The Doctor's face seems to swim in and out of focus. You see the pores in his skin. Scrobicular arrays and then, suddenly, without dissolve, crossing the threshold. Filmic cut. Continue the war. A circle of homogenous flesh tone. It makes no sense. K-codes for cybernetic. Nostrils for cybernetic. Dark side K-micro-cultures. Eyes shut and switched on forever. Lips, sweep, tongue migrate downwards out of short. The disk receiving at speed towards a point of disappearing. In the centre of the screen, the old reality is closing down.
Passing through mathematical punctuality, the dot winks up. We apologise for the loss of signal. There seems to be a transmission for the road. We are unable to restore the whole movie. You were three years old from the rocket state, blot out, and re-off. You were okay or functions as a synthetic problematisation module also turned up to the pack. Shapes and colours, collapse, feminisation, show beyond what it does. We have come to the end of the series and there will be no repeats of daddy and mummy. There has been a terrorist incident ever in the archives. The Western Civilization Show has been discontinued. Soft, hundreds of gigabytes, god, daddy and
the unit, death, mummy, the zero, stink of epidermis and burnt cellulose. You must remember, It expels as to truth, it's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. It's different. from the side of the investigation of the region, scorched, ill-gained by any set or war, hit charts, you are drawn into the drifting depths of the net, where dynamic, eye-to-search
forces, have your mind, stop, relaborate, and risk, coincidental information, and tangered disease reverberation, and what is making you make a lot of love, big bang, and to be redesigned, Twisted trace systems have told the net is the one. Pulsing of the future of the system. Now outside the system is the three-dimensional and the machine's headband. The shielding of the system is the one. The escape with the eyes. The runaway is the one. The track of the system is the one. The window is the one. The windows are the one. The window is the one. The residue of time is way-lying. Yeah. It's remembering that the weight of the third grade equals zero
and you'll need to be right from the left side. This report comes from beyond the electrician. If you climb out through the electrician, the oxygen mark will send all matters. Please extinguish all smoking detectors. Deposit syringes in the trade provider. There will be a slight jolt as we cross over. Thank you for flying with transnational modification. We shall shortly be arriving in Mayhem. If there is anybody on board who can impersonate a pilot, it would be of comfort to the other passengers. Echt? Echt? Echt? Echt? Echt? Echt? Echt? Echt? Echt? Echt? Echt?
ideology, heralding the smooth space promised by the internet and technology as emancipatory. and it's also the time of the rave scene and dance music, jungle and drugs and it is also in a more academic vein, it's also the time whereby Deleuze was starting to be really seriously considered by the Anglophone world along with kind of the rise of post-modernity and post-structuralism becoming kind of almost a hegemonic discourse in the academy. And speaking of that academy, it's also a time where the academy was becoming increasingly stifling as an institution.
And I think the theories that came out of these theorists of the May 68 era were considered to be very experimental and revolutionary. this didn't really fit I think with the academy and I kind of think at this time like this you know this increase of market forces and technology um kind of in a way via land I feel like it's a little bit like that energy of May 68 but like digitized or inflected by the digital age that was starting to, that was so new and so exciting. So the question is, of course,
does Land even see himself in his writings as like a person? Is he like an external programmer plugging different things into other things and kind of developing a systematic theory of of everything or what's really happening or is it is actually many are there many lands um and my my kind of argument is that although there's these many kind of phase transitions um the the reader can experience via land's writings that there is this kind of constant stream all the the way through and I would label that stream as accelerationism.
These phase transitions kind of moves from a very academic traditional kind of tone, a very left-wing critique of capital and kind of moves through a kind of via an affirmation of chaos or intensity moves through figures such as as Nietzsche and Bataille to Deleuze and Lieto and Tillit kind of reaches this threshold whereby the critique of metaphysics reaches its kind of logical conclusion and a critique of representation as well and an almost purely constructivist kind of tone is reached so this is like this transition from essays with a kind of problematic that is then unpacked, addressed, critiqued,
to far more creative, exciting kind of writings that resemble something much closer to sci-fi. So do you think there's a moment where Land sort of stops narrating and analyzing what it is he wants to do philosophically and starts performing it? Yeah. Starts imbuing it, you know, channeling it in an imminent way. And that's what we see when we see his writings sort of transform from this academic register, this critique, this kind of sophisticated critique of Kant and representationalism through the use of, you know, counterposing philosophers like Bataille and Nietzsche.
and then it moves into a place where he becomes the force that he himself was attempting to introduce philosophically. Yeah, like I think you could say that he goes from representing what's going on or the situation or what accelerationism is to functioning in an accelerationist way and producing, purely producing so as opposed to taking accelerationism as it's like as the object of critique uh it instead goes kind of alongside accelerationism and proceeds to kind of function alongside maybe or even along even saying alongside is perhaps still separating him too
much from it and it seems to me that he begins to enforce it like in imbue it basically in an imminent sense functionally as you're saying um it's like an attempt to diagram within the diagram there's a really interesting moment uh i think in his in i think in machinic desire where he says that Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus is not really a book of philosophy, it's an engineering manual. I think that really sums up this kind of moment you're talking about where land stops seeing philosophy as something that we should write about
and starts seeing it as a moment of engineering construction. A kind of enacting via writing. And the CCRU in their work did attempt to kind of theorise or give a name to this way of writing, which is hyperstition. Even though these were very creative pieces of work and really rich and really complicated and quite confusing, probably deliberately so, there's still the common thread coming through, which is a rejection of representation and a rejection of the promise held out by reason, for example. And a desire to converge with imminence, with the imminent forces which he takes to be primary.
It's a performance of the theory that was settled before that writing. And I think for me that phase transition is really important because it's kind of at that point whereby by Nicolette may start saying, I'm just functioning, I'm not conceptualising, but I'm just functioning. There are these conceptual channels that he has to pass through in order to get to the conclusion that it's a kind of a viable way of acting in the world. Okay, so I think this is a good point at which we can talk about the distinction between philosophy proper and what Nick Land is attempting to do.
At this point when he's writing and he's attempting to converge imminently with that writing in order to channel imminent forces into philosophical discourse as opposed to representing them or reflecting upon them through concepts, we get this moment where you can't apply sort of truth and adequacy versus falsity and misrepresentation to his work anymore because thought thought can no longer be measured in this way the only way to measure what you're doing when you're thinking is to ask whether or not your proxys, because it's always a proxys, is intensifying and accelerating or
if it's delaying or inhibiting. I think at one point he says philosophy has always had a certain alliance with despotism. So I don't think that he'd see what he's doing here as any kind of philosophy at all, really. But for me, it's super problematic because there was a lot of kind of a philosophical working through of ideas, concepts to get to that point. It seems like the justification for that kind of functional approach to culture and writing and life has as its foundation, like thoroughly philosophical ideas.
And this is the difficulty with Lund's philosophy is it's in a lot of ways it's an attempt to unilateralize, to sort of posit, although he wouldn't see it as positing primary processes or primary production as the kind of base material structure of reality. and attempting to sort of activate those forces in order to unilaterally destroy and de-territorialize ideas, transcendence, concepts, philosophy. But in order to do that, you have to first engage in philosophy to come to this conception of the unilateral capacities of the real as chaos, as intensity.
so that you're right there's like this initial working through that has to be done it's absolutely necessary before you can then sort of endeavor on this project of absolute de-territorialization but that didn't really stop land no but it leads to some interesting sort of problems and contradictions in his work later on I think. And not just doing this work later on but I think I think it led to a lot of problems for himself. The affirmation of a kind of becoming mad that we can get from Deleuze and Guattari and Anti-Oedipus at this point
kind of is taken to its most extreme conclusion and it seems that there was a And a real unravelling, the very unravelling that Land was diagramming as occurring throughout the Socius and kind of prophesying as would be the inevitable result of capitalism, kind of wreaked havoc maybe on himself. And so famously, you know, he had this kind of break and this is kind of the passing through of another threshold, like this time kind of the absolute outside. to return like years later and kind of surfacing as this, as like a neo-reactionary, in neo-reactionary politics
or kind of espousing these principles of the dark enlightenment, which we're not going to go into today because I'm not, I haven't read much of it and I'm not super across it at all. It's considered to be kind of neoconservative or right-wing. And I think these things are intimately linked, though, because what you get with land, with this kind of desire to converge with the absolute imminent processes of intensive reality, is you get a threshold that we will pass through, supposedly, which will be the kind of displacing of the human being in any way, shape or form that we can think or conceive of it.
And so what happens at that point is that politics itself must be displaced or sort of be made redundant. and you dissolve into, in order for you to be able to dissolve into the processes themselves, which we're taking to be the ultimate goal. But what happens at that juncture when you pass through that threshold is exactly what Deleuze and Guattari were trying to warn us about, the risk of falling into despotism. And so I think we can explain a lot about Land's political trajectory just by looking even at his very early work and sort of taking it to its logical conclusions or its kind of contradictory conclusions.
as we'll talk about later one of the big parts of Deleuze and Guattari that land kind of severs is this idea um that uh too wild de-stratification or like a too too much of a scrambling of the codes or a kind of going too far with the becoming madness will also have as its correlate a kind of reaction against and a kind of flow back in a way and that kind of emptying of the space that kind of reaching the body without organs the empty body without organs was a dangerous kind of move and and Lenfali went there and I think it's kind of amazing and commendable that he did like to
kind of believe so fully and commit yourself so fully to a kind of philosophical trajectory is something we don't see very often anymore and of course like it was experimental and it had really dangerous side effects and and that kind of resurfacing on kind of the far right and it's like that re-stratification ever more intensely than it was before um uh just as um deleuze and Gwattari had warned readers of Thousand Plateaus, and so there's this kind of poetry in these phase transitions. But aside from all of the changes, like, in the writing styles and, like, the changes on a personal level, Land is still, like, writing prolifically about, like,
technology and time and, you know, markets and money and it's still it's it's all still can be characterized as accelerationist kind of theory yes and I think if we want to talk about continuity in his work as well it's really fascinating when when you talk about land because on the one hand it's wrong in a lot of ways to think of him as an individual within within a historical context and it's also wrong in a lot of ways to think of him in terms of the left and the right so to say things like he resurfaced on the far right um i think is really problematic because if accelerationism functions to do one
Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. Uninstall. as his accelerationist theory. And it's in one of the first readings, Kant, Capital and the Prohibition of Incest, that Land starts by critiquing Kant, or rather he critiques capitalism via a critique of Kant. For Land, there's a certain relation between Kantian critique and modernity or capitalism. and modernity and capitalism tend to be synonymous with one another in Land's work.
He kind of sees in Kant's metaphysics and the idea of the noumenon a similarity with the way that capitalism operates globally. So in terms of imperialism and colonisation of the third world by the first world or the periphery by the centre. Capital can only really bring those in from the periphery into the centre if they're recognisable as labour because the only thing that's able to be incorporated into that system are things that are recognisable as commodities. And he sees in this like the theoretical mirror in Kant
in terms of inhibited synthesis. I guess at this point, we're talking about the first critique, the critique of pure reason, where Kant outlines the limits of human reason through his theory of transcendental synthesis. and what's similar to what you're talking about here with capitalism is the idea that we cannot experience anything that is not already translated or translatable into preconceived categories or a priori categories for understanding and synthesis. The main thrust of the first critique is that knowledge, understanding and experience are not empirical, they're not derived from the external world. Instead, we can only explain the sort of coherence
of human experience through the construction of these a priori conditions for human perception and comprehension. So things like space and time are not external, they don't exist as things out there in the world, they are instead a priori conditions for our experience. In this sense, I guess what inhibited means for land is the idea that the external world for Kant, that which is outside of our experience, is inhibited in that it is nothing other than a pure negative abstraction outside of those things which are always already translated into human experience.
So the external world becomes something negative, purely a limiting thing, something which circumscribes in a purely abstract way, an empty way, our own human experience. So I guess land locates in this a kind of imperialism whereby this idea of synthetic apiary knowledge first requires this question like what must objects be like in order for them to be known to us and he sees in this the logics of the settler state or colonization whereby by the other or radical alterity can only be known insofar as it makes sense.
So this idea of the Numenon, Emma, you were saying you've been reading Kant for a long time and it still evades you, this kind of concept, but it's a massive concept for land. We know that the edited collection of writings published by Opennomic is Fanged Numenor, which is also the name of an essay that he wrote in his book on Bataille. Yeah. I mean, there's been debates for hundreds of years about what Kant means by Numenor. The quotes that Land lifts in his essay on the cyclone, the Fanged Numenor essay in the Bataille book. The Passion of the Cyclone. Generally come from a section sort of in the middle
of the first critique called Simply Phenomena and noumena, where Kant explains, and this is important and often misunderstood on a first reading of Kant, that the noumenon itself does not refer in any way to an object outside of our experience out there in the external world. In fact, the noumenon is an abstract concept, which we must assume in order to sort of undergird the structure of reason and of knowledge. It's an idea of an idea, basically, a purely negative idea that reinforces the positive, which is the sphere of human understanding and knowledge as given to us through the a priori
categories and conditions of experience of human experience so it's that which falls outside of of that yes it falls outside of it but only insofar as it's completely internal and integral to the system itself so the reason it's inhibited the word inhibited is important i think because the negative becomes something completely impotent completely deep potentiated without content, without any form of positivity, it's inhibited in that it is imported into the system to kind of undergird it and reinforce human reason, the sphere of human reason, as the only positive sphere. That's what Lan's problem with Kant is, that the negative for Kant, the noumenon,
is nothing real, it's nothing powerful, it's nothing forceful or able to interrupt or disrupt the sphere of pure human reason and experience, it becomes co-opted, it becomes sublimated into the system itself. And we can see that that logic at work in things like modernity and capitalism, We conceive of the other as a purely unknown something, an empty nothingness. So the Númena acts as a purely limiting kind of thing. It acts as a safeguard. Yeah. I think that's the best way to put it. I mean, Lann's argument is that it is in some sense and that Kant has repressed or sublimated real negativity.
So you only ever have access to phenomena, which are appearances, so that those things which are translatable into the necessary conditions of human experience, which for Kant are space and time and the categories of judgment. So in that sense, yes, we only ever experience appearances. But for Kant, there is nothing other than appearances. it's not problematic in the same sense of someone who is a dualist like descartes where there's appearances and reality and they they somehow don't coincide or there's a separation there and we need to you know distinguish between the two for kant there is nothing but appearances
because of these a priori transcendental conditions that are necessary for any kind of thought to occur at all. That's what justifies the description of Kant's philosophy as purely as idealist, as purely a description of appearances, a philosophy of appearances, a philosophy of ideas, because he doesn't posit anything like a real, the noumenon is not is not a material sort of autonomous reality outside of us. Yeah, so this kind of distinction yet relation kind of tension
that I'm getting from your description between phenomena and noumena for land means that Kant's inability or limiting of himself to talk about radical alterity inhibits the synthesis so it delimits alterity in advance like always already unable to be recognized unless it's kind of translated and at the end of this this paper so like land begins as an anarchist i think he ends as an anarchist i don't know it's hard to say like i think he ends uh he is now as a compromised anarchist well like there's Yeah, there's like anarchism all across the spectrum here, right? It kind of is a journey from one end of the spectrum to the other.
There's this thread all the way throughout the writings, and I want to tease out how we get from a critique of capital via a critique of calm to something of an affirmation of capital. But he ends this paper really interestingly with the kind of imperative to escalate the cycle of violence. Like nationalism will always fall back into kind of genocidal practices and racist practices and will kind of fail in the face of global capital. And so all we can do politically is escalate the cycle of violence without limit. So this idea of escalation and intensification is already there as a kind of response to the problem
of capitalism. As we go along, we then have more critique of Kant. But it happens in that it starts to take a bit of a different turn. And I think this is how you can account for how capitalism begins to become affirmed. And in Delighted to Death, Kant is critiqued in terms of his understanding of the idea of the sublime and reason so there's this duality set up in Kant between like the finite animal part of human the primal sensible urges and the transcendental moral part that's integral to the human which is like reason and our ability to reason for them this is
problematic first of all because I think for land it becomes obvious pretty early on that intensity is primary and that reason our attempt to have a stable transcendental ground from which to understand the world around us as is present in Kant is a kind of primary repression of intensity. so in Kant the idea of the sublime and this is very simplified is when the subject is overwhelmed by stimuli it causes an intense confusion right of reason it destabilizes our idea of ourselves to be able to understand coherently the world around us when that kind of audit experiences
is obliterated there's a certain kind of pleasure that's derived from a subject but this is inherently linked to the ability of the subject to then kind of come back to reasoning to float from shore ever so momentarily into the ocean but then to quickly come back to that shore and kind of that re-stabilization of reason is a concretization of reason and the pleasure So in that sense, I think what's important here is that the pleasure we derive from the sublime or from the experience of the sublime comes from a recognition of the limits of our reason, of the limits of our conscious apprehension.
so it's tied very much to reason the experience of reasons incapacities or of its limits being broken um but that can only occur in a momentary sort of slippage or a momentary experience of that it's dependent on those categories and and those limits being there The limits themselves are what is experienced in that moment, and that's where the pleasure derives from. For Land, though, in his reading, because intensity has something of a primary place for Land, he sees sublime and he sees his materialist reading of Kant
as flowing from the idea that repression precedes its justification. Rather than reason, then kind of generating the sublime, he sees sublime as being the generative force behind reason. For us to have something like reason or a stable identity or understanding, we need to first of all repress these primal urges or this intensity. and as a result the more kind of I think for Len the more we try to repress that intensity the more it comes back to us in bursts and destabilizes that reason and so morality is
all about kind of persecuting persecuting yourself or persecuting those kinds of intensities or primal urges. Morality is all about kind of repressing those, but getting some kind of pleasure out of that repression. But for them, the more we try to repress this kind of desire for obliteration, the more it seems to kind of come back and structure and feed reason. And so there's this paradox there. And I think for me, this is the interesting point, this paper, where capital also becomes slightly revised as well. Because in this reading, even though we're not necessarily talking about synthesis, I think it relates,
this idea of uninhibited synthesis for land in Kant was always something of a kind of fiction, that that alterity would keep coming back to haunt the subject and was a structuring force of that logic of sameness. On Land's reading of Kant, what happens in the construction of the theory of transcendental synthesis, the a priori categories, is that there's a primary repression there of the real, of the outside. And that repression leads to something like concept of the noumena, which makes the real, makes intensities no longer primary but rather something always secondary something always after a kind of structuring
force of reason itself um and of stability so so whereas for in Kant these forces these intensities and the real are always secondary always abstract for land they're primary and they've been repressed primarily and that's why they have this intensive force and effect upon and this ongoing intensive force and effect upon everything that attempts to inhibit. Talked about before that this could be considered even amplificatory the relationship between in Kant the relationship between the repression of intensity and then the you know burst of an experience of that bare intensity and then a coming back to a strengthening
of reason could be seen to not only amplify the stronghold of reason, but also chip and erode more and more that stronghold. It's not surprising that there's a turn to Bataille because Bataille really affirms, totally affirms intensity, an intensity kind of for intensity's sake. It's just a pure affirmation of excess. This can kind of give us a little bit more of an understanding of the connection between the critique of Kant and subsequent kinds of affirmations of capital. So the ceaseless flow of life and death and destruction and reconstruction is kind of the
truth in Bataille, the truth of the world or the primary process of nature. And it's this kind of radical outside, also called death, which begins to feature a lot in Land's writings. Death is this kind of absolute limit. It's the total unknown of cosmic expanse. It's just the radical like outside to experience there's this like intricate relation between death and matter for land and bataille that primary repression identified in Kant always gives way to the ceaseless slipping in of of death or absolute zero so this is where
and nothing can make sense to us but can only be kind of sensed. A convergence with absolute zero, a kind of cosmic schizophrenia as the end toward which we are being propelled. The way I like to think of it in this essay, and we're still talking about the essay Fantanoumenon in the Bataille book, it's called Passion of the Cyclone, and it starts with a discussion of cyclones hitting Bangladesh and how cyclones function. It's obvious that Land sees his philosophy as cyclonic and for him he uses the quote from the Critique of Pure Reason
and why Kant describes his philosophy as an island in an ocean of the unknown and sort of holds up terra firma, the firmness of the earth and of solid ground as that space for which we should aim in philosophy always. And the unknown sea is this kind of lure that we must resist. And I think what Lan tries to do in this piece is he tries to hit Kahn's island with a cyclone and Bataille is that cyclone. Bataille is the absolute zero as intensity, as disequilibrium, as basically death and destruction, as the primary force of nature, basically.
For land, it's about unleashing that, unleashing the noumenon from its kind of relegation to the unknown, to the ocean. allowing it to emerge out of the ocean, this cyclone, and sort of hit the terra firma, hit the solid ground of human reason, of transcendental representation and synthesis. And I think as well he sees, in the end, capitalism itself as a kind of cyclone which hits social formations. There is this kind of relationship between death and money, If death is the dissolution of all meaning and the kind of convergence or the slippage of all meaning, then money performs this kind of death act on the socius.
Money forms in a way to totally abstract reality or what reality was for us. Any stable foundation that we might have expected or assumed becomes destabilised, continually kind of eroded away by money. You know, money is a kind of famed noumena in this sense, in that money is not, is a not, it is a nothing. it's a pure quantity or quantifying amount that ends up setting up relationships of equivalence between subjects and objects for example with this relationship between this death and money this allows land to identify in capitalism this cyclonic force where increasingly things have
less and less meaning for us as subjects, where our world is less stable in very real ways due to this kind of cyclonic capitalist force. So we start to see not so much the escalation of violence as we had in Land at the Beginning, but the escalation of a different kind of violence, capitalism as the kind of pure violence of death. There's some kind of truth relation that's identified here. And it starts with Bataille. With the affirmation of chaos and the affirmation of liquidity, there is a subsequent affirmation of capitalism as unleashing this. This leads land to connect Bataille with Deleuze and Guattari's Antioedipus, which becomes the key text.
Everything starts to flow from Antioedipus. In Antioedipus, there's this conceptualisation of social formations. It's Deleuze and Guattari's attempt at a universal history that is contingent and non-linear, but nonetheless a way, their kind of experiment or way of trying to think through history in a non-dialectical way and in a non-psychoanalytic, whereby desire or that kind of intensity becomes primary and not secondary. Not sublimated. Yeah, not sublimated. And what becomes secondary instead with this historical overview for them is the kinds of representations and illusions that the Socius uses to organise itself
and organise the flows of desire. The flows of desire and the coding of those flows of desire is seen as integral to the collectivisation of Socius through many epochs that Deleuze and Guattari go through. But what's most important, I think, to consider is in the despotic age, there's an overcoding of flows with regards to theology and or like the king or the emperor. so everything in this socius is understood in turn and linked back to one kind of source like the king like producing for the king or having a child for the king having a child for god this is
not difficult to see with theology but there's a move with capitalism away from the despotic formation to the like the so-called civilized formation whereby all of these codes begin to become decoded and eroded so any kind of ways of valuing putting a value judgment on flows of desire become gradually more and more eroded correlatively to the ways commodification and capitalization works at setting up general relationships of equivalents between anything and anything. We'll talk about that later when we talk about kind of the heart of land's accelerationist program. But what's interesting between the move from Bataille to
Deleuze and Guattari is there are certain key modifications made to Deleuze's theory, which come from Bataille. Because for Deleuze and Guattari, whilst chaos may seem to have a kind of primary structuring force there's more it seems like there's more of an interplay there's an interplay between um chaotic forces and social organization definitely uh and the idea of an absolute de-territorialization or pushing beyond an absolute limit i think it would be regarded by them as a as a kind of impossibility yeah because i would agree with that because uh the affirmation of deterritorialization the ongoing affirmation of intensification decoding deterritorialization
absolute deterritorialization that we get in land is in some sense incoherent in terms of Deleuze and Guattari because the very thing motivating deterritorialization is the fact that there's territory there's an excess of territory there's a strata so destratification is motivated by the existence of strata. You need, in some sense, an interplay of decoding and recoding, deterritorialisation, re-territorialisation, in order to be able to keep affirming that process. If you amplify that one force, the negative force of deterritorialisation,
if you absolutise that as a value, then it kind of becomes unclear where you're going to go. Well, that's right, death. Yes. I mean, that's death. I mean, for land, it's quite fine that that's unclear. Exactly. Like, it's absolute death. And that's where the Bataille comes in, because I think in Bataille, much more than Delos and Guattari, that unknown and that beyond and that affirmation of kind of pure intensity is unashamedly accepted and works within land's kind of theory. But he also, importantly, has a big problem with Deleuze and Guattari's warnings in A Thousand Plateaus. These warnings were like along the lines of don't too wildly destratify. If you're too wildly destratified, you bring the whole system back down on yourself even harder than before.
This gives you the idea of that dueling to play. So if you're too disruptive, if your strategy is just about pure reactionary politics, for example, or if you push madness to an extreme limit, this doesn't necessarily bring everyone along with you on this journey of madness, but you can become incarcerated. or Land hates this. He sees a neo-Kantianism kind of creeping in here, something of an ethic, which is really big in Deleuze and Guattari, but Land hates it. Land doesn't like any form of identifying a Kantianism within Deleuze and Guattari. But Bataille, I think, allows him to do this, like the viciousness, just the relentless deluge of the fanged Numenau
allows him to kind of cut this ethical warning label. This palliative. Yeah. Yeah. Element of Deleuze and Guattari with pretty interesting results. Act. Thank you.
or a slightly modified acceptance of many of the theses ran in Talos and Guattari's Antioedipus. Death is figured in land via Pataille as like the absolute limit, the unknown. It's not like the private affair of an individual, but instead kind of like actually the impersonal subject of critique for land. And so death is kind of always on the horizon, always there, They're always present. And it's also, I think, by Abitai, something that we are kind of drawn into, haunting us. And the relationship between death and capitalism, the idea that you can have anti-capitalist
politics is ludicrous for land because capital in kind of pure form represents this kind of death. It's like the death of the social. It's the complete dissolution of all traditions, beliefs. And there's this inevitable tilting towards this ultimate death for land that's brought about via capitalism through his reading of Anti-Oedipus. So this is definitely present in Deleuze and Guattari's kind of formulation of capitalist socius, so their idea of what is happening with capitalism. There's just a purely generalized tendency towards decoding. And I think it kind of comes from the idea that once things become maybe untrue for us
or lose a sort of primary value or truth for us, it's very difficult to come back from that. And so the generalized tendency of decoding, whilst it might be met with paranoiac disavowal or a kind of oppression is relentless a force of capitalism. If there's this generalised tendency towards decoding in anti-Oedipus, then this is definitely compensated, not by a recoding on the other side, but instead by this theory of axiomatics, which for me, I take it to be kind of truth values that kind of are constantly shifting and changing in terms of the marketplace.
So I'm not sure if it's right to read it purely in economic terms, but I think with land you can. So the axiomatic and the limits of what's allowed, allowable, and considered to be true in associates is no longer coded in terms or overcoded in terms of religion or even value systems. It's purely about the accumulation of money. it's purely production for production's sake. So things that block production for production's sake, things that block kind of the commoditisation of things, things that block profits are going to be decoded
and then kind of axiomatised as kind of just something that has to happen. So there's like examples that we can see of this kind of general tendency today. And just to like name one that always to me comes to mind is like the relationship between human rights and refugees. So on the one hand, like in liberal democracies, the kind of very standard humanist line of everyone having kind of inalienable human rights is totally considered like a truth. It's pretty like hegemonic. we could say that this is a kind of a code a kind of a coding of the desire a coding of our desire
in ways that are kind of empathetic or that take life to be sacred even and there's like this religious kind of residual there I guess in a way but then with regards to how we justify our treatment of refugees, all of these kind of values like go out the window because the axiomatic is widened. So there's the code of all people should be treated equally and as human beings, etc. But then as soon as this becomes problematic for production or capitalism, as soon as this kind of deterritorialisation of bodies across borders becomes something that could be not profitable
or something that could somehow hinder the economy, this justifies insanely inhumane treatment of very intense border policing and detention centres. So you have a general kind of decoding, I think, in this situation. of our kind of humanist values. For me, it's this mix between, like, this contradictory standpoint that seems, I think, to structure everyone's lives under capitalism and kind of increasingly more so. Like, as years go on, things seem to become more and more extreme, yet that axiomatic widens and widens to greater extents,
that more and more is kind of accepted whilst being kind of contradictory to the way that we thought we valued it this is kind of for me maybe one of the elements of why there's kind of a schizophrenia is engendered via this things on the one hand are taken to mean something and be valued whilst on the other that meaning and value is kind of being eroded away and uh it's this it's that difficulty in grappling with both of those things happening that engenders a kind of a switching between these two poles really kind of increasingly rapidly. So for Land, this theory of axiomatics does not figure very importantly in his work. This is merely a small hindrance to this
generalised decoding process and is merely a kind of a historical or social relic that will eventually become totally eroded. I think once technology and the economy kind of converge in a way to feed back on themselves in such a manner that the idea of social axiomatics or what humans take to be good for business or true or whatever just doesn't exist anymore. For land, it's this process of decoding and this idea of death that is central to capitalism, that capitalism actually cannot kind of function without self-destructing and unravelling. This is like an inherent part
of capitalism. I mean, what's really interesting, I think, and what ties Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of capitalism to lands is the idea of this primary production, like this machinic unconscious, that the flows themselves are primary. And social formations, humanism, everything are things that we build on top of these flows, like ways of capturing and channeling them breaking them and so in that situation what you get is you no longer see capitalism as itself a social formation like the left you know the hegemonic left marxist story goes that
capitalism is one social formation um to which we can which we can break down and build other alternative social formations which are going to be more beneficial for society as a whole instead of that you get this kind of association of capitalism in itself as the production of production for production's sake an association of that with nature with this kind of primary force which exceeds all social formations that's a radical sort of restructuring of not only politics but ontology metaphysics everything instead of social formations
giving rise to forces so instead of the sort of classical left reading of capitalism giving rise to violence and alienation and the sort of dehumanization of subjects, we see all those forces as something existing prior to and outside of any social formation, which means that the response to barbarism, to global capital, to oppression, to the dehumanization of refugees can no longer be looked for in the construction of a new and supposedly better social formation, but must be reached via this kind of imminent proxys of unleashing these primary processes
of production. Yeah, because they're repressed. Land takes this theory of repression to new heights, the idea that like organisms and matter and the earth and like our very biological makeup is a kind of repression that just has as its kind of like final instantiation the repressions that we think about when we think about neurotic attachments to things theorized in psychoanalysis this is kind of the end point of like the of history a huge history of traumatic repression and I think he there's this kind of fictitious theory of geotrauma that like the
history of the world is just many traumatic events based on the idea of a repression of a kind of primary or primal intensity and so any kind of organization is always already going to be repressing this intensity and is therefore for land totally um illegitimate but also will inevitably fail like how we were talking a bit about the that idea with reason and can't and the sublime. And so therefore the program becomes about affirming to a certain extent an affinity that capitalism has with certain natural schizophrenia.
And instead of trying to slow capitalism down or trying to kind of revolutionise it via man-made, like organizational structures, for example, like socialism, it becomes about kind of jumping on board this accelerating process and trying to push it as far as you can because it kind of takes that line from Antioedipus that's become so famous now and pushes that to its extreme. So it becomes about putting all of your effort into undoing any kind of attachment whatsoever that you might have. Where is the human in land?
Who is the human in land? What is a human? Well, kind of the result of that repression. Yeah. If our imperative with land is to accelerate, to affirm the acceleration of intensification, the goal is to become part of this process to dissolve ourselves into the process which has always um preceded us and will and exceeded us who's us us we are nothing but excretions of this process that's that's how i see it the human is just a kind of accident a kind of in a way a frustration of the process uh humans with all their ideas and their social formations
and their kind of stratifications of the flows and the coding of the flows and the blocking of the flows are just a kind of we're a machine part we're a part of a machine part we're we're an excretion we're like a component soon to be like obsolescent We are like an outmoded piece of technology. And our goal is to dissolve ourselves so we might be able to fuse or converge and thereby become more efficient parts, more efficient machine parts of this primary process of production. So we are nothing but a partial or a kind of peripheral byproduct.
we're a byproduct of the intensive flows of production. Yeah, it's like that machinic code or machinic modes of communication or what we might think of as like information, digital information, seems primary, seems to have something, some inherent link with that primary intensity that's repressed. But there's this kind of deep, the in itself or something is this machinic language that just functions kind of numerically. It does not need to represent anything to itself or derive meaning. It doesn't ask, what does this mean?
It's just, what does this do? Okay, increasingly complicated ways of saying if, then, true, false. And this kind of comes from the mass influence that the theory of cybernetics had. And there were many modernist conceptions of cybernetics, a machine that was kind of created externally by humans that would kind of self-regulate and reach a kind of point of equilibrium through a series of feedback loops that would kind of interplay on one another until a certain homeostatic level was reached. And Lent hates this modernist conception. And you could call his concept post-modernist.
And that is the idea of kind of auto-cybernating machines or auto-replicating machines. Machines that can grow and function kind of exponentially, expand themselves. rather than this being some external thing as well, this is kind of what's always, this is what's underlying reality or something. Like this is kind of the primary process of desiring production that's in Deleuze and Guattari. Definitely. That the unconscious is productive, that the real as such is kind of produced via the unconscious, that there's not an object there that we then kind of have this fantasy representation of that we then kind of associate
with different, I don't know, memories or whatever, but that the real and those objects are kind of created by us in this kind of feedback loop. Well, I think that in some ways that's still a humanist conception of the relationship between humans and machines. And I see one of the most exciting things in Land's philosophy, and it comes from through Deleuze and Guattari as well, is this kind of radical deconstruction of the distinction between humans and machines. But it's radical in that it goes beyond deconstruction because it's not just about collapsing the kind of humanist fantasy of the idea that humans are somehow the makers of, creators of machines,
the controllers of machines, and that the AI is something that we ourselves will invent one day. You know, one day humans will invent AI. We will invent machines that can self-replicate and self-automate and self-replicate. Lan's point, and I think Deleuze and Katari as well, is that this has already been happening long before us. like we are machinic we are part of the process already and always have been of machines self replicating and being themselves autonomous there is no dialectic between humans and machines that will someday lead to some convergence of the two or a domination of of the one by the other like
the machines taking over all of a sudden or something like that in fact the machines have always been in control and we ourselves are a kind of functioning byproduct of that process and like in terms of machines i think what happens in anti-odipus is a lot of people who might read it might think it's just like this kind of functional uh dehumanization or uh just this purely pragmatic um machinic cold world that they're describing but what they're doing more is destabilising our prior ideas of what a machine is and what a machine can do. Because machines misfire, they fail and they block and they break down
and they connect with things and they disconnect with things. And so it's trying to think through ontology in a kind of machinic register because they're so against this idea of representation and transcendence. So a machine is kind of imminent to the situation it finds itself in, right? A machine will either connect with this wall and then this kind of thing will happen and connect with this other thing and this will happen. But there's never a question of, well, what does this connection mean? It's just there's a connection, right? There's a firing or a misfiring. There's a functioning. There's a functioning and a kind of like imminent working out or something or that kind of most immediate.
For land, I think the human is a misfiring. Or all of these neurotic attachments, right, or religion and family and tradition are all misfirings of the machine because they're problematic. all of those you know belief systems that we have are just a kind of a an illusion like a mist and an inhibition yeah or something that leads to the inhibition of the forces that gave rise to them in the first place an inhibition of the machinic unconscious yeah yeah that idea of misfiring like something that kind of uh makes the machine not work quite as smoothly as it could have but for those kind of representational illusion.
When we're talking about AI in land's writing, it becomes, you know, very difficult to say, like this invention that humans make that then, you know, achieves a kind of self-consciousness because that very idea of self-consciousness to begin with in land is totally fictitious. It's a hallucination. Yeah. And I've always wondered, you know, wouldn't the mark of what AI or AGI be, wouldn't we think of those markers as being the ability to represent the world around you? I don't know why this awful human history or social, why the history of humanity would not continue on through AI or AGI,
but for land, this history is just a defect. the more efficient kind of ways that we can mechanise or that become mechanised will do away with this. And so this is why the market becomes centre stage for land. This idea of technology and economics converging, the AI project, right, the resources that are expended on automatising robots more and more in order to reduce labour costs, has a kind of a feedback loop function between the marketplace and technology, whereby it makes more sense from a profit-raising level to autonomise as much as you can
in order to save money. But then that autonomisation project is what gets funded more and more to the point that there's a convergence in land between the economy and technology, where the economy becomes auto-cybernating, like the economy becomes AI. And I think there's already companies at the moment that are starting to be run purely by computers and algorithms. I mean, yeah, I think what we're getting at here is really, when we ask the question of what is the human in land, if we're talking about this politically we're asking where is the place of agency or where is the will and there's the suggestion in all of this discussion that if essentially
if this process that we are an offshoot of a misfiring a byproduct is happening without us if it's an inevitability which land says it is it's it's happening whether we like it or not then there can't be will and there can't be agency. And so it makes sense or it becomes affirmative to accelerate these convergences of things like the market and technology, the economy and technology, because it's increased efficiency, it's increased profitability, it's an obsolescing of agency, it's an obsolescing of the will or intervention by or from humans. It was always an illusion anyway. And negative, like bad for land.
Like there is a politics all the way throughout. I don't know. I just think that there really is. Like that politics is, you know, that idea of anti-fascism. Like, you know, on a complete level, like just the fascism of any categories or any ideas or any beliefs or anything that's imposed, any presupposition is all kind of seen as fascist. and the way out for land that that that anger and that that that um that kind of screaming that you get in the first reading flows through throughout because this is the escape like this is this is the it lulls you i think it lures you and it lulls you into kind of feeling like even though
it's via a lot of horror language like horrific kind of language and and and meant to be quite you know maybe scary or just um or an anarchic or dystopian you can see desire being a dream it's a dream of convergence yeah it's a dream of returning it's a dream of escape it is escape it's an escape from from capitalism as much as it is from anything else to a complete escape of the human altogether i think there's a dream or a desire an absolute desire for almost a kind of cosmic convergence and maybe that's what the singularity is. The singularity, there's this kind of feeling in the writing that it's this, strangely it's like
a return, it's a return to the beginning, it's a return to the intense germinal flux that you know apparently history has repressed. Cosmic schizophrenia. Yeah cosmic schizophrenia, like complete escape and so that raises the question of time there's this idea that the future invades the present and kind of machines the present from the future like the future has kind of already kind of decided what it is or something and just invests desire in the present in certain ways that call us forth to the future so it's like ai for example is like an invasion into the present. The idea that people working on AI right now, it's like desire is being
channeled in ways that we can't understand towards kind of technological advancement and proliferation. That convergence that you kind of spoke about is what's like programming and machining our desires. So this idea of like a future that we progressively strive towards is disintegrated. For land, the future kind of insinuates itself, and it's this idea of camouflage. AI, you know, it's not something external to us, and when these kinds of processes, these processes are happening right now for land, like they're just there, they're underneath our skin. And this kind of convergence or this invasion of the future into the present is always masking itself to the point that we won't know.
There's not like a snapping point whereby, you know, suddenly everything changes. It's just that that gradual change has been happening, you know, for 2000 years or something, you know, before we know it, you know, that shift will just happen. Yeah, I think what you're describing is really well articulated in one of Lan's early texts, which begins with a kind of sci-fi imagining of the world as we know it, that sort of moment that we will cross the threshold into the machinic unconscious, that our flesh will melt away and we will sort of re-enter the schizophrenic cosmos.
And he talks about, I guess, a kind of feeling of deja vu. So this supposedly alien future, this machinic unconscious, which we will sort of pass through into in the future, is something that is already our past. He, at the moment when the world code, the program stops functioning and we break into that space, he says something like, you have the strange feeling that you've already been here before. and I think that is really what this is about in terms of thinking of it in terms of time,
the idea that history isn't this kind of dialectical progression towards some end point, like some kind of AI or some kind of singularity. It's in fact this ongoing process which has and always, which always has been and always will be greater than us and part of us. And part of us at every moment during this process which we are going through. And that's why we get this very interesting and serious conception of a non-linear, a non-linear time. the importance of of capitalism for land i think can be overstated for land capitalism just seems
to be um you know if if our if our ways of conceptualizing are like misfirings of the machine then capitalism is something that's connected one you know one kind of thing like the abstraction of labour with another, like the abstraction of money, and connected these two things together, which has, you know, the opposite of a misfiring, which is like totally productive. And so it's like suddenly in history two machines have been connected, which is what we deign to call capitalism, which, you know, we think we kind of created and have control over. land is just something like a vehicle or a small step along the way to moving almost
evolutionarily post-biological. And this is why I think it's really important to be careful when we talk about land in terms of capitalism and talk about him as somebody who's left or who's right, because I think you're exactly right. I think insisting that he's a capitalist is an overstatement because like everything, like the way he conceives everything, the human politics, ideology, they're just vehicles. They're just tactics. They are things that function. They're camouflaged. They're things that are hiding the more primary process that are going on. There are possibilities, machinic possibilities, that are so immense that we ourselves are not only insignificant, but we are in fact a hindrance.
We are a hindrance to this process that could lead to these immensities that we can't even conceptualize and never will be able to. yeah we're experienced in land as a drag yeah um but what what is it about us that's experienced as a drag and i think it's you know all those neurotic attachments and so you can read the book as a kind of way of attempting to dissolve those attachments um in a lot of ways as like kind of like an instruction manual for people to read and kind of reduce their attachments to a certain brand of politics or politics in general in order
to kind of just emerge I guess or fuse. But this changes actually a lot in teleoplexy his most recent paper that we haven't talked much about and it's pretty incredible and it does highlight the fact that a lot of things remain the same all the way throughout lens writing and in teleoplexy it's this idea of these processes these ever accelerating processes technological and economic processes, we can kind of, leftist accelerationism, if it wishes to be productive in any way, must put all of its energy into kind of tracking, mapping and tracing
those processes, those functions. So as opposed to trying to build a grand narrative about the kind of future that we would like to construct. It's instead maybe paying close attention to processes at the moment and seeing maybe times or moments, taking advantage of moments of maybe sabotage or capture or explosion. Yeah, I think the best way to put it is probably like coming up with tactics through close observation, imminent critique. We can configure ways not of destroying
and reconstructing a new future, but of reorientating, swerving, channeling the forces in new directions. Once it was a twin, now it's nothing. Twin, twin. Unborn. Absorbed it. Absorbed it.
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Now. Now. Now. Unborn, unborn, and absorbed it in the system. Once it was a twin, it was a twin. Now, now, nothing. Unborn, unborn, and absorbed it in the system. Once it was a twin, it was a twin. Now sound. Unboard. Absorbed.
Coat Coat and the waves and the waves and the oceans and the clouds and the monsters and the waves that are and the dreams and the dreams and the dreams There's a couple of different ways that you can read land. And I want to think right now about how his writings function.
You know, what do they do? What's the potential effects that they can have on a reader? Maybe what were they intended to do? The place of truth in land. Like, the place of truth is a vexatious issue, I think, in constructivism generally. because if you just flat out kind of reject an idea of representation or any kind of transcendent value and everything you do is, you know, like constructing a machine that you put out into the world that then just functions, you totally avoid responsibility for the effect that that machine might have, which I think is fine. Like who said anyone needs to be responsible for what they do? but it doesn't mean that you're immune from a level of critique okay so just because you reject
the idea of truth values doesn't does that mean you know that truth kind of starts coming creeping back into your work and that it's the way that it connects with the world is as a kind of a truth or a bible you know it's all well and good to say like land falls outside of the register of left and write politics, you know, but anyone that says, you know, I think anyone that says that they're apolitical essentially aligns themselves with, like, the dominant discourse of the time. And I think that it's not hard to see that in those writings, like sort of, you know, complicity with neoliberalism. But with regards to his writings, is it all just sci-fi? I mean, I think there's a real problem here in a lot of ways.
Because, yes, and it's with constructivism in general. Because if you reject representationalism or you destroy the possibility for there to be any transcendental principle of value or measure that you can sort of use to analyze your philosophy and its functioning, you get rid of correspondence theory of truth. You get rid of any kind of quantifiable or transcendent value system. How do you know or how do you measure success? I think it's really hard with Len because, I mean, he definitely has a goal. It's not that this is a completely sort of pointless, meaningless practice, right? The idea is that we are going to affirm increased intensification, acceleration of deterritorialization,
and we're going to reject and critique anything that delays and inhibits this process. So there's a kind of program. There's a program. It's not about truth and falsity, but how do you measure whether intensity is increasing or whether it's being inhibited? And I think it gets really complicated when you start picking this apart philosophically and you ask, well, what is intensity? how do we measure levels of intensification through effective experience through some form of effective experience but how do you do that if you reject any concept of the human subject of the kind of phenomenological experiencing being transcendence it becomes at that point
very complicated to figure out exactly what is being achieved and how we are achieving it well it renders critique and critical negotiation impossible precisely and it renders the this the functionalism has a kind of attribute of muteness like it's a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby if it is not attended to on its own terms then it has kind of nothing to say in response um And the paradox of it is, and it's autoimmunity from critique kind of makes it resemble a dogmatic theory, like someone of Kant's, like of an a prioric principled philosophy that simply states, well, you know, this is, this is how it is.
There's no way to sort of empirically deny this. So you have to accept it kind of as a first principle. the first principle of chaos like that that that negative empty space that idea of dissolution how do you how do you measure worldwide primary production yeah how do you measure worldwide schizophrenization i think who would be the bearer or what would be the bearer of this worldwide schizophrenization and if you can't answer that question which we can't how do you sort of grapple with this philosophy how do you i don't think that you grapple with it like i think a lot of people kind of but that's like that's that's how you affirm it right I mean you're either in it or you're not you either function with it or you don't and so but how do you affirm it because
the only option is to affirm and to continue to affirm intensification at all costs but you're what you're affirming and this is Ray Brassier's critique is you're affirming your own incapacity to continue affirming because you're affirming your own dissolution into the processes themselves. So in a sense, there's a radical break somewhere where there's a collapse, the philosophy collapse, and I think we have to acknowledge that. For land, philosophy always had an affinity with despotism. And what is despotism in Deleuze and Guattari? It's overcoding the flows of desire. It's not difficult to read in land a kind of, you know,
despotism throughout the whole text. Like it ends, every chapter ends in this really kind of sardonic, you can do nothing about this, like give in, give in. It's happening whether you like it or not. Yeah, and how does this invest our desire? Like, okay, so humanists who read this are like whatever, buddy, like, you know, maybe they feel slightly disheartened. But what about generations of techno-nihilists, people who have given up on the fantasy of Marx or feel as though there's no hope? This book for me functions in a way that's really alluring, seductive and invest desire in a way that could cause a lot of people
to just give up on politics and just acquiesce with the market. On the other hand, though, I want to talk about how else it's functioned, like, and how it definitely functioned. Some people regard land and accelerationism not really as, like, a serious program or political endeavor, but as a sudden shock to the left. And something that woke the left out of its kind of slumber and forced them to kind of consider the very points that land brings up and think through those thoughts. if only to move beyond them, in order to kind of grapple with the complexity of the processes that we do find ourselves in. Definitely. I think it's really important to not see the kind of lack of a
political ideology or a political strategy in land as an imperative to acquiesce with capitalism. Because if we read land carefully, it's very clear that he's interested in capitalism as a force, as a tactic that might lead us to a different end. So he instrumentalizes it. And I think that's how we have to approach land as well. I think we can instrumentalize him politically. There's not a political ideology there that we can reproduce, but it's an engineering manual. The same thing he says about anti-Oedipus. It's an engineering manual, And you can see a lot of great work being done now in the 21st century, which has taken up techno nihilism or techno determinism as an instrumental tool to kind of continue to reinvent politics and political discourse.
So you can see it in left accelerationist discourse today and in things like xenofeminism, which we've talked about already. There's an instrumentalization of these ideas and an attempt to increase the complexity of political discourse and get it out of sort of illusory, fantastical kind of humanist registers and make the left deal with the complexity of global capitalism and the convergence of economics and technology and to grapple and to intervene with these issues.
Yeah, I mean, I think that the challenge posed by Land's theoretical conceptualisation of accelerationism ended up really raising a lot of problems with the ways that the left were thinking and organising and encouraged people to better understand market forces that were structuring their lives, you know, made us take neoliberalism seriously as a structuring force of our subjectivity, as something that has become so thoroughly imbued with reality that we can no longer really see it as separate from ourselves but as a process that is occurring within us and alongside us. And despite us. Yeah. And the kind of speed at which change happens these days,
whether it's experienced as inertia or not, is such a complicated kind of any kind of politics, you know, leftist or otherwise, that wishes to understand this, you know, needs to kind of achieve that kind of a similar speed of understanding and cognition if it wants to intervene and understand and kind of map that process out. And I think that's kind of where the future lies for left accelerationism and anyone who takes himself, you know, to be on the left in any form. Echt?
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