Nadia Bou Ali and Ray Brassier
but its self-exposition, an unfolding that takes time, but only
recognizes itself as such belatedly. Thus, there is a temporality
inscribed into thought’s acknowledgement of the rationality of
the actual: what is actual is what has already happened, or what
has just happened. But this is to suggest that, far from actuality
realizing a transcendent rationality, or reason accomplishing itself
through the medium of actuality, rationality comes after the fact:
the actuality of the actual is nothing but its belated rationality.
What joins substantial actuality to conceptual rationality is a
delay or lapse. This non-coincidence or asynchronicity compels
the becoming-subject of substance.
Precisely because actuality is constituted by “the continual
activity of conceptual determination,” it comprises the totality of determinations in their negativity, contradictoriness, and
contingency. Negativity, contradiction, and contingency are not
foreign to reason; on the contrary, they are comprehended in the
rationality of the actual. Actuality is not a stable achievement but
an explosive compound whose integration coalesces at the point
of disintegration. It is this integral disintegration that demands to
be rationally comprehended. But if philosophy, as its own time
comprehended in thought, always comes after the fact, is this to
say philosophical reason is fated to belatedness? Is reason always
too late? Too late for change yet too soon to attempt it? These
questions bring together politics and psychoanalysis. Does the
symbolic (or the world of objective spirit) shift only through the
displacement of jouissance? Is there no way out of the solitude
of enjoyment, harbored by philosophy? Must desire always be
embarrassed by identifications? These questions point towards another, perhaps more fundamental one: Is belatedness nachträglich,
retroaction, or something else? Castration perhaps?
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After Too Late: The Endgame of Analysis
The Fantasy of the End
The logic of time governing symbolic crises oscillates between
the too-soon and the already too-late. In Lacanian parlance, it
is as though there is a temporality that is fated to oscillate between enjoyment and death. Every moment is a potential end,
yet it is always too late for a final end; a real end to end all the
failed endings. Perhaps the logic of a “fantasy of an end” is that
it is too optimistic and refuses to accept that no matter how bad
things are, they can always get worse. The fantasy of a final end
ignores the fact that there is a potentiality for spurious infinite
suffering, or an enjoyment in suffering; that although the wheels
of history keep turning and turning, they are effectively going
nowhere. The problem of potentiality and temporality here can
be stated in terms of Alenka Zupančič’s critique of Paolo Virno:
What makes history possible is a gap in potentiality itself. This
gap in potentiality is inaccessible beyond appearance, beyond its
imitation, which constitutes appearance. Zupančič argues that the
gap in potentiality is itself doubled and that the doubling effect
is the substance or form of appearance: every historical moment
has its moment “with-without” cream (Zupančič 2019). There is
a “with-without” status to historical unfolding, or, in Hegelian
terms, there is an irreconcilable gap between the in-itself and the
in-and-for-itself. But what if it is too late even for these gaps, cuts,
and failures? What if it is too late to wait for repetitions or wager
on the return of the repressed? If it is indeed too late, then what
are we too late for? What is too-lateness?
This problem of appearance can be considered to be the same
as the problem of power, or the problem of the Lacanian Other. In
capitalist society, labor-power is assumed to have a potentiality –
whereas it is a negativity. Labor-power, as we know from Marx,
is not the source of value; rather, it is the form of the commodity
that is the source of value. There is an incommensurability or
non-relation between labor-power and its form of appearance
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Nadia Bou Ali and Ray Brassier
in the commodity-form. Thus, the failure to realize labor-power
is embedded in the capitalist structure. This failure is the source
of surplus-value. The fantasy of capital is concomitant with its
own immanent end: it is always framed through crisis. Capitalism
relies on the failures of potentiality to be realized; or the failure
in potentiality itself. This problem is one that Lacan assumes in
his theory of discourse: there is no big other as such but a “form
of a big other” that is sustained by the very belief in its nonexistence. The emperor was always a fool, an empty signifier, a naked
force; the master lacks and it is this very lack that sustains the
symbolic order and strengthens it: it has always been too late for
us to have a proper master.
The Dregs of Spirit
Jouissance or enjoyment is the “glue” that carries a repetition
structure for the originally missing signifier, the S1, which inaugurates the signifying chain or symbolic function (Zupančič 2008).
The status of S1 remains, however, a serious point of contention
amongst contemporary interpreters of Lacan.2 The contention
over the status of S1 poses a set of questions: Is the symbolic
unstable (characterized by a “non-existence” of the signifier),
while topology and formalization are stable? Or are they both
characterized by instability and it is precisely this instability that
tethers them to the Real? The symbolic is sustained through the
production of a surplus of desire: every chain of signification or
discourse operates by encoding the body, petrifying it with meaning: the object of the symbolic is none other than a body arrested
by the signifier. But that is not the only possible body; there is
2
This disagreement pits Alenka Zupančič and Mladen Dolar against Adrian
Johnston and Lorenzo Chiesa. It concerns Lacan’s account of signification or the
question of the “emergence of the signifier” and has serious implications for the
position of psychoanalysis in relation to modern science, nature, and philosophy.
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After Too Late: The Endgame of Analysis
also a body that dreams while reason sleeps. This is what Hegel
would call the left-over dregs of spirit; once spirit realizes that
it cannot but leave finitude behind, it demands the simplicity of
a concept. The “baits” that lure spirit are love, the beautiful, the
holy, and the eternal. In Lacanian terms, we could call these the
stuff of enjoyment. Spirit is not driven by the conceptual alone,
but also by the non-conceptual, by the thing itself or das Ding.
“Spirit is time”; consciousness is the identity of thought with itself
in its own disintegration and “life is the union of union and nonunion.” The “absolute power” of the work of the Understanding
proceeds through dissolution, negativity, and opposition: it is akin
to Goethe’s Mephistopheles, without whom Faust simply could
not be. The principle of negativity, embodied in Mephistopheles,
is necessary for the unfolding of consciousness, and it “attains an
existence of its own and a separate freedom” (Hegel 1977, Preface,
§32–33). The drive, or principle of negativity, breaks from life as
it attempts to return unto itself, and culture ensues in this movement of return upon itself. There is life—whose sense for Hegel
is not vitalist—and there is moribund speculation; but there is
also something else. Life is not some form of infinite productivity
without any concrete oppositions or determinations. There is in
Hegel a distinction between life and the consciousness of life, or
the in-itself and for-itself. Psychoanalysis intervenes at precisely
this point: Spirit is not only time; it is also held back by time and in
time. Time is always too-late for the moment of apprehension; it is
what holds back the possibility of grasping everything all at once.
Spirit and its enjoyments can be better off without the astringencies of time; they can dream of annulling time, sublating it once
and for all. Rebecca Comay points to Hegel’s mockery of Kant’s
transcendental aesthetic as an “oral-sadistic phantasm symptomatic of a disavowed breach between self and world” (Comay and
Ruda 2018, p. 67). The unity of apperception attempts to engorge
its own failure to apprehend itself in its object and is left with an
undigested lump of “cold duty” as its sole enjoyment. Comay
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argues that Hegel makes a “hypertranscendental” move—one
might add here almost a Schreberian one—whereby he seeks to
turn “the critical bite back on itself such that the orifice between
inner and outer, container and contents, is in turn involuted”
(ibid.). Hegel seeks to consume time; one could even read the
whole Phenomenology as one long procrastination: procrastination is an anal relationship to time where a sense of omnipotence is
retained through a refusal of time. Anxiety, procrastination, mania,
obsession, ennui, neurosis: all are in different ways indefatigable
pursuits of an arrested time.
In the Phenomenology, Hegel introduces a postulate of asif-ness to consciousness. It must always begin as if it is too late;
as if all that had come before had been lost; as if nothing was
learned. This, as Comay puts it, is “the truth of absolute knowing
as a recollection of absolute forgetting” (ibid., p. 68). She considers Hegel’s Saturnine image in the figure of Kronos; a figure of
obscene enjoyment and privation at once, or a perverse father, a
father or worse. Comay meditates extensively on Hegel’s rewriting of a quote from Schiller and asks: Must philosophy return to
poetry, as the perverse father returns to his mirror image? Kronos
stands for the metaphor of digestion that Hegel employs to think
of desire as the movement towards an object; an engorgement of it,
a destruction of it, and a reinstatement of it into the circle of life.
How do we analyze Hegel’s oral fixations: digestion and desire,
Christianity and the Eucharist, the perversions of Christianity,
the mouth as the knot of spirit, where both speaking and eating
occur? Is the mouth a “speculative knot”? (ibid., p. 77). The oral
drive that Hegel points to is our entry point to the psychoanalytic
drive, which is always in any case a partial drive. The drive is what
bars access to the Other; it is the sexual non-relation. Relation to
an other, or self-relating negativity in Hegelian terms, is always
possible through a partial drive, an excerpt (like Hegel’s excerpt
from Schiller at the close of the Phenomenology); an objet a which
comes into the place of the Other. In the place of a relation to
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After Too Late: The Endgame of Analysis
an Other, Lacan proposes there is only a relation to the object.
Both sexes can only have a rapport with an object, the phallus,
and not each other. Castration is the marking of negativity in the
relation; both man and woman will have the phallus but only
through castration, through embarrassment, through lack. In a
sense, man and woman will have the phallus but only when it is
too late. As Jacque-Alain Miller once put it: “To have it or not to
have it, anyway it is not the being” (Miller 2001). Subjectivity is
plagued with the attempts to follow desires or to take the bait, in
Hegelian terms, but only falls back into the traps of identifications, into the imaginary and jouissance.
Stuck in Drive
The drive is precisely what we arrive at from the problem of the
belatedness of thought: How do we posit the object of the drive
against that of desire? What of the eventual capacity of desire
versus the mundane compulsions of jouissance? The temporality
of the unconscious is not only constituted around a retroaction
or nachträglichkeit, but also around a second movement of cuts,
breaks, and interruptions. In unconscious thought there is a repetition with retroaction and a repetition that reinscribes jouissance
in a singular manner, but there is also the possibility of a different
signifier, a naming of desire beyond jouissance.
The idea that the worst has already happened, that it is
too late, is always accompanied with a longing for a time when
nothing happens, when desire is still. Besides nostalgia for a past
where nothing happens and a longing for an end that will put us
out of our misery, there is also anxiety, which stands in the way
of desire. Anxiety emerges in modernity precisely when it is impossible to finish, to end, to “finally progress,” but it is crucial
in psychoanalysis for identifying with the symptom. Once that
happens, it becomes very clear for the subject that there really is
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Nadia Bou Ali and Ray Brassier
no easy way out; that the hardest thing of all is to name a desire
beyond the symptom. Anxiety is itself a form of jouissance that
is separate from desire. Ultimately, psychoanalysis claims that we
have to accept that there is no way out in order for something
else to be possible.
Is there then a “too-lateness” that is not only a nachträglichkeit, but also not only phallic jouissance or idiotic enjoyment? Is
there something in reality, in the thing-in-itself, that isn’t adequate
to the concept? The wager of psychoanalysis has always been that
there is a “stuckness,” a something that cannot be worked through,
and that only through naming this “stuckness” does some form
of politics become possible. Or, in other words, it is only if we
really think that it is too late that something can happen. Adorno’s
formulations on too-lateness in his essay on Beckett’s Endgame
are decisive here. The dialogue in Endgame “sounds as though
the law of its progression were not the rationality of statement
and rejoinder, or even their psychological interconnection, but
rather a process of hearing something out, akin to the process of
listening to music that is emancipated from preexisting forms”
(Adorno 2019, p. 257). Hamm’s depiction of the end (“If I can
hold my peace, and sit quiet, it will be all over, with sound, and
motion, all over and done with”) offers “the imageless image of
death [that] is an image of indifference, that is a state prior to differentiation” (ibid., p. 266). But for Adorno (as for Benjamin),
it appears that this “stand-still,” or negative ontology, offers yet
another absurdity (beyond those that existentialism is stuck in)
where the peacefulness of reconciliation and the peacefulness
of annihilation can no longer be distinguished. The “imageless”
state prior to differentiation indexes the indifference of subject
and object and the liquidation of consciousness. Thus the voice
through which Endgame’s characters speak is not the voice of
consciousness or reason; it cannot be squared with the “I” against
whose substantiality the ego synthesizes itself. What Beckett’s
characters voice is not really something at all, yet nor is it nothing;
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After Too Late: The Endgame of Analysis
it is rather the impossibility of becoming. As Mladen Dolar put
it, in Beckett’s work: “The voice is an intruder, an alien body,
the prosthesis, the extimate” (Dolar 2008, p. 10). This extimate
nature of the voice is precisely what the “eternal life of spirit”
hinges on. The drive, as the negation that precedes all determinate
negations, cannot be the standstill of the dialectic, the moment
where reconciliation and annihilation are rendered equivocal.
The drive seems to be more on the side of a movement that has
no end, that cannot end, that is without punctuation. In relation
to this interminable movement, death becomes the hardest of
tasks as what must wrest itself away from the compulsions of the
drive. The subject must insist on properly dying despite all the
attempts to actualize potentiality, or the crack in potentiality. In a
sense, one can say that it is never too-late-to-die anyway, keeping
in mind that the final repose promises no reconciliation. Death
always comes on time. It is this second death, the true end, that
cannot be sublated (aufgehoben) or grasped in its concept, but
through which the concept must be staged. Beckett’s Endgame
stages this end.
The Fall
Why is Endgame so exemplary for Adorno? Three reasons suggest
themselves. First, it is a drama about the end of drama, but one
that presents drama’s impossibility without dramatizing it. Second, it is a text about the end of meaning, but one that configures
meaninglessness without ennobling absurdity by turning it into a
metaphysical predicament (as existentialism does). Third, it constructs a form that takes the obsolescence of form as its material,
without thereby presuming to have superseded it. In this regard,
Endgame’s achievement for Adorno lies in managing to express
historical truth at a moment when the disparity between social
experience and the resources of meaningful expression threatens
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Nadia Bou Ali and Ray Brassier
to render truth unintelligible. Endgame renders historical truth
intelligible by confronting this disparity and reflecting upon the
lapse in the conditions of meaning and the end, not of this or that,
but of everything:
In Endgame, a historical moment unfolds, namely the experience
captured in the title of one of the culture industry’s cheap novels,
Kaput. After the Second World War, everything, including a resurrected culture, has been destroyed without realizing it; humankind
continues to vegetate, creeping along after events that even the survivors cannot really survive, on a rubbish heap that has made even
reflection on one’s own damaged state useless. The word kaput
[finished, defeated, destroyed], the pragmatic presupposition of
the play, is snatched back from the marketplace:
CLOV: (He gets up on ladder, turns the telescope on the without.)
Let’s see. (He looks, moving the telescope.) Zero . . . (he looks)
zero . . . (he looks) . . . and zero.
HAMM: Nothing stirs. All is–
CLOV: Zer–
HAMM: (violently) Wait till you’re spoken to. (Normal voice.) All
is . . . all is . . . all is what? (Violently.) All is what?
CLOV: What all is? In a word. Is that what you want to know?
Just a moment. (He turns the telescope on the without,
looks, lowers the telescope, turns toward Hamm.) Corpsed.
[In the German translation quoted by Adorno, “Kaputt!”]
(Beckett 1986, p. 106)
(Adorno 2019, p. 240)
To snatch the meaning of destruction from the marketplace
is to return it to its non-equivalence, its un-exchangeability.
This requires wresting the concept of destruction free from the
metaphysics of the end as accomplishment, fulfilment, completion. But this cannot be done by overturning the sovereignty of
completion and turning incompletion (understood as partial or
fragmentary signification) into a new, supposedly desacralized
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After Too Late: The Endgame of Analysis
guarantor of meaning. This would endow the part with the power
of expressing infinity previously attributed to the whole. But it
is the power of expressing infinity, whether relayed by whole
or part, whose termination is at issue here. Metaphysical meaning, writes Adorno, has been “exploded,” and this explosion is
historically rather than metaphysically mandated. Thus, “Understanding [Endgame] can mean only understanding its unintelligibility, concretely reconstructing the meaning of the fact that it
has no meaning” (ibid. p. 243). Endgame does not represent the
experience of meaninglessness, dramatizing the encounter with
nothingness as if it were an eternal verity. Meaninglessness is a
historically meaningful fact, not a metaphysical certainty. That
“all is finished,” including meaning, cannot be a metaphysical
fact, since metaphysics seals allness through meaningfulness, such
that meaning and totality are two sides of the same metaphysical
coin. The end of meaning cannot be inscribed within a metaphysics of the end; it marks what Adorno calls “the fall” (Verfall) of
metaphysics, which resists alignment with Heidegger’s “end” of
metaphysics. For Heidegger, the end of metaphysical meaning is
epochal, which is to say, conditioned by Being’s disclosive withdrawal from humanity. For Adorno, it is historical: it cannot be
abstracted from the social ascendancy of capital, of which the
Second World War is merely the then (1961) latest catastrophic
symptom. This end—the radiant calamity of the enlightened
earth—manifests the nadir of the dialectic of enlightenment, understood as nature’s recurrence in the reason that seeks to dominate it. Unbounded subjective domination binds and objectifies
subjectivity. Under capital, the identity of subject and object is
no longer their reconciliation in and through the Notion; it is
their mutual indifference in and through the empty equivalence
of the exchange abstraction, which commensurates atomized
consciousness and quality-less material. Endgame confronts us
with this vacuous equivalence: “In order to underbid history and
thereby perhaps survive it, Endgame takes up a position at the
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nadir of what the construction of the subject-object laid claim to
at the zenith of philosophy: pure identity becomes the identity of
what has been annihilated, the identity of subject and object in a
state of complete alienation” (ibid., p. 251). Adorno cites another
exchange from the play in support of this claim:
HAMM: Open the window.
CLOV: What for?
HAMM: I want to hear the sea.
CLOV: You wouldn’t hear it.
HAMM: Even if you opened the window?
CLOV: No.
HAMM: Then it’s not worthwhile opening it?
CLOV: No.
HAMM (violently): Then open it! (Clov gets up on the ladder,
opens the window. Pause.) Have you opened it?
CLOV: Yes.
(Beckett 1986, p. 123–124)
Here is Adorno’s gloss on this passage:
One is almost tempted to see in Hamm’s last “then” the key to the
play. Because it is not worthwhile to open the window, because
Hamm cannot hear the sea—perhaps it has dried up, perhaps it is
no longer moving—he insists that Clov open it: the senselessness
of an action becomes the reason for doing it, a belated legitimation
of Fichte’s free activity for its own sake. This is how contemporary actions seem, and they arouse the suspicion that it was never
much different. The logical figure of the absurd, which presents as
stringent the contradictory opposite of stringency, negates all the
meaningfulness logic seems to provide in order to convict logic of its
own absurdity: to convict it of using subject, predicate, and copula
to lay out the nonidentical as though it were identical, as though it
could be accommodated with forms. It is not as a Weltanschaung
that the absurd replaces the worldview of rationality; rather, it is in
the absurd that worldview comes into its own (ibid., 265).
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After Too Late: The Endgame of Analysis
Rationality does not falter upon absurdity; it consummates
itself in it. Purposelessness is the sole guarantor of rational stringency conceived as pure spontaneity. But the purposelessness
common to freedom and compulsion is not solely negative; their
equivalence is not only to be indicted. Recognizing this commonality is also the key to breaking the spell of identity, whose
compulsion perpetuates history’s ensnarement in nature. Taking
up a position at the nadir of the subject-object identity also offers the chance of surviving history. By underbidding history,
Adorno writes, Endgame “perhaps survives it.” In laying bare
this absolute impoverishment, in rendering the disintegration of
historical meaning aesthetically and therefore making it historically legible, Endgame carves out a distance through which the
calamity can be named. Pointing to the nadir, it reveals its doubling in the zenith. The worst is the culmination of the doubling
that has prevailed until now; but naming it as the worst opens
up the possibility of staving it off. Where idealism would affirm
the difference between zenith and nadir, Endgame presents their
indifference as the truth masked by their semblance of difference.
In doing so, it does not affirm indifference; rather, it negates the
semblance of difference. In this way, “Endgame moves away
from the nadir only by calling its own name, as one does with
a sleepwalker: the negation of negativity” (ibid., 254). Through
this negation of semblance, history is made apparent, but apparent as fall: “The only part of history that is still apparent is its
outcome—fall (Verfall)” (ibid. p. 247). The difference between fall
and decline is worth marking. It distinguishes negative dialectics
from metaphysical pessimism. Pessimism is reactionary because
it enshrines negativity as principle. All change is deterioration.
But the negation of negativity, which Adorno sees exemplified
in Endgame, dissolves its metaphysical reification, whose affirmation of continual deterioration merely contradicts idealism’s
affirmation of continual progression. Whether as progressive or
regressive, the continuity of metaphysical meaning is maintained.
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Nadia Bou Ali and Ray Brassier
By way of contrast, Endgame’s negation of negativity denies the
difference between progressive apex and regressive nadir without
affirming their indifference. Its denial registers their distinction,
but only in negative, not as a positive datum. Thus Endgame
does not hypocritically lament a collapse of zenith onto nadir
whose inevitability it has already secretly affirmed. Where decline
implies the inevitable sequel to a prior state of organic fruition,
falling figures a movement in which the division between origin
and terminus appears inseparable from their indivision. If the
concept of Verfall is, as Adorno insists in Negative Dialectics,
“the secular category pure and simple,” (Adorno 1966, p. 351;
1973, p. 360) then there is no fall from grace, and this for the
same reason as there is no metaphysical difference between first
and second nature, or the given and the made: “Second nature [i.e.
what we have made] is, in truth, first nature [i.e. what we take to
be given],” which is to say, fatality (Adorno 1984, p. 124). Falling is not fatality because it first makes apparent the difference
between fate and freedom, or fatality and redemption. Falling
unites progress and regress, rendering their indivisibility apparent, not as something given to us but as something we have made.
It reveals the meaninglessness of what has passed for history up
until now. What we know as history is only prehistory, which is
to say, nature once again. But this failure of realization is not a
fatality to be affirmed precisely because it reveals the possibility
of history, and therefore of freedom, to depend upon the negation
of negativity. Negating is a doing. To take the difference between
zenith and nadir as given is to render it indifferent, but recognizing that it is we who have made it indifferent by taking it as given
is what allows us to make it different. Yet to allow something is
not thereby to realise it. Freedom is possible, but its realization
is blocked by the unfreedom of what is actual, society as fatality,
ordained by the rule of capital. Rationality persists as possibility,
not despite but because of the impossibility of its actuality. This
hiatus between reason’s actuality and possibility is fundamental
to Adorno’s quarrel with Hegel.
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After Too Late: The Endgame of Analysis
The Residue of Possibility
Adorno’s 1962 essay on the concept of progress, delivered the
year after the essay on Endgame, pushes further the suggestion
that liberation is enciphered within domination, and that reason
is harboured by unreason. Adorno credits Kant with the insight
that unfreedom is the condition for freedom:
When, in the most sublime passage of his philosophy of history,
[Kant] teaches that the antagonism, the entanglement of progress
in myth, in nature’s hold upon the domination of nature, in short,
in the realm of unfreedom, tends by means of its own law toward
the realm of freedom—Hegel’s “cunning of reason” later came out
of this—then this says nothing less than that the conditions for
the possibility of reconciliation are its contradiction and that the
conditions for the possibility of freedom are unfreedom. [Adorno
2005, p. 149]
Adorno’s mention of “conditions of possibility” is significant
here. Conditions of possibility are in us, not in things themselves.
They are subjective conditions for phenomena, not objective
properties of noumena. Thus when Adorno paraphrases Kant to
the effect that antagonism is the condition for the possibility of
reconciliation, and that unfreedom is the condition for the possibility of freedom, he situates this antagonism and this unfreedom in us, not in things themselves. They are man-made social
phenomena, not God-given transcendent realities. The coercive
and antagonistic nature of capitalist society is of our own doing.
Part of Adorno’s point is that recognizing this facticity allows
us to see that it could be changed. Allowance here is a minimal
condition: it is at least possible to change these phenomena. But
of course knowing that something could be otherwise does not
suffice for us to make it otherwise; it does not compel us to act.
Thus the self-reflection through which reason recognizes that
what it took to be given has been made by it, that it is itself
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Nadia Bou Ali and Ray Brassier
the nature from which it seeks to emancipate itself, that nature
continues to dominate it through the domination which it exerts
against nature, perpetuates the autarky of spirit unless it is supplemented by a practical act:
The beneficial self-reflection of reason, however, would be its
transition to praxis: reason would see through itself as a moment
of praxis and would recognize, instead of mistaking itself for the
absolute, that it is a mode of behaviour. The anti-mythological element in progress cannot be conceived without the practical act that
reins in the delusion of spirit’s autarky. [ibid., 153]
This suggests that while reflection is the element within which
the dialectic of Enlightment is cognized, it is not the medium
within which it can be overthrown. The element of transformation remains the social actuality (the bad totality of capital) from
which reflection has become historically estranged. Thus it is the
oppressive forces and conditions wrought by the domination of
nature that must be resorted to in the attempt to overcome that
domination. More pointedly, Adorno points to regression itself
as the condition of progression: the progress of catastrophe and
the wreckage of history, watched over by Benjamin’s impotent
angel, are in fact the only resource for the aversion of disaster and
the inception of humanity:
Part of the dialectic of progress is that historical setbacks, which
themselves are instigated by the principle of progress […] also
provide the condition needed for humanity to find the means to
avert them in the future. The nexus of deception surrounding progress reaches beyond itself. It is mediated to that order in which
the category of progress would first gain its justification, in that
the devastation wrought by progress can be made good again, if at
all, only by its own forces, never by the restoration of the preceding conditions that were its victim. (ibid.)
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After Too Late: The Endgame of Analysis
The realization of progress, understood as freedom from
domination, would coincide with the abolition of progress, understood as the domination of first and second nature. But if the
domination of domination (also known as the dictatorship of the
proletariat) is no longer a condition for communism since it perpetuates what it is supposed to abolish, what practical act could
realise the possibility of overthrowing domination? Reflection
demythologizes the actual by exposing its subjective facticity.
Since what is, has been made so by us, the possibilities latent in its
actuality have also been shaped by our activities. But this is not to
say that reflection would suffice to render the world wholly amenable to reason. Reflection itself relays compulsive identification.3
For change to be possible, we would have to change the practices
that shape thinking together with the thinking that shapes those
practices. This would be an impossible task, were it not for the
fact that in reproducing itself the social totality reproduces the
contradictoriness that stymies it as totality. This is the residue of
negativity that must be negated: not just to prevent the reproduction of totality, but to transform it. This negation is the missing
link between reflection and practice. Yet Adorno either will not
or cannot specify the determination that would render negation
practically transformative. He rearticulates the split between
immanent and transcendent possibility on one hand, along with
the distinction between knowledge and practice on the other.
The possibilities recognised by identifying cognition harbour an
unrecognised underside: this is not a reservoir of transcendent,
metaphysical possibility; rather, it is constituted by the residue of
nonidentity within every identification. Conversely, the knowledge governed by identity is conditioned by unidentified utilities
3
“Something compulsive distinguishes animal conduct from human conduct. The animal species homo may have inherited it, but in the species it turned
into something qualitatively different. And it did so precisely due to the reflective faculty that might break the spell and did enter into its service.” Adorno
1973, p. 345.
27
Nadia Bou Ali and Ray Brassier
(exchange), while the practice compelled by utility is conditioned
by pointless identifications (equivalence). Thus knowledge is
hemmed in by practical imperatives to which it is blind, just as
practice is constrained by cognitive imperatives dictated by social
utility. Neither knowledge nor practice exhausts the domain of the
possible. But while the difference between the actual and the possible transcends cognitive and practical identification, it does not
transcend reflection. Reflection rescues the residue of possibility
secreted by the contradictoriness of the actual. Yet so long as it is
bound only to point to negativity while resisting the compulsive
affirmation of the actual, reflection merely enables the negation
of negativity, without carrying it out. Naming the impasse may
loosen its grip, but does not suffice to break out of it.
Living Death
Pointing to compulsion, reflection momentarily interrupts it, exercising the spontaneity in whose name it has subjugated itself to
fate. This spontaneous nomination is the extremity of reflection,
releasing a possibility not programmed by actuality: an impossible possibility, whose actualization requires symbolic death or
subjective destitution. After symbolic destitution, after it is too
late, comes a different symptom and a new nomination; a new S1
that exceeds what exists. Perhaps the Marxian analogue here is
the self-abolition of the proletariat, the impossibility of affirming
its identity as the working class, since to be a proletarian is to be
reduced to being a bearer of labor-power (whether employed or
unemployed) rather than being a laborer. As a social category, the
proletariat is the negation of every anthropological predicate; it is
the social embodiment of cultural destitution. The proletariat is
living-labor forced to mortify itself to stay alive (by turning itself
into labor-power); a mortification compelled by the dead-labor
which lives from it (capital). It is the life that fuels the death to
28
After Too Late: The Endgame of Analysis
which living has unknowingly wedded itself. While knowing this
does not suffice to break the mutual reproduction of life and death,
the growing impossibility of living by dying—the brute fact that
their interdependence destroys its own reproducibility—may yet
compel the act that terminates this compact.
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