WRAP THESIS Beddoes 1996

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Breeding Demons A critical enquiry into the relationship between Kant and Deleuzewith specific reference to women Diane J. Beddoes A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick Department of Philosophy 16th May 1996

® Copyright by Diane J. Beddoes 1996 All Rights Reserved

Table of Contents Acknowledgements iii Summary iv Abbreviations v Introduction : Side-Communication I Revolution 1 1 II Critique 9 III Demons 22 Chapter 1: `a book on an enemy... ' System:FacultiesinTheory and Practice I 11 System-A Gap III Deleuze'sEscapeRoute IV ProblemI 30 31 38 45 48 Chapter 2: Losing Face 53 I II III 55 63 74 Recognition Sense ProblemII Chapter 3: Forces and Deductions Attraction and Repulsion I Repulsion Attraction II Lagoon Dynamics III DeductionI: Kant 1V Deduction11:Deleuze V Demon1 89 92 93 99 103 110 113 119 Chapter 4: PassiveSynthesis 125 I Synthesis 130 11 Passive 141 Chapter 5: A Row of Doors Soul I II Imagination Continuity III 146 146 155 162 Chapter 6: Becoming-woman 171 I Receptacle, which is now called space 171 II III Turn of the screw A Kind of Schizophrenia 176 186

IV VA Out of the middle HesitantDiscipless 188 192 Chapter 7: Breeding Demons I Changingthe Object II Making Femininity III Market Making IV Becoming-imperceptible V BreedingDemons 201 201 208 212 218 222 Conclusion: No Tribunal 227 Endnotes 231 Bibliography 271 ii

Acknowledgements I ,would like to thank Andrew Benjamin for always being encouraging, Keith AnsellPearsonfor reading this at short notice and Nick Land for not interfering at all. Specialthanks are for Adrian Haldane, for his coffee, his design senseand his supremecalm, and my mum, for too many things to list. 111

Summary This thesis addressesthe relation between Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze, with referenceto women. It argues that Deleuze's "methods" reveal an intensive dyanamic in Kant obscuredby readings which concentrateon the molar structuresin his thought and that this dynamic is implicated with the deployment by Deleuze (and Guattari) of becoming-womanas a middle line which escapesthe rational tribunal. It insists that a philosophy of difference function as a positive elimination of relations to unity, to the subject and to other figures of power in philosophical thought and that Deleuze's oeuvre is a critical and creative engagementwith the transformation of philosophical problems and the relation of thinking to history which emergefrom this. The other theme, that of women, is addressedthrough Luce Irigaray's reading of Kant and Rosi Braidotti's reading of becoming-woman. I argue that whilst the former's critique of an uncritically assumedsymmetry in Kant's work is effective and well-directed, shebecomescaught in her own methodologyof jamming, but that there are nonethelessstrong and productive directions in her thought, many of which are parallel and/or connected to those of Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-woman. Against Braidotti's interpretation of becoming-woman, I argue that it adopts a molar political strategy and as such does not connectwith the force behind this thought. Lastly, this thesis is an argument against bilateral sexual difference, in favour of distributive or `n-sexes': the title, Breeding Demons connectsthe theme of demons in Deleuze's writing to the cycleswhich effect such distributions. Iv

Abbreviations B, 1949 Boyer, C. B., The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development (New York, Dover Publications) B, 1989 Battersby,C., Genderand Genius:Towards a FeministAesthetics (Landon,The Women'sPressLtd.,) B, 1991 Braidoäi, R, Patterns of Dissonance:a study of women in (Cambridge,Polity Press) contemporaiyphilosophy. B, 1994 Braidotti, K, Nomadic Subjects,(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press) B, 1985[1] Braudel, F., Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Ce tury. Volume 1: The Structures of Everyday Life, tr. Miriam Kochan, revised by Sian Reynolds, (London: Fontana Press) B, 1985[21 Civilization and Capitalism.15th-18thCentury.Volume 2: The Wheelsof Commercetr., Miriam Kochar, revisedby , SianReynolds,(London:FontanaPress) D, 1963,1984 Deleuze,Gilles, La philosophiecritiquede Kant (Paris:PUF),trans. Kanes Critical Philosophy, Tr. Hugh Tomlinsai and Barbara Habberjam(London:The AthlonePress) D, 1968,1994 Difference et Repetition (Paris: PUF), trans. Difference and etition tr. Paul Patton, (London: The Athlone Press) D, 1969 'Zola et la felure, prefaceto Zola, La BeteHumaine,(Paris: Gallimard) D, 1969,1990 L,ogique du seas (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit), trans. The Logic of Sense,tr. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, (New York: Columbia University Press) D, 1988 Bergsonism. (New York, Zone Books) D, 1993[1] Critique et Clinigue, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit) V

D, 1993[2] The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, tr. Tom Conley, (London:Athlone) DB, 1979 Deleuze, G., and Bene, C., Superpositions, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit) DG, 1972,1984 Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F., L'Anti-Oedipe: Capitalisme et Schizophr6nie(Paris,Les Editionsde Minuit), trans. Anti us: Capitalismand Schizophrenia, tr. RobertHurley, Mark Seem,Helen R. Lane,(Landan:lhe AthlonePress) DG, 1980,1988 Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrenie 2 (Paris, Les Editions de Minuit), trans. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism (Und: DG, 1994 and Schizophrenia, tr. The Athlone Press) Brian Massumi, What is Phdosoahy?(London, Verso) DP, 1977,1987 Deleuze, G. and Pamet, C., Dialogues, (Paris: Aux Editions Flammarion),trans. Dialogues,tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam(London:The AthlonePress) F,1992 Friedman,M., Kant and the Exact Sciences,(Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress) G, 1987 Gleick,J., Chaos:Making a New Science,(London:Abacus) I, 1974,1985 Irigaray,Luce, Speculumde I'Autre Femme,(Paris:Les Editionsde Minuit), trans. Speculumof the Other Woman, tr. G. C. Gill (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress) 1,1977,1985 Ce Sexe Oui Men Est Pas Un. (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit), trans. This sex which is not one. tr. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), K, vol no Kant, Immanuel, Kants gesammelteSchriften. Herausgegebenvon der Königlich PreußischenAkademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co) M, 1992 Massumi, B., A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari (Cambridge: The MiT Press) Ili

L, 1973 Leibniz, G. W., Philosophical Writings, (London:J.M. Iknt & Sons. Ltd. ) L, 1994 Lazreg, M., Women's Experienceand Feminist Epistemology,a critical new-rationalist approach' in Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectivesin Epistemology ed. Kathleen Lumen (Landon:Routledge) PS, 1985 Prigogine, I., and Stengers, I., Order out of Chaos (London, Flamingo) S,1991 Stone,S., mie empirestrikesback:a posttranssexual manifesto),in Epstein,J. and Straub,K. (ed) Bodyguards:the cultural politics of genderambiguem(Landon:Routledge) S,1992 Sagan,D., 'Metametazoa:Biology and Multiplicity,, in J. Crary and S. Kwinter (ed.), IncorporationsZone6 (New York Urzone) Iv1I

For Emily

Introduction Side-Communication `Philosophie, rien que de la philosophic, au sens traditionnel du ' mot'. Two primary themes inform the direction of this thesis. The first is the relation of Immanuel Kant and Gilles Deleuze and the second,the position of women in philosophy, both as philosophers and as creatureswith a philosophical design which women themselves have had no part in creating. The two problems connect in the concept of becoming-woman, found in Mille Plateaux (1980), the second of the two volumes of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie,which Deleuze co-wrote with Felix Guattari. I Revolution Each element - Kant, Deleuze and women - is attached in its own way to revolution. The French revolution `fords in the hearts of all spectators(who are not engaged in this game themselves) a wishful participation that borders closely on enthusiasm', Kant wrote, sounding close to enthusiasm himself, from the safe, if by that time censorial Prussian State under the rule of Frederick William 11 Under his .2 uncle, Frederick the Great, Prussia had been shapedby a thirst for power and glory, rationalized through the medium of Enlightenment ideas. Unlike his mystically inclined nephew, Frederick was religiously indifferent, believing his authority restedin the State itself; and he set about shaping it in a way which would reflect this status.He instigated massive land-reclamation and colonization projects; he established a huge bureaucratic administration; his codification and uniformization of the law resulted in a new political character, the citizen; and he quieted the Prussian aristocracy, enlisting their servicesfor the State with privileges and rewards. For Frederick, the idea of the 1

Introduction State as servant to the people was anathema:to Voltaire, he wrote: `I view my subjects like a herd of stagson some noble's estate[;] their only function is to reproduceand fill the Space' Kant flourished on Frederick's estate, and could observe from its safe .3 less in less the order with revolutions areas of world, stable pasturesevents unfolding than that of Frederick. Deleuze's pre-1968 writing has the appearance of conservatism, in both language and tone. But the appearance is misleading, and to sustain it requires deliberate effort. His collaboration with Felix Guattari in the two volumes of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie effected a transformation in thought, taking it out of the academyand restoring it to life and desire, energizing language with fresh air. It sides l'Urstaat fascisme lequel hante 'Democratie, ou socialisme, n'est par politics; no with comme modele inegalable (democracy, fascism, or socialism, which of these is not haunted by the Urstaat as a model without equal)?'4 Attacking, with joy, the oedipal, the familial, the statist, the fascistic, the ideological, the patrimonial and the repressive, L'anti-oedipe, the first volume, is thought as exterminating angel. To the extent that thought returns to the subject and to subjection, `L'anti-oedine a ete un echec 5 complet'. Yet there are continuities which run throughout his work, consistent themes; an initial list might include intensities, the problem of critique as production, the body, the strangulation of thought by consciousnessand conscience.And consistent names: Spinoza, Artaud, Freud, Nietzsche, Marx, Leibniz, Kant, Simondon, Canetti, Geoffroy St. Hilaire - again naming only a selection. May `68 and the collaboration with Guattari catalysedthe assemblageof these charactersand themes, together with many others, into an up and running machine of thought without image or single origin, which proliferates potential directions with each reading. There is 2 treachery in

Introduction choosing to follow the continuities, as this thesis does, rather than emphasizing the break But: `Etre traitre ä son propre regne, titre traltre ä son sexe, ä sa classe,ä sa majorite - quelle autre raison d'ocrire? (What other reasonis there for writing than to be traitor to one's own reign, traitor to one's sex, to one's class, to one's majority?)' (DP, 1977:56; 1987:44) In an attack on the re-domesticationof thought in France in the `70's, Deleuze points to the convergenceof disparate and apparently contrary positions on one agreed point: hatred of May `68, and the declared impossibility of revolution, either explicit or tacit, in the enthusiasm for the principle of election. For this, one must first place oneself as a subject,a citizen -a Staatsbürger;for this man, Deleuze argues,revolution becomes`1'actepur du penseurqui la pense impossible (the pure act of a thinker who thinks it [revolution] impossible)'6A similar convergencecan be seentoday also, this time in relation to the reception of Deleuze's work, and this time the point of unity is possession.Those who do not live up to the revolutionary potential are castigatedfor their `craven submissionto the Academy', whilst those less craven are charged with a range of crimes from mis-reading, philosophical inadequacy, outright lunacy, and desiring the impossible.' Each side has its orthodoxies and its enemies, its image of revolution and of thought. A running theme throughout Deleuze's writing is that of the image of thought, and the stultifying effect it has on the potentials for thinking. This thesis claims neither right or wrong, truth or falsity. It is an idea, a problem which does not here pretend to a solution. Indeed, whether writing solvesanything is doubtful.

Introduction This brings me to the third theme, that of women. At the time of both revolutions, the Kantian and Deleuzian, the role of women was in transformation. What characterizedfemale nature becameuncertain towards the end of the eighteenth century, many qualities previously attributed to women became associated with maleness- the sublime and genius both attribute a femininity to men, and a relation with nature and imagination which had previously been associatedwith the wildness and unrestrained immorality of women. Christine Battersby writes: `there was no longer a consensusabout which features of the psyche doomed females to perpetual inferiority', and traces their re-definition as culturally refined, self-controlled (when virtuous), and generally domesticated! Kant solves the problem of apparently contrary qualities of sexual wildness and cultural refinement by distinguishing between an anthropological and a cultural perspective on women. In an uncivilized state, superiority belongs to man, and the proper nature of women is as unrecognizable in a crude state of nature as `that of the crab apple and the wild pear, which reveal their diversity only when they are grafted or inoculated'! It is only through culture - the end of a reasonwhich women do not have that properly female qualities develop, a beautiful understanding and sensible virtue fitting her for marriage and legal reception of nature's true gift, the foetus. Concomitant with the culturally driven emergenceof qualities which, in a natural state remain indiscernible, women appear to achieve a lind of activity, or power, which is exercised against or over men. However, the range of this power is limited to domesticity and expressesa desire for domination which is revealed through tears, nagging, manipulation and a shrewdness in the exercise of her charms, as a 1° is `imperceptibly fettered by consequenceof which man a child'. Whilst she `should 11, [herrschen]' Queen of the domestic arena, `supreme command in the reign household' is the prerogative of `only one person who co-ordinates all occupations in 4

Introduction is his. i12 is The thus gifted of women power apparent accordancewith one end, which by men through a cultural and socio-political order which is extrinsic to women's own desires; moreover, women's power is permitted within the framework of a space dominion limiting to the into divided women's private spheres, public and already latter and tolerating it only within the co-ordinated ends of man. That the gifted power ends on the doorstep is made clear by Kant in Der Metaphysik der Sitten, where he differentiates betweenactive and passivecitizens: the latter includes journeymen, household servants, juveniles, and all women. Passive State, included the those are as members of quantitatively are who, whilst citizens qualitatively differentiated from the legislating active members. Disenfranchised and playing no part in its constitution, they are nonethelesssubject to its law. Whilst Kant holds out the possibility of transition from passiveto active citizenship, this is clearly not an alternative for women: to become an actively legislative and vote-holding Staatsbürger, a woman would have to be able to becomea man." Women's truth, Kant says, comes from the world: what it says is true and what it does is good. They can as well learn theoretical principles as they can grow beards, he mutters; as for girls, they `must be got used to smiling in an easy, unconstrainedway when they are still very young' for smiling `gradually moulds them 14 disposition joy, friendliness to within as well and establishes a and sociability'. Moulding, growing, pruning, cultivating, women become problems of the landscape, country gardens created as a resource and for relaxation from the real life of public affairs. By encouraging smiling in girls, Kant seemsto envisagethe prospect of selfpruning women. Whilst his comment on smiling applies to children in general, it is `especiallygirls"5 at which it aims. 5

Introduction In the 1960's and '70s, Western women's lives were affected in radically different ways: the Pill removed sexuality from reproduction; women began to work in greater numbers (though still for the most part in menial "female" occupations); lesbian separatism developed; women began to attack their assimilation into class structuresbasedon the social status of men; to question the exclusion of home labour from economics; to play with the images assignedto them on their own terms; they began to write and to be published; to uncover a richer and more diverse view of women's roles in history, and to move into territories previously defined as male, either positively so, or on the grounds that women's biology/minds/ hormones etc., naturally excluded them from large areas of life. Most importantly, women ceased to prune themselvesin line with male expectations.Men began to concern themselveswith the movementsof women, and many could find no more original responseto the changes than ridicule or tired appeals to the proper and natural function of women as reproduction animals. The most important argument is economic. In the West, the decline of industrial capital and the emergenceof information technology has transformed the labour market: physical strength and brute force have lost their value, to be replacedby manoeuvrability, flexibility, easeof transition betweendifferent areasof life, interactive skills. One in four women in Britain choosesnot to bear children, and many women who do have children prefer to bring them up without men. Fewer and fewer women are choosing to confine themselveswithin the legal bondageof marriage. The Internet has openedup spacefor playing with gender assignations,whilst cyberfeminism drives home historical connectionsbetween women and technology, messing up its image as toys for the boys. Oedipus collapses all around, as women begin (slowly) to gain the economic control over their lives which releasesthem from their historical dependency on men. 6

Introduction What, however doesthis have to do with the debateover Deleuze, from where this discussion of women began? The issue is treachery. The academic debate over Deleuze divides him into two parts, one revolutionary, of the streets, and the other institutional, of the university, but it can be paraphrasedas an argument over which side is the most treacherous?Is there more treachery in throwing aside the constraints of the academy, rejecting its theory, descrying the ascription of labels, or in assimilating Deleuze with, for example, problems coming out of deconstruction. In the context of economic viability, there is no difference, since these debatesoccur for the most part amongst well-paid men. It is therefore not a debate into which women fit easily, anymore than they fit easily into philosophy, or into class structures. Rage against the academyis less clearly a revolutionary position for those who have been fighting against restrictions on their entry into it, and the rejection of theoretical approachesto Deleuze's work sits differently when history has spent much effort persuadingwomen of their theoretical inadequacies.This is why remarks such as those of Rosi Braidotti's are problematic. Shewrites: `Philosophy creates itself through what it excludes as much as through what it asserts.High theory, especially philosophy, posits its values through the exclusion of many - non-men, non-whites, nonlearned, etc.. The structural necessityof these perjorative figurations of otherness makes me doubt the capacity, let alone the moral and political willingness, of theoretical discourse to act in a nonhegemonic,non-exclusionary manner'.16 History has createditself through similar exclusions: science,economics,law, engineering, politics, - the list can be continued at will - all have exercised either 7

Introduction theoretical or practical restraints against women. Philosophical theory provides an abstractstructural account of theseexclusions and is, as Braidotti says,createdthrough them. However, unless one subscribes to the view that thought, as opposed to institutional philosophy, is generatedby exclusion and the exercise of the negative on difference, the case against infiltrating theory as well as practice seems slight. Moreover, the theory/practice distinction is, once more, an artifice of the exclusionary mind. As will be discussedin the thesis, Deleuze's understanding of the theory/practice relation is not one which divides down a central line; it is instead one of mutual and reciprocal interaction, theory opening space where practices are blocked, and so transforming the potentials of practice, and practice mobilizing theory, breaking down walls and moving through crevices, and in so doing transforming what is understood by both theory and practice. Bedtime stories for children need not of necessitybe peopled by fairies, and uncut minds understandpower with ease,since it is exercisedupon them without the possibility of escape. Children are pragmatists too: generating variations without regard for rule, in responseto the situations they discover, transforming language into a toy, a game which changeswhilst it is played, a field of edible words. Leaving girls to think so they can smile for themselves,rather than re-furbishing historical tales of their necessaryexclusion from certain women's, whilst at the same time leaving boys to do the same, rather than imposing the burden of history of their backs; these seem most profitable for the future becoming-woman.It is for thesereasons,amongstothers, that I am uninterested in the attribution of reactionary/revolutionary labels and the fight for possessionover Deleuze (or Kant). Revolution belongs to the young. Cold indifference to opinion is something one learns. 8

Introduction II Critique `Copernicussaid: "When you have once seen the chaos, you must make some thing to set between yourself and that terrible sight: and so you make a mirror, thinking that in it shall be reflected the reality of the world; but then you understand that the mirror reflects only appearances,and that reality is somewhere else, off behind the mirror, and then you remember that behind the mirror there is only the chaos." Dark dark dark'" Kant effecteda revolution in philosophy, through the introduction of time into the subject, effecting its disjunction into two elements,the `I think' and the `I am', the relation of which is neither logical or empirical, but transcendental. This means real logical is for transcendental the than conditioning, materially rather merely conditions, is, it impose does that simply epistemological restrictions on the possibility of not understanding the world, but is implicated in its material order. The relation of indeterminate existence- "I am" - to determining thought - "I think" - is determined in or as time; that is, the existenceof the subject is determined in time and consciousness of this existence is representedas time - that is, as the subjective and psychological experienceof succession.The condition of this determination is transcendental,rather than either logical, through the medium of a "therefore", or theological, through the medium of pre-establishedharmony. The introduction of time as a transcendentalform is, to use an anachronistic term, part of Kant's anti-logicist project, and the movement 9

Introduction away from a rationalist epistemology devolved from concepts. Leibniz, for example, in `would in living (and they time the that, exist creatures of space), absence saysof ideas only, as mere possibilities'18whose truth is grounded in God. The difference to the Kantian conception of time as a form of intuition whose ideality is immanent to the constitution of human knowledge, and a condition of its real possibility - that is, a transcendentalcondition - is quite clear. For Leibniz, the essenceof time is continuous succession,this being generatedby the aggregation of monads,the ultimate and simple elements of reality. One might go on to inquire about a successionof perceptions within a monad. The complexities implied by this question are too great to pursue in depth, for two reasons. Firstly, the matter is tangential to the thesis, and secondly, Leibniz himself has little of an explicit nature to say about time, and nothing which supportsthe claim that it can be discussedin terms of what happenswithin a monad which does not also include the world. However, the direction in which this question might be explored can be suggestedby the following. Each monad includes the entire world: `in every particle of the universe there is contained a world of infinite 19 creatures'. Separation of the temporality of a point of view or perspective within a monad from that of the aggregatewhich it includes it thus illegitimate, in Leibniz's own terms. As he writes, it is impossible `to conceive of the possibility of any internal motion being started, directed, increased, or diminished within it, [a monad] as can occur in compounds, where change among the parts takes place.'20 Although the principle of change comes from within a monad - necessarily, since they have no windows - each monad is a universe and time (and space) are nothing `other than certain orders of things. s21That is, they cannot be thought in the absence of the physical relations amongstbodily organs, which the soul or monad represents.22 Through abstraction from phenomenal relations, or appearancesgenerated through the monadic activity of appetition, Leibniz draws his mathematical conception 10

Introduction of time, which, whilst well-founded, is nonethelessan useful intellectual fiction - that is, it cannot be intuited, or perceived phenomenally, but can, nonetheless, be understood. This intellectual fiction is non-contradictory - that is, it's truths are necessary - and distinguishes mathematical time, as a possible fiction, from the impossible fiction of supposing that time is other than certain orders of things.23 A physico-mathematicalview of the world, from a Leibnizian perspective,is thus a view imposed on an already given world of determinate extension and change, the "already given" being an ideal consequenceof the co-ordinated activity of the only real elements in Leibniz's system, the monads. Mathematical consistency thus occupies a different order of ideality than phenomenal coherence.The universality of both, however, is a function of the mirroring by every monad of all the activity of all others, in a network of interconnections: if this mirroring were only partial, no universal systematic physico-mathematicsor public phenomenalworld would be possible, since there would be different orders of temporal and spatial co-ordination amongst different groups of monads. What guarantees the interconnectednessof all monadic activity is preestablishedharmony, or God. There are interesting directions in which to take this formulation: the idea of an infinitely interacting network, so important to Deleuze's understanding of Kant, is already plain from this brief discussionand such a system,as will becomeclear in the thesis, is integral to Deleuze's understanding of the Kantian faculties. However, the function of this brief excursion into Leibniz is to mark his difference from Kant with relation to time. Kant turns the Leibnizian view upside down and re-formulates the situation and value of its terms: the well-founded and useful fiction (in the sensethat it does not refer to any real properties of the world) of Leibnizian mathematical time becomesin Kant a presuppositionalform of experience,a condition of the possibility of knowledge of the object. In this way the separation of phenomenal and mathematical 11

Introduction time is closed, mathematics becomes immanent to the production of phenomenal knowledge, rather than abstracted from it and the empirical world is immediately physico-mathematical.This allows Kant to say that time is empirically real, whilst for Leibniz it is only ever ideal. Moreover, for Kant, the universal status of mathematics, and the claim of a single time of which all different times are parts, is no longer guaranteed by pre-established harmony gifted by God, nor does it `remain when "' its intuition. is made of all subjective conditions of abstraction Not even as a possibility in the ideas of God. Independently of these subjective conditions, `time is 25 nothing'. A last point is that for Kant, the pure form of time as such must be distinguished from time as succession.`Time has only one dimension',26 and that dimension is experiencedboth subjectively and objectively as succession.However, if the pure form of time is confusedwith the experienceof time as succession,which is a mode of time, the transcendentalimport of the Aesthetic is lost; time is conflated either with its conceptual formulation in terms of causally determined motion, or with a psychologistic, and (apparently) arbitrary sequenceof subjective states in inner sense. 'Motion, as an act of the subject first producesthe concept of succession'; succession ... is part of a temporal language, as are co-existenceand duration, but as pure form, it is a condition of the possibility of that language, so whilst successioncan be describedas 21 form itself described be time, the this time a mode of of mode as successive. - cannot If successionis ascribed `to time itself, we must think yet another time, in which the 28 be Successionpertains to the parts of time - that is, to the sequencewould possible' experienceof determinate quanta of intuition in inner sense- and thus to a limitation of the pure form of time; `different times are but parts of one and the sametime', but 29 that one and the sametime is not itself successive. 12

Introduction In one of the four metaphysical expositions of time in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure ReasonKant writes: `Only on the presuppositionof time can we representto ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time (simultaneously)or at different times (successively).'30 Different times, or as Kant says `parts of time', are successive31: however, different times - points or instants - are limitations which presupposethe transcendentaland pure form of time. But once more it must be emphasizedthat this does not imply that the pure form of time can be collapsedinto succession:for whilst the parts of time are successive,the pure form of time is a continuum not comprised of points or instants. Whilst it can be divided into parts, which exists only as a function of this division, it is not equivalent to these parts or to their successiveaddition. To think thus would be to lead Kant back towards a Leibnizian perspective on the problem. This is a critical difference, not only for a rigorous reading of Kant, but also for understanding the 32 Deleuze form to the time. attention pays pure of It is time which opens up the problem of the transcendental, and the differences which flow from it, between phenomena and noumena, appearancesand things-in-themselves.Kant's criticisms of Leibniz for intellectualizing sensibility, for not thinking forms of intuition outside the relations of things and for conceiving of `time as the dynamical sequence'of the statesof substance,leading to its formulation as something akin to confused concepts, may not be drawn from direct contact with Leibniz's writings: nonetheless,the latter offer no support for any reconciliation of the Kantian and Leibnizian positions on time. The Copernican revolution evicts God from theory and removesthe form of time from reason,logic, meaning and psychology. 13

Introduction Kant's work covers a huge range; science - including physics, biology and chemistry, the latter two first emerging as sciences at the close of the eighteenth century -, aesthetics, history, politics, morality, anthropology, logic, mathematics, geography and pedagogy and more. Despite this vast spread of interests, however, a its his drive both direction be thought to the and of said single problem might immediate reception -the problem of critique, as a demand for immanence of criteria. `Our age is, in especial degree, the age of critique, and to critique everything must 33 he in Critique first Pure Reason, the of the three critical works. submit', writes the of A critical tribunal, in which reason functions as both subject and judge, was to legitimate all claims to knowledge, and its necessityfor Kant was paramount: in the absenceof such a legitimation, he argues,reason lapsesinto its natural state, a state of war. Responseto the critical challenge was swift: why must everything so submit, from where doesthe authority of reasoncome?On what doesit basethe privilege of its first principles? That it was no longer God was recognized immediately: indeed, there was an injunction against the teaching of Kant's work at Marburg, pending a report on the dangers of its scepticism - epistemological as well as theological. It was lifted, however, on the basis that even if his work was sceptical, `undermin[ing] the certainty of human knowledge' it was so obscureas to be largely unintelligible, and thus of no danger.34But the responseto the implications of critique were swift. As Beiser writes in The Fate of Reason.post-Kantian philosophy begins with the meta-critical question 35 itself `looked the the of authority of reason,and possibility of criticism critically at Schopenhauer,a philosopher who titles himself the first Kantian, dismisses the post-Kantians, (mostly through polemic, seldom with argument): 'serious 14

Introduction departure declares, `I left it', he take Kant therefore my philosophy still standswhere from him' 36 Schopenhauersets off in a direction very different to that of the metacritical challenge. He is uninterested in the argumentsover reasonand respondsto the practical philosophy with the comment: `[W]hen Kant demolished old and revered errors, and knew the danger of the business, he had only wanted to substitute here and there through moral theology a few weak props, so that the ruin 37 have him, he fall time to get away' and would would not on top of Instead, Schopenhauerprivileges the TranscendentalAesthetic, calling it the diamond in Kant's crown; the thing-in-itself, which he calls will; and Ideas, which he calls Platonic, but which are more Kantian than this suggestsand than Schopenhauer himself will allow. He is critical of Kantian Ideas for their remotenessfrom perception, and of Kantian perception for being pure, in the senseof divorced from empirical data: for Schopenhauer, Ideas are inseparable from perception, and `perception is throughout the source of all knowledge.'38 It is this insistence on a perceptual and objective element to the transcendental,which is both impersonal and pre-individual, (prior to the pnncipium individuationis and the subject-objectdivision) that Deleuze shares with Schopenhauer. Nonetheless, despite their relation with perception, Schopenhauerian Ideas retain the Kantian characteristic of not being objects of representation, or phenomenasubjectto the forms of space,time and causality. Schopenhauereliminates the possibility of conceiving of the thing-in-itself either as an object somehow `behind' representation, or as the implicit cause of sensation, this latter being a purely subjective component of perception, - under the sldn, as he puts it; he also rejects the association of Ideas with the theological- 15

Introduction is in Kant them, essential to retaining what places whilst metaphysical register which the Kantian notion of the transcendental, which is that it expressesimmanence of criteria and real logical. For those to are purely which conditions as opposed Schopenhauer,however, Ideas are not immanent to reason, but are immediate and direct expressionsof relations of variance of the will. In effect, he is opening up a thought of relation (the transcendental being concerned with relations, not objects) which is neither conceptualor psychologistic; a rigorous thought of the transcendental. A SchopenhauerianIdea is defined as an adequateobjectification of the will. By adequateobjectification, Schopenhauerunderstandsthe material manifestation of the will, its corporealization, not as mediate knowledge, worked through the secondary functions of the brain, or intellect, but as a condition of experience,as material, nonconceptualand impersonal, expressingthe activity of the will in-itself outside the laws of experience.In this sense,Ideas and their adequateobjectification function as real conditions of empirical experience rather than, as for Kant, regulative tools for the delimitation of speculativereasonand place-holdersfor its practical legislation. Schopenhauer's formulation, criticism of Kantian in terms of the focus imaginarius, Ideas aims at their subjective and is thus in line with his more general criticism of Kant's failure to consider the objective, or physiological aspects of knowledge. empirical This leads him towards consideration perception, in the direction of the material of the thing-in-itself, or will. conditions of Part of his attachment to the term Platonic as a qualification of Ideas is to highlight their relation with perception and emphasize the borrowed reality of the phenomenal world; Plato's Ideas, unlike Kant's, are empirically manifest in copies. He writes: 16

Introduction `To the brook which rolls downwards over the stones,the eddies, waves, and the foam-forms exhibited by it are indifferent and inessential;but that it follows gravity, and behavesas an inelastic, perfectly mobile, formless, and transparent fluid, this is its essentialnature, this, if known through perception, is the Idea.s39 (original italics) The inessential aspects of natural phenomena belong to borrowed reality, to the unfolding of the Idea through the functions of the brain, whilst Ideas are `the whole 40 form the thing-in-itself, only under of representation'. Under this form, and at the lower grades of objectification, Ideas are representedunder the title of laws of nature which allow for their recognition in particular cases:gravity, electricity, crystallization, magnetism, fluidity, elasticity, chemical properties, sexual desires.However, the nature for is forces laws `something that these the entirely strange and unknown'; of express Schopenhauer,force is thought on an intensive register, as a qualitas occulta emerging from immanent relations of the will, a residuum of which always remains exterior to the formal description of law.4' The will or thing-in-itself is antecedentto these laws, not causally so, but as the blind quantitative drive of the will, outside measurability and formal description. Ideas are the direct objectivity of this drive, standing between the representationof particulars referred to by laws of nature and the `variance with itself 42 to the essential will' . Effected through the incessant immanent self-variance of the will, the world as representation is manifest with ever-increasing complexity - from blind forces of nature to inorganic structuresto organic entities such as plants, and then on to animals and man. Variance of the will is expressed also in conflicts of Ideas, the resolution of this conflict involving the analogical assimilation of the conflicting orders into higher 17

Introduction Ideas. (This is not to say that this complexity can be read back into the will. ) Each Idea is thus both the resolution of problematic relations of the will at lower grades of is is itself `Each at the same time the end attained a problem. objectification, and beginning of a new course,and so on ad infinitum. s43Each Idea is abstract,eternal, and by just `gains taking up character entirely new each an unchanging, yet nonetheless, into itself from each of the subduedIdeas an analogue of higher power', expressing a different set of abstractrelations.44 So whilst Schopenhauer describes Ideas both as archetypes, and as Platonic, the facility for analogically assimilating prior grades of adequate objectification in such a way that their character is transformed also marks a definite difference from Plato's theory of forms. Moreover, Ideas and the adequate objectification of the will are differentiated not in kind, but by degree: as has been said already, they are intensive, and exterior to the forms through which the ideal world of representation is ordered. Secondary qualifications of the intensive gradations of the will introduced from this ideal perspective are thus not pertinent to exploring the real constructions of the thingin-itself. 45 It is in this sense that they are problematic, in a Kantian sense, since they cannot be referred to a universal law. Rather, they express the resolution of a conflict of the will at a certain degree, and the emergence of a qualitative representation ('a very complicated physiological force, which occurrence in an animal's brain'46) universalizes with the term "law of nature", but whose real conditions can be referred to only as qualitas occulta. It is in this sense that Ideas are abstract and diagrammatic, since they articulate the essential aspects of a real problem which cannot be expressed in terms of representation, but which is nonetheless only manifest empirically. Ideas are thus abstract, problematic and diagrammatic expressions of the will, whose solution is materialized through blind and non-cognitive striving. 18

Introduction Schopenhaueralso collapsesthe elaboratearchitecture of the Analytic through the Aesthetic, the conjunction emerging as a single principle of sufficient reason comprising time, space and causality, the three formal elements of the world as representation. The material element of the will or thing-in-itself, at the adequatelevel of objectification of which the animal is the phenomenon, is the brain, and its intellectual functions, which structure the world as representationare secondarycontrol and guidance mechanisms, which he refers to as parasitic upon the will. It is this physiological aspect of the will which, as has been remarked above, Schopenhauer chides Kant for neglecting, and which Nietzsche, first as student then as critic of Schopenhauer,developsmore fully, taking it further from its Kantian source, and reformulating critique in terms of the will to power. Its importance, both for reading Kant, and for reading the relation of Deleuze and Kant is to emphasizethe difference betweena psychologistic rendition of the transcendental,in terms of subjectively, and a rigorously critical formulation, in terms of material conditions. Schopenhauer's philosophy drives in the direction of the transcendental empiricism which Deleuze refines. Deleuze's second book, written in 1962, nine years after a slim volume on Hume, is Nietzsche et la Philosophie. In this book critique is addressedas a problem concerning the quality and relations of forces: `tout le reste est Symptome(everything 47 is else symptom)' The will gives, Deleuze writes: `eile n'aspire pas, elle ne recherche pas, eile ne desire pas, surtout eile ne desire pas la puissance.Elle donne (it does not aspire, it does not seek, it does not desire, above all it does not desire power. It 48 gives)' The genetic or critical principle of the will gives senseand value - quality - to the relations of forces immanent to the will. That is, the qualitative expressionsof quantitatively differentiated relations are not qualified by anything extrinsic to those relations: senseand value emergefrom real relations, manifest, as Schopenhauermade 19

Introduction being forces, than the rather cognition, of conceptual clear, as and outside scope qualified according to the requirements of a philosophy of representation - the most basic of which are identity and the subject-objectdivision. Sense and value are thus no longer functions of a systematic disjunction between theory and practice, which legitimates the separation of (scientifically objective) fact and (morally objective) value, but become immanent to the determinations of relations of the will, or thing-in-itself. The subject becomes integrated into the network of relations generatedthrough the determination of force relations immanent to the will, and has no values separablefrom its empirical effects. There is no longer a single territory under two contrary sets of principles, those of speculativereason and those of practical reason, and a vertical and hierarchical series of conduits leading to and from a rational subject, but a horizontal plane of relations of which the subject is a late and peripheral effect. Since the relations immanent to the will are understoodas differential and conjunctive, rather than contrary and disjunctive (as is the casewhen the noumenon/phenomonaxis in Kant is taken to be the critical one), and these relations become generative of the transcendental, rather than the consequenceof its conditioning, the transcendental becomes entirely vacuous until empirically constructed,but is not to be confusedwith that empirical construction. Hence Deleuze's attraction to the pure form of time and his demand for a `properly transcendental empiricism' 49 And hence, also, his criticism of Kant for being overly psychologistic in his formulation of synthesis; it is not that Kant is too empirical, according to Deleuze, but that he is insufficiently empirical, since he hypostatizesthe sensesand values of human (male) experienceand universalizesthem, as conditions for the possibility of knowledge of the object, and a unified experience, and then reducesthe empirical to representation. The empirical is constructedthrough 20

Introduction the lens of a set of conditions which are specific to a subject defined as active, spontaneous, rational, morally legislative and scientifically objective: all characteristics,as will be seenlater in the thesis, specific to white males. The transcendental,taken from this perspective,is traced from the values and sensesof a specific and psychologically coloured empiricism. Deleuze insists that the transcendental is impersonal, pre-individual, a field of singularities and a problem which cannot be solved through the instancesof its solutions; that is, it is produced as the relation of the empirical with something which is not empirical, and which cannot be defined as either the negative limit of the empirical, a conditioning principle extrinsic to experience or as a priori. Instead, it becomesa relation with the will, or thing-in-itself, understood as pure exteriority, the immanent threshold of sensible experience.(A fuller discussion of this will be found in a later chapter.) In this way, rather than critique being legitimated through an image of thought as rational and legislative, it becomesa positive principle of genesis. It also destroys. Critique becomes something new in Nietzsche, and something which, in conjunction with the typology of forces, turns back on the questions raised by the post-Kantians, with results which would confirm their misgivings about its implicit atheism. The division of the world into the real and the apparent is attacked, the subject becomes an effect of the will, and critique becomes immanent, not to reason, but to the will, a genetic principle which thinks against reason, against itself, against conditioning and against the image of thought; against truth, error and method. The problem of the critical relations of forces, as quantitative degreesof the will to power which effect a particular quality, that quality which is willed, is one which remains with Deleuze throughout his writing, and which finds its consummate 21

Introduction destructive force in L'anti-oedine, the first volume of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie,as the machinic or desiring unconscious,and its most positive and creative expressionin the secondvolume, as the machinic phylum. It is this latter book that Deleuze describes as philosophy, in the traditional senseof the word, as the creation of concepts;which does not interpret, nor call for interpretation, and which works, without labour, and plays, with all seriousness. III Demons This thesis addressesthe relation of Deleuze and Kant in terms of these problems: forces, the image of thought, the principle of recognition, the question of production, the materiality of the thing-in-itself, the genesis of sense and immanence of criteria. An additional element, which comes from Deleuze's book La philosophie critique de Kant, is that of a network. The network of faculties, Deleuze says, is the true transcendental method, and the Kant book (1963) is structured around their changing relations in each of the three Critiques. Systematic variations in these relations correspond to different methods of realizing an interest of reason. This notion of system runs throughout Deleuze's work He understands systems as open, nested and interconnected: everything connects to everything else, everything is implicated in the genesis of everything else, not as a universal principle through the rhizomatic or conditioning element, but interaction of forces. The concept of an assemblage, which emerges through his collaboration with Felix Guattari, molecularizes the notion of a faculty system, of body as a complex and articulated construction of interconnected components whose operations shift depending on the bodies into which they plug and the nature of relations into which they enter. 22

Introduction However, theseare not simply images,for Deleuze sharesKant's insistenceon the importance of science for philosophy. His theory of forces emergesfrom work on Guattari in biology, the technology; covered with range amongst vast embryology, Mille Plateaux are genetics, geology, the movement of populations - both molecular and animal, evolution. Whilst these themes are not explored in this thesis, Deleuze's insistence that his own work, and that with Guattari, is empirical, must be kept in mind. `[E]n verite, l'inconscient est de la physique (in reality, the unconsciousbelongs 50 the to realm of physics)' There are no metaphors;if something works, it is becauseit is real. So what of becoming-woman? This too must be real. Philosophy has associatedwomen with nature, matter, spaceand babies, ever since Plato spoke in the Timaeus of the receptacle or womb whose neutral plasticity accepted without discrimination the impress of eternal forms. The receptacle nurses becoming, but is itself immutable. It is this supposedpermanenceof function attendant on women which becoming-woman seeks to break away from; from women as reproductive and essentially sexual creatures to women as self-organizing systems which are effected only through their interactions with other machines in their environment, which is no longer defined as nature, indeed, which has no definition until it is generated. Deleuze has been criticized for neglecting feminist projects directed towards the constitution of a specifically female subjectivity. Rosi Braidotti describesherself as a Deleuzian, but nonethelessaccuseshis position on women on the grounds that it comes from a male embodied subject. Yet criticisms such as these have limited purchaseon the impulse infecting Deleuze's work, which is to exposethe mechanisms by which transcendenceis produced,as a real rather than imaginary or ideal repressive mechanism. Deleuze does not deploy becoming-woman as a feminist theory, as a 23

Introduction theory of woman, but as an element in the critical arsenal of pragmatics, or autocritique. Essential to the diagnosis of limitations imposed on desiring or machinic production through the negative real generated by transcendent, or illegitimate syntheses,to the destruction of the forms which perpetuatetheselimitations, and to the formation of a radical and positive critique, becoming-woman has no organic location or social image, aestheticnorm or political motivation. `It ya un devenir-fenunequi ne se confond pas avec les femmes, leur passe et leur avenir, et ce devenir, il faut bien que les femmes y entrent pour sortir de leur passeet de leur avenir, de leur histoire. (There is a becoming-womanwhich is not the same as women, their past and their future, and it is essential that women enter this becoming to get out of their past and their future, their history)' -51 . It is comments such as this which have, unsurprisingly, led to women questioning the use of becoming-woman, especially at a time when women are uncovering the extent of their historical involvement, and the degree to which it has been obliterated by the macro-histories of the subject.Yet Deleuze's comments always function in two directions at once. Women's history, on a macro-level, has been couchedin terms of their relations with the subject: getting out of this history and the future it projects means at the very least changing the elements in relation to which women are understood, and it is this transformation of the assemblagesinto which women move, and through which they are createdwhich becoming-womaneffects. The other question, of course, might be; what right has a man to tell us what and what is not essential for us? And there are occasions on which Deleuze (and Guattari's) philosophy takes on a prescriptive air, look out for the fascist within you, they say, suggestingeveryonehas a hidden policeman. Moreover, distinctions such as 24

Introduction that in L'anti-oedipe, between legitimate and illegitimate synthesis suggesta bilateral disjunction and a potential re-vitalization of dialectics, against which the whole tenor of their work drives. However, this thesis doesnot challenge or addresstheseproblems, for three reasons. Firstly, becauseone of the most important and fruitful effects of Deleuze's writing lies in its generosity towards those thinkers he admires. If the conflictual approachof dialectics, and the operation of the negative as a mechanism of movement is to be dissolved, such generosity is necessaryas a strategy of reading. Secondly, because to address the molar sexuality of an author as a reason for discounting elementsof his or her writing seemsprecisely what feminism must not do, and cannot, without reproducing precisely that against which it has argued What a book does,and what movementsit effects, are more important than the specifics of the physical bodies which wrote it. And lastly, to quote a friend: 'The problem is one of thinking the included disjunction of the legitimate and the illegitimate; of thinking the transcendentsuch that its relation to the immanent is itself one of immanence.'SZIf this is misunderstood,the movement of becoming-women,as Deleuze and Guattari use it, is also misunderstood,becauseit is this problem which underlies the AND logics of Deleuze's empiricism, and which mobilizes the movement of desire outside the conditions of its production without generating transcendence. This perspective demands a new understanding of the body. Nature, matter, affection, passion, etc. are not static terms, and as technology drives the perpetual reformulation of their scientific conceptualization, so too must the understanding of their relations and interconnectionswith woman change. One aspectof the problem of a philosophical feminism is the generation of a responseto these transformations: beginning from the perspective of "real women" as fully formed socio-political, cultural, ethical or aesthetic entities does not constitute a response,becauseit cannot negotiatechangeswhich impact on the machinic production of bodies. 25

Introduction As they are philosophically formed, women, like God, are always around, 53 Schopenhauer of great consolation. and sometimes creative and usefully, not usefully, for `the dramatist, Jouy, Byron, the correct viewpoint a and poet, with attributes estimating the value of women'. The former writes: `Without women, the beginning of our life would be deprived of help, the middle of pleasure, and the end of consolation.954The latter omits the middle pleasure zone, concentrating instead on for breeder the patient ears role as and educator of and as nurse with women's young, the dying sighs of men. Women are cast as altruists, essential componentsin framing the construction space within which humans live and die, whilst they themselves appearto be neither born nor to die. Observationof actual women is mediatedby a litany of exclusive disjunctions, each specialty or discipline incorporating its own version: if you don't have a penis, you must be castrated; you may have facial hair, or you shouldn't; you don't have testes,you must have ovaries; you have no y chromosome,you must have two x's; you have a flat chest or you have breasts; you desire men or you don't; you raise your consciousnessor produce an argument; you are either a woman or a man. Variations on the endless series of alternates which sift uniformity over bodies like a caul are considered accidents, the result of systematic errors in the interpretation and implementation of codes given in advance. Integrations of the body with non-organic matters are tolerable only to the extent that it is curative of these aberrations. You can get a pace-makeror have your penis involuted into the cavity of your body only if you arejudged sufficiently sick first. Deleuze calls the gods operating these exclusive disjunction the forms of recognition and their statementis 'C'est done moi, le roil c'est done ä moi que revient 26

Introduction le royaume (so I am the king! So the kingdom belongs to me)1'55There is something remaining of this statementin the argument over possessionof Deleuze's thought. The lineage of the gods is one of repetition of identity, the occurrenceand recurrenceof the same analogies, myths and fears, whereas becoming-woman is a line of material invention, of `connexions qui sautent d'arbre et arbre, et lui deracinent (connections that jump from tree to tree and uproot them)' The problem is not how to distribute the fruits on an equal basis with men, but how to destroythe trees on which they grow. Deleuze calls the jumping signals flashing betweenthe trees demons: demons are `puissancesdu saut, de l'intervalle, de l'intensif ou de l'instant et qui ne comblent la difference qu'avec du different (powersof the leap, the interval, the intensive and the instant; powers which cover difference with more difference)'.57 With no identifiability or function separablefrom their productive synthesis, demons become signs only on assemblage, in the formation of matters into intensive patterns, communication structures. Immanent to its function, nothing other than what it does, and it does and thus is nothing except through interaction, a demon is a pure information point, a pixel. De Landa expands the theme of demons in his book War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. Demons create a spacecalled a Pandemonium,where `control is never passedfrom a higher authority to a lesser authority. There are no hierarchical levels, but only a heterarchy of demons capturing control whenever they are invoked into action.'5" What invokes them into action are data patterns: indeed, they are themselvesno more than data patterns, or packets of information, which function as both messagesand addresses.The survival of a demon is a function of its interaction with other demonsin its locality, where locality is not a geographicalposition given in advance,but the consequenceof connectionsgeneratedamongst demons in the process 27

Introduction of developing problem-solving strategies,whose duration is a function of the patterns they form, rather than imposed by external criteria, or a function of the life-span of a single demon (indeed there are no such things). It is from here, from Deleuze and DeLanda, that the title of this thesis comes.It seeksto uncover the demon potential of Kant, the play of forces immanent to an actual continuum, an intensive and tactile space, which, if Kant is read "appropriately" - by which I mean, in line with the formulation of problems in Kant as they are articulated from the perspective of a subject,remain imperceptible. *** The range of the thesis is kept deliberately close: there are few other players than Kant and Deleuze.This is undoubtedly a betrayal of both Kant and Deleuze, since both can be addressedfrom a myriad other perspectives.There is no Marx and little Freud, no Fichte or Hegel, no Lacan or Lyotard, all of whom connect with both or either of Kant and Deleuze. However, there are reasonsfor this, which arise from the theme of feminism, or perhaps more accurately, the situation of women in and by philosophy, which is not of necessityequivalent to feminism. For women, the problem is not that of the subject: it once was, when feminism positioned itself as the victim of the power of a subject which it was not. Women have been situated by this subject alongside the object, as more or less its equivalent, in terms of being exchangeable commodities, and alongside nature, defined in terms of material reproduction rather than conceptual production. My intention is not to argue with this, but to utilize Deleuze's method of eliminative deduction: to eliminate the subject and its perspective and discover the movementsthrough which the object is formed, and to diagram the intensive field which the construction of a subjective spacecovers up (and which, as will be seen,makesKant nauseous):to suggesta breeding ground for demons. 28

PAGE MISSING IN ORIGINAL

Chapter 1 `a book on an enemy...' Le discredit dans Icquel est tombee aujourd'hui la doctrine des facultes, pigce pourtant tout ä fait necessairedans le systemede la philosophie, s'explique par la meconnaissancede cet empirisme proprement transcendental, auquel on substituait vainement un decalquedu transcendentalsur 1'empirique. (Despite the fact that it has become discredited today, the doctrine of the faculties is an entirely necessary component of the system of philosophy. Its discredit may be explained by the misrecognition of this properly transcendental empiricism, for which was substituted in 1 from the tracing the transcendental empirical). of vain a The slendernessof Deleuze's book on Kant - his book on an enemy, he saysde its La belie immensity implied by title, to the the task critique philosophie of seems Kant: Doctrine des facultes. Yet in little over a hundred pages, Deleuze produces an elegant and efficient map of the three Critiques which is far from a simple commentary or introductory text. `[L]a betise... estla facultedesfaux problemes,temoignantd'une inaptitudeä constituer, ä apprehenderet determiner un probleme en tant que tel' (stupidity...is the faculty for false problems; it is evidence of an inability to constitute, comprehend or determine a problem as such').2 The intelligence in Deleuze's reading of Kant lies in his constitution of critique as a real problem, on his selection of elements and in his concentration on its systematics.Focusing on the network of the faculties, on the two sensesof this word in Kant's own writing, on their disjunction into higher and lower forms, and on their illegitimate and legitimate employment, he deducesa consistent 30

Chapter 1 geography of Kant and takes up the keen edge of critique. This first chapter looks briefly at La philosophie critique de Kant and then more broadly at themes in Kant of importance to Deleuze's philosophy. I System: Faculties in Theory and Practice Two sensesof the word faculty are always in play, faculty as source and faculty as relation. Each faculty is understoodboth as a type of relation between a representation and something else (an object or subject), and as a source of representations.To each relation correspondsan interest (or disinterest, in the caseof aesthetics)of reason and each source legislates a means of realizing this interest, since `rien ne nous garantit que la raison se charge elle-meme de realiser son propre interet (there is no guarantee 3 itself interest)' Where reasonis disinterested, that reason undertakesto realize its own it is becauseit has no affective relation with the world, nothing to either gain or lose; this allows feeling to achieve its higher and culturally dignified form, as a pure operation of judging of which pleasure is a consequence,independently of desire and knowledge. Faculties in the first sense, as relation, are knowledge, desire and the feeling of pleasure and pain, whilst faculties in the second sense, as source, are sensibility, understanding and reason. It is immediately clear that the correspondencebetween the two sensesof faculty is not straightforward. Establishing a relation of correspondencebetween knowledge and an object involves input through sensibility, the accord of sensibility and understanding relies on the schema of imagination; systematizing knowledge requires the aid of reason.So two problems emerge.Taking the faculty of knowledge as an example, there must first be a convergenceof sources,each contributing a unique component to the production of objective knowledge - intuition, in the case of 31

Chapter1 in (according to in the schemata), caseof understanding, synthesis sensibility, concept, the caseof imagination, and Idea in the caseof reason.There is a further difference, in that three of the faculties are active, whilst sensibility is passive.So the common accord is it formal involves dynamic knowledge a element; the as a as well a of elements of 4 This form, forces to the activity. of passivity of relation as as of of well problem relation cannot be thought through the conceptsof substanceor cause,since this throws the problem into the domain of understanding, rather than understanding it in terms of relations amongst faculties as powers which must be thought antecedentto the specific constitutional order of any of them individually. It is clear that both sensibility and imagination operate, in the first Critique, under the management of understanding Kant writes, for example, of a `synthesis which does not belong to the senses' by 5 `understanding determines the sensibility'. But passivity here is constrained,in which that it is constituted through the relation of sensibility to the activity of understanding, from the perspectiveof understanding, and thus not transcendentally,as Kant writes, it is `a matter of fact' that the unity apparently belonging to sensibility, through which the forms of intuition become formalized and conceptual, is determined by 6 understanding. A matter of fact, rather than a problem of the real conditions of the possibility of facts. This meansthat this determining synthesisis not transcendental. As the Introduction made clear, the transcendental as a problem must be thought in relation to the Aesthetic rather than the Analytic, in order to preclude a psychologistic interpretation thought in terms of the subject.In order to understandthis dynamic relation of the faculties, therefore, a thought of passivity not delimited in advanceby understanding needsto be formulated: this is the topic of a later chapter, however, so will not be pursued here. A further point is that the type of activity associatedwith understanding differs from that attaching to imagination: the former is described by Kant as spontaneous,the latter as productive. In order to preclude the 32

Chapter 1 collapse of the Kantian architecture into the dry zones of conceptsand understanding, these differences need to be articulated; if they are not, the dynamic relation amongst the faculties is subsumed under formal constraints imposed by the operations of judgement and the functional unity of the categories,and the problematic aspectsof the system of faculties, together with the manner in which Deleuze understands this as integral to critique, to critical method, are lost. The second problem addressesthe first, that of convergencein a common form. The achievement of common sense - whether logical, moral or aesthetic - is dependenton an attitude of reason - interest in logical and moral common sense,and disinterest in aesthetic common sense.Common senseis a managed convergenceof faculties on a shared task of recognizing an object as the Same. In the first Critique. Kant refers to a `common function of the mind (gemeinschaftliche Funktion des Gemfits]' by which the disparate components of knowledge are combined into one representation.In the Critique of Judgement,the idea of common sense[Gemeinsinn] provides the criteria by which subjective judgements of taste can be presented as objective, removing taste from the private domain of the individual, legitimating the demand for universal assent to aestheticjudgements on the beautiful and attributing them with the modality of necessity.' Common senseis the meansby which the quality of sensation can be conceived of as uniformly and universally communicable; taste, Kant writes, `could be called a sensus communis aestheticus, and common understanding a sensus communis logicus.'8 Under the idea of common sense, therefore, a subjectivequality of feeling, different to sensation,becomesthe ground for an objective statementof aestheticvalue. Common understanding `is regarded as the very least that we are entitled to expect from anyone who lays claim to the name of human being'9; it functions both 33

Chapter 1 vertically, as a meansof differentiating man from the animals, as a creature who rises `truth, horizontally, the of propagation ensuring a means of as above sensation,and propriety, beauty,or justice', as sharedhuman ideals which define a community of man 1° `higher as a creature with cognitive powers'. Membership of this community is thus predicated on assent to its cultural values, its epistemological norms and its moral laws: as will be seen,all theseare problematic in relation to women. Common sense,a uniform accord amongst the faculties such that knowledge, taste and morality become public zones, rather than personal and private, becomesa question not only of establishing relations, but also of ensuring that they reflect (for a naturalized common sense) or realize (a priori common sense) an interest (or disinterest) of reason. `L'idee d'une pluralite (et d'une hierarchie) systematiquedes interets...domine la methode kantienne (The idea of a systematic plurality (and a hierarchy) of interests...dominates the Kantian method')': this community of interests is the `principe d'un systemedes fins (the principle of a systemof ends)' unrealizable by nature.12 Immanent critique, as the method of transcendental philosophy in a Kantian sense,setsout the nature and realization of theseends. The balancing of interests of reason does not form common sense,but good sense: privileging speculative interests threatens practical interests, and Kant's statementof good sense,of limiting knowledge to make room for faith, indicates two things. Firstly, that achieving equilibrium of interests requires both limitation and negation, which, as will be seen later in this chapter, are two of the functions which Deleuze arguescorrupt the critical method and lead to a degenerateformulation of the transcendental. And secondly that good sense and common sense complement each other, in the formation of a single Image of thought, another line in Deleuze's relation with Kant which is addressedin chapter two. 34

Chapter 1 To ensure the balance of interest and systemof ends, one faculty (in the first sense,as relation) must play two roles: it must contribute, on a horizontal plane of integration, to common sense,and also, through the discovery of an autonomy from natural common senseand an internal legislative capacity, determine the relation of common senseto its objects,legislating vertically, from above,for the realization of an interest of reason. That is, one faculty provides the a priori conditions of natural common sense,colouring it as logical, aestheticor moral. In the case of knowledge, it is understanding that legislates: it determinesimagination to synthesizeschematically, according to the concepts,and generalizes over intuition. In a `synthesiswhich does not belong to the senses'but to an imagination constrained to schematizeby universal rule `the understanding determinesthe sensibility', defining it as a receptive channel, and as contributing to the delimitation of differences,betweenobjective and subjective knowledge, and between legitimate and illegitimate theoretical claims.13To contribute to theoretical or logical common sense,sensibility must be free of subjectivesensationpleasure and pain - but nonetheless have a form of immediacy with the real in experience which legitimates the claim of objective knowledge, confirming or contributing towards a speculativeinterest of reason. Determination of sensibility by understanding also producesa limiting device, the noumenon, the representation of an object in a purely intelligible, non-sensible world. At the same time as understanding `entitles an object in a relation mere phenomenon...[it] ...forms, apart from that relation, a representation of an object in itself (Gegenstandein sich selbst)', on which the conceptshave no legitimate purchase, but which, nonetheless,the understanding `must think'. 14Thinking in the absenceof sensibility - and so in the absence not only of intuition, but also of intensive magnitudes, the real in experience, understanding thinks of a negative object which 35

Chapter1 forms a conceptuallimit of the objectivevalidity of sensibleknowledge, preventing the intellectualization of sensibility, (an Aristotelian failing which Kant accusesLocke of perpetuating). Although Kant appears to assimilate the thing-in-itself and the noumenon,the function of the two is quite different. The noumenon concerns limits, and the negotiation of a single territory under the forms of two different laws, and is not unknowable in principle, only in relation to the limitations of human cognition. Articulated in relation to phenomena which are objects constituted according to the unity of rule of categories, the noumenon is a gap which can be filled and made positive only by practical reason.The thing-in-itself, however, attachesto problems of thresholds, to matter and sensation,and so to intensities. Deleuze does not discussthe thing-in-itself explicitly. However, as has been seen in the Introduction this Kantian problem feedsthrough the Schopenhauerianwill and on into Nietzsche's will to power. Whilst there are clearly differencesto be arguedbetweenthe thing-in-itself, the will-tolife and the will-to-power, the fundamental problem is that of an impersonal, nontransitive and unconscious process inseparable from but not identical with, force. Deleuze will call this process machinic or desiring-production. Having declared this thread as common throughout the different formulations provided by these three thinkers, a lengthier discussionwill be left for chapter two. The noumenon, as the negative doctrine of sensibility, is an object produced by understanding when it claims determinate knowledge of something in general, extending its legislation beyond the aggregation of particulars in experience and seeking knowledge independently of sense. Since the accord of the faculties in knowledge is not free, as it is in aesthetics,the production of common sense must involve not only mechanismsfor convergenceamongstthe various sourcesbut also the exclusion of differenceswhich are either not commensuratewith realizing a speculative 36

Chapter 1 interest of reason, or which trample on other interests of reason. The noumenon is a solution to the co-ordination of speculativeand practical interests. The transcendental use of understanding, its claim to know something in general, or the negative noumenon,convergeswith the transcendentuse of reason,and reason's claim of knowledge of an object corresponding to an Idea. Under what conditions of possibility? It is this latter uncritical `supposition qui entrain 1'entendementlui-meme Bans son usage transcendantal illegitime (supposition that draws the understanding itself into its illegitimate transcendentalemployment)''S. Or as Kant puts it, speculativereasonis `compelledto assume' the noumenon,pressedby law to provide the negative space for the transfer of one kind of causality into 16 another. The Critique of Pure Reason militates against the confusion of these two zones. Whilst different legislative powers are involved, they occupy a single territory, and only by acting negatively against the passivity of senseis the negotiation of this spacebetweenreasonand understandingsuccessfulin realizing an end of reason. Understanding utilizes the noumenon negatively, limiting sensibility by providing a foundation for appearances,only if it does not also supposeitself to have legislative authority over this object: it must, at the same time as limiting sensibility `set["1 limits to itself. " Reason allows understanding to operate in its speculative interest only if, whilst legislating over experience it also recognizes the limits of its jurisdiction: so understanding legislates in two senses, both in relation to the convergenceof faculties in common sense,and in relation to itself. In relinquishing the claim to know an object in general independentlyof sense,understanding leavesfree a space which, in its positive sense is filled by morality: understanding projects a negative surfaceon which practical reasoninscribes its positive face, the pure form of Law. 37

Chapter 1 II System -A Gap In exploring relations amongst the faculties in his book on Kant, Deleuze makes marks: that is to say, certain problems are flagged or differences made precise, spaces made clear, which are taken up, in radically different form, in his later work For instance,he writes: `chaque foil que nous'nous placons ainsi du point de vue d'un rapport ou d'un accorddejä determine, dejä spccifie, il est fatal que le senscommun nous paraisseune sorte de fait a priori au-delä duquel nous ne pouvonspas remonter. (each time we assume the perspective of a relationship or an accord which is already determined, it is inevitable that common sense should seem to us a kind of a priori fact beyond which we cannot '8 go), In other words, common sensecannot answer the question of its own genesis, of an a priori subjectiveaccord, a balanceof difference not predicatedon unity and not determinedby experience.Deleuze's criticism of Kant is, at its most naked, that whilst he provides an account of the production of representation, he fails to provide an account of the production of production, and in the book on Kant, the question of the genesis of the faculties and of their accord is opened. What produces the effect of formal laws extrinsic to experience, which determine universally its nature, shape, pattern and order through the various determinate relations amongst faculties? Kant rejects a Leibnizian solution through pre-establishedharmony and indeed, the first 38

Chapter 1 Criitique provides no solution at all. The problem is deferred until the Critique of Judy,ement, where it can be seen that the common sense relations of differentiated faculties brought about by the legislation of one faculty over others are dependenton their prior free and indeterminate accord. The universal, necessaryand public spaceof cognition has its genesisnot in law, but in a proportionally differentiated `attunement [Stimmung] of the cognitive powers', the differences being conditioned by `what difference there is among the objects that are given.'19 From the free accord of imagination and understanding in judgements of taste in the beautiful, and from that which arises out of the discordant and unregulated relation of imagination and reason in the sublime, a public spaceof communicability is formed, 'the necessarycondition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which must be presupposedin any logic' 20 In judgements of the sublime and of the beautiful, reason is disinterested. However, the possibility of disinterest itself testifies to their security. Judgementsof taste on the beautiful have a logical form commensuratewith understanding and the idea of a norm or standard of beauty is achievedthrough an averaging processwhich, whilst not conscious,is nonethelessmechanically repeatable.And judgements on the sublime require culture. The problems of the genesis of the faculties is one amongst others which will find, through labyrinthine routes, a solution in machinic production, and the relation of 21 body is in to the machinic assemblages chapter two. without organs, and addressed The beginnings of this solution follow on in chapter two, but it is not fully explored until a later one, when more of its elements have been provided. Another mark made on the Kantian systemin La philosophie critique de Kant pertains to Deleuze's empiricism, and the spacethat Kant opensup for a pre-legislative dynamic - the dynamic which Schopenhauer will take up and call the ai11. 39

Chapter 1 Theoretically, this is not possible: objects of knowledge constructedin contradiction of natural law are impossible, outside the limits of understanding, this latter being defined as giving the law to nature. It is illegitimate for understandingto make a claim over the empty spaceof the noumenon on behalf of knowledge, a claim to know the object in general. It treads on the feet of practical reason and breaks the systematic unity of the ends of reason apart: `nous perdons seulementla condition sous laquelle [notre existenceintelligible] fait partie d'une nature et composeavec les autres un tout systematique(we lose the condition under which [our intelligible existence]forms part 22 the of a nature and composes,with others, a systematicwhole)' Practically it is not possible either. Practical reason gives the law to freedom as absolute and categorical, and pure practical reason has no choice but to act legitimately - that is to say, within the realm of law. Practical reasonis meant to realize its Law in action. But the space that Deleuze opens up is against Law not through intent or choice, but through referenceto a pre-legislative economy- that economyof the will which Schopenhauer will draw from Kant and which seedsone of the directions which feedsinto Deleuze's thought. Whilst the previous mark was concerned with the production of harmony amongstthe faculties, here it is a question of what conditions the good senseunion of sensibility and intelligibility and the coherenceof theory and practice. What ensures that good sense is good in itself, rather than merely a means to some other, not necessarilygood, end? What ensuresthat restriction of one legislative domain by the affairs of another is limited to their territorial effects, whilst the domains themselves remain separate?Only insofar as a creature is both legislator and obedient subject of the Law, in its pure form, doesthere arise `a systematicunion of rational beings under common objective laws - that is, a kingdom [ein Reich]'23and this end is possible only insofar as good senseis categorically defined as `necessary,in virtue of its principle, 40

Chapter 1 for a will which of itself accords with reason'. 4 What conditions the union of sensibility and intelligibility as good senseis Law, the positive side of Kantian theory. Where good senseis absent,or there is a positive failure to recognizethe ideal of the Reich, we `cessonsd'etre sujets, mais d'abord parce que nous cessonsd'etre legislateurs (ceaseto be subjects,but primarily becausewe ceaseto be legislators)', so transforming our relation with both senseand desire. 5 It is this transformation of sense and desire outside the framework of both the subject and law which points towards a pre-legislative domain, for which Kant opensa space.Making a point which is integral to a later theme in his work, regarding the impossibility of a completed system - he saysoften that something always escapes- Deleuze arguesagainst the identification of practical reason,as pure form of Law, and freedom, as a problematic idea. This is not a point about Kant's moral theory. It is indeed the casethat the spacebetweenfreedom and legislation openedup by Kant is immediately closed, and that it must be assumed that obedience to maxims contrary to the categorical imperative nonetheless still constitutes a choice. What is important in Deleuze's use of Kant is the selection of gaps and breaks within the construction of the critical system; that is, he does not produce a reading or interpretation of Kant but rather constructs a machine which utilizes those breaks and gaps, putting critique to work beyond the limits of reason, speculativeor practical. In his reading of Kant and his movement of critique beyond the threshold of reason, these smallest differences generateglobal effects on the system, becausethey are mobilized intensively, acrossthe actual continuum and not extensively,through the lines scoredon spaceby its theoretical demarcation. In this caseas in others the issue concerns the real nature of problems, or the nature of real problems. Not: what 41

Chapter 1 conditions experience,or our knowledge of objects,but what principles are inunanent to the genesisof a concreteworld? In an interview with Foucault, Deleuze talks of the relation of theory and practice; instead of a defined and immovable limit demarcating the two, he refers to a mobile connection. Under the conditions of representation, practice is at times the application of theory, its technical consequence, a theory applied to matter, whilst at others, theory is a consequenceof practice, drawn out of the empirical or through the subjectivemaxims of the pure form of Law. However, Deleuze wants to fragment their relation, and to reformulate theory as local, relative only to the domain it describesand exhaustedby its practice, rather than universal and legislating beyond the concrete exhaustion of its terms. It may have application to other domains, but the theory itself does not involve the necessityof this. In other words, it is contingent, encountering obstacles, problems which necessitate side-ways moves, the incorporation of new elements,which do not function as buttressesto the theory, additional hypothesesin support of a major claim, but whose addition feedsback into the theory to transform its nature. It is in this sensethat Deleuze's work might be called theoretical: rather than providing a single set of rules which encompassall concretemachines,and in terms of which all empirical contingencies can be hypothesized,he provides radically abstract rules, whose functioning is not pre-inscribed in their articulation, but contingent and differentiated according to the domain of practice. Practice is described as an assemblageof relays, which mobilize a theory, moving it across domains, through walls, whilst theory allows for the relay of practices. The relation is one of mutual reciprocation and interaction, rather than of fixed rule and principle. There is an action of theory and a passion of practice, a series of transformations by which theory becomes practice and practice becomes theory. 'Mn systeme de relais dans un ensemble, dans une multiplicite de pieces et de morceaux ä la fois theoriques et 42

Chapter 1 pratiques (a systemof relays in an assemblage, a multiplicity of parts and fragments 26 both theoretical and practical)' As is often the case with Deleuze's simultaneously reformulation of philosophical orthodoxies, such as the separation of theory and practice, the distinction becomes untenable once it is reconfigured; instead of a distinction one is left with an assemblage,a machine which constructsboth theory and practice, but which is definable in terms of neither. This digression on theory/practice relations explain Deleuze's attention to the gap which maintains their separationin Kant, and the utilization of the tiniest interval teasedopen betweenfreedom and law as an interzone of autonomy, where desire is not constrained by law to produce objects, nor sense similarly constrained by understanding. The idea (here, of freedom) remains problematic, as it is in the theoretical philosophy, but practical Law provides no solution to it, becauseit is no longer an idea produced under compulsion, familiar and repeated,and governed by duty, obligation and pain, but one which mobilizes the potential for departurefrom this particular territory. Kant writes of the occupation of the `vacant place' of the noumenon by the moral law: `Speculative reason does not herewith grow in insight but only in respect to the certitude of its problematic concept of freedom, to which objective, though only practical, reality is now indubitably 21 ' given. The `zone de libre-arbitre (zone of arbitrium liberum)', however, is unknown, uncertain, and the nature of its reality is not indubitably given: 43 that is, it is

Chapter 1 contingent, its conditions are unknown and its effectsare not played out on the territory where the laws of theory and practice operatemutually restrictive devicesagainst each other. It is neither a negative theoretical device limiting sensibility nor a positive practical device. The logical test of practical reasonis madeby analogy with theoretical laws: `the maxim which I adopt in respectto freely disposing of my life is at once determined when I inquire what it would be in order that a system of nature could maintain itself in accordancewith such a law. 29 A theoretical model of a form of law is a test for pure practical reason; the subject judges the truth or validity of the law he applies to himself by an analogy betweenthe two domains of theory and practice: a correlation of the two confirms the unity of natural causality and freedom under the law, and the noumenon is the name for this correlation. As Kant says, `the concept of freedom is meant [der Freiheitsbegriff soll] to actualize in the sensibleworld the end proposedby its laws'. 0 This meaning would translate into theoretical nonsense,if the laws of the sensible world were incommensuratewith those of the practical. If the two domains of theory and practice did not resolve into - at least in principle - an unconditioned unity, the territory which they share would crack apart: this is what Kant recognizes when he calls for a critique of reasonas a meansof preventing a lapse into a state of nature as warfare, and what he is underlining in his referencesto nomads and barbarians who crossthe terrain of thought without having first securedpossessionof a ground. 44

Chapter 1 In the Prolegomena, Kant says that discovery of the a priori concepts of understanding demands no greater insight than detection of grammatical laws: in no case is it possible to say `why each language has just this and no other formal 31 constitution' Theoretically, one must assumeit is contingent. However, that it is not contingent but bearsa necessitypredicatedon moral law is made clear by the statement above: the meaning of freedom, and the fact that it makes theoretical sense - that analogiesbetweenmoral maxim and theoretical law are possible - is a function of the Law. The autonomous interzone in freedom on which Deleuze picks up escapes this analogy and the meaning of law: it is intelligible (which means no more than it expresses sense) and sensible (which means that it is intensive and that it is not legislative - sensibility does not legislate, being immanently passive, where passivity is not understood in relation to activity, but as passional and generative of affects). It thus cuts a transverse line across Kant's system which escapes the systematics of reason, its cultural, moral, political and theoretical ends, and describes a different diagram of critique, one of practice and pragmatics, and a contingent autonomy. It is sensible; relative in the sense that it is attached to the concrete, but not relative in a liberal sense whereby one is necessitated to respect alternative opinions, alternative approaches; intelligible, but not rational, problematic but not subjective, effective but not caused and patterned but not meaningful. Falling on the side of neither theory nor practice, having unhinged sensibility from its reliance on various forms of imposed activity and disassociated autonomy from the freedom to impose Law on oneself, something escapes reason but not critique, nor indeed the problem of the transcendental. 45

Chapter 1 III Deleuze's Escape Route The interconnections amongst the faculties and across the three Critiques produce a `veritable systeme de permutations (complete system of permutations', at once both static and creative, which distributes amongst itself the immanent problem of its own 32 This latter construction. point is of importance: Deleuze's reading of Kant is not comparative - his interest is not in whether Kant produces a more theoretically consistent epistemology than another philosopher, or in how apposite his practical philosophy is to the late twentieth century, but in what is immanent to the production of Kantian philosophy. So there are no (or very few) accusations of unjustified assumptions, Scholastic hangovers or claims that some other thinker has generated more satisfying solutions to problems with which Kant deals: nor does Deleuze engage in corrective analyses, suggesting "improvements" to Kant's thought in order to rectify apparent inconsistencies. There are `pas d'idees justes, juste des idees (no correct ideas, just ideas)', some of which are illusions, but none of which are wrong. 33The little Kant book begins with Kant's own definition of philosophy, as `the science of the relation of 34 knowledge human And Deleuze reads the system to the all essential ends of reason' of faculties within these terms; but through the additive effect of the marks he makes and the selection and connection of elements which, unhinged, elude these ends, he removes the thought of a faculty system from its contained place within a subject, and opens it up to the world. This is the beginnings of an assemblage, or desiring-machine. Whilst he calls the book a book on an enemy, Deleuze is neither destructive nor aggressive, but camouflaged, disengaging the Kantian machine from common sense in the process of analyzing its production as such. The problems of critique are production and the real, synthesisand sense,and the transcendentalmethod concernshow, rather than what, or in which direction, to 46

Chapter 1 think not how one must, or how it is possible to think, but what are the conditions of a genealogy of thinking, how does practice mobilize theory, through walls, outside departments, beyond institutions and into the streets? How does theory diagram practice, transforming its potential directions? Because Deleuze understands the transcendentalin a rigorously critical manner, it does not function as a conditioning presupposition; as will be seen more clearly in a later chapter, it becomesan abstract machine, evacuatedof structure and immanent to the production of the concrete, a genetic rather than conditioning element. This is the route that Deleuze takes, connecting the marks and gaps in Kant and using the machine he constructsto undo common senseand depart from the direction of good sense,his language changing as the systemproducesits own escapelines, becoming less academic,faster, more dense as it picks up speed,until in L'Anti-Oedipe his practice escapesphilosophical theory and builds a different, strangemachine. But I am running aheadof the problem of this chapter. `[I11'y a des Ides qui parcourent toutes les facultes, n'etant l'objet d'aucune en particulier (there are Ideaswhich traverseall the faculties, but are the object of none in particular)'; Ideas which `vont de la sensibilite ä la pensee,et de la penseeA la sensibilite (go from sensibility to thought and from thought to sensibility)' 35 But pass not through theory, practice, or their completion in an Image of thought. It is this problem, of thought as the superior or transcendentalexerciseof sense, the practice of sense,rather than its theoretical description, which Deleuzepursues,and the remainder of this chapter explores further aspectsof Kant's writing which support his claim that senseis the real discoveryof transcendentalphilosophy. The system of faculties, Deleuze argues, points towards a transcendental empiricism implicit in Kant, the discovery of senseas a transcendentalfaculty being 47

Chapter 1 radically incommensuratewith the general logic of the understanding. Kant betrays this discovery on three counts at least. Firstly, through the convergenceof knowledge into a form of common sense; secondly, by directing thought teleologically, complementing common sense with good sense; and lastly by installing a form of conditioning which dictates that problems are understoodin terms of the possibility of their solution. These components- an emphasison the network or systemof faculties, the problem of the vector of thought, and the discovery of sense as the properly transcendentalelement - are at the basis of Deleuze's relation with Kant. IV Problem I In Difference et Repetition, Deleuzewrites that what is essentialto any problem is 'the genesisof the act of thought, the operation of the faculties'.35A problem, or Idea, is defined not through the possibility of its solution, through a need to provide a correct, or true response to a question, but transcendentally. Understood in terms of the Critique of Pure Reason,this remark suggeststhat the transcendentalas a problem cannot be characterizedin terms of the Analytic, since this instancesonly a solution, the functions of judgement providing a conceptualframework for a set of propositions true within a given and limited field. The transcendentalproblem, or Idea is one for 'which there is no solution' in advance,no common senseanswer, and, according to the limits of knowledge establishedby Kant, no solution in principle. 37 Each solution is complete, but problems are abstract Deleuze is critical of Kant for naming the Ideas, a move which defines an area or possibility of solution. How else, for example could God, freedom and immortality be solved other than by religion or morality? 48

Chapter 1 Yet whilst a problem cannot be defined in terms of its solutions, just as the itself, the theory theory nonethelessa problem never resembles concrete practice of determinesand is inseparablefrom its solutions; there is thus a paradox. Tracing the outlines of a problem from the instancesof its solution and trying to solve paradoxes illusions, logic foul falls or philosophical of natural a reversible and symmetrical with leading to a misunderstandingnot only of the senseof an Idea, but also of the nature of the transcendental. One ends up oscillating between two domains, without the two every meeting or interacting. Deleuze takes the transcendentalas a serious problem, and is rigorous about the need to understand it in terms of immanence. However, unlike Kant, it is not immanent to reason,but to critique; it becomesthe principle of critical practice, the abstract thought of zero presuppositions.This is one reasonwhy, as theory, it is not traceable from its solutions, since solutions are empirical, contextual, temporary, and their discovery feedsback into their conditions and transforms them, as different. Deleuze's problems are sense and thought, Ideas inseparable from their solutions, yet not traceable from the instances of these. Problems are given as produced, as empirical and produced as given, immanently, this relation being neither symmetrical nor bilateral, each element being continually displaced and destabilized in a becoming which is not anchored to being. A solution is unilaterally from its problem: distinguer, `Ic distingue differentiated s'oppose ä quelque chose qui ne peut pas s'en et qui continue d'epouser cc qui divorce avec lui (something which distinguishes itself - and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it)' 38 The paradox of this relation, of a surface rising from itself, folding within itself and involuting, is inseparable from Deleuze's thought. 49

Chapter 1 Deleuze marries Kant's insistence on immanence with a Leibnizian system, which he plugs into the crack within the Kantian subject effected through the introduction of time, a sense which fractures general logic.39 The Transcendental Aesthetic becomesa problem whose genesis is connected with the unfolding of an infinite plane of immanence, and with material relations which produce rather than presupposetime and space.From Kant, there is the illegitimation of a transcendent determining form and from Leibniz a systemwhose elementsare nested; `Each portion of matter may be conceivedas a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But every branch of each plant, every member of each animal, and every drop of their liquid parts is itself likewise a similar garden or pond.i40 This opens out a radically different Kant, and begins to characterize Deleuze's critique as a microanalysis of power: of the mechanismsby which signs are inverted, positive to negative or negative to positive: of the slightest deviations from the systematicsof reason, which, when connected, escapethe damage of law. By marrying systems against reason, and by cutting across Kantian territory, rather than following the lines of its structural organization and the rules of his thought, Deleuze begins to uncover the genesisof the transcendentalin sense,imperceptible to the conceptual generalizations to which it is reduced in the Analytic in the first Cr taue. Rather than functioning as a set of conditioning principles, the transcendental becomes a part added alongside the concretemachine, not as a whole in terms of which the machine can be explained, but as another working element immanent to the empirical, but not definable in its terms. By connecting critique and the network of the faculties with an open systematicsof nestedand differential elementsnot co-ordinatedby or subordinatedto a centralized subject, the whole assemblage functioning instead as an intensive magnitude modulated through the pure form of time, Deleuze flips Kant onto an intensive synthetic axis, connecting time with the discussion of intensity in the 50

Chapter 1 Anticipations of Perception, using only the smallest intervals and differences in Kant's him intact, but leave Kant does in opens the not creation of an effect which writings up, as a surface of variation and change. It is important not to understanding nesting by in inside "nest" is that, the analysis, one could sense another, each not extensively: discover and lay out a coherent and total system.Becausethe systemis intensive, each movement changesthe relations of all parts, the distributions and densities of space. Deleuze follows a critical vector which is neither mechanically nor organically structured- that is, it is neither a systemof understanding or an architectonic of reason forced to be Kant himself but `an in finite that will unconscious understanding... discover when he will hollow out the difference between a determinant and a determinable self 41:the problem of time, senseand the thing-in-itself. Because Deleuze does not argue relations between the three Critiques, or internal to any one Critique in terms of contradictions or resemblancesbetweenthem, critique becomesan open systemwhich is `merely transformed by the different foldings it receives', a plastic and mobile space42 The transcendental becomes an abstract distributed surfaceof flows and assemblagesrather than a hierarchical edifice enclosed within the bounds of reason,and each Critique becomesan engagementwith a reason whose senseconstitutes a responseor solution to transformations in the abstract space of the transcendental:a machine. This move is of crucial importance, since it implies infinite variations generated immanently to a finite open system by intensive elements: a system in continuous displacement. By bringing what is imperceptible and analytically intractable within Kant's philosophy to its surface and allowing it to function synthetically, by connecting and interweaving lines and elements from philosophies and philosophers, stealing something from here, something else from there, Deleuze 51

Chapter 1 assemblesa nuanced, fluid Kant, no longer the stolid moralist and oppressor of difference but unknowing inventor of a problem. The critical treason in Deleuze's reading of Kant is double, in two senses. One, chronologically, because although the potential of the transformation is implicated in the early work, it is only in Deleuze's later writings that the components selectedand connections effected interact without reference to their source, critique becoming an impersonal and abstract machinic force, auto-critique, or as it comesto be called in Anti-Oedipus, schizoanalysis.By which time it is as legitimate to claim that Kant has nothing to do with Deleuze as it is to claim that Deleuze has produced a Kant-becoming. And secondly, becauseDeleuze splits Kant across an unfamiliar axis which connectsintensities with differential relations, so drawing the problem of force into the dialectic, and Ideas with individuals, so the latter become solutions to the former. Again, a paradox, Deleuze's critique being both immanent to the system of faculties, as an intensive depth, whilst at the sametime differentiated from Kant, not as a single line of departure, but through the selection of tiny intervals, and their connection in a movement which transforms the nature of the conditions, and opens out the potential for a Kant whose problems are not locked into a subject. His concern is not to establish a doctrine of faculties, but to determine its presuppositions and discover its machinery. In the next chapter, the image of recognition which blocks this move will be circumnavigated. 52

Chapter 2 Losing Face `La noologie, qui ne se confond pas avec l'ideologie, est precisement 1'etude des images de la pensee,et de leur historicite. D'une certaine maniere, on pourrait dire que cela n'a guere d'importance, et que la penseen'a jamais eu qu'une gravite pour rire. Mais elle ne demande que ca: qu'on ne la prenne pas au serieux, puisqu'elle peut d'autant mieux penser pour nous, et toujours engendrer ses nouveaux fonctionnaires, et que, moins les gens prennent la penseeau serieux, plus ils pensent conformement ä ce qu'un Etat veut. (`Noology, which is distinct from ideology, is precisely the study of images of thought, and their historicity. In a sense,it could be said that all this has no importance, that thought has never had anything but laughable gravity. But that is all it requires: for us not to take it seriously. Becausethat makes it all the easier for it to think for us, and to be forever engendering new functionaries. Becausethe less peopletake thought seriously, the more they think in conformity with ' State the what wants)'. In its broadest senseand throughout, Deleuze's writing constitutes a critique of images which have protected the assumption that everyone knows what thinking means. In the early book, Nietzsche et la Philosophie, he summarizes three theses essential to the dogmatic image of thought: truth is the formal possessionof sincere thought; error is in opposition to truth, the effect of forces alien to thought; method is the meansby which the formal possessionof truth is protected from the distractions of 2 interests)' Truth `corps, intdrets (body, error passions, sensibles passions,sensuous is abstract and universal, method is independent of context, and always remote from the errors of the senses. 53

Chapter 2 Deleuze writes that it is disturbing that thought understoodin this way `n'ont jamais fait de mal ä personne. Le fait est que l'ordre etabli et les valeurs en cours y trouvent constamment leur meilleur soutien (has never hurt anyone. In fact the established order and current values constantly find their best support in truth 3 in this conceived way)' By not taking seriouslythe professedinnocenceof thought, by not exploring the prejudicial nature of an image which protects itself by negating the body, the senses,the passions,desire and the potential cruelties of thinking, philosophy embracesstupidity, and even this is misunderstood,as bestiality or laziness or error. Stupidity is not these,however but the condition under which misadventuresin thought are categorizedas either truth or error: leading to thought as quiz-show, Deleuze says. Stupidity is a structure of thought as such: henceDeleuze's question: why has stupidity never beenconsideredas `l'objet d'une question proprement transcendentale(the object 4 transcendental question)' Whilst the legitimacy of thought as a juridical of a properly and image-bound process is deduced, the intelligence of this process, of this sort of deduction as a legitimation of the real nature of thought, is never made the object of critique. Deleuze targets several prejudices: that thought has a natural rectitude; that amongst the undeniable elements of thought are included subjectivity, representation, and discourse;that a common senseproper to the nature of thought distributes a form of the Same, an identity continuous throughout the diversity of empirical fields: that good sense determines a principle of direction which forces choice and eliminates alternative routes and patterns of thought: that thought has a form of interiority modelled on the Statewhich, once given, is universalized: and finally, that the value of thought is established - that it is, indeed, we who think, who know who we are and what we think. The first person plural indicates not modestyor reticence in the face of 54

Chapter2 saying `I think', but illustrates that thought has been consigned to regurgitating the particular in the light of what is generally thought, of what thought holds in common. Deleuze's reading of Kant is twofold, however: the critique of the dogmatic image simultaneouslyengageselementsof critique which are not under the regulation of good sense,nor constituted by common sense,and so not under the grammar of the "we". This minor treatment of Kant strips out the power structures,culture, doctrine, dogma, the ends of reason, senseand thought, so efficiently and elegantly mapped out in the little Kant book, to exposecritique's potential becomings.s I Recognition The principle presupposed by the image of thought, Deleuze argues, is that of recognition. Recognition implies a transcendental model which orients thought according to rules of distribution which function specifically to limit and control its relation with senseby requiring thought to be thought of an object, of something, something in general, something = x. The element of generality, of both scope and direction, is essential to the dogmatic image of thought, since it allows for the substitution of particulars on a horizontal plane, each and every object being exchangeablefor any other object, and the subsumption of particulars on a vertical plane, each relation being contained under emptier but more general laws. There is no need for caution, thinking on this plane, because it is a general space organized identically throughout. No danger, no surprise. Extrinsic to sense,the form of the object in general lays claim to the empirical in advance of experience, and prejudices the potential force, direction and distribution of synthesis by explicating it along generally familiar lines. 55

Chapter 2 Recognition of the particular dependson the field of sensebecoming an object in general for the understanding. As Kant says, `the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses'and produce recognition, 6 is intuition is is the since sensibility passive, singular and real a posteriori The conjunction of heterogeneoussensible presentations into a field of generality must therefore be an act of understanding, the faculty of representation. However, by generalizing the manifold diversity of sense under the form of an object, the real elements of sensible relations are inverted and hidden, and the transcendental problematic is lost. Conceptual determination according to the unity of rule special to understanding generalizes over difference in order to lock it into a relation with identity: sensiblerelations are thus formalized according to the categoriesof substance, causality and community, and the material interactions of bodiesare coveredover, each relation being a particular instance of a formal and general rule. In the Aesthetic, Kant says that the parts of time and space,which are pure intuitions, presupposethe whole: time is not composedof times nor spaceof spaces. Howm-er, according to the axioms of intuition `All intuitions are extensive magnitudes'7, which is to say `the representation of the parts makes possible, and therefore necessarilyprecedes,the representationof the whole'! When predicated of the object in general, as empirically real, intuitions - which `rest on affections'becomefixed quantities, discrete quanta with particular values which are a function of neither sensible nor real relations but of the formal concept of magnitude, and their affective genesis formalized, generalized and brought into relation with unity. 9 According to the concept of magnitude, space and time are divided into metric intervals, quanta. As the experience of space is rendered axiomatically extensive, all real data becomes subject to cardinal measurability, the former indirectly, through 56

Chapter 2 referenceto extensity, and the latter directly, and can thus be summedaccording to an additive (+1) principle. Matter, in this context, is condensedinto a point, and the qualities of forces are evaluated independently of real differences in the intensities from which they '° emerge. Since the judgement of which the concept of quantity is a function is universal, this segmentedEuclidean spatio-temporality becomesthe field of thought to which understanding is limited, the surfaceon which the image is organized and across which a single subject expressesitself in an object in general. In this way a nestedand intensive system,which is ordinal without the order of the sequencebeing determined by anything extrinsic to the system, becomes subject to a principle of succession which dictates that each element counts as a unit of the same magnitude. Ordinal does not mean first, second,third... etc., but first, ninth, twenty-third, second, seventeenth: not as arbitrary leaps, but as expressionsof relations structuring a problem, of qualities " force than quantities of substance. rather of Only by unhinging the Aesthetic, together with imagination, from understanding and its empty conceptual boxes can the empty form of time becomea carrier of intensive distances and depths of a space without uniformity, which is produced as it is crossed, rather than being there before you arrive. This is what Deleuze meanswhen he calls the pure line of time a labyrinth: it is spatially intensive, just as space is temporally differentiated, and there is no single and uniform time which comprehendsall space.But one must be careful to differentiate - as Kant does between intensity and intensive magnitude. Intensity is correlated with the material qualities of the real: 57

Chapter 2 `Appearancescontain in addition to intuition the matter [Materien] for some object in general...they contain, that is to say, the real [das Reale] of sensationas merely subjective representation,which gives us only the consciousnessthat the subject is affected and which we "2 in relate to an object general. Kant is referring to the real here, and not to the concept of reality: the real in sensation, or matter of perception, is that qualitative aspect of empirical experience which, unlike conceptual reality, cannot be known or anticipated a priori, but without which the form of the object in general remains empty and logical. A posteriori and intensive, the singular qualities of real relations are, as remarked above, masked, diverted and distributed according to conceptualrules extrinsic to their production; the qualities of forces are qualified under the general conditions of possibility, making them commensurate with subjective unity through their relation to the object in general, or transcendentalobject, correlate of the transcendentalsubject. Throughthis relation,degreesof intensitybecomere-describable as intensive magnitudes.Intensities effect (but are not equivalent to) sensation,or affects and Kant thus ascribes them (not their genesis, but their effect) to the subject; intensive magnitude, `a degreeof influence on the sense',is ascribedto `all objectsof perception, in so far as the perception contains sensation.913The problem of the generation of intensities, as singular and instantaneouseffects which testify to relations of bodies and of real forces, is lost in this move, which follows that same split describedat the opening to the TranscendentalAesthetic, which isolates an objective and subjective element of sensibility. The intensive and real continuum of which all quanta are composedis rationalized through the form of the object, which is folded back over intensities, splitting them into sensationson the one hand - subjective, unmeasurable, 58

Chapter 2 private experiencesof a closed body, and degreesof intensive magnitude on the other objective, measurable,public experiencesof qualitative motions by cognitive subjects. Kant can only then make the claim that though it may `seemsurprising that we should forestall experience,precisely in that which concerns what is only to be obtained through it, namely, its "4 less, is the the matter-none such actually case. Intensities experiencedas sensationare instantaneous.If succession,a concept first produced by `[m]otion, an act of the subject [Bewegung, als Handlung des Subjekts]' 15isnot taken into account, then intensities have no extensive magnitude, becausetheir apprehension `does not involve a successivesynthesis proceeding from 16 to the whole representation. That is, they are real qualities, but are not parts commensurablewith the axioms of intuition; instead they are discreteand singular, yet complex, since the real is infinitely divisible. In the move from intensities understood thus to intensive magnitudes as general and anticipatable qualities corresponding to a degree of influence on the sense,infinite divisibility is formulated on the extensive axis, the pure form of time becomesthe form of succession,the act of a subject,and the intensive continuum becomes correlated with the successive continuity of time, determinableeither subjectively, in terms of inner sense,and thus as directional, or in terms of the body, and thus without relevance to cognition, or objectively, epistemologically, in terms of quanta, and thus as rational and extensive. In all three casesthe real problem of intensities - of an infinitely divisible, impersonal and preindividual heterogeneousmanifold of real qualities - is lost. Deleuze is critical of Kant's use of recognition in the Analytic of the first Criti e not only for its specific employment in that context, but for its wider function, 59

Chapter 2 which is to provide thought with a model of the `concordancedes facultes fondee dans le sujet pensantcomme universel, et s'exercant sur l'objet quelconque(harmony of the faculties grounded in the supposedlyuniversal thinking subject and exercisedupon the " unspecified object)'. Common sense,the collaboration and convergenceof faculties on the shared task of recognizing an object as the Same, limits thought by requiring that, to be legitimate, it adhere to this model. Recognition of the object thus becomes the means by which the real relations of sense are differentiated from the formal relations of judgement and understanding. That is, recognition is the mechanism by which the truth of image and the errors of the body are distinguished. But: `11ya dans le monde quelque chosequi forceä penser' (Something in the 18. forces [us] The limitations imposed on thought by the principle of to think' world recognition and on senseby its generalization under the form of an object imply a paralogism at the heart of Kantian epistemology: senseis separatedfrom what it can become by a regime of relations which reduce the real to a condition of general possibility, and negate its genetic We in thought. In the first Critique, sense's only logic is conceptually conditioned What forces thinking is discountedby this condition, which separatesa content of thought from a form, and then determinesthe former on the basis of the latter, endorsing hylomorphism. *** The abovegives a negative aspectof Deleuze's Kant, and as such is derivative of the positive aspectof critique. "[D]evant un tel genie, il ne peut We question de dire qu'on n'est pas d'accord. It faut d'abord savoir admirer, it faut retrouver les probl8mes qu'il pose, sa "machinerie ä lui" (in front of such genius, perhaps it is not only a question of sa3ing that one does not agree. First of all, you have to know how to 60

Chapter 2 19 It in itself")'. he "machinery have the to rediscover the problems poses, admire; you is this positive and generous consideration of the machinery, of the network of faculties, which gives Deleuze's critique of Kant its force: he operateswith courtesy towards his enemy, camouflaging the movements which effect the turn of the result against its origin, forging a strange alliance and producing a monstrous offspring. Of his practicesin the history of philosophy at the time of writing the Kant book he writes 2° he looked it (enculage) that on as a processof screwing His reading of Kant is, once more, double, a Kant of recognition and the image of thought, bureaucratic and moralizing, counterposedwith a Kant of synthesis, insistence on real conditions and sense as the problem and discovery of the transcendental.Unless the network of faculties is simplified, and the critical machinery collapsed back into understanding, (in which case the real problem of the transcendentalis also lost) it is quite plain that imagination is the productive engine of synthesis, and that it is only in its epistemological operation that it is legislated by understanding, and annexed to recognition. Understanding does have a facility for synthesis:however, this is an empty and merely formal combination in the absenceof data provided through the synthesisof imagination. This latter brings `the manifold of intuition into the form of an image' by taking `impressionsup into its activity'? ' The manifold of intuition, even if pure, is not empty, but nor is it uniform or necessarily commensuratewith the possibility for recognition: that this is the caseis clear from the third Critique, where concepts have no purchase, on either aesthetic or natural production. As Buchdahl writes, this synthesis of imagination is a 'pre-categorised u process' If recognition is allowed to infect synthesis at the level of transcendental imagination, the import of the schematism for the relation of sensibility and 61

Chapter 2 understanding is lost. Kant writes that the `application of categories to appearances becomespossible by means of transcendentaldetermination of time' (italics added)." Recognition works at the level of the image, whilst the schema, `a product and, as it were, a monogram of pure a priori imagination' is a mediating function, a "third thing" clearly distinguished from the image, which allows for the application of is in In the to as other appearances synthesized apprehension. words, categories indicated by the words `becomespossible', the relation of the conceptsto appearances is transcendentally conditioned by the determination of time through imagination; understanding has no immediate relation with the manifold of intuition, and only because,in the epistemological task of the first Critique, imagination is functioning under the managementof understanding, is the determination of time consistent with the concepts. Were time only and necessarily determinable according to the pure categoriesof understanding, all experience would be exhaustedby the architecture of the first Critique. Synthesis does not require recognition; recognition presupposes synthesis.The combination of representationsby understanding and the spontaneous addition of a formal rule to material data presupposesthe synthesisof imagination. If this important role of imagination is missed, then the real problem of synthesisis also missed. Mapping the Kant of real problems and sense involves both an abstract problem, that `does not explain, but must itself be explained', and an empirical problem, of `analyzing the states of things, in such a way that non-pre-existent 4 be from Abstract and empirical together and at once, a them'. conceptscan extracted singularity, and not a particular. Explanation in Deleuze's sense is not, however, discursive clarification or interpretation. Analysis of a substantial multiplicity, of the state of a "thing" made up of `a set of lines or dimensions which are irreducible to one another' is neither exhaustivenor definitive, becausethe lines tangled in a multiplicity 62

Chapter 2 are becomings, material solutions or explanations to real problems of matter and 25 flows There is, for an empirical logic of multiplicities, no "thing", only setsof energy . inseparableand continuously varying relations, and analysis is at once synthesis,since plugging into a multiplicity effects its reconfiguration, and any change in relation is, for an intensive, nested and real system, also a change in nature. There is always an escape:indeed, if critique were not immanently creative, Kant would be a dull enemy and a feebleally. 11 Sense In Difference et Repetition. Deleuze differentiates between the given (le donne) and 'ce par quoi le donne est donne (that by which the given is given)' 26 Difference is `ce par quoi le donnd est donne comme divers (that by which the given is 27, diverse)' the virtual and real condition of concrete appearance,substantial given as multiplicities. Senseis thus both abstract and concrete simultaneously,perceptible and imperceptible; it neither explains nor hides itself by forced conduction along pre-given co-ordinatesbut is self-organizing, actualizing the differential relations of the problem as a distribution of multiplicities, or diversity-, and whilst space is always to varying degreessegmentedand partitioned, ordered and structured, there is at the same time something that always escapes. Deleuze's formulation of the relation of difference and diversity addressesthe paralogism mentioned above; senseis not separatedfrom what it can become by the form of possibility, nor channelled by a r6gime into providing the content for logical meanings and forms imposed from outside sense. Instead, it individuates a body, making solutions to problems perceptible whilst simultaneously adding the imperceptible alongside, not as a unifying or unified element, or as causally related to 63

Chapter 2 what is perceived,but as an additional component,which differentiates this assemblage from that, not extensively, according to properties or charactersattaching to identical units, such as organisms or persons, nor through comparisons of differences on the basis of a prior commonality, but as the immanent condition of a body as a singularity, or haecceity, the term used in Mille Plateaux Deleuze distinguishes two sensesof difference; differentiation, which belongs to a problem, and differenciation, as the concretization of the differential relations of the problem. Where these are confused, and the processof actualization is taken to instantiate the relations of the problem, the problem discussedearlier, of confusing solutions with problems, and attempting to trace the nature of the problem from the instancesof its solutions arises. This early formulation in Difference et Repetition of two communicating orders of difference which cannot be referred to a single unifying principle carries through, though in different terminology, into the later work. In Mille Plateaus. for example, the concrete individual is named an assemblage,whilst differential problems becomeabstract machines: in both cases,what is important is the relation betweenthe two. The variables negotiatedby the assemblageeffectuatethe machine, and the latter does not exist independently of the former, whilst the former does not function independently of the latter. There are passagesof communication between the two, variations in the variables selectedwhich in turn change in nature of the variables. It was said above that there is no time uniform for all space,and no spacedistributed in advance of its occupation: each assemblageor body effectuates a singular machine, realizing a spaceand time without comparison. (The system, needlessto say, does not wear democracywith ease.) 64

Chapter 2 Kant is criticized, as has been seen,for isolating his abstractcomponentsfrom the empirical, his practice from his theory, disallowing their communication and the transformation of the problem, or abstract machine, as it interacts with its solutions. The Kantian transcendental is folded back over the empirical, appearing as a miraculous condition of its order, independently originated and establishing a set of invariant constants.Deleuze, however, sets the constantsin motion, so that a problem becomes a set of variables, the difference amongst things which have nothing in common, and itself varying in relation to the concrete. He describesphilosophy as the creation of concepts,but conceptswhich remain contingent That by which the given is given is not time or space,but their genesis,a set of intensive syntheses immanent to the formation of a pure straight line and a rhizomatic distribution -a labyrinthine, ant-like line, the effect of time unhinged from 28 cardinality, of passive syntheses. These latter are the imperceptible and contingent cycles of the sufficient reason of sense,the molecular patternings of perception whose emergent effect is the concrete world, not as a theatre of representation, but as a shifting and mobile field of directions and tendencies. In unhinging time from cardinality, logic and the order of succession,Kant is also disconnecting it from generality, making it autonomous of understanding and of consciousness - of movement, succession,co-existence, etc., - which are modes, or consciousnessesof time. As has already been remarked in the Introduction, to confuse the pure form of time with one of its modesis to reduceit to a psychologistic notion. It might be argued, with reference to the SecondAnalogy, that subjective successionis definitive of the form of time. However, successionis merely subjective consciousnessof time, tied up with the apprehensionof perceptionsrather than with their materiality; the function of the SecondAnalogy is to demonstratethat objective relations amongst appearances,as 65

Chapter 2 opposed to the arbitrary successionsin inner sense, are governed by the concept of causality. Kant writes: `The objective successionwill therefore consist in that order of the manifold of appearanceaccording to which, in conformity with a rule, the apprehension of that which happens follows upon the apprehensionof that which precedes.Thus only can I be justified in asserting, not merely of my apprehension, but of appearanceitself, that a successionis to be met with in it. '29 The distinction being made is not that between the pure form of time and a ruledetermined causal and objective order, but between a subjective, conscious experience of time-relations as successiveand arbitrarily ordered and an objective conscious experienceof time-relations as causally determined To confuse the pure form of time with successionis to commit the critical error of formulating conditions in terms of the conditioned. Kant's insight, Deleuze argues,demands`une nouvelle definition du temps (et de 1'espace),(a new definition of time [and of space])', which considers it within its own terms, as aesthetic and as singular, rather than in terms of understanding, as conceptual and general30 This in turn necessitates a different theorization of imagination in relation to time, and sensibility, in which it is no longer rigidified by its common sensefunction of schematizing along channelsof conceptualunity. This break up of common sense is one amongst other problems that Deleuze works out in Difference et Repetition. beginning to seed the apparatus of Anti-Oedipus, where the sense of a faculty has been melded onto that of real distributions, and becomes a function of the relations of a substantial multiplicity, or assemblage,which is not 66

Chapter 2 definable as a unity or as in relation to a unity. The assemblageis the basic unit of machinic critique, composednot of an aggregateof extensiveunits, a sort of clutter of randomly collected bits and pieces, but as a series of inter-related affects, continuously mobile and in variation; rather than existing in time, an assemblageis chronogenetic, generating a temporal and temporary metastability as an effect of the infinite firings of intensive difference which comprise its substance. There are `des facultes non encore soupconnees,ä decouvrir. Car on ne peut rien dire d'avance, on ne peut pas prejuger de la recherche' (faculties yet to be discovered,whose existenceis not yet suspected.For nothing can be said in advance, one cannot prejudge the outcome of research'), or of relations amongst senseswith 31 in nothing common. In Difference et Repetition, Deleuze's productive interest in Kant focuses on what forces sensibility to sense, on the relation of sense, as both sensationand intuition, to the thing-in-itself, which Deleuze re-namesa dark precursor and disconnectsfrom the unity which Kant allows himself to postulate in relation to it. What is important for the dark precursor, or `1'en-soi, c'est que, petite ou grande, la difference soit interne (the in-itself, is that the difference, whether large or small, be internal)'. 32 Difference is not a function of the relation of an identity to its external environment; indeed the determination and definition of something as a boundary or limit becomes increasingly problematic. Without moving outside the terms of the problem, components whose sense is purely extensive cannot be introduced as mechanismsfor its solution. As remarked above,two sensesof difference are in play, that of the problem - differentiation, and that of its concretion or actualization differenciation. Where the difference of the in-itself, or dark precursor, is confused with the concrete order of differences, the critical move of the transcendental is lost: subjectively experiencedfeatures of experienceare mistaken for real relations, which 67

Chapter 2 in turns suggeststhat representation is understood not as a mode of construction or production, but as production of the real. Deleuze does not refer specifically to the thing-in-itself or to its formulation within the Kantian system.Similarly, remarks concerning the thing-in-itself made here do not constitute an interpretation of the term or of its particular functioning within the first Criitigue. It is under any circumstances important not to present a crude formulation of the thing-in-itself as an object, as the concept of an object, or as synonymouswith the noumenon; it is crucial that it is not understood in such terms in order to track the manner in which Deleuze takes up this problematic. Whilst Deleuze's formulation of the "in-itself'of difference appears much transformed from the few and inconsistent references to it in Kant's own work, it is nonetheless implicated with the same problem, which as discussed in the Introduction, are addressedfirst by Schopenhauerin his deployment of the thing-in-itself as the will. That is, the problem of a blind (in the sense of non-teleological, non-directed, unconscious,non-intentional) dynamic force or drive antecedentto law. As such a drive, the thing-in-itself is immanent to the empirical, since without it the empirical is no more than a logical form devoid of objective (material) reality, that is, it does not function as a limit to the empirical. Nonetheless, it cannot be thought through or in terms of the empirical without this leading to a transcendent formulation. It is against such uncritical tendenciesthat this reading of the thing-initself operates.There are only two elements to be considered - firstly, a continuum of intensities, a full spaceof varying degreesof density and compressionand secondly,the empty form of time. It is in this context that the dark precursor needsto be understood. In Kant's own terms, this is not a problem for consciousness,since from the position of consciousnessthere are no relations other than those which appear, and those which 68

Chapter 2 appear are, for consciousness,axiomatically extensive; so whilst it may be true to say that consciousnessis also intensively differentiated, the qualities of intensity are extensively qualified. Nor is it a problem equivalent to that of the noumenon. The noumenon is `something in general' distinguished from sensibility and leaving as form logical by determining `a the thought alone merely object residue mode of -a law for firms the the natural analogical conversion of ground without content' which 33 law. But the thing-in-itself as precursor is a differenciator, and maxims of moral 34 leap. Deleuze demon, difference, `in-itself however,the also calls signal or which of A majoritarian reading of Kant boxes the thing-in-itself into a single problem: this is how it becomesassimilated with the noumenon and conceived in causal terms, as both a principle of the convertibility and exchange of subjective terms - moral maxims into general laws of science and back again - and in relation to the strange causality of freedom under the Law. It characterizesit negatively, too, as a concept of in The in far it is leap time. thing space and so as perceived not perceived a sensuously is thus no longer a flash-flow but a labour. Not an autonomousinterval but freedom and equality under Law. Deleuze precision engineerscritique, stripping it down whilst remaining rigorously transcendental (in the sense of immanence of criteria) by deploying senseagainst conversion and exchange,by not pre-supposing unity, and by illegitimating the resignation of thought to illusion, philosophical or physical. The thing-in-itself ceasesto be a single problem with a single solution, but becomes a singular matter immanent to and indistinguishable from its collective solution in a concrete assemblage,but imperceptible, and not explicable through reference to that assemblage.It cannot be thought in terms of (Kantian) substance-a concept, and thus not in terms of permanence either. It is through the interrogation of this relation between an intensively differentiated continuum, the in-itself of difference, and the 69

Chapter 2 pure form of time that Deleuze teasescritique from reasonand the transcendentalfrom the subject. Illusions are to be dismembered,not resisted. As the processof shifting the ground and uncovering elements inverted by negation and constrained by limitation continues, the nature of the transcendental and of the thing-in-itself become transformed,as each is divorced from the structuresof unity, recognition and the image of thought. The transcendental- by which Deleuze means the pure empty line of time unhinged from cardinality - becomesincreasingly abstract, whilst the thing-in-itself becomesan intensive problem, synthesizedas the variables of the transcendental are selected in the formation of a body, or assemblage; the thing-in-itself becomes produced as the imperceptible, or inaccessible,produced through the given, as the difference of the given, rather than as its cause. It remains unknown, since it is by definition imperceptible. Kant introduces the problem of the thing-in-itself in the Transcendental Aesthetic, in an argument pitched at Leibniz, against the confusion of the forms of spaceand time with properties of objectsof representationor things-in-themselves. `The true correlate of sensibility, the thing-in-itself selbst] is not known, and cannot be known, [Ding an sich through these representations; and in experience no question is ever asked in regard to it. '35 There are some clues here as to the direction in which to explore the thing-in-itself. Firstly, the apparently trivial remark that the thing-in-itself cannot be known through the representationsof spaceand time servesas a reminder that the problem attaching to 70

Chapter 2 the thing-in-itself, unlike the noumenon, is not primarily epistemological. When Kant 36 the appearanceof matter, refers to the thing-in-itself as underlying which, as Chapter Three discusses,is composedof forces - this substratecannot be thought in terms of substance,since the thing-in-itself is definitionally not within the possibility of it be in forces Nor knowledge. human the can which compose understood conscious terms of causality, for this again would be to give it an illegitimate attachment to the categoriesand once more to formalize it as an intelligible but non-sensibleobject, and eject the material problematic of the thing-in-itself out into the practical zone of the noumenon. It is not known through space and time since they are aesthetic forms rather than cognitive formalisms, but it also cannot be known; that is, whilst Kant postulatesa non-human form of intuition which could provide accessto the noumenon, no such intuition is postulated for the thing-in-itself. This moves one away from any in Secondly, by terms. thing-in-itself the conceptual calling it of consideration serious the correlate of sensibility, but distinguishing it from the forms of spaceand time, Kant is implicating the thing-in-itself with sensation, and thus with intensity and with 37 matter. In other words, the thing-in-itself attachesto the problem of real possibility that is, to the unique problem addressedby the transcendental - rather than to that of logical possibility. Thirdly, the thing-in-itself is not a problem which arises in experience; experience is its solution. This means it is not a problem which can be formulated in terms of consciousness,either, since Kant understandsexperiencesolely in terms of consciousness.These three points suggest,then, that it is in the areas of intensity, matter (not understoodin terms of the logical conceptof substance,but rather as the unspecified and undefined "given") and the unconsciousthat solutions to this problem might be discovered Sensation, as Kant explains in the Prolegomena, does not contain space or 38 It neither has time or space,nor is it `occupy time' time, nor any part of space or of 71

Chapter 2 inside time or space. And as an intensity, sensation is not a quantity, in any The is degree, but the concept of quantity quantity of quality. a straightforward sense, intuitions in it is the spaceand time of appearances as Subsumption non-relational intensity, is the singular real of any degree the of a relation of expression whilst but be differential, that anticipated cannot which element which and perception, a becomesthe content of the form of intuition when expressedthrough the axiom of extension. Only insofar as it is correlated with sensibility, and the forms of intuition can degreebe estimated quantitatively - that is, only when brought into relation with possible experience in general can the qualitative intensity be formulated proportionately with any other qualitative intensity. It was said in the Introduction that Schopenhauereliminates the possibility of formulating "behind" it the thing-in-itself representation, an object as of conceiving instead as antecedentto the formal and secondaryaspectsof the world which are added by the intellectual functions of the brain - that is, those functions which generatethe world as representation.This is moving in the direction of the perspectiveof the object from Introduction, from it be the the perspective was which this will recalled - which, thesis addressesKant, the perspectiveof women - and towards a positive formulation of the thing-in-itself, since it directs attention towards intensities, (for example, qualitas occulta) and away from the borrowed reality of the conscious representationsof the subject. The thing-in-itself is no longer explained negatively - that is, as the concept of a sensuouslyperceived thing insofar as it is not perceived in space and time, but becomesimplicated with a positive and unconsciousdynamic which is imperceptible that is, not part of the visible world of representation,which is structured through the secondaryfunctions of the intellect - but which is nonethelessimmanent to perception, in that it is connected with sensation. The thing-in-itself becomesproduced as the imperceptible, or inaccessible,produced through the given, as the difference of the 72

Chapter 2 given, rather than as its cause. It remains unknown, since it is by definition imperceptible. This does not mean in any sensethat it is outside representation; indeed, the problem escapesthe limited theatre of that doctrine. The thing-in-itself or demon becomesimmanent to perception as the imperceptible, though not for empirical reasons such as might be overcome by more sophisticated microscopic instruments, or more powerful telescopic devices. This reducesthe problem back to extension. It has rather to do with movement, not as the motion of an object in extension, but as a stationary process or principle of composition, which is at once both secret and transparent, continually escapingperception, but nonethelesseffecting it. It is in this sensealways in advanceof perception, a sourceof time rather than a movement in time. It has thus lessto do with an economyof vision than one of affective or intensive differences, with variations in heat, in pressure, in density, in the tone of a voice, in clandestine changeswhich escapeperception, which go unrecognized but whose effects are, of a sudden,there. The difference of diversity from that which gives diversity is intensity, the `raison du sensible (reason of the sensible)' 39 which forces thought, which is not caused nor causal in any simple sense, nor outside the world, but immanent to its production: an abstract vector which distributes a surface, rather than an origin and sourceof knowledge. Rather than the faculties being independently defined, they are measuredempirically, according to 'ce qui revient ä chacune sous la forme de leur collaboration (to that which pertains to each, given the form of their collaboration)' 40 This meansthat faculties emerge, flash and die, as inconstant variables, rather than as the constantsin terms of which variations can be defined. Faculties becomethe effects of relations into which a body enters, and thought becomes a game whose rules 73

Chapter 2 change in the playing, where the pieces come and go, where anything can move in any direction and the point is less to win than to maintain a line and to keep a spaceopen, play by play, rather than according to a single over-arching strategy. The demon, or dark precursor operatesin the intervals, a practice which leaps theoretical boundaries, confounding recognition, relating disparate systems, determining `ä 1'avance le 41 in but in (a advance reverse)'. It is a form given but not a chemin renversd path priori: which is to say, it is a signal of material-forces given immanently to the formation of a path or line of flight, to the labyrinthine line of the pure form of time. The form of the dark precursor is not, as was the noumenon, a logical form without content, a shadow compelled from without, nor, like the thing-in-itself is theorized, a causal problem, or something outside the system, but an immanence of field, a critical and material provocation, a demon, incitement to alliances and distributions of difference. Deleuze is diagramming a keen critical unconscious of Kant: not The Unconscious, which is a theatre for the staging of conscious representation,but a principle of sufficient reasonfor sense,the genesisof thought. III Problem II For Kant, the principle of sufficient reason is a logical relation of grounds to consequences;`it is quite customary', he writes to Reinhold, `for the conjurors of metaphysics to make sleights of hand, and before one realizes it, to leap from the logical principle of sufficient reason to the transcendental principle of causality, assuming the latter to be already contained in the former. '42 So whilst it may serve understanding as a formal justification of synthetic connections amongst concepts,this principle says nothing about the effective genesis of real conditions and relations amongstthings - the objective problem of transcendentalphilosophy. `That every thing 74

Chapter 2 must have its reason is the transcendental (material [materielle]) principle', and to move from the logical principle of sufficient reason to the material or transcendental principle as if they occupied the samedomain is a critically illegitimate step, confusing 43 logic for things the the the reason governing propositions. genesisof with The principle of sufficient reason rests on the principle of contradiction, a negativecondition of analytic judgements, and governsjudgements; Mat every proposition must have a reason is the logical (formal) principle of knowledge, which is subordinatedto, and not set beside, the principle of contradiction.'44 The principle of sufficient reason as Kant understands it is a logical principle governing propositions about experience, rather than a material or transcendental principle implicated in the construction of experience. No one has, or ever will prove, Kant continues, the transcendental (material) principles of things from the logic governing propositions, or judgements or in `general from mere concepts without relation to sensibleintuition. i45As has been said previously, it is in Aesthetic that the real problems of critique, and of transcendentalphilosophy lie. Transcendentalprinciples, expressthe real, rather than merely hypothetical or possible conditions of things, and involve both a formal and a material component, to which correspond, subjectively, intuition and sensation. Kant writes, again to Reinhold, (in a letter which elaborates on the manifold errors in Eberhard's understanding of critical philosophy): 75

Chapter 2 `the real ground [i. e., not the logical principle of sufficient reason] is formal the twofold: ground (of the intuition of the either again object), e.g., as the sides of the triangle contain the ground of the angle - or the material ground of the existenceof the thing. The latter determinesthat whatever contains it will be called cause.' 46 Deleuze's argument with Kant is directed less at the distinction betweentranscendental and hypothetical conditions, than towards the latter's differentiation of sensibility belongs disjunction to properly to understanding rather than to which a according sensibility. That is, Kant compromisesthe radicality of the distinction between real, or transcendental conditions, and hypothetical, or logical conditions. He divides sensibility into an objective component, intuition, which is necessaryfor mathematics, and provides content for concepts, and a subjective element, of sensation. In strictly aesthetic terms, in terms of the pure line of time, however, this distinction plays no role. Difference cannot be articulated according to an exclusive disjunction in this manner, Deleuze argues,without subjecting it to transcendentoperations. Nor can the transcendental, as an abstract material principle, be articulated in relation to understanding: it must rather be immanent to the production of sensibility, perception, into heart He bodies takes the transcendental the passions. of the thingand sensation, in-itsel& as matter, and in doing so, dissolves its structural containment within the a priori. The problem to which sensation and intuition correspond is intensity, not as an empirical matter, - that is, not couched in terms of sensation,which tends to leads towards its formulation in terms of a subject - but as a transcendentalprinciple, and its sufficient reasonis a logic of sense-a diagrammatic and material aesthetic. Within the conceptualor formal understanding of time and space,which generalizesover intuition 76

Chapter 2 in order to render it commensurate with rational or cardinal divisibility, intensive forms because be the of extension affects not only of axiom anticipated, magnitudescan intuition, but also matter and the dynamics of the real in space; as has been said, intensive magnitude is a constructed category, whilst intensities are qualities of force, and Kant does not understand force as constructed. It is not that the perception of be be but be to that of matter can anticipated any perception anticipated, matter can obedient to the axioms of intuition and the laws of phoronomy. Forces, for Kant, move acrossthe straight lines of extension. With time and spacelogical constantsintegral to the form of generality which rationalizes sensein terms of uniformity, the quality of material forcesbecomesopen to the claim that it too can be anticipated, and moreover, that what is anticipated can in principle not fail to arrive. In the Schematism,Kant says: `that in the objects which corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (thinghood, reality) [alle Gegenstände als Dinge an sich (die Sachheit,Realität)]'. 47 Kant defines matter in the following terms: quantitatively, as motion in extended space, along lines between points; qualitatively, as the filling of space through intensive forces - attraction and repulsion -which have a determinate degree (force limited by an a priori point-line system)and, beyond that determinate degree,as infinitely divisible.48The infinite divisibility of this "beyond" is where the problem of the real filling spaceis evacuatedto: that which cannot be analyzed to exhaustion or made determinate extension. Theoretically, matter appearsas either randomly chaotic (beyond), or dead (determinate). Whilst the spaceand time of determinate degreesof 77

Chapter 2 force and motion is conceptual, the problem of infinite divisibility, as an intensive matter, is transcendental.The line or limit is only theoretical, a beyond of determinacy, of matter already dead, and only theoretically do the two sides of the system, determinate here and infinitely divisible there, sum to unity. The line is conceptually extensive,a limit, but intensively it is a threshold and changesin nature as it changes in degree,rather than delineating a rational successionof states,a modulation and not a mould. '[U]ne pure ligne droit (a pure straight line)' of time is not a successively constructed extension, but a vector tracking the autonomous involutions of a surface 49 without extrinsic given condition. Any limit is thus only relative, and not definitive, marking a penultimate beyond which is not chaos and disorder, but which necessitates modifications in the structureswhich populate the spacewithin the limit. The pure form of time is not defined in terms of motion or point, nor spaceas line or organized plane. Kant saysthat `extensionand figure belong to pure intuition', ... but without common sense there is no conceptual definition of either, no image 5° figure to are recognizable. In the Aesthetic, intuition according which extension and is given, not constructed so unhinged from common sense, there is no necessity immanent to time which dictates its functional convergencewith Euclidean axioms, nor to forces which dictate their functional convergence with gravity or thermodynamics, nor to material production which forces its functional convergence with mechanism.These are purely contingent solutions, historical answersto questions from consciousness. In L'anti-oedine, Deleuze (and Guattari, here) write: 'cc qui met si longtemps ä arrive ä la conscience,c'est la nouvelle que la mort de Dieu n'a aucune importance pour ! 'inconscient' (what takes so long in coming to consciousnessis the news that the death of God makes no difference to the unconscious')51 78 It is understanding this

Chapter 2 which allows him to travel so efficiently through Kant's network of faculties, and discard elements which make no difference to the transcendental as an abstract and naked surfaceon which the diagrammatic solutions of problems immanent to relations of force are recorded, but merely impede its potential solutions by intervening with demandsfor recognition, with a prior format for recording, an image of thought. In Difference et Repetition, Deleuze begins to diagram an impersonal and unconscious consistency of sense, mapping the forces of thought, the sufficient reason of the sensible:the death of God is as irrelevant here as is his life. The line beyond which is the beyond of representation - and thus +1, the inverse image of representation, stupidity face to face - is dissolved in a threshold or surface which folds into itself, continuously changing in nature and form. What is so intelligent in Deleuze's reading of Kant is his selection of the elements which expressthis indifference, even though many do so only negatively: for Deleuze, `la negation, c'est l'image renverseede la difference' (the negative is difference inverted, seenfrom below)'. 52The in-between, or middle, or AND logics of machinic or rhizomatic sense which function in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia are assembledthrough the inversion of the negative through difference, rather than through an identity which would restore it to unity, as the single positive term. Demons string variables and sequenceconnections, and are nothing other than those variables and connections, functioning only through relations and never as the terms related, not recognizing or recognized, exploring a pure straight line of time, a line of flight, without monogram, profile or name. Within the general field of understanding, the intensive real in experience, `is viewed as a cause...[and]...the degree of the reality as cause is then entitled...the 5.3 moment of gravity' Viewed as a causemeansviewed hypothetically: that is, intensity as an issue for the principles of understanding is not problematic, and any absenceof information which could confirm an hypothesis and determine causality is merely a 79

Chapter 2 subjective insufficiency in knowledge, and correctible. `[N]o misunderstanding is...possiblewhich cannot easily be removed', since the dynamic or quality of intensive magnitudes presupposesthe axioms of extension conducting force potentials and qualities acrossthe striated, linear and punctuated metric of a general and extensively 54 just is from is differentiated What the recognized enough to general quantified space. it internalized has it is that the control time: that given enough self-cancelling, confirm systemsappropriate to it, and will apply them, given sufficient time. Aberrations are only ever temporary. `Et ce qui est en jeu dann cette difference, c'est toute la repartition, toute la determination, toute la destination, tout l'exercice des facultes Bansune doctrine en general. (At issue in this difference is the whole distribution, the whole determination, destination and exercise of the faculties within a 55 doctrine' general Rational science systematizesconnections amongst empirically gathered data according to a coherenceof grounds and consequents.The aggregateunities distributed by understanding, in its legitimate use immanent to experience,would not unite into a ideal focus outside experience if Ideas did not reason provide an of systematicwhole, for the convergenceof conceptsof understanding. But this perspective on distribution is subjective: the focus imaginarius regulates for formalism, which is to say, for syllogistic relations, maxims of theoretical reasonwhich havejudgements for relations and conceptualrepresentationsfor their content. For a formal system,it is `not the idea in itself, but its use only, that can be either transcendent or immanent'. 56 It is judgement as a tool of the subject - the application of logical principles - that errs. 80

Chapter 2 Transcendentally - which is now immanent to senseand objective problems - there is no error, becausethere are no facts, but there are still illusions. One illusion is that there is an analog between the way understanding functions in the production of the object in general as correlate to subjective unity, unifying diversity within the form of the Same - (common senserecognition, in other words), and the way in which reason `unifies the manifold of conceptsby meansof ideas, positing a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding, 57 distributive which otherwise are concernedsolely with unity'. This analog is logical, rather than transcendental, but the transition from theoretical constitution to regulation is void of real relations, since its base is in conceptsand generality rather than in singularity and sense.Firstly, real relations need to be distinguished from relations of reality, the real (das Reale) and the concept of reality (Realität) are not equivalent or interchangeableterms. This is important, firstly, becauseto understand the difference between real and formal grounds in terms of a concept(a formal and empty function, in the absenceof intuition) is clearly to miss the force of this distinction. Real relations, those which engage with the problem of the transcendental,involve intuitions and existence,rather than conceptsand cognition, as has already been remarked, and are associatedby Kant with perception, actuality, matter and existence;in short, with issuessurrounding the problem of intensities. `It is sensation.-that indicates actuality [Wirklichkeit] in space or time'; it is perception through which `the material [Stop] required to enable us to think objects of sensible intuition must first be given'm; it is the real [das Reale] `which constitutes the thing 81

Chapter 2 itself [das Ding selbst]' and which `must be given - otherwise the thing could not be 59 conceivedat all'. These elementsof experience are given through or in relation with the pure form of time. In the Logic, Kant writes of the difference between concepts and intuitions, calling the former general [allgemeine) or reflected presentations, and the latter singular [einzelne] presentations.60 (Singular here must not be confused with singular judgements.) In order to supposethat regulative judgements have a purchase on the material necessaryfor thinking empirical objects, it must be supposed that reason has accessto the thing-in-itself, and to the real which constitutes it. Kant eliminates this as an answer, however, in experience,which for Kant means conscious 61 in it' is Even if one choosesto suppose, `no to question ever asked regard experience, in a theological mode, that this is God - clearly not an intellectual response- Kant illegitimates rational accessto such an entity. Moreover, existenceis not a matter to be resolvedby appealto figures of belief. Hypothetically, reasoncan move from comparative resemblancesamongst particular casesin relation to a rule, in order to discover whether these casesfollow from the rule; it can then generalize over `all particular instances, even to those which are not 62 themselvesgiven' But problematically, it can't: there is no way of finding an Idea on the grounds of its general solution, amongst particular cases,since objectively, Ideas interact with sense and the singular logics of bodies, outside the possibility of constituting general conformity. Problematically, there is no universal account of the particular through which to protect its objective status or serve as a general rule for what is not given: there is, in other words, no substitution for a problem, the object of an Idea, whereasthere are substitutionsfor representations,the objectsof concepts.The analogy between understanding and reason illegitimately carries substitutability into 82

Chapter 2 the Ideas.God, Freedomor Immortality: in Kant, if you pick one, you get all three. But Ideas are singular, and it is as singularities that Deleuze plugs sense into Kantian ideas. `Les Idees sont les problemes, mais les problemes apportent seulement les conditions sous lesquelles les facultes accedent i leur exercicesuperieur. (Ideas are problems, but problems only furnish the conditions under 63 faculties attain their superior exercise)' which the Problems are the abstract grid through which that which forces sense difference in diversity, a demon or dark precursor - becomesconcrete, not in terms of a faculties, by becoming but of or configuration unhinged from model previously settled all models. It is only so that they produce their own superior exercise, or immanent autonomy in relation to intensity, rather than in relation to common sense or the image. Deleuze's diagram of Kant draws problems of sense - of intuition and intensity - together with Ideas, but in the process the whole surface of critique is rewired. In Difference et Repetition he defines transcendentaland transcendent: `La forme transcendentaled'une facultd sc confond avec son exercice disjoint, superieur ou transcendant.Transcendant ne signifie pas du tout que la facultd s'adresse ä des objets hors du monde, mais an contraire qu'elle saisit dans le monde ce qui la concern exclusivement,et qui la fait naitre au monde. 83

Chapter 2 (The transcendental form of a faculty is indistinguishable from its disjointed, superior or transcendentexercise.Transcendentin no way means that the faculty addressesitself to objects outside the world but, on the contrary, that is graspsthat in the world which concernsit 64 into it brings the world)'. exclusively and Disjointed, or unhinged from common sense, nothing legislating their in formulation, into the or, good sense equilibrium, analogical convergence thermodynamic equilibrium, the faculties give no hypothetical solution, only real ones. A faculty becomes the formation of a pipe, a connection in an assemblage or multiplicity, or a leap which snapsthe order of Kantian sense,changing its nature and degree, and an Idea a system of connections between these differential genetic elements, a multiplicity or assemblage.A machine which grasps that in the world which concernsit exclusively, without substitution, singular and real. This is not to say, however, that the transcendentand the transcendentalare the same: being indistinguishable from each other does not necessitatetheir identity. Kant is quite clear that they are not interchangeableterms. A principle which removes limits, `or even commands us actually to transgress them, is called transcendent'.65 They are actual, rather than transcendental principles, and incite the possessionof in illegitimacy domains, their use of empirical, or actual their rests and unlimited principles to describe spacesoutside the conditions of their generation: that is, they encouragethe transfer of a solution from one problem to another, without regard for differences in the variables. This is why, for example, Ideas of reason have no in being for theory, relation to the empirical. only regulative constitutive value The transcendent is counterposed to immanence, which describes the legitimacy of the transcendental. The transcendental has two senses:there is the 84

Chapter 2 transcendentaluse of the concepts, under the compulsion of reason, as described in chapter one, which producesthe concept of an object in general and limits sensibility. This is illegitimate, Kant agrees, but since there are no actual principles informing such errors of judgement `not duly curbed by criticism', becauseunderstanding is in this case disconnectedfrom sense,the transcendentaluse of understanding does not threaten the security of the system.66 Because there is no empirical incitement to transgression- and it is thus not pathologically or affectively motivated - there is no danger from the transcendentaluse of understanding. Indeed, as has been seen, it is compelled by reason. The transcendent use of a faculty unhinged from its common senserelations, however, is precisely what the noumenon is designed to preclude: it limits sensibility. It is in this sensethat Deleuze understandsit, as transcendent with regard to established relations, exacerbatedby a problem for which these relations cannot articulate a solution. He calls it indistinguishable from the transcendental becauseit is a movement incited by a singular abstract machine; it is transcendentin relation to extant empirical orders, in that it aggravatesthe limits of that order. In this sense it is related to practice, as a mechanism for moving through walls. It only remains transcendentif it carries the principle of possession- for example - specific to a particular configuration of the faculties across the threshold and over the wall. Becauseit does not then grasp what is exclusive to both its operation, bringing it into the world, but remains bound by principle outside the operation. It is in this sensethat it is transcendental,immanent to the concretegenesisof a solution. *** `Plutot qu'ä ce qui se passe avant et apres Kant (et qui revient au meme), nous devonsnous interesserA un moment precis du kantisme, moment furtif eclatant... 85

Chapter 2 (Rather than being concerned with what happens before and after Kant (which amounts to the same thing), we should be concerned with a precise moment within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive 67 )' moment... Deleuze calls this brief flash of thought without image `schizophrene du droit (schizophrenia in principle)' which leads directly to Anti-Oedipus, the first volume of Capital and Schizophreniawhere critique has becomeschizoanalysis." In Difference et titio he complains that Kant does not follow this moment: moreover, he implies that Kant was aware of it, but chose good sense and a philosophy compliant with common sense.`[Q]uitte ä compromettre 1'appareil conceptuel des trois Critiques (at the risk of compromising the conceptualapparatusof the three Critiques)', he redeems 69 its image in Law. it, and stabilizes civilizing thought and recognizing The critical project of L'anti-oedine is explicit: Deleuze and Guattari, referring to Kant, denounce 'Z'usagetranscendant des syntheses(transcendent use of 70 by today's cogitatio universalis. Auto-critique, or psychoanalysis, syntheses)' schizoanalysis,plays in relation to psychoanalytic Law and myth a role parallel to that played by reason in the first Critique in relation to metaphysical dogmas and mystic enthusiasms:both critiques distinguish illegitimate and legitimate syntheses,extract thought from myth and ideology and above all emphasizeimmanence. Their essential tendency is eliminative and materialist. But one of the factors that differentiates Kantian critique, stilled by the hand of redemption, from auto-critique, is that whilst each invents its own destructionsand invests in its own decline, the former does so for the sakeof - what it is in the processof destroying -a metaphysicsbasedon theological premises:God is not alive, for Kant, but nonethelessan unconditioned unity continues to operate as a limit, endlessly displaced and internal to the engine of critique, as an 86

Chapter 2 axiom of productive synthesis.The system gives to itself with one hand what it takes back with the other. Auto-critique invents in destruction and invests in decline, but not for the sake of - anything. Kant's care is evident in his stabilization of the systemof faculties at the risk of compromising the machine he has built, and it is the stability disciplined into a system which presents an image, not what escapesit. Deleuze's positive and sober critique of Kant addressesits instabilities, and it is from these that Anti-Oedipus takes its critical sense (though there are other sensestoo) fuelled by their refinement in Difference and Repetition. The method is one of the undisciplined micro-analysis of the disciplined microphysics of power. Noology, as a science of cognition whose principles derive from the Mind rather than from the richness and multiplicity of concrete experience, is a common target of both Kant and Deleuze. At the end of the Critique of Pure ReasonKant cites Plato as `the chief of the noologists', his philosophical error being to intellectualize knowledge and collapse intuition into cognitive functions.'' Kant's cure to the intellectualization of knowledge is well known: intuition and cognition become twin stemsof knowledge, giving rise to an industry attempting to resolve this disjunction, in intellectual or aesthetic intuition, in God or the State. As has been seen, however, Kant's cure itself comes under criticism from Deleuze, the force of the explosive moment, of the introduction of time into the subject, being vitiated by its restriction within extension. As has been argued, it is this aspect of Kant from which Deleuze forges the force of his critique, taking the senseof synthesistogether with the problem of Ideas and dissolving with consequentresolution the image of thought. Moving the aesthetic away from extension, refusing the division of sensibility into objective and subjectiveelements,and the postulation of the unity of the thing-in-itself, Deleuze 87

Chapter 2 introduces sensibility to problems of force which cannot be reconciled with the image of thought or the conceptualmechanicsof the understanding,and initiates a thought of movement which does not belong to objects, but is a kinetics of packs, populations, bodiesthat are multiplicities without relation to unity. *** `Perds le visage (lose your face)', Deleuze writes, becauseit is scarred with `les deut maladiesde la terre, le couple du despoteet du pretre (the two diseasesof the '2 despot the the the earth, pair of and priest)'. Losing image, becoming vague without becoming homogeneousor unclear, speeding and slowing in continuous qualitative transformation, Deleuze is not a destructive writer, but one of camouflage; his tactic is to `glisser son corps comme une piece dans de pareilles machines (slip his body into 73 Philosophy as enculage. To flee, the such machines as one part among others)'. leave, evade are subjectsof movement: to flee is to trace a line, but unlike the lines drawn explicitly by Kant, measuredextensively through the addition of discrete units, lines of flight exceed the perspective of the image. Each line has its subtleties and nuances, qualities of speed and slowness, and Deleuze is explicit about selecting philosophical components to assemble machines which flee and make weapons of flight at once, rather than thosewhich adopt a position or a stance. Kant, he declares enemy. As this chapter has shown, Kant is a problem, becausehe is himself in between, and becauseof this, open to diverse and contrary deployment. He is not properly enlightened, not properly idealist, not properly romantic, not properly Newtonian, not properly religious. Not only chronologically, Kant is a critical juncture between Spinoza and Nietzsche, the two thinkers who, Deleuze says,releasedhim from his debts and who without doubt (though beyond this thesis) inform his re-writing of critique. 88

Chapter 3 Forcesand Deductions `Un espace dynamique doit We defini du point de vue d'un observateurlie ä cet espace,et non d'une position exterieure. (A dynamic space must be defined from the point of view of an ' from tied to that observer space,not an external position)'. In chaptersone and two, Deleuze's identification of the network of faculties as constitutive of the transcendentalmethod was explored, together with his attack on the principles of recognition and the image of thought in Kant's critique. His relation with Kant operates on (at least) two faces simultaneously. At the systematic level he explores connections,functions and operations amongst the faculties; questioning the repetition of the model of common senseas a mechanism for the stabilization of these relations, and its complementary,good sense,which is the common senseof teleology, Deleuzebegins to exposehis real relation with Kant. As the last chapter remarked, this is firstly and foremostly positive; Deleuze does not destroy without utilizing the componentshe has disarticulated to build new machines, and this is the secondaspect of his employment of Kant. He occupies a space,and then redistributes it, from the inside, not from the position of an external observer. If one wanted to describe a method in this aspect of Deleuze's engagement with critique, it would be one of selection and connection; intensity is connected with ideas, and dialectics is re-distributed as a problem of real differences,of magnitude; thought is connectedwith sense,removing the former from the rule of concepts and identity, and relating it with the now objective problematic of ideas; the thing-in-itself is connectedwith difference, with that through which the given is given as diversity. 89

Chapter 3 What forces thought is discovered in sense, rather than in the illusory figures of image. the and generality possibility, recognition, A question which emergesfrom the re-wiring of the systemof faculties is that Critique in forces in first Kant the doesn't the forces. the of relations explain of distribution of intensive magnitudes; the real moment of a cause, as has been force be is described before, to allowing conceptualized as gravity, simply mentioned in relation to substance.Mille Plateaux, in a discussionof a difference between nomad and royal science,opposestwo models; that of the Compars,whose primary distinction is a hylomorphic one, between matter and form, constructed through the selection of is Dispars, distinction law, that the the relevant of and of which and constants `materiau-forces(material-forces)' which composethemselvesby `mettre les variables elles-memeen etat de variation continue (placing the variables themselvesin a state of continuous variation)'? Each model is characterized by different distributions; the Compars by logos, which divides `un espacelaminaire, strict, homogene et centre (a laminar, striated, homogeneous,and centred space)93 and presupposesgravity, and Dispars by nomos, a tactile spaceof contact and affects, which is homogeneousonly `entre points infiniment voisins (betweeninfinitely proximate points)'4 yet which is not differentiated by pre-formed relations and connections. The most obvious model of science in Kant is that of the Compars: he is famously an admirer of Newton. However, Deleuze's relation to Kant and his deployment of critique as essentially economic suggestthat the other model must also be implicated in Kantian critique. In Difference et Repetition. L'anti-oediue and Mille Plateaus. a continual emphasis is placed on the co-existence of the two models: the material-forces distinction does not replace the matter-form distinction anymore than the State replaces the nomads. `L'histoire ne fait que traduire en succession une 90

Chapter 3 coexistencede devenirs (all history doesis to translate a coexistenceof becomings into a succession)'5.A purely historical perspective,leading to an evaluation of Kant's work in terms of what camebefore and followed after him, and the division of his philosophy as a whole into pre-critical and critical (and, in some cases,as post-critical and senile) writings, will discover only this translation. Deleuze looks instead for consistenciesin the system,and for the weightings and privileges attendant on certain structures which repress or cover becomings, and translate them into chronological movements. His interests is in critique as a singular and economic problem, rather than in the successiveattempts at solving this problem which run throughout Kant's work and are continued by his successors. For Deleuze, the machinic elements of critique are in its systematics,hidden in the theory of forces, in the problem of Ideas,and in the network of the faculties, and it is on these that he focuses. His critique does not progress from Kant, but rather abstractsout the various machines operating in his work, allowing forces and patterns hidden beneathand coveredover by royal and statedivisions of spaceand operations of power to be exposed.The regimes of molar and molecular (which for the moment can be taken to correspond roughly with the division of Compars and Dispars) are immanent to each other, what differs - as Kant always says - is not the ideas themselves, but the use to which they are put. Royal science deploys ideas reproductively: reducesomething to a unit and make more of the same.Nomad science follows ideas, and an idea which Deleuze follows in Kant is that of repulsive and attractive force, in order to uncover further the conditions of real production. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Kant discusses fundamental qualities of material forces - repulsion and attraction (Zurückstoßungslarafi/repulsiveKraft and Anziehungskraft). The latter functions in 91

Chapter 3 empty extendedspace,as action at a distance, and is constructedthrough negation and limitation; it belongs to the Compars model. The former is a force which, like nomos, distributes a spaceof contact, intensive magnitudes filling space without determinate measureand belongs to the Dispars. In this chapter, Deleuze's method of deduction is explored, which functions simultaneously with his selection of the system of faculties as the real elementswhich constitute the problem of critique as such. But first, forces. I Attraction and Repulsion According to Kant, `the only two moving forces that can be thought' 6, and which are fundamental to matter, are repulsion and attraction. These are differentiated in a ' variety of ways: Force of Repulsion Force of Attraction Force of extension: Force of penetration Impenetrability = function of (of space) dynamic relation of repulsive forces - degreeof compression. Driving [triebende], diffusive Drawing [ziehende]: compelsapproach Expansive: relation of repulsion & expansionis conditionof elasticity Basis of matter as essentially Inferred on the basis space-filling (substantial) of the possibility of matter as matter in general; operatesacross empty space. Relation of repulsionlexpansionis condition of elasticity Not limitableby space 92

Chapter 3 Repulsion `[B]y meansof the senseof feeling [Sinnes des Gefrihls]' repulsive forces provide `the size and shape [Größe und Gestalt] of an extended thing's. Their magnitude is aesthetic and intensive, and contact amongst repelling forces is physical and immediate; there is `no actual distance of parts, which always constitute a continuum 9. the the spaceof whole' That empty space could not be as regards all expansion of proved through experiencewas made clear in the first Critique. in relation to both the Anticipations of Perception and the infinite divisibility of intensive magnitudes, and at length in relation to regulative judgement, which is governed subjectively by three logical maxims assertingthe continuity of nature; the absenceof a vacuum - non datur vacuum formarum; the impossibility of leaps in nature, transitions between species Odegrees difference `all between the that them" smaller of mediate comprehending datur continuum formarum: and the law of their conjunction, continuum specierum, which `recognise[s]a relationship of the different branches, as all springing from the 11. Homogeneity and specification are thus joined in an arborescentform, same stem' leading to a problem of roots, and what grounds them. This logics of continuity presupposesa transcendentallaw, Vex continui in natura'12. Kant is at pains to avoid the suggestion that attraction at a distance is across a real empty space, or that variations amongst speciescorrespondto real gaps. In the MFNS. Kant's concern is with an intensive continuum of force, and with the possibilities of constructing a concept of full spacewhich will give material weight to the law of continuity in nature and support his claim that nature knows no vacuums. The distributions of bodies considered as expressing intensive qualities are not determinate, in relation either to themselvesor to a geometric boundary, prior to 93

Chapter 3 the construction of the concept of quantity the most one can say is that there are regions of density and patterns of flows. This follows quite clearly from the description in the first Criitiaue of intensive qualities as flowing, and from Kant's assertion that there is no legitimacy in the assumptionthat the real [das Reale] is uniform in degree. To understandthis, it is necessaryto differentiate between a body - `a matter between determinate boundaries', assumedto be intensively homogeneous,and density, which is a function of the relation between attractive and repulsive - that is, intensive forces." Density is unsuitable as a means of thinking relations amongst matters, precisely because of its heterogeneity and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of establishing proportionality amongst intensively differentiated regions of space without introducing a principle of determination - such as extension - which segments, orders and determinesmatter in spacein such a manner that it is analytically tractable is homogeneous its to to say, which with regard units of composition. `[N]o comparison can properly be permitted between heterogeneousmatters with regard to their density'14; the determination of intensive qualities, and the relative proportionality of attractive and repulsive forces is a function of their relation with extensive quanta, their characterization as qualities of bodies confined within determinate boundaries,or, as Kant expressesit, their `represent[ation] as specifically homogeneousamong one another'. In the Aesthetic Kant says that removal from the representation of a body of those aspectsbelonging to sensation leaves extension and figure; however, there is nothing in this remark that determines the nature and configuration of such figures, since determination is a function of understanding, and mathematical objects exist through construction in pure intuition, which requires productive imagination. There is thus no weight to the claim that Kant can be refuted by the existenceof non-Euclidean geometries, or by forms of non-rational mathematics, since there is no formal 94

Chapter 3 grammar, as it were, to the pure forms of spaceand time. They underlie the possibility of geometryand mathematics,but the processof numbering is prior to the concept of a Kant's bodies is figuration just to the geometric axioms. prior of spatial as number, elucidation of intuition is confined to a three-dimensional space and the onedimensional line of time is axiomatically extensive and produced through the successiveaddition of units. But the forms of intuition themselvesare empty. This is a complex issue and outside the scopeof this thesis, so will not be pursued in any depth. It must be kept in mind, however, that pure intuition is vacuous and that the construction of spatio-temporal figures concerns the relation of imagination to intuition, so is implicated with the functioning of the former, a topic for the next chapter, and that intuition itself does not contain pre-given restraints on the potential for such constructions. As has already been seen,the pure forms of spaceand time are for is feeding lines Euclidean the of example along space empty, what configures axioms into the process of construction, and not any characteristic of intuition. As Buchdahl points out, it is necessaryto differentiate betweenthe principle of the axioms and the axioms themselves;the 'latter do indeed presupposethe former, as providing a "proof" that extensional axioms have a synthetic a priori status in general. But this does not tell us what axioms there are, nor whether there is a " single and unique set of such axioms. At the level of principle - that is, transcendentally - there is no legitimacy in the assumption that space or time have any formal grammar or any specific axioms Euclidean or otherwise - constraining the nature of the empirical. `[T]here is no contradiction in the concept of a figure which is enclosed within two straight lines'; however, given space - that is, the extended space of experience as experience of 95

Chapter 3 objects - operates against the possibility of non-Euclidean, synthetic geometries, becauseit is already configured as three-dimensionaland linearly co-ordinated.16 The logical grammar of understandingand the principles of judgement construct one space, for is it there thus, no space alternative as were, are parts; all spaces of which geometries. But from the perspective of the pure forms of space and time, thought outside the constructions governedby definitions and axioms of understanding, there Deleuze their configuration. exploits this to the on potential restraints no pre-given are full. As the abovelist notes, repulsive forces are not limited by space;they have no exhaustive extension, but become infinitely diffuse, until `no assignable quantity of matter would be found in any assignable space.'" Repulsive force alone, therefore, gives no concept of the dynamic magnitude of a body, no concept of quantity is constructible from the diffuse indeterminacy of intensive magnitude; space is full but not denumerable, occupied without measure. It is not the case that repulsive force in impossibility for Kant: he is time the Metaphysical spends considerable an alone Foundationsof Natural Sciencediscussing the qualities of repulsion, defining physical contact in its terms, as a problem of infinitely small distances,and characterizing it in terms of feeling. What is impossible is any determinate quantification of repulsive forces, in the absence of their relation to attractive forces and the mathematical punctuation of space.That is, any workable (in a scientific or epistemological sense) definition of matter depends on the construction of repulsive forces according to a metric which is not immanent to those forces themselves,but arrived at through the postulation of attractive forces acting at a distance acrossempty spaceaccording to the principles of phoronomy. 96

Chapter 3 In Kant, this distribution of repulsive forces is subjected to negation; the multiplicitous difference of degreeis `represented..through approximation to negation = 0'18, and intensity becomesthought of as a unit, representableas a point, the real moment of cause. The actual intensive continuum filling mathematically conceived as a uniformly space can then be homogeneous field of points, all interconnected with each other, no part more distant than any other, becausetheir relation is intensive, rather than extensive.Through the medium of the point, repulsive force can conceived of in relation to a uniform and undifferentiated mathematical continuum, extending to infinity. If, as Kant desires,repulsion is to becomethe basis of the movable, the topic of mechanics,then it cannot itself be thought of as mobile, just as, for time to be the form of everything which changes,it cannot itself change. The immanent dynamics of repulsive force have to be distributed uniformly, which meansthey have to be recorded in a manner different to their production, becausethe mechanical field into which they are to be folded is based on a principle of a unity of force, whilst intensity is immanently differentiated. The homogenization of force is the first move in this recording process,and forms the conceptof substance. In relation to substance,force is determinately defined, as a state of matter, rather than as an intensive vector. In the latter case,the given as diversity and that by which the given is given as diverse are immanently entangled, rather than subordinated to the principle of an `ultimate subject of existence' and there is neither assignable ' 9 to the origin nor end vector. Empirical time and space are constructed through the movementof forces,rather than through referenceto axiomatized quanta. Difference is thus virtual, or immanent to the actual continuum, and rather than being subjectedto limitation, changesin nature as it changesin degree.It has been said that spacecannot 97

Chapter 3 limit repulsive force. Nor, however, is the filling of space self-limiting: immanently 20 is 'compelled-to its continuously expand' occupation of space. In repulsive, matter relation to substance,this expansion is necessarilya relation with unity, and thus of determinateand measurableextension. In relation only to itself, intensive expansion is not defined or conceivable,and hencebecomesa problematic, rather than a theoretical issue. Deleuze, by critiquing the formation and assumptions of common sense and setting a different model of scienceagainst that of universal gravitation, opens up this space,and focuseson the problem of how repulsion is first set up (a matter addressed later in this chapter). Repulsive force is a force of surfaces:every part touchesevery part, and there is no empty space: `physical contact is the reciprocal action of repulsive forces at the 21. boundary But the boundary is only common in the sense of two matters' common that two matters are infinitely proximate, for it is immanent to the field of each. It is not common in the sensethat both matters share a law which their relation instantiates nor is it formed through the subordination by one matter of another. The boundary or limit is not governeda priori by any element implicated in its formation, but produced as an effect of the relation of forces at different intensive degrees:it is common only in the sensethat it is a difference common to all distributions. Contact, Kant says, is differential, a problem of `infinitely small distances' u. The model here is not hylomorphic, since the dynamic filling of space by repulsive forces is materially distributive, but there is as yet no differentiation of matter and form. For this, contact has to be referred to a limit, a point: it is the sameproblem as that of sensation, noted above, where the subjective indeterminacy of sensation appeared to void the possibility of objectively measuring intensive magnitude. `La geometrie et 1'arithmetique prennent la puissance d'un scalpel (Geometry and 98

Chapter 3 arithmetic take on the power of the scalpel)'23,Deleuze and Guattari say in Mille Plateaux, and it is this function which orders the homogeneousand dead spaceacross which the true force of attraction drops bodiesand draws lines. Attraction Unlike repulsive forces,which fill spaceby meansof the senseof feeling [Gefiihl], (and thus are in the sphere of aesthetic, rather than speculative or practical judgement) attractive force is characterized as ambivalent in relation to sensation [Empfrndungl: either there is `no sensationat all' or there is sensation,but no determinate object, and it is this that makes it appear at first problematic as a fundamental force, since no determinate quanta of intuition can be correlated with the spread or absence of sensation. There is either zero sensation of intensity, which as Kant says `would involve the representationof the instant as empty, therefore = 0', and repulsive forces 24 impossibility Or there is sensationbut no determinate intensive the this. necessitate of magnitude, or `degreeof influence on the sense'which would validate the objectivity of ' it to sensation,attributing an objective cause. So attractive force becomesopen to the accusationof having only subjectivevalidity, and of functioning in a spacewith no real dynamic qualities. No positive concept of real attractive force can be constructed: it is inferred, Kant says,but not derived, and on the basis of the possibility of a general concept of matter, so its positivity is not real but conceived. Independently of repulsion, attraction becomespurely mathematical: if there were only attractive forces, the parts of matter 26 in `coalesce in would a mathematical point' empty space As Kant says,mathematics `presentsthe most splendid example of the successfulextension of pure reason,without the help of experience', and it is through mathematics that the heterogeneous 99

Chapter 3 involution and division of repulsive forces becomes tied to points of attraction, becoming uniform and inert Z' Synthetic, and thus productive, but a priori and thus merely possible in relation to the real, Kant's mathematics grounds the royal description of space,as `strib par la chute descorps, les verticales de pesanteur(striated by the fall of bodies,the verticals of gravity)'. 28 Spaceis inverted through the negation of dynamic intensities, and the real is sucked through an impenetrable point, its sign inverted. Its depth becomes empty, voided of continuously differentiated degrees of intensity and re-distributed as homogeneous,parallel, Euclidean, inertly receptive to the mechanical principles of order. the shift is from feeling to sight, from an intensive distribution to a determinate vision, from a real spaceunobservablefrom outside to an ideal spaceonly observable from outside. There is a cancellation of indeterminate sensationsin favour of a split sensibility according to a difference imposed from outside, by understanding, rather than one which emergesfrom intensive magnitudes. The force of attraction is defined in terms of the action of points at a distance, `through every spaceas an empty space'29,but only two bodies at a time defining, as Deleuze and Guattari say, `la forme d'interiorite de toute science (the form of interiority of all science)'.30 In the construction of this form real magnitudes are assigneda negative value, and space is covered over with extensive lines, pillars of force, giving rise to a third form of compression, resulting from the relation of repulsive and attractive forces, which establishes a direction to flows of force, distributing a before and an after of time in relation to which a before and an after of intensive distribution can be determined. The point becomesa present, but a vacant one, which defines a direction of time `du passe au futur, comme du particulier au general (from past to future as though from particular to general)', from the 100

Chapter 3 determinatepoint or state of matter, the moment of gravity, to the homogeneouschaos 31 intensity. dispersed Kant's dynamics are thus commensuratenot only of uniformly with mechanics, but will support too a thermodynamics of good sense.The `themes d'une reduction de la difference, d'une uniformisation du diverse, d'une egalisation de l'inegal (themes of a reduction of difference, a uniformisation of diversity, and an equalisation of inequality)', fused in thermodynamics, established basic definitions satisfying, Deleuzewrites, `tout le monde,y compris ä un certain kantisme (everybody, including a certain Kantianism)' 32 Deleuze, however, finds a third relation, generated through the conjunction of the purpose-drivendirectionality of force proper to teleology and thermodynamics(the force of good sense)and the determinateconceptualization of force as the moment of gravity (the force of common sense).This conjunction drives critique acrossthe thresholds of rational ends and towards machinic or auto-critique, which is not principled by unity but according to a principle of difference: given nothing but difference there is nothing in common but there is still difference. Extension is the cancellation and covering up of intensities, their incorporation into an mechanical common senseand eschatologicalgood sense,which organizes things `dann les conditions de 1'etendueet dann l'ordre du temps (in the order of time and under the conditions of extensity)' so that difference is encouragedto cancel itself, as time becomes subject to logic and material forces become hylomorphically arranged.33In order to understandthis one must recall a remark made in the Introduction, pointing out that this thesis is not written from the perspective of the consciousKantian subject whose capacity to intuit intensity is restricted to within extendedhomogeneousspaceand time. Rather, it takes a route driven by the position in which Kant has placed woman - that is, a position aligned with the object, with nature, with imagination and sensation, on the thresholds of the system of consciousness,neither wholly outside nor completely incorporated within it. From this 101

Chapter 3 perspective, as Chapter Six makes more explicit, the mechanisms which construct extended homogeneousspace - negation and limitation, the axiomatization of all magnitudes as extensive, the reference of all events (or accidents) to a permanent subject/substance- are mechanisms which cancel out and cover up the immanent movements of nature, sensation and imagination with the demands of order and uniformity, in order to produce a nature of regularity whose laws are given by the subject. From the perspectiveof the subjectintensity is thought only within the bounds of extension. However, it is preciselybecauseKant doesnot completely eliminate those figures associatedwith intensity - the thing-in-itself, imagination, senseand sensationwith the logical demandsof the concept that he presentsthe occasion for a different reading, one which doesnot require a woman reader to becomea Kantian by becoming first an honorary man. If the theoretical writings are read in conjunction with Kant's writings on history and politics such a position is not, from the perspective of "orthodox" Kantianism, a tenable one, since women remain always the passive componentsin any theoretical, social or political space. The final moment in constructing a dynamic concept of matter, a substance commensuratewith mechanical expression, is limitation, which defines and confirms the degree of negation necessaryto generate a universal and permanently uniform containment of repulsion by a point of attraction, and form a general conceptof matter. Attractive force splits into true and apparent. Attraction is apparent when the combined force of two bodies is not biunivocal, and their approach is not intensively symmetrical: one body `has been driven Lgetriebenl toward the first body from ''' impact'. by But impact is an empirical and derivative concept of force, elsewhere 102

Chapter 3 rather than a fundamental property, and so includes an admixture of elements, both empirical and a priori. Yet although it results from physical contact rather than being a function of the relation across empty space of the bodies involved, the effects of impact can, given a generalized concept of matter and a science of forces, be anticipated a priori. Apparent attraction is the negative of repulsive force and `proper object of our external perception'35;in order to discover the true attraction at its basis, the massof a body must be understoodin terms of a point at its centre, and the relation of forces understood as constant for all variables. True attraction, Kant says, is estimated without the intervention of repulsive force or the need to accommodate intensive variations, and it is in this, its true and mathematical sense,that attraction is the ground of possibility of matter as matter in general. 11 Lagoon Dynamics Kant gives two fine illustrations of the effects of disequilibrated forces, where the dynamics of full space do not slide unproblematically into points and striations and mechanical relations, and in both cases,imagination is involved as an exacerbatory processof the destabilizedrelations of repulsion and attraction. In the first chapter, the schematizing function of imagination under the determination of understanding was mentioned briefly, as was the focus imaginarius, a subjective focus mediating the transition from the distributive unity of understandingto the collective unity of reason. When the faculties are unhinged, and their relations not ordered by common sense, imagination comesto play a different role. In the sublime, the inadequacy of imagination to fulfil its two theoretically assigned functions of apprehensionand comprehension, and thus provide a qualified quantumof intuition to understanding,is felt as pain and resolvedby the superior 103

Chapter 3 might of reasoninto negativepleasure. In its attempt to use nature as a schemafor the presentationof the sublime, imagination becomesalternately attracted and repelled by natural might [1facht], and disengagedfrom sensibility and understanding, it moves vertically into a realm of incomparablequantity, the magnitude of the supersensible, where reasonassertsits dominance [Gewalt] over the exertions of imagination. This is 36 however, in different looked be this much written about so chapter a example will at. The sublime recurs, however, in the context of a discussion of imagination in the next chapter. Crossing water, `[o]n a trip from Pillau to Königsberg, if this can be called a 37 Immanuel Kant, Professor from Königsberg, voyage', grows seasick. Diagnosing his condition, he pins the nauseadown to 'antiperistaltic movement of the intestines by the abdominal muscles' reversing the cycle of ingestion and evacuation through the 38 organism. Swelling waters on the lagoon interfere with the successiveand automatic compressionof the tubular pathways in the body, `repeatedrising and falling' of the field of appearance, felt first as a disturbance in sight is, when `provoked, by imagination', exacerbated and thrown into reverse.39 If this reversal is not countermanded,the organism exports matter, the processof which through the body has beenunbalancedby dynamic distortions in its environment. Regulated and directed wave-like contractions in the vermicular canals through which the organism ingests and dispels waste are unable to negotiate an equilibrium with wavering uncertain waters, and excited to confusion. The proper organization, contents, and connectionsof the input/output channels running through the closed volume of a whole body become disordered. The irregular and unregulated flows of the waters play havoc with the regulated structure of the organism and under the provocation of imagination, sight turns back in on the organism and the outside world darkens. Kant's analysis of this problem is instructive, since it is one of the few occasionson which he can indeed be 104

Chapter 3 said to occupy a dynamic space,not as an observer,but as an body interacting with the forceswith which it connects. `Sight is the noblest of the senses'Kant writes, and `comesclosest to a pure intuition' 40; the purity of the light medium being imperceptible except through its special organ, the eye, the object seems independent of sensation. As said above, sensation was initially problematic in relation to attractive forces, either lacking a determinate object, or not felt at all, and Kant solved this difficulty of an intensive distribution without determinate form or relation by negating the forces implicated with feeling and physical contact and collapsing matter into a point, a limit. On the water, however, such a resolution is precluded. The homogeneousspace of universal attraction, the world organized as a laboratory in which sight is privileged, gives way to a turbulent and fluid heterogeneousfield in continuous variation, to which none of the corporeal sensesare adequate,and which effectstheir recoil back into the body in a refusal of their tentacular role on behalf of the empirical subject. The response is similar to that of the sublime; in both cases,what is looked for is a place of safety, from where the disturbance can be estimated as fearful, but the subject can be unafraid. In the caseof the sublime, this is culture. Kant writes: `[T]he vast oceanheavedup by storms cannot be called sublime. The sight of it is horrible; and one must already have filled one's mind with all sorts of ideas if such an intuition is to attune it to a feeling that is itself sublime, inasmuch as the mind is induced to abandon sensibility and occupy itself with ideas containing a higher " purposiveness'. 105

Chapter3 Out on the lagoon, does Kant experience the sublime? Certainly, his description suggestshe is induced to abandonsensibility. Whether cultural ideas are sufficient to sublimatehis nausea?- this is unclear. Light, the medium of sight, `unlike sound,is not merely a wave-like motion of a fluid element that spreads through space in all directions, but a radiation that determines a point in space for the object'42 And in the MFNS: `nothing prevents one's thinking of light-matter as originally and indeed thoroughly fluid, without being divided into fixed particles'.43 Whilst not composedof discrete quanta, illumination nonethelessdeterminesa unit or quantum of intensity. In his discussionof forces, Kant contrasts a model of the diffusion of light provided by optics, `by means of rays diverging in a circle from a central point' with one depicting the diffusion of repulsive forces acrossa spherical surface.44 The optical model returns a problem of empty space,not as proposed by the conceptof action at a distance,but betweenthe real elementsfilling space.If diffusion is represented in terms of lines, the actual continuum of intensive force becomes segmented,broken into discrete elements, repulsion as the filling of space becomes confusedwith the enclosureof space,and the only light is that of the lines, `as if there 45 be found devoid light between to the always were places of rays'. Kant is of course anxious to prevent an account of material force in terms of monads, or atomic elements, or suggest the possibility of real empty spacesincreasing as the rays are further extended. In his preferred model `light diffuses itself everywhere from an illuminating point in spherical surfaces', from one point to all distances, not as rays, but in divergent circular waves. The degreeof intensity then becomesa function of the extension of the diffusion surface across which it is distributed; the greater the extension, the less the illumination, the illuminating point remaining constant. Space 106

Chapter 3 by its in but full, a the terms, are given organization conditions of actual remains it back folds itself to this and records movement over space, which principle extrinsic on its surfacein terms different to thosewhich producedit. *** Deleuze's argument with Kant - that he provides possible conditions for the is for the of production production of and not real conditions production representation, focused on this folded back surface, on the stratified space it generates,and on the condition or idea implicated in the disjunction which elevates law above the real. In effect, his criticism is that Kant provides no real account of the conditions for the tactile and full spaceof the actual continuum, only ideal and possible conditions for the visual and empty space of continuous attraction in which these forces are enclosed. There is no transcendentalaccount of the construction of the enclosure.Alex continuii in natura underpins an arborescent model of the species, in terms of which it is possible to `recognize a relationship of the different branches, as all spring from the same stem' and a linear model of forces, in terms of which each is a function of 46 the radical of power, underpins a striated model of space. substance,as The point is a centre of resonance,`un point d'accumulation, comme un point de croisementquelquepart derriere tous les yeux (a single point of accumulation that is like a point of intersection somewherebetween the eyes)'47;sight and the coalesced intensive force figured as a mathematical point in the interests of theorizing action at a distance acrossempty spaceconverge on the same model, the eyes of the subject, all implicated in the direction of the systematic ends of reason. In the case of sight, radiation determinesa point in spacefor the object. In the caseof action at a distance, force is represented `as converging at the attracting point from all points of the 107

Chapter 3 be determination both for direction to in the of cases, surrounding spherical surface'48; determined it be function `all the not and surface' of points of objectively valid, must a by the illuminating centre.49Only thus can intensity be quantified as equal in all space, it If directions its its density, were or speed. connections, regardlessof compressionor a function of the illuminating centre, it would need to be understood as increasingly diffuse and, as mentioned above,would result in the absenceof assignablequantity or does but it be intensive Besides, eschatological, good sensemay position of magnitudes. not take its end as real: there is no real force of attraction, as seenabove :true attraction is a mathematical construct, a point, and a basic point of Kantian philosophy is that in `the knowledge is As Kant in the writes, real real not constructible. existencespace' is a distribution of repulsive force and `the proper object of our external perception'; its `negative, namely, attractive force' is not described as real, however, but as necessaryfor the `possibility of the conceptof matter'. In order for a conceptualthat is, logically and mathematically tractable - formulation of matter, the real must be subject to negation and limitation. Attraction belongs to the possibility of matter as matter in general - that is, its possibility is formally rather than really configured. To describethe relations of horizontally diffuse and differential intensities in terms of a point, and `indicate the rectilinear direction, straight lines must be drawn from the surface and all its points to the illuminating point' S0 These are the lines describedby falling bodies, the pillars which striate space,pegging difference to points; the central illuminating point does not determine direction, merely organizes a resonanceamongst all points on the sphere, effecting their communication within the interior spacebehind the eyes. *** 108

Chapter 3 Kant's nausea is the outcome of unanticipated alterations in the vectors of forces which preclude the smooth transformation from dynamics to mechanics or thermodynamics; there are aleatory lines departing from the rectilinear, directions outside anticipated variations, not forestalled by a rule or law, and the dynamics of the oceando not translate into the substancesand forms of the land. On Kant's lagoon, the regularity of the body begins to breakdown; no more pure logical movement, continuous quality of medium. Instead of completing an indeterminate aestheticspace, ein vorgriff, and driving objective production to the benefit and purposes of the ultimate substance of existence, intensities explode into the noise of the waves. Undirected and turbulent, they return on the body, also incomplete, only to be further exacerbatedby an imagination unhinged, synthesizing without schemaor rule. Kant's desire for symmetry becomes ridiculous as the incompleteness of the imaginative circuit is mimicked or mirrored by a similarly incomplete organic circuit. The geometric completenessof sight is unhinged, vision becomeswaveform, and the body becomesa complex of channelsand disorderedreversals. Its anticipatory systemsfailing it, an organism becomes`more consciousof the organ's being affected than of the referenceto an external object'51; `In other words, the intensity of the sensation, in both cases, prevents us from arriving at a concept of the object and fixes our attention merely on the subjective representation, namely the alteration of the 52 organ'. In an organism `just as each part exists only as a result of all the rest, so we also think of each part as existing for the sake of the others and of the whole, i. e., as an instrument or organ.03 Its turbulence connecting with a zone of the body, fomenting 109

Chapter 3 sudden, violent or unanticipated alterations of a single organ, here the eye, intense sensationdisequilibrates the careful structure of the whole. Indeed, there is no whole, for the systematicinterconnection of the parts of the body according to a principle of wholenesshas broken down. Organs no longer exist for the sake of the others and of the whole, imagination no longer makes space for objects, and unity mutates into a chaos of traffic on a circuit, a congealed transformational zone, a direction and intensity of flows acrossan indeterminate non-organic body. The object is the constant of subjectivity, its fetish. With its point gone, what could a subjectbe? III Deduction I: Kant `[T]hat laborious deduction of the categorieswas neededfor theology 54 how ' fruitful it for them. and morals and was Dieter Henrich argues that the model for the deductions in Kant's critical writings comes not from logic but law. Whilst the steps in the proof may function " its deduction is defined by this. Deduktionsschriften syllogistically, status as a not (deduction writings), used in Germany since the late fourteenth century, were widespreadby the beginning of the eighteenth century, and for the most part sought to justify claims of the successionof reigns or of territorial inheritance. Henrich points out that Putter, coauthor of the text Kant used in teaching natural law and defender of the imperial ideal of the Reich, was `the most admired deduction writer of Kant's time' and that its widespreadpractice gave Kant reasonto think that the transferenceof `the term "deduction" from its juridical usage to a new, philosophical one' would be 56 understood. Henrich argues for a structural similarity too; Kant's deductions follow the requirement for brevity and solidity and the custom of appending a brief summary of the salient points of the case at the close of the argument - Henrich points to the 110

Chapter 3 Brief Outline of this Deduction which closes the B edition of the first Critique as an example. Deleuze saysof Kantian critique that it amounts `ä donner des etats civils A la penseeconsidereedu point de vue de sa loi naturelle (to giving civil rights to thought considered from the point of view of its natural law)'S' and Henrich also argues that Kant uses `Natural Right... as a paradigm'. 58Beneath the regional specificities of civil rights lies a generic concept of natural right, a reference to an `original acquisition' which cannot be legitimated becauseno objective account of its possessioncan be 59 provided. No physiology could warrant the supremesituation of man in relation to the law, even if Kant thought such a physiology possible. Nonetheless,this natural right, whilst not being instrumental in the deduction of civil rights both grounds and is supportedby them. The relation of natural right to civil law is analogous, in Kant, to that of the sublime to culture. Neither culture nor natural right ground either the sublime or civil rights. Nonethess, just as the sublime requires culture, civil law requires natural right. As has been seen,Law is meant to be exercisedempirically, but this requires the natural capacity to do so: in talking of women, Kant refers to their physical weaknessand to the superior strengths of men. Here is a direction in which the natural rights required by civil law might be found Natural right functions much as repulsive forces do in the discussion above, when brought into relation with attraction. The channelsand conduits of the law define the civil rights of a body, but these have no real power in the absenceof the natural right which underpins them, just as the striations of empty space have no real force independently of the tactile full space of the actual continuum. What counts as a legitimate and quantifiable action is in both casesdefined in terms of its difference from a mobile diversity of intensive distributions on the one hand, and from a centre of III

Chapter 3 resonanceon the other, and what is diverse in relation to action so defined is rendered uniformly exterior to the problem of law, as legally and substantially inert. The centre of resonancebecomesthe sourceof all form, of the power in its application and the end towards which true actions lead: possession. Extended corporeal space is established in the relation of repulsive and attractive forces, and compressedbetween true and apparent attraction. Whilst the court of reason constitutes its territory in the spacebetweenthe two parallel series of natural and original right, the ground of the court, the substratumof so-called natural right, is formulated reductively through the evacuation of bodies, passions and sensuousinterests: there is no feeling implicated in the proper exercise of law, for either subject or legislator, and just as feeling, or the physical contact of repulsion needed to be weeded out in the construction of royal science, so too must it be eliminated here. For nature to carry right a law extrinsic to it must govern its application. And it is through the critique of practical reason, for which as Kant says, the deduction was so necessary, that `the obligation to prevent the empirically conditioned reasonfrom presuming to be the only ground of determination of the will' is legitimated.60 Henrich points out that deduction means `to carry something forth to 61: it is thus implicated with a channel something else' or duct, the dimensions and directions of which are defined according to principles of law which in turn define the legitimacy of empirical objectsbrought before the law, and the conditions of possibility under which actions are recognized in the court of reason.The deduction is thus also a reduction, compressing actions into legal form and eliminating intensities not commensuratewith a juridical concept of action. The real possessionof an original acquisition cannot be justified independently of factual data, but the data must be 112

Chapter 3 formulated in a manner that 'suffice(s) to justify the claims attached to our knowledge.'62 And again, a principle of continuity is implicated, this time of possession. Parallel and complementaryto the reductive formulation of substanceas that in relation to which actions havejuridical weight, and count as justification towards a claim - the subject has a defacto case -are interests of reason.As affective constituents are defined out, an empty space opens into which interests of reason are defined, transferring the ground of law from nature to reason, shifting right from nature to law and defining what is outside the law, in the senseof not being a recognized action, negatively. The same series of moves which constitute a body as a mechanically movable inert substancein space,define the subject as similarly movable, no longer in relation to a theory defined in teens of force, but in terms of a practice defined in terms of power. IV Deduction H: Deleuze `ce qui est soustrait, ampute ou neutralise, ce sont les elements du Pouvoir, les e16mentsqui font ou represententun systemedu Pouvoir' (what is substracted,amputatedor neutralized are elementsof power, the elementswhich make or representa systemof power)' 63 Deleuzeunderstands deductioneliminatively.Real critique and real creation are not differentiated, and the destruction of the image of thought and the elements constitutive of its power are immanent to the real genesisof thought. There are always two things occurring simultaneously, and the negative is always an effect of the 113

Chapter3 positive, but there is no determination of signs in advance of the formation of the division: creation is not of necessitypositive, anymore than destruction is of necessity negative. It is important not to confuse Deleuze's method as prescriptive of a better future, or as claiming more truth than any other: uncovering the real conditions of the production of production is not an exercisein curing the world of its ills, but rather of describing the mechanismsimplicated in its construction, and it is in this sensethat Deleuze's is a rigorously critical project. This method of eliminative deduction complements that of selection, by stripping out the signs of power in a writer or system or order, so allowing for a description of the development of virtual elements disguised or covered over by constructions submitting to the requirements of law and systematicunity. 'Soustraire l'unique de la multiplicitd ä constituer, ecrire A n-1 (subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constitute; write at n -1 dimensions).'64 The method is positive, in that it is not simply a caseof removing arbitrary components,but of selecting elements which collapsethe necessitiesattaching to functions of power, unity, law, the State: the negative elimination is thus a function of a positive operation. He calls the method minoritarian and it differs from majoritarian thought, which operateson a principle of recognition and law, in the following ways: majoritarian law makes doctrine from thought, facts from eventsand normalizes by admiration; a minor literature disengages life from culture, becoming from history, thought from doctrine, and bodies from society. Minorities are defined not in terms of their denumerable quantity - which would, for example, exclude women from minoritarian status - but `par l'ecart qui les separent de tel ou tel axiome constituant une majoritd redondante (by the gap that separatesthem from this or that axiom constituting a redundant majority)'65 As minoritarian in method, Deleuze's deduction focuses on exposing the differential intensive elements and problematic sensations which 114 attraction cancels by

Chapter 3 condensationinto a point, an axiomatic quantum immanent to real distributions, and tracking the tactile connections of the actual continuum, generating simultaneously a radical new description of space. In Mille Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari describe the coexistence of mechanisms in primitive and nomadic societies, which anticipate the State in two senses,both warding off or repulsing centres of resonance,and incorporating vectors moving in their direction. Before appearing,the State `agit dejä sous forme de l'onde s'annule precisement au point convergente ou centrip&e... qui de convergence Vinversion des signs ou 1apparition qui marquerait d'Etat. (already acts in the form of a convergent or centripetal wave...that cancels itself out precisely at the point of convergencemarking the inversion of signs or the appearanceof the State)' "6 The model fits neatly with Kant's description of attraction as a wave-like convergencefrom all points on the surface of a spheretowards a point. The point made in Mille Plateauxis that this movement is anticipatory of the State, rather than effected by it, responding to it as something which does not yet exist, but which nonetheless `agit dejä sous une autre forme que Celle de son existence (is already in action, in a different form than that of its existence)'67 The point of attraction is thus doubled, functioning both virtually, as a real potential to be anticipated and warded off, and actually, as concrete,effectuated.The inverse movement of a diffusive, divergent wave testifies to this actual operation, to the concretestriation of spaceand division of forces in terms of an order folded back over the surface of the flows, imposed from one point on all distances. 115

Chapter 3 Rather than searching for the origins of the resonant central point, the State, or giving a chronological account of its emergence from pre-State societies, Mille Plateaux divides the existence of both - state and nomadic societies - into virtual and actual potentials, arguing that both have always existed, and that virtual potentials coexist alongside concretemachines,but cannot be describedin their terms. The move is familiarly Kantian: the transcendentalcannot be describedfrom the empirical, but is its condition. Where it departs from Kant is in its refusal to generalize over the virtual, and reduce it to a possibility recognizable in its concrete instantiations, and in the positive feedback from the concrete which functions as a selective mechanism, potentiating the actualization of virtual elements. There is no Law, no lex continut in natura, no Master, no Slave and no Rebel, and the economy is not visual, but tactile, affective, a matter of sensation and intensity rather than sight and extension. Every assemblageis individuated simultaneously as both singular and collective, virtual and concrete, and only by empirical exploration of the branchings, proximities, contacts and connectionsinto which an assemblageenters is its mode of functioning disclosed. Thus, for example, when addressing the situation of women in relation to capital, no general statement is possible which comprehends the complexities and degrees of attachment to this system,and attributes a position of women as a whole. Instead, the actual situation of individual women has to be explored, and the micro-physics of power organizing and blocking lines of becoming followed at the local level, rather than from a global perspective. Kant defines points of contact, tactile proximities in full space in terms of relative degreesof compression, and Deleuze and Guattari focus in on this problem. Rather than uniformizing their distributions, a move which proposes both an initial and eventual equilibrium, initially that of unity, or the present, and eventually that of 116

Chapter3 homogeneousentropy, or the future, each is taken as singular. So a different conceptof chaos emerges,one which is not unformed and uniformly homogeneous,but which is patterned, populated by haecceities,or `des modes d'individuation qui ne procedent ni par la forme ni par le sujet (modesof individuation proceeding neither by form nor by the subject', and which is immanent to the content and expressionof bodies and their languages`8 Each plateau describesa singularity, a concrete date which effectuatesa set of virtual elementsin a configuration without precedentor model, a region of chaos sufficiently massive for exploration by human methods. Unformed matter is no longer the future generality of good sense, heat death or the kingdom of ends, but `une matiere-mouvement qui comporte des singularites (a matter-movement bearing singularities)', the stuff of bodies, or content; and a nonformal functions diagramming a plane of consistency or abstract machine, is 'une expressivitt-mouvement qui comporte toujours une langue etrangere (an expressivity-movementalways bearing a foreign tongue)', the stuff of language,or expression.69 An abstractmachine is defined in terms of concreteflows on its surface,flows of air, breath, heat, food, sperm, shit, sex, words, sunbeams, money, stones, etc.: `continuums of intensity, blocs of becoming, emissions of particles, combinations of fluxes'. "' The theory of assemblagesor multiplicities arises from theseflows, from nonformal functions, tendencies to the limit, unformed matters and the atypical expressionsof minoritarian sciencesand literatures, philosophies and arts, which no longer refer to disciplines or faculties, but to the relative mix of elementscomposing a machine. The State is an abstract machine, and there has always been a State, Deleuze and Guattari argue, and nomadic societies,far from being precursors of the State, are always in some relation to them. Instead of separating the waves of attraction and repulsion, convergence and divergence into two separate tendencies Mille Plateaux seeksto theorize them as simultaneously concretizing different virtual tendencies, or 117

Chapter 3 abstractmachines, so that any assemblageor multiplicity is both attachedto the strata, which are State apparatusof capture, and so interior to its territory and as transversed by a vector of escape,which eludes and evades that order. Applied to Kant, this exposesa third kind of line, which is neither that of convergenceor divergence, nor that which biunivocalizes relations between two bodies, which Deleuze and Guattari call a line of flight. The surface on which forces are distributed is no longer made uniform by rectilinear lines striating space, and organized by a superstratum elevated vertically above it and functioning as a central resonator for all points on the sphere, but is instead a differential field of thresholds and gradients of intensities. This intensive space, or spatium connects with discussions in chapter one - with the given as intensive, the sufficient reason of sense which forces thought: with Deleuze's definition of the transcendentform of a faculty as grasping that in the world which concerns it exclusively, differentiating the transcendental: with Kant's definition of transcendentalmatter as that which correspondsto sensation:with the thing-in-itself; or in-itself of difference. Deducting the assumption of unity which covers over the real problematic involved in these elements, and attaches them to a subject-based epistemology and an ontology of being, Deleuze opens up the problem of diagrammatization of this differential field, populated by spatio-temporal dynamisms, torsions, drifts and larval subjects.Rather than, as with Kant, attempting to construct a concept of quantity which could contain magnitudes of intensity, and allow for their mechanical distribution through the medium of a subject,Deleuze concentratesinstead on the nature of lines, flows, connections and distributions immanent to materialforces. 118

Chapter 3 V Demon I In Difference et Repetition, difference of intensity, infinitely doubled differences potentiating infinities is called disparity, dispars, the dark precursor or demon: this function was met with in an earlier chapter, where the importance of difference as internal was noted, together with its röle as differenciator. The model of science as Dispars, as demonic rather than divine in nature, is thus never concretely completed: it does not present, like Compars, a finished world, but a cosmosin continual involution, perpetually variable, dividing into itself and with each division changing in nature. The demon is implicated with the causality specific to nomadic science,a reversecausality that testifies `d'une action du futur sur le present, ou du present sur le passe (to an action of the future on the present, or of the present on the past)'". Again, however, this is not a generalizablefunction, but is specific to each system; its connection with the concrete actualization of any distribution is always an effect, rather than a condition of its operation. The demon, or dark precursor `determine ä l'avance le chemin renverse, (determines their path in advancebut in reverse)', functioning as a 72 is in discernible the nature of which virtual attractor, only retrospect. It is not something always already there, however, but generated in the process of its concretization, like the convergentwave or the anticipated potential. It is important not to confuse reverse causality with teleology, however: as mentioned before, machinic production expressesthe conjunction of mechanism and teleology through difference, taking synthesis across the threshold of antinomic division, changing the assemblage and re-wiring the transcendental network, unhinging the faculties and differentiating the process of production from its source conditions. Reverse cauality is without finality: the future is not somehow there in advance,pre-determinedand fated, rather it is virtual to the formations of the actual. 119

Chapter 3 The demon is not a point or principle in advanceof individuation, or a form governing beforehand the material constitution of a machine, body or system: it is instead a radically local function, an element in a scienceof intensities which invents orders of communication amongst differences for which no prior order exists, using of necessity the elements of a majoritarian form but speaking of necessity a foreign language. Whereas Kant reconciles differences in intensive magnitude by referring them to an extensivespacewhich equalizesthem out into a uniform field, Deleuze uses such differences as communicating principles amongst disparate series, which are themselves composed of intensive differences, and it is the complications of the relations generatedin this manner which demand the invention of new concepts, new terms, new functions and new distributions and the creation of a foreign philosophical language. The re-formulation of the thing-in-itself in terms of a plane of consistency,an intensive magnitude immanent to and simultaneouswith the given does not cancel its statusin Kant as an objective problematic; it continues to demand a solution. However, it transforms what counts as such. Jacobi said: `I need the assumption of things-in-themselves to enter the Kantian system; but with this assumption it is not possible for me to remain 73 inside lt' Jacobi was responding to the thing-in-itself in the context of representation, as something which, in some undefined manner, is the cause of the content of representations,but is itself unrepresentable.Deleuze's method of deduction, and critique of representation changes the nature of the problem, however, because it 120

Chapter 3 in Deleuze: is Firstly, field its as there the access problem of no changes solution. of has been said, any machine is already integrated on the strata, as well as facing away from it, on a plane of consistency, and thus potentiated by both actual elements it. No State, the and repel anticipate and elements virtual which comprising assumption of a content aboveand beyond that distributed on the strata, or composing lines of flight is necessary.Deleuze reminds continually that critique is immanent: a be do State itself its to to the would and so situate outside object, critique of cannot repeat identically old errors. Besides,Deleuze's understanding of systemis in terms of openness;there is no outside to open systems. `Elles ne repondent pas ä la condition visuelle de pouvoir titre observeesdun point de 1'espaceexterieur ä elles (they do not meet the visual condition of being observable from a point in space external to them)' 74 Secondly, Deleuze can be said to read Jacobi's claim that the assumption of the thing-in-itself ejects one from the Kantian system as positive. From within Kant, Deleuze subjects representationto a rigorous critique and deducts the componentsof power, generality, recognition and unity of image which restrict its operation, undoing common senseand good sense.The thing-in-itself can no longer be defined, following that critique, in relation to representation,as the unrepresentable,however, but must be re-formulated in terms of the production of production. It is in the processof deducting the power structuresfrom Kant that the movement of feedbackis released,and it is this which allows for the re-formulation of the thing-in-itself in terms of difference and intensities. Instead of being a general problem, it becomesone of singular distributions of intensity on a smooth surface, of vortices and turbulences which have no definition outside their concreteswirlings and speeds,displacementsand divergences.An infinity of demons, of molecular leaps, qualities, emerge from intensive magnitudes, and in differentiating themselvesfrom that magnitude, also carry it with them, immanently. 121

Chapter 3 This is why Deleuze is a philosopher of both surface and depth, and why the thing-initself retains its paradoxical nature, but instead of paradox being cancelled out in extension and representation, it becomes a prolific machine, an engine of the real from the feedback to The the concrete positive without condition or presupposition. is being "a the thing-in-itself'; perhaps a there singularity of problem virtual precludes more appropriate term for it, in the context of Deleuze. ### The relation between Kant and Deleuze has become both closer and more distant in this chapter. Deleuze's deduction of the power components in Kantian critique and his deployment of a method remote from the juridical model force a gulf between the two. His concentration on the explosive moment within the subject (amongst the topics addressedin the next chapter) and his distribution of the network of faculties as an interconnectedsurfacerather than an organic or hierarchized edifice imply a distinctly unKantian approach. However, his subtractive deduction uncovers directions and problems in critique which are missed when the structures erected by Kant are taken to be constitutive of the transcendental, and when the movement of critique is confined within the science and economics of the Enlightenment. It is Deleuze's attention to forces and flows, limits and thresholds, and synthesis (again, a topic for the next chapter) which re-connecthim with Kant, and with the real problems of critique. Deleuze's relation with Kant is, however, more complex than the above suggests,including many elements for which this thesis does not have space. In his paper Sur quatre formule poetiques qui pourraient resumer la philosophie kantienne, Deleuze weaves Hamlet, Rimbaud and Kafka into the heart of Kantian problems. 122

Chapter 3 Hamlet and Kant together achieve `1'emancipation du temps (the emancipation of time)'; Rimbaud and Kant, in their different ways, proclaim `Je est un autre (I is another)'; Kafka and Kant alike describe the practice of law on the body. Kafka illustrates the immediacy of Kantian law with the body, through this story, its vaulted magnificence subsidesinto the bureaucratic pettiness of the officer delighting in the but known, flesh. is law directly It the not onto perfections of a machine which writes met with in its execution, its application through pain and violence. In each case,when the strangenessof these alliances is pursued a problem of forces and of systematics is uncovered. Kantian philosophizing is remote from the spacesof force, however, a task rather than a movement, and whilst Deleuze describes him as the analogue of a great explorer, his exploration is limited to the surface, and doesnot travel the intricacies of its depth. He is concernedrather to prevent tunnellings and connectionswhich do not follow the strict lines of extension or the strict rules of law. `The worker in the field of philosophy, especially pure philosophy (logic and metaphysics), must hold his object hanging in midair before him and must always describeand examine it, not merely part by part, but within the totality of a systemas well. 75 This Deleuze's the this with chapter, and opening of directly contrasts comment about the need to occupy space without measuring it: Kant's method is to take each part and refer it, through a variety of means - analogy, resemblance, comparison, proportionality, directionality, numerical identity, and so on - to the ends of reason, to the totality of the system. All the seasicknessin the world could not, it 123

Chapter 3 seems,persuadehim that attraction at a distanceacrossempty spaceis inadequateas a theory of force. The next chapter looks at Kant's theory of synthesis,as an act of the subject, and Deleuze's deduction of unity from synthesis,leading to its formulation as passive, together with the changeseffectedwithin imagination as a result of thesechanges. 124

Chapter 4 PassiveSynthesis `Profondementschizoide est la theorie kantienne d'apres laquelle les degres ä des la intensives remplissent sans vide mauere quantites divers. (The Kantian theory according to which intensive quantities fill up, to varying degrees,matter that has no empty spaces, is profoundly ' schizoid)'. In L'antiýedine themes from Deleuze's earlier works are not lost, but by virtue of its language and his alliance with Guattari, they are transformed; the academictones of Difference et Repetition give way to a compilation vocabulary, built from fragments stolen from a variety of sources,Artaud, Marx, Freud, Lacan and Kant being amongst them.2 (Theft is another of Deleuze's methods.) However, the apparatus of the book is familiar, and situatesit in the context of Kantian critique: three syntheses as the productive machinery, a distinction betweentheir legitimate immanent use and illegitimate transcendent use, a transcendental principle, paralogisms. To select familiar elements is to run counter to the sentiments the book expresses(Destroy! Destroy! being one); however, to understand why Kant's theory of intensities is called schizoid by Deleuze and Guattari, it is necessaryto look at the way in which synthesis works, and at the transformation of the transcendental.This will connect it with Kant, and the previous two chapters. Women are also introduced in this chapter, but only by identifying in passing those terms with which philosophy has associated them, precursoryto the longer discussionsin the two following chapters. 125

Chapter 4 In his preface to the English edition of L'anti-oediue, Foucault cautions against looking for a philosophy in the book, for `a flashy Hegel'3; no more should a flashy Kant be looked for. Although the book expressesan explicit alliance with Kantian critique, and with the transcendentalmethod, the networks it deploys are not those of common sense, and the criticism is not confined by reason. The central Kantian themes are immanence of criteria and synthesis.Immanence not to synthesis, or machinic processes,but of machinic processes.That is, there is no containment of syntheseswithin something which is not synthesis, and nor is there a goal. The language of the book is not flashy either, but integral to the problems with which it deals. In Kant, imagination synthesizes; however, the psychological overtones of imagination cannot be killed, no matter how careful the attempt. Whilst exploring the Kantian imagination and unhinging it from its proper speculative, aesthetic and practical uses exposesa way of connecting Kant and Deleuze, the peculiarities and nature of this linkage are missed if terminology particular to human machinesis used. Deleuze and Guattari have been criticized for exploiting the term schizophrenia.Elizabeth Grosz writes of objectionsto their investment `in a romantic elevation of models of psychosis, schizophrenia, and madness,that on the one hand, ignore the very real pain and torment of individuals, and,on the other hand, raise pathology to an unlivable, unviable ideal for others.'4 It is indeed not difficult to see the schizo as an image or model, if one is searching for such things. However, the vector of Deleuze's writing militates against this; his critique of the image of thought was referred to in chapter two, and on a more general level, the nature of his writing changes from book to book, using new 126

Chapter 4 If holes. different draw in one and open new elements vocabularieswhich continuously is inclined to personal sympathy rather than to making things work - which is not the same as interpreting what Deleuze means by schizophrenia - then no doubt there are criticisms to be made. But schizophrenia,as it is employed in L'anti-oedipus, refers to a machinic, rather than a human operation, of inclusive disjunction. Rather than the includes intensity both differentiates disjunction, the and schizoid either/or of exclusive difference, in a continuous variation of variables which shucks off orders imposed from the outside; it refers to the releaseof intensities, the emission of spores. In Difference et Repetition, Deleuzewrites: `11 ne s'agit pas d'opposer ä l'image dogmatique de la pens6c une autre image, empruntöepar exempleä la schizophrene. Mais plutöt de rappeler que la schizophrönienest pas seulementun fait humain, qu'elle est une possibilitä de la pensee,qui ne se revöle ä ce titre que Bans1'abolition de I'image. (It is not a question of opposing to the dogmatic image of thought another image borrowed, for example, from schizophrenia,but rather of remembering that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a possibility for thought - one, moreover, which can only be revealed 5 image)' through the as such abolition of that `[N]ot only a human fact' is crucial. L'anti-oedipe is neither an anti-humanist nor post-humanist text, as some enthusiastswould claim; it is simply not interested in this argument, in the sameway that Deleuze is uninterested in tiresome discussions over whether philosophy is dead, whether we live in a post-philosophical age. Machinic synthesis is impersonal, and indifferent to human divisions: it does not differentiate man and nature, nature and industry, industry and history, but is immanent to the cycles it synthesizes,generating difference but not presupposingany 127

Chapter 4 pre-given and conditioning articulations of its nature, adding difference at each level of in Guattari it in Deleuze than are engaged extension. and production, rather cancelling formulating an abstract account of production that does not isolate production from desire, nor privatize desire within the family in order to leave a social field free for labour. To say that schizophrenia is not only a human fact is simply to issue a reminder that the term is not used with reference to the social construction of the schizophrenic,but as a potential of thought. Much as Kant saysthat the transcendental is illegitimate if conceivedof in the image of the empirical. Humanity is a term for a' particular mode of production, involving the rationalization of processeson the grounds of universal necessity,global superiority, exclusive binaries (reason/nature, man/woman, sanetinsane, good/evil etc. etc.); insofar as `eile fait du luxe meme un moyen d'investissement (it makes luxury itself into a means of investment)'6 and operates with an arsenal of rules within a complementaryframework of cynicism and stupidity, impotence and power. However, L'anti-oedipe is a critical book and as such not sentimental about the values that this mode of production protects and requires. Its problem is to find out how they work, how to undo them, and let a bit of fresh air into thinking. The schizo is not an image or model, but an illustration, a working attempt to exposethe uncritical assumptionsin philosophical dogmas. Deleuzeis critical of images of thought which are basedon `I'extrapolation de certains faits, et de faits particulierement insignifiants, la banalite quotidienne en personne, la Recognition, comme si la pent e ne devait pas chercher ses modeles dans des aventuresplus etrangesou plus compromettantes. 128

Chapter 4 (extrapolation from certain facts, particularly insignificant facts such as Recognition, everydaybanality in person; as though thought should not seek its models among stranger and more compromising adventures)'.' The schizo is not a metaphor, but a principle, but rather than being basedon God; the it is facts, their as the empty of meaning as of criticism, principle everyday just God, does than as madness exists no more than reason. exists no more schizo Everything can be banalized, and at this we are particularly adept. Both are made, different different different to along modes of production, conditions, according under lines of thought. There is not a choice betweena world modelled on the schizo and one in L'anti-oedine deployed God; the are past the and relations on processes modelled opposition between the multiple and the one. There are only markets, connections, breaks and flows, blockages or escapes,consumptions,distributions. To the question: do you believe in God? Deleuze and Guattari write: `bien sür, mais seulementcomme au maitre du syllogisme disjonctif (of course,but only as the master of the disjunctive syllogism)' .8 God, like the schizo, is a machinic operation, a production; becausethere is no unconscious material, no theatre staging myth and fantasy, only the cycle of production, there is no schizo in the unconscious,just as there is no God. Both are produced as effects of machinic synthesis, which either over-code it, and direct it towards defined ends - exclusive disjunction, in the case of God; or differentiate it, intensifying synthesis and proliferating displace and identities, in inclusive disjunctions which add difference and so shoot relations outside the terms related. In this chapter synthesis, as the basic apparatus of L'anti-oedine will be looked at, and drawn out of its connectionswith Kant and the activity of a subject. 129

Chapter 4 Kant takes this conclusion into a discussionof the noumenon.The noumenon, as argued in Chapter One, is an object produced by understanding when it claims determinate knowledge of something in general, in its search for knowledge independent of sense. The claim to determinate knowledge of a substantial transcendental subject is just such a move on the part of understanding; the transcendental,rather than immanent employment of the conceptscompels speculative reason to assumethe noumenon, limiting sensibility and initiating the transfer from epistemological to moral law. Yet following on from his clarification of the error which leads to the psychological paralogism, Kant remarks on the legitimacy, in the practical field, of assuming the substantiality and freedom of the subject, as logical functions of ground and consequence.In a different legislative domain, a non-sensible but intelligible rational principality, theoretical illegitimacies find a practical utility. Yet this move is not necessitatedby Kant's conclusion as expressedin the comment quoted above, for as has been argued, the noumenon and the thing-in-itself are not synonymous, nor do they fulfil the same function. The conflation of the noumenon and the thing-in-itself relates to the collapse of the important difference between productive imagination and synthesis as thought without identity on the one hand, and understanding and the unity of synthesiseffected through the formal logic of the concepts on the other. It is this latter formulation of synthesis which leads towards the noumenon. The former is implicated with intensity and thus with the material qualities of the real rather than its formal values. This allows a different direction to be drawn from the quote aboveregarding the heterogeneityor otherwise of the thing-in-itself as a substratum to the materiality of appearances.For it cannot be confusedwith either substanceor causality and thus taken towards the epistemological limit of the noumenon,the realm of practical reasonand a moral subject.Rather one is 133

Chapter 4 I Synthesis `It is to synthesis...that we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge.i9 In chapter two, Deleuze's eliminative deduction was discussed,as a positive selectivemethod which collapsesthe power operatorsin a writer, exposing problematic undercurrents, and bringing to the surface of his writing patterns which, under the covers of law, appearas an undifferentiated or chaotic depth. (It is worth remembering this before attempting to read the schizo as such an operator.) Part of the difficulty of reading L'anti-oedine within a strictly philosophical register is that its language and relations are assembled from philosophy, science, economics, literature, psychoanalysis, politics and art, so reading it solely terms of its connections with Kant is undoubtedly a limited exercise. However, Deleuze's work feeds back onto Kant, and exposesnot a firm ground and a certain unity, but a dynamic, mobile and immanently differentiated space. This doesnot mean a spacethat is unable to function as a basis for a theory of mechanism. However, Kant's claims for mechanism have to be re-sited: it no longer presents a universally comprehensive theory encompassing the totality of objective movementsin space,but becomesa limited description of a motions acrossempty space according to ideal principles, following predictable and pre-determined channels. In mechanism, the process of individuation, or differenciation, is constrained and governed from an external position. That Kant is aware of this is clear from his discussion of teleology in the third Critique, where he distinguishes the formation of natural bodies from mechanical bodies on precisely the difference between something set into operation from the outside, and something which is formed through the 130

Chapter 4 10 it. Deleuze and Guattari formulate a third theory of immanently forces to relations of production, or synthesis,which is neither purposive, as is the Kantian understanding of a natural body, nor mechanistic,but machinic. There are severalways in which the relation of passive synthesisto Kant can be addressed.For example, there are three synthesesin both L'anti-oedine and the first Critique. the former mapping loosely onto the three categoriesof relation: the synthesis of connection/selectionwith cause and effect, the synthesis of disjunction/recording with substance and accident, the synthesis of conjunction/consumption with community/reciprocity. These relations can also be connectedwith the problem of the modes of time specific to each relation - succession,permanence and co-existence respectively,as discussedby Kant in the Analogies of Experience. Another possibility is looking at the qualities of force which correlate with each synthesis, libido with connection, numen with disjunction and voluptas with conjunction. However, because the underlying question in this thesis is where women are situated in the theoretical structures of philosophy, or more precisely in Kant and Deleuze, the axis privileged is that of passivity, women having been situated in relation to this by philosophy, and the problem of how passivesynthesisrelatesto Kantian synthesis. Kant defines synthesisas an act of combining difference under unity, in which elementsof knowledge are gathered,whether of pure or empirical origin, and united to form the content of a representation.' l Although he refers to it as a connection `thought 12, identity' amplifying rather than analyzing or explicating the content of without concepts, he also say that `all combination or separation that constitutes thought relates' to a simple "r". It is, in other words, a limited amplification. Thinking turns a circle through these two statements on synthesis, from synthesis as relation of difference not constrained by the logical formalism 131 of a concept to a relation of

Chapter 4 difference anchoredto identity; this latter understanding of synthesisthen servesas the model of the possibility of synthesisin general. Synthesisis drawn into the subject,and differences in the flow of imagination and variations in qualitative intensities - in degreeof intensity - are equalizedthrough the conceptof magnitude. The formulation of synthesis as a process anchored to identity, rather than thought without referenceto it, is bound up with Kant's argument against confusing the apparent heterogeneityof objects of inner and outer sensewith a real difference, a confusion which leads to the attribution of a separateand substantial existenceto the purely formal unity of thought. From the thought of a subject abstracted from the empirical experienceof an existing body an illegitimate epistemological claim is made to the effect that `I have knowledge that what is substantial in me is the transcendental subject.914This implies the attribution of conceptualcharacteristics- such as substance or causality - to a subject assumedto exist independently of the body - in other words, to the transcendentalemployment of understanding. One can see the same tendencies at work here as were argued against in Chapter Two, with reference to the thing-initself. Kant traces the source of this error to the mistaken assumption that the difference between inner and outer objects is something other than the result of the sensible limitation of human knowledge, an error which generatesthe thought of a subject with no object as a real, rather than merely logical form. His responseis to point out that the heterogeneity of body and thinking is a function of the forms of intuition - spaceand time - rather than of any real underlying difference, and that `what, as thing-in-itself [Ding an sich], underlies the appearanceof matter, perhapsafter all may not be so heterogeneousin character.'" 132

Chapter 4 lead - as Schopenhauersaw - towards a problem of forces which has no conceptual formulation, which cannot be thought through the subject, but which is immanent to the production of the world as representation. Whilst one cannot argue with Kant's point concerning the error of assuming that thinking and the body are composed of different "stuff', his solution remains formal, in the sensethat it ignores the materiality of the body in favour of the identity of the subject; it is only in this way that the final solution to the problem can be discovered in the form of practical law. When SchopenhaueraccusesKant's view of the intellect for being one-sidedand ignoring the physiological functions of the brain in favour of its formal intellectual functions16 he is moving towards an objective consideration of the intellect, not as an object of representation - which is to say, in terms of the epistemological structuresfollowing from the princip1um individuationis but as thing-in-itself, or will: `In itself-and outside the representation,the brain, too, like everything else, is wi11.'11 In Kant's terms this would mean that rather than synthesisbeing subordinatedto identity and thus attached to the subject, it is thought without identity; his point still holds concerning the error of assuming body and thinking to be other than externally differentiated, in accordancewith the forms of intuition, but the direction in which this points leads is no longer towards the moral philosophy, but towards a deeper exploration of the material substrate underlying appearance. Kant distinguishes two types of synthesis,figurative synthesesof imagination and intellectual synthesesof understanding. The former are `the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul", whilst intellectual synthesis is a spontaneousact of the faculty of representation, an act of 19 be `the "synthesis" title understanding to which general may assigned'. The former is 134

Chapter 4 synthesisproper, and combinesintensive qualities, whilst the latter is a function of the unity of the `I think' and combines axiomatized quanta of intuition. The former is implicated with the production of an actual continuum, with the dynamic commercium of machinic synthesis, whilst the latter is associatedwith an ideal continuity, with the conceptual community of human labour. As seen above, the difference is between synthesisthought without identity, and synthesisbrought in relation with identity, and a different direction may be followed from each, one leading towards the problematic thing-in-itself and the other towards the noumenon. In the first Critique, imagination is annexedto understanding; it schematizesin accordancewith the categoriesand the continuous flowing quantities of productive imagination - degrees of intensity - are given discrete and extensive formulation through the axioms of intuition. In the production of objectsof knowledge, the two synthesesoperatein conjunction. However, imagination is a separatefaculty, not merely an adjunct to understanding, as is clear from the third Critique in the discussionof the mathematical sublime.20 A synthesis of imagination produces continously flowing degrees of intensity21,but sightlessly, without prior referenceto recognition or concepts:that is to say, the production of degreesof intensity is not governed a priori by the formal logics of the concepts.Intensity attaches to that element in experiencewhich `can never be known a priori, and which therefore constitutes the distinctive difference between empirical and a priori knowledge'u and there is no concept of degreesof intensity as such for Kant, since sensationis not a concept.In respectof the sightlessproduction of continuous degrees of intensity, imagination is connected with intuition rather than understanding; `intuitions without conceptsare blind'23. A degree of intensity is not a quantity in intuition, but the quantity of the quality of sensation,a degree of influence 24 the on senses. It thus has no connection with conceptsas such; the spatial extension of the object to which such a degree of influence is attributed can remain constant, 135

Chapter 4 whilst the degree of quality of influence on the senses- the sensationitself - can vary without this difference registering conceptually. Deleuze's thought of synthesisresults from this unhinging of imagination from unity and understanding, and of intuition from its modes, and theorizes productive synthesis as a positive intensive difference from the empty form of time. *** In L'anti-oedine, synthesisis passive: U desir est cet ensemblede synthesespassives qui machinent les objet partiels, les flux et les corps, et qui fonetionnent comme des unit6s de production. (Desire is the set of passive synthesesthat engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies,and that function as units of production)'. I The problem of synthesis is taken back to the question of a relation thought without identity, deducted from the act of understanding which relates it to identity. The starting point from which to explore Deleuze's formulation of synthesis is the subject. In the second of the four poetic formulae summarizing Kant, introduced by Rimbaud's phrase `Je est un autre', Deleuze begins by asking under what form indeterminate existence-je suis, I am determinable by je I the think. And the pense, -is answer Kant gives to this problem arising out of Cartesian subject, is that it is determinable in the form of time; "therefore" is not sufficient as a theory of relations between the I and its other. Existence is determinable only in the pure form of time, `comme1'existenced'un moi passif, receptif et changeant.(as the existenceof a passive, 136

Chapter 4 26, )' receptive and changing ego. and it is the production of this mobile and passive I am, rather than the activity of the fixed but spontaneousI think which is, for Deleuze, where the real problem of the subjectin Kant lies. The aesthetic is Kant's most important contribution to philosophy and the insinuation of time into the heart of the subject the explosive moment referred to in chapter one, so Deleuzeaddressesthis as the critical relation in regard to the subjectin Kant, rather than the logical vehicle that accompanies representations. The epistemological problem becomessubordinateto one of affects and intensities, bodies and desires, and ontology gives way to blocs of becoming, or cycles of synthetic production. The I am is an affect, but passively, rather than actively synthesized,and is characterized intensively: Kant himself says that `consciousnessitself always has a degree, which diminution'27, so putting the problem on an intensive allows of ... register. Deleuzefocuseson the relation of the degreeof intensity to pure empty time, rather than to inner sense,the formal appropriation of time into the subject.That is, he does not theorize it in relation to modes of time which are analogous to conceptual relations. Set into variation through the deduction of the I think, the recognized principle of thought, the I am becomesa problem of becoming, in formation but never a form, becausethere is a continuous modulation of intensities through time and a continuous transformation in the quantitative degree which composesconsciousness. This move is immediately of interest in relation to the question of women's location in philosophy, since the passivelactiveand receptivelspontaneousaxeshave been amongst those used to articulate their difference from men, women being attributed with the first arm of each of the two disjunctions. Women are also associatedwith imagination in Kant. Deleuze's shift of synthesis from an active mode of production to a passive 137

Chapter 4 imagination from to as unity as agent of understanding producing process, and synthetizing continuous flows is implicated with the philosophical positioning of 28 is follows in But fuller discussion this two this the remark chapters; next of a women. merely to begin weaving women into the discussion-to createan undertow, as it were. The relation of passivesynthesisto the distinction in Kant betweenproductive or figurative synthesisand the intellectual synthesiswhich subordinatesthe former to unity is not one of opposition, and nor doespassivesynthesiscorrelate directly with the synthesis of imagination. Firstly, passive synthesis describesa transverse line across the oppositional axis, so is not directly associable with Kant's activelpassive distinction. As has been said before, Deleuze's subtractive method does not remove through exclusion, but is instead a positive privation which removes the belts and blockagesof limitation and negation. In Kant's table of the conceptsof nothing, the negation of reality results in 'a concept of the absenceof an object, such as shadow, cold (nihil privativum)''ý a trace of what was real remaining as a negative imprint. Deleuze's use of privation is positive, and rather than leaving a shadow of what has been removed, brings to the surface what was covered over by the concept. 'Soustraire et mettre en variation, retrancher et mettre en variation, c'est une seule et meme operation (subtract and place in variation, remove and place in variation: a single operation).'30 Subtraction effects the release of variations which do not fall onto either side of the disjunction, but include both as potentials, not in the form of binaries, but as elementsof a multiplicity which cannot be scored down the middle, or reduced to the sum of its parts. Rather than the removal of a quality of reality - an intensive magnitude - leaving the shadow of itself:, it opensup the quality of distributions which the asiomatization of quantities suppressed.The deduction of activity from synthesis does not therefore leave the 138

Chapter 4 for but the rein Kantian a space opens register, a problem of passive synthesis formulation of passivity stripped of psychological overtonesand cultural constructions of women as the "passive(= weaker) sex." It is not that there is a movementbetweenactive and passivewhich cannot be exposed,an undecidable median which is neither simply one or the other, and which distributes this difference but is not determined by it. What effects a division in a break. divided distance between does a clean make states nor not straddlea multiplicity In Dialote, Deleuzewrites: `On ne sort effectivement des dualismes qu'en les deplacant ä la maniere dune charge, et lorsqu'on trouve entre les termes, qu'ils soient deux ou davantage,un defile etroit comme une bordure ou une frontiere qui va faire de 1'ensemble wie multiplicite, independamment du nombre des parties. Cc que nous appelons agencement,c'est precisementune multiplicite. (You can only escapedualisms effectively by shifting them like a load, and when you find betweenthe two terms, whether they are two or more, a narrow gorge like a border or a frontier which will turn the set into a multiplicity, independently of the number of parts. What we call an assemblage is, 31 precisely, a multiplicity)' The border or gorge does not institute a relation between intensity and extensity, or active and passivesyntheses;to formulate it thus turns the transversal line into a diagonal which can be plotted on a plane graph. Intensity becomessubordinated to the qualities filling extensity - force becomesrelative to distance, for example, or pressure to volume. The multiplicity, or in-between, or frontier, however, neither distributes dualisms, nor reducesto them, becauseit is effected by asymmetrical and 139

Chapter 4 differential conjunctions which, by including both arms of a disjunction construct an assemblagewhich is not commensurate with the conditions of its production, but 32 A very simple illustration might be direction. them, escapes giving relations another that of transsexuals:whilst the desireprofessedby a man might be to becomea woman, or by a woman to become a man, becoming-transsexualdoes not result in a simple switch - this is an extensiveappearance,effectedby surgery - but the inclusion of both terms, and the creation of a new sex contained by neither.33What appearsare n-sexes, not two sexes; n-qualities, distributed not as the result of the qualification or axiomatization of quanta necessitatedby the attachment of production to identity, but through the connections and relations into which a body enters, and of which it is assembled This is the logic of empiricism, and of rhizomatics, the principle of which has been quoted in relation to deduction in chapter two: subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted. Deduction works at the level of principles; it is not merely a matter of taking a bit off as if one were removing part of an argument which did not contribute to the proof. Every qualification of force resulting from unity and the monopolization of power by substanceremoved shifts the nature of the problem: each movement changes space, each change in space effects the direction and speed of movement. Evacuation of the principles which structure transcendental matter, or intensities, according to unity, and of the principles which regulate the stability, purity and upkeep of unity, shifts Deleuze's logic away from one of being, and the `subordinationdes conjonctions au verbe titre (subordination of conjunctions to the verb '34tobe). His operator is the AND, 140

Chapter 4 `qui fait filer Ies relations hors de leurs termes et hors de l'ensemble de leurs termes, et hors de tout cc qui pourrait eire determind comme Etre, Un ou Tout. (which makes relations shoot outside their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside everything which could be determined as Being, One, or Whole)' 35 Consciousnessloses unitary senseand is no longer a priori but a posteriori, the real effect of a singularity already in action, but in a different form than that of its 36 existence Transversality is not a diagonal on a co-ordinate system,but a movement which generates new co-ordinates and a different system. Synthesis becomes an additive function, rather than a relation with identity. Not, however, the addition of equal units, but the addition of difference. Where God is the master of disjunctive syllogism, unity is added to differential relations of empirical and heterogeneous sequences,and difference is articulated according to the either/or: either production is social or it is desiring - either it is public or it is private, familial, secret.The inclusive disjunction of machinic production affirms diversity and adds difference, adds value without siphoning off profit, breeding flows from flows, breaking and detaching elementsand setting them into motion in other directions. II Passive Deleuze fuses the problem of consciousnessdefined as a degree of intensity, and thus as a multiplicity, or assemblage,with the real which forces thought, the imperceptible and contingent cycles of the sufficient reasonof sense.He does not focus on either the I think or the I am, however, but on the `position passive (cc que Kant appelle la receptivite d'intuition (passive position [what Kant calls the receptivity of 141

Chapter 4 intuition])' which is implicated with the pure form of time, a nonformal intuition, and with the passive synthesesof perception and individuation. 37 This is the vector of passivity which does not resolve back into the system of binaries, but brings the underlying differenceson which it is founded to the surface, so introducing variations which cannot be comprehendedin biunivocal relations. `Une faille ou une felure dans le Je, une passivite dans le moi, voila ce que signifie le temps; et la correlation du moi passif et du Je feie constitue la decouverte du transcendental ou l'element de la revolution copernicienne. (Time signifies a fault or a fracture in the 1 and a passivity in the self, and the correlation between the passive self "and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the CopernicanRevolution)'.(Ibid. ) Deleuze does not find a self in Kant's Deduction: it is this, he argues, that betrays the death of God signified by the pure form of time, as condition of a finite empirical animal. Starting from a passionateand receptive self, a "me", rather than an "r, which is always an effect not an origin, a peripheral residue rather than a source, and defined in terms of affects, as a substantial multiplicity replete with faculties, not as functions of common sensebut of multiplicities it plugs into, Deleuze then asks: what are the real conditions of its production? One no longer starts from one, but from zero, the pure and empty form of time. The problem becomesone of the difference of thresholds and limits and the passive becomesa transient limit, a skin immanent to a threshold, rather than an existencecontained within an I think, or a border distinguishing an inside from an 142

Chapter 4 outside. Mobile and ambulatory, the passive"me" is a variable affect, and rather than being located behind the eyes, travels a body, changing its qualities as it engages different connectionsand transforms functions, each movement of different order, of different relations, different synthesesand times; every change in degreeis a changein quality. If the passivehas an apparentobjective constancyor identity, this is a function of its empirical circumstances,of the social orders and codes which define it, rather than of the real conditions of its production; it is always corporeal, corporealizing, a thought of sensenot of understanding or reason. Constantsare temporary and mobile, rather than fixing parameters;relations are explosive and escapist,rather than placid and imprisoned. The passive is a crack which transmits only itself, and transmission is not more or less than this crack: the cracked or fractured subject is its negative inversion, its dead consequence,an old transmission from Kant 38Rather than the crack being encasedbetweenthe I and its other, it is infiltrated by Ideas,abstract material problems `emergentconstammentsur les bords de cette felure, sortant et rentrant sans cesse,se composant de mille manWres diverses (constantly emerging on its edges, ceaseless coming out and going back, being composedin a thousanddifferent manners)', which do not form a unified totality, but inform the processof individuation which constitutes 39 but a self, not as a subject, as a mobile affect. However, the passive is not to be mistaken for a subject nor the self mistaken for a body; a body is teeming assemblage of larval selves, bacterial, chemical, electrical, social, sexual affects composing a surface;Deleuze's argument against the image of thought is that it inscribes an image on that surface, and so precludes exploration of the complexities of the interactions amongst all thesedifferent orders of selves.Unlike the subject,the assemblagedoes not say "mine": the possibility of possessionis bound up with identity, with law, with the deduction of right and to say "mine" presupposesI own myself as an object, contain 143

Chapter 4 another. The passive without possession is composed of affects, is a crowd, a population, units of production, larvae, intensive degreesof imagination at a positive distancefrom the zero of the pure form of time. Saying "mine", and expressing possessionof a space, is an effect of the illegitimate or paralogical use of the third machinic synthesis,conjunction. This has alreadybeen referred to in its legitimate formulation, as the AND logics of empiricism. In its paralogical employment, the actual dynamics of the commercium, the infinite proximities of the elements of repulsive force filling space,are contained within the boundaries of a subject, and conceptualizedindependently of real interaction. So the subjectbecomesprior to the lived state, and possessesits body as an object, owning its behaviour, rather than being a peripheral effect of the mobile affects which cross its surface. An assemblageof larval and swarming selves becomestotalized under the name of the agent, as the principle of its definition, in relation to which the dynamics of intensive spacebecome passive; not in the senseof passive synthesis as the blind generation of real affects, but as inert in relation to the spontaneity of the acting subject. Kant refers to this difference in the third Analogy, noting that a local spatial community has for its real condition the dynamic commercium of real interactions, which are co-existing and co-ordinated, but not according to any extrinsic rule. However, he turns this relation inside out, by making an ideal community the condition of the possibility of knowledge of the commercium, so situating the subject outside, in an elevated position; the subject does not then co-exist with the dynamic space,as a continuously mobile variant, but becomesthe principle of its subordination to unity. Whilst the first synthesis, connection, is indicative of the escape of abstract flows 144

Chapter 4 which have neither code or territory, and which effect the deterritorialization of space and the decoding of flows, conjunction in its illegitimate formulation `indique...leur arret relatif, comme un point d'accumulation qui bouche ou colmate maintenant les lignes de fuite, opere une reterritorialisation generale, et fait passerles flux sous la dominance de l'un d'eux capablede les surcoder. (indicates their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that plugs or seal the lines of flight, performs a general reterritorialization, and brings the flows under the dominance of a 40 flow them)'. single capableof overcoding It is in the context of the relation of connection and conjunction that Deleuze and Guattari come closest to admitting to history: they distinguish between a history which takes for its elements classes and segments, and follows the major line overcoding the vectors of escapeand a microhistory which traces massesand flows -a history of populations and packs, flows of money, of sperm, of blood, milk, rivers, bodies; history as market, rather than as capital. The former, macrohistory, attachesto the conjunction specific to subject as agent of synthesis: it is the acts of men which constitute this history, allowing for the claim of this illegitimate use of conjunction Vest donc moi, le roil c'est donc ä moi, que revient le royaume! (so 1 am the king! So the kingdom belongs to me)' 41 The subject becomesthe single flow overcoding all flows, the consumerof time and of history from which both appearto emanate. 145

Chapter 5 A Row of Doors `Le plan de consistance (grille) est le dehors de touter les multiplicites. (The plane of consistency(grid) is the outside of all multiplicities). " In the previous chapter Deleuze's use of passive synthesis was discussed, together with the transformations in subjectivity when synthesis is not related to identity, nor understoodas a spontaneousact of synthetic unity, nor confined within an image of thought. The passive "me" is not "other" to an acting I, but a mobile and variable affect, impersonal and intensive. In this chapter, changes effected in imagination by theseshifts in the nature of the subjectand synthesis will be looked at. This shift has implications for Kant's associationof the imagination with a soul, the latter being essential to the constitution of the category of the Person, defining a cultural body subject to law and capable of faith. Imagination is also involved in aestheticjudgements on the sublime, and the effects of the reconfiguration of synthesis as passivein relation to suchjudgements will also be explored. Lastly, the nature of a machinic continuum is addressed,in terms of the continuous exportation of the model of death, or zero, as the immanent condition of production. I Soul `C'est l'imagination qui traverse les domains, les ordres et les niveaux, abattant les cloisons, coextensive au monde...conscience larvaire allant sanscessede la scienceau reve et inversement. 146

Chapter 5 (It is imagination which crosses domains, orders and levels, knocking down the partitions coextensivewith the world... a larval consciousnesswhich movesendlesslyfrom scienceto dream and back again).'2 In Mille Plateaux Deleuze and Guattari remark on the complementarity of impotence and power and their mutual reinforcement `dann une sorte de satisfaction fascinante (in a kind of fascinating satisfaction)s3 particular to mediocrity and definitive of the glory of men of the State. In terms of its relations, this dynamic, incorporating impotenceand dominant authority as reciprocal correspondants,operates very much like the Kantian sublime, in which imagination and reasonpush each other to their limit, the inadequacyof the former resulting from the superior might of the latter. In the sublime, the relation of production to reproduction essential to recognizing unity is disturbed: imagination apprehends,or producesintensive quanta, but there is no general rule appropriate to the comprehension,or reproduction of their degree in a determinate objective form. As it was out on the lagoon, the subject becomesturned in on itself, disconnectedfrom sensibility. Whilst Kant emphasizesthat there is neither an interest or liking of reasonin the sublime, and that it is a purely aestheticjudgement, it is only in the context of a cultured mind that the fine line between enthusiasm and fanaticism and the sublime can be negotiated successfully.But as was remarked in a previous chapter, that the sublime requires culture, `in no way implies that it was initially producedby culture94: its foundation belongs to the human predisposition for `(practical) ideas, i. e., to moral feeling' S Thus, whilst imagination and reasonare discordant and the play of faculties unregulated in the sublime, `imagination is...really part of moral common sense'6and only under the condition of a moral common sense,as a place of safety, are the violent agitation and 'sacred thrill '7 of the sublime commensuratewith rational faith. The 147

Chapter5 fascinations its into the pleasure, subsiding negative reconciliation of sublime, of pain becoming satisfying rather than threatening to reason,and its impotence giving way to authority is made possibleby the movement out of nature, away from the sensible,and into the supersensiblestrata of Reasonand Law. It is indeed imagination that crossesdomains and demolishesthe orders and structuresof the world; however, for Kant the movement from the world of objects,the world of science,to that of dreams is achieved through a relation of inadequacyand authority. Imagination in its cognitive role, schematizing relations of production to reproduction, or apprehensionto comprehension,according to a rule of understanding, is inadequate in the face of the superior and incomparable supersensibledreams of reason; in the sublime, imagination apprehendsor produces quanta which can neither be reduced to determinacy through analogy, nor reproduced or comprehended according to the axiomatics of extension. But this disordered relation between production and reproduction is legitimate only in the context of culture. As Kant says in the first Critique. before venturing onto the ocean, one must first be securein the possessionof the land. The case is very similar in the sublime: before the natural disorder and indeterminacy of faculties can be countenancedas within the ends of reason, and the fortitude of imagination, or the soul `raised above its usual middle 8 first have the prepared range', culture must ground. Authority and impotence are hand in hand, but the latter is rationally legitimate only if the former is first made certain. This is becausethe sublime in its dynamic, rather than mathematical formulation, testifies to the physical impotence of man in the face of nature - not external nature, but the nature of the faculties; the chaotic and overwhelming forces of the sublime are expressedin the vastnessof nature, but the feeling of the sublime itself testifies to the containment of this vastness;man 148

Chapter 5 has within him a disorder of immense magnitude, but reason in its cultured form is always adequateto this. Reasonhas `a different and nonsensiblestandard that has this infinity itself under it as a unit' and it is this that prevents the sublime from being a degradation of humanity, and evidencesinstead its superiority over nature.9 Reason contains chaos, but chaosis no match, it seems,for reason. In Mille Plateaux the interiorization of intensive natural forces is discussed in relation to the war machine and its containment by the State. A war machine is `une pure forme d'exteriorite (a pure form of exteriority)' , associatedwith the science of Dispars and with nomos, as full intensive and tactile space distributed without 1° law. A war machine has no necessaryrelation with violence: it is to reference characterizedrather by its relation to speedand intensity, and by its irreducibility to the mechanismsof capture specific to the State. In this respect, it is situated similarly to the position in which women have been established - or rather, not established - by philosophy, as necessaryto the State,but not reducible to its forms and orders. The war machine is a pack, a gang of street children, a diffuse and mobile composition which cannot be understoodin terms of class relations, age groups, sexual proclivities, or skin colours. In Brazil, the children are murdered by the State, in Borneo the women are prostituted by the State, in all States, the aim is to incorporate the war machine, by whatever meansand in whatever form, whilst eliminating those elementswhich cannot be reducedto its monopoly. Mockery, murder, prostitution, criminality, the police, the army, the church, the academy,the school, the youth club, the hospital, the prison: all theseways of producing the war machine as a suicide line inside the State, rather than as a pure exteriority. It is noology, the image of thought, which serves as the mechanismof interiorization. 149

Chapter 5 The war machine is counter-statistical: it is of `une autre justice, un autre mouvement,un autre espace-temps(anotherjustice, another movement, another spacetime)'" which testifies to an exteriority, but not an exteriority which is an outside to the State, in the sensethat one might think of an outside to representation. As has been explained, the thing-in-itself is immanent to sense,produced in relation to it as the imperceptible, that which escapesthought but is not beyond it. It is not the "unrepresentable", but the imperceptible; not outside the limits of knowledge, but immanent to the threshold of sense.It is in this sensethat the space-time of the war machine is outside the State,as a force which destroysthe image, the rule, the law and order of the State, not through the exerciseof violence, which is a State function, even when it appears to act against the State, even when it appears criminal, but by shattering and scattering the consistencyof the image and forming alliances which run counter to the arranged systems.The form of exteriority testified to by the war machine is `le devenir-femme du penseur, le devenir-penseede la femme qui ne se laisse plus ... contröler (the becoming-woman of the thinker, the becoming-thought of the 12 be to controlled)'. woman-that refuses Of the aestheticin the third Critique, Deleuze says `le sensiblevaut pour luimeme et se deploie dans un pathos audelä de toute logique (the sensible is valid in itself and unfolds in a pathos beyond all logic)' 13 With this remark, he is forging an associationbetweenthe sublime and thought as war machine, where thought operates solely through unregulated relations, charged with intensities foreign to the grammars of its language. Once more, Deleuze is drawing lines which ally the schizo with the explosive moment in Kant, and focusing on the primacy of sensibility and imagination, and on thought as potentiated on the basis of `un effondrement central, qu'elle ne peut vivre que de sa propre impossibilite de faire forme (a central breakdown, that it lives 14 by its incapacity form). If, as said in the previous chapter, this to take solely own on 150

Chapter 5 breakdown is given image - Artaud is the one which crops up most frequently in Deleuze and Guattari's writing - and the image becomesa model, the senseof the war is The is is lost. the treachery treachery: never that of a of a man point machine woman, the treachery of a child never that of a mother, the treachery of a philosopher is it language becoming foreign is This to means: one's own what never that of a poet. not a matter of rebellion, of suicidal daring and a struggle to introduce shock-value into an otherwise pedestrianthought. This is why Deleuzeand Guattari are so effective, and why, for example, to dismiss Difference et Repetition as a work of regular academicproportions is to miss the degreeof its deviance. When the war machine is interiorized by the State, as the sublime is interiorized by Reason, the relation becomes that of impotence and authority, the inadequacy of imagination and the superior magnitude of the supersensible.The central breakdown which potentiates thought is interiorized, made whole, contained and controlled within the image, and the pathos of the schizophrenic explosion becomesmerely pathetic. *** In practical reason, imagination receives the sentenceof the law. Kant's identification of imagination with the soul has already been noted in the previous chapter, and the schematism is described as `an art concealed in the depths of the human soul'15.In the first Critique the conditions for deducing the objective possibility of an immortal soul - and thus of an unbounded imagination - are absent, or at least, not immediately involved in speculation, and there is an admixture of sensible information in the construction of cognition. But practical freedom is antithetical to the functioning of imagination on behalf of understanding, at its middle range, where the 151

Chapter 5 The is determinate. soul as and stable and reproduction relation of production immortal substanceis an insoluble problem for finite entities, and speculationson its nature lead to paralogisms and claims of a rational psychology (which, despite its theoretical illegitimacy, Kant remarks, has a disciplinary use)16 The relation of substance(permanence)to force (intensity) is axiomatically extensive, and irreducible to a radical unity, matter appears heterogeneousand force diverse. Nonetheless,the idea of a fundamental power [Grundkraft] `is the problem involved in a systematic representationof the multiplicity of powers'" and imagination is no exceptionto this. With practical reason, the possibility of the soul becomes a legitimate postulate of reason,on the basis of the determination of freedom by the Law. Only on this basis can immortality be framed without referenceto modes of time, imagination removed from the framework of permanenceand substance,and intensity reconfigured in relation to the will, as a drive [Trieb], rather than as a force [Kraft]. This takes the problem out of physics and into practical reason. Much as the understanding was compelled by practical reason to assume the noumenon in the interests of reason's systematicgrowth's, practical reason commands the assumption of an immortal soul, on the basisof the fact of a free will, in the interestsof reason'smoral growth. The practical postulate of an immortal soul is `an inseparable corollary of an a priori unconditionally imaginarius valid practical is no longer imaginarius, subjective idea regulating formal law'19. Under practical law, the focus as it was in the case of speculative reason, a 20 implicated systematic unity, with the negative noumenon, but real. The unity of law must be enacted, objectively, not merely posited, subjectively. Deleuze emphasizes that `un seul contresens est dangereux, concernant I'ensemble de la Raison pratique (a single dangerous misunderstanding regarding the whole ofpractical Reason)' is failure to realize that `l'abime entre le monde sensible et 152

Chapter 5 Ie monde suprasensiblen'existe que pour titre comble (the abyssbetweenthe sensible world and the suprasensibleworld exists only in order to be filled)This was seenin an earlier chapter one, in Kant's insistencethat practical reasonwas meant to influence the sensible configuration of phenomena.The negative noumenon is the medium for the conversion of permanencefrom its sensibleand conceptual relation with time and causality to its practical configuration as immortality through which the concept of substancebecomescomplete, and physical force discovers its impotence in relation to the drives of the will. As remarked above, however, this impotence is permissible and indeed predicated upon the a priori magnificence of reason, and the containment of immanence, as pure exteriority, within reason. Disassociatedfrom time, through the `marks of permanence'22which reveal its real nature, the imagination fades into the immortality of the soul. Elevated above sense, man discovers the root of his duty to the Law in personality, and (according to the principle of exclusive disjunction and the necessity for practical law to be realized) at the same time its empirical counterpart is formed, The Person. The subject understanding objects in the first Criitique was for the most part a merely logical function; The Scientist. But under practical law, the growth of the architectonic is no longer a methodical theorization of a subjective idea but the real practice of its objective construction. Kant's three Critiques build a law house for an organism with soul. With art on its walls too, for the characteristics of intensive permanenceand substantive imagination are attached to exemplary works of art and their production by genius. Speculativereasonconcerneditself with the plan for the court house- with the erection of a structure `just sufficiently commodious for our business on the level of experience,and just sufficiently high to allow of our overlooking it''3 This vantage 153

Chapter 5 sight has no objective substance independently of the fact of freedom, however, remaining merely hypothetical. But postulatesof practical reason `give objective reality to the Ideas of speculativereason in general'24; all the aggregateunities, the random data, the technical methods,the particular schemes,all the loose change of knowledge contributes to the supply of the creaturewhich occupiesthat theoretical house,which is the Person.Personsare the objectiveends of reason,of absolutevalue, and do not serve `simply as means'25 Reason is its own end, and everything contributes towards it: which legitimates the use of bodies as means,on the grounds that reasonis not a body, and it legitimates the use of imagination as a means, on the grounds that imagination is not a soul, merely its empirical relative. Imagination is objectively legitimated in the form of a Person, relinquishing its role as medium between sensibility and understanding to take its proper place in the holy trinity of God, Freedom and Immortality. The (human) organism becomesa Person,imagination becomessoul and their empirical and relative forms becomelegitimately describableas means. Independently of the objective value of an immortal substantial soul, and not confined by personhood, imagination does not lose its infinity, instead, it loses its reasonand good sense.But it is not for that evil. The devil, Kant says, `has reason,but not infinity. '26 The simplistic divisions of moral Law require that goodnesshave its devils just as white men need their women and their blacks to retain the vantage point of their situation over the businessof experience,and Kant's devil without infinity is unimaginative and powerless,but nonethelessnecessary.The State, as Deleuze and Guattari say, needsits impotence, and Personsneed to be sinners too, to forget their immortality, in order that they might be reminded of it, under the Law. 154

Chapter 5 II Imagination Imagination is not a faculty of the `I think', constrained to schematizeon its behalf; like judgement, it is annexed to reason or understanding, in recognition of the particular interests of reasoninvolved, but cannot be defined in terms of either. It is in between, but not produced by the poles it relates, or reducible to them. When imagination is unhinged from law and rule, and synthesis is not bound in a relation with identity, it becomes passive, passionate: this bears on the arbitrary freedom describedin chapter one, since the passions,for Kant, involve the abolition of freedom, and the de-restriction of desire from principles of reason. Thus, whilst arbitrary freedom provided a space through which to choose against Law, it was only in the context of the network of faculties as constituted by Kant. The interzone does not remain open, however, the moment was passing and transitory, the door opens and passingthrough it dissolvesits conditions. Imagination `belongs to sensibility'27, only to sensibility, the conditions of which `carry with them their own differences'28;not the difference between subjective and objective elements,which sets the separation of sensationin subjective - pleasure and pain, and objective - sensibility as the forms of a priori intuition, but indeterminate quantities of infinity not accountedfor by reason,not contained by its standard unit of chaos, which do not substantiate a soul, but a `multiplicit6 de fusion qui deborde effectivement toute opposition de l'un et du multiple (fusional multiplicity that effectively goes beyond any opposition between the one and the multiple)' 2`' When imagination is annexedto understanding, operating at middle range and contained by the generalizations of conceptual cognition, its productive capacities are constrained by the condition that anything it generates is reproducible. Contrary to what may appear to be the case in the first Critique, the condition of reproducibility is not 155

Chapter 5 immanent to the operation of imagination, but rather a function it performs when deployed in conjunction with understanding, under its rule, in a theoretical domain. What makes reproduction possible, Kant says, is a rule to which appearances are subject; in other words understanding, as the faculty of rules, grounds reproduction. The difference between the two operations of imagination comprehension is not articulated clearly are separable, and that imagination in the first Criti does indeed - apprehension and e. That the two functions have an operative capacity independent of understanding and the rule which makes reproduction possible is clear, however, in the discussion of the mathematical sublime in the third Critique, where Kant argues that for imagination to function within an epistemological framework, it must perform both acts - that of apprehension apprehend what is given in intuition and of comprehension. It must both and provide a schema for understanding. The formal comprehension of what is apprehended sensibly allows for the application of concepts to intuition reproducibility and thus for the reproducibility is a condition for the claim of what is given, where of objective knowledge: a scientific experiment which cannot be reproduced, either mathematically or in practice, cannot count as objective knowledge, for Kant. In the sublime, however, understanding is of no relevance to the functioning of imagination, which is brought into a conflictual relation with reason. The logical comprehension of basis for the reproducibility apprehension which forms the gives way to an aesthetic comprehension in a singular judgement without concepts. So, whilst it may appear as though reproducibility required by imagination, this is only insofar as imagination is annexed is to understanding, and functioning epistemologically. This does not, however, exhaust the power of imagination. In the first Critique imagination is a labourer on the assembly line of knowledge, making things which could as well have been made by another, under 156

Chapter 5 different empirical circumstances.When annexed to reason, its generative capacities are necessarily understood as impotent in relation to the supersensibledominion of is imagination is however, In to rule nor under neither reason. relation sensibility, there a standard according to which it may be judged as inadequate. It is a positive intensive distancefrom zero, the pure and empty form of time. The subjectiveand objective division of sensibility, as has been remarked, are functions of understanding, not of imagination, just as the productive and reproduction relations of imagination are functions of recognition, not of intensities; when understood immanently, imagination has neither image nor schema, destiny nor vocation, limit or condition, outside its relation with sensibility. Sensibility is not split into subjective and objective elements, but becomesa surface, a plane of consistency composedthrough the descriptions of imagination, populations of intensities, infinities has been is local Intuition different as singular, orders, absolutes standard. of without seen,and it is in relation to singularities that Deleuze understandsimagination, as the processthrough which an idea is actualized, becoming concrete. It draws difference, contracting a point, a singularity, not as a unit, but as a complex articulation, which doesnot cancel difference but coversit with more difference, extracting the elementsof speedfrom the differencesit contracts and releasing them onto the surfaceof time, like sporesfrom a pod.. In a sense, imagination objectively indeterminate might be said to be always sublime; it is intensive, in relation to identity, comparison, but nonetheless differentiated, infinite and without empirical patterned. A process with no relation to identity, it becomes divorced from the idea of production. But it is more accurate to say there is no longer any sense to the sublime (and it does have sense for Kant, as a cultural item), because without understanding to set extensive limits on synthesis, or 157

Chapter 5 reason to impose intensive penalities and feelings of respect for the law on imagination, convincing personsof their soul, the conditions of the feelings of negative pleasureand pain characteristic of the sublime are no longer operative. `Moral law...by thwarting all our inclinations, must produce a feeling which can be called pain' 30and pain can be connectedwith `all presentationsin us, no matter whether their object is 31. instead intellectual' Different qualities emerge, however, merely sensibleor wholly from an imagination not pressedby religious or moral ideals, nor rationalized from a position of safety through the superior magnitudes monopolized by supersensible reason, becoming divorced utterly from the edification of nature into a cultural property. `[C]omment se prolongent les continuums d'intensite? dans quel ordre les series de transformations Sc font-Blies? quels sont ces enchainements alogiques qui se font toujours au milieu, et par lesquels le plan se construit morceau par morceau suivant un ordre fractionnaire croissant ou decroissant? Le plan est comme une enfilade de portes. Et les r6gles concretesde construction du plan ne valent que pour autant qu'elles exercentun role selectif. (How are the continuums of intensity extended?What is the order of the transformational series?What are these alogical linkages always effected in the middle, through which the plane is constructed piece by piece in ascending or descending fractional order? The plane is like a row of doors. And the concrete rules for the construction of the plane obtain to the extent that they exercisea selectiverole)' 32 Thesequestionsalways have an answerfor Kant. In the end, all the doors lead to the same ends, to the standardized infinity of reason, becausethere is no longer imagination, only a soul, no longer a body, only an organism with personality, no 158

Chapter 5 longer time, only immortality, no real patterns, only a schemaborrowed from an idea of reason. Imagination and time do not, for Kant distribute a surface, but describe a corridor for the delivery of intensities to reason. This is why the sublime appears ejaculatory: an accumulation of heterogeneousforce vectors constrained to be, whole, at the end, channelled along a single route. The critical path is `the only one that has 33 Kant remained unexplored', writes. But Kant mistakes its nature and its intellect with man's existenceand desire, and wraps the route around in a circle, forming nothing, as the ground from which nothing escapes.Through the doors, relations fly outside the terms related, outsidethe set which contains them, past One and the totality of being. ### In the Kantian sublime, imagination `strains to treat nature as a schema' for Ideas.34That is, it attempts to produce a material determination of time which realizes the indeterminate object of the Idea, making the standard infinite real. It is necessarily the casethat it can only fail in this task, however, since to succeedwould suggestthat reason itself was reproducible, and that the infinite could be externalized as a perceivable quantity; this is not a possibility of aesthetics,only of Law. To Deleuze's comment that the abyssexists only to be filled, must be added the rider: but only by moral practices. Filling the abyss is legitimate only under the condition of Law. This is why Kant is so careful to insist that it is not nature itself that is sublime, and why nature is limited to the function of mirroring the unregulated discord of the faculties. There is always, for Kant, a relation of symmetry between nature and the relations amongst faculties: in the caseof understanding, which gives the law to the relations of faculties in cognition, nature mirrors this relation by appearing IawfW; in the case of reason, there is no law to the relation amongst the faculties - their accord has to be produced,and so nature reflects this, appearing indeterminate, overwhelming, fearful. 159

Chapter5 Were imagination able to schematizeideas in nature, it would mean that the soul itself appearedin nature, or god did, or freedom. But this would render faith irrational, the soul material, and freedom a natural cause,undermining the theoretical operationsof reasonand allowing ideas a constitutive rather than merely regulative role. Again, this is legitimate only in the context of practical reason.. In the sublime, a `rapid alternation of repulsion from, and attraction to, one 35 breath forces, the the threatens the and and sameobject' checks vital producing pain. But this stammering and stuttering of intensities only resolves into the quality of respectassociatedwith the sublime when imagination is qualified as inadequate;where there is no standard set, no image according to which the infinite is measuredand no unit which contains it as an interior form, the stuttering and stammering does not resolveinwardly, into the interiority of reason,but outwardly, as the pure exteriority of the war machine, of anotherjustice, another space-time,another origin, simultaneously making and passing through a door, an arbitrary freedom which is unrepeatable, unreproducible,image-free. The place of safety which assuresthe proper resolve of the conflict in the sublime is the Person, the consummatecultured man of State, rather than a physical location - though it is that too, since it is only men, for Kant, who are capableof the sublime. The traits which distinguish women from men are those which `chiefly result in making her known by the mark of the beautiful'36 whilst the `noble sex [edlen Geschlechtsl', man, has `a deep understanding, an expression that signifies identity 37 Even if women are in principle capable of the sublime, it is the with sublime' neither to be encouragedin them, and nor do they possessthe inclination to cultivate it: their association is with beauty, a sensation which `proclaims itself through shining 38 in features, through the through cheerfulness eyes, smiling and often audible mirth' 160

Chapter 5 This relation of beauty to visible characteristics of the body suggesting a sunny disposition, together with the associationof women with beauty, helps to explain why, as was remarked in the Intrsoduction,it is girls especially who should be encouragedto smile; it functions as a steering mechanism, an element in the training of women (for, as Kant says, women are not educated, but trained) towards their proper cultural function, and away from the "masculine" pursuit of learning. Women, he says, carry books as they carry a watch, `so that people will see that she has one, though it is usually not running or not setby the sun.'39 The cultured man has nothing to fear from the sublime, since culture is erected on the interiorization of its unregulated forces and then turns these forces against nature, in the specific form under which the State understandsforce - that is, in terms of violence. But from the blind play of imagination consequenton the sensible affection of a body emerges a persistence of passion, an intensive unit of production positively differentiated from the zero-dimensionality of time, an opening, a field of openings, a holey space. At this juncture there is no sense any more in psychologizing force with the term imagination. Deleuzeis not a philosopher of enthusiasm,of affects accompaniedby the idea of the good, nor, in any simple terms, is his philosophy aesthetics-basedThe circuitous manner in which his deductions operate obviate the distinctions which have isolated sciencefrom art, history from nature, industry from nature and nature from society, and his theory of synthesis is not concerned simply with formulating a science of human perception, as Kant defines aesthetics in the first Critique. It is not, in Irigaray's words, a specular economy and nor can it be charted on the axis of impotenceand power. Deleuzetakes the machinery of the sublime the oscillation of forces,the chaosof an unregulated network of faculties, the indeterminacy of nature 161 -

Chapter5 but instead of consolidating thesewithin culture and according to the ends of reason, allows it to function like a electrical charge, a shock which communicates itself through all the faculties. So instead of the sublime being a momentary dischargewhich does not effect changes in the formations of common sense and good sense,it is a disturbance which trauels through the faculties, in between, operating by relays, a weapon of thought rather than a tool of culture, which catches its breath at the thresholds of breathlessness,rather than sinking back into contemplation of its own magnificence. III Continuity `Voila cc que sont les machines desirantes: machines formatives, dont ics ratts memessont fonctionnels, et dont le fonctionnement est indiscernable de la formation; machines chronogenes confondues avec leer propre montage. (Desiring-machines are the following: formative machines, whose very misfirings are functional, and whose functioning is indiscernible from their formation; chronogeneousmachines engagedin their own 4° assembly)'. The continuity of the processof desiring-production is an immanent cycle of production, distribution and consumption, three syntheseswhich produce a model of death, a body without organs". Everyone has one, everyone is one and makes one, Dcleuze and Guattari write in Mille Plateaux death doesnot lodge with God any more, everyone has death, is death, makes death, continuously evacuating the infinite into finitude, making a local absolute,an atheistic infinite. If this processis traced back to the sublime, and the discussionof the war machine, it can be seenthat it is precisely 162

Chapter5 this that Kant could not allow. Becausehe named his ideas, giving death images which of necessitycould not be realized, it necessarilyremained contained within reason,an infinite virile secrecywhich could not be evacuated;the Kantian system disallows the possibility of exporting chaos, and thus of differentiating its order, its levels, its patterns and its functionings. The model of death is converted by desiring-machines, or machinic assemblagesinto an experience of death, conversion being a synthetic cycle, the production of production or bloc of becoming through which the model movesup from the depths of a body to its surface, simultaneously making and finding a door, and exteriorizing the interiority of a body, breaking down its orders and thus beginning once again from a different order, repeating infinity according to an infinite pattern of into death is Death: This the the to exportation of model of a reference not variation. experienceof death doesnot mean that "one dies" - though it can mean that: nor is it a matter of an authentic death, the ownmost death of one's self. It is only by breakingdown the model of death, evicting the interiority of the body that a body functions: breaking-down is the functioning of desiring-machines, a million little demises constructing the operationsof a body. In a thermodynamic model of this process,breaking-down would consist in an increasingly homogeneousfield, where differences are reducedinto unity, as the end of the possibility of labour, of the conversion of heat into work. This is not the model to which L'anti-oedioe appeals,however. In Mille Plateaux and Logique du SensDeleuze (and Guattari) refer to the emission of singularities, bursting like sporesfrom a pod: this is the movement outwards of a model of interiority, an export process which conditions the functioning of a body, beginning always from the zero intensity of the model as principle of production, but rather than merely exhausting the model, as if it 163

Chapter 5 constituted a finite resource,the experiencereturns to the model, as difference, and the circuit repeats,but beginning from somewhereelse, with a different model. Death and life becomemutually immanent and a body is transalivedead,always in the middle, a conjunction which destroys the exclusivity of the two terms, together with an is infinite. limit, beyond finitude the a which as of understanding If the cliche "death of the subject" means anything, it is this: the subject is a model continuously exportedfrom the body, the experienceof a solution to the problem of death, not as a suddenafflux of power, an exorbitant expenditure,but a continuously leaky process,a smooth plane of consistencyrather than a pipe and an outflow into the kingdom of ends. The subject is the residue, rather than the source of this process, however, the creature which turns back and reflects on the circuit, identifies, recognizes,catalogues.In effect, the subject is death, whilst the processis life, for the processis always in advanceof the subject,a future potential, an attractor. Becausethe cycle repeatsdifferently, however, and difference repeatsdifferently on each cycle, the subject , as the effect of this process,also appears differently, only if the attractor is death hole does it black to the appear retain an model of as a zero-dimensional identity, becauseit is then determined according to a single direction. What sensethere is to the term subject becomeslost, however, when the only principle common to all selves is difference, and there is no model of unity - when the attractor is strange, chaotic, and thus unpredictable. A body is a plane alive and teeming, populated with intensities, a substantial multiplicity, full of holes, not a determinate object. But Deleuze and Guattari advise caution: it is better, they say, to remain stuck on the strata than to evacuatethe model too fast, at the wrong time, without sobriety. 164

Chapter 5 `Liberez-le d'un gelte trop violent, faites sauter les strates sans prudence,vous vous sereztue vous-meme,enfonce dans un trou noir, ou meme entraine dans un catastrophe,au lieu de tracer le plan. (If you free it with too violent an action, if you blow apart the strata without taking precautions, then instead of drawing the plane you will be killed, plunged into a black hole, or even dragged towards 42 catastrophe)'. If the model becomesexperience at speedsnot practiced, if distances are corneredat too much speedthat they are not bearable by the finitude of a body, they exhaust its capacity at once, in a sudden movement. It is, they say, a matter of the careful disarticulation of an organization, rather than a wild and mad leap into an unknown. The problem is not how to make the movement,but rather how to continue it, to describe a smooth plane. This caution is evident in Deleuze's philosohy: by understanding how a philosopher works, how to mimic him (they are always him), and by being meticulously and rigorously involved in his operations,he succeedsin freeing w hat is blocked up within them, bringing their depthsup to the surface. The Freudian colouring of this movement is evident: the circuitous routes taken by the organism towards death are, Freud says,misunderstoodif characterizedas self-preservative. Instead, their function is to ensure that `any possible ways of returning to inorganic existenceother than those which are immanent in the organism itself' are warded of: " For Freud, however, the organism seeksto return to an earlier stage,the inorganic. The inorganic servesas a model of death retained internally to the body, which in turn dictatesan organic body be understoodas a container, a box for the model, and what the organism seeksis to perfect a copy of this model. The route each organism takes is individual to it, but the principle governing the route is universal. 165

Chapter5 The movement from depth to surface is also evident in Kant; reason is the immense, from death conflictual, as massive, a model of nature exported of experience in is But the through one model resolved might. afflux chaos as overwhelming and of faculties doctrine inter-connected that the of elements non-conflictual composedof constitutes the real transcendentalmethod - which contribute to one end, that of the systematicunity of reason. There is mechanism, or more generally, extensively empty and interiorized space,logical common sense:aesthetics,or more generally, harmonic reflection on the form of an object, resulting in a conceptof an aestheticcommon sensesharedamongst men, which servesas the basis of other forms of common sense;teleology, or more generally, the reflection of nature as objectively and systematicallypurposive and of the body as an organism, nature's good sense;and, as the instigator of their contributions being directed towards a systematic unity, or kingdom of ends, reason - more generally, a juridical system based on the exclusion of intensities, which proposes a theory of desire as production of an object according to a model representedin advance by the law. Once it is established,the return of experienceto the model as an intensive in its functioning is precluded. As Kant says, transformation effects a quantity which the model is produced out of the depths of reason,and by reason,and the completeness of this production leaves`no task to our successorssavethat of adapting it in a didactic 44 manner'. *** The Kantian transcendental functions as a splitting device, which separates the problem of experience into two elements, the model which conditions it and the 166

Chapter 5 real content which materializes those conditions - the effect of this on sensation has been remarked above, its division into objective and subjective elements disallowing any reciprocal communication between the empty form of time and the intensive magnitudes of sensation. The model expressesits content, but both expression and content are themselves divided into form and substance,allowing for two different understandingsof difference. But becauseof the master of exclusive disjunction, which is the principle of division betweencontent and expression,the two arms of difference do not communicate.Reasonis borne from chaos once only and then communications are cut, and reasonconstructsits own order, according to its own principles. Kant writes: `the causality of an alteration in general, presupposing, as it does, empirical principles, lies altogether outside the limits of a transcendentalphilosophy, 45 For Kant, there is no real interaction of the heterogeneousand diverse distributions of experience and the homogeneous and unified divisions of the transcendental;the potential of experience is limited within the terms of the model, which, as an earlier chapter has shown, has for its ground permanent substance.And the model of death is contained within reason, by its monopoly over the legitimate application of pain. Although for Kant, transcendentalphilosophy cannot answer some questions, such as that of the causality of alteration, or the particularity of its contents, it is founded on the elimination of the possibility of de facto evidence collapsing the structural order it imposeson the empirical, so whilst it cannot explain the particular, 167

Chapter 5 it can reducethe relations into which it enters to formally legitimated functions of the understanding. Kant knows about the doors; he just thinks they open on to known routes, or that passagethrough them is regulated. A substantial unity, ultimate subject of existence and ground of activity, whose genesis is not comprehended by the transcendental,but presupposedby it, defines the empirical subject within a limited intensive range, and this model of death doesnot rise. The continuity of the process of desiring-production and the continuous exportation of the model of death constitute a responseto this universe, and to Kant. Intensities are implemented as intrinsic genetic elements of the real, differentiated immanently and asymmetrically, rather than split according to principles of either/or: either phenomena or noumena, either empirical or transcendental, either man or nature, either reasonor death. L'anti-oedine removesthe problem of critique from the court-house and transcendental analysis becomes the problem of determining the criteria for escape,for production of a line of flight of the smallest interval and the sequencingof connectionswhich do not return to the conditions of their origin. Nature is no longer massivebut molecular. `Elles [machinesdesirantes]fonctionnent suivant des regimes de synthesesqui n'ont pas d'equivalent dans les grands ensembles(desiring-machines work according to regimes of synthesesthat have no equivalent in the large aggregate'46;the relations into which they enter are not betweenobjects,but connect partial objects,the elements of which desiring-machines are composed.Not as parts which go to make a whole, since desiring-machines are also partial objects, the elements of another machine. `Each portion of matter may be conceivedas a garden full of plants, and as a pond full of fish. But every branch of each plant, every member of each animal, and every drop " itself liquid is likewise their a similar garden or pond'. of parts 168

Chapter 5 There are no simples, or ultimate elements,only a nestedsystemof involuting differences: partial objects are desiring-machines are BwO's are partial objects. The most quoted eimple Deleuzeand Guattari give of the relation of partial objects is that of the wasp and orchid: the wasp is a liberated element of the orchid's reproductive system,whilst the orchid `devient l'objet d'un orgasme de la guepe elle-meme liberee de sa propre reproduction (becomesthe object of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated from its own reproduction)' 48 The connection is not a link between the wasp and the orchid, but a conjugation of the two asymmetrical relations effecting a line of flight, a relation not confined by its terms, a bloc of becoming. The model of the transcendental is not evacuated in a single output, but through an infinitely diffuse repulsion, the tiny intervals or demons leaps of the actual continuum, from the depths of a body, which is individuated or corporealized through that processbut does not pre-exist it, in either principle or fact. A body does not exist as an individual, but as a series of variable affects, effected by the connections into which it enters, as a process,or bloc of becoming. To define a body is thus to discover what machines it plugs into, rather than, in the Kantian manner, as a product in isolation of its environment. `Un corps ne se reduit pas ä un organisme (a body is not 49 to reducible an organism' And in the absenceof the organism, there is no soul, no housefor the person. Subtracting the unique from Kant's theory of forces, Deleuze and Guattari set about the construction of a machine in which form and formation and functioning are not separable.A body is not defined socially, or biologically, or mechanically, but as an individuated band of schizoid intensities, none of which function as structural elements,but u hich are continually evacuatedand replaced,as part of the processof its 169

Chapter 5 formation. There is never The Schizo, only schizoid quanta, break-flows, connections, intersectionsand interactions, transmissionsand transformations. Related to unity, the systembreaks down in a way that is not produced by the system itself. As a positive distance from zero, absent of presupposition (which is of course, impossible; a completedcritique is not possible),a body is only what it does. 170

Chapter 6 Becoming-woman In the last chapter, the relation of passivity, as Deleuze and Guattari formulate it, to the activelpassivedifference in Kant's philosophy was teasedapart. A question arising from this is what instigates the leap? Is there an initiating function which drives a systemover from the side of mechanismvs. teleology to machinic production, c ecting the conjunction of an inclusive disjunction and the generation of multiplicities without referenceto unity, full of exits, cracks, tiny intervals of difference leeching through the strict limits of possibility, and incommensurate with the antimonic progressof dialectical thought. There is such a function, which Deleuze and Guattari call becoming-woman.Becoming-woman, they say, has a special introductory power, as the key or first quantum in all becomings, on the way to becoming-animal, rushing towards becoming-imperceptible. In this chapter, becoming-woman will be introduced, but largely in the context of readings by those few feminists who have engaged with Deleuze. Irigaray's reading of Kant will also be looked at. It will be argued that her project is not successfulfor reasonssimilar to the limited effectiveness of feminist criticisms, in that both adopt an uncritical position with respect to sexual difference, in their different ways. A fuller discussion of becoming-woman is found in the next chapter, pulling out the relations of this line to themes which have arisen in previous chapters. I Receptacle, which is now called space' Betweenthe two layers of skin, the lower dermis and the upper epidermis are colonies of touch receptors.Merkel's disks respond to sustained pressure; Pacinian corpuscles respond to changes in pressure, converting mechanical into electrical energy-, 171

Chapter 6 Meissner's corpuscles record low-frequency vibrations. On a hand there are flexure lines, tension lines, papillary ridges. A tongue is replete with sensorytalents, a nose is dusty. Irigaray's one of touch. economy and collects moistures, sweet `Quand eile y revient, c'est pour repartir d'ailleurs. (When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere)'? As do Deleuze and Guattari, Irigaray explores difference through the middle; intensive but distributing between tactile terms, two space. and a as not as a medium Multiple and interconnected,immediately autoerotic with her body, Irigaray's woman is before the possibility of distinguishing activity and passivity. `L'homme...a besoin d'un instrument pour se toucher, sa main, le sexede la femme, le langage (man needs deux dejä ''), but `est body, language... his hand, instrument: woman a woman's an into divisible (is divisibles two not already qui s'affectent en un(e)s mais non -but " The from different Everything begins that a place. other). caress each one(s) in in by the point of three, to remarked chapter philosophy was sight privilege given intersection behind the eyes functioning as the centre of resonance,and principle of recognition. Irigaray privileges touch: `La femmejouit plus du toucher que du regard (woman takes pleasure more from touching than from looking)', she takes pleasure `justement de cette incompletude de forme de son sexe qui fait qu'il se re-touche inddfiniment lui-meme (precisely from (an] incompletenessof form which allows her organ to touch itself over and over again).'S However, her theorization of touch does not describe a simple oscillation between two terms, but a positive feedback which continually dissolves the middle, precluding it from functioning as a dividing term which would articulate the two lips as different in relation to unity, which could 172

Chapter 6 privilege a right over a left side, a one over the two. She keeps herself as a secret, nithout knowing it. In the contest of a discussion of Freud, Irigaray calls the laws of the conservationof energy and of the fundamental dissymmetry of nature, (the move from the present to the future, as if from the particular to the general and the first two laws 6 `isomorphs feminine thermodynamics), than of of masculine rather sexuality' This criticism is coincident with Deleuze's characterization of thermodynamics in terms of good sense.Shecontinues: `Feminine sexuality would perhaps harmonize better, if you need to invoke a scientific model, with what Prigogine calls "dissipative" structureswhich function by means of an exchangewith the exterior world, which proceed by energy levels and whose order is not one that seeks balance but one that seeks passage over thresholds correspondingto a movementbeyond disorder or entropy without any discharge.0 In the last chapter, the sublime was characterizedin terms of discharge, as an accumulation of heterogeneousforce vectors channelled along a single route, and contrastedwith the plane of consistency,as a plane of doors where relations fly outside the terms related Irigaray's use of dissipative structures as a model suggest a coincident direction, (and Deleuze does refer to Prigogine): in far-from-equilibrium conditions, the behaviour of a system becomes highly specific, and there are no universal laws from which its overall behaviour, or future, can be deduced.It is in that sense a model which is not a model, since to make any further claims about a dissipative system, its particular behaviour must be explored The system itself 173

Chapter6 determines its own intrinsic size and distribution, since its future is undetermined, which means that although associatedwith chaotic attractors, it can also return to a zero-dimensional or limit attractor, however, it is the implication of chaotic attractors and symmetry-breakingpropertiesof dissipative systemsto which Irigaray and Deleuze alike are drawn. Of the tactile economy that she formulates, Irigaray writes that not only can the distinction between touching and touched not be upheld, but also that it is mobile and ubiquitous: 'la femme a des sexesun peu partout (woman has sex organs more or less everywhere)' There is no gap or room for intrusion, and no possibility of .8 logically distinguishing what is seeing from what is seen,for the difference between them is not extensivewith the co-ordinated intersections of spacewhich meet behind the eyes. Nor is there a possibility of female sexuality according privilege to genitalia: the body becomessexualized,not through a single privileged term, but as a surface of mobile passions. For Irigaray and Deleuze alike positive feedback emerges through similar moves.Irigaray writes: `[S]on sere, qui nest pas un sexe, est compte comme pas de sexe. Negatify envers, re%, ers, du seul sexe visible et morphologiquement designable (meme si cela pose quelques problemes de passage de l'Crection ä la detumescence):le penis. ([H]her sexual organ, which is not one organ, is counted as none. The negative, the underside, the reverse of the only visible and morphologically designableorgan (even if the passagefrom erection to dctumescencedoesposesomeproblems): the penis).'9 174

Chapter 6 The comment echoesthat of Deleuze, when he calls the negative difference 10 from below, inverted. By removing the one from the multiple, she seeks to seen describe a specifically female space, which both engages with the philosophical tradition, whilst at the same time subverting its directions, by exposing the logical tricks, reductions, negations and limitations by which it securesthe privilege of the subject.She explores the mystification of women, in systemsof supposedtransparency, their positioning as passive"other" to reason,and the primacy accordedto that faculty. Her abstract machine, or problem, is the gap, or hole in the systemof representation,a crack: `son sere repnsente 1horreur du rieh ä voir (her sexual organ representsthe horror of nothing to see.)" By opening up this space and materializing it, she introduces it to Kant, to the tactility of the actual continuum, and the problem of fluidity, but in the processit losesits function as a receptacle. Irigaray's early writings in Speculumand This Sex Which Is Not One opened up a rich field of problems for feminism. Her method is one of mimesis: through detailed re-workings of writers, including Plato, Freud, Marx, Hegel, Kant, Aristotle..., she works at jamming their systemsand exposing their inconsistencies,incoherences and uncritical assumptions: `[LJ'enjeu n'cst pas d'elaborer une nouvelle theorie dont la femme serait le sujet ou l'objet, mais d'enrayer la machinerie theorique ellememe,de suspendresa pretention a la production d'une verite et d'un sens par trop univoques. Cc qui suppose que les femmes ne se veuillent pas simplement les egalesdes hommesdannle savoir. (The issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and a meaning that are excessively univocal. Which 175

Chapter 6 presupposesthat women do not aspire simply to be men's equals in knowledge)."z The extent to which her method is successfulhas been argued, and will be touchedon below, but of primary interest here is her reading of Kant. II Turn of the screw There are, as has been seen,connectionsbetweenDeleuze (and Guattari) and Irigaray: if there were not, the claims of the previous chapter about the rhizomatic nature of machinic production, and of a system in which everything connects with everything both Both draw dissipative be demolished. the on model of structures; else, would addressthe problem of third things whose effects are crushed betweenthe terms they imagination; hold the the the the of on production; regulation of subject rigid relate; role of the copula in a systemwhich has no place for the copulation, exceptthrough the language of law which belongs only to one member. Both look at the function of pain in the constitution of representation, and at the formation of bodies as necessarily into its in their entry system. advance of mutilated In Speculum,in a piece on Kant called Paradox a priori, Irigaray focuseson gaps within Kant coveredover by vague mechanismswhich have no proper location in relation to the two stems of knowledge, or fall on one side or the other of the divide betweena sensibleand supersensibleworld, or are excluded altogether: schemataand transcendental objects. These are the third things that Kant deploys as means of moving betweendomains, without considering the nature and effects of that movement except in relation to the two connectedterms - in other words, on the confinement of relations within the terms related. 176

Chapter6 She identifies the function of the schema,third thing between sensibility and understanding, as that of negation: the multiplicity of sensations, of indeterminate matters, all the heterogeneousvariations of nature, are negated in the formation of the passagethrough which understanding/l think draws on material nature and determines it as objective. Her case is illustrated with the example of enantiomorphic bodies, - of `differences that are internal as the sensesteachi13- which are affective, rather than conceptual,and which Kant relates to intuition. The opening quotes of her paper refer to Kant's theory of incongruent counterparts.'4 `I shall call a body which is exactly limits but be in the to as that same cannot enclosed another, which and similar equal other, its incongruent counterpart.i15 Amongst Kant's examples are left and right hands and ears, hair whorls, twining plants and the spiral curvatures of shells, but his argument extends to asserting a privilege of the right over the left hand, of the right over the left side of the body in terms of skill and strength, and an advantageof power that the right side of the body has over the sensitivity of the left. So in terms of affective asymmetry, a body is constructed according to differences weighted with significances.16Kant's solution to enantiomorphic bodies, alike in all properties, },et with unmistakable sensible differences, is to refer the problem to extensity, as a whole, in the form of an extensive magnitude, externalizing the affective differencesin a world of constituted objects.Irigaray calls this mechanism of externalization a passage,and the function which she identifies as structuring the reappearanceof sensible differences in extensive space is the transcendental object, " introduces into the a symmetry world. Through this object, the paradox of which sensiblyperceivedand affective differences enter into the symmetriesof a spacewhose planes intersect in the transcendentalsubject,the correlate of the transcendentalobject. Whereas the schema is integral to the determination of objects, however, the transcendentalobject functions regulatively: 177

Chapter6 `[T]his transcendental thing [Ding] is only the schema of the regulative principle by which reason, so far as lies in its power, "s field the of experience. whole extendssystematicunity over In the first Critique Kant wavers, sometimeseliding differences between the transcendentalobject and the noumenon and sometimes upholding their separation, sometimes referring it to the thing-in-itself, and sometimes isolating it from the material problems implicated by this association.Its positioning is very similar to that of the schema, both describing an ambivalent and vague distribution between sensibility and intelligibility, one of which is incorporated into the construction of representation,the other of which functions from the outside, as an Idea. Like the noumenon,it is Janus-faced:`regardedas the causality of a thing in itself, [Dinges an is intelligible in its action; regarded as the causality of an this object selbst] sich appearancein the world of sense,it is sensiblein its effects.'19 There is thus an admixture of data compactedin the transcendentalobject, and it is this that leads to its tendency to collapse into either the thing-in-itself or the noumenon, the former pointing it outside the system of representation,and the latter internalizing it within the subject, as marker of its divided nature. However, it must retain its two-fold function, because, like the schema, it indicates a gap between sensibility and intelligibility that `can never be filled', only gestured at, 'through the ascription of outer appearancesto that transcendental object [Gegenstande]which is the causeof this speciesof representations'but `of which we shall never acquire any concept.i20 In its relation to appearance, the transcendental object connects with intuition, and with the framework of limitation time and spacebecomewhen instituted as axiomatically extensive. 178

Chapter 6 On the side of sensibility, from which it cannot be separated,it tends towards the thing-in-itself, and to the problem of material causality: `what matter may be as a thing in itself (transcendentalobject [Objekt]) is completely unknown to us'21. This problem of matter as thing-in-itself, the transcendental matter referred to in earlier chapters, suggestsa link betweenthe transcendentalobject, the concept of reality and intensive magnitudes, since it is the latter, as has been said, which indicate the real in appearances.And Kant writes that transcendentalobjects `in our present state appear as bodies.'22Irigaray's point addressesprecisely the problem of what is negated in the movement from transcendental matter, as the intensive stuff of affects, to the transcendentalobject, whose `permanenceas appearancecan indeed be observed.'23 What happensto bodies in the movement from intensive matter to appearanceswhose relations are a function not of the materiality involved but of the `present state' of a subject? The word permanence signals a relation of the transcendental object to substance;to the negation of intensive differenceswithin the substratumof appearances in general; to subjectivity, to the delimitation of sensible intuition as a complex of mobile and differentiated intensive magnitudes to logical time; to causality as a referenceto determinateintensive quanta and to matter re-castempirically, as a state. Implicated with matter but not apparent, apparently but not cognitively causal, it must therefore be intelligible, although it is not known as an object: the transcendentalobject is `the purely intelligible causeof appearances',and `can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, [Gegenstand] that is, objective reality. 'Z° In this respectit is related to the principle of convertibility, and Kant allows then it may be called noumenon `for the reasonthat its representation is not sensible.'25 Its intelligible function is to `leave open a spacewhich we can fill neither through possible experience nor through pure understanding.'26 In its 179

Chapter 6 intelligible form it is the terminus of contingency, a thought-entity without reason which we `have not the leastjustification for assuming.%27 Irigaray's argument is that the schema is a mechanism for disguising the transition from intensive, affective differences to extensive, geometric differences, and that the transcendentalobject performs a similar function, but this time the transition is between the limits of human knowledge and an intellectual intuition that must be assumedbut cannot - like the transcendental object - be known or presumed to be constitutive of experience.. "Comme si" toute cette diversite trouvait sa finalite en une unitd superieure...ä laquelle il importe qu'il se conforme aussi, du moins qu'il tente, sansla/le connaitre. ("As if' all that diversity were directed toward a higher unity which ... it/he also should strive to conform to, even without any knowledge of it)' 28 As the schemaallows for the reconciliation of sensibility and understanding, so the transcendentalobject allows for the reconciliation of understanding and reason, since in its intelligible form it servesas the object of a transcendentidea, and can thus be utilized regulatively, thought not constitutively. And Kant does indeed refer to analogies as the `only resource' for making the movement between concepts of 29 `some intelligible things' experienceand sort of conceptof . Irigaray's problem is with the nature of time involved in this process,of whose time Kant is referring to, and her question is: what is the time of the mirror? `What can be more similar in every respectand in every part more alike to my hand and to my ear 180

Chapter 6 that their images in a mirror? ' Kant asks.30Irigaray turns the question back on him, however, asking why asymmetry, rather than symmetry should be problematic, and concludesthat `Un miroir, donc, ici s'avoue comme supportant dejä 1'apprehensiondes 3' (already a mirror turns out to support the apprehensionof objects)' This was objets seenin the previous chapter, in the changing faces of nature according to the change relations amongst the faculties, nature always reflecting the order or chaos of the subject. Why should it be more strange that differences rather than identities are reflected? And does it make senseto speakof differences as reflected, in the absenceof a unifying function which could testify to the fact that yes, indeed, those differences reflect these? Irigaray's argument drives towards the inevitable conclusion that reflection and difference are incompatible, the former belonging to the specular economy of rational insight and the latter to the empirical zones of touch, and that attempts at their reconciliation results only in the negation of difference by the cycle of the sameparticular to reflection. Kant was concerned, in his argument with Leibniz, not to conceptualize spatial relations, and thus referred the sensible differences amongst enantiomorphs to intuition: Irigaray's question runs beneath this, and addressesthe constitution of symmetry itself, the paradox of a world reflecting the identity of a subject, when it is, as Kant reflects, full of differences. How does the left side becomescollapsed into the right, sensibility into power? In her very different way, she is questioning the relation to identity referred to in the previous chapter, and the representationof its of synthesis products as a reflection of the legislative power of the subject. Irigaray exploreswomen's position in Kant in terms of this gap, or mirror, as a surface of reflection presupposed,uncritically, in order to address the problem of enantiomorphs.The time is of the subject, the subject is man, and the mirror a refusal 181

Chapter6 of the blindness which, as the last chapter showed, attaches to imagination and intuition. 'Aveuglee dans le refus de son aeuglementpar tout savoir qui, en son esprit, ne trouverait pas sa cause(In its own refusal of blindness, consciousnessis blinded by all knowledge that does not find its causein the mind itself). 932Each third thing, each movement from sensibility to understanding, in the schema,or from the sensibleto the intelligible cause, through the transcendental object, reflects a new facet of a single point of convergence, and a different blindness, each of which finds its cure in a different configuration of light, a new image of 'un Pere qui n'existe que dannun desir de tout legiferer librement (a Father who exists solely in a desire to exerciselaw freely over everything).933One blindness is given up for the sake of another, or one blindness is constructedin order to prove the necessityof another.34 Irigaray addressesthe sameaspectsof Kant as does Deleuze, but for strategic reasonsconcentrateson the internalization of the world within a subject: `la scenese passetoujours dans sa maison, son esprit (the action is always inside his house, his mind). i35 She understandsthe indispensable nature in Kant of a detour through the world, but attends to the re-formulation of that passage in terms of subjective reflection, the obliteration of a tacit symmetry with a spuriously problematic asymmetry 36 laws the the the that and representationof world as mirror which reflects of subject. She becomesthe matter inside the system, but speaking with a foreign tonge, she subvertsits order. Women becomethe carriers of vagueness,of the gap and the mirror, being situated both inside and outside, the material gathered in the detour through the world, a smoked and blackened mirror veiling perception, and the surface inverted in the mirror, a kind of difference which remains unanalyzed. The paradox a priori of Irigaray's heading is this difference, incongruent and incommensurate with the representationor reflection of objects. 182

Chapter 6 'Cc qui ne se fait pas sanspeine. Ni sansreste. Mais que 1'espaces'y resorbe en temps, et 1'espoir subsiste toujours pour 1'esprit de parachevercette operation dans un avenir ä perte de vue. (This is not achieved without pain. Or without a remainder. But provided that spaceis resorted into time, there is still hope that the mind can perfect this operation at some point in the boundless future), 37 Irigaray draws her analysis through Kant's theoretical writing and into the aestheticand the collapseof imagination under the weight of its own inadequacyin the face of reasonparticular to the sublime, noting that it is the soul to which Kant appeals as a solution to appearanceof the infinite and which paves the way to pleasure and to culture. She identifies the over-whelming nature of the sublime with the mother, and the culture which confines the legitimacy of the sublime with a site of learned resistanceto and independenceof its basis in that nature. Kant becomescaught in a bind, both searching for the presuppositions on which man bases his culture, knowledge, science and art, and simultaneously enclosing himself within a cycle of reflection which obviatesthe possibility of any real solution to his search. `The thread of a screw which winds round its pin from left to right will never fit a nut of which the thread runs from right to left. i38 Irigaray's claim is that it is precisely this that Kant does allow; whichever way that subject turns, the nut will take the screw, nature will take the laws of the subject. This is the paradox of symmetry, the possibility of a space,or gap, sufficiently plastic to be moulded to the demandsof representation,providing its real nature is not taken into account,providing the one difference which cannot be analyzed does not enter the 183

Chapter 6 house of the subject on its own terms, unmoulded, rather than as one of the building blocks of its erection. Providing it remains a means to the achievement of a value outside itself. It is the cruelty of this operation she challenges. `Et, dans la souffrance que necessite son plaisir, mettrons-nous lä Kant avec Sade?Ou, un quart de tour supplementaire- en plus ou en moms -r tant donn8 ä la subtilit6 de son esprit, avec Masoch? (And, in the suffering made necessaryby his pleasure, shall we place Kant ne-d to Sade?Or, if the subtlety of his mind is given one quarter 39 in Masoch? )' to the turn of screw more, or out - next *** Irigaray is a very difficult writer; her language resists the subtractive moves that Deleuze makes on Kant, and in this senseshe is entirely successfulin producing structuresirreducible to their parts. She runs very swiftly over an immense field, racing in the space of thirteen pages through the three Critiques, collecting as she passes snippets from the Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime, and from Kant's writings on the family, and the rights of its members.This kind of overflight is another feature she shareswith Deleuze; rather than picking over the bones of an argument, they catch what is integral to the machines they are building and incorporate it in the mechanismsof her escape.Her "method" - and as with Deleuze,this is a difficult word to use in relation to Irigaray - is to deploy the abstract machine, two lips which are not one, by operating both inside and outside the system simultaneously. However, Irigaray's escape is less effective than that of Deleuze; her critique does not quite succeedin escaping its negative function of jamming theoretical machinery, and as a result its positive consequencestend towards a valorization of the mysterious and a 184

Chapter 6 definition of women in terms of motherhood, or in relation to a female divine and a feminine ethic. Rosi Braidotti characterizesIrigaray's ethics of sexual difference as `the recognition that differences among women need not lead to the state of disaggregation and hostility that has always played into the hands of patriarchy' 40 This is extremely problematic at an empirical level. Algerian women are shot in front of the classes they teach, but in Rwanda women have been implicated in massacres:women leave the Philippines for work in Saudi Arabia, but are not paid and beaten,by both men and women, whilst in the U. S. and in England, girl gangs thump their "sisters", sometimes to death. The dream of women united through their differences is a white liberal construct, and does not take account of the real and extreme range of differences amongst women, deploying, if only implicitly, an appeal to a unified thought of "woman". I prefer to retain a potential hostility. An image of sex replacesthe image of thought and becomesequally restrictive. The only way out of this problem is to characterizethose behaviours which do not coincide with the idea of universal sisterhoodas produced by men: however, this returns women to the status of victims. Deleuze and Guattari's characterization of a body in terms of the machines it plugs into does not appeal to a base identity in terms of which all relations are understood,and so doesnot meet with theseproblems. Where Irigaray's critique of Kant is most problematic is in its adoption of his formulation of nature in the sublime as massive, all-powerful and over-whelming, her associationof this with the figure of the mother, and of imagination with women. Her 185

Chapter6 mimetic jamming method necessitatesthis, since it operatesby keeping very close to the problems thrown up by a writer, as if both in parallel to him whilst at the sametime She follows logical incoherencies the trickery. and exposing cutting acrossand over, detour of the Kantian subjectthrough the outside, but her method doesnot allow her to build from the outside and away from the structures she criticizes, and so their ground does not lose its security. It is in this respectthat Deleuze's solution is more effective; by attending to the micro-deviations and molecular disturbances in the ground, and piecing together elements which in turn exacerbatethose disturbances whilst at the builds Irigaray Deleuze the constructs time structures, a machine, whilst escaping same but does image the not subject, nonetheless remains mirror of which women, an biunivocally related to it, in that it retains precisely that mystery which philosophy and history have long attachedto the fairer sex. Moreover, by reading relations in terms of by is for difference, the attacked problems philosophy very which she repeats sexual feminism. III A Kind of Schizophrenia One writer exploring the philosophical and scientific habits of attributing sexualvalues to everything around it is Evelyn Fox-Keller. She points to a `kind of schizophrenia' between science and gender, causing polarized oscillations of understandings plaguing `fixed natural categories in one moment, and constructed, perhaps even indefinitely plastic, categoriesin another.' The solution to this impasse,she argues, is 'learning to 1A first result of this is that matter becomesunderstood in terms of two'. count past interacting forces, rather than as the content of form. Keller argues that this has been scientifically problematic becauseit seemedto sentimentalize nature; immanently cooperative matter self-organizing coherent systemswithout external direction implied a natural altruism of form on the part of individuals, their willingness to 'die' for the 186

Chapter 6 42 system. A similar problem of balance concerns all trade-offs between group benefit and individual cost. The critical question concerns the maximum degree of cost to themselves individuals will tolerate before any socially desirable character is disinvested.This situation is clearly that of the multiple +1, and so does not correspond to the spaceoccupiedby Deleuzeand Guattari. Counting past two, but not by using another one, argues Keller, involves paying scientific attention to the middle ground ignored by zero-sum cost benefit analysis. She cites Lynn Margulis' work on bacterial sex as doing this; that it has been describedas `introducing feminism to Darwinismi43 rather than as a piece of "proper" science indicates a resistanceto the radical differences implied by the breakdown of basic taxonomies in her work. It is problematic for feminism becausethe body as a whole object, complete with vagina or penis, womb or testes,is no longer the site for discussionsof sexuality and reproduction: bacterial sex problematizessexual difference beyond the possibility of its redemption by two bio-socially defined terms, male and female. Patternsconceivedof as socially constructed,teleologically directed or divinely imprinted become understood as self-organizing material functions, and the body is merely one amongst many solutions to problems of matter and force. Initial explorations of these functions often drag anthropomorphic hangovers with them altruism, for example,or zero sum games. But thinking past two involves understanding that `Nature is oblivious of all our romances, and knows nothing of our gender roles and distinctions.'44 The implication of all this is that feminist categories can only reach so far: a feminist epistemologycan no more reach back into matter than can a male intellect. A further implication of Keller's paper is this: since the impulse towards sexing and gendering parts male or female, masculine or feminine is an old scientific habit, an imposition of 187

Chapter 6 romanceonto nature, its continuation by feminists is a subscription to that romance. At bottom her paper addressesthe legitimacy of the thought of sexual difference which emergesas a question out of the middle. IV Out of the middle 'Bref, une ligne de fuite, dejä complexe, avec ses singularites; mais aussi une ligne molaire ou coutumiere avec ses segments; et entre les deux (T), une ligne moleculaire, avec ses quanta qui la font pencher d'un cöte ou de I'autre. (In short, a line of flight, already complex, with singularities; but also a molar or customary line with segments;and betweenthe two (?), a molecular line with quanta which cause it to tip to one side or the other) . 'S In Mille Plateauxthe middle line, the line which causesthe collapse back into an empty spaceof attraction and common sense,good senseand order, or becomesthe subject of escape and effects a singular diffusion of intensive quanta and the distribution of full space is called becoming-woman. Becoming-woman is the inbetween of the two systems, machining communications between orders of incommensuratepotentials, that of the State and that of the nomad, of Compars and Dispars, logos and nomos, an itinerant vector. `[D]iffusion procede au milieu, par le milieu, comme tout ce qui "pousse", du type rhizome (diffusion happens in the inbetween,goes between, like everything that "grows" of the rhizome type)'. 6 There is thus an explicit connection between tactile, full space, and becoming-woman, the transverseline discussedin the previous chapter and the logic of conjunction, of the And, not as blockage and accumulation, but as an additive function. However, as seen, 188

Chapter 6 the middle is not enclosed within its terms, and so becoming-woman becomes associatedwith the formation of substantial multiplicities with no relation to unity. Delcuze and Guattari make no claim about "real women," and what their 47 be. There is no image of women, nor determined direction to experience might becoming-woman as line: the plane of doors, as has been said, does not representthe outside behind it, but is constituted by moving through the openings. Indeed, Guattari writes of becoming-womanin the context of queer politics: `in order to understandthe homosexual, we tell ourselves that it is sort of "like a woman"'. (G, 1981, p87) Women's proximity to but absenceof identification with or recognition in terms of the biunivocal relations of Law, empty striated space, etc., and the strangenessof their sexuality, from the perspectiveof an economyof desire basedon a lacked object and an ejaculatory satisfaction, have marked them as dissident, deviant. Caught by the mechanisms designed to neutralize this deviance - marriage, domesticity, public invisibility, and sexual debt (in this economy, Guattari says, `the woman owes her orgasm to the man' [Ibid. ]), women becomedebtors to a systemwhich usestheir body to survive. The point is very similar to those made by Irigaray, regarding the position of women as necessarilyinside and outside the spaceof representation. Guattari argues that by detaching themselves from the profits promised to masculinity - power, control, monopolization of violence, etc. - men too become `directly linked to a becoming-feminine body, as an escaperoute from the repressive socius' (Ibid. ). (It is claims such as thesewhich have worried feminism and led to the accusation of appropriation: a queer man is still a man, it is said.) In more general terms, he argues for the destruction of categories -woman, man, black, white, queer, straight, deviant - and for a distributed sexuality, n-sexes,without definition or border, temporal enduranceor specificity. For a full space,of infinitely proximate and singular 189

Chapter 6 sexes. Again, this has been the focus of feminist objections. Rosi Braidotti, for example, one of the first women to respond positively to Deleuze and Guattari's work, calls it one of `sexual neutrality which does not allow for the fundamental lack of 48 between the sexes'. This criticism reflects Irigaray's concern with the symmetry unexamined paradox of symmetry; but whilst de-stabilizing the rigid structures which form spaceas a three-dimensional domain of co-ordinating planes intersecting at the point of the subject,who provides the fourth dimension in the form of a time constant, Braidotti's insistence on sexual difference as an articulation between male and female remains co-optable by that space. Difference is not, in her view, an immanently differential processwhich escapesthe confines of the binary terms which it relates, howeverasymmetrical that relation might be. Becoming-woman, as Deleuze and Guattari use it, is not biologically, hormonally, or chromosomally defined. Nor is it a gender theory, gender is a term whose field is composedby specific trajectories in the formation of socio-political and cultural spaces,which may or may not be attached to biological femaleness,which itself is not a transparent or determinate concept. For Deleuze and Guattari, becomingwoman is not a necessary condition of the possibility of biocultural concepts of femalenessor the feminine, but rather an immanent condition of becomings, and a positive element in an economics of desire, rather than in its socialization through codesand blockages.They refer to it as `le premier quantum, ou segment moleculaire (the first quantum, or molecular segment)' 49of becomings, and the key to a smooth itinerant line whose motion can be described neither in terms of convergence or rectilinearity, but through the smallest intervals, demon leaps effecting communication betweenthe two orders of force, attraction and repulsion, in a patois which belongs to neither. *** 190

Chapter 6 Unlike Derrida, whose work was embraced enthusiastically by feminists, Deleuzeand Guattari have for the most part been treated with suspicion. Yet Deleuze's critique of common senseand good sense, his attack on the image of thought, his empiricism and the privileging of materiality and force all suggest connections between the direction of his thought and arguments in feminism. A major strand of feminisms' criticisms of philosophy is that it has no body; its exclusion, together with passions and sensuousinterests - all identified by philosophy as "other" to the real problem of thought, and as the source of the apparent peculiarity and atheoretical nature of `women's' thought processes - has limited and restricted its relevanceto the approximately fifty per cent of the human population who are male, since it is precisely on the basis of this exclusion that the (male) subject has beentheorized. So its claims to universal and necessarytruths are unwarranted. Deleuze has been criticized for neglecting feminist projects directed towards the constitution of a specifically female subjectivity. Rosi Braidotti describesherself as a Deleuzian, but nonethelessaccuseshis position on woman on the grounds that it comes from a male embodied subject. Criticisms such as these have limited purchase on the impulse infecting Deleuze's work, which is to exposethe mechanismsby which transcendence is produced, as a real rather than imaginary or ideal repressive mechanism. Deleuze does not deploy becoming-woman as a feminist theory or as a theory of woman, but as an element in the critical arsenal of pragmatics, or autocritique. 191

Chapter6 VA Hesitant Discipless In Patternsof DissonanceRosi Braidotti saysof Deleuze: `He seversthe thread which links the puppets to the master and lets them circulate freely in space,that is to say no longer activated by a central power but through the multiple effects of attraction and '0 intersecting bodies with each other'. -' repulsion of spatial entities, Braidotti understandsbecoming-woman as a term operating outside bilateral oppositions, and as a departure from "the feminine" in its Derridean construction as s' derivative difference. Heideggerian of a more primary ontological and essentially Locating the starting point of Deleuze's work as the death of the subject52,and noting the difference of a philosophy of intensities from one of representation,Braidotti goes on to explicate this difference through the body. The puppet body `as the other of a divinely-ordained mind' is contrasted with a Deleuzian body defined as a `material surface where the codes of language interact...the pure product of cultural and social 53 is "natural" interaction, them' there nothing about modesof Braidotti's formulation of Deleuze is essentially political, and this means her analysis of becoming-woman is informed less by its functional operation in the transformation of a systemof forces, and more by an appeal to "real women"54,where this "real" is neither explored or explained This collapsesthe generation of machinic difference and the breaking symmetries of the line implicated in becoming-woman onto the side of a politics organized in terms of binary sexual difference, limiting it to socio-cultural field, and so contracting the sense of becoming-woman. She is not incorrect, but her reading is incomplete, since it tends to operate as a restriction on 192

Chapter 6 what she understandsby `body'; material bodies - desiring-machines - becomewritten and defined in relation to a socio-political space,and it is in terms of this alone that she understands becoming-woman. This is a retrograde step in relation to Irigaray. Irigaray's force arises from her interrogation and consequent jamming of the theoretical basesof the relations into which Western philosophy has slotted women, and her simultaneousdisengagementof a different woman from the structural orders of its systems and so problematizes across different axes, both inside and out. By confining her debateto the political, Braidotti is unable to utilize this force. Braidotti is critical of Deleuze's `mechanized vision of desire'55 on the grounds that it results in a genderless amalgam of sexuality, a `dispersed polysexuality'56which is uninformed by feminism, and she argues that he is caught in the paradox of a philosophy of difference which does not take into account the very difference that his use of becoming-woman suggests -that is, sexual difference. Her claim about dispersedpolysexuality is not incorrect, since, as seen above, for Deleuze and Guattari sexuality does become a distribution rather than a bilateral disjunction. But their project is neither feminist nor prescriptive: `we do not mean to say that a 57 is kind the this the prerogative of creation of man', and has broader implications than Braidotti's reading suggests. However, becoming-woman includes, but is not exhausted by the political trajectory of "real women", and machinic process are not limited to sexuality or definable in its terms. `Noun ne croyons pas en general que la sexualite ait Ic role d'une infrastructure dans les agencementsde desir, ni qu'elle forme une energie capable de transformation, ou bien de neutralisation et 193

Chapter6 sublimation. La sexualite ne peut titre pensee clue comme un flux parmi d'autres, entrant en conjonction avec d'autres flux, emettant dans particules qui entrent elles-memes sous tel ou tel rapport de vitesseet dc lenteur dans le voisinage de telles autres particules. (We do not believe in general that sexuality has the role of an infrastructure in the assemblagesof desire, nor that it constitutes an energy capable of transformation or of neutralization and sublimation. Sexuality can only be thought of as one flux among others, entering into conjunction with other fluxes, emitting particles which themselves enter into particular relationships of speed and 58 in the vicinity of certain other particles)'. slowness Sexuality is not equivalent to or a basis of desire, and a body is a geography and population of fluxes, a bloc of becoming, defined not in terms of its molar components - this one has breasts, this one a penis, this one is black and this one scarred,this one beautiful, this one plain - but by its affects and the linkages it effects with other bodies, by contiguous intensities which release sexualities as qualities of their difference. Deleuze suggests relinquishing the term desiring-machine, which comesfrom Guattari, in order to prevent the confusion of desire and sexuality. Amongst the criticisms directed at Deleuze and Guattari is that they perpetuatehistorically entrenchedassociationsof women - with madness,for example. History has also devotedmuch time to reducing women to sexual objects,however, and for feminism to perpetuate this attachment and use sexuality as the major defining factor of women seems not only to mitigate against their criticism of Deleuze and Guattari, but also to privilege one type of flow, rather than addressing the vast complexities of `women's' lives and the myriad qualities of the force lines with which they connect. 194

Chapter6 Braidotti counteractsher positive responseto connections between Deleuze's work and feminist interrogations of traditional philosophical tales, both of which are engagedin `developing forms of subjectivity and modesof desire at the furthest remove from the Phallic model': he is, she writes, `normative by omission' and `[Alt no point in his thought does he take into account the specific history of women's own attempts to redefine their subjectivity'. $9 Her position is no doubt strategic, borne out of a reaction against the proliferating philosophical use of "woman" as a newly privileged term through which to negotiate problems coming out of the "death of the subject." However, it remains within the reach of negative operations connectedwith a traditional metaphysic of the subject, becauseit continues to search, however disguised that search might be, for something essential to women, an exclusive definition which characterizesthem as a unified group, as "real women". As has been remarked, above, Deleuze and Guattari are not claiming either to be feminists, or to be providing a theory of women; as for appropriation, the phantom of the victim is buried in this term. Braidotti's criticisms might be filled out by examining the economic systems which produce women as consumers/subjects;by exploring the different empirical relations which generatetheir various and diverse situations. However, it is, as it stands,unsatisfying as a responseto becoming-woman. Becoming-woman does not, for Braidotti, result in the upheaval of exchange between men of women, and nor does she engage with desiring-machines outside the realm of metaphor: she quotes Irigaray - `isn't it a sort of metaphor for her/it, that men can use?'60 Rather than leading to problems of material self-organization, undoing the possibility of implementing the schemaof subjectivity by dissolving its parametersas it 195

Chapter 6 passes through, becoming-woman remains within a representational frame-work, where women's bodiesare still whole objects,defined sexually, with no critical account of this sexuality being provided outside the realm of social, symbolic and cultural images; this implies that despite her recognition of the intensivextensive disjunction, she continues to conceive of this as exclusive, in order to retain a bilateral distinction between man and woman which is as a consequenceonly extensively legitimate which is to say, illegitimate in Deleuze's terms. Matter remains outside. Inside (representation)she is quite correct to say: `The `becoming-womanof... 'is a force which appropriates women's bodies, an exchangeamong the master-thinkers of the feminine body: it perpetuatesan ancestral habit of domination as the trait of the masculine discourse on women. It is still a misogynist mode of thought.'(B, 1991: 123) *** Returning to Deleuze's work in a later book, Nomad Subjects, Braidotti's hesitance is reduced. Nomadic becoming is seen as expressing Deleuze's `quest for postmetaphysical figurations of the subject'61, which is no longer centralized and productive, nor even dead, but 'a term in a process of intersecting forces'. The later reading is more incisive, in that rather than being concernedwith what she seesas the starting point - "the death of the subject" -her attention has shifted to the periphery, to the point of exit from death, and the question of the exportation and return of the model of death, as the immanence of experience, the zero added to each body as an assemblage.However, despite being more materialist, characterizing becoming in 196

Chapter 6 terms of `sensitive matter, independently of the subjectsinvolved and their determined forms'62 her understanding of force as `highly constructed social and symbolic'63 continuesto restrict it to a molar regime. For Braidotti, sexualdifference `cannot be consideredas one difference among many but rather as a founding, fundamental structural difference on which all others rest and that cannot be dissolved easily.'64 This contrastsdirectly with Deleuze's remark above,about sexuality being one flux amongst others. She is critical of Deleuze for privileging one becoming amongst others, that of becoming-women,but seemsto want to privilege one difference amongst others, that of sexuality. Yet the idea of a fundamental structural difference is anathema to materialism: structures are generated, not original, plastic not fixed. Appeals to a founding structural difference which grounds all others and which is close-to immune from dissolution pushes Braidotti back towards basic bilateral disjunctions and a transcendentmetaphysic. Braidotti closesher chapter on Deleuze's becoming-woman as follows: `Speaking as a Deleuzian who believes that desire is the effective motor of political change, as opposed to wailful transformation, I experience that "I know, but..." mode as a genuine, positive contradiction in Deleuze's thinking. '65 197

Chapter 6 "I know, but..." expressesher hesitancy in calling herself a Deleuzian because he's hesitancy "but" A like is Deleuze man. well-placed, since, a sexuality, one flux amongst others, and besides,disciplehood is not a condition one associateswith his writing. Moreover, her understanding of this as a positive contradiction makes it a fertile move rather than one which closes down her relation with Deleuze. Whilst he (like Kant) privileges following over imitation, to attribute him with mastery of the lines he himself follows is in the end to approach his machines with cynicism, the capitalist disease.Some strange innocence is needed, 'd'une autre espece,d'une autre 66 d'une (another species,another nature, another origin)' autre origin nature, Her remark above obviates in a senseany need to critique the particulars of her argument: it is engaged less with what he writes, than with the difficulties feminists discover, when open to engagements with `male' philosophies whose direction is not - unusually -antagonistic towards women, either openly or, like the work of Derrida, sycophantic - he'd love to write like a woman, he says,even though he finds feminism castratingl67And Braidotti is not as naive in her reading of Deleuze as the above criticisms imply: she understands that what is useful for feminism in Deleuze's writing is not what is said `about women 68- which is very little, but in its interdisciplinarity, in the abstract nature of the tools it offers. In Patternsof Dissonance,Braidotti asks: `What is the point of using the term "becoming-woman" in the analysis of masculine texts when it is clear that the study bearson the vicissitudes and the internal evolution of a system closed -and foreclosed- to women, that is, philosophy?'69 198

Chapter 6 Several questionscould be asked. Since Braidotti speaks as a Deleuzian, but claims philosophy is closed to women, where does this mean she locates Deleuze?Or, has her understandingof philosophy changed in the three years betweenthe two books, betweenDeleuze as essentially misogynist and herself as hesitantly Deleuzian? Or, has she decidedthat whether or not Deleuze is a philosopher, he is at least a socio-political thinker who engageswith feminism? Attempting to answer these questions maps one into an implied agreementwith the basic claim that philosophy is systematicallyclosed to women. This reducesphilosophy to the canon of its history, to its secondarytexts and academicinstitutions. Making it a discipline rather than an exploration. ### Limiting its attention to "female/feminine" centred problems and building systems and epistemologies on unexamined concepts of experience, based on metaphysically unquestioned assumptions, feminism will be doomed to intellectual ghettoization, and close down a potential market for its subversions. If it limits its attentions to scienceto pointing out the intrusion of social theory into scientific claims about women, and fails to deploy positively the technological transformations immanent to the new models science is producing, whose trajectory suggests the collapse of precisely those concepts against which feminism has in the past argued objectivity, identity, idealism and dead matter, - feminism will be a side-line, of interest only to women fuelled by the political fluxes of desire. If it is the casethat philosophy has misconstrued women, positioned them in places they would rather not be, and made claims about their intelligence, their bodies, their capabilities, etc., which are both disagreedwith and are looking increasingly ridiculous, then there is little point attachedto a continuing argument with reasondesignedfrom the position of its victim. For if women are not its victim, reason is either empty and impotent, or its function 199

Chapter 6 must be understood differently. Feminism becomes normative when it becomes incapable of engaging with philosophy beyond the limits of theorizations of gender and suggeststhat such an engagementis anathemato women. Kant saysthe same: women may as well grow beardsas learn how to think. 200

Chapter 7 Breeding Demons `we will call them "demons," becausethey are not controlled by a ' masterprogram. I Changing the Object `Warton was held down by wardressesas the doctor inserted a fourfoot-long tube down her throat. A few seconds after the tube was down, she vomited all over her hair, her clothes and the wall, yet the task continued until all the liquid had been emptied into her stomach.'2 It is easyto lose sight of the violence to which women have been subjectedin their struggles to transform their situation, and to which they are still subjected.Jane Warton's treatment in prison was a consequenceof her protestation against this same treatment, which she had seeninflicted on women who, like her, had been imprisoned for engaging in suffragist activities. Shewas in reality Lady ConstanceLytton, and had disguised her identity in order to illustrate the different treatments meted out to women in prison on the basis of their class status; on their visibility as appendagesto men. On a previous occasion,under her family name, she had been treated more leniently, and released after a couple of days. This simple example illustrates that analyses of connectionsamongst women is not comprehendedby class determined as a relation to modesof production. Warton was on the women's side. Yet class relations are only one example of the different orders across which women move, at odds with the major directions, passing through them but never at 201

Chapter 7 home. This difference is also inscribed in the theoretical operations of philosophy, and meansthat finding where women are distributed within philosophical theories, such as Kant's, is problematic: the elementsprivileged by commentators are for the most part those which are explicitly associated with men - spontaneity, superior strength, activity, reason,genius, abstract logical thought, firmness and accuracy of judgement, moral fortitude, duty, respect, honesty...the list could be longer, but the idea is clear. And it is not only that women are conceptually disconnectedfrom the major concerns of philosophy, where those themes with which they have been associatedare discussed imagination, beauty, madness, nature, passion, receptivity, lying, sensibility, etc. - the relations according to which they are constructed do not emerge from those themes, nor indeed distribute them, but are imposed upon them from outside. Understanding is, after all, the lawgiver of nature. This is why a systemsuch as Kant's appearsso different when addressedfrom a perspective whose interest is in the theoretical underpinnings of philosophical misogyny, and looks to discover how deeply ingrained they are. Deleuze's philosophy is not feminist, but it doesnot claim to be so: what it does, however, is build a machine which doesnot follow orthodox patterns, which is creatively destructive and rigorously and acutely composed, and which, by exploring the structures which support the spontaneouslyacting and judging subject, or man of State, crosseslines with feminist thought and provides meansof accelerating the collapse of philosophical preciousness regarding what is appropriate to it. Deleuze does not provide a model: unlike Braidotti, I do not think one can "be a Deleuzian". However, it is an exemplary machine of thought, and it is in this that its value for feminism rests, rather than in its explicit remarks on becoming-woman. 202

Chapter7 The isolated remarks which Kant makes about women in discussions of anthropology and aestheticsare the effects of more deeply ingrained structural and systematicmisogynies, and it is to these that violence refers for its justifications and validations. Fernand Braudel writes: `The role of women is always a structural element in any civilisation it is long-lived test: reality, resistant to external pressure, and a -a hard to change overnight. A civilisation generally refusesto accept a cultural innovation that calls in question one of its own structural elements.*3 Transformations in the visible images and operations of women, the collapse of the orders of their historical containment, such as the family, together with their accelerating infiltration into disciplines and cultures erectedon the exclusion of women (and blacks, and anyone else who does not fit the model of recognition and image of thought) are changing the long-lived reality. In tracking the forces and flows of woman independently of the subject, in connection with natural technologies and material flows, one seeksto diagnoseand generatelegitimate descriptions of the future tenseof women. This is the line of becoming-woman. Women cannot simply be identified with objects, although they have been objectsin part. Irigaray, reading Marx, writes: `Merchandises, les femmes sont deux chores ä la fois: objets .. d'utilite et porte-valeur. (As commodities, women are thus two things at once: utilitarian objects and bearers of value).v4 203

Chapter 7 In terms of its utility, a woman's body is material, but this is of secondary importance to its exchangevalue, Irigaray argues, which rests in abstraction and in the resulting cancellation of material difference. But this abstraction from utility generates lacks location: do have it that the visible a women not value produces since problems, in reflective economies, and thus the necessary are which of power, she writes, signs abstraction can be realised only through exchange, only by measurementin relation to a third term, to which neither of them correspond. However, for this to take place, horizontal relations amongst women need to be cancelled, or overcoded,the materiality of their bodies re-configured, for, in terms of their own affinities, the qualities which support abstractionare lacking. This move is clear in Kant. Whilst he allows that individual men will have brunettes, blondes for different or slim or curvaceous,vivacious or women preferences coy - when it comesto evaluations of beauty, as the quality of women which bears the value of abstraction, these differences, since they are based on physical attractions, must be discounted All the `other merits of a woman should unite solely to enhance the character of the beautiful, which is the proper reference point'. ' However, judgements of the beautiful do not locate it as a quality of a body sojudged, but refer it to a subject, and his feelings of pleasure or displeasure; only thus can a judgement be universal, since it is devoid of any specific attraction or agreeability. In such circumstances,Kant writes, one `must believe that he is justified in requiring a similar liking from everyone because he cannot discover, underlying this liking, any private conditions, on which only he might be dependent,so that he 204

Chapter7 must regard it as basedon what he can presupposein everyone else as well. s6 In the caseof judgements of the beautiful on bodies public taste is appendedto a moral concept, presupposing an idea of what that body is supposedto be, what its function or purpose is. And for women, it is reproduction; in terms of this value, women's materiality is re-configured, in order to becomethe repository of an abstract exchangevalue, that attachedto the capacity to produce a child. As the practical value of women, reproduction is visible, has form and beauty; the image is the Madonna. However, as a material and bodily function, it is fearsomeand gives rise to disgust: to prevent this, which would suggestthe tangling of sensible elements in the form of the object (the body) and so degradethe judgement both aesthetically and morally, women need to develop a senseof shame, which `servesto draw a curtain of mystery before ' the most appropriate and necessarypurposes of nature'. Women must thus even contribute to their production as exchangeableobjects, whose abstract value is rests in their reproductive capacity. They must, as was remarked in the Introduction, be selfbodies is intensive The their thus made relative to extension, to materiality of pruning. a public and universally agreed upon quality of form which excites the contemplation of a community of subjects whilst simultaneously confirming the function of reproduction, which is no longer a messymaterial process,but a moral duty. Only then can this object becomerelated on a plane of equality to other objects of the same type, through the medium of a third party, the judging subject. Donna Haraway problematizes theorisations of women as objects, by complicating the idea objects are inert and passive in the face of judgement. Her challenge is directed at Irigaray's critique of specular economiesand the privilege of touch. As a scientist and primatologist, observation is essential to her work; but her 205

Chapter 7 theorisation of vision removes it from the mirrored economy of reflection, so that it does not operate as a principle of identification or recognition. Observation ceasesto be, necessarily,a power move codedin advancethrough structures specific to a subject, but becomesa manoeuvrableand manoeuvring direction, which neither takes charge of, nor submits to, an object; it becomesa movement between, echoing Deleuze's AND logics, a relation which effectuates both sides as both observer and observed, in a manner which carries the logic of Irigaray's two lips, as a positive feedback process. The object is no longer the result of formal impositions pressedonto intensive matter, but a formation generatedthrough material interactivity which does not arrive at the logic of subjectivity, since the conditions of its production are technically incompatible with the closed systemsprotective of a unified (or even fractured) identity. `The body, the object of biological discourse, itself becomesa most engaging being. Claims of biological determinism can never be the sameagain. When female "seal' has been so thoroughly re-theorised and revisualisedthat it emergesas practically indistinguishable from "mind", somethingbasic has happenedto the category of biology. '$ is strong. Theories of female `sex' no longer run directly (or claim Haraway's even indirectly) through the womb; desire connects instead with the intellect, and this circuit has effects which bleed beyond the limits of feminism, to the very category of biology itself. Feminist discoursefeedsback into science,not as an addendum,but as a challenge to its basic categories and methodologies. Haraway's demon, the cyborg, draws technologically enhanced sensibilities together with female desire, in the production of a body whose boundaries are no longer definable through a linear and maternal nature, and for whom reproduction is no longer a privileged term. Intensities are no longer confined within extensive form, nor re-structured according to moral 206

Chapter 7 purposes,and, most importantly, the cyborg dissolvesthe veil of shamewhich lingered in feminism in its depiction of women as victims. Remembering the violence remarked at the opening of this chapter does not necessitatean identification with the position of its victims (and certainly not with its perpetrators: who wants equality with this?). This is based on sentiment and turns women, once more, into objects of pity, as well as perpetuating an image of nature as violence and conflict. The cyborg is not based on identifications between women and `nature in the Western sense',Haraway writes, but moves towards an anorganic nature, a techno-naturewhich debunks the privileges of the organism and the human, and the mechanistic technologies specific to this latter. Since Haraway's work on primatology connectswith the cyborg too; the latter does not describe a relation of humanity with technology, but a much broader concept, which upsets the easy separation of teleological and mechanical orders and human and "other" primates. It is in this respectthat it connectswith Deleuze and Guattari's machinic phylum.9 Haraway attacks both the production of women (by women as well as men) as victims, and the prescriptive voices which call for a unity amongst women, in the interests of some political aim, on the grounds that it attributes a shared identity amongst them, which effects the same cancellation of differences which women have argued against. `There is nothing about being "female" that naturally binds women.'1° This has already been questionedin the last chapter, with respectto referencesto "real women"; Haraway's cyborg dissolves the possibility of such categories having any purchaseon bodies, by dispersing sexuality, by dislocating it from discussionsof lack, and relating it to the positive operationsof the intellect. 207

Chapter 7 II Making Femininity The association of women, or the feminine, or femaleness with passivity and man/masculinity/malenesswith activity has never been a simple one. The disjunction is unstable; as a reproductive animal, woman is conceived of as passive and receptive in relation to the activity and spontaneityof the man. Yet sexually she exerts an attractive force, although even this is not coherent, being intermixed with repulsion (the man feels repulsion, not the woman). The feminine has no necessarytheoretical relation with women at all, but is rather attached to notions of genius. Christine Battersby, in an extendedexploration of the relations of genius and gender, exposesthe twists and turns in the value of the feminine, which are not limited to philosophy. `The medical texts imply (without ever making the implication explicit) that the human being who possessesgenius will have the sexual organs of a male, but will also have feminine " characteristics'. Genius feminizes, but females have neither the mental or physical stamina for genius; feminine is not the root of feminism, nor attached to the female. The parenthetical remark about implication is also important, for it is these undercurrents which carry themes whose force is made redundant by the explicit structures erected on their ground. Part of the task of feminism in relation to philosophy is dissolving the certainty of theseerections. Kant gives graphic expression to the contraries and contradictions and implications of philosophy's women in a quote from Horace appended, inexplicably and unexplained, to a footnote in the Anthropology `A beautiful woman aboveends foully in a black fish'. 12 Reconciliation of the wide distribution of functions designated female/feminine/womanlywith passivity has generatedacrobatic thought processesand incredible claims. Freud has becomea classic example. In his lecture Femininity, he is cautious, advising against the decision to make `"active" coincide with "masculine" 208

Chapter 7 and "passive" with "feminine" c13,citing the relation betweenmother and child as one in which femalesare active, and the restriction of activity in male spiders to `the single act of sexual unions14 as problematic cases. Yet whilst Freud is prepared to accommodate `the influence of social customs, which-force women into passive situations"5 he undercuts himself by attributing a preference for passivity to women, `on the basis of her share in the sexual function'16 (without questioning to what extent this is also socially inscribed), and by making woman's activity relative to `passive aims'. His opening summation of the puzzle of femininity reaches its height in his description of what is truly feminine as masochistic in nature. Social pressuresserving only to develop thesedestructive trends, so making truly feminine passivity that of the victim. Yet Freud's advice against easy acceptance of the established mapping between the woman/man and passivelactive oppositions comes to nothing: however complicated the distribution of activity and passivity become in the female - for example, the relation of little girls to their mothers is `completely ambivalent, both affectionate and of a hostile and aggressive nature'" - nonethelessthe `turn towards femininity' is signalled by a `wave of passivitys18.The girl turns to her father and, `with the help of passive instinctual impulses...which clear phallic activity out of the 19 `turn be to out normal'. Phew. way', may perhaps In both volumes of Capitalisme et Schizophrenie,Deleuze and Guattari talk of the theft of little girls bodies, and its necessityas preparatory to the theft of little boys bodies. `[C]esse dc to tenir comme ca, tu n'es plus une petite fille, tu n'es pas un garcon manque, etc. (stop behaving like that, you're not a little girl anymore, you're not a tomboy, etc.)i20.The creation of female femininity appearsdirectly counter to that of male femininity. The former is a process of restriction, limitation, repression and 209

Chapter 7 prohibition, which serveto introduce the female body to its proper desires, the location feminine its being, its truly passivity. The latter, however, attachesto sexual of proper expressionsof release,to the outpourings of genius and is close to madness. But the point of this is not to engage in a debate with Freud concerning the developmentof female sexuality. His words ring bizarre in much the same way as, for example, Aristotle's, when he proposes his flower-pot theory of reproduction, which also places women as both powerful and active, the potent materiality from which the logos grows, and as weak and passive, since women themselves lack the power of the logos growing inside her. What these discussions illustrate are the confusions and contortions which grow from attempts to reconcile the passive/active opposition with sexual or gender distinctions, and the mobility of characteristics attaching to each arm of the disjunction, as historical contingencies shift privileges and values. The easyleap from passivity to masochism; the assumption that, in children's play, passivity is it, the degree to which this is successful annuls which against activity, reacted with serving as a basis for `conclusions as to the relative strength of the masculinity and femininity that it will exhibit in its sexuality'21; the characterisation of the libido as constrained `when it is pressed into the service of the feminine function'22; the physiological equivalenceof this constraint evidencedby the `small penis', or clitoris23. Freud offers these and many more examples of the problems generated by the developmentof girls and women into proper passivefeminine persons. Kant is no less happy with the equation of woman with passivity. `Her 24 is [Weltweisheit] but [Empfinden] to The critical to not reason, philosophy sense . implications of this are not that women lack understanding, but rather that they lack the methodological capacity with which to systematiseknowledge.25The architectonic ordering of transcendentalrelations is absent in the female, so whilst `the fair sex has 210

Chapter 7 just as much understanding as the male...it is a beautiful understanding', rather than a in thus can she not contain a unit, as reason was seen only chaos not rational one, and to do in the discussionof the sublime, but her knowledge remains at the aggregateand 26 lacking level, pattern and systematicity. She can neither build a house with random an overlook, nor does she have the reason to make the marks of permanence on her imagination and confirm the immortality of a soul. There is no rational compulsion attendant upon women's understanding which condemns them to formulate objects in general or morality, no diktak commanding the conversion of their intellects into Law. However, the problem is irresolvable by further interrogation of the intricacies and confusions of Kant's comments directly bearing on either the beautiful or woman. What is at stake is a break in the understanding of production, which is the focus of Deleuzian critique. To return to the flower-pot, there is no account of the production of the all-powerful soil from which logos emergesas a secondarymode of production. In Deleuze's terms, there is no account of the production of the unconscious- of how, for example, Kantian reason came to contain a unit of chaos, and it is this uncritical assumptionof a power possessedby a subject, still functioning illegitimately in Kant, that passivesynthesisforces into operation, with rigour and unKantian consequences. III Market Making 6I1est devenu le temps de la ville et rien d'autre, le pur ordre du temps. (It has becomethe time of the town and nothing else, the pure order ' time)'? of 211

Chapter 7 Deleuze saysthis of Kantian time. It is not meteorological, rural, governed by the seasons,the climate, growing patterns, the reproductive cycles of the animals; nor is it cosmic, celestial, referring to the movementsof the stars, the turning of the world. It is the time of the town. But what doesDeleuze mean by this, and how is it related to the problem of becoming-woman? The problem of the town is one of circulation, of entries and exits, flows and polarisation's, frequencies,horizontal integrations and co-ordinations. The town is a `point remarquablesur des circuits qui la creent ou qu'elle crde (remarkable point on the circuits that createit, and which it creates)', which makes no sensein isolation, but exists only as a point in a cycle of flows, a node in a network of transfers and transmissions,interactions and associationswith other towns.' In Mille PlateauxDeleuzeand Guattari draw on the work of Fernand Braudel, who writes of towns as `electric transformers', accelerating tensions and rhythms of 29 interaction. Braudel charts a history of the town (and writes that social and economic history was introduced with the town, with the appearanceof the written word); he talks of its creating and conquering the countryside and of their mutual reciprocity; of thresholds of urbanisation at which self-generated transformations occur, beyond which a town achievesa minimum of efficiency; of the divisions of labour implied by the town; of rings of stone marking the effort for independence and desire for expansion in the middle ages, offering both protection against enemies and contributing to the control of the population inside the walls; of the complicated networks of Western towns and the regimented order of Roman towns; of the emergence of town-planning in the Renaissance; of vertical as well as horizontal growth; of taxation, credit, customs and excise. And of much more. But for understanding why Deleuze calls Kantian time the time of the town there is one 212

Chapter 7 remark which standsout: `everytown, wherever it may be, must primarily be a market. Without a market, a town is inconceivable'30 Braudel differentiates between markets and capital. The former can be associatedwith Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the production of production, the three synthesesof connection, distribution and consumption as a single cycle; market hinge', but `is both turning the circle and a co-ordinated, not enclosing an exchange sub-ordinated, effect of a myriad connections, at fairs, shops, at cross-roads,on the corner, where prices are mobile but the emergenteffect is one of a meta-stableand self" regulating system. From the chaos of the market emerges `the first computer mankind ever had'32;but rather than the program being fixed (e.g., as in a price list or through subsidies),and functioning as a control mechanism on the relation of input to it itself is by subject to transformations as a extrinsic conditions output, or governed result of the concrete flows which pass through it. The cycle itself adds difference to the potential of its own functioning: more simply, it learns and learning potentiates material changesin the routes and connections, distributions and conjunctions of the cycle. The spaceof the market is not striated and segmentedby extrinsic operations; it has no image, no central memory or general rule, and is an actual continuum, presupposing nothing other that its immanent operations, a circulation of states, a33 central, non-hierarchical, surface This contributes to understanding why Deleuze and Guattari call synthesis passive.The cycles of a market are not effected through the operation of an external agent, an identity to which synthesis is related, but through indirect interactions, productive connectionswhich are not trades or exchanges(Braudel differentiates trade from the self-regulating mechanismsof markets) but break-flows. 213

Chapter 7 `[r]oute machine est coupure de flux par rapport A celle ä laquelle eile est connectee,mais flux ehe-meme ou production dc flux par rapport A celle qui lui est connectee.Teile est la loi de production de production. ([E]very machine functions as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is connected,but at the sametime is also a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connectedto it. This is the law of the production of production). 934 The continuity of the actual continuum, of a materially intensive full space,is conditioned by the breaks or interruptions of the machines. The break constitutes a partial object, partial not in the sense of incompleteness, which would return the processto an economy of lack specific to capital, and direct desire towards a whole object, a complete thing, once more framing the problem in extension (for how could an intensity be incomplete?). But partial (partiaux) in the senseof biased, evaluative, `comme les intensites souslesquellesune matiere remplit toujours 1'espaceA des degres divers (like the intensities under which a unit of matter always fills space in varying degrees')35Objects become pieces of a journey, directions, tendencies, selective principles, elementsin a sequenceor chain, molecular, rather than molar. In a trade and exchange system, each object is complete - in the sense that an object of representation is complete - its value determined in advance of the process of exchange, through the system of pricing. Exchange serves not only to confirm this value which pre-occupiesthe object but also removes it from circulation, since it's value then restsin its utility - that is, it belongs to the consumptive subject,that subject to whom the kingdom belongs. In the market, however, each interaction is only partial, objects are partial and rather than dropping out of circulation to be consumed, each 214

Chapter 7 different different them circuit, and principle of selection, a a with connects movement different sequenceor chain.36 Since the continuum is intensive, and so too are partial objects,the distinction between flow and objects -which might be understood as that between money and becomes difference The dissolved. one of relative compressions, commodity -becomes break does intensities; a not mean a separation, a removal of a of or contractions but is itself flow, line hole behind, different leaves a a of escape, a a which sequence bias or directionality, which connectswith another flow, effects a break or interruption else' here. Capital, on the other hand, through States as `modeles dc rdalisation 37 immanents (immanent models of realization)', imposes external controls, ostensibly "fair" "equal". The things the the consumer of or making of protecting purpose with State corporatizes, industrializes, massifies, introduces regulative mechanisms, taxation, credit control, tariffs, damaging the autonomous balance of markets, and, more importantly, divorcing economic from social life through the medium of politics: capital, Braudel says,is a political word. In effect, Braudel argues, capital functions as an anti-market, as an inhibitor, or as Deleuze and Guattari express it, as God, State Unlike transcendent the Despot the extrinsic unity as an antiproduction. however, in a capitalist regime, the State as the agent of anti-production becomes immanent to all flows, `une gigantesqueentreprise d'anti-production, mais au sein de la production meme, et la conditionnant (a gigantic enterprise of antiproduction, but at 38 itself, '. The cycle is thus heart this the and conditioning production) of production attached to an extrinsic determined image, from which its power and its movement its in terms to all relations are understood. and of which appear emanate, 215

Chapter 7 In Passive Synthesis, the difference beween conjunction as a blockage, or flows flow, to that all a single subjugates and conjunction as accumulation of point AND logic was mentioned - the difference between a macro-history of great men, with the subject as agent of synthesis, and a micro-history of populations and flows. The former, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is the conjunction specific to capital, to the formation of an abstract attraction-machine, from which all flows seem to emanate. Like the Kantian transcendental,like the subject, capital appears as an unengendered presuppositionof production, as the father of surplus value, folding back over markets its the abstract axiomatic. of concretization and regulating The complexities of the relations between capital and the State, capital and the market, the difference between the social economics of a market and the political its to social relations according own needs, re-describes capital, which economicsof are too intricate to explore here: another thesis would be needed.What is important for Deleuze's Kantian is double town time the the about of comment above understanding both in faces direction, it faces State, implies. The it town the ways; one and aspect it faces Deleuze in the the market. other and Guattari call and capitalist axiomatics 39 du 'la (capitalism's true capitalisme vrai police police)'; money and the market however, Irigaray's question concerning what would happen if commodities learned to in be re-asked relation to money and markets. What and sideways, shifted can speak happens if money learns to speak, not with the voice of capital, as an expression of purchasing power, of hedonistic potential, of luxury and excessand of the expansion of power, but of its own behaviour, as a flow which resists accumulation, which always escapes,which effects movements, rather than buying things, potentiates mobilities and interactions which crossthrough capital zones,but never remain inside. 216

Chapter 7 Community or commercium. From one perspectivethe town and the flows of trade appear organized by the capital and the State, and the town and its markets appear to depend for the flows that circulate through it on the resourcesthese supply. In the other direction, the town is fundamentally a market in contact with other markets, from which emerges a world-economy different to the capital economy between States; indeed, Deleuze and Guattari write that not only did the towns not create capitalism, but that they anticipated it and warded it off. They point to the in Deductions, inhibition in Forces to of anticipation and referred and mechanisms relation to the warding off of the State by primitive and nomadic States; these mechanisms `jouent dans les villes "contre" l'Etat et "contre" le capitalisme (are at play in the conflict of towns "against" the State and "against" capitalism'). Whilst capitalism won, however, the horizontal networks of the towns were not demolished as a result of this; for capitalism requires the markets, requires the release of flows it effects and the cycles it turns, just as reason needs time, in order not to be god, and men needwomen, in order not to die. But something always escapes. Like the town time faces both ways: in one direction it is the chronological line of succession,defined by the unit, the corporeal present measuring actions and causes,to which past and future are relative, indicating only the relation between two presents.Here is formal time, the concept of time, physical and cyclical, concrete: time as money. In another direction, however, it is the pure empty form of time, the labyrinthine line which divides into itself, incorporeal, imperceptible, autonomous, divested of matter, and the time with which Deleuze credits Kant, in the first of the four poetic formulae; time unhinged from the cardinality of capitalism, which adds its coins one by one by one by one and keeps them in the bank, measuring its wealth relative to its history and the dreamedprospectsof its future. The market is the turning hinge of the cycle; unhinged from the Stateand from capital, the market becomes. 217

Chapter 7 IV Becoming-imperceptible `Bref, une ligne de fuite, dejä complexe, avec ses singularites; mais aussi une ligne molaire ou coutumiere avec sessegments;et entre les deux (?), une ligne moleculaire, avec ses quanta qui la font pencher d'un cote ou de I 'autre. already complex, with singularities; but also a molar or customary line with segments; and between the two (?), a molecular line with quanta which cause it to tip to one side or the other)' (DG, 1980: 249; 1988: 203 - translation amended). (In short, a line of fight, Deleuze and Guattari position becoming-womanas the first quantum, the first demon flash which tips the balance of becoming away from the strata, from customary orders and patterns and towards the molecular line. It is in this respectthat becomingwoman relates to the town, and to time, as an itinerant movement which is in-between the State and the market, simultaneously facing onto and away from the strata. Precisely, it seems,as philosophy has always positioned women, as neither inside or outside, not properly one thing or another. It is the potential for positioning women in relation to the town, rather than to nature, and for becoming-woman as a movement towards the market which effects the releaseof monetary flows from the accumulativetendenciesof capital; it is this relation of women to the economy, as a bias of escape,rather than as an object exchanged between subjectsin state capitalism, which includes socialism as well - that is missed by a purely politico-sexual analysis. For in the movement the balance tips from the molar to molecular, and women ceaseto be commodities, or even, as Irigaray says, commodities which speak, and instead begin to function as partial objects, biases, 218

Chapter 7 evaluations. Whilst their interactions are not regulated from any external position, the combined effect - to those who remain outside, in the rare air of the State, capital, the subject - the movement appears purposeful, directed, the biases appear correlated, caused.If it is this latter, it is in the sensespokenof before, of reversecausality without finality, testifying to an action of the future on the present. Becoming-woman is this movement,a future not yet synthesized,but whose effectsare becoming concretetoday. Both Rosi Braidotti and Elizabeth Grosz, in their readings of becomingwoman refer to a Cartesianmodel of the subject,which has no relation with either time nor town. Not only does this make life much easier, for the Cartesian subject is something of a straw-dog against which to pitch an argument, but it also misses the philosophical forces on which Deleuze draws. The labyrinthine lines of the pure form of time feed throughout his work, and philosophy becomes a market-place without rules, with no historical pre-conditions determining the directions one can take, the associationsand alliances one can make. Kant argues against Leibniz? Deleuze makes them bargain for space. Against Spinoza? He draws a Spinozist substancetogether with the critical demand for immanence. There is no truth, only ideas, no profit, only surplus flows to return to the horizontal integrations and latitudes of the market. Deleuze and Guattari call this `communication d'ä-cote (side- 40 communication)'; side-communication is surplus but not profit, composed of transferable fragments, `supplementsdann l'ordre d'une multiplicite, plusvalues dans l'ordre d'un rhizome (supplementsin the order of a multiplicity, surplus values in the 41 order of a rhizome) which transfer information from one order to another, from one speciesto another, in an aparallel evolution - like the wasp and the orchid mentioned in an earlier chapter. It is perhaps becausethere is no grandeur or magnificence in these tiny connectionsthat they have been overlooked, and so little thought has gone 219

Chapter 7 into the patterns they follow and the systemsthey effect. Where nature is conceivedof as red in tooth and claw, or a subjectof rape rather than of passiveexploration, its real patterns remain imperceptible. It is these movementswhich this thesis has showedare necessary to the construction of the extensive theatre of representation; singular asymmetrical connections,horizontal side-communications,intensities escapingpoints, money escaping the banks, sexuality escaping biology, desire escaping sexuality, everywherea shifting drifting flow of mobile distributions on the body of the earth. Side-communication relates also to Deleuze's method of theft; becausethe market is not driven by ideology - as are state capitalism/socialism - the history of philosophy itself becomesa market, the tendencies and directions of which are not fixed, but which can be broken into, pieces and fragments stolen, taken elsewhere, connectedwith other machines. What counts is only if something works, which is to say, only if something releasesflows, rather than containers, accountsin which to keep them. Because women have been characterised as both inside and outside, their movement - as Irigaray saw - is double; inside, on the strata, which correspondsto Irigaray's occupation of the philosophical body, to her careful and elegant tracings of its magic geographiesand logics - inside, women move in perceptible, and sometimes 42 apparently recognisableways. But through their relations with the outside, they are also and simultaneously imperceptible, their movements disappearing, becoming secret,only to re-appearelsewhere,different, re-configured, transformed. This is what deterritorialization means: the connection of leaps, tiny intervals, demons breeding demons,in a smooth continuous line of escapewhich re-territorializes somewhereelse, differently - as Irigaray says,when she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere. `Mais que signifie devenir-imperceptible, ä la fin de toes les devenirs moleculaires qui commencaientpar le devenir-femme? 220

Chapter 7 (But what doesbecoming-imperceptiblesignify, coming at the end of all the molecular becomingsthat begin with becoming-woman)?'43 Elizabeth Grosz's responseto becoming-imperceptible, or an-organic, is to situate it within a molar political context and refer it to the potential `obliteration or marginalization of women's struggles.'44 She argues that, by the `uncritical internalization of perspectivesand interests devised and developedby men', women fail to notice the pit-falls of a movement which suggests, once more, that women function as a means towards the ends of men.45Not only does becoming-woman not have any intrinsic or essentialrelation to women (that is, it is not an empirical concept, in the sensethat it has the apparent stability of the concrete present - it does not "look like" a woman), but moreover, Deleuze and Guattari are explicit in saying that women must become-womanin order for men to be able to become-woman,and that sexuality goesby way of this latter becoming - `par le devenir-femmede 1'homme(by way of the becoming-woman of the man)'. 46 Grosz equates becoming-imperceptible with the invisibility of women in a molar domain, and with the annexation of their desire to systemswhose interestsare elsewhere- in other words, with a failure of recognition. However, that is to mistake the nature of becoming: it is not women who becomeimperceptible, or anorganic. Imperceptibility refers to the nature of movement, rather than to something that moves. To Irigaray's secret movements, to intensive distributions, connections amongst women and men, women and women, men and men, and all with machines, which have shattered the categories, broken the codes, dissolved the restrictions and emptied the bodies of meaning, effecting a release of sexuality from binary distinctions, effecting n-sexes, a million tiny sexes, and have released women from sexuality, by making it a quality of desire, rather than the 221

Chapter 7 defining characteristic of their bodies. Becausethe problem is one of relations which escapetheir terms, and relation which effect biases, partial objects, not of how fully constituted whole objects are related. Becoming-imperceptible is sliding a body into machines, camouflaging movements and appearing, as if from nowhere, in the middle. Deleuze notes that biologists have often questioned why life is effected through carbon, rather than through silicon, and goes on to say that `la vie des machines modernespassepar le silicium (the life of modern machines runs through 47 silicon)'. This is where becoming-women moves,where money releasedfrom capital moves,where life becomesnon-organic, nature becomesa thinking machine, infinities of tiny demons leap, effecting a co-ordinated and fluid movement, eroding the statues of power, the historical . Becoming-woman moves towards becoming-imperceptible, but women do not dissolve or disappear in that movement: it is rather than life itself becomesmobile, becauseit is not longer in the womb nor arranged in the organisms which emerge from them, but instead becomesa movement, a cycle that turns on its hinges. Humans are no longer the privileged class, but the surrogate reproductive machinery of a machinic phylum which is passing across into a different base, in a movement which effects the conjunction of teleology and mechanism, and transforming the nature of intelligence. V Breeding Demons '... when demons are allowed to barter, bid and compete among themselves for resources, they begin to form "computational societies" which resemblenatural ecologies(like an insect colony) or 222

Chapter7 Philosophy and two thousand years of society built on the principles with which it has covered thought like a caul, has designed women as weak, passive, sensitive, mad, imaginary, material, natural, disgusting, prudish, whorish, virginal, Amazonian, foolish, untrustworthy, ammoral, childish and incapable of learning (Kant saysthat educating women is `a malicious strategemof men'49,and done only in the interests of male vanity). But, despite all this, men have still wanted to possessthese peculiar, confusing and contrary animals they have been both fearful of and attracted towards. At times, philosophers have displayed apparent generosity towards women one might use Plato's suggestion in the Republic that women too might be guardians in the ideal State,despitetheir natural weaknessin relation to men. However, the move is duplicitous on two counts. Firstly, it is designedto introduce women as contributing membersof a Statewhose orders and laws are establishedin the absenceof women; the participants in the dialogue are men, and the functions and potentials of women are articulated from the perspectiveof men. The case is similar to that of passivity, as it functions in Kant in relation to activity: its characteristics are determined through the lens of an active, spontaneousand legislative subject - which, as the Introduction has shown, women are not. Secondly, the move is incorporative: that is, it does not envisageany transformation in the State effected by women through their introduction within it. Looking elsewhere, one finds the same problem. Spinoza, for example, argues that `women have not by nature equal rights with men'. -50His argument functions similarly to those more recently proposed, which exhort women to avoid dark places and "provocative" clothing on the grounds that they open themselvesup to attack from men; women's spaces are limited and defined not through their own desires,but by those of men. Moira Gatens says of Spinoza's remarks on women that 223

Chapter 7 `women's political exclusion not on the basis of the qualities or predispositions of women, but rather on the basis of men's predispositions', calling them a `"scar" on the body of his work. '51 There are historical nuances and variations in the qualities attaching to women; as a philosophical entity, woman is designed to be fluid, and to operatein the problematic intersticeswhich escapethe ordered and segmentedworld of the subject. However, it is less the qualities themselves than their relative value in regard to the subject which is important: as has been remarked earlier, femininity attachedto a man has associationsof genius, whilst in relation to women, it attachesto passivity, defined through the lens of the active subject. So tracing transformations in the historical trajectory of philosophy's women exposes not only the fluidity of movementand qualities through which she is designed,but also the shifting values in those qualities, effected by historical changes in the subject. Nonetheless, their situation remains defined by and through the privilege of the subject: philosophy's woman is never so dangerousnor so mobile as to be able to either destroy or escapethe defining perspective of the (male) subject. Kant says that even in a state of nature, women are domestic animals - already tamed, and useful if only to carry the bags. The wilder aspectsof designedwomen are- like the sublime - always situated in a context, in the socio-cultural context of women, that of domesticity and reproduction. A demon is a figure in the process of generating independencefrom design principles - in other words for an element in a learning system, a bias towards concretizing real solutions, like a market, which operatesnot through the accumulation of information, as goods, but through interactions with other demons, in a heterarchical space(a Pandemonium), which is continuously mobile, and perceptible, although the principles of its mobility are imperceptible, escaping recognition. The survival of a demon is a function of its interaction with other demons in its locality, where locality is not a geographical position given in advance,but the consequenceof 224

Chapter 7 connections generatedamongst demons in the processof developing problem-solving strategies. The problem-solving strategies depend in part on what Manuel DeLanda, from whom this information on demonscomes,calls "trust. " Words such as this are dangerous, implying moral sensibilities dictating material interactions. Evelyn Fox-Keller has already been quoted in regard to this problem, of imposing human romances on nature. Fox-Keller located the critical question behind the apparent altruism of natural systems(their willingness to `die' for the system) as a problem of quantifying the maximum degree of cost to themselves individuals will tolerate before any socially compliant character is disinvested - social in a bacterial, rather than human, sense. However, this is not sufficient, since it suggeststhere is an option for disinvestment through which the individual is retained, but in an isolated state. In systemswhere function and formation are inseparable,and where interaction generatesa partial object, as an intensification of a movement or direction, disinvestment is equal to death, or more accurately, the complete eradication of the parametersin terms of which the inital problem was understood. So absenceof toleranceto a systemon the part of any element generatedby it results in the extinction of that element, which in turn transforms the nature of the system. The movement is that of the actual continuum, the basis of Kant's dynamics, the material force of synthesis,the resourceon which the subject draws, the detour he takes into the outside. What is missed when the position of women in philosophy is read solely in terms of their exclusion is precisely this movement, right at its heart. For philosophy has not simply been an abstract theoretical discipline, but has been instrumental in the organization of social, political, cultural, sexual, economic, legal, educationaletc., etc, orders. In order to function as a real description of space- as Kant demandsof transcendentalphilosophy - it has to have some account of real relations; 225

Chapter 7 in order for him to declare with confidence that from the court of reason `nothing can 52 it lie. However, this is the possibilities of escape escapeus', must understandwhere an impossible demand; something must always escape,unless the system is dead in advance, becauselife is an escapeart, an art of destruction and creation, which is theorized under the name critique. 226

Conclusion No Tribunal `You think my gait "spasmodic." I am in danger, Sir. You think me "uncontrolled." I have no Tribunal.... " Bacteria borrow genesfrom plants, animals & fungi: bacterial fungi find their way into animals and plants; animals and plants pass genes to each other. A body does not recognize itself from something not itself. There is only side-communication. Kant's arborescentschema,the law of continuum specierum, which `recognise[s] a relationship of the different branches, as all springing from the same stem' is unnatural? Transposons,as thesejumping genesare called, come in different types: there is the P element, which invades fruit flies, the mariner, spread amongst species as diverse as earwigs and beetles. Molecularity. Meanwhile: 'Over the past twenty-five years, a stack of laws has transformed Britain from a country that welcomed people to one that it is virtually impossible to get into. i3 Molarity The difference in regime illustrated by thesetwo examplesis stark. On the one hand, an order built on the myth of nationhood, or heritage, on memory and history, on xenophobia and fear, a molar regime of regulation, dreams of sovereignty and independent agency. On the other, fluid communication, migrations without regard for the clumsy geographiesof the 227

Conclusion political world, a market of tendenciesand directions rather than objects and exchanges.A capitalist economy feeds through the State, which imposes its dogmas and fears, its racism and hatreds on the movements of people and money; a market is open; its principles immanent to its operation. Money doesn't recognize boundariesany more than bacteria do; it is this difference which Deleuze and Guattari are pointing up in their distinction between rhizomatic and arborescentregimes,betweenmolecular flows and molar structures. The indifference of nomadic distributions to concepts and ideals is not wise and paternalistic, equal and fair, racist or misogynistic, but naive and cruel, with a strange innocence. This is not to say that royal science does not have vicious observational habits amongstthe tools of its wisdom: `pure cultures...in Petri-dish concentration camps, are just bacteria whose social and community behaviour has been reduced to the level that we investigators can manage.'4 There are gaps through which things escape,solving problems without recognition, unless they are trapped on the Strata, deadenedby a society with a hypertrophied conscience and little imagination. Breeding Demons has shown a relationship betweenKant and Deleuze which is folded in gaps in Kant over which the tracks of third things - schema, transcendentalobjects,noumena- run, without thought that the intensive depth beneaththem involves differently to the straight lines and segmentedspace of the subject. The degree to which it might be called a feminist thesis is the degree to which it indicates a potential for escaping the history of philosophy as an institutionalized and exclusively male domain, and making it work across different dimensions, according to different privileges. Woman the Object is an effect of the subject;but becoming-woman as the processof moving in-between, with AND logics and eliminative deductions suggestsa different way out of the problem than 228

Conclusion seeking to constitute one more theory of subjectivity. Schopenhauer(a misogynist but not to the core, for like Fox-Keller he does not supposenature sharesour romances), and the first Kantian, speaksof a direction towards the imperceptible. Representation,he says, offers no route, for it places the thing-in-itself, or will, outside itself, and constructs its reality through ideal forms, the secondaryfunctions of the brain which large and feeble organisms such as man require in order to negotiate the complexities of their world. He suggests, however, another way: `It is, so to speak,a subterraneanpassage,a secretalliance, which, as if by treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could not be taken by attack from without. '5 This is very similar to a remark Irigaray makes about science, about the need to appearwithin it, in the middle; rather than adopting once more the external perspectiveand critiquing the surface structures she suggestsfinding the subterraneanpassages.Kant knew also of thesetunnellings, or Mauhvurfsgangeas he calls them. His critical response,however, was to block them off, since they threatened the ground and the `security of the superstructures'.6 However, as his trip on the lagoon shows, and his theorization of repulsive forces, he too can be in the middle, without recognition. `Il arrivait ä des penseurs, dit-on, d'expliquer clue le mouvement etait impossible, et cela n'empechait pas le mouvementde se faire. (It is said that there were thinkers who explained that movement was impossible,but that this did not prevent movement from occurring)'. ' It is said that there were thinkers who explained that women thinking was impossible:but this did not prevent the thinking from occurring. 229

Notes to Introduction 230

Notes to Introduction 1. L'Arc, p99 2. K, VII: 85 3. S, 1989;67 4. DG, 1972:311; 1984:261 5. L'Arc, p99 6. Delcuze, Interview in Le Afonde, 19-20 June, 1977 7. Alistair Welchman, `Deleuzeon Stageat the Academy' in British Journal of Nietzsche Studies (forthcoming) 8. B, 1989: 80 9. K, VII: 303 10.K, VII: 306 11. K, VII: 309 12. Ibid. 13. For this discussion,cf. K, VI, pp313-315 14. K, VH: 265 15.Ibid. 16. B, 1994:33 17. Dr. Copernicus,John Barwille, Minerva, p209 18. Leibniz's Fifth Paper in Leibniz Philosophical Writings, trans. Mary Morris and G.H.R. Parkinson, J.M. Dcnt & Sons, 1973, p237 19. Primary Truths, in Leibniz Philosophical Writings, p 91 20. Monadologv. para.? 231

Notes to Introduction 21. Leibniz's Fourth Paper (Correspondencewith Clarke), in Leibniz Philosophical Writings, p218 22. cf. MonadologV,para. 25 23. cf. Leibniz Philosophical Writings, pp. 218 & 235 24. K, III: A33B49 25. K, III: A36B52 26. K, III: A31B46 27. K, III: B 154-5 28. K, IV: A183B226 29. K, III: A31-2/B47 30. K, 11I:A30B46 31. K, III: A33B50. 32. cf. Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysicsand the Philosophy of Science:The Classical Origins Descartes to Kant, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969: `In his psychologising account, Kant frequently characterisesthe form of time also by the remark that all our sense-contentsare "apprehended" always "as successive"(cf.K, III: B224B234), something that reminds us of Locke's attempt to define time in terms of the successiveorder of our ideas.But this would be a misunderstanding [italics added]. Both successionand simultaneity can only be expressedas happeningsin time, characterisedthrough time, which is -whatever it may be - still presupposed.' (Buchdahl,p642n2) The point of this discussionof time in the Introduction is precisely in order to precludeboth a psychologistic rendering of time in terms of succession,and the introduction of meaning into the pure form of time through its referenceto the relational grammar of empirical experience. Buchdahl goeson to say: `[I]t is only in the context of an empirical language i. e., when regardedas forms in which perceptions(actual or potential) occur, that the expressions"space", "time", have a meaning; and this holds even in the caseof intuitions that are "pure", i. e., where we abstractfrom any sensorydeterminationsor presence.' (Buchdahl, p647) Independentlyof this empirical meaning, the pure forms of spaceand time have neither meaning nor definition: this radical 232

Notes to Introduction indeterminacy is, as will be seenlater in the thesis, what is important in Deleuze's encounterwith Kant. 33. K, IV: Axiin 34. Correspondence,fn. p122/Apr.7/1786 to J Bering,266.vol. x p441. and. Werke, XIII, 182f 35. B, 1987:7 36. S,1969(I):416 37. S,1969(I):511 38. S,1969(II):41. In On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,Schopenhauer elaboratesa theory of empirical intuition as intellectual: this is a consequenceof his collapse of the elaborateKantian conceptualarchitecture and might seemto eliminate the critical difference of understandingand sensibility - the transcendentaldifference. What it does,however, is displace it, referring it to the relation betweenthe world as representationand the world as will, situating it on the level of Ideasand their adequateobjectification, so rendering it an objective rather than subjectiveproblematic, prior to the possibility of psychologistic interpretations. Perceptionis generatedthrough understanding,a subjectivefunction operating in accordancewith the principle of sufficient reason;however, its explanation is physiological, and specific to animals, rather than merely to man: betweenthe understanding of animals and that of man `the difference is only one of degree.'(Fourfold Root, p111) 39. S, 1969(1): 182 40. S, 1969(I): 175 41. S, 1969(I): 97 42. S, 1969(I): 146 43. S, 1969(I): 164 44. S, 1969(1): 145 233

Notes to Introduction 45. This thesis employsthe word "real" in a similar sense:that is, not as a conceptualterm (e.g., Realität), but as a referenceto uncausedactuality, or the effective qualities of the thing-in-itself or will, and, in a Deleuzian register, to the desiring or machinic unconscious. 46. S,1969(1I);191 47. D, 1962:89; 1983:79 48. D, 1969:97; 1983:85 49. D, 1968:186; 1994:143 50. DG, 1972:336; 1984:283 51. DP, 1977:8; 1987:2 52. Welchman, On the Matter of Chaos,p153 53. The dangers of replacing a patriarchal God with a feminine divinity are pointed out by Teresa Brennan, «ho points to Kristev a's appeal to the Virgin Mary and Irigaray's feminine Godhead. Arguing against conclusions which focus on these appeals as strategic ploys, she asks: `strategy for whom? If we know that God does not exist but they need to believe that She does, what precisely are we saying? ' Brennan's comment on the difficulty of taking such appeals seriously is succinct: `The difficulty with these writings is less with the writings as such than with the commentators' attempts to deal with the embarrassment of having an otherwise admired thinker apparently endorsing God. 'Brennan, 1993, p172, n6 54. Schopenhauer,Parerga& Paralipomena,Werke vol 4 55. DG, 1972:106:1984;88 56. DG, 1980:632; 1988;506 57. D, 1968:189; 1994;145 58. DL, 1991:164 234

Notes to Chapter 1 1.D, 1968:186; 1994:143 2.D, 1968:207; 1994:159 3.D, 1963:16; 1984:9 4.The question of the production of the a priori accord of faculties in common senseis not addressedby Kant until the third Critique and his solution will not be explored this thesis. 5.K, IV: B161n 6.1bid. 7.cf.K, V: §§20-22 8.K, V: 295n 9.K, V: 293 10.1bid. 11.D, 1963:13; 1984:7 12.Ibid 13.K, Ill: B161n 14.K, I11:B307 15.D, 1963:40; 1984: 26 16.K, V: 48 17.K, III: B312/A257 18.D, 1963:36; 1984:23 19.K, V: 239 235

Notes to Chapter 1 20. K, V: 239 21. Machine assemblages,at this early stageof the thesis, can be read as Deleuze's re-formulation of a faculty system,and the BvO as the transcendental:however, this correlation must be read in scarequotes, since, as yet, how it is arrived at has not been explained. It will becomeclearer as the thesis continues. 22.D, 1963:48; 1984:32 23.K, IV: 433 24.K, IV: 414 25.D, 1968:48; 1984: 32-3 26 L'Arc. 1980,4 27.K, V: 50 28.D, 1968:48; 1984:32 29.K, V: 44 30.K, V: 176 31.K, IV: 323 32.D, 1963:97; 1984:68 33.DP 1977:15; 1987:9 34.K, III: A839B867 Ralf Meerbote's paper, `Deleuzeon the SystematicUnity of the Critical Philosophy' remarks on both the attention to systemand the immanent nature of Deleuze's book on Kant, leading to a presentation of `those leading ideas of Kant's which shapethe content and direction of the entire Critical enterprise' (Meerbote,347); this helps to elucidate `a number of rather more fragmentary discussionsin the literature of parts of the Critical enterprise, often supporting those discussionsand deriving support from them in turn' (Meerbote, 354). This last remark highlights the positive nature of Deleuze's interaction with Kant, with producesfrom within the system,rather than acting on it from the outside. 35.D, 1968:190; 1994:146 236

Notes to Chapter 1 6 36.D, 1968:204; 1994:157 37.K, III: A328/B385 38.D, 1968:43; 1994:28 39.cf Deleuze's preface to Variations, Jean-Clet Martin: `Je crois ä la philosophie comme Systeme.C'est la notion dc systemequi me deplait quand on la rapporte aux coordoneesde 1'Identique, du Semblableet de 1'Analogue.C'est Leibniz, je crois, qui le premier identifie systemeet philosophie. Au sensoü il le fait, j'y adhere.'(p7) 401,1973: 190, para.67 41.D, 1993[21:89 42.L, 1993:120 237

Notes to Chapter2 1.DG 1980:466; 1933:376 2 D, 1962:118; 1983:103 3 D, 1962:119; 1983:104 4.D, 1968:197: 1994:151 S.cf. Un Manifeste de Moins, in Superpositions.Here, Deleuze explores Carmelo Bene's `Richard HP as an illustration of the minor treatmentof theatre. This is not anti-theatre,just as his reading of Kant is not antiphilosophy. It is rather a more preciseoperation, of sulutraction and deduction. However: `Vous ne pouvezmeine pas dire que c'est une operation negative,tant eile engageet enclanchedejä des processus positifs (you can't even say that it is a negative operation, since it already engagesand mesheswith ' (D, 1979:103) Stableelements,constants,and the indicators of power are stripped out, positive processes. to expose 'le role des operateurs,rtpondant ä 1'idee d'intervalle «plus petit. (the role of operators, responding to the idea of the smallest interval).' (D, 1979:106) Negation is thus a consequenceof affirmation. Cf. Differance et Rjpetition, esp.Chapter 1 for discussionof this Nietzsche-informedsenseof affirmation and negation. 6.K, 11I:B129 7.K, I11:B202 8.K, JI: A162/B203 9. K, III: A68/B93 10 The elimination of sensible differences in favour of distinctions which can be mapped in extensive spaceconnectswith the problem of enantiomorphic bodies, and with Irigaray's critique of Kant, and is addressedin chapter six. In `Kant on the Impossibility of the "Soft Sciences",Nayak and Sotnak argue for the measurabilityof intensive magnitudes,and for someother way of differentiating betweenintensive and extensivemagnitudesthan through a difference betweenordinal and cardinal measurability. They argue that `the filling of spaceby matter is ultimately groundedin quality (force) [so] forcesare not constructible in terms of quantity, for quantity would then be more basic than quality'. This latter is precisely what Deleuzeand Guattari argue for quantify writing. they say, in Mille Plateaux. Seealso `Construction and Mathematical Schcmatism:Kant on the Exhibition of a Conceptin Intuition' (Alfredo Ferrarin), where a difference is madebetweennumbersand numbering; this is also a working difference in Mille Plateaux,in 238

Notes to Chapter 2 relation to the distinction bctwccn scienceas war machine, or Dispars and scienceas royal state thought, or Compars.SeeChapterThree for discussionof this. 11.i. e., problem as a differential Idea, as discussedin the text. 12. K, Ill: B207 13. K, III: Al66IB208 13. K, III: A167B209 15. K, ll l: B 154 16. K, III: A167B209 17. D, 1968:176; 1994:134 18. D, 1968:182; 1994:139 19. L'Arc, p41 20 S,1977:112 21. K, III: A120 22. Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysicsand the Philosophyof Science:The ClassicalOrigins. Descartesto Kant, Blackwell (Oxford), 1969,p670. Another remark of Buchdahl's clarifies the formalist function of understanding:'To saysthat it [the act of combination by understanding]is `logical' and `spontaneous'is to saythat it is not a material detail, but only a manner of characterisingthe nature of objectivecognition, and of the logical intentions of the cognitivejudgement.' Ibid.p632n. Logically spontaneouscombination provides nothing that goesbeyondthe conceptof the subject,which is the problem of synthetica priori judgement. 23. K, III: A139/B178 24. DP, 1986vii 25. DP, 1986:vii 26. D, 1968:182: 1994:140 27. D, 1968:286: 1994:222 28. `Lcs gonds, c'cst laxe autout duquel la pone tourne. Le gond, Cardo, indique la subordination du temps our points pn5cisement cardinaur par oü passent les 239

Notesto Chapter 2 motn-cmcnisppriodiqucs qu'il mcsurc. Tant que le temps reste dans ses gonds, il est subordonnnau mouv-emcntextensive:il en est la mesure,intervalle ou nombre. (The hinges arc the aids around which the door turns. Cardo designates the subordination of time to the cardinal points through which the periodical movements that it measurespass. As long as time remains on its hinges, it is subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval or number)'. (D, 1993[11:40; 1963:Nii) That Kantian time is not logical time, but unhinged from the conceptual order of the understanding,and determinedcardinally only in relation to understandingand epistemologicalcommon senseis a resourcewhich Deleuze uses to the full. This empty form of time feeds right through his philosophy, into the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, as the zero intensity of the body without organs: this will becomemore clear as the thesis continues. Passive synthesesare the topic of chapterfour. 29. K, HI:A193/B238 30. D, 1993111: 42 31. D, 1968:187; 1994:143 32. D, 1968:158; 1994:121 33. K, III. B345/A289 34. Allison differentiatesbetweena causal and a semanticaccount of the thing-in-itself, dismissing the first on the groundsthat if things-in-themsehesare taken to be causes,then `it is presupposedthat we can refer to them, and this is the very point at issue.' The seconddifferentiates between the concept of an appearancesand the conceptof a thing as it is in itself; he challengesthis, on the basisthat it suggeststhat appearancesand thing-in-itself `refer to two distinct entities, the claim being that referenceto entities of the former sort presupposesthe possibility of referencesto thoseof the latter sort' and thus does not allow for the `transcendentaldistinction bets%-ecn two way'sof considering one and the same thing' (Allison, p240) His solution is to differentiate betweenmodesof consideration,one which is empirical and sensible, the other speculativeand reflective. It is this interpretation which leads him to the assimilation of the thing-in-itself and the noumenon:'To consideran object as it is in itself is just to treat it as a noumenon'. (Allison p243) However,the collapse of the noumenoninto the thing-in-itself, given the function of the noumcnon as described in this chapter, pushes the compulsion to assume the object in general, or transcendentalobject,exercisedby practical reasonon understanding,back into transcendentalmatter and thus into sensation.This tendencyto lock Kant down by the assimilation of differences into unities is 240

Notesto Chapter 2 counterto Dclcurcc'sinsistencethat the smallestdifferencescan generatethe greatesteffects:there is more butterfly effect in Dclcuzc than in Allison. A30/B43 35. K, 111: 36. K, 111:B427 Seealso discussionof this issuein Chapter Four 37. CCp32ff. 38.K, IV;309 39. D, 1968:287: 1994:222 40. D, 1968:186; 1994:143 41. D, 1968:156; 1994:119 42. K, Xl :pp33-40 43. K, V11I:194 44. K, VIII: 193-4 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47.K, IV: A143/8183. Kemp Smith's translation of this passagereads it with a negative: `that in the objects which corresponds to sensation is not the transcendental matter...'; This reading supports Allison's casefor drawing an equivalencebetweenthe thing-in-itself and the noumenonwhich collapses their difference.As said above(note 24), it is preciselythesedifferenceswhich Deleuzeteasesout. 48. cf. MetaphysicalFoundationsof Natural Science, 41; 1984:ir 49. D, 1993111: 50. K. III: A211B35 5 1. DG, 1972:127; 1984:106 52. D, 1968:303; 1994:235 53. K, IlI: B2IO/A169 241

Notes to Chapter 2 54. K, III: A425B453 55. D, 1968:255: 1994:197 56. K, III: A643B671 57. K, III: A644B672 58. K, III: A374 59. K, III: A581-21B609-10 60. K, IX: 91 61. K, 11I:A30B45 62. K, III: A647B675 63. D, 1968:190; 1994:146 64. D, 1968:186;1994:143 65. K, III: A296B353 66 Ibid. 67.D, 1968:83; 1994:58 68.Ibid 69.D, 1968:178; 1994:136 70.DG, 1972:89; 1984:75 71.K, III: A853/B882 72.DP, 1977:58-9; 1987:47 73.DG, 1972:8; 1988:2 j 242

Notes to Chapter 3 1.D, 1968:39; 1994:26 2.DG, 1980:458; 1988:369 3.DG, 1980:458; 1988:370 4.DG, 1980:459; 1988:371 5.DG, 1980:537; 1988:430 6.K, IV: 498 7. For a fuller discussionof the propertiesattributed to attractive and repulsive forces, and for the sourceof the information containedin the table, cf. K, IV: 496ff 8.K,rv:510 The matter of differences which are felt, but not conceptual connects with the problem of bodies,and is discussed in chaptersix, with referenceto Irigaray'swork on this. enantiomorphic 9. K, IV: 505 IO.K, III: A659B687 11.K, III: A661B688 12.K, III: A660B688 13.K,IV: 525 14.K, IV: 526 15. Buchdahl, Metanhvsics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical Origins Blackwell, 1969 (Oxford), p609 16 KIII: A220B268 17.K, IV: 508 18.K, III: A168B210 19.K, IV: 503 243 Descartes to Kant,

Notes to Chapter3 20.K, IV: 508 21.K, IV: 512 22.K, IV: 520 23.DG, 1980:258; 1988:212 24.K, III: A168B210 25.K, III: A166B208 26.K, IV: 511 27.K, III: A712B740 28.DG, 1980:458; 1988:370 Deleuze and Guattari take full advantageof the fact that Kantian intuition is not of necessity attached to Euclidean spacenor to cardinality. From the four poetic formulae summarizing the Kantian philosophy, through Difference et Repetition and L'anti-oedimeand on into Mille Plateaux. the difference betweencardinality and ordinality is a continuing theme. In Mille Plateaux there is a discussion of the differencebetweenState and nomadic numbers.The former `gain masteryover matter...control its variations and movements', and refer only to a single base. Numbering numbers do not presuppose number, but `appear as soon as one distributes something in space, instead of dividing up space or distributing spaceitself They are `ciphered, rhythmic, directional, autonomous,movable' and articulated, as opposedto metric, punctuated. (cf. DG, 1980: 483ff: 1988:387f1)The complexities of this, however, are outside the current range of my knowledge; this remark indicates, but does not explain, the difference betweenthe numberednumbersof the Stateand the numbering numbersof the nomos. 29.K, IV: 517 30.DG, 1980:459; 1988:370 31.D, 1968:290; 1994:225 32.D, 1968:288; 1994:223 33.D, 1968:290; 1994:224 244

Notes to Chapter 3 34.K, IV: 514 -4 35.K, IV: 523 36.There is a discussionof the sublime in chapter five. 37.K, VIII: 169n 38.Ibid. 39.Ibid. 40.K, VIII: 156 41.K, V: 245-6 42.K, VII: 156 43.K, IV: 520n 44.K, IV: 519 45.K, IV: 520n 46.K, III: A660113688 47.DG, 1980:257; 1988:211 48.K, IV: 519 49.Ibid. 50.K, IV: 520n 51.K, VIU: 157 52.K, VIII: 157 53.K, V: 373 54.K, V: 141 245

Notes to Chapter 3 55.Borrowing methods or principles from other disciplines and deploying them philosophically was not something new for Kant: in his paper Versuch den Begrif der negativen Großen in die Weltweisheit borrows from he of quantifying negative a method magnitudes mathematics. einzuführen, 56.F, 1989:33 57.D, 1968:178; 1994:136 58.F, 1989:36 59.Ibid. 60.K, V: 16 61.F, 1989:31 62.F, 1989:37 63.D, 1979: 93 64.D, 1980:13;1988:6 65.DG, 1980:586; 1988:469 66.DG, 1980:538; 1988:431 67.DG, 1980:537; 1988:431 68.DG, 1980:632; 1988:507 69.DG, 1980:638; 1988:512 70.D, 1977:127 1987:105 71.DG, 1980:537; 1988:431 72.D, 1968:156; 1994:119 Attractors are of different types. Zero-dimensional attractors draw whatever falls within their basin to a fixed point of rest. A pendulum without a driving motor is drawn to a rest midway in its period, slowed by friction. Its phase diagram spirals inwards to a central static point. The State in Deleuze and 246

Notes to Chapter 3 Guattari's work functions as a zero-dimensionalattractor. A limit cycle or periodic attractor describesan orbit; a pendulum driven at a constant rate circles continuously, any fluctuations being temporary deviationsfrom equilibrium, being returned within a short time to the orbit. In other words, no fluctuation is sufficiently deviant to escapethe basin of the attractor. A strangeor chaotic attractor, which aroseout of problems in fluid dynamics, refers to systemswith no periodicity, which describe orbits which never itself, is infinite depth finite is because intersects This to the and of within space. point, never same return of what Gleich calls a `mille-feuille' effect, and he quotes Lorenz: `We seethat each surface is really a pair of surfaces, so that, where they appear to merge, there are really four surfaces. Continuing this processfor another circuit, we see that there are really eight surfaces,etc., and we finally conclude that there is an infinite complex of surfaces,each extremely close to one or the other of two merging surfaces.' (G, 1987:141) This has clear connectionswith the paradox of surfaceand depth in Deleuze's writing, and intensities. See involuting differenciation DG, infinitely 1991: 1994:206; and Prigogine the of also: with and Stengers,Order out of Chaos. 73.B, 1987;124 74.D, 1980:460; 1988:371 75 K, VII: 113 247

Notes to Chapter 4 1.DG, 1972:26; 1984:19 2. DP, 1977:13; 1987:7 `Rencontrer,c'cst trouver, c'est capturer, c'est voler, mais il n'y a pas de methode pour le de de Voler, longue contraire plagier, copier, c'est preparation. trouver, rien qu'une d'imiter ou de faire comme. La capture est toujours une double-capture, le vol, un double-vol, et c'est cela qui fait, non pas quelque chose de mutuel, mais un bloc des evolution noces,toujours «hors» et «entre». a-parallele, asymetrique,une (To encounter is to find, to capture, to steal, but there is no method for finding other imitating, is Stealing long the or of plagiarizing, copying, opposite than a preparation. doing like. Capture is always a double-capture,theft a double-theft, and it is that which creates not something mutual, but an asymmetrical block, an a-parallel evolution, ' "between"). "outside" and always nuptials, 3.DG, 1984:xii 4.G, 1994:190 5.D, 1968:192; 1994:148 6.DG, 1972:266; 1984:224 7.D, 1968:176; 1994:135 8.DG, 1972:19; 1984:13 9.K, III: A78B 103 10. '[Al machine has only motive force [bewegendeKraft]. But an organized being has within it formative force (bildende Kraft) that this being imparts to the kinds of matter that lack it (thereby organizing it). This force is therefore a formative force that propagates itself -a force that a mere ability to move (Bewegungsvermögen) (i. e., mechanism)cannot explain.' (K, V: 374) Kant's third Critique was influential not only on the naturphilosophische movement emerging foundations helped Jena, broadly, but, to the theoretical shape of nineteenth century German more around biology; Blumenbach, an anthropologist and comparative anatomist, provided empirical confirmation of 248

Notes to Chapter 4 problemson which Kant had beenworking, and Kant in turn influenced the courseof Blumenbach's own work. In the third Critique Kant eliminates analogs for the formative force of natural bodies. To call organismsanalogsof art is, for Kant, to suggestan external design agency, a rational power which can in principle be isolated from matter. Natural self-organization is implicated with a force which, whilst strictly unknown, is inseparable from matter and `preformed virtualiter in the intrinsic purposive predispositions imparted to the stock (Stamm).' (K, V: 423) Influenced by Blumenbach, Kant calls the force Bildungstrieb. Unlike mechanical or aestheticrelations, where the form of possibility is extrinsic to their sensible configuration, the reciprocal relations of force in a natural product are not formalized in advanceof their dynamic distribution, and their qualities cannot be qualified and equalized in extension. The direction in which this force develops, the nature of the material filling of space, is not determinedmathematically, as is the space-filling force in mechanistic dynamics, but is, Kant argues, the function of a purpose - at least for the purposesof judgement. A natural purpose (Zweck) is an order manifest in a particular arrangement of the parts, from whose interrelation a result eventually emerges. Each part not only exists for the sakeof every other part, but each part also standsin a mutually reciprocal productive relation to every other part. Variations in the result can become hereditary, as mechanical feedback from the concrete situation of a body potentiates different aspects of the pattern of virtual preformation. However, the concept of intrinsic purposivenessrequires that localized changes are conceived of as no more than the capacitationof `undevelopedoriginal predispositions' (K, V: 420) in the virtual pattern. If this were not the case, the separation of mechanism and teleology would be compromised, if mechanical action were understood as a primary function in the material organization of the body, rather than simply a consequenceof local selective pressures,or as Kant puts it, `a subordinate cause of intentional effects' (K, V: 414), then the door would be held open to suggestionsof animism, to mystical internal forms, or the `alien principle (a soul)' (K, V: 375) as explanatory principles for the workings of a body which has been reducedback to mechanism. The concept of a natural purpose holds teleology and mechanism, and the distribution of forces each implies, apart: understandinga maggot as a natural purpose gives no reasonto `count on there being a mechanical way of producing it' (K, V: 412). But once a maggot is understood mechanistically, and disassembledthrough putrefaction, the idea of a purposive causality will not put the elements back together, and reproduce the same product. The forces of mechanism and teleology - gravity and Bildungstreib - are materially incompatible, non-communicating distributions. 249

Notes to Chapter 4 When discussing the character of natural organization, Kant differentiates the causality implicated in it from that which determines mechanical relations. In the latter, causal connectivity is progressive,`constituting a descendingseries' (K, V: 372) of efficient causes;a causeconditions an effect and the necessityof the relation is enclosedwithin them, as betweentwo points or states.When the will is implicated, dependency is both progressive and regressive, and any connection is both caused and effected.The general idea of reasoncovering the systematicand collective unity of this doubled causality is purpose. It is tempting to see a connection between Kant's theory of self-organization and purposive causality and the immanent distribution and reverse causality referred to by Deleuze and Guattari. However,they emphasizethat reversecausality is without finality, and equateteleology with good sense. Whilst Kant's concept of teleology introduces the problem of self-organization, his solution is reconciled with the universality and necessityof mechanism,through the supersensibleprinciple of convertibility, it is this collapse into unity which Deleuze and Guattari argue against, together with the exclusive disjunction which separatesthe zones of teleology and mechanism. In L'anti-oedipe they gloss the problem in the following terms: in both systems `the machine and desire...remain in an extrinsic relationship, either becausedesire appearsas an effect determined by a system of mechanical causes,or becausethe machine is itself a systemof meansin terms of the aims of desire.'(DG, 1972,1980: 284) An additional incidental point is that Kant's relation with Blumenbach illustrates his ongoing referenceto empirical data. 11.There are clearly argumentsto be had concerning what Kant meansby the content of a concept: if it is taken to mean partial conceptsconjoined under one more general concept,the definition is purely logical. it is to be understood as the heterogeneousmanifold of intuition (empirical In this discussion, howeNeer, and/or a priori) combined according to a rule of synthesis given by understanding. It thus involves referencesto matter and to time and space. A real definition of concepts involves `descending to the conditions of sensibility, and so to the form of appearances'(K, III: A240-41B300) which separateslogical content from real content, and contributesto the objectivevalidity of a pure concept. 12. K, III: A71B11 13. K, III: B420 14. K, III: B427 15. K, III: B428 16. S,WWVII: Chp.XXII 17. S,WWVII: p273 250

Notes to Chapter 4 18. K, III: A78B103 In the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. in Refutation of Mendelssohn's Proof of the Permanence of the Soul' (K, III: B 142), Kant argues against the possibility of proving a continuity of existenceof a soul by any of the following means: negative arguments to the effect that since it cannot disappear or vanish, or be annihilated, it must be permanent; rational arguments seeking to prove the inexplicability of the I think based on a heterogeneous ground, logical arguments appealing to dynamical based division of intensive quantities. His own case the on arguments materialist contradiction; is basedon a difference betweenintensive magnitudes of existence and the real. The real, 'the supposed substance- the thing [das Ding]', he argues `may be changed into nothing, not indeed by dissolution, but by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers, and so, if I may be permitted use of the term, by '(K, III: B414). However, the real is no less real for this remission of powers. This is elanguescence. important in relation to Deleuze's argument against possibility, as a logical intervention which produces paralogismsby separating the real from what it can do. In Difference et Repetition, he writes: `Le virtuel ä ! 'actual. Le virtue! possedeune plein realfite, en Cantque virtue! au mais seulement pas reel, s'oppose ne (the virtual is not opposed to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual)'. (D, 1968:269; 1994:208) (Also cf. Deleuze's Bergsonism, where the relation of the virtual to memory is explored) Elanguescence,or the remission of intensities, is a relaxation or diminution in the the density of intensive magnitude, a difformation of qualities, and comesout of early work on the problem of calculus. (The term "difformation" rather than the more obvious "deformation" is used here, and below, in order to avoid the privative implications of the prefix "de-" and the generally negative sense of deformation. "Difform" carries the sense of diversity, asymmetry, non-uniformity and irregularity of form which deform does not and it is this positive dimension of intensity which is important for Deleuze.) In a brief discussion in Superpositions,Deleuze refers to attempts by physicists in the middle ages to theorize the multiplicity of types of qualitative variations in intensive forms, calling the geometry arising from this `une gesometriedes vitesses et des intensites, des affects'(D, 1979:115); he mentions Nicholas Oresme (c. 1323-1382), who investigated the latitude of forms. Boyer's The History of the Calculus and its con l Development,refers to the use of the word `form' here in the following terms: `There seemsto be no scientific term which correctly expressesthe equivalent of the word form as here used. It refers in general to any quality which admits of variation and which involves the intuitive idea of intensity - that is, to such notions as velocity, acceleration,density...In general the latitude of a form was the degreeto which the latter possesseda certain quality, and the discussioncentred about the intensio and the remissio of the form, or the alterations by which this quality is acquired or lost.'(B, 1949:73) The connection with Deleuze's theory of intensive magnitudesis quite clear: in Mille Plateaux, it is mentioned explicitly: 251

Notes to Chapter 4 `Noun distinguons: 1) les CsO, qui different comme des types, des genres, des attributs du CsO le du CsO drogue, Dolorifere le Froid masochiste: substantiels,par exemple la 2) de (c'est 0 degre ce qui se production remissio); principe comme son a chacun intensites les les les CsO, de produites, modes, ondes type c'est-ä-dire passesur chaque les CsO, le de eventuel de 1'ensemble latitudo); 3) toes (la plan qui passent et vibrations le CsO). (1'Omnitudo, appelle parfois qu'on consistance (We distinguish between: (1) BwO's, which are different types, genuses,or substantial BwO. BwO, Pain drugged Cold For the the the the masochist of of example, attributes. Each has its degree0 as its principle of production (remissio). (2) What happenson each type of BaO, in other words, the modes,the intensities that are produced, the waves that BO's, The the plane of consistency (3) totality (latitudo). of all potential pass (Omnitudo, sometimescalled the BwO))'. (DG, 1980:195; 1988:159) Other references include discussions of. intensive latitudes as `diformement difformes (diffonnedly difformed)' - Oresme's latitudo difformiter difformis, (DG, 1980:310; 1988:253); Spinoza's is defined 'faite de intensives latitude do, body as parties sous une capacitd can where a question of what (made up of intensive parts falling under a capacity)' (Ibid. 314/256) - which draws connections between the Omnitudo or "ailness" of the plane of consistencyand Spinoza's substance,central to Deleuze (and Guattari's) work; Ou'est-ce aue la Philosophie?.p35ff, where Omnitudo is associatedwith fractals and immanence. 19.K, III: B 130 20.cf.K, V: paras.25,26,27. Here, Kant explains the two functions of imagination - apprehensionand by is in function together means of estimating number as necessary magnitudes which comprehensionfor knowledge claims: `imagination performs the combination that is required to present a functions differential two these In the [Ibid. of exceedsthe the sublime mathematical p254] magnitude'. be formulated, intensive difference the extensively no cannot possibility of numerical quantification be is, be that can reproducedsuccessivelyas a measurableunitnone which presented magnitude can imagination inflicts inner Instead, `makes be the violence on sense and numbered. can which none simultaneity intuitable'. [Ibid259] The principle of progressionwhich underlies the psychologistic imagination in instant to comprehend time and attempts an collapses, as succession what of understanding is, in the theoretical framework, apprehendedsuccessively.This suffices to illustrate the independenceof imagination in relation to understanding,an independencewhich is implicated, at the very least, in the first Critique, most notably in commentssuch as: `Now, since every appearancecontains a manifold, and since different perceptionstherefore occur in the in have itself, is demanded. they them, as cannot sense such of a combination and singly, mind separately 252

Notes to Chapter 4 There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesisof this manifold To this faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perceptions,I entitle apprehension.'[K, llI: A1211 The importanceof this separationof the powers of understanding and imagination is great when one is considering Kant not from the perspectiveof the rational subject,but from the position of thoseassociationsattaching to women - which include nature, imagination and the object. 21.cf.K, III: A170B212 22.K, III: A167B209 23.K, III: A51B75 24.cf.K, IV: 309n 25.DG, 1972:34; 1984:26 26.D, 1993:43 27.K, III: B414 28.An essayby Irigaray focusesspecifically on matters of fluidity. In This Sex Which is Not One, in The "Mechanics of Fluids" she points out `a complicity of long standing betweenrationality and a mechanics dynamics fluids, having leaves 107), 1985E: the specific of various unconsidered which of solids alone'(I, "tricks" with which to side-step the problems it generatesfor a mechanics of solids. The theoretical engagementwith fluid dynamics has, she argues,detachedthem from the reality of bodies. Her argument including Guattari) Delcuzc (and the non-denumerability of fluid diffusions, on points, on several crosses its greater sensitivity to pressure,on the infinite nearnessof its elements, and on its instability. It must thus also have closenessesto Kant's theory of intensities. Irigaray correlatesthe exclusion of fluidity with that of women: `what she emits is flowing, fluctuating. Blurring. '(Ibid. 112) Like fluidity, she argues, women lack definite identification, and are irreducible to the symmetry consecratedbetween the subject and its world in the theatre of representation. There is also a connection between Irigaray's questions regarding mathematical analyses of fluids and the problem of instantaneousvelocity implied by the quantitative study of variation addressedin the theory of the latitude of forms (cf.Note 16). Irigaray argues that fluid currents are considered in leaves `Up to infinite: the centre of these to some remainder: which a point, a privileged axis, relation "movements" corresponding to zero supposes in them an infinite speed, which is physically briefly, it involves is insistence Deleuze's the (Ibidp109) to this complex very response unacceptable'. 253

Notes to Chapter 4 that absolute or infinite speedproceedsby way of relative speeds;in other words, it is immanent to the creation of a plane of consistency,rather than transcendent,produced rather than discovered. Absolute speedis associatedwith nomos, or nomadic distributions; `seul le nomade a un mouvement absolu, c'estä-0ire une vitesse ; le mouvementtourbillonnaire ou tournant appartient essentiellementä sa machine de in have (only other words, speed;vortical or swirling movement is an movement, absolute nomads guerre is local `dann feature (in a local absolute)'. (DG, their a nomad un absolu of war machine)'; essential 1980:473-4; 1988:381-2) 29.K, III: A291B347 30.DG, 1980:132; 1988:104 31.DP, 1977:160; 1987:132 32. The simplest example is that of convection. Take a cell of fluid which can be heatedon the bottom and cooled from the top. The difference in temperature (an intensive quantity) controls the flow, heat being heat increases fluid the the towards the top the cell; expands,becoming less dense,lighter, of as conducted and the molecules move more rapidly, colliding as they push towards the surface. The system becomes chaotic. However, further increasesin heat give rise to behaviour which is counter to assumptionspossible from the point of view of the two constraints on the system, gravity and the second law of thermodynamics.A cylindrical role develops,heatedfluid rising and cooling fluid falling in a continuous cycle, and the systemdisplays a consistencyand activity beyond the thresholds of behavioural possibility defined by the two constraints on the system,gravity and the secondlaw of thermodynamics.cf. Massumi, A User's guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia:Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari p58ff. , 33.Sandy Stonenotesthe ultra-femininity of both pre- and post-operativemale to female transsexuals.The imperative which defines them is that of passing: they must passas women both in order to be considered suitable candidatesfor the medical procedure and to minimize the difficulty of settling into the socially defined ways of a woman once they have beenphysically reconfigured. In the `60's, when theseoperations became economically and medically interesting, a single book outlined the criteria according to which suitability was determined. Strangely, all applicants fulfilled thesecriteria: they had the book too. Stone's point is that the fixation on medical proceduresand defined psychological criteria, and the willingness of medical institutions and their clients to satisfy them, is socially produced along with binary sexual difference and neither have any necessaryrelevance to the processesimplicated in the continual invention of a body, processeswhich the theft of a child's body channel along a pre-determined course. Male? Fourteen?Time to be a social nuisance, smash a window, get a gun. Female? Forty? Time 254

Notes to Chapter 4 to go grey and wear sensible shoes.A molar body is fixed across a set of interconnected criteria whose most basic resolution is in terms of a sexualbiology and a psychological and intellectual make-up which "fits" that sex and which has appropriate phenomenaattached to it at any given age and in any given in half bracket. Paul Broca, the second of the nineteenth century, laboured hard working socio-economic to prove that brain size was correlated with intelligence. Since it was common knowledge that European lesser human Broca's intelligent task was to generate types, than and other women more males were fact `[h]e between To do data this truth. traversed the confirm gap a prior! so, which would quantitative be by the usual route - predominantly in reverse'(G,1992:85). Broca wanted to may what conclusion and fix a brain which would correlate with the body in which he found it, rather than research the brain as implicitly insistence Stone's thwarting this at on the permitted band of deviation argument aims such, and dictated by the demand for unity, both historically and of the body. (Cuvier's brain, - which `reflects a Euclidean space'(DG,1980:63; 1988:47) - was, incidentally, discovered by Broca to be the largest in France.) When expressionsof desire becomeincommensuratewith the codesapplied to the body, the gulf is corrected by pro-tiding the body with a new set of sexual characteristics, making the content fit the it first. desire The is, if That this with cannot cure problem produced misfit of psycho-analysis expression. the socially coded body is clearly associatedwith the sex/gender distinction: the proper alignment of biological in the organization of a whole system, a results and or coding, coding sex, or social gender, distinction is by Stone, for in The bodies this made clear of who argues or paucity man woman. whole it body becomings, invention, that the the than medical re-invention of occasional so rather continual might properly contain the psychological make-up analysis has exposed.She calls these post-transsexual becausethere are no longer gulfs and gaps and sexual lines to be crossedbut n-sexes,bodies machined by desire. Not the institutionalized re-arrangementof an object so that its gender and it's sex might once more meet, and the facts fit the advanceconclusion. Stone's desire for post-transsexualismis caught up with discussionsin Difference and Repetition St. Hilaire's Geoffroy A Plateaus Thousand abstract Animal, because both refuse conditions of and extrinsic to the material processesthrough which bodies are formed as organs of a machinic assemblage, and repel the positions and places,imagesand instincts allotted to them, the fixation of desire on an object imaginary Real bodies by the values. engineering does not make objects, but of pre-occupation and assemblesbits and pieces, partial-objects, transposableelements which, depending on their location and their movements transform the timing and control of development. The basic unit is the assemblage,a body composedthrough its own functioning, not organized from on high, and the human body is but a part of this, not its controller. 255

Notes to Chapter 4 cf. Stone, S (S, 1991) `The empire strikes back: A posttranssexualmanifesto' in J. Epstein and K Straub (ed) Body guards: the cultural politics of genderambiguity (London: Routledge) 34.DP, 1977:71; 1987:57 35.Ibid. 36.cf. Chp.2, fn. 67 on attractors. 37.D, 1968:117; 1994:86 38.In his Introduction to La Bete Humaine. Deleuzetalks of the paradox of heredity, and the confusion of itself; he itself, is transmission, transmits transmission the transmitted suggests, only not as a with what message,but as transmission, a processnot an object. Zola, cinematographic novelist, is caught up in a singular process of transformation which cuts through the novel as it does through philosophy and difference fundamental is [la felure], itself: the pure form of time, `le Transmission the or crack cinema. installing linearity Wrecking 1969: 11) aide (D, interieur'. and an abstract core of sterility into grand is from logical is the than a residue, paradox removed realm of no more a subject processesof which force become to and of machinic production. The term term used by Deleuze a mobile, perpetuum problem (and Guattari) for this problem of transmissionin Mille Plateauxis machinic phylum. 39.D, 1968:220; 1994:169 40.D, 1980:269; 1988:220 41.DG, 1972:106; 1984:88 256

Notes to Chapter 5 1.DG, 1980:16; 1988:9 2 D, 1968:284; 1980:220 3.DG, 1980:275; 1988:225 4.K, V: 266 5.K, V: 266 6.D, 1968: 1984:43 7.K, V: 269 8K, V: 261 9 Ibid. 10 DG, 1980:438; 1988:354 11 DG, 1980:437; 1988:353 12 DG, 1980:469; 1988:378 13 D, 1993:48; 1984:xii 14 DG, 1980:468; 1988:378 15.K, III: A141B 180 16.cf. Paralogisms of Pure Reason, B edition, K, III: B421fi 17.K, III: A649B677 18.Architectonically, reasongrows `from within (per intussceptionem),but not by external addition (per is by like body, It is the the addition of a new member, thus growth of animal which not an appositionem). but by the rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and more effective for its delivery form faculties '(K, III: The Kantian 833B861) systemswhich remains unchanged by the purposes. delivery, since their products are absorbedinto the ends of reason and fuel the growth of its strength, which in turn allows the strengthening of the delivery. 257

Notes to Chapter 5 40.DG, 1972:341; 1984:286 41.For the moment, this can be read as a transcendentalfunction: however, the distance Deleuze and Guattari have moved this from its function in Kant as a condition of possibility for knowledge of the object will become clear in the explication of the body without organs, and its relation with desiringmachines (seealso note 2). 42.DG, 1980:199; 1988:161 43.F, 1984:311 44.K, IV: A.,cd 45.K, III: A171/B213 46.DG, 1972:342; 1984:288 47.1,1993: 190, pata.67 48.DG, 1980:36Q; 1988: 293 49.DG, 1980:453; 1988:366 259

Notes to Chapter 5 19.K, V: 123 20.ef.Chapter 1 for discussionof thefocus imaginarius. 21.D, 1968:57; 1984:39 22.K, V: 133 23.K, III: A707B735 24.K, V: 133 25.K, IV: 428 26.x, 21:37 27.K, III: B151 28.K, III: A270/B326 29.DG, 1980:191; 1988:154 30.K, V: 76 31.K, V: 277 32.DG, 1980:633; 1988:508 33.K, III: Axii 34.K, V: 265 35.K, V: 258 36.K, II: 228 37.Ibid 38.K, II: 209 39.K, VII: 307 258

Notes to Chapter 6 1.Plato, Timaeus, 52 (para.20) 2.1,1977: 28; 1985:29 3.1,1977: 24; 1985:24 4.1,1977: 24; 1985:24 5.1,1977: 26; 1985;26 6.Irigaray, Is the Subjectof ScienceSexed?p.75 7.Ibid, p.76 `During the nineteenth century the final state of thermodynamic evolution was at the centre of scientific research. This was equilibrium thermodynamics. Irreversible processeswere looked down on as nuisances,as disturbances,as subjectsnot worthy of study. Today this situation has completely changed We now know that far from equilibrium, new types of structures may originate spontaneously. In far-fromequilibrium conditions we may have transformation from disorder, from thermal chaos, into order. New dynamic statesof matter may originate, statesthat reflect the interaction of a given systemwith its surroundings. We have called these new structures dissipative structures to emphasize the constructive role of dissipative processes in their formation. 'PS, 1985:12 8 1,1977:28; 1985:28 9 1,1977:26; 1985:26 IO.cf. Difference and Repetition. Chapter two, Image of Thought. 11.1,1977:26; 1985: 12.1,1977:75: 1985;78 13.K, IV: 286 14.The context of Kant's argument is a debate with Leibniz; for Leibniz, space is an abstract and mathematical description of relations that hold between objects. Kant's claim is that he is providing the 260

Notesto Chapter 6 philosophical grounds of the possibility of Leibniz's mathematical determinations. His solution in Directions of Space is later revised. Using the same example as that in Directions in the Inaugural Dissertation, in the later work he reachesa different conclusion, which heralds the so-called critical turn. In the Prole ogmenahe writes: `What is the solution? These objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves,and as somepure understandingwould cognize them, but sensuousintuitions, that is, appearances,whose possibility rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else, viz., to our sensibility.'(K, IV: 286) The Newtonian solution of an actual absolute spaceis abandoned for one arising out of the Copernican revolution, and the reference of sensibility to the pure form of intuition. 15.K, II: 382 16.And it was from Adam's left rib, the myth goes,that God createdEve. 17. SeeChapter 2, Note 24.. 18.K, III: A682/B710 19.K, III: A538/B566 20.K, III: A394 21.K, III: A366 22.K, III: A394 23. Ibid. 24.K, III: A109 25. K, III: B345 26. K, III: B345/A289 27.K, IH: A566B594 28.1,1974: 256; 1985:206 29. K, III: A566B594 261

Notes to Chapter 6 30.K, IV: 286 31.1,1974:256; 1985:205 32.1,1974:264: 1985:211 331,1975: 265; 1985: 212 34.The word pupil comesfrom the Latin pupil/a, meaning `a little doll'; the Hebrew expressionfor pupil is similar, eshon a.0n meaning `little man of the eye'. When looking in the eye of your fellow man, you arc supposedto seea doll-like reflection of yourself, a sort of visual homunculus. 351,1974: 265; 1985:213 36.The problem is spuriousbecausein the caseof a spacecontaining nothing but a single hand, the hand itself may be asymmetric,but it is meaninglessto speakof it as either a left or a right hand in the absence of any other structure; it is not merely, as Kant says `completely indeterminate in respect of such a property'(K, II: 383) but completely senselessto question whether such an object is a right or left hand, because left and right mean, in a Humpty Dumpty way, whatever we want them to mean. Only when a body missing a hand is introduced, the sides of which have already been decided in relation to left and does ), Eve, (power Adam the question of which hand it is and etc., and sensibility, good evil, right and hand in by be the turn the side of the then the and right sense: naming and resolved make problem can body on which it fits can be called right. Only when there are two asymmetric objects present in the same spacedo the labels applied to each ceaseto be arbitrary. 37.1,1974:262; 1985:210 38.K, II: 381 39.1,1974: 265; 1985:212 40. B, 1991:261 41. Inventing Women:Science.Technologyand Gender.p. 50. 42. Cell suicide, or apoptosis,is vital at all stagesof an organism's life: during the embryonic development of mammals, about half of all nerve cells self-destruct, and a failure to do so results in the build up of surpluses; cancer, for example, and the proliferation of cells which cause it can continue only when cells fail to self-destruct.One would be hesitant to describethis as `altruistic'; it is to account for processessuch 2 62

Notes to Chapter 6 as these without qualification by human values that Deleuze and Guattari use the term machinic. cf. The Economist, May 4th 1996, p. 103-4. 43. Inventing Women: Science.Technologyand Gender,p.56. 44.Ibid. 45.DG, 1980:249; 1988:203 - translation amended 46.DG, 1980:543; 1988:435 47. `To claim that women's experience is a source of true knowledge as well as the substance of the world to be known (the "female world") classical empiricists. '[iiomen's constitutes the same "epistemic fallacy" as the one encountered by Experience and Feminist Epistemology, a critical new-rationalist approach in Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology. 48. B, 1991:122 49. DG, 1980:342; 1988:279 50.B, 1991:111 51. For Derrida's relation to Heidegger with regard to sexuality, cf. `Geschlecht: sexual difference, ontological difference' in Researchinto Phenomenology.)(111,1983 Derrida's own perspective on sexuality is distributed through his work, but see especially Enerons:Les Stylesde Nietzscheand `Women in the Beehive' in Men in Feminism. 52. Braidotti is not the only thinker to describeDeleuze in theseterms: Alison Assister, for example, in a brief comment on Deleuze suggeststhe same. It seemsan inappropriate description. Deleuze does not begin with the death of the subject,but rather aith a desire to generatean account of its real conditions. Both Difference et Repetition and L'anti-oedine contain accountsof the production of subjectivity, both as a fixed and actively synthesizing agent and as a passive and larval entity of ectuated by the sensible conditions forcing thought. This is referred to in an earlier chapter. C.f. Assiter, Alison, The Enlight Woman: ModernistFeminismin a PostmodernAge. 53. B, 1991:114 263

Notes to Chapter6 54.Marnia Lazreg highlights some of the philosophical difficulties implicit in the appeal to "women's experiences" as a basis for a feminist epistemology, noting the tendency of such positions to fall into problems attachedto empiricism more generally. `In so far as experienceis central to the empiricist philosophy and theory of knowledge, one might think that feminists' use of this concept is grounded in a discernible intellectual tradition. Yet feminists generally do not explicitly seek any grounding for experienceand often act as if they hadjust discoveredits import. It seemsas thought any relationship between feminists' use of experienceand that of acknowledged empiricists is either fortuitous or the result of the unexamined(and therefore unsuspected)effect of an intellectual tradition steepedin pragmatism and positivism.'p51 `As far as feminist theorizing is concerned...the concept of experienceas it is currently used is insufficient since it includes men as a reference rather than as a constitutive component. Men are usually seen as having constructed women's reality instead of being engaged in a continuous process of interaction with women that is equally constructive of their reality. 'p5112 `In sum, contemporary feminists' use of experience as the foundation of a theory of knowledge fits into the tradition of the empiricist school of philosophy and encounters many of the sameepistemologicalproblems.'p55 Her objection seemsto spring from critical instincts, and ask for a more rigorous formulation of the empirical: in this, she sharestendenciesu ith Deleuze. Quotes from `Women's Experienceand Feminist Epistemology, a critical new-rationalistapproach' in Epistemology. in Knowing the Difference:FeministPerspectinves 55. B, 1991:119 56. B, 1991:120 57. DG, 1980:351: 1988: 275 58. DP, 1977:121; 1987:101 59. B, 1991:122 60. B, 1991:120 (the quote is from This Sex Which is Not One) 264

Notesto Chapter6 61.B, 1994:122 62.B, 1994:114 63.B, 1994:112 64.B, 1994:118 65.B, 1994:123 66.DG, 1980:436: 1988:354 67 cf. Braidotti's Patternsof Dissonancefor an incisive reading of Derrida's misogyny. 68.B, 1991:125 69.B, 1991:108 265

Notes to Chapter 7 1.DL, 1991:120 2.June Purvis writing in The Times Higher Education Supplement,April 26,1996, 33,1993: 29 4.1,1977:171; 1985:175 5.K, II: 228 6.K, V: 210 7.K, II: 234 8.11,1991:199 9.1-1,1991:151 10.K1991: 155 11.B, 1989:88 12.K, VII: 247 13.Freud, New Introductory Lectures p. 44 14.Freud, Femininity, p. 115 l5. ibid, p. 116 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid, p. 124 18. Ibid, p. 130 19. Ibid, p. 128 20. DG, 1980:339; 1988:276 21. Freud, Female Sg2uality, p384 266 p21

Notes to Chapter7 22.Freud, Femininity, p. 131 23.Ibid, p. 118 24.K, II: 230 25. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime was written in 1764, seventeenyears before the Critique of Pure Reason. In her paper `The "Charming Distinction": Ur-teil as the En'Kant's have Olga Lucia Valbuena in Kant's Thought', Reason commentators writes: not of gendering in Anthropology Kant's "Observations" their the to the or assessment of either much space afforded but dispensable find devvelopment. Critics texts these tend to curiosities ultimately suggestive philosophical favors Such late though the Kant's critical writings as a reading position and period, respectively. early of from influences late disconnected ideas the there and early affirmations of were somehow generated the his thinking. However, there does east a continuity betweenthe empirical and the critical dimensions of Kant's writings that is worth exploring. 'From: Genders, Number 4, Spring 1989, Copyright 1989, University of Texas Press. This is the case not only in relation to women, but also with regard to intensity: from the early force are a continuous intensity forces Opus Postum living through to the of and problems um, on paper theme in Kant's writings. 26. K, II: 229 27. D, 1993a:42 28. DG, 1980:539; 1988:433 29. B, 1985(1):479 30. B, 1985(1):501 g 1.B, 1985(2):224 32. B, 1985(2):224 33 One might Nish to suggestthat the thought of market, as described,implies idealism, and to argue that features distort its to `free" or persuade governing apparently extrinsic an market, with no such itself. impossibility, is in favour direction, a capital pipe-dream of an development of any particular Briefly, there are two directions from which to begin a responseto this. Firstly, that the dichotomy 267

Notes to Chapter 7 betweenfree trade or exchangeon the one hand and constrained or planned or determined trade on the other belongs to capital. Markets are "headless", acephalous, rather than free and their growth or development is effected through the partialities or biases of the elements of which they are composed. Secondly, the accusation of idealism illustrates a failure to comprehendimmanence and the relation of immanence to its own abstraction,which is real; that is, it functions as a virtual machine added alongside the actual, rather than as an ideal abstracted from the concrete or describing a set of conditioning delimiting its form. Spinoza is in It is this that the at perhaps most sorely point missed structures discussion, for it is towards a Spinozist conception of substanceand the unity of composition of common notions that this thought of market drives. However,that discussionis for another time and place. 34.DG, 1972:44; 1984:36 35.DG, 1972:368; 1984:309 36. This is particularly pertinent to women: in an exchangesystem,the value of women is determined in image is their they an which confirmed through the of with exchange amongst are objects men; advance bodies here, however, discussed briefly In no of external agents. a system, as market - those of actions function its has in of any other of within a particular machinic or assemblage advance value women distribution. They are not priced - which is not to saythey are priceless,merely that value ceasesto be transcendent. cf. 1,1977; 1985 for a discussionof the treatmentof women as commodities. 37. DG, 1980:568; 1988:455 38. DG, 1972:280; 1984:235 39. D, 1972:284; 1984:239 40. DG, 1980:70; 1988:53 41. DG, 1980:70; 1988:53 42. This relates to two problems already discussed. The first is that of the thing-in-itself, as the erenciator or the demon of difference. A molecularized thing-in-itself and the empty form of time were domain the theatre the against as of the subject and molar state thought, in of representation, mobilized filling fluid forces is interests of exposing an empirical space continuum of which and contained and the by The is in the the previous second a conceptualization as mechanical. reference of motion punctuated her to Irigaray, the positive a secret movements of continuously abstract associated and with with chapter dividing intervention lips hich term two the of a middle as of a escape which are and m not one machine; 268

Notes to Chapter 7 binary articulate a relation, whilst at the sametime mobilizing a movement of escape(it is would which this which Irigaray does not quite manageto effect,becomingjammed by her own machinery). 43.DG, 1980:342; 1988:279 44.G, 1994:209 45. G, 1994:209 46.DG, 1980:341; 1988:278 47.1: Arc, p101 48. DL, 1991:177 49. K, II: 230 50. Spinoza, A Political Treatise, in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza,vol. 1, ed RH. M. Elwes, New York, Dover, 1951,p386 51. Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics. Power and Corporeality, Routledge,London & New York, 1996, p134 52. K, IU: Axx 269

Notesto Conclusion 1.Emily Dickinson, letter to Higginson, June 7,1862, The Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson. Ed. Thomas H. Johnson, Little Brown & Company(Canada)Ltd., 1951,vii 2. K, III: A6611B688 3. The Economist, May 4,1996, p34 4. Margulis and Guerrero, 'Two Plus Three Equal One: Individuals emerge from Bacterial Communities' p61 5. S, 1966(II), p195 (G, vol II, 253 6jcIII: A319B376 7. D, 1968:73; 1994:52 270

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