Suprematist Ontology and the Ultra Deep Field Problem Operations of the Concept

Iain Hamilton Grant/Texts/Essays/Suprematist Ontology and the Ultra Deep Field Problem Operations of the Concept.pdf

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REASON IS INCONSOLABLE independently of language. Although the inferentialist premium on discursive practices privileges the game of giving and asking for reasons, this game is not only or exclusively realized in specifically linguistic discourse. The category of discursive practice is broader than that of linguistic practice. This is to say that reasoning understood as the unfolding of discursive commitments, entitlements, and incompatibilities, is not confined to the medium of explicitly self-conscious theoretical discourse, which unfolds in and through language. Not every rational discursive practice operates in this specifically linguistic medium. Artists think, and some artists think as rigorously as any theoretician, albeit in and through a nonlinguistic medium. Where noise is concerned, an artist like Mattin is engaged in thinking through the implications of the commitment to the ideal of “free improvisation.” In the course of working out these implications, he has discovered an incompatibility between what is implied by the norm of free improvisation and the conventions governing its actual practice. So he has undertaken a series of experiments designed to test the limits of what is allowable within those conventions and in doing so he seeks to expose the latent contradiction between the norm and the practice. I see Mattin as someone engaged in an eminently rational cognitive practice, in which self-consciously linguistic theorizing is just one element deployed alongside other, nonlinguistic elements: sonic, gestural, verbal, visual, and so forth. His performances frequently bring all these elements into play. And the fact that the rational reconstruction of the complexity of assertions implicit in these performances is often retrospective in no way compromises their discursive rigor: the rationality of a discursive practice is always retrospectively constructed. This is what it means to say that thinking takes time; the rationality implicit in a discursive practice—where “rationality” is understood as the intersubjective elaboration of discursive commitments, entitlements, and incompatibilities—is never immediately accessible to its participants at any single stage of its unfolding. Moreover, Mattin’s work is characterized by its self-consciousness (I mean this in the sense of cognitive awareness) about the status of artistic practice in late capitalist society and, in this regard, it explicitly addresses issues such as the nature of abstraction and the content of emancipation. Thus he is doing more than merely testing the conditions and limitations of a specific artistic medium—“noise” and/ or “free improvisation”—he is exposing the ways in which specific artistic practices are implicated in broader social and discursive contexts. And the “philosophical” tenor of his interrogation of his chosen medium has been generated in and through his practical engagement with it: it is not an extraneous imposition. In interrogating the limitations of a specific artistic practice, he has been compelled to investigate whether and how these limitations may be conditioned by the nexus of other practices in which it is enveloped. Thus the engagement with universality follows from unpacking the logic of a specific practice. 230 Concept Suprematist Ontology and the Ultra Deep Field Problem: Operations of the Concept Iain Hamilton Grant It took fourteen billion years to produce this image, for time to present its insuperably partial self-portrait: Figure 1: The Hubble Ultra Deep Field (HUDF)1 The image raises many questions concerning the character of time, the emergence of order, and the imageability of creation. It presents the early universe approximately one billion years after the big bang, yet was taken in 2004. The Hubble Ultra Deep Field (HUDF) is the name of the image, not of what it images. It images time through space because the farther into the universe imaging reaches, the deeper into time it descends. For all the marveling we might do concerning science, or what knowing makes, the image does not, of course, present the inexistence antecedent to the “imaged” infant universe or that inexistence antecedent to the universe’s emergence. The first inexistence is merely that of the billion years missing from the image, which is, to that extent, a deep field problem. Yet this is merely a relative inexistence. The ultra-deep field problem, which the HUDF does not image, involves not only the relative inexistence that fringes the existent image, concept or entity, but the absolute inexistence entailed when the deep field problem is acknowledged. Only this 1 This image “should offer new insights into what types of objects reheated the cold, dark universe about one billion years after the big bang, when stars first started to shine, about thirteen billion years ago.” See www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2004/mar/HQ_04086_Hubble_UDF.html. Concept 231
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SUPREMATIST ONTOLOGY AND THE ULTRA DEEP FIELD PROBLEM IAIN HAMILTON GRANT warrants the qualification “ultra-deep field,” since it exceeds depth in the direction of the depthless, exceeds any existent in the direction of inexistence. Historically, then, the HUDF is of something antecedent to its being imaged. In other words, the image of the antecedent is consequent upon not only an image-capable universe (deep field), but also upon the universe (ultra-deep field). As such, the image is additional with respect to the universe: not merely an image of it but an additional element in it. The HUDF shows that every journey into the past takes place not only in the future of that past, as is entailed by journeying into it; it also shows that, as a result, this past is consequent upon the future in which it is made; and that, as a result, the past for which the infant universe was a future remains a past undisturbed by Hubble’s intrusions. From this perspective, despite the fact that the universe insuperably antedates its being imaged, it is not inconceivable that creation itself be imaged, though this entails the image of the inexistent universe consequent upon that inexistent universe. But the imaged creation would be the future of the unimaged, its consequent rather than its reproduction, and would amount to the production or emergence, within that universe, of its own inexistence. Accordingly, the irreducible remainder of imaged inexistence will be the existent universe. For the same reason, however, the surd or remainder of a newly existent universe is precisely its inexistence, from which alone, according to the “Earliest System Program of German Idealism,” creation can be understood as “emerge[nt] out of nothingness,”2 that is, historically or temporally. It is this inexistence, the nothingness or not-being of the universe, which, once there is a universe, is paradoxically ineliminable. To see this, consider what temporality entails. According to F. W. J. Schelling, temporality is what is always in excess of what is, because “what is” cannot be reduced to a thing or an object. He writes: “Everything is temporal, the actuality of which is exceeded by the essence, or the essence of which contains more than it can contain in actuality.”3 Essence consists in more than actuality only if everything actual, everything currently active, is emergent. Temporality therefore entails the inactuality from which being operative must itself emerge if it exceeds actuality. Thus understood, temporality is temporality only if creation is involved, and creation entails inactuality, an inexistence consequent upon what is actual that remains irreducible to the inexistence antecedent to the emergence of this actuality. Accordingly, creation is consequent upon creation, or if creation is at all, it is creation to the nth power. The “time before the world,” the antecedent of the image of the infant universe or the HUDF, is therefore both a consequent of the existent universe and irreducible to the antecedence it conceives. In other words, the concept of creation is itself an instance of creation, involving the same irreducibility to the conceived as the universe has to its creation: there is always an irreducible remainder between creation and its concept, image, or additional element because the latter are instances of the former and therefore involve their ineliminable inexistence. After Immanuel Kant,4 philosophers would object here that any attempt to conceive or to image “nature in its natural state—the time before the world”5 is an attempt to conceive without concepts, to conceive a preconceptual nature behind all concepts. Hence they would conclude that any attempt to conceive of what is without concepts is self-contradictory. The concept of universal inexistence, such philosophers would argue, merely captures a mourning, in the act of conceiving, for its inability to conceive its own creation, a melancholic Romanticism bewailing what the concept cannot conceive, or what is “given” in advance of the concept (“nature in its natural state” and so forth). Rather than pursue the self-contradiction, it would be better, it might be argued, to abandon the attempt to conceive of what being is before being conceived. Better not to do ontology at all and to complete the shift that Kant initiated, according to some, from ontology to deontology.6 The “space of reasons” that concept-using creatures by definition occupy, they argue, is insuperable for such creatures which, to that extent, are not saliently biological.7 To acknowledge that conceivers irrevocably occupy such a rational space is thus to accept that it is not things that issue rational demands, but only reason-givings. It is this on which philosophers should concentrate, and thus “privilege inference over reference,” abstraction over representation, or the norms entailed in making judgments over (hypothetically) nonrational realities.8 This need not deny that there are photons before there are speakers, but only that photons issue 2 3 F. W. J. Schelling, Friedrich Hölderlin, and G. W. F. Hegel, “The Earliest Program for a System of German Idealism,” in Theory As Practice: a Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings, ed. and trans. Jochen Schulte-Sasse et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 72–73. F. W. J. Schelling, “On the Relation between the Real and the Ideal in Nature, or the Emergence of the Axioms of Naturephilosophy from the Principles of Gravity and Light” (1806), Schellings Werke II (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1856–61), 364. (Hereafter Schellings Werke is cited as SW plus volume number. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Schelling are my own). For Schelling’s theory of essence (Wesen) or “being operative” (wirksam sein), see his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and the Objects Connected Therewith (1809), in SW VII, 341–342, 346, 258. 232 Concept 4 5 6 7 8 That contemporary philosophy is insuperably “downstream from Kant” is asserted, for example, by Robert Brandom in his “From German Idealism to American Pragmatism—and Back,” in Perspectives on Pragmatism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 1: “Developments over the past four decades have secured Immanuel Kant’s status as being for contemporary philosophers what the sea was for Algernon Swinburne: the great, gray mother of us all.” This is the definition of Romanticism Novalis gives in §31 of his Allgemeine Brouillon, in Gerhard Schulz, ed., Novalis Werke, 3rd ed. (Munich: Beck, 1987), 455: “The time of universal anarchy— lawlessness—freedom—nature in its natural state—the time before the world (the state). Pre-world time provides as it were the dispersed traces of post-world time. […] Chaos is creation fulfilled. The future world is rational chaos, self-permeating chaos, chaos or .” As the neo-Hegelian philosopher Brandom claims, for instance, in Tales of the Mighty Dead (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 212. Examining “Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism,” Brandom writes that, insofar as they occupy the space of reasons, “merely biological beings […] become spiritual beings, undertakers of commitments” (Tales of the Mighty Dead, 217). He later clarifies this view: “The world consists of things and their causal relations, and they can only cause and not justify a claim or a belief ” (Perspectives on Pragmatism, 123–24). Robert Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 1. Such “non-rational realities” are merely hypothetical in the sense implied by the famous Hegelian dictum that “what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational.” See §6 of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia Logic, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 28–30. Concept 233
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SUPREMATIST ONTOLOGY AND THE ULTRA DEEP FIELD PROBLEM IAIN HAMILTON GRANT rational demands to which reason-exchanging creatures are practically responsive.9 Such rational demands include well-justified scientific fact. No one can deny that conceptual work is insuperable in all conceiving. But can it be straightforwardly assumed that the space of reasons is therefore not nature? Surely to do so relies on an assertion concerning what reason is that, contrary to the hypothesis, privileges reference over inference, if only in this instance—a realism, that is, even if only with regard to the concept. This realism tends, interestingly, to be cashed out in terms of doings, of practices (chiefly the making and justifying of judgments), rather than by considering the concept to be an “object,” a risk philosophers share, according to Freud, with schizophrenics.10 Yet since concepts issue only from judgments and do not precede them, the only conceivably real doings are those of judgment makers. Attention is paid neither to the operations of the concepts themselves nor to actors other than those that occupy the space of reasons. Insofar as this position maintains but does not elaborate this restricted realism, it fails to note the deep field problem: as the HUDF shows, no matter how deep the field, it is fringed with the inexistence of that field in which all imaging, conceiving, and constructing are in consequence insuperably partial constituents. A consistent realism concerning the concept, the image, or the additional element therefore entails either that “reality,” being itself a concept, is a state that cannot be extended beyond the conceptual or that the concept of reality, if not so restricted, entails conceiving the inexistence of the concept. Examining the work of Kazimir Malevich, I will contest the claim that the concept—this abstract entity or additional element—is not part of the universe in which conceiving arises. For it is hard to see how a concept, an image, or an abstract element may be added to a world if a world were not some field in which thoughts, images, and abstract elements occur. In consequence, the insuperability of the conceptual does not entail the abandonment of nature for norms, nor a naturalization of normativity or, what amounts to the same thing, the normativization of nature.11 And so I deny, secondly, that the insuperability of conceiving licenses the abandonment of ontology: if conceiving arises, it does so (a) in a universe and, (b) consequently upon the inexistence that the concept shares with the universe that arises and in which that concept itself arises. The realism at issue concerns the operations, the distributions of antecedence and consequence, by means of which alone elements may be additional. The Flight Paths of Dust 9 See Brandom’s discussion of the status of photons before there were vocabulary users in Perspectives on Pragmatism, 125–27. 10 Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious” (1915), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 14, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–74), 204. 11 This last is John McDowell’s favored response to the problem. See especially his “two sorts of naturalism,” in Mind, Value and Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 167–97; and his responses to Robert Pippin in Reading McDowell on Mind and World, ed. Nicholas H. Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), 274–77. 234 Concept Malevich’s theory of The World as Non-Objectivity, as its title argues, does not claim that because nonobjective art abandons imitation and expression, it therefore abandons realism, but rather that the world is nonobjectively.12 Thus the realism Malevich advocates for nonobjectivism, insofar as this consists in a knowing of what is, is for him inseparable from the works of science, as he constantly argues, just as some scientists have argued that the productive element and transformative productions that “knowing makes” turn physics into art.13 It is not by virtue of their various objects (stars, paintings, concepts) that the sciences, arts, and philosophy are “realist” in the sense I wish to spell out, but rather by virtue of the surd-structure, the “irreducible remainder” or the “time before the world” that the concept of creation entails and that is entailed in turn if there are additional elements. The concept of creation, that is, entails that what is created was not. This structure is universal, I will argue, insofar as, if true even in a single instance, it rules out its non-occurrence. Three theories underpin the philosophy of nonobjectivity, according to Malevich’s unpublished writings of the 1920s. The first concerns the theory of the additional element, the second that of the world as nonobjectivity, and the third, the theory of the copula. Each entails the other two: To the question “To what is an element additional?” therefore, the answer is—and “of course,” we might say—“the world”; not, however, the world just as we find it, the world of experience and concrete objects for instance, but the world as it is, as “nonobjectivity.” Just as in any proposition the copula is that element that combines a subject (such as “a square”) with a predicate (such as “white”), so too an additional element augments the nonobjective world by means of the copula. What the copula does, therefore, its actions or operations, how an element is added to a nonobjective world, forms the theory of the Suprematist copula. Crucially, how the copula operates and in what environments it operates demonstrate that it is not reducibly a concept or formal device, where “formal” is understood as not being material. We will address each of the three theories in turn. Malevich begins his account of creation thus: Not in vain have little airplanes emerged from the bowels of the Earth [1]. They will not be stopped on Earth by the three-dimensional law [2], they will fly to the place whence they have come [3], they are the dust of the Earth 12 Kazimir Malevich, The World as Non-Objectivity. Unpublished Writings 1922–25, ed. Troels Andersen, trans. Xenia Glowacki-Prus and Edmund T. Little (Copenhagen: Borgen, 1976). 13 Johann Wilhelm Ritter, “Die Physik als Kunst” [Physics as Art] (1806), in Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse eines jungen Physikers [Fragments from the Literary Remains of a Young Physicist], ed. Birgit and Stefan Dietzsch (Hanau: Müller & Kiepenheuer, 1984), 288–320. His account of what “knowing makes [was das Wissen schafft],” a pun on Wissenschaft, or “science,” occurs at pages 294 and 319. For a contemporary, albeit more “constructivist” variant, see Isabelle Stengers’s account of science as the experimental embrace of a risky future in Power and Invention, trans. Paul Bains (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 162–66. Concept 235
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SUPREMATIST ONTOLOGY AND THE ULTRA DEEP FIELD PROBLEM which flies off the Earth’s surface, and by this means pulverize the globe [4] […] Everything is striving to leave the globe [5], and to make its way further into space [6], but thanks to the relationship between the elements which have not yet been discovered, it sits like a tick on the Earth [7].14 The seven points I have singled out clarify the sense of the passage, which concerns the character of the world as nonobjectivity or demonstrates the problems to which the category “object” is ontologically prone. [1] Airplanes do not take off from airports but “emerge” from subterranean worlds. The scope of the flight is larger than its geographically located points of departure; and destinations, or its essential operations, to recall Schelling, exceed the actual flight. The airplane’s natural history thus encompasses the ores from which its metals were smelted, the formation of these ores over geological timescales and the development of the engine. Accordingly, technology and nature are not different in kind. Just as the natural history of the airplane exceeds its flight, point [2] argues that the flight exceeds the limitations of terrestrial geometry. Yet it also problematizes this: implicit in “geometry” is that it does not measure all dimensions, but only those of ge, of the Earth. It is a local or ontic science, tied to its object. That there are other dimensions—and not reducibly spatial ones, as [1] affirms—again attests to temporality, of what Schelling called the excess of essence over actuality, of the operation over any local “what is” (“What is the Earth?” “What is flight?”). The core of the problem of the flight path that absorbs the entire passage is addressed in point [3], which offers one solution to it, which I will call Trajectory A. The passage asks whether the flight, as what Malevich will call an “additional element” or “culture of action,” is a line or a curve. Here he asserts that airplanes, and by extension natural history, “will fly to the place whence they have come,” that is, that its flight paths are ultimately circular such that origin and end points are identical. Point [4] thus completes the circuit: flight is from and to dust. From the dust the flight becomes; the earth, its elements exhausted in this effort, turns to dust in turn, raising the crucial question of whether first dust (D1) is equal to second (D2), to which I will return below. Point [5] argues that it is not, and reposes the problem of flight not in terms of orbits but of striving. If essential operations exceed actuality, then this amounts to a realism concerning striving that is, for that reason, not restricted to the airplane or to the Earth. With point [6], therefore, it is not the airplane or the pilot (interestingly unremarked by Malevich) that strives; rather “everything is striving” to abandon earth for space. Point [6] therefore opens Trajectory B—that of the line in the “aerial element.” Striving is a straight line insofar as striving is considered as such and not in regard to the objects within which it is caught or, what amounts to the same thing, to the subject whose striving it might be. Yet no sooner is Trajectory B set against Trajectory A than an animal skepticism rears up 14 Malevich, World as Non-Objectivity, 111–12. 236 Concept IAIN HAMILTON GRANT to recapture striving among objects. The airplane does not leave the Earth but “sits like a tick” on the planet, locked into its changeless parasitism. Finally, then, if [3] appears to be confirmed by tick-talk, that is, that the local holds flight captive, that return is not a habit but a physically insuperable cycle, our attention is returned to the presupposition of the Earth, the history of which gives point [1] its force. If the natural history—mineralogy, metallurgy, manufacture, electricity, and combustion—on which the extended flight path is inalienably dependent, what gives the Earth its ultimacy, what licenses the Earth’s exemption from this history? What makes it the ground upon which all else occurs and to which, therefore, the flight paths of dust must invariably return? Malevich’s first indication of the Earth’s historicity is by way of its future—which turns out to be the future of dust: “Possibly our globe itself will be pulverized, as once a huge lump was pulverized, creating the globe [8].”15 Is this another cycle? More tick-talk? If the Earth itself emerges from pulverization, from dust, then either this is an eternal cycle, or escape is the rule rather than the exception. With [8], we are thus returned to the problem first spelled out in [3], namely, that the place whence all derives is the flight path of dust. Dust is itself emergent from pulverization, however, once again inculcating a behavioural cycle, like the tick, but this time holding planetary formation (and everything consequent upon it) prisoner. The Theory of the Additional Element The problem raised here is whether antecedent and consequent dust are the same. That is, is D1=D2? If [3] is true, then D1=D2; if [6], it is false. Only [5] supplies a possible differentiator for the two trajectories, by raising the theory of action. An act occurs only if its consequent is not contained in its antecedent, or just when it forges a difference such that, in this instance, D1 D2. Malevich’s fullest account of “action,” and thus a guide to what is meant by “striving” in nonobjectivity, occurs in his “Theory of the Additional Element in Painting” (1926): Under the sign of the additional element is hidden a whole culture of action which (in painting) can be defined by a typical or characteristic state of straight or curved lines. The introduction of new norms, the curved fibrous-shaped additional element of Cézanne, will make the painter different from that caused by the sickle formula of Cubism or the straight line of Suprematism. […] After Futurism comes a new element, the supreme straight, which I have called the Suprematist additional element of dynamic order, the appropriate milieu for the airplane, for the aerodynamic structure of planites, aerial Suprematism.16 15 Malevich, World as Non-Objectivity, 112. 16 Malevich, World as Non-Objectivity, 156, 188. Concept 237
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SUPREMATIST ONTOLOGY AND THE ULTRA DEEP FIELD PROBLEM IAIN HAMILTON GRANT This further clarifies the character of the problem that gives rise to the tick-cycle, or to thesis [3] that D1=D2. Like a physicist, Malevich’s construal of “element” is not an indivisible atomic body, but rather concerns fundamental forces. An element is additional, therefore, when it induces actions of which the field in which it acts was previously incapable. Thus Cubism’s sickle formula (figure 2B) does not eliminate but mutates Cézanne’s residual organicism, with its “fibrous lines” that curl, twist, and knot. With the Suprematist “aerial line,” as in Malevich’s beloved Schopenhauer,17 everything strives, nothing rests. sufficient to demonstrate that, even if “the world” were not created, creation is nevertheless effected. Yet it is just this that Malevich disputes, insofar as, across large timescales, the fact of flight is reducible to orbital dust. The flight paths of dust bring critical focus to the object as a frame of reference regarding the temporality of creation. Whether the measure of creation is world, airplane, dust, or tick is irrelevant to the problem. Each entails its perspective accidents because in each case these objects cannot but remain constant referents. Hence Malevich’s emphasis on striving, on the actions that form the theory of the Additional Element: “Everything is striving to leave the globe.” This proposition counters the others: “the airplane is planetary dust,” “the world is rest.” They can be countered because they concern particular states, so the truth or falsity of the proposition is timescale dependent: as a simple consequence of the second law of thermodynamics, the airplane will be dust and the world will be rest, even if neither is dust or rest now. A key Platonic insight: what can be stated of anything consisting of time-dependent states is neither true nor false, since it will have been both. Figure 2. A: Cézanne’s fibrous curve, B: Cubism’s Sickle-Curve, and C: the Supreme Straight.18 The three propositions at issue run: It is from that perspective that the flight is minimally different from the earth from which it emerges. It is the world’s future (the future of what is both “world” and “rest” in the Russian term “mir”) by means of which its past is first exhibited. The futurability of the earth—how long it will endure, rather than how long it has endured, being the true measure, according to Kant,19 of its age—becomes finite just when it is destroyed; but its destruction—and this is the second point to note from the earlier passage—is coincident with its creation, just as the airplane will “fly to the place from whence it has come,” remaining dust, or a tick on the planet’s skin. Hence the question whether D1=D2 remains unresolved. Implicit in this account, if from dust to dust is true, is the impossibility of novelty or the nonoccurrence of creation. To claim that there are no actions, therefore, amounts to the hypothesis that creation has never been, that what is, insofar as it is or even if it is, always is, so that the world is eternal. The slightest novelty in such a world, the most meager “additional element,” would eliminate the hypothesis. In the present context, is a world without flight the same as one with it? Surely the fact of flight is P1. Everything is striving. P2. The airplane is dust. P3. The world is rest. 17 Troels Andersen cites Malevich from his notebooks as saying “On Schopenhauer’s book it says ‘The World as Will and Representation.’ I should have said ‘The World as Non-Objectivity.’” Accordingly, Andersen’s introduction to The World as Non-Objectivity analyzes the structural similarities of the two works. 18 Ibid., 118. 19 Immanuel Kant, “The Question whether the Earth is aging, considered from a physical point of view,” trans. Olaf Reinhardt, in Kant: Natural Science (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), ed. Eric Watkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 165–66. 238 Concept According to P1, an action (striving) is predicated of all things, an action ruled out if P3 is true, or if “everything” covers the same number of cases as does “world.” Yet P1 and P3 are notably dissimilar to P2, which is the most concretely objective of the three. This is because it simply asserts of one object that it is another. Yet in so doing, the copula, the “is” in the proposition, effects or covers the transit between what must, if P2 is true, be considered two states of the one object: the airplane state and the dust state are, accordingly, not different objects but just one. The Ring and the Copula How the copula, the “is” in “the world is rest,” is understood—whether it effects or eliminates transition—is what is at stake between P1 and P3. If P3, then no transition takes place, so that P3 is the hypothesis of the eternity of the world, or the non-occurrence of creation. If P1, then not only is there transition, but the transition has consequences for the subject or the “everything,” such that no state is taken as primary or as the ground of consequent actions, since every state consists in “striving.” P1 is therefore object-eliminating while P3 is transition-eliminating. Malevich’s decision is evident in a 1916 Suprematist manifesto: Concept 239
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SUPREMATIST ONTOLOGY AND THE ULTRA DEEP FIELD PROBLEM I have destroyed the ring of the horizon and got out of the circle of objects, the horizon ring that has imprisoned the artist and the forms of nature. This accursed ring, by continually revealing novelty after novelty, leads the artist away from the aim of destruction. […] Objects have vanished like smoke; to attain the new artistic culture, art advances toward creation as an end in itself and towards domination over the forms of nature.20 Thus Malevich opts for P1 over P3 precisely because P2 is both true and false. Several terms are introduced here that flesh out the theory of the world as nonobjectivity. Firstly, the “ring of the horizon” imprisons not just the artist but also the forms of nature. As with nature and technology, neither is art of another kind than nature. If this were not so, nothing could bond the two and art’s dominion over nature would be inconceivable. Secondly, while art pursues creation as an end in itself, the artist’s aim is destruction— in the first instance, of the ring. There thus arises the question of what this ring is, such that it is capable of binding both artist and nature yet is susceptible of destruction. The ring or cycle is the universal copula to the extent that it binds all things (nature and art) insofar as it asserts of one thing that it is another (the airplane is dust; the world is rest). As binding all things, it consists in continuous novelty as form follows form; but this continuous sequence of forms thereby destroys all novelty. Thus the ring is accursed because, insofar as it is restless novelty, the only true novelty—rest—is impossible, so that, conversely, because it is ceaseless, absolute novelty is absolute rest, just as the airplane is dust. Rest—mir, or the world—lures the artist from destruction and art from creation because the cycle returns all forms to ultimate formless indifference. The ring is the horizon, remaining the constant point of reference not merely for the division of earth from sky, mapping the terrestrial geometry within which aerial escape is condemned to return, but also thus fixing the coordinates of all transit, sealing reversible motions into objects and all objects into one world, so that D1=D2. The ring is accursed because it precisely eternalizes objects—“novelties”—and thus imprisons the forms of nature in changeless eternity. It is destroyed when objects no longer circumscribe the capacities of creation, when creation cannot be reduced to the created. The ring is therefore the form and consequence, the self-identical pattern of entailments following from the hypothesis of the eternity of objects. Malevich hates the curve because it welds all differences into a single intuition of the world, a single horizon. As a partial ring, a curve describes the horizon of object, apparently guaranteeing particularity but betraying it to another, since limit states, like outlines, belong both to the limited and the limiting. As such, the curve endlessly unravels particularity: if the airplane is dust, if all things are just “things,” then their destiny is not the maintenance but the elimination of particularity. As such, the ring or the curve, the universal copula that welds all differences into one, 20 Kazimir Malevich, “From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New Painterly Realism,” trans. John E. Bowlt, in 100 Artists’ Manifestos, ed. Alex Danchev (London: Penguin, 2011), 106–07. 240 Concept IAIN HAMILTON GRANT is transition-eliminating since a cycle, having no end, has neither beginning nor finality: in consequence, claiming to describe particularity, to outline things, the maximal non-particularity of the curve (the concave interior is externally convex, such that the single line describes both) entails the deep field inexistence of objects: the airplane is dust, returns to the earth which was and will be dust again. All is dust. Thus, an object’s outline does not individuate it but generalizes it qua object such that no object, insofar as it is an object, differs from another. At best, objects flicker in and out of existence; but this, too, is a merely local phenomenon, since this, too, is a cycle, a being and a not-being of the same thing. The endlessness of the ring therefore proves, for Malevich, that reality is nonobjective, that is, that the world is “nothing”: If the world is endless, i.e., has no end, neither a beginning nor a finality, then the circumstances of the movement of matter are also endless. The facets, therefore, are endless, if this is correct, [and] it proves that the reality of the world cannot be expressed, for there is no limit, there is no beginning, there is no finality, and under this condition there can only be a “nothing.”21 What is there to image in all this dust? If all particularity is eliminated in it, then there is nothing to image, nor, since an image is part of the world it images, could there be sufficient differentiation between it and what is not it such that an image might be possible. In the nonobjective world into which the ring plunges all existents, the deep field problem is that of the elimination of objects, of particularity, for which reason it cannot be resolved by representation or expression. But even the proposition “all is dust” is a differentiator, so the image of dust remains, as the HUDF shows, too objective. The image is trapped, as in Plato’s Sophist, between “plurality of being and unlimited not-being,”22 but pointing forward to an inexistence antecedent to what both is and is not. Hence, once there is existence, ultra-deep field inexistence (unlimited not-being) arises consequently upon deep field inexistence. The Operations of the Concept Thus, in accordance with the post-Kantian philosophical horizon within which he works, Malevich’s realism is not only inferentially based, but realist concerning all inferences, all abstract or additional elements. That “everything that exists for us also exists in the universe”23 does not mean that the universe consists solely in “everything that exists for us.” Rather, from conceiving the insuperability of the deep field problem, there derives the ultra-deep field problem of the inexistence of the universe. Inexistence is ineliminably an element of the universe. Thus, it is due to the operations of the concept 21 Malevich, World as Non-Objectivity, 60. 22 Plato, Sophist, 256e5–6. 23 Ibid., 87. Concept 241
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SUPREMATIST ONTOLOGY AND THE ULTRA DEEP FIELD PROBLEM that ultra-deep field inexistence is consequent upon deep field inexistence. Since such an operation has occurred, therefore, it follows that it had not. The transition between “had not” and “has” is itself therefore the additional element, the action that differentiates the inexistence consequent upon the operation of the concept not only from the concept itself, but from the inexistence antecedent to what acts. If, following Kant, the “great, gray mother of us all,” everything is concept, the concept “concept” is maximally indifferent. This is why Brandom insists that it is the judgment rather than the concept that is the minimal unit of sense: to say something about something, even if this something is insuperably conceptual, is still to say something, and from this, various rational commitments flow. Nevertheless, this acknowledges even as it denies deep field inexistence: rational commitments buttress concept users against the inexistence from which reason turns. Yet the world of which the concept is part, when there is a world in which there is a concept, is capable of differentiation only if the concept’s actuality is not given in that world, but arises. That the concept is thus operative rather than representative was, in fact, Schelling’s response to the post-Kantian problem of the insuperability of the concept: It comes to a point where man must liberate himself not merely from revelation but from everything actual (Wirklich) in order to flee into a complete desert of all being, where nothing is to be encountered but only the infinite potency of all being, the sole immediate content of thought in which it moves only within itself as within its own ether.24 Schelling’s reading of Kant’s lesson does not stop with the straightforwardly idealist thesis that “all is insuperably concept, so that the concept ‘being’ is, firstly, the only being there is, and secondly a consequent of conceiving” (in fact Kant expressly denies this, as does Schelling).25 Rather, thoughts or conceivings are acts or motions, even if only in “their own ether.” Being consists in motions or acts only if being is creation. But it is by moving in itself that thought discovers the “infinite potency of all being.” That is, even if being were a mere creature of thought, a concept, it would be consequent upon an act antecedent to which being was not. Even consequent being entails that inexistence from which alone its production can be conceived. Moreover, if thought were this act by which being arose, then thought, too, would have to emerge from what is not thought, or no act would have taken place. The consequent inexistence of everything actual follows therefore from chasing down the movements of thought that are instances of the potencies of being which, since they are “infinite,” cannot eliminate inexistence once there are concepts at all. 24 F. W. J. Schelling, Grounding of Positive Philosophy, trans. Bruce Matthews (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), 142. (Translation slightly modified.) 25 Kant goes to some lengths to demonstrate that existence cannot be a predicate, from which arguments Schelling draws the following conclusion: “It is not because there is thinking that there is being, but because there is being that there is thinking” (Ibid., 203n). 242 Concept Representation