Much attention has been devoted to the political, diplomatic,
economic, and even military aspects of the 'One China'
principle. It is natural enough - given the practical gravity of
the issues involved - that purely conceptual considerations
have not been prioritized. Nevertheless, the 'One China'
debate is - at least implicitly - philosophical in nature, since it
orbits the abstract and elusive concept of unity. In this respect
the experience of Western philosophy, although apparently
detached from the intricacies of the 'One China' discussion,
has a considerable - and perhaps surprising - relevance to
some of its key dilemmas.
Since the dawn of Western philosophy the meaning and
status of unity has been a central preoccupation. According to
the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides, and to his disciple
Plato, the true nature of reality was indivisible and
unchanging. In contrast, the multiple and the transient were
dismissed and denigrated as mere appearances; deceptions
derived from the body and the senses. The tendency of these
thinkers was to idealize unity as a supreme and eternal being
above and beyond the many, the origin of - and ultimate
sovereign over - the world. This intellectual trend was
consolidated by the neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus, whose
relation to 'The One' crystallized into an uncompromising
mystical devotion. When further reinforced by the doctrinal
commitments of Judeo-Christian and Islamic monotheism
over the course of the following centuries this deification of
unity hardened into a fundamental cultural orthodoxy.
An important current in modern European philosophy has
called into question the long established privilege of unity. In
the final years of the Nineteenth Century Friedrich Nietzsche
announced a 'revaluation of all values,' seeking to overthrow
the entire tradition descended from Plato and the Church. In
the late Twentieth Century this philosophical revolution was
re-invigorated by the collaborative work of Gilles Deleuze and
Felix Guattari, which combined arguments from philosophy,
mathematics, sociology, and economics to criticize the
hierarchical power of 'The One.'
According to Deleuze & Guattari the philosophical conception
of unity is not original, but is derived from the organizational
model provided by the state. It is no coincidence from this
perspective that Plato's most celebrated work (The Republic)
is dedicated to the description of an ideal state. When the
state unites diverse groups, peoples, interests, and territories,
it does so by subordinating them to an over-arching authority.
It thus identifies itself with the whole, but also as something
additional to - above or beyond - the whole. Its implicit
ambition is to both represent and stand above its population.
This ambivalence, of a whole that is simultaneously higher
than - or superior to - its parts, is intrinsic to the prevailing
concept of unity. 'The One' only describes completeness by
producing hierarchy and centralization.
Whilst in certain respects philosophically abstract, this
conception of unity has obviously played an extremely
prominent role in the 'One China' debate. It is particularly well
exemplified by the formulation, recently endorsed by Egypt, of
"One China with Beijing as its capital," in which the unity of
China is immediately referred to a central political authority.
Beijing's own version of the principle, naturally enough, insists
that unity be conceived in this way, asserting that "the
government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal
government of China."
It is inevitable that such formulations will feed democratic
suspicions, since they imply that assimilation into a greater
unity presupposes subordination to a non-accountable higher
power. The apparent concession involved in the PRC's
favored 'One China, two systems' version of the principle
does little to assuage such doubts. As the example of Hong
Kong demonstrates, the diversity of systems cannot provide a
secure basis for popular freedoms when this diversity is itself
enveloped under a central authority that completely
suppresses the democratic sovereignty of 'its regions.' At best
such diversity survives precariously, at worst it serves as a
mere mask for oppression.
Given this context it is understandable that ROC negotiators
have tended to seek refuge in merely preliminary (and
ultimately evasive) formulations, whose model is the 'One
China with each side having its own interpretation' position:
the '1992 consensus' which is embraced precisely for its lack
of definition. A more radical disillusionment with the version of
Chinese unity on offer leads to a more-or-less explicit
abandonment of the entire One China concept, such as that
exemplified by Lee Teng-hui's suggestions: "two Chinas" or
"One-China, one Taiwan."
It can thus be seen that mainland bullying - expressed by an
adherence to a highly authoritarian version of the 'One China'
formula, and associated sabre-rattling - results almost
inevitably in an increasingly obfuscatory or even
pro-independence response from ROC negotiators. However
natural this response might be, its practical consequence - as
even the DPP has come to recognize - is the breakdown of
cross-straits communication, causing great uncertainty and
damage to both sides.
Need any possible 'One China principle' lead to such
deadlock? Drawing upon strains of anti-hierarchical thought
drawn from both Eastern and Western sources - both Lao-tse
and Spinoza are prominent influences - Deleuze & Guattari
point to a quite different type of unity to that favored by
authoritarian states. They note that systems of relatively 'flat'
or non-hierarchized intercommunication provide an alternative
model of unity: that of an integrated network. The most
important characteristic of any such system is that its unity
neither stands above, nor enters into conflict with, the
freedom and diversity of its parts. 'A' network, population, or
economy is no less One because it is Many: its multiplicity
and singularity exactly coincide.
In 'the Age of Networks' the systems that succeed and
proliferate are characterized by tightly integrated but
decentralized commercial, communicative, and administrative
webs. Trends towards economic deregulation, globalization,
and the explosive growth of wireless telecommunications and
the World Wide Web have produced an environment in which
rigidly monolithic institutions, whether governmental or
corporate, prove ever more fundamentally dysfunctional.
Downsizing, decentralization, and 'bottom-up' dynamics have
become the watch-words of postmodern political, economic,
and business reform.
Real Chinese unity cannot be conjured by ideological
pronouncements - however imaginative or obstinate - but is in
fact the product of densely meshed interconnection,
interchange, and intercommunication. This process of
unification though multiple connections has its own
irresistable momentum, as beneath the crust of political
stand-off a myriad of small business enterprizes, joint
ventures, and individual initiatives promote trade, travel, and
cultural exchanges. It is in this way that a non-oppressive
cohesion - or integration without subordination - builds its own
model: producing the future of a free and diverse One China
from the bottom-up.