 1s chatter about something called ·speru 1at1ve Rea•sm·-�ac1ng 1t on an ontobg1cal par with chatter aOOut the 'Montauk PrOjOCt'. It 1s not difficult to see how Specula· t1ve Realism passes Harman's existence test. since this test 1s p-edcated on a principle as s1rrple as 1t 1s dubious: robe IS tobe talked about. But there 1s another rrore important question underlying the dispute over Speculat1'-"'! Realism's elClstence. It 1s the fol· IOW1ng: Is there anything ol real phlosoph1cal import at stake in the controversy<Ner what MedlaSSOUJ(calls 'cooelat10nism'? I think that there 1s indeed. but unfortunately this 1s precisely what has been obscured by the concerted attempt to brcmd

Speculative Realism. The irrpetus for the onginal. eponymous workshop was to revive questlOfls about reahsm. materialism. science. representation. and objectMty. !hat were dismissed as ot10se by each of the main pdlars of Continental ortho­ doxy: phenomenology. cntlCEll theory. and deconstruction. The synopSis !or that workshop. which I cori-.xised with Alberto Toscano. 1s worth C•ting because 1t illustrates the shortfall between the concerns that animated the OOQinal 'Specula live Realism' event. and those of the current Speculative Reahsm brand: Contomporsry 'C01trontel' 1� arum pndos nrou on Mv1rg ove<coroe !he age·dd metaph)'SICll 00111&5 bet\Well mOismanddedtsm. Slbject-object�.whoserep.dauon hasrurnedintoac:o.-duonedrelle><olconterrp:ir..-yth!cfyhas . supposedlojbooncles!royedby theauiqoaof represcnlauon Bild supplsrlted byVWIOIJSwr<'fSOI thlikrrg tte f\.rdamentel Butperhapstt'osar111-reprasentauonal(or'c:onll'llltr::1rusf) oonsensus-whchOJ<CeGdsphilosoptl';'properardthrMIS.., �dornainsorthehi..rnlrotiesard1h9soc181SC<!H"'COS-hdes adeap!'f ardmore n.dn>s!deallsm lsraalosm rmllojso ·na�·? Andslhew.dosp-ood<isrmssol lrepre:;enlalionoodo1¥o:1Mty tharlldc:at.a11r::alsla"IC01tso01tendarns1ob9? The interest 1n rehab1litat1ng representation and objectiv­ ity remains my cmn personal preo::cupat1on and was cer­ tainly not shared by any of !he other panic1pants then or now. But the rssue of the hnk between representation and ob1ec1Iv1ty generates questions about the status of sc1eri­ t1flc representation. whch 1n turn lead to the more funda­ mental �sue of philosophy's relatlOfl to the natural sciences.

This issue is central to Me1llassoux's work. whether 1n the form of his attempt to provide a speciJetive proof of the contingency ol the laws ol nature or in his acC0U1t ol the positive 'meal'lnglessness' of mathematical signs." But 1t 1s eciually fundamental for Grant. whose reactivation of Schell1ng1an Noturphilosopllfe requires reasserting '!he eternal and necessary bond between philosophy and physics·"-an inter est emphatically reamrmed b{ Grant's ongoing research oto the philosophical 1rrphcations ol the 'deep-held problem' n cosmology. It is precisely this concern with renegotiating phi­ losophy's relation to the natural sciences that's conspicuously absent from the Harman·sanctioned branding ol Speculative Realism. For Harman. such concern smacks of 'scient1sm' Indeed. Harman's weal disdain for 'scientism' (not to mention 'epistemism') confirms the extent to which. notwithstanding the eccentricity of his reading of Heidegger. he remains an orthodox Hetdeggerian. For Harman. metaphoncal allusion trumps sc1ent,flc investigation and fasonation with objects trumps any concern !or obtect1v1ty. Indeed . the irony-as Pete Wollendale's withering dissection ol Object-Oriented Ontology demonstrates-is that n Harman's hands. Specu­ lative Real151'T1 merely exacerbates the diSdam !or rationality. whether ph11osoph1cal or scientlhc. which is among correla­ tlOllism's more objectionable consequences. It 1s this misol­ ogy which Meillassoux's After Fm1tude sought to challenge. Far from chalieng1ng 11. HEl"man's Object-Oriented A-iilosophy 9- Q Mellas:lo.i•. ·tt,;rnton. Reotenmon. R<lpet�on· A Sl)eo.ia1"" An;Jy S<SOltt..Mio\r.;;e.s,s5'Qn·. .,,,_A_i.-.:ISMall<(eds)� O(Specu'o�orrMo!e<o:'.lllsm ond Suti,o.:til'ltyS.ncoSt1ucr<."ol<sm(london: Bloornsturv.1or1hcorrm;i) 1Q �IH.Gram.'lhe"E!wnal<W"ld�BordS.11\-.Ph""°Pl"I' i.-.:!Physcs··,.,o_vea1(ed).Ang<!lolo10"1 (2005�43-59

pushes this misolO'JY towards even m:ire reckless extremes. such that 1t ends up being. as Woaendale p.its 11. 'correlaMnism's eccentric uncle'. The denigrat10n or rationality often serves as an ahbi !or those seeking to evade the obligatJOn to 1ust1fy tl-eir phlo­ sophical claims. But this 1s precisely the obliga11on that no philosopher can shirk. and the demand !or JUSl1hcation will not go away. no matter how stuttiornly one tries to ignore 1t For how are we supposed to kflOW whether or not there are things 1n themselves. let alone how they are structixed? While Me1lassoux and Grant adduce different k1ndS al a pnon proof to the effect that we can know that the 1n-rtself exists. even though 1tdoesnot consist of objects (since both Meillassoux's surchaos and Grant's Naturing nature a<e unobjechflable). Harman rernmns content with assen1ng that the world 1s crammed fiJI ol o�ects1n-themselves. whose sensualquahties veil real quahties neither we nor any other object can know. Yet as Wolrendale demonstrates. Harman lads to explain how one mght ever know that there 1s a one-to-one correlation between. on the one hand. the sensual objects which we and other objects apprehend. and on the other. the real oti,ects that underhe these sensualobtects. This 'object-onented"real1sm 1s dogmatic 1n Kant's strict sense. Unlike Meillassoo• aod Grant. Harman does not try to provide a rat10nal rebuttal of Kant's edict that all metaphysical assertions about the noumenal are equally arbitrary. He simply ignores it More egregiOUsly still. Harman ca11no t answer the sim­ ple quesl10l1 that would seem to be utterly fundamental lor any Qqect-Onented Ontology: What is on object? Harman's s1a<t1ng point is phenomeOOogy. He generahzes ntentKJnal correlation and turns 11 1n10 the basic relation through which objects interact. Yet he insists that the human-work! correlate

1s not the 1nclispensable conclitlOfl of access to oqects. But how then 1s 1t possible for us to describe the quldd11y of objects independently of our mtentK>Oal relation to them? Without 1ntenuonal consc10Usness as source and uritler of the eidetic Cot:.ect-disclos1ng) honzoo. we have no reliable way of d1stnguish1ng between the eidetic or real features cl objects and their acadental or sensual qualities. The upshot •Sa metaphysics in which we cannot sa-; whar anything really is. For 1f we cannot specify the essential qualities that dis11n­ gu1sh one real object from another. how can we be sure that the discrete mult1phc1ty of sensual objects does not mask the underlying contnuity of a single. indivisible real object? Ultimately, Harman's account of 'real obsects' fuses epistemc ineffati.l1ty with ontological 1nscrutablhty: since real objects can never be represented. only 'alluded' to. 11 IS irrposs1ble to S8'/ what they really are. The result. as Wolfendale shows. 1s a ITT:!taphysics where we can never know what we are 'really' tal<1ng about. nor explain why our alus1ons should succeed where our representations tail. Graham Harman should feel honoured by what he himself recognizes as Wolfendale's 'encyclopedic d1hgence', even 1f he may be d1scomhted by its consequences for his own work. What Wolfendale provides us with 1s a corrpelling dragnosis of what IS wrong not JUST with Object-One11ted011tology, but the Speculauve Realism brand to which Harman has lent his 1�1matur. Wolfendale's painstaking dissection of the confusions. fallli!C1es. and non sequitLW'S unleashed by this new species of speculative dogma11sm 1s as 1nstruct1ve as 11 1s devastating And ndeed. there 1s an ap�:rnp-1ately dialectical paradox 1n the reahsat10n that Wolfendale's autopsy for Harman's SpecUa t1ve Realism brand errt:iodies everything that !he 'Spec:Uat1ve Rea•sm' workshop seemed to promise: the breakout from a

terrmlCily sclerotic Continental tradition epjtomized by a motley of what Lakatos called 'degenerating research programmes'." There 1s no •nle irony 1n the !act that this promise. bnefty kindled in April 2007. was 17ematurely snufled out as a result of the attempt to render Speculative Rea•sm palata�e to an audience whose sen�blht1es were already shaped by Conti­ nental philosophy-an audience that equates representation w11h repression. otiiectMty w11h oppress10n. and naturahsm wllh soenflsm. But Wolfenda\e has reignt!ed the breakout. His matchless ph1k>soph+cal intelligence cuts across traditions 1n search of the necessar y resources !or the construction of new conceptual poss1bh11es. reart1cula1ing the quesllOlls that the 'Speculative Rea•sm' workshop had initially prorrvsed to take up. It IS thusonlyhtting that Wolfendale's 'speculative autopsy' shoUd al$0 mark the birth of his own genuinely t¥1precedented philosophical v01ce