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TIME,
CONSCIOUSNESS AND SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION
Joan Elizabeth Dixon
B.A. Econ. (Hons.), MA-, P.G.C.E.
STY a\
(LI8RA8y)
9921525
A5
9_
.5
for
deg
infuf &nent
Submitted
the
tlae
of wquinments
w ofDoctorofPhilosophy
University of Warwick
Department of Philosophy
September 1997
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Tableof figures
Acknowledgements
Summary
1
THE DISUNIFIED
THEORIES
OF TIME
1.1
Introduction
1.2
The philosophiesof time
1.3
Disputed theories of time in the natural sciences
1.3.1
Time reversal invariance
1.3.2
Entropy and irreversibility
1.3.3
Far from equilibrium thermodynamics and irreversibility
1.3.4
Fundamental time asymmetry and Penrose's "New Physics"
1.3.5 Summary
1.4
Pretheoreticaltimes
1.4.1 Newton and the time-line
1.4.2
2
Time in ordinary language
1.5
Arguments for disunity
1.6
Summary
PHENOMENOLOGY
AND THE CRITIQUE
OF NATURALISM
2.1
Introduction
2.2
The basicproblemsof phenomenology
IN PHILOSOPHY
2.2.1 The ejx
2.2.2
2.3
Intentionality
(1910-11)
1aq*
Two essaysby Husserl - Philosophy
Phi
as rigorousscience
and
and tl. crisis
(1936)
Eun
of
inzmmz
2.3.1 The naturalisticparadox
2.4
the Phenzanmdogy
of Internal TvneCcn iot
2.4.1
ss
The constitution of the temporal object
11
3
2.5
2.4.2 The absolute,temporallyconstitutiveflux of consciousness
Someproblemswith phenomenologicalanalysis
TIME,
PHILOSOPHY
3.1
Introduction
3.2
The decline of the a priori approach
3.3
Tempus ordine geometrica demonstata
3.4
Instrumentalism
3.5
Conventionalism
3.6
Reichenbachand coordinativedefinitions
Observables
3.7
AND SCIENCE
3.7.1
Human observers and their problems
3.7.2
Anthropic principles
3.7.3 The direction of time and localisedconditionsof observation
3.8
Theory and observation
3.9
Shift to research programmes
3.10
4
3.9.1
Bootstrapping
3.9.2
Co-evolution of theories
Conclusions
THEORETIC INTEGRATION
4.1
Introduction
4.2
Historical backgroundto the unity of sciencehypothesis
4.3
Different usesof the term reductionism
4.3.1
Ideological reductionism
4.3.2
Methodological reductionism
4.3.3
Ontological reductionism
4.3.4
Explanatory reductionism
4.4
Microreduction and macroreduction
4.5
Diachronic and synchronic reduction
4.6
"Unity of science as working hypothesis"
III
4.7
Type-type identity theories
4.8
Arguments against unity of science
4.9
5
4.8.1
Multiple realisability
4.8.2
Responsesto the multiple realisability objection
4.8.3
Dupre's TheDim-%r of Things
Orthodoxy challenged
4.9.1
From growth by incorporation to scientific revolutions
4.9.2
From diachronic reduction to elimination
4.9.3
Super-empirical virtues
4.9.4
Summary
4.10
Renewed interest in the unity of science
4.11
De facto limitations of reduction
4.12
Provisional ontology
4.13
Conclusions
TIME
AND CONSCIOUSNESS
5.1
Introduction
5.2
Arguments against the naturalisation of psychology
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.2.1
The argument from lack of imagination
5.2.2
The special quality of subjective experience
5.2.3
The autonomy of psychology
Naturalised psychology
5.3.1
Time is not a simple, unitary experience
5.3.2
Time consciousnessis not unique to humans
5.3.3
No single master clock or timer
5.3.4
The ambiguous nature of time consciousness
Explaining the subjective experience of time consciousness
5.4.1
The internal clock hypothesis
5.4.2
Zeitgebers
Conclusions
IV
6
TOWARDS AN UNIFIED
7
APPENDIX:
7.1
THE DEGENERATION
OF THE FOLK OLFACTORY
Why olfaction?
The five familiar sensorymodalitiesof Folk Psychology
7.2.1
The many less familiar sensory modalities of contemporary science
7.2.2
"Taste", gustation and flavour
7.3
Culturalinfluenceson gustatoryresearch
7.4
Theoriesof olfactory coding
7.5
The problem of odour classification
7.6
BIBLIOGRAPHY
RESEARCH PROGRAMME
Introduction
7.1.1
7.2
THEORY OF TIME
7.5.1
Objective classification
7.5.2
Language
Conclusion
AND REFERENCES
V
TABLE OF FIGURES
No.
DESCRIPTION
BETWEEN
PAGES
1.1
The reversibility of Newton's mechanics. (From Coveney
1989)
1: 6-7
2.1
The Diagram of Time. (Adapted from Husserl 1905-10)
2: 17-18
3.1
Poincare parable. (Sklar 1992)
3: 7-8
3.2
Planes of simultaneity in special theory of relativity using
light beams for synchrony. (Ray 1991)
3: 13-14
3.3
Equations(Glymour 1980)
3: 25-26
3.4
Diagram (Glymour 1980)
3: 25-26
4.1
Diagram of a possible array of theories. (Causey1977,137)
4: 17-18
5.1
The Fodor-Pylyshyn model of cognition.
5: 10-11
5.2
Organisational levels of the brain
5: 12-13
5.3
A model for the temporal pacemaker (Treisman etaL 1990)
5: 23-24
7.1
Different types of sensory receptors in vertebrates
7: 4-5
7.2
Primary branches of the trigeminal nerve that innervate the
nasal and oral cavities. (Silver 1987)
7: 5-6
7.3
Role of the chemicalsensesin flavour assessment
(Ney
1990)
7: 5-6
7.4
ASBC beerflavour wheel (MBAA 1976)
7: 5-6
7.5
Diagram of tongue showing areasof sensitivity to four
traditional primary tastes. (Buss 1973)
7: 8-9
7.6
Amoore's seven primary odours, illustrating the "lock and
key" approach (Amoore 1952 and 1962)
7: 10-11
7.7
Historical table showing renowned odour classification
7: 13-14
(Shepherd1988)
systems
7.8
Munsell system for colour notation. (Hurvich 1981)
7: 14-15
7.9
Linnaean categoriesincluding hedonics
7: 16-17
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Firstly, Greg Hunt who did his bestwith a waywardDeleuzian.He hastaught me almosteverythingI
know. He encouragedme to stop reading,and start writing. Occasionallyhe mademe do somework.
But most importantly of all, took me to "lunch."
Secondly, all the kind readers of bits of this thesis in its various drafts: Ian Morley, Steve van Toller,
Roger Broadhurst, Michael Luntley, Ian Lyne and Nick Land.
Thirdly, the Universityof Warwick Board of GraduateStudies,who gaveme a Warwick scholarship.
Finally,Tim Pearcefor insightful discussion,conscientiouscopy reading,and practicaladviceon the
beerflavour classificationsystem.
SUMMARY
To date,there is no universaland coherenttheory concerningthe nature or the function of time.
Furthermore, important and unresolved controversiesraging within both philosophy and the
natural sciencesapparentlyindicatethat there is little hope of constructinga single,unified theory.
Even so-called "folk" theories of time, embeddedwithin different cultural traditions, show no
description
therefore
common elements,and
can not provide a pre-theoretical
of time, towards
which an explanatoryframework could be constructed.This lack of consensusindicatesthat the
being
defined,
be
it
is
is
ill
least,
the
to
concept as
currently
used
and, at
very
needs
considerably
has
disarray
The
time
conceptual
surrounding
revised.
aided and abettedthe argumentsof certain
thinkers, especiallyRicoeur, working within the phenomenologicaltradition who make de prixij3
be
that
there
claims
cannot a singletheory of time.
My intention is not to try and to produce a concept of time that was capable of unifying all
these different elements. Rather, Ricoeur's arguments and those of others working in the
dissatisfied
believed
by
informed
I
tradition
that
their
phenomenological
me.
arguments were
a
myopic, muddled and positively 19th Century understanding of the scientific project. Hence, my
is
aim to show that Ricoeur's claim will not stand up to scrutiny, and that there are no principled
arguments against the possibility of a unified theory of time. We examine the major arguments
against unification in general, and also with particular reference to theories of time, such as
Husserlian phenomenology, conventionalism, instrumentalism, anti-reductive positions in general,
as well as the specific problem of reducing subjective experience to objective description. We
demonstrate that none of these objections constitutes a watertight a priori argument against a
unified theory of time.
Furthermore,we demonstratethat recent developmentsin the philosophy of scienceand the
have
philosophy of mind
madesucha unified theory a plausiblegoal.We arguethat post-positivist
philosophy of science,with its emphasison researchprogrammes,the co-evolution of theoriesand
for
be
brought
the
types
to
super-empiricalrational support,opens way
to bearon
new
of evidence
questionsabout time. Also, recent developmentsin the brain sciencesmean that a neurologically
fully
being
developed.
is
time
plausibleand
naturalisedanalysisof our experienceof
Although much work in this direction has begun, we argue that it is fragmented, partly through
the limitations of our current knowledge, but more particularly through an inadequate background
has
lead
both
This
thought.
of coherent philosophical
philosophers and scientists to attempt grand
metaphysical answers to muddled philosophical questions which threaten the progress which
natural science and the philosophy of science have offered in the second half of the twentieth
century.
1: 1
CHAPTER 1
THE DISUNIFIED
THEORIES OF TIME
In anyattonptto bridgethedonidnsof expert klongmgto tlx spirit" andphysical
sidesof
key
the
tvne
Vies
position.
ournature, oe
Arthur Eddington
fran
by
Well,thornhasprobablyMn nxrenonsense
tune,
the
philosophers
Witten
on subfit of
Platoonwards,
thanm anyothertopic
PaulDavies
1.1
INTRODUCTION
When setting out to write about the concept of time, it has become obligatory for wouldbe authors to quote St. Augustine,
What then is time? I know well enoughwhat it is, provided nobody asksme;
but if I am askedwhat it is and try to explain, I am baffled. (Augustine397,
264)
The significance of the Augustine quote lies not its succinct encapsulation of a
half
have
but
by
in
its
A
gone
since the good
philosophical problem,
age. millennium and a
his
Confessions,
and yet still philosophers and scientists alike are unable to
saint wrote
define
the concept, nor even agree on a single property that it may possess.
adequately
Time has been described as linear and cyclic, relative and absolute, continuous and discrete,
finite and infinite, as being a property of the real world and as being an imposition of the
have
by
intractability,
infuriated
Some,
the
the
mind on
world.
concept's
resorted to
led
him
Notoriously,
McTaggart's
to conclude
extreme measures.
philosophical musings
that time did not exist at all. (McTaggart 1908) It is this lack of coherent definition that
for
initiating
this thesis.
the
provides
problem
In this opening chapterwe examinethe diversity of extant theories of time. To
date, there is no universal and coherenttheory concerningthe nature or the function of
time. Furthermore,important and unresolvedcontroversiesragingwithin both philosophy
1: 2
hope
little
indicate
is
that there
of constructinga single,
and the natural sciencesapparently
different
"folk"
Even
theories
time,
theory.
of
embeddedwithin
cultural
so-called
unified
traditions, show no common elements,and therefore can not provide a pre-theoretical
description of time, towardswhich an explanatoryframework could be constructed.This
lack of consensusindicatesthat the conceptasit is currently being usedis ill defined,and,
disarray
be
least,
The
to
needs
considerablyrevised.
conceptual
surrounding
at the very
from
has
thinkers
the
time
emanating
aided and abetted the arguments of certain
de
be
prindpe
that
there can not
claims
a single
phenomenologicaltradition who make
for
failure
have
These
thinkers
to reduce time as
theory of time.
cited,
example,the
for
"cosmological
time" assupport
their claims.
experiencedto theoriesof
1.2
THE PHILOSOPHIES
OF TIME
There is, to date, no universallyacceptedtheory of time. The most casualsurvey of the
diverseliterature,which constitutestime's philosophical treatment,revealsa manifold of
apparentlyunconnectedmaterial.So much so that it is not evidentthat the sameconceptis
being discussed.Hence it is not a new observationthat time asa concepthas playedmany
differing roles in a wide range of theories. So, for example,Adam writes of the various
theorists,who haveusedthe term,
It is hard to believe that these theorists have made the same "phenomenon"
death,
Between
them
they
to
their
time
central
work.
associate
with
ageing,
history,
They
growth and
with order, structure, synchronisation, and control.
(Adam
idea.
time
view
as a sense, a measure, a category, a parameter, and an
1990)15)
Many authors have claimed that the concept of time is of central importance to the subject
have
develop
Philosophy,
theories of
struggled to
of
and the roll call of philosophers who
from
list
its
the pre-Socratics onwards: Aristotle,
time reads as a
of
greatest thinkers,
Augustine, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger. It is disquieting, therefore, amongst this
has
be
itself
least
that
there
to
the
prided
on conceptual analysis
profession which
appears
little
is
There
the
the
or no commonality of reference
consensus over
meaning of
concept.
between many of the term's philosophical (or even technical) uses. It is as if Heidegger,
1: 3
McTaggart and Reichenbach were writing on completely different subjects. Their
few,
bibliographies
if
carry
any,sharedreferences.
respective
There have been different philosophicalresponsesto this disunity of the concept.
Firstly, there are those who have tried to do some groundwork towards a unified concept.
For example, Kenneth Denbigh (1981) arguesthat time as it is currently understood is not
distinct
draws
it
is
three
time
to conscious
concept
and
out
strands:
as
an unitary
in
in
theoretical
time
thermodynamics and evolutionary
time
physics, and
awareness,
factors
be
in
is
He
that
these
three
to
some
sciences.
argues
which will need
reconciled
fashion if we are to achieve a unified theory of time. Secondly, in frustration at the
inadequacies of previous attempts to ground an explanation of temporality in some
(1967)
Jacques
Derrida
time,
anti-foundationalist philosophers,
and Paul
original, primitive
Ricoeur (1984 and 1988) have chosen pluridimensional accounts as the preferred option,
different
have
Thirdly,
there
accounts are not reducible to one another.
arguing that the
been those philosophers like Heidegger and Husserl who regard any scientific theories of
derivative
time as secondary and
of our pretheoretical experience of temporality.
Finally,
by
has
been
the work of
already
mentioned, some philosophical approaches, typified
as
McTaggart, have led certain thinkers to pronounce that theories of time are internally and
irrevocably incoherent, and that therefore time is unreal.
That a philosopher might be driven to this extremeconclusion is not surprising.
The philosophical discussionsof time are exhausting,if not exhaustive.Every possible
been
have
be
Without
time
to
to
at
one
or
another
occupied.
stanceseems
claiming
a
discussion
description
complete
of the plethora of theories,the philosophical
of time can
be describedas falling into four main categories.Firstly, what we will call the AristotleAugustine debate.The question here is whether time is a real property of the external
by
debate
imposed
dealt
is
(This
the
the
structure
on
world
or
an
ordering
mind.
world,
detail
below
in
Timeaid
discussed.
)
in
is
Ricoeur
Narratiw
The
thesis
when
s
with
more
between
debate
is
Newton
Leibniz
and
second great
staged
about the structure of time,
that is, as to whether time is relative or absolute in relation to events. Einstein
hotly
debated,
for
issue
is
is
though
the
tendency
the
current
still
notwithstanding,
debate
badly
is
to
that
the
relative
claim
absolute versus
conceived.
philosophical authors
(See,for example, Newton-Smith 1980 and Earman 1989.) Subsidiary to this debate there
is a gamut of issueswhich concern themselves with the topology of time; each of these
tributary arguments involves dichotomous positions: Is time finite or infinite, is it linear or
discrete
but
is
it
Related
to
the
topology,
question of
or continuous?
cyclic,
of such
1: 4
importancethat it hasmerited a field in its own right, is the third major debatethat focuses
direction
book
(1956)
is
The
Thne
Hans
Reichenbach's
Direst
n
time.
the
of
of
on the
field.
(For
in
Horwich
Finally,
1987)
the
text
this
treatment,
a
contemporary
see
seminal
fourth main areaof debateconcernstense.Briefly, this is the questionof whether indexical
differences
its
in
Are
there
truth value.
ontological
components a sentencecan effect
betweenthe past,presentand future suchthat, for example,statementsabout the pasthave
(i.
future
do
determinate
(i.
truth-value
the
e.
are
real),
statements
a
whereas
about
not e. are
future
(There
all ontologically equivalent?
unreal); or perhaps are past, present and
are
debate
be
intermediate
is
Subsidiary
that
to
this
ontologicalpositions
can adopted)
several
the question of whether temporal relation are primitive, or whether they are reducibleto
kind
discussion
(For
see,e.g., LePoidevin and
of relation, such as causality.
some other
MacBeath1993or Mellor 1981.)
Newton-Smithhaseloquentlynoted that the confusion surrounding"time" is further
for,
compounded
Mime is not just an abstract beast but also it is a most promiscuous beast who
(Newton-Smith1980,3)
regularly couples with elusive partners.
He lists a host of other conceptsthat havebeenusedin an attempt to define time including
He notesthe problem with usingthese
motion, change,entropy,agencyand consciousness.
firstly,
like time, they are terms that are from theories
is
terms to explain time twofold:
"underdeterminedby data." Secondly,eachof theseterms dependson the conceptof time
for its own definition. So, for example,time can only be explainedin terms of causality,
be
in
and causalitycan only explained terms of time.
Despite their longevity,all of thesephilosophicaldebatesremain for the most part
death
for
have
Furthermore
their
a
unresolved.
certainphilosophers,with
wish
profession,
be
found
debates
in
They
that
the
to
these
suggested
solutions
will not
philosophy.
argue
that these are empirical, not philosophical questions; that it is only by grounding
begin
theory
that
to approachan
we can ever
philosophical explanationupon empirical
be
is
However,
time.
to
authentic explanation of
as
expectedin this most contrary of
deny
that time, as it appearsin scientific theories,
professions,certain other philosophers
(See
for
Chapter
The
2)
the
time.
conceptof
can tell us anything about
chances a unified
theory of time seemremote, given that such basicmethodologicalargumentsare far from
being resolved.
1: 5
In the twentieth century,the initiative for the study of time has beenwrestedaway
from the philosophers,and lies firmly in the graspof the scientists.A review of the UK
best seller lists cataloguesthe ascendancyof ProfessorsHawking, Penrose,Davies and
Prigogine,eachhawking their own brand of metaphysics.The ascendancyof the scientist
hasbrought with it a certainarroganceof tone. For example,Paul Daviestypicallyremarks,
Well, there has probably been more nonsense written by philosophers on the
from
(1995,252)
Plato
time,
than
topic.
subject of
onwards,
on any other
(One wonders why Davies, therefore, prefers to call himself a professor of natural
by
Aspersions
than
this
philosophy,rather
a physicist)
aside,
annexation the "scientists"of
the traditional territory of the "philosophers" has not occurred without some resentful
ripostes.In Chapter2 of this thesiswe will examinethe exemplaryargumentsof Husserl.
In developingthe phenomenologicalmethod, he managedto construct a philosophical
position that entirely negatedthe influence that the empirical theories of natural science
have
could
on the understandingof time.
1.3
DISUNIFIED
THEORIES
OF TIME IN THE NATURAL
SCIENCES
Though it may be true that philosophersin their time havewritten their shareof nonsense
be
have
it
true to say that scientists
about time, would not
alwayswritten good sense.
Indeed the history of scienceis just aslittered with degeneratedand degeneratetheoriesas
any other subject.
The initiative for theoriesabouttime hasundoubtedlybeenwrestedfrom the hands
but
for
the
of
philosophers,
not without cost. In order to claim its theoretical successes,
has
had
deny
basic
human
to
the
example, space-time physics
of
one
most
phenomena of
has
is
had
lawlike
ignore
It
that
time
timeto
experience perceived as asymmetrical.
also
behaviour
in
in
asymmetrical
other natural sciences,
particular the Second Law of
Thermodynamics. As with philosophy, important and unresolved controversies raging
is
little
hope
indicate
the
to
that
there
within
natural sciencesseem
of constructing a single,
unified theory of time.
In a letter addressedto MicheleBesso'srecentlybereavedrelatives,Einsteinwrote,
1: 6
For we convinced physicists, the distinction between past, present and future is
however
(Einstein,
illusion,
in
Speziali,
21
March
1955,
only an
persistent.
1972)
In making such an assertion,Einstein was dismissing an problem which would be of
his
direction
is
to
there
centralconcern many of
scientificcolleagues,namely,
a
of time?
1.3.1
TIME
REVERSAL INVARIANCE
Time-asymmetryhasposedone of the most perniciousconundrumin science,for sincethe
time of Newton there had beenan incongruencebetweenscientifictheory and the human
in
is
invariant
Briefly,
time.
explanation classicalphysics
with respectto time
experienceof
inversion. That is, eventsin time can be reversedwithout requiring a different form of
explanation.Within Newtonian theory a reversedsequencewould makejust asmuch sense.
(Prigogine1980)(SeeFigure 1.1)
It was the influence of Newton's theories that first popularised the representation of
time as a parameter, universal and absolute. Also in Einstein's theories, time acts as a
functions
Time
though
to
an observer.
as a t-co-ordinate that
parameter,
now relativised
fits in alongside side the other three spatial dimensions to comprise space-time. In the
theories of relativity, time as such has no intrinsic direction. Relativity theory provided its
proponents with ammunition againstthe phenomenological experience of time-asymmetry.
The phenomenological subject, they argue, perceives "now" as a unity of existence.
Whereas according to the theory of relativity all of the things which the subject observes as
have
happened,
because
light
it
the
to reach the retina. In effect,
time takes
of
now
already
has
This
we observe only past events.
encouraged certain physicists to claim that the
subjective experience of the "now" is only an illusion. If the experience of "now" is an
illusion, this casts into doubt other subjective judgements concerning time, such as timehave
Some
asymmetry.
philosophers
added their support to similar claims. For example,
Price (1996) argues that there is a need to distinguish which properties of time are
from
those perceived properties which are peculiarities
genuinely properties of reality
humans
from
through
the
which we
anthropocentric perspective
observe the
resulting
world.
1989)
Coveney
(From
Newton's
mechanics.
The
of
reversibility
Figure 1.1:
.
Ci
1
Ll
0
O
u
m
C
"ý
r--+
C
O
-ý
C1,
co
v
Oa
ü
ý 4
4
ý-
o
O
CIS
4-4
r-4
Oý
-0
.
v
t/)
oý"
ý+
Z
z
o
Cý
U
C
ý *-qý
V
°
ýt4
ý v V
O
Q
44
1--4
L-. -ý
1: 7
Our present view of time and the temporal structure of the world is still
distorted
by
(Price
1996,
the
constrainedand
contingenciesof our viewpoint.
5)
It has been noted that the ordinary or "folk" experienceof time as an irreversible
directly
phenomenonseemsto
contradict scientific theory. As we have seenEinstein and
dismissed
The
irreversibility
theorists
this
temporal
other
contradiction.
phenomenon of
dismissed
human
was
as a curiosity of
consciousness,
and therefore only appropriateto a
level
description.
feeling
have
The
that
phenomenological
of
we
a past, present and a
future is dismissedas a characteristicof the human observer,not existing in scientific
important
in
therefore
terms of scientificexplanation.
reality and
not
No seriousattemptwas deemednecessaryto reconcilethe perceivedarrow of time
levels
description.
dualism
for
implicit
An
the most part
with other
of
remained
betray
laws
It
a position, which would put the
of perception and
unexamined. seemsto
beyond
laws
the
of science.
cognition
of
1.3.2
ENTROPY
AND IRREVERSIBILITY
However a challenge to time reversal invariance comes from within the ranks of science.
During the 19' Century the time-reversible theoretical framework of classical mechanics
dissaray
(1824)
developed
his
into
Camot
Sadi
theory of heat transfer in
was thrown
when
develop
into
His
The
to
the
thermodynamics.
steam engines.
work was
study of
physicist
Ludwig
Boltzmann
seized upon
the time-asymmetrical
behaviour
displayed by
thermodynamical processes.Boltzmann believed that he could define the direction of time
by linking it to another anisotropic process, and increasing entropy offered such a possible
(Boltzmann
1896-98)
process.
Hereafter it was no longer possible for science to easily dismiss temporal
human
for
had
the
asymmetry as a quirk of
observation
now
putative arrow of time
from
highly
Boltzmann's
theory.
theories
support
scientific
received a
critical response and
themselves offered theoretical loopholes, which other physicists used to defend their
fundamentally time-symmetrical theories. For example, Arthur Eddington (1929) argued
irreversibility
impression
illusion,
that the
that originated in
of time was an
a subjective
(statistically
improbable)
in
exceptional
conditions
our part of the universe.
1: 8
The disagreementsbetween scientists over time still remain unresolved. Paul
Davies argues that the theories that claim that nature imposes time-asymmetryon
everything,including individual particlesmisleading.There is no time-asymmetryqualityto
be found. He writes of Boltzmann'sH-theorem:
Mime asymmetryis only a type of description,relevant to the macroscopic
be
ingredient
the
than
to
world-view of
physicist, rather
an extra-physical
laws
(Davies
1974,4)
to
the
added
of mechanics.
However there are equally adamant advocates for time-asymmetry. Whitrow (1980) argues
that the Second Law gives substance to the claim that there is some objective temporal
trend in nature, and the experience of directionality is not a curiosity arising from the
subjective standpoint.
1.3.3
FAR FROM EQUILIBRIUM THERMODYNAMICS AND IRREVERSIBILITY
Prigogine's work on far from equilibrium thermodynamics has added credence to
Boltzmann's claim that the direction of time can be defined as the direction of increasing
entropy, and also provides a potential bridge between the laws of fundamental science and
those governing phenomenological experience. Prigogine argues that in some selfinherent
in some classes of dynamical
organising, non-equilibrium processes which are
find
time-asymmetrical activity which is compatible with our phenomenological
system, we
he
laws
That
is,
in
later
thermodynamics
experience.
posits
ontogeny, phylogeny and
where
events are not transitive with earlier ones. Prigogine does not incorporate time into his
theories merely as a parameter. Rather time is an operator. Prigogine argues that in
biological and physiological systems it is as important when things happen as where they
happen. Temporal organisms, Prigogine argues, depend on temporal organisation to
maintain their integrity. We shall seethat Prigogine's theories will provide an important link
in any attempt to construct a unified theory of time. (See Chapter 5) The import of his
lies
in the challenge to the assertion, for example, found in Whitrow, that human
theory
beings are the only biological life forms that experience time or organise their lives in time.
He will challenge the viability of the nature human dichotomy. Prigogine suggeststhat we
form
dissipative
"an
should think of ourselves as
evolved
of
structure" and that this
1: 9
basis
being
future.
he
himself
distinguish
between
As
of our
provides the
able to
past and
biological
humans,
have
history.
it,
systems,as well as
phrases
a
In summary, Prigogine's argument are: irreversible phenomena are as real as
fundamental
irreversible
in
reversibleones;
processesplay a
constructiverole the physical
deep
irreversibility
is
in
irreversible
thermodynamics,
world; and,
rooted
and
processesare
found
level.
the
also
at
most primitive
1.3.4
FUNDAMENTAL
TIME-ASYMMETRY
AND PENROSE'S
"NEW
PHYSICS. "
Prigogine'swork is not the only theory position which aims to bridge the gap between
time-symmetricalphysics and time as experienced.Roger Penrosein The Empetr'sNew
Mind (1989) argues that we need a new theory of quantum gravity, which will be
fundamentallytime-asymmetrical.Furthermore he also arguesthat we do not yet have a
is
physicswhich adequateto explainingthe operationsof the mind-brain. We must await
this new physics for our explanationof time-perception,as well as for explanationsof
deep
free
other
philosophicalproblemssuch as
will. NeverthelessPenrose'sposition is as
but
behind
it.
yet nothing
a promissorynote,with no substantialnew theory
1.3.5 SummARY
In brief, it is evidentthat the conceptof time plays different and sometimescontradictory
in
The
the
roles
natural sciences.
sourceof this conflict is that the symmetrical,isotropic
time relations of Einsteinianphysicsare not commensurablewith all forms of scientific
for
levels
description
irreversiblephenomenaseemto occur
explanation,
at certain
of
be
diffusion
heat.
is
If
there going to
such asthe
of
someunified scientific explanation,the
incongruencebetweenthe seeminglymore primitive time-symmetricallaws of physics,and
the irreversible,asymmetricalbehaviourobservedin somechemicaland biologicalsystems
be
to
will need
explained.
1.4
PRETHEORETICAL
TIMES
There is a further difficulty howeverin trying to align scientific explanationwith time as
experienced.Even so-called "folk" theories of time embeddedwithin different cultural
traditions which would provide the background for phenomenologicalaccounts of the
1: 10
experienceof time show no common elements,and therefore can not provide a pretheoretical description of time, towards which an explanatory framework could be
constructed.
A
description
society's
of
time is not
independent of
the overarching
framework
his
it
is
in
Sociologist
Emile
Durkheim,
situated.
epistemological
within which
Elan ntary Fonns of ReligiousLife (1947) argued that time is an essentially social concept,
human
ideas
He
that
to
the
species.
claimed
of space, time, number and other
unique
Time
is
general categories are not natural concepts, universal and unchanging.
a social
institution in so far as it is socially organised. Hence, it takes its form from the structure of
different
between
different
is
the
society changes, or
society, and changes as
societies.
Though we will not agree that a sense of time is unique to the human species (seeChapter
5), it is the casethat time has had different structures and functions within different forms
differentiate
Indeed
towards
time
of society.
attitudes
can
societies. Historian E. P.
Thompson (1967) has argued that it is the orientation around clock time which is the main
distinguishing fact, separating the capitalist form of society from other forms.
1.4.1
NEWTON AND THE TIME LINE
Much has been written about the historical emergence of our (i.e. Western) folk
for
(See,
Whitrow
time.
example,
understanding of
1988.) If this time were to be
be
drawn
it
line,
divided
into
to
then
one expect
as a single
represented,
equal intervals,
heading of into an indefinite past and future. The origins of this form of representation are
deeply embedded within the Judaeo-Christian-Moslem tradition and the development of
the merchant navy, combined with the rise of the mercantile classes and monetary
(See
in
Dixon, 1993) However the influence of the
the
economy
proto-capitalist period.
Newtonian research programme is prevails in this representation of time as a geometrical
linear
line
line.
history,
The
idea
the
time
teleological
the
straight
concept of a
and
and
of
time as the basis of that history, gained popularity in the last century and developed
through this. This linear concept of time underpins work in different disciplines; for
(the
dynamical
(the
example, geology
world as a
and changing environment), astrophysics
having
its
life
beginning
own
with the Big Bang and ending with its Heat
universe as a
Death), biology (humanity emergesout of a long process of evolutionary development) and
importantly
(Hegel
most
philosophy
and Marx, Kuhn).
1: 11
Newton's predecessor as Lucasian professor at Cambridge, Isaac Barrow, first
described the time line in 1760.
Time has length alone, is simple in all its parts and can be looked upon as
from
flow
instants
a simple addition of successive
constituted
or a continuous
)
(Quoted
instant.
in
Whitrow
1988,128.
of one
However, prior
form
linear
to this relatively recent
of representation, time was
is
Indeed
in
this
time
predominantly represented as cyclical.
representation of
still apparent
face
forms
have
had
Other
"analogue"
the
the underlying
of
clocks.
of religion, which
not
teleology of
the Judaeo-Christian-Moslem traditions,
have reinforced
a cyclical
Zoroastrian
For
Hindu,
time.
the
the
understanding of
example
and the Mayan cultures
believed that the underlying structure of time was one of an eternal recurrence,
emphasising the cosmic rhythm of an essentially unchanging world. There are still some
living
have
for
in
example the
cultures who,
memory,
preserved this cyclical notion of time,
Mursi (I'urton and Ruggles 1978) of Ethiopia, the Saultaux of Canada (Hallowell 1937) and
the Ainu, Hokkaido (Ohnuki-Tierney 1973). Common to all these cultures is the organic
linked
it
is
time,
to sidereal and natural cycles, such as seasonal changes,
quality of
as
dates
Rather
tides.
than
to remember
cropping, animal migration and
using calendrical
identified
in
datability
Precise
terms
their
to
events, past events are
of
relation
other events.
is replaced by a social consensusabout location in time.
However, as Nguyen has noted:
[TJhe specifically western temporal regime which had emerged with the
invention of the clock in Medieval Europe became the universal standard of
time
hegemonic
development
its
Indeed
measurement.
signified the
irreversible destruction of all other temporal regimes in the world, the last
form
historical
in
the
vestiges of which remain only
of
and anthropological
(Nguyen
1992,33)
curiosities.
Thrift (1990)hasdescribed"the makingof a capitalisttime consciousness,
" wherethereis a
from
in
task orientationto time orientation.
shift emphasis
1: 12
In industrial societiestime has becomethe measureof work where work was
the measure of time in earlier historical periods. (Adam 1990,112)
The increasing importance of time measurement and clocks is well recorded. (SeeLandes
1983 for a fascinating and detailed history of horology) In a moment reminiscent of
Heideggers Beingand Tim, Lefebvre writes that,
The dominanceof the paradigmof capitalisttime consciousness
is such that it
longer
leaves
lived
(1991,95-6)
to
think
time.
no
even
us able
about
Although the Western capitalistnotion of time appearsto be the ascendantcultural form,
there is no consensusbetweendifferent cultural traditions as to whether time is linear or
dispute.
differ
is
Cultures
But
this
the
cyclical.
not
only areaof
asto whether they treat time
disagreement
is
There
also
as concrete or abstract.
as to whether time is continuous or
discrete,and alsowhether it can be used instrumentally.(Whitrow 1988)A surveyof the
different
"folk"
theoriesof time, embeddedwithin
so-called
cultural traditions, showsno
universalelements,which might provide the basisfor a researchprogramme.
1.4.2
TIME IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE
Even when forgetful of cultural difference,the Western understandingof time, more so
has
beendistorted by the vagariesand metaphoricitiesof ordinary
than any other concept,
languageand "folk" theory. The languagemost frequentlyusedto describeor explaintime
hasoften servedmore to obscurethan to elucidatethe concept.
The metaphor of time as a river, perhapsthe oldest of temporal metaphors,is also
the most enduring,and least easyto shakeoff. PhilosopherJ.C.C. Smartwas particularly
vociferous againstthe metaphor of time "flowing," arguing that it leadsto all sorts of
metaphysicalconfusion.
Talk of the flow of time or the advance of consciousness is a dangerous
be
(Smart
that
taken seriously.
metaphor
must not
quoted in Davies 1995,253)
Never the less,despitehis warnings,the metaphor pervadesboth our ordinary language
heritage.
and cultural
1: 13
There is a sort of river of things passinginto being, and Time is a violent
torrent; no sooneris brought to sight than it is swept by and anothertakesits
be
(Marcus
Aurelius,Med 4: 43)
place,and this too will
sweptaway.
Time, like an ever-rolling stream,
Bears all its sons away. (Watts, 1790)
We have already described the Western representation of time as being dominated by the
time-line. This representation has also come under attack. Henri Bergson (1896) was
he
to
this
referring
representation when
argued that our understanding of the concept of
time had become contaminated by our representation of space. Thus, when time is
line,
by
break
lines,
designating
fixed
duration,
be
intersected
it a
representedas a
each
a
like
be
it
impression
that time,
second,month or year, givesthe
space,may measuredwith
is
This,
Bergson,
tape
misleading.
a ruler or
measure.
claims
Another misleadingphrasein common parlanceis the "senseof time." The term is
frequently used in everydaylanguage.However the term "sense"is used in the sameway
that one uses,for example,a senseof direction or even,a senseof things to come.That is,
the term is understoodmetaphorically,and doesnot imply that we have a senseof time in
the senseway that we havea senseof audition or olfaction. Sensein this latter senseusually
five
direct
is
senses,where there a
refers to the putative
physical or chemical stimulus
have
been
like
body.
Unsurprisingly,
Ernst Mach, who
there
those
the
acting upon
have
is
like
flavours.
On
that
time
nevertheless
claimed
a sensationexperienced soundsand
the whole, the evidenceis againstthis suggestion.In Chapter 5, however we shall be
examiningsome of the theoriesthat attempt to explain the senseof time in terms of an
internal clock model asin, for example,the work of Treisman(1990).
It is clear that using everydaylanguageas a starting point will not be a helpful
departure point from which to try and construct a theory of time. Our ordinary language
descriptions of time have long led thinkers astray who should have known better. Our folk
theories are just as riddled with conflicting theories as philosophical and scientific theories.
1: 14
ARGUMENTS FOR DISUNITY
1.5
So far we havedetailedthe many,diverse,and sometimesconflicting usesof the term time.
We have looked at its different role in theories in philosophy, the natural sciences,and
has
been
little
different
Overall
there
common agreementabout the term.
within
cultures.
This lack of consensusindicatesthat the conceptasit is currently beingusedis ill-defined,
least,
be
and, at the very
needsto
considerablyrevised.
However it is not sufficient to note that there are different accounts of time
different
disciplines.
differences
The
these
operatingwithin
awarenessof
and the apparent
incommensurabilitiesbetweenthese accountshas enabledcertain philosophersto argue
be
disarray
The
that
there
theory
can not a single,unified
and conclude
of time.
conceptual
has
time
shored up the argumentsof certain thinkers working within the
surrounding
de
tradition
phenomenological
who make principeclaims that there can not be a single
have
for
failure
These
to reduce time as
theory of time.
thinkers
cited,
example, the
experiencedto theories of "cosmologicaltime" as evidencefor their claims.We will now
briefly examinetheir arguments.
Upon reading the writings of Wood (1989) and Ricoeur (1984-88), what becomes
immediately apparent is their steadfast belief that science'sonly real concern with time is as
in
Interpreting
the
the
this way
a means of measurement.
entirety of
scientific corpus
enables them to characterise the problem of procuring a unified theory of time as one of
dialectic
instant"
lived
"cosmological
"the
the
the
threefold
reconciling
with
of
present" of
experience.
Their belief that science'ssole interest in time is as a means of measurement
familiarity
in
informed
originates, not
an
and topical
with scientific theory, but in an
be
be
Aristotle
that
to
the
and
widespread
obsession
unhealthy
considers
all and end all of
best
investigation.
by
Their
is
to
typified
scientific
attitude
science
a remark of Heidegger's
in The Conceptof Tm1ewhen he describes Einstein's theory of relativity as, "An old
(Heidegger
Aristotle's.
"
1924b, 3) (Though Kuhn also shares some of
proposition of
Heidegger's sentiments when he writes: "[I]n some important respect, though by no means
in all, Einstein's general theory of relativity is closer to Aristotle's than either of them is to
Newton's. " (Kuhn 1970,207))
An exampleof this somewhatidiosyncraticattitude towards sciencecan be seenin
Volume 3 of Paul Ricoeur's Timeand Narratite (1988). His thesis is,
1: 15
fies precisely in the difficulty in holding on to both
.....
This
is
this
the
time
the
that
the
ends of
chain,
of
soul and
of
world.
why we
The apariaof temporality
impasse
to
the
this
and admit that a psychological theory
must go
very end of
and a cosmological theory mutually occlude each other to the very extent that
they imply each other. (Ricoeur 1988,14)
In brief, he is arguing that one can not adequately reduce either of these two accounts of
time to the other, without losing some explanatory power. He makes an additional claim
that, by itself, neither account is able to ground adequately a universal account of time.
Ricoeur is quoted as saying that,
We are not capable of producing a concept of time that is at once
biological,
historical
(Quoted
individual.
in
Virilio
1991,103)
and
cosmological,
That is, there can be no unified theory of time, becausethe theoriesare incommensurable.
However the problem of incommensurability that Ricoeur encounters might be a
he
the
two
consequenceof
protagonists choosesto representthe respectivecosmological
he
does
For
the
time
cosmologicalaccount of
not choosea
and psychologicalpositions.
Hawking or a Penrose, or Einstein, or Boltzmann, or even Newton. Rather, as we have
he
harks
back
indicated,
in
Aristotle's
Book
two
to
time
some
already
millennia
account of
0 of the Physics.Equally perversely, to represent the psychological explanation of timehe
disregards
Treisman,
Fraisse
the
modern work of
or
preferring Augustine of
perception,
Hippo's fourth century theories concerning the distension of the soul (distezsianimi. )
The dispute betweenAristotle and Augustine is describedthus. Aristotle, in the
Physics, struggles to define time. He identifies time as being ti tes kineg
is, something
that
,
to do with movement, without making time synonymous with it. Aristotle notes that there
be
being
(It
is
time,
there
to
a perception of movement.
appears
no perception of
without
a
debate
for
is
See
that
this
sorry reflection on philosophy
still up and running.
example,
Shoemaker 1969.) Time then, Aristotle muses,is linked to movement, that is, change.
For time is just this - the number of motion with respectto before and after.
(The Physics, Book E, 219b)
1: 16
And it is here that we find the origins of the connection between time and the
he
debate,
Even
the
modernises
substituting Kant and
measurement of activity.
when
Husserl, or "ordinary time" and Heidegger, for Aristotle and Augustine, his perspective on
drawn
is
cosmological time
so narrowly
as to make any scientific explanation seem
insignificant. Again, the cosmological account is limited to measurement and chronometry.
(Ricoeur 1984-88) If the post-Husserlian scholars are attempting to ground an argument
inadequacies
the
theory
time
the
against
possibility of a unified
of
solely upon
of science
characterised as chronometry, then clearly they are setting science up as a straw man.
Augustine's phenomenological project fails, R.icoeur argues, because he is
for
in
theory
time
substituting a psychological
a cosmological one.
of
unsuccessful
Psychology legitimately supplements cosmology, however it
does not
replace a
(i.
has
Unlike
Aristotle,
cosmological theory of time.
where the soul e. mind-brain)
no
derive
Augustine
tries to
the principle of extension and
power to produce time,
from
distension
fir
is,
Distezsi
Augustine,
time
the
the
the
of
of
soul.
animi
measurement
for
is
time
the
measurement of
and as such measurement
condition of possibility
be
likened
McTaggart's
A-series,
Augustine's
to
secondary.
position can
where past, present
future
defined
in
indexicality
terms
the
and
are
of
of a particular person and their
consciousness.
In summary,the debate betweenAristotle and Augustine is one between time
(nature,
(consciousness,
in
in
the
time
the
originating
world
universe)and
originating
mind
the soul.) Ricoeur arguesthat though they both explaintime, neither accountis primitive.
This position is untenable, being constrained by an antiquated and myopic
understandingof the scientific project. Our conclusionsare similar to those of Adam
(1990)who arguedthat the conceptionof time which is usedin the socialsciences(which
for my purposes also includes philosophy) is antiquated, and has not taken into
in
is
in
the
time
considerationrecent changes
way
understood the natural sciences.She
arguedthat social scientistsare still working with Newtonian and Cartesiantheories.This
failure to incorporate new information has resulted in the persistence of the
incommensurabilitiesbetweennaturaltime and socialtime. (Adams interestin time is asa
sociologist)
Similarly the position taken by Ricoeur has failed to incorporate advancesin the
based
has
long
disappeared,
His
theories
are
on a type of sciencethat
socialsciences.
since
if it ever existedat all. He has failed to take into accountadvancesboth on the theoretical
level.
his
how
Firstly,
the natural sciencesregard their own
conception of
and empirical
1: 17
dismissed
it
is
is
Science,
would seem,
as a naive,
activity,
nineteenth century.
foundationalist and positivistic enterprise. The shift to an anti-foundationalist and
driven
is
Secondly
their
epistemology either not recognisedor not understood.
empirically
descriptionof the role that time playsin scientifictheory is a hotchpotch of Newtonian and
Aristotelian physics, and shows scant awarenessof twentieth century theory. Without
factors,
both
into
these
taking
any criticisms of the natural scientific programme
account
be
must surely inefficaciousandinvalid.
1.6
CONCLUSION
So far we have concentratedon the role that time plays in a wide range of theories:
folk
is
in
Though
the
time
theories.
concept of
of central
philosophical, scientific and
importanceto all thesetheories,it is not clearwhether eachtheory is referring to the same
is
The
There
the
term.
main areaof contention as
concept.
aremany contradictoryusesof
it
is
is
to whether time a real objectiveproperty of the world, or whether
an organisational
latter
be
by
human
imposed
If
the
option were to
structure
on the world
subject. the
be
likes
ironically
in
Einstein
Husserl
to,
then
the
of
and
could
agreement,as
subscribed
both regard the phenomenon of temporal-asymmetryas being a product of human
have
little
in
though
their
consciousness,
and
respectiveontologieswould
else common.
In this thesis, I intend to take up the gauntletthrown down by Ricoeur.He has
be
incorporate
priori
there
that
that
time
can
not
a
account
of
made an a
claim
unified
can
time as we experience it and time as it appearsin scientific theory. It is not my intention to
begin
Rather
to
theory
time.
to
construct a unified
of
my path will take
construct or
even
the via nngatiw.In the next chapters, I analyse all of the major arguments against a unified
account of time, and, more generally, against the unity of science. I will show that none of
these arguments constitutes an insurmountable hurdle to the project, even less so an a prioi
from
drawing
Furthermore,
the philosophy of science
argument.
upon recent arguments
backed
by
is
I
that
there
the
the
studies,
argue
empirical
and
philosophy of mind,
up
possibility of a thorough reconciliation of the subjective and objective aspects of time. For
the first time, a theoretically integrated concept seemspossible.
2: 1
CHAPTER 2
PHENOMENOLOGY
AND
ITS
CRITIQUE
OF
NATURALISM
IN
PHILOSOPHY
Ixe had a hannfd ef}at on scientzfic
I am crnnmzaiel
that thephilosophers
thinkingin
funda'naizd
fmn
danain
the
nth
certain
canpts
of anpritten,uh em arewider
heights
intmzgiNe
to
the
ourmnt7o1,
of theaprirni.
Albert Einstein
2.1
INTRODUCTION
A crucial place to start examining anti-reductionist and anti-unificationist arguments with
is
(1859-1938).
German
Edmund
Husserl
His
to
time
the
regard
work of
philosopher,
disagreement with Frege over Husserl's book ThePhilosophyof Arithnetic (1891) is regarded
bifurcation
development
in
the
point
as a crucial
of Western philosophy, defining the socalled separate strands of anglo-american and continental philosophy. However, despite
Husserl's work being usually classedas continental philosophy, Husserl can be regarded as
a precursor to several anti-reductionist schools of thought in both the continental and the
anglophone tradition. His influence is as cogent on Hubert Dreyfus as it is on Paul
Ricoeur.
In the following chapter,the work of Husserl will be examinedin two stages.In
Section 2.3, we will deal with his criticisms of naturalism in philosophy, which he believed
had brought the discipline to crisis point. This will be done by examining two essays
written in the first half and towards the end of his career, respectively Phil
(written
in
1910-11) and Philosophyand the crisisof Eure
sdo c
ry as rigomm
(written
in 1936). In
t Mn
both, he advocatesphenomenology as the only way forward for philosophy. In Section 2.4,
his
lectures
logy
71
Phwanm
iausness,which represent an
we shall examine
on
of Tmne-Con.
actual example of a phenomenological analysis.
Using thesethree essays,and drawing on material from the rest of the Husserlian
focus
following
his
first
Firstly,
the
corpus,we will
on
aspectsof
the claim that
position.
hand or "lived" experienceis not reducibleto any natural scientific explanation,that is,
description.
be
based
is
It
that
this
publicly availableobjective
will
shown
assertion
on a
2: 2
further claim, that scientific knowledgeis a secondary,derivative and inauthentictype of
knowledgethat relieson the intentionalact of the subjectto constituteand validateit.
As a consequenceof this stance,Husserl is able to make severaladditional claims.
Firstly, that phenomenologyis the only possiblefoundation for epistemology.It alonecan
is
truths
thought,
the
eternal
of
and thus the only possiblephilosophy.We shall see,
reveal
for examplein his work on time-consciousness
that Husserl eliminatesall other potential
for
candidates
a philosophy of time on methodological grounds. However we shall
having
looked
his
is
Husserl's
Also,
question whether
position sustainable.
carefully at
he
has
his
analysisand results,we askwhether
gone any way to establishing claim. That is,
how
by
is
time constituted a transcendentalsubjectivity.
show
Secondlywe will examineand later challengeHusserl'sclaim that phenomenology
is the only disciplineappropriatefor the study of experience.On the basisof his study of
how
far
is
time-consciousness,
we will ask
phenomenologysuccessfulas a study of the
experienceof temporality, and whether Husserl can legitimately eliminate, for example,
data
from
his
psychological
account.
Finally, we will examine the methodological difficulties presented by
due
its
We
that,
to
phenomenology.
shall see
rejection of natural scientific method,
for
its
its
phenomenologyrequires own methodology and
own grounds
validation. The
have
damning
if
it
is
tenable,would
adoption of this position,
and terminal consequences
for the project of developinga unified theory of time. However, it shall be arguedthat the
by
isolated
leave
it
this
adoption of
position
phenomenology will
vulnerable and
has
developed
its own
meanwhile
uncorroborated,whereasthe natural scientific approach
for
sophisticatednon-foundationalistand co-evolutionarystrategies validation (SeeChapter
4). In conclusion,we shall be asking,Can phenomenologyjustify its candidatureas the
its
Can
time?
philosophy of
phenomenologyvalidate own methods and results?Are its
be
justified?
that
there
theory
time
claims
cannot
a unified
of
2.2
THE
BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Before dealing with the specific essaysmentioned, it is necessaryto give an brief overall
background
in
for
his
Husserlian
the
to
account of
project
order
provide a
arguments.
Becausethey assumemuch of the methodological thought that has gone on and will go on
(1929),
(1913)
in
Cmtesimz
The
Meditations
Ideas
Fonnal and
the
elsewhere, such as
and
Transcendental
Logic (1928-29).
2: 3
Hegel had already coined the term "Phänomenologie", that is,
des Geies (1807), the school of thought founded
"phenomenology", for his Phä nanozologk
Although
by Husserl can not be regarded as originating out of the Hegelian project. Nor does it
appear to be related to Peirce's namesake. Furthermore it is wholly distinct from the
doctrine
is,
the
that human knowledge is
philosophical position of phenomenalism, that
confined to the appearancesof the senses,although a superficial comparison of the two
might suggestsome similarities.
Husserl in Ideasdefined phenomenologyas "the theory of the essentialnature of
(Husserl
"
1913,177) Elsewhere the project has
transcendentally purified consciousness.
been more lucidly described as "an analytical method devoted to describing the qualitative
human
(Wood
description
Though
does
"
1989,40)
this
constants of
experience.
not
for
is
the
the
adequately capture
metaphysical underpinnings of
project,
what patent in the
Husserlian definition is that phenomenology is a theory of essences(essena), as opposed to
(exista'tia).
he
(Though
Husserl
theory
that
a
of existence
would claim
was very much
interested in questions of existence) This distinction between essences and existence
indicates an epistemological stance,which holds there are universal rules of logic, which are
forms
to
applicable all
of thought. Husserl's adagewas "To the things themselves." By this
he meant accessingthe essencesof things which are common to all of us, regardlessof the
differences between our empirical experience of the world. In order to illustrate what he
by
he
be
Thus,
the
the
example of
means essences, uses
colour, red.
we may
presented with
two different objects, for example, a strawberry and a ruby. When asked what colour they
both are, despite differences in hue, intensity and chroma, both objects could be described
as "red. " Given that their colour is not exactly the same, how do we identify them both as
Husserl
is
that
this
red?
argues
essence of redness
not something that could be
from
for
reconstructed
experience,
our experience of the external world is always of
particular objects. Husserl argues that one can never abstract universals from particular
logical
investigation, dedicated to the theories of
In
the second
existing examples.
found
in the British empiricists (Locke, Berkeley and Hume), Husserl seemsto
abstraction
suggestthat such theories tend to presuppose what they aretrying to explain. So where do
believes
do,
Husserl
this
we get
general concept of redness unless, as
we
we all have access
to the same universal essences?In general he phenomenological project sets out to draw up
the inventory of all these pure essencesof thought. As such, phenomenology claims it is
disciplines
laws
it
is
to
unique amongst all
as
able reveal
of experience which are absolutely
in
valid, everywhere and
all circumstances. Hence in The Phe7v1rndogyof Internal Tine-
2: 4
Consciousness,
Husserl presents us with a set of a priori laws which always structure our
(See
below)
Section
2.4
time.
consciousnessof
Immediatelyphenomenologyis settingitself and its subjectmatter (essences)
apart
from the subjectmatter of the empiricalsciences.And groundedin this separationarethe
both
for
explanations
why phenomenologyrequires its own methodology and also the
justification for its claim to be a foundationalor first philosophy. Inherent in the move is
belief
the
that consciousness
or experienceis not a physicalentity in the world, like a brain
or a sensory organ, and hence it demands a radically different type of philosophical
treatment.Husserl claimsthat he adoptsan "transcendentalattitude" to consciousness,
as
by
"naive
to
the
opposed
attitude" adopted the natural sciences.
In the Cartesian
Meditations,
Husserl claims for phenomenologythe statusof first
it
philosophy as makesessencesmanifest.These essencesand the transcendentalsubject,
intends
by
these essences,
who
are arrived at
careful reflection on our consciouslife. An
his
book
is
in
exampleof this shown
on time-consciousness.He arguesthat it is essences
which constitutethe conditions of possibility of all our experienceand our language,and
henceall our knowledgeof existentia,the externalworld. Hence essences
ideas
or
are said
to be prior to any existentialrealisation- an idealist manoeuvre,which has trivialising
for the entirety of the natural sciencesand the significancefor philosophy.
consequences
This shallbe discussedfurther below. (Section2.3)
In characterisingHusserl'sphilosophy,two major and connectedfeatureswill be of
importance
intentionality
this
to
thesis,
the
particular
namely,
of mental statesand the
device
methodological
of the e
former.
2.2.1
The latter is a meansto draw ones attention to the
THE EPOCHE
The pari, synonymouslyknown as "phenomenologicalreduction," "bracketingout" and
"transcendentalsuspensionof belief," is a methodologicaldevice to draw attention away
from both the world as such and alsoour everydayand unphilosophical(in the Husserlian
below)
sense,see
stancetowardsthe world. It enablesthe phenomenologisto concentrate
insteadon experienceas it is lived. Epoch'also has the function of avoidingwhat Husserl
knowledge
from
founding
is,
"positive
in
"metabasis,
"
taken
that
the
useof
a
science"
calls
knowledge.
theory
a
of
2: 5
The epedx'hasboth a purgativeand constructivestage.The purgativestagehastwo
from
detaches
is,
it
Firstly
the
the
that
observer
naturalisticstance,
our everyday
outcomes.
disposition, which takes the world and its content for granted (or as given), without
intentional
to
the
attending
actswhich constitutethe world qua worth Husserl'saccountof
function
in
the
the
of
subject endowingthe world with meaning,
experiencestresses active
distinction
between
having
The
it
the synonyms
a simply receptive role.
rather than
"subjectmatter" and "object," the former implying the positive imposition of the subject's
difference
between
the
the activeand passivemodels.
cognition over the world, emphasises
drawn
from
is
In emphasisingthe sense-bestowing
the
action of the subject,attention
away
"inauthentic" public domain of given objectsthat is characterisedby the easeof speechin
language.
language
in
This
"bracketing
the
everyday
off" of
world as represented ordinary
be
for
first
be
The
to
the
will
shown
problematic
phenomenologicalproject.
stageof the
does
debars
it
also
any reliance on
epndc
not solely suspend the naturalistic stance,
judgements about the "world as such" beyond that experienced as phenomena. This is a
Like
Kant,
Husserl
twist.
post-Kantian move with a
moots the subject's cognitive activity
be
its
being
No
the only gauge of
as
own truth.
allusion can
made to any external
benchmark as providing a criterion by which to evaluate the truth of thought. Hence for
Husserl, "objectivity could never be the measure of subjectivity...
that which corresponds with true thought. " (Lauer 1965,16)
is
objectively real
-The
But Husserl goes beyond
Kant. Kant posited a noumenal world, which was real and out there, albeit inaccessible,as
by
discards
Categories.
Husserl
the
structured
with
perception and cognition are necessarily
the need to reference extrinsic considerations (such as "external reality"). All the
information he requires to elucidate the constitutive elements of experience are disclosed
involves
in
Phenomenology
thus
the adoption of a non-committal
adequately phenomena.
in
towards
the
the scientific sense, material world
position
existence of an objective,
autonomous of intentional
consciousness. Phenomenology is as such an idealist
undertaking.
Once the ejxx ' has "bracketed out" thought of inauthentic and existential
its
task
then
can
concentrateon revealing particular
considerations,the phenomenologist's
by
intentional
is
or meaninggiving acts which the transcendental
subjectmatter, that the
focussing
its
The
subjectcreates world and
on immanentstructuresof that consciousness.
implementationof the e'and
its outcomeshallbe demonstratedin the discussionof The
Plaaranmokgof InternalT i»Ccnrk mess,below.
2: 6
2.2.2
INTENTIONALITY
Husserl'sanalysis,he claims,leadsus backto the intentional act which constitutesthe object
has
The
two elements:nods and noenu Noesi is the act of
as such.
graspingof an object
consciousness,
which is correlatedwith the noem,which is the object of the consciousness,
(It doesnot imply the existenceof
in the senseof the object asit appearsto consciousness.
) Noms is intentionality or directedness(goal
an object, independent of consciousness.
orientatedactivity.) Here the influence of Brentano is apparentin positing the essentially
is alwaysconsciousness
intentional characterof all actsof consciousness.
Consciousness
of
de
it
is
The
two
alwaysabout something.
elements,noemaandnoesi,are jure
somethinginseparable.
The important task of philosophy is then, for Husserl, bringing to light the
beliefs
(1989,39)
intentional
describes
Wood
essentially
grounds of our
about the world.
for
Husserlian
the
the primordiality, intuition and immediacy that
project as a search
Husserl believed all previous philosophy had lacked. Rather than an "objective", derived
inauthentic
it
Husserl
to
and
account of experience,
wanted
replace with a subjectively
intuitable, original, authentic account. As will be shown, Husserl in his two essays,
Philosophyas rigorousscienceand Philosophyand dx crisis of Europro man, argied that the
legitimacy of all scientific concepts and principles depends upon this intuitive process.
2.3
TWO ESSAYSBY HUSSERL
PHILOSOPHY AS RIGOROUS SCIENCE (1910-11) AND
-
PHILOSOPHYAND THE CRISISOF EUROPEANMAN (1936)
We shall now look at Husserl'scriticismsof the natural scienceapproach..The two essays
(hereafter
Philosophy
Phiksop&y
Euroeau
Crisis)
the
as rig us sciaco and
and
crisisof
man
respectivelycome early and the end of Husserl'swriting career.However the opinions
expressedin these essaysare markedly consistent given the quarter of a century gap
betweenthem, even taking into accountthe major shifts in Husserl'sphilosophy around
1910. Both are concerned with the crisis, as Husserl judged it, facing philosophy.
Principallywe are concernedwith the criticismsthat Husserlvoicedagainstempiricismand
its inappropriatenessas a philosophical method. However Husserl did not restrict the
his
his
dissatisfaction
his
historical
if
Indeed
scope of
criticism.
with most, not all, of
precursors is made evident. Hegel's speculative Weltansaaumgphilosophy as well as
Dilthey's historical relativism are rejected.Similarly the later essayand its accompanying
2: 7
his
his
dissatisfaction
famously
Heidegger, as
to
give
with
addenda
voice
own pupils, most
well as the members of the Vienna circle whose "mathematical positivism" Husserl deemed
be
dismissal
his
is
in
his
Husserl
to
sham philosophy.
not unique
of
philosophical peers, as
like so many before him, and certainly many more to come, claimed that he would found
his
definite
"First Philosophy. " Once again, in
philosophy afresh and create
own
his
hearken
back
Husserl
to the supposed
concordance with many of
peers,
would
"Golden Age of Philosophy" of Ancient Greece to establish his arguments.
The crisisthen which HusserljudgesEuropeanphilosophyto be facing can only be
history
in
interpretation
Husserl's
of the
of thought. In the
understood the context of
Crisis,Husserl arguesthat the very identity of Europe is intrinsically linked with the birth
and developmentof philosophicalthought. And only Europeanthought, stemmingfrom
the Greek tradition, is truly philosophical.European thought is characterisedby a shift
from the humanwho is pre-theoreticallyliving in a world and being conditionedby it, to a
theoreticalstancewherebythey areactivelyinvestigatingthat world. For this reason,claims
Husserl,only Westernthought can be classedastruly scientificin its nature. (Husserl1936,
171) The Greeks are a turning point in that, for Husserl, they representthe move in
thought from the pre-theoreticalto the theoretical. This is exemplified by a shift from
mythological explanationto t/wria. Thought predating that of the Greek philosophersis
describedasthe
life
[....
]
natural primordial attitude
characterisedas
naive, straightforwardly
directedat the world, the world alwaysbeing in a senseconsciouslypresentas
horizon
however,
being
(Husserl,
1936,
thematic
an universal
without,
assuch.
281)
The transformation that heralds the beginning of philosophy takes place when the subject
transcends its Umzdt, that is, removes itself from naive engagementin worldly activity, and
for
instead
impassive
knowledge supersedes
A
the attitude of an
thirst
adopts
observer.
myths, superstition and unquestioning acceptanceof authoritative position.
Man becomes a non-participating observer, a surveyor of the world. He
becomes a philosopher. (Husserl, 1936,285)
2: 8
But, and this is the crux of the Husserliananalysis,at the sametime as the philosopher
detached
this
adopts
and now theoreticalstancetowardsthe world, shesimultaneouslyand
has
been
The
has
LebamwiL
Lebene&
the
ongoing
always
necessarily
already assumed
brief,
hence
is
In
[Bauei]
theory.
there, and
the ground
or condition of possibility of
what
Husserl is claiming is that we are necessarilyinvolved in the world before we are able to
focus
it
is
involvement
is
And
this pre-theoretical
which the
objectify the world quaworld.
demand
its
own unique analyticaltools.
of phenomenologicalanalysis,andwhich will
2.3.1
THE NATURALISTIC
PARADOX
Due to its unique subject matter, Husserl claims that philosophy has never been able to live
be
at
be
defined
its
Husserl
that
to
to
claim
a rigorous science. will
recalled
philosophy
up
however,
in LogicalInvestigation
"science
")
Historically
as the
of the trivial.
rigorous sciences
have been founded out of philosophy. Husserl, recalling his academic roots as a
have
been
in
the
that
mathematician, acknowledges
great advances
made the natural, social
leaves
However
this
the empirical sciences with a problem.
and mathematical sciences.
Husserl has already argued that the natural sciencesnecessarily presuppose involvement in
the world as the condition of their possibility. This being their back-ground, Husserl alerts
for
have
it
is
to
the
to
only when we
need
a genuinely scientific science of philosophy us
have secured this that the scientific validity of any of the empirical sciences can be
for
is
Phenomenology,
Husserl,
then the science of science, or the universal
guaranteed.
his
famously
in
introduction
Later
Heidegger
this
to
science.
would more
reiterate
claim
Beingand Tim, stating that,
Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical
inquiry of the positive sciences.(Heidegger 1927,31)
In the CartesianMditations Husserl returned to the Cartesian project of grounding a
The
through
the
thinking
reflective consideration of
subject.
universal and rational science
impact of the Cartesian revolution in thought can be portrayed as the inverse of the
Copernican revolution in science. Whereas the earth lost her importance by no longer
being regarded as the centre point of the universe, epistemologically the objective world
becomes dependent on the thinking subject. The subject qua thing
its
substance asserts
importance as the ground for validating knowledge of the external world. Scientific
2: 9
knowledgeis active (not "a passiveacceptanceof allen matter to the mind.") This has
for
it
repercussions scienceas complicatesthe pre-Cartesianunderstandingof objective
has
Though,
been
in
Chapter
1, researchers
scientific observation.
as
already
pointed out
involved in the empirical sciencesfrequently and necessarilypay no attention to such
transcendentalproblems!
However, by Husserl'sexactingstandards,the empiricalsciencesscarcelylive up to
for
is
by
Science
Husserl,
its
their name.
characterised
as such,
aspiration to and
achievement of pure, apodeictic evidence, that is, cognition free of conjecture and
because
But
the
they rely on empiricalevidence,
empiricalsciences,precisely
construction.
is
its
Science
truths.
therefore
can not produce apodeictic
at oddswith
own telos.Its aimis
the objectively and the eternallytrue, but its methodology by its nature denies what it
Through
is
Husserl
thus
presupposes.
such reasoning
able to reject naturalism and
bases
for
being
psychologismas
not
sufficiently "scientific." Psychologyasa science,by its
empirical nature, can not reveal anything essentialabout thought. It can not produce
universaltruths about the structure of our apperception.So Husserl sets up scienceas
having idealist aspirations,but it is inevitably doomed to failure by its own idealistcriteria
becauseof its necessarilyempiricalmethodology.Whether this is an accurateand pertinent
be
later.
the
scientific
portrayalof
enterprisewill
questioned
So, as has been seen,the foundations of sciencehad to be analysedby a more
for
by
is
"Scientific
Husserl
thinking
rigorous
philosophy"
constituted
- phenomenology.
intuition.
is
At
Husserl
the
time,
an infallible graspof ideal essences,
via
same
making a
be
for
that
there
methodologicalclaim, namely,
can not
a universalmethodology
scientific
has
That
for
the
the
analysis.
methodologyof
natural sciences reapedsuccess the natural
believe
is
be
to
their
sciences not sufficient reason
successcan
extendedto the scientific
has
He
study of experience.
already presented a priori arguments for why such methods will
be
insists
determined
by
He
that
the
the object of
succeed.
method
should
also
not
by
in
the
the
analysis,not predetermined and prejudiced
successof certain methodologies
inappropriate.
And
The
the
the
methods of
natural sciences are wholly
natural sciences.
is
defined
by
its
Husserl,
to
tenet that only the physical is real
naturalist stance, according
[wirklich] and therefore the object of its attention. (Psychology is naturalistic in so far as it
)
it
is
As
the
objectifies
such
mental.
unable to treat upon non-physical realities, as Husserl
identifies them, for example, the lived experience of the subject. Phenomenology, he
is
does
"method"
it
the
claims,
only
capable of studying consciousness, as
not treat
hitherto
Through
the process of epod4 all
consciousness as a physical entity.
physical or
2: 10
bracketed
out thus enabling the phenomenologistto concentrate
external referenceare
in
itself.
is
is
It
that
to
the
via the
phenomena,
appearance consciousness,
exclusivelyon
by
intuited
experiencethat we graspthe objectivevalidity of consciousexperience.
essences
So that we can seeimmediatelythat there is a contrastbetweenthe kind of knowledgethat
is acquiredthrough lived experiencevia phenomenology,and the "naturalattitude."
from
distinguishes
Briefly, it is the e'
that
other
phenomenologicalobservation
firstly,
have
bracket
Husserl
As
the
typesof naturalisticobservation. we
seen,
wants to
out
for
validating the content of
possibility of any referenceto reality as such as a standard
Furthermore,
towards
epoche
experience.
experienceand secondly,our naturalisticstance
have
it
independently
to
that
of
no
access
means
we can not accessreality as such, aswe
intend.
Additionally the methodology of the natural
the world of meaning,which we
for
knowledge
basis
it
is
is
theory
of
as
obliviousto
a philosophical
sciences ruled out as a
is,
it
ignores
foundations
its
That
the constitutive activity of giving
truth.
the
own
of
investigates
In
that which other sciences
the
phenomenologicalmethod
meaning. contrast,
(that
investigation)
for
is,
their
take
the essenceof
object of
granted
For Husserl,philosophicalsciencehasto be a strict science- it cannotrestrict itself
to empirical observation.The world that this strict sciencestudies is not the objective
be
domain
in
is,
It
the
the
the
that
of
natural
sciences.
can
not
objective
world of nature is
its
"immediately
Umwe
Rather
the
the
the
object
natural sciences.
same way as
surrounding world" of the mental subject. Natural scientific methods are not the
is
appropriatemeanswith which to analysemind, as scientific method a product of mind.
Mind requires its own methodology. Husserl's methodological claim that there is no
for
Paul
Ricoeur
the
way
certain philosopherssuch as
universalscientific method paves
discourses
incommensurable
David
Wood
two
that
there
to
are
of time - the
claim
and
cosmologicaland the phenomenological.
After a somewhatsparseand esotericsummaryof phenomenology,we shall now
by
in
detail
Husserl
in
the
the methodsand analysisusedand conclusionsreached
examine
(hereafter
The
is
7nL-Carsciousness
PITC).
Interval
Phi cinenalogy
this
purpose
of
manifold.
of
It will serveas a practical exampleof the phenomenologicalapproachwhen appliedto a
few
by
is
Husserl.
(Though
PITC
actual analysespublished
one of very
specific problem.
his
his
books
The
in
most of
concentrateon the theory
prolific notes)
other attemptsexist
in
This
the next chaptersto
practical examplewill also allow us
of phenomenology.
compareHusserl'streatmentof a philosophyof time againstother candidates,andto assess
2: 11
how far his method is successfuland can be defendedagainstthe naturalisticapproaches
he eschews.
2.4
THE PHENOMENOLOGY
OF INTERNAL
TIME- CONSOIOUSNESS
The writings, which we now know as the Phei n»zdogyof Internal T ne-Consd a s, were
first
lecture
in
1904-05.
Husserl
the
given
academic
year
repeated these
originally a
series,
lectures with some modifications in subsequent years, up until 1911. However it was not
Husserl's
Martin
1928
the
that
they
editorship of
student,
were published under
until
Heidegger.
The argumentof the book can be roughly divided into three stages.After a few
first
Husserl
criticises Brentano's theories of time consciousness.
opening remarks,
Whether Husserl intended these remarks to be included in the published version is a
his
lectures,
Husserl was unawarethat Brentano
At
the
time
of
subject of contention.
himself had distancedhimself from his own theories.Husserl later found this out and
his
have
been
(It
his
but
is
this.
comments,
editor may not
awareof
rumoured
retracted
job,
have
Husserl
Heideggers
that
this
that
editing
and
might
was not well pleasedwith
been one of the reasons.See Wood 1989,66) The second part of the argument is
by
in
"temporal
"
object, exemplified the
a phenomenologicalanalysisof a
constituted
(See
)
final
The
2.4.1.
tone.
third
and
part uses this analysisas the
structure of a single
foundation of a generaltheory of time-consciousness,
is
in
which ultimately grounded what
Husserlcalls"flux. "
PITC begins by stating the subject matter of its analysis. The book's self-declared
(1905-10,22)
is
"
Husserl claims
"a
time
consciousness.
phenomenological analysis of
aim
he
how
is
in
terms "subjective timeto show
temporal objectivity
constituted
what
he
is,
is
it
is
That
"
to
time
of
going
offer
an
account
as
experienced,without
consciousness.
factors.
For
to
any reference
extrinsic
example, this would rule out psychophysical
judgement
to
time
time
a
subject's
approaches
experience or
perception where
about the
duration of a certain interval of time is compared with chronometrically defined periods.
(There will be further in depth discussion of psychophysical approaches in Chapter 5)
However it might be a mistake to describe PITC as merely undertaking a piece of
introspective and descriptive psychology. The philosophical agenda has important
for
consequences
directly
indirectly
investigations
time,
of
whether
or
empirical
philosophical. In accord with the general phenomenological project outlined above, PITC
2: 12
for
first
for
itself
the
the
claims
privilege of
and only candidate a philosophy of time. If
for all the other contenders.The
Husserl'sclaim is true then this hasterminal consequences
works of McTaggart,Reichenbach,Grünbaum and a great many other eminent thinkers
be
will
exposedas philosophicallynaive usurpers.Whether Husserl's claims are justified
be
later.
examined
will
The claim of phenomenologyto be tke philosophy of time is entirely consistent
disposition
Husserl's
towardsthe sciences.That is, the questionof how time is
with
overall
be
constituted can only
clarified [Erkliirrmg] in terms of the essentialstructuresof our
His
is
that
experience.
claim
phenomenology the only approachthat can yield the true
flies
face
in
his
time
the
the
of
of
researchof many of
essence
contemporaries.Thoughthe
is
itself,
it
time
the
study of
study of philosophy
necessarilyasold as
was only at the end of
the nineteenth century, with the birth of psychology and the cognitive sciences,that
from
it
is
However,
time
systematicempiricalstudieswere undertakenon
perception.
clear
holds
lofty
Husserl
the outset that
such approacheswith a
contempt. In the opening
his
Husserl
instead
contemporaries'work on time consciousness,
paragraph,
rejectsall of
favouring the works of SaintAugustine(397),somefifteen hundredyearsprevious.
Chapters 13-18 of book XI of the Confessions must even today be thoroughly
by
in
For
the
time.
this
studied
everyone concerned with
problem of
no one
knowledge-proud modem generation has made more masterful or significant
in
(Husserl
1905-10,21)
these
than
this
matters
progress
great thinker...
We believe this claim, extreme as it appears,was made in all earnestness.It is towards these
"knowledge-proud" types (Dondes 1868, James 1890, Guyau 1890, Nichols 1891) that
Husserl's criticisms are aimed, as well as the work of Brentano, explicitly discussed in the
first section of PITC Husserl would eschew incorporating any of their findings into his
he
find
inspiration in the emergent theories of Boltzmann or
Nor
would
own work.
Einstein, unlike the writings of his contemporary, French philosopher Henri Bergson (e.g.
Matie,r et merry,
1896, revised 1908), who incorporated material from the ascending
general and special theories of relativity into his theories of time. Husserl would argue that
help
do
such studies
not
clarify the "essence" of time, as they presuppose a certain
scientific conception of time already.
Husserl claimsa privileged statusfor phenomenologybecausenaturalistictheories
presumean objectivetime. Phenomenologicalanalysiscan actuallyoffer an accountof the
2: 13
intentional constitution of the supposedobjective time. The phenomenologicalapproach
be
because
be
it
to
to
these
theories
time
thus
said
prior
all
other
of
explainsthe
can
foundations on which these theoriesare constructed.That is, it dealswith the primitive
forms of time. It is on this pretextthat phenomenologyclaimsto be First Philosophy.
After this preliminary stageHusserl then moves on to the phenomenological
first
is
in
It
these
the
temporal
stagesof the argument proper that
object.
analysisof
from
bracketed
begins
data
is
Husserl
the
the
out
philosophical enquiry.
empirical
by
detail
immediately
[AusschaJtaad
excluding
all
concerning
phenomenologicalanalysis
is
That
time.
to saythat no transcendentalsuppositionabout the existenceof a
objective
being
has
is
(This
time
time
to
consciousness
made.
exclusionmove,as
world
extrinsic our
been
discussed,
is
the theoretical precursor to the phenomenologicalepoche
already
introducedin Ideas.The later terminologywill be used.) The focus is wholly on time andits
lived
in
is
in
Inherent
this
they
experience.
move the adoption of a
structuresas
appear
from
is
"Method
Doubt,
"
the
of
whereby one's cognition
quasi-Cartesian
stance,adapted
be
datum
into
treated as an absolute
that can not
called
question,whereasthe positing of
be.
beyond
any externalworld
onesconsciousness
can
Just as a real thing or the real world is not a phenomenologicaldatum, so also
in
time,
the
time
the sense of natural science
of nature
world-time, real
including psychology as the natural scienceof the psychical,is not such a
datum. (Husserl 1905-10,23)
So, from the outset,Husserl has prohibited any referenceto the world, which might be
duration
He
time
to
and
as they appearto us as
external our experience. acceptsonly
he
do
data.
These
absolute
appearances, argues, not necessarilypresumethe existenceof a
do
immanent
However
time.
they
the
the
time-of-the-flow-ofpresume
existence
of
world
he
for
is
the
conditions of possibility what positedas
consciousness,
which arguesprovides
"real Objectivetime." Whether Husserlactuallybelievedthat there was such a thing asreal
time or world time externalto and independentof the intentional act of a subject'stimehand,
(1964,
debate.
has
been
Sokolowski
On
the
the
one
matter of much
consciousness
75n) arguesthat at the time of writing PI7C, Husserl has not yet made the move to an
idealist position. Husserl therefore admits the existenceof a world time independentof
for
be
but
the subject matter
time-consciousness, as this can not
phenomenological
treatment, he pays the topic no further attention. Wood (1989,60), on the other hand,
2: 14
typically places much emphasis in Husserl's use of phantom scare quotes. Wood argues
that already in PITC Husserl is ontologically non-committal about the existence of an
(or
intentional
is
independent
the
time,
that
of
as Wood stresses,
external world
lived
hold
"The
experience:
relationship of constitution can not
constitutive) acts of our
between independently existing things. " (Wood 1989,61) What is certain, though, is that by
least
(1913),
have
Ideas
Husserl
the time
which must
overlapped or at
abutted
was writing
lectures
he
had
definitely
he
in
the period
on time-consciousness,
which
was giving the
(Husserl's
be
described
idealist
"transcendental
to
shifted
an
position.
position can
as
idealism," as distinct from Berkeley's "empirical idealism.")
The prohibition of any resort to extrinsic referenceindependentof consciousness
hasimportant methodologicalconsequences.
It alsoleavesa questionor two beggingto be
he
does,
has
been
by
defining
has
Husserl
As
the
task
as
seen,
philosophical
used
asked.
for
(i.
this to eliminateall other e. non-phenomenological)candidates a philosophy of time.
Given the position he has stakedout, other ways of addressingand contributing to the
be
but
questionof time, such ascosmologicalor psychological,can acknowledged they can
form
basis
be
the
of any philosophical
not claim to
philosophicalapproaches,nor canthey
be
how
justified
is
Husserl's
However
the
to
to
question
still
needs
raised
as
approach.
form
is
the
true
that
only
of philosophy, and therefore on what
claim
phenomenology
his
he
impinge
this
validate
claim, given no extrinsic evidence can
on
grounds will
issue.
We
to
this
will return
philosophicalproject?
Turning our attention backto the text, in order to illustratehow the epoc/Ioperates,
Husserl uses the example of space. A phenomenological analysis requires that all
from
interpretation
is
the phenomenologicallygiven content.
transcendent
subtracted
Hence we are askedto eliminate all we know about three dimensions,perspectiveand
distance as these are transcendentalschema extrinsic to appearance.What is left is
his
how
is
in
itself,
interpretation.
isolate
So,
the world
aim to
stripped of
appearance
framework.
its
He
theoretical
to
of
claimsthat once the epoche
appears us, when stripped
hastakenplace,then phenomenologywould producethe following description,
Roughly described, this is a two-fold, continuous multiplicity. We discover
inter-penetration,
juxtaposition,
superimposition,
unbroken
relations such as
lines which fully enclose a portion of the field, and so on. (Husserl 1905-10,
24)
2: 15
Hence we are not able to makejudgementsof the types that the table is one metre from
the chair, or that the clock is abovethe fire, as thesejudgementsrely on interpreting the
field
is
in
that
not given the phenomenological
visual
within an objective spatialstructure
field.
is scrutinised,certainnecessary,
When the experienceof time consciousness
that is,
become
Husserl's
For
priori,
analysisrevealsthat temporal
apparent.
example,
a
structures
doubt.
is
Even
though sometimesthe order of things
that
thing
we cannot
succession one
becomesconfused, even if there is an inversion of the proper order, there is still a
la
is
A
Kant,
temporal
to
succession then an essential
successionof events our appearances.
is,
temporality,
that
of
a primitive relation.
structureof our consciousness
Husserl then proceeds with his treatment of time and temporality. He begins his
by
double
exclusion. His
analysis
a
first
is
to establish the priority
move
of
field,
" over Objective time. Objective
"the
time,
temporal
primordial
phenomenological
lived
is
identifies
derivative
is
Objective
Husserl
time
the
time
time
with the
experience.
of
be
dated.
That is,
in
time of chronology which all things and events, physical or mental, can
be
by
definite
"have
they
their
temporal positions, which can
measured
chronometers."
(Husserl 1905-10,26) Objective time is a transcendent concept [Tran
naeazm], which
belongs to what he terms the empirical order, along with Objective space and the Objective
have
Phenomenology,
things
seen, makes no such
and events.
as we
world of real
beyond
it
As
things
the
and events
experience.
such can
reality of
presuppositions about
The
Objective
tell us nothing about the
world.
psychophysical approach to time would not
be acceptable as an analysis of internal-consciousness as it relates to objective time. In the
des
Phännnrkgie
innevi Zeitbau,xstseins,
Husserliana notes supplementing the Vor sung?
t zur
(1893-1917) Husserl claimed that he would one day carry out a phenomenological
investigation of "objective" time. Interestingly, this task was never undertaken.
Husserl also separates the phenomenological study of time-consciousness from
for
disregards
He
psychological approaches that
example psychological.
other methods,
in
that
stimuli
produce
sensations
us.
presuppose
We are indifferent to the question of empirical genesis.What interests us are
lived experiences as regards their objective sense and their descriptive content.
(Husserl 1905-10,28)
2: 16
The study does not concentrateupon temporal determination in the objective physical
from
for
different
he
is
So
phenomenology, example,psychophysical
sense.
excludingas
duration
in
judgement
to
about
experimentswhich attempt correlatevariations subjective
for
body
determined
intervals
to
along with certain variables,
example
chronometric
deprivation.
drug
induced
temperature,
statesor sleep
Psychological apperception, which views lived experiences as psychical states
is
persons...
something wholly other than the phenomenological.
of empirical
(Husserl 1905-10,28)
So Husserl has no interest in psychological temporal determination. Rather, as
far
it
is
intended
is
Objectivity
so
as
or
phenomenology only concernedwith reality or
focus
fall
how
his
his
intend
That
is,
Objective.
the
we
statedproject
will
upon
represented,
is to accesswhat he believesare the a priori truths that belong to the moments that
constituteobjectivity.
2.4.1
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE TEMPORAL OBJECT
After a discussionof Brentano's theory of the origin of time-consciousness,
which Husserl
finds steepedin "psychologisms,
" PITC proceedswith its own phenomenologicalanalysis.
In order to discusshow time itself is intended, Husserlclaimsthat it is first necessaryto
he
how
he
By
temporal
temporal
object, meansa
objectsare constituted.
explain
what calls
for
time,
examplea melody,or
single event or thing that enduresover a certainperiod of
latter,
he
is
It
the
which usesto phenomenologicallyanalysethe
even a singlenote or tone.
how
distinct
to
the
the
time-consciousness
temporally
structureof
experienceof
and show
into
the
tone
that
areunified
a singletemporal object.
elements
comprise apperceptionof a
He chooses it becauseof its simplicity. It has minimum sensory content that facilitates the
barest
be
Temporal
the
time-consciousness.
to
structural
objects,
content of
exposition of
have
be
"temporally
to
encompassedwithin a
comprehensive act of
understood as such,
(Husserl
is
heard,
it
"
For
1905-10,40)
example, when a piece of music
can only
cognition.
be understood as a piece of music, and not just a succession of sounds, becausewe have an
it
Though
"a
"
temporally
enduring object: unitary apprehension.
each
understanding of as a
is
in
the
presented
succession, we recognise them as a single temporal
melody
note of
hear
However,
at any given moment, we only
a short phase of a melody, or of a
object.
2: 17
longer
how
le
is
is
For
Husserl,
tone.
the
that
crucial
question
a
moment
no
now can
single
incorporated into a unified act: "Is it possible to combine these successive, expiring
[ablauft],
data
(Husserl
into
Once
"
1905-10,42)
the
one now-moment?
representative
has
been
be
Husserl
then
temporal
tackled,
object
will
able to tackle a
question of the
phenomenological analysisof time proper.
Husserlusesa spatialexampleto illustratehow we experiencethe past,
To my consciousness,points of temporal duration recede, as points of a
from
The
I
"go
"
the
away
object.
object retains
stationaryobject recedewhen
its place:evenso doesthe soundretain its time. Its temporalpoint is unmoved,
but the sound vanishesinto the remotenessof consciousness;the distance
from the generativenow becomesever greater.The sound itself is the same,
but "in the way that" it appears,the sound is continually different. (Husserl
1905-10,45)
Husserl is trying to describe by analogy the continuous action of ablari,
which is so
binding
how
his
In
the
together
temporal
theory
to
of
we
experience
of
a
event.
essential
further
in
Ablaufsphäncn
Husserl
Section
10
the
to
of
experience
order
elucidate
iie,
illustrates the structure of time-consciousness with a diagram
diagram of time. (See
the
-
Figure 2.1)
The diagram illustrates the constitution of a temporal object, that is, unitary
The main purposeof
apprehensionover a temporally extendedcontent of consciousness.
the diagram is to explain how a moment that has chronologically passedcan still be
in
Other
temporal
retained presentconsciousness
as part of a unitary
object.
solutionsto
this question have been suggestedsuch as the "speciouspresent" of James(1890),but
Husserlraisesseveralobjectionsto such approaches.(Husserl1905-10,41)If we examine
diagram,
line
OE representswhat Husserl calls a "seriesof
the
the upper portion of the
line
be
described
line,
0
"
Ordinarily
this
time
might
as
a
where
marks the
now points.
beginningin time of a certaintemporal event,and E marks the current point in that event.
However it would be a mistaketo interpret the diagramin this way, as it will be recalled
that chronology as the representationof a single objective time into which all events,
does
has
been
Line
OE
not representa seriesof
explicitly rejected.
physical or mental,
but
by
in
time,
that
occur
a seriesof now-points perceived the subject as
perceptions
for
is
It
of no consequence the phenomenologistthat the order as perceived
successive.
Figure 2.1: The Diagram of Time. (From Husserl 1905-10,49)
0
0PE
E>
PI
EI
OE
Series of now-points
OE'
Sinking-down [Herabsinken]
EE'
Continuum of phases (now-point with horizon of the
EN
Series of novus which possibly will be filled with other objects
past)
2: 18
from
disparity
differ
Indeed
between
to
the
order.
even
speak
the
objective
may
of
is
illegitimate
time
time
move within phenomenologicalrules.
an
and objective
experienced
What is of interest to Husserl is the ineliminability of successionfrom the perception of
is
being
There
is
that
the
order
real
no guarantee
of events
phenomena.
reproduced
becauseof the effect of intentionality,the function of bestowingmeaning.Whetherwe are
be
is
ignore
temporal
the
that
phenomenonof reconstructing
order a question
will
ableto
for
However,
the meantime, we can note that it is an areain which incisive
returnedto.
fields
been
in
line
have
The
EE'
the
of
cognitive
made
recently
science.
advances
representsthe retention of the previousmomentsor now-pointswithin the current now, so
in
bound
is
together a unified act. Without this binding effect,
that the temporal object
disjointed
be
there could no temporal objects,only a seriesof
moments.We will reassess
Husserl'swork in the light of theseadvancesin Chapter5.
So having establishedthat subjectivesuccessionis not to be identified with an
objective seriesof events, Husserl outlines the purpose of the running-off phenomena
[Ablaufsphänonv
e.]
With regardto the running-off phenomena,we know that it is a continuity of
form
unit,
inseparable
into
transformations
which
an
constant
not separable
divisible
be
by
into
themselves
nor
parts which could
phases,points of the
by
be
(Husserl
1905-10,48)
themselves.
continuity,which could
So there is a dual movement of the Ablzufsphäný,
both into the subjectivepast on the
OE line and deeperinto the current moment (EE). So that as each moment passesit
becomesfurther and further into the past,and alsodeeperand deeperinto the present(7).
(In the upper part of the diagram,he
The line OE representsthis deepening[Herabsinken].
hasnot yet includedprotention, that is, anticipationof the rest of the temporal object into
his schema.
) Husserl distinguishesbetween the two distinct and mutually exclusive
elements that constitute an adequateexperience of the temporal object: perception
(indicated by the point E on the diagram, and sometimes referred to as primal
(EE
).
modification) and primary remembrance
[A] temporal object is perceived (or intentionally known) as long as it is still
impressions.
in
(Husserl
1905appearing
primal
continuous,
newly
produced
10,61)
2: 19
So primal impression and retentional modification both play a role in consciousness.The
structure which makes up the tone compromises of two elements, the now and retention.
Crucially both elements are, says Husserl, immediate and non-reproductive. Primary
is
a type of memory that occurs whilst the
remembrance or retentional modification
because
it
is
is
is
Primary
still
non-representational
temporal event still ongoing.
retention
is
from
distinguishes
it
Husserl
the
temporal
event
secondary remembrance where
present.
in
but
is
longer
Husserl
the
mind.
prefers to call this rememory now present
no
enduring,
its
in
the
the
to
of
original
event,
simulation
order
emphasise
production or re-constitution
further
Husserl
claims that
non-presence, rather than the continuing presence of retention.
it is only because we have a retentional grasp of the past that we can understand our
being
That
is,
the
of
past.
without retention we would
secondary, reproductive memory as
be unable to distinguish memory from imagination.
In the lower part of the diagram, the concept of protention is illustrated to
important
in
is
Protention
part
or expectation recognised as an
complete the explanation.
listen
For
to a piece of music, we
the apperception of a temporal object.
example, when we
have certain expectanciesof what is to come and would perhaps be surprised if the music
bar.
through
a
ceasedsuddenly part way
Finally in this discussion of the constitution of the temporal object, Husserl
distinguishes between protention and recollection which we would normally term, memory.
Recollection is a re-production of an apperception once the temporal object is no longer
faithful
is
Unlike
to the order of subjective succession,
retention, which
ongoing.
degree
in
For
of accuracy.
recollecting, the order of
recollection can offer no such
lost.
detail
be
how
be
However,
added or
may
altered and elements of
succession can
Husserl can observe this alteration in the order of subjective memory without reference to
fathom.
belief
difficult
in
itself
is
If
the external world,
to
some other criterion other than
including an Objective time-order, has been suspended,then there can be no way of
differs
from
in
if
the original
the
order of eventsas reproduced memory
checkingto see
it
is
For
the very order of that original apperception
apperceptionof the order of events.
disordered
its
has
become
in
that
remembrance.
So far, Husserl has arguedthat phenomenologyis the philosophy of time, because
is
phenomenology the only method that can offer an accountof the constitution of time.
His analysiscan be carried out without any reference to the world, external to our
from
has
He
types
cosmologicaltheoriesabout
of analysis,
experience.
ruled out all other
2: 20
time to psychological theories, becausethey presuppose an objective time. In his
however,
have
his
the
temporal
that
phenomenologicalanalysisof
object,
seen
method
we
in
because
he
data
his
to
to support
cannot refer to any extrinsic
runs
problems,precisely
theories.
2.4.2
THE ABSOLUTE,
TEMPORALLY
CONSTITUTIVE
FLUX OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Husserl,having analysedthe structureof the temporal object finally moves on to discuss
the origins of time-consciousness,
that is, the constitution of time. However, before he
does this he presents the reader with some general comments about the a priori
has
In
Section
Husserl
33,
the
characteristicsof our experienceof time.
reassertsthat time
following essentialcharacteristics,
1) that there is a fixed temporalorder of an infinite two-dimensionalseries.
2) that 2 different times can neverbe conjoint
3) that their relationis a non-simultaneousone
4) that there is transitivity, that is, to everytime there belongsan earlier and a
later time. (Husserl 1905-10,29)
Here he does no more than reiteratethe statementshe made earlier in Section2 of the
book, where he promisedthat he would,
try to clarify the a priori of time by investigating time consciousness,by
bringingits essentialconstitutionto light. (Husserl1905-10,29)
So it is a disappointment when Husserl simply restates these a priori characteristicswithout
further
his
is
For
transitivity
significant
clarification.
example,
analysis of
restricted to: "[I]f
A is earlier than B, then B is later than A. " (Husserl 1905-10,97) This is patently not
himself
breaking
describes
Husserl
these a priori characteristics as "selfground
material.
laws.
(Husserl
if
"
But
1905-10,24)
they are so self-evident, it seemsunlikely that he
evident
his
his
important
it
Indeed
is
could claim this as an
result of
analysis.
appears
philosophy
the "science of the trivial. " He is trying to establish the essential constitutive laws of
by
basic
is
the
temporal
that
experience,
most
elements,
which all phenomena are
determined. Husserl wants us to accept that through phenomenological analysis we can
2: 21
because
these
access
primitives which,
of their a priori characteristics, are necessarily preform
justifiably
be
discussed
Whether
this
theoretical.
this
can
sustain
claim
of analysis
will
in detail, but it is noted here as one of the problematical claims in PITC, and with
in
phenomenology general.
Having describedthe constitution of temporal objects,Husserl now looks at the
origin of the constitution. This analysisshould reveal the most primitive source of
flux
describe
Husserl
"the
"
In
temporality - what
to
calls
absolute
of consciousness. order
deep
denotation
Husserl
this
the
structure,
struggleswith
underlying
connotation and
of
he
language.
inauthentic
language
Husserl
to
the
that
wanted eliminate
ordinary
states
of
by
but
is
it
public speech,
constrained
as the only mode of expression.His most explicit
flux
defeatist
defining
this
attempt at
concludeswith a
note.
It is absolute subjectivity and has the absolute properties of something to be
denoted metaphysically as 'flux', as a point of actuality, primal source point and
lacking.
(Husserl
For
1905-10,
this
a continuity of movements.
all
names are
100)
One tactic he is able to adopt is metaphor as a form of indirect communication,but this
doesnot comewithout its drawbacks.The metaphoricuseof the term "flux" [Fluß] brirgs
does
his
it
Husserl
with
many connotations, which
not want
concept to inherit.
Consequently Husserl's description is almost totally characterisedby statementsof
flux
is not a process,in the senseof
it
Accordingly,
tiw,
elimination -a zia n
as were.
be
flux
described
in
in
Consequently
the same
something that proceeds time.
can not
for
flux
is
the a prirni condition of all temporal objects.
temporal
manner as a
object,
Similarly,asthis is the ultimate sourceof temporality,Husserltries to rule out what he calls
the "absurdproperty" (logicallyspeaking)of the flux flowing more or less quickly. For if
flux could flow more or lessquickly, then there would haveto be anothermore primitive
determined
this changeof speed.In order to prevent this regress
metric of time which
Husserl has to say that flux doesnot manifest any temporal properties.In order to skirt
he
around the problem of when these constitutive acts occur,
attempts to remove the
descriptionout of the temporaldomain.
Temporally constitutive phenomenaare, in principle, objectivities other than
those constituted in time. (Husserl 1905-10,101)
2: 22
(1905-10,150)
Subjectivetime is constitutedby an absolutetimelessness.
This obscurereferenceto a primordial "flux" is as far asHusserl'sanalysiscan proceed.It
had
he
be
is
Husserl
that
that
said
not concernedwith questionsof empirical
recalled
will
flux
its
That
is,
if
in
Husserl
to
such a
exist,
could
not
explain
origins
genesis.
were
for
locating
be
it
It
theory
thermodynamics.
terms,
example
within
a
of
scientific
will
have
because
in
is
to
theory
that
this
a natural scientific
which objectivetime plays
recalled
intentional
idealist
Husserl
its
to
steadfastlyaims construct an
constitution.
a part presumes
first philosophy.
Pre-objectified time, which pertains to sensation, necessarily, founds the
(Husserl
Objectification
1905temporal
of
of
an
positions.
unique possibility
10,97)
2.5
SOME PROBLEMS WITH PHENOMENOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS
Phenomenologyasa project in its own right hasbeencriticisedat length by many different
by
interest
in
Oxfordites.
However
Marxists,
the
thought,
existentialists,
our
schools of
has
been
his
Time-Cbndb
Husserl's7hePhazaraaaalogyoflnteinal
uness
objectionsto naturalism
in philosophy, and particularly how they apply to other theories of time. We saw that
Husserl has claimed that first hand or lived experienceis not reducible to any form of
has
knowledge
is
He
that
claimed
scientific
secondaryand
natural scientific explanation.
inauthentic, and relies on intentional act of subject to validate it. That is, scientific
knowledgeneeds"prior" validation.Phenomenologyis the only candidatefor a philosophy
deliver
laws.
Hence,
universaltruth and
of time, given that natural sciencesare unableto
for
basis
is
it
is
the
only rigorously scientific
epistemology,as
phenomenology
able to
deliver universaltruth and laws. Phenomenologyis the only discipline appropriatefor the
in
time-consciousness
and experience general,asall other approachespresuppose
study of
be
in
As
time.
there
can no universalmethodology the natural sciences,there
an objective
be
can no unified theory of time.
However we haveidentified severalproblemswith Husserl'sanalysisthat seriously
his
hence
his
objectionsto the project of a unified theory of time.
undermine claims,and
Firstly, there are no criteria by which Husserl'scan validatehis phenomenologicalanalysis.
2: 23
hermetism.
This is a consequence
Certairlythe resultsof
of phenomenology'self-imposed
his investigationsarenot going to be independentlyrepeatableand verified as,for example,
in naturaland socialscientificexperimentation.Nor can phenomenologyrely on producing
the samesorts of proofs, which are availableto mathematiciansand logicians.Science,on
the other hand, has realised the difficulties of trying to establish a foundational
has
developed
highly
its
epistemology,and
own
sophisticatedmethods of validation, or
discuss
We
thesein Chapter3. But phenomenology,by its very
partial corroboration.
shall
definition
has
own
ensuredthat none of these mechanismsare availableto validate its
claims.Secondly,it seemsunlikely that Husserlcan simply ignore any scientific input to its
in
in
In
the
that
priori
next chapterwe will argue
a
project?
approaches, general,are the
does
his
Thirdly,
how
Husserl
is
time
not successfullyanswer own question,namely,
wane.
itself constituted?Husserl at no time claims that he is going to give any account of
Objectivetime. This is becauseanytalk about real time, aswell astalk about the realworld
datum.
is
So it may
things,
or real
explicitly excludedas not part of a phenomenological
him
for
his
deliver
inability
to
seemunfair to criticise
precisely
on this subject.Indeedin
he
be
found
PITC
the openingpagesof
claimsthat nothing can
out about Objective time
via phenomenologicalanalysis,as these are all transcendencies[Tranmxlenzen].Objective
time is only bracketedin order to seehow this becomessomethingtranscendentfor us.
But given this, can the phenomenologicalepo deliver? Or is Husserl being naive in
believinghe can accesstheseconstitutionalactswithout his observationsbeing distortedby
theory. Philosophersbroadly sympatheticwith his aims have even questionedHusserl's
(1967)
For
Derrida
claims.
example,
challengeswhether Husserl can abstractautonomyof
intention from the significationfound in language.
There are clearlymany problemsinherent with the phenomenologicalprogramme,
has
been
Husserl's
He
and
claims remain unproven.
not
able to construct a sustainable
for
his
difficulties
have
Furthermore,
priori
time.
the
argument
a
philosophy of
many of
been compoundedby the very aspectof phenomenologythat is meant to bestow it with
the statusof first philosophy - its hermetism.It seemsthat phenomenology,in its defining
dooms
itself.
act,
3:1
CHAPTER 3
TIME, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
For theattireroi se,thetzendi ationsof tirrearethusvnpassibk
to distinguish,
andthessnne
holds
for spacethereisneitheral norBlow
Ludwig Boltzmann
Thepivblenof timecannothesohaibyan appedto intuitk kno
If thereis a solution
...
in d equations
to tlephilosophical
je an of trim it isz ittaadozen
physics
ofmat/»natical
HansReichenbach
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter,we examinedHusserl'sa priori argumentthat our subjectiveexperience
be
time-consciousness
of
cannot givenan objectiveand naturalscientificexplanation.
In this chapter we will examine some different a priori argumentswithin the
philosophy of science,which are similarly concerned with the question of whether
be
brought
bear
to
empiricalevidencecan
on questionsabout the structureof time. They
alsoaddressthe questionof the ontologicalstatusof time - arewe entitledto saythat time
fiction
is
just
helps
Or
the
time
that
to bind together certain
concept of
a useful
exists?
laws.
scientificobservationsand
We will arguethat evidencefrom the fundamentalsciencescan be brought to bear
has
become
This
time.
on philosophical questions about
possible through recent
developmentsin the philosophy of science.There has been a shift away from both
foundational questionsof meaning,and an emphasison individual laws and their evidence
basedon observation.This has been replacedby an emphasison researchprogrammes,
bootstrapping,the coevolutionof theoriesand super-empiricalvirtues.
3.2 THE DECLINE
OF THE A PRIORI APPROACH
In the previous chapter,we saw that Husserl characterisedthe founding act of European
thought as a rejection of mystical and religious types of explanation, in favour of a
demystification
it
He
that
this
claims
naturalisedapproach.
was out of
of the world that
Westernphilosophy and sciencewere born. At this early stageof development,the pre-
3:2
Socraticand Socraticphilosophershad not yet made a demarcationbetweenphilosophy
it
is
For
and science. example, unclearwhetherHeraclitusand Empedocleswere proposing
identify
theories
they
to
when
attempted
a primary substance
philosophical or scientific
differences
between
Aristotle
By
the
time
the
the
that constitutedthe world.
of
we can see
division
between
disciplines
beginning
in
Theß'ýysics
the
two
to emerge
of content
and The
7lß Plhysics
Metaphysics.
addressedquestionsthat Aristotle believedcould be answeredby
includes
in
investigation,
He
time
than
a sectionon
rather
metaphysicalmusing.
empirical
Book a.
Sincehis time, the domain of metaphysicalphilosophy has beenin decline.History
has witnessed an academy of disciplines breaking away from metaphysics and establishing
have
independent
As
themselves as
seen physics and also mechanics were
subjects.
we
break
to
off and establish themselves in their own right. They
some of the earliest subjects
followed
by
other n"al
were soon
birth
The
of the
sciences.
nineteenth century saw the
foundation
disciplines
human
independent
so-called
scienceswith the
of the
of economics
(Ricardo), sociology (Durkheim)
(Wunci).
and psychology
With
an emphasis on
disciplines
these
wanted to emulate the methods,
observation and controlled experiments,
has
hopefully
This
the success,of the natural sciences.
century
witnessed the empirical
and
last
bastions
investigation
the
of philosophical
sciencessuccessfully encroaching on one of
from
being
Evidence
theories
neurophysiology and cognitive sciencesare
and
- the mind.
brought to bear on philosophical argument. Virtually all aspects of the world and our
discoveries
life
And
to
naturalistic explanation.
certain scientific
are
mental
seem receptive
forcing philosophy to re-examine its construal of reason, explanation and understanding. (I
)
knowledge,
issue
in
in
Chapter
In
5.
to
these
to
this
advancements
response
will return
fashion
from
has
been
in
there
a prbi arguments, in
a gradual shift
philosophical
away
favour of empirically informed theorising. The areas over which philosophy exclusively
be
becoming
increasingly
the
restricted, so
question might
raised as to whether
reigns are
been
left
for
has
is
Queen
Or
Metaphysics
to
the
there any role
philosophers
play.
of
well
in
dethroned,
her
lineage
its
traced to
common experience?
vulgar origins
and
and truly
(Kant 1769-80,8)
Undoubtedly the role of philosophy and its relation to sciencehas changed.The
longer
in
is
is
modem view that philosophy no
an extensionof science, the senseof it
beyond what physicsis able to explain. It servesrather as a critical
being meta-physics
describing
the
observerof the empiricalsciences,clarifying their conceptualrelationships,
for
These
these
the
employed
and
exploring
ground
rationalising
methods.
methods
3:3
do
include
data,
but
forms
grounds
not mere
consistency with observational
other
of
judging
theories on their simplicity or explanatory power. We shall
rational support such as
following
in
to
this
the
this
chapter.
return
and
3.3 TEMPUS ORDINE
GEOMETRICA
DEMONSTRATA
The idea that scientific observation and experimental data can be brought to bear on
is
Although
included
Aristotle
the
time
about
time in
questions
nature of
relatively recent.
The Physics,those who succeeded him, Augustine, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant, firmly
for
item
investigation.
In Chapter 2 we saw that this
time
established
as an
metaphysical
in
holders
from
its
twentieth
thought,
though not all
opinion still prevails
century
the
come
phenomenological school of thought. Looking at some of the reasons for the persistence
be
of this opinion will
useful. Understanding why an a priori theory might be possible will
difficulties
of trying to construct an empirically informed theory of
elucidate the particular
time.
The belief that it is possible to construct an a prhri concept of time is a long held
by
belief
be
The
longstanding
this
the
persistence
of
one.
can
explained
apparent and
furnished
by
Euclidean geometry. For many
priori
the
a
model of space
success of
centuries, geometry was to provide the paradigmatic example of a theory which was "a
prior" - that is, knowable by pure reason and invulnerable to empirical evidence. Starting
finite
first
it
"true",
a
of
axioms
and
postulates,
with
number
which are
principles and
vas
believed that the whole of the rest of geometry could be logically deduced therefrom. (We
know
is
incomplete)
The ten axioms and postulates were for
Euclidean
that
now
geometry
the main part self-evidently simple, and yet abundantly productive of secondary theorems.
As a result of its fertility, Euclidean geometry became the epitome of rational theory, and
disciplines
(Sklar
its
)
1974,9-156.
Many
to
aspired
other
self-contained and rational rigour.
thinkers tried to equal its simplicity and rigour in their own theories, dissatisfied with the
founded
both
because
fallibility
that
theories
contingency of
were
upon observation,
of the
human
laws
from
instances.
inducing
general
of
perception and the problem of
particular
Geometry in contrast seemedimmune to such flaws. For centuries, many thinkers believed
degree
fields
in
that an equivalent
of certainty was possible other
of enquiry. They tried to
The
beautiful
most
example of the application of the
emulate geometry's success.
(1661-75).
is,
Spinoza's
Ethics
Geometry provided the
of course,
geometric method
"prototype of a demonstrable science." (Reichenbach) We now know that it is a matter of
3:4
historicalcontingencythat Euclideangeometrywasthe only geometryavailablefor so long.
Two millennia would passby before Lobachevsky,Riemannand Gausswould posit their
development
The
of alternativesystemsprompted thinkers to speculatethat
alternatives.
different
from
have
by
those
spacemight
properties
permitted Euclideangeometry.
Prior to the developmentof alternativegeometries,Euclidean geometryprovided
the model for any aspiring scientific or philosophical theory. It was the exemplary
body
furnished
It
theoretical systematisationof a vast
the model of a science,
of truth.
lay
Given
to
the persisting successof
claim
completeness
which could
and veracity.
Euclideantheory, it is not surprising,therefore,that it was believeda similar theory could
be constructed for time. Likewise it might start with a small number of true and selffrom
first
be
deduced.
After
the
truths
time
evident
principles,
which all
other
about
could
does
it
all,
not seem that there are certain self-evident and simple truths about time?
Perhapsthe singlemost self-evidentassumptionconcerningtime is that it has a direction.
That is, eventswhich are not simultaneousstand in a relation of temporal order to each
be
is
is
than
the
the
that
to
earlier
other, whilst
other always
other, so
one event alwayssaid
be
later.
deeply
The
iteration
is
in
to
this
temporal
said
of
concept of
order so
embedded
language
describe
it
is
in
As
the
the
that
truism.
way
we
world
almost
a
we
ordinary
and
have shown, the asymmetry of time is virtually all that Husserl is able to surmise in The
(See
71nß-Camibt
Chapter
Phenanmnckgy
Internal
2) However, our suspicions about
of
e s.
the steadfastnessof any so-called self-evident truths about time should have awakened
held
little
(if
(See
in
Augustine's
Aristotle
theories
and
so
anything)
common.
when
Chapter 1)
The dispute betweenLeibniz and Newton is a significantmoment, as for the first
focused
different
in
Their
it
time, plays a central role a scientifictheory.
argument
on
and
denied
is
independent
Leibniz
theories
time.
that
time
of
of the eventsthat
conflicting
be
in
It
He
that
talk
time
the
argued
about
could
occur
world. was an abstractrelation.
between
temporal
relations
events.According to the Leibniz theory,
reducedto talk about
if there were no eventsat all there would be no time, and one therefore could not talk
has
however,
He
that though time
about empty time.
argued,
no independent existence,
hand,
between
Newton thought that time
On
the other
temporalrelations
eventswere real.
in
Sklar
that
take
the
them.
events
place
points
and spacewere somethingover and above
he
inconsistent
in
Newton
thought time and spacewere,
that
often
what
exactly
was
out
if
them
they were a substanceand sometimesreferring to them
to
as
sometimesreferring
(Sklar
God.
if
1992,22)
Newton's
theory of
they
a
property,
or
even
an
attribute
of
were
as
3:5
time is sometimes referred to as the "container theory of time. " Crudely, this theory treats
be
located
kind
into
in their temporal
time as some
of placeholder,
which all events can
lack
disagreement
is
its
The
in
Recent
Newton-Leibniz
also
resolution.
significant
of
order.
by
(1989),
(1974)
(1980)
Newton-Smith
Sklar
Earmann
testify to the vitality of
and
works
the debate. Newton-Smith blames the evasivenessof a solution on the underdetermination
data.
(Newton-Smith
highlights
by
This
is
it
1980)
the most
theory
significant as
of
important aspect of Newtonian theory, that is, space and time play a crucial role in
behaviour
is
in
to
the
explain
of
scientific theory, whose existence assumed order
level.
(Sklar
1992,23) For Newton, they
phenomenaat the observationaland experiment
features
but
in
the
they are unobservable themselves.The only
are very real
of
world,
for
availableevidence their existencecomesindirectly through the successof the theory
disagreement
for
Significantly,
that they underpin.
representsan
also
our thesis, their
important juncture in the history of the concept of time. Time here becomesan item for
its
investigation
than
rather
metaphysicalspeculation,raising question about
scientific
ontologicalstatus.
3.4 INSTRUMENTALISM
As we have just noted above, Newton posited the existence of space and time in his theory
though neither can be observed. However the issue of the ontological status of theoretical
dried.
in
is
Does
the
theoretical
entity
positing of a
a successfultheory
entities not cut and
have
been
Various
that
the
philosophical solutions
entity actually exists?
necessarily mean
is
instrumentalist
One
the
proposed to circumvent this problem.
response
position. An
instrumentalist claims that theoretical, unobservable entities should be credited with being
fictions.
helps
The
theoretical,
than
positing of
unobservable entities
no more
useful
connect one series of observations with another. Only those entities that are observable
highly
be
The
is
can
position
conservative, only admitting observation as a
said to exist.
for
reason positing a theoreticalentity'sexistence.
Historically the instrumentalist position may have been adopted out of vital
kind.
is,
For
than
the
that
rather
necessity
of
cultural necessity
philosophical
necessity,
his
famously
bacon
during
by
Osiander
Inquisition,
the
time
the
tried
to
save
of
example,
arguingthat Copernicuswas not actually claiming that the earth orbited the sun. Rather
for
that this capricewas a mere mathematicalmodel, useful
predicting the orbit of the
3:6
in
Osiander
the Introduction of
planets, and made no claim about reality whatsoever.
wrote
Copernicus's On theRem&tiansof theHeawdy Spheres,
[These hypotheses need not be true nor even probable; if they provide a
calculus consistent with the observations that alone is sufficient. (Osiander
in
Rosen
1959,250)
quoted
In its most naive manifestation, instrumentalism could accommodate explanations that
fitted
if
in
they
with observations. So, providing it
were superstitious, magical or mythical,
fits in with the observable data, it would be just as acceptable to explain earthquakes in
fish,
big
flipping
its
tail, as it is to explain quakes in terms of plate
terms of a
underworld
like,
instrumentalist
is
An
tectonics.
makes no commitment to saying what the world
really
falls
in
being
is
It
the
the
many
antithesis
of
of
which
ways
overall aim
science.
short of
a
"bold" conjecture in Popper's language. In fact, it conjectures nothing at all. It does not
knowledge
of the world.
amplify our
However, certain unobservabletheoretical entities, which are meant to be useful
fictions, sometimesturn out to actuallyexist.Chalmers(1976)illustratesthis point with the
benzene.
exampleof
The idea that the molecular structure of some compounds, benzene for
instance, should consist of closed rings was first proposed by Kekule. Kekule
himself had a somewhat instrumentalist attitude towards his theory and
fictions.
his
it
On
theoretical
this
regarded
ring structures as useful
view, must
be regarded as a remarkable coincidence that these theoretical fictions can be
(Chalmers
"directly"
1976,117)
through
seen almost
electron microscopes.
The fact that good theoriescan sometimespre-empt scientificdiscoverysuggeststhat there
for
be
believing
later
In
than
to
observation,
may
other reasons,other
an entity
exist.
is
sectionswe will alsoshow that observation not so straightforward.
3.5 CONVENTIONALISM
The conventionalist offers a different approach to dealing with unobservables.Before
historical
I
the
the
time,
specificallyaddressing
question of
will continue with
example
3:7
from
for
by
be
Section
Euclidean
It
3.2
that
recalled
geometry
a
provided
geometry. will
long while was regarded as providing thetopology for space.Then, during the 1820s,Bolyai
developed
in
Lobatschevsky
competing alternative non-plane geometries, response to
and
(Reichenbach
(1958,3)
infamous
"the
the
notes that
problem of
axiom of the parallels".
Gauss is said to have tackled this problem earlier, but did not publish his work. ) The
development of the alternative geometries raised two new problems. First, which of these
geometries was the actual geometry of the world? For all these new geometries appearedto
be as internally consistent as Euclid's. Secondly,what sort of evidence could be brought to
bear on this question? Previously it had been believed that the true geometry of the world
be
by
in
the
to
any
reference
observation
operation
of
pure
reason,
without
could
posited
devised
leave
Poincare
Henri
the a
an argument that would
or experiments on the world.
priori approach to geometry intact. Poincare argued that the geometry that we choose to
decision.
is
is
It
adopt a matter of convention or
possible to adopt mathematically any of
his
he
being
To
illustrate
these geometrical systems without
right or wrong.
argument
uses
the thought experiment detailed in Figure 3.1 which shows that no experiment could
determine any particular geometry as the true geometry of space providing that one is
(Sklar
1974,91-91)
to
theory.
to
the
willing
make
necessary changes other parts of ones
Poincare concluded therefore that it is a matter of convention which pure geometry was
between
bodies.
he
describe
And
Euclidean
that
to
moreover,
claimed
spatial
relations
used
because
(Though
be
it
is
is
the
this
the
simplest.
a matter
geometrywould
normal choice
(1920)
(1958).
)
by
his
Eddington
Reichenbach
contended
critics,
and
Conventionalismis appropriateonly in caseswhere items can only be known via
inference,and not by any sort of direct observationor experiment.However Poincare's
be
known
is
conventionally,which implies that
claim that spaceand time can only ever
be
brought
be
to bear on questions
there could never any empiricalevidencewhich could
This
Firstly,
that some experiment or
two
their
rules out
possibilities.
about
structure.
future
hypotheses.
be
in
inform
is,
That
the
that
that
could
our
made
observationmight
knowledgeof spaceand time is indifferent to empirical evidence.Conventionalismwould
decisive
be
how
be
if
And
experimentor observationcould
made.
not
appropriate some
definitively
be
items
in
For
Poincare
that
so
such
observation
can
ever
made.
say
many
can
the world which were once unobservable,are now observable.Furthermore, many
for
features
We
the
of
world
are
example,
gravity.
never
uncontroversial
unobservable,
directly observegravity,only bodieswhich theory tells us gravity actsupon. Secondly,that
future
in
our re-evaluatingour current experienceof the
shift
might
result
some
paradigm
Poincare
3.1:
Figure
Parable (Sklar 1992)
T=0
Poincare's
inhabitants
are confined to the
parable. Two-dimensional
interior of an ordinary disk on the Euclidean plane. They are equipped with measuring rods that change length with temperature in a linear way. The temperature
at the center of the disk is TRZ , where R is the radius of the disk and T is a constant.
At any point on the disk the temperature is T(R2 - r) where r is the distance of
the point in question from the center of the disk. At the rim of the disk, then the
temperature goes to zero and the measuring rods shrink to zero length. It is easy
to show that if the inhabitants take their measuring rods as having constant length,
they will come to the conclusion that they live on a nonflat Lobachevskian plane
that has constant negative curvature and extends to infinity..
3:8
has
happened
its
Certainly
this
world so that we could see temporal or spatialstructures.
from
heliocentric
in
For
times
the
terracentric
to
theoriesof
example, shift
many
science.
the planetarymotion meantthat we were ableto seethe structureof our solarsystem.
Certain scientistsare reluctant to admit that important elementsof their theories
by
based
the members of a scientific
about the world are
on conventions, agreed
facts.
founding
directly
It
than
tenet of scientific
on
challenges the
community, rather
by
knowledge
be
determined
independent
that
to
all claims
means,
can
practice, namely
facts.
by
is,
In
terms of time, a conventionalist might argue that,
that
to
reference empirical
because of underdetermination by data, it is impossible to make a judgement about the
decision
is
its
Therefore
is
time.
that
about
structure of
all
possible an empirically arbitrary
topology and its metric. We are unable to make meaningful statements about the nature of
holds
it
is
justifiable
introduce
A
that
to
time.
weak version of conventionalism
real
fruitful
into
just
in
it
in
theory
subsequent research.
physical
case proves
conventions
Indeed some element of convention seems very much to be an ineliminable part of any
for
(1980)
is
Lakatos
scientific research programmes.
argues that there a role
convention in
his description of a research programme, in so far as the scientists involved in a certain
decide
its
in
For
to
the research
accept
metaphysical
core.
example,
research programme
based
programmes
around the special and the general theories of relativity, we might
include amongst the conventions the claim that nothing travels faster than the speed of
light in a given direction, and the prohibition of super-luminal particles such as the
hypothetical tachyon.
There have been several other attempts to circumvent the problem of
by
data
it
when comesto selectinga structure of time. For example,
underdetermination
Newton-Smith (1980)in 7heStnutwvof Tvnearguesin favour of what he callsthe standad
based
linear,
is
interval
topokgyof tvne: an open
of real numbers
on a topology that
unified,
be
discrete
justification
His
that
either
and
can
or
continuous.
non-ending, non-beginning,
for adopting such a topology is not based on convention, but based on a form of a priori
is
in
the
topology
that
standard
applicable
more possible worlds
argument, which claims
his
is
But
Newton-Smith's
to
that
topology.
than any other
argument
careful
state
have
knowledge
in
is
no
of the constitution
argument only appropriate situations where we
fore
decisive
his
inform
Should
that would
empirical evidence come to the
of the world.
his
Newton-Smith
would relinquish
claim.
choice,
3:9
3.6 REICHENBACH AND COORDINATIVE DEFINITIONS
As we have alreadyseen,Reichenbachwasunhappy with the conventionalistposition. He
be
that
to
argued
what appeared
competingalternativegeometrieswere not alternativesat
but
different
defined
Conventionalism
the
theory.
expressionsof
the
all,
merely
same
by
fiat,
be
(by
theoretical
terms
priori
meaningof
where meaningcould neither posited a
known
by
investigation.
Reichenbach offered an
empirical
analytic statement) nor
alternativeaccountof the semanticsof theoreticalterms.He arguedthat if we wish to usea
first
define
distinguishes
in
it.
betweentwo sorts of
Reichenbach
term science,we must
definition
he
definition
definition
By
conceptual
and
coordinative. a conceptual
meansa
involves
which
reducinga conceptto other concepts.Hence,using spatialmeasurementas
define
length
distance
an example,we can conceptually
a standardunit of
asa
which when
distance,
distance.
Typically
transportedalonganother
the
this
this unit
supplies measureof
form
be
in
he
However
the
represented
of a measuringrod or a ruler.
would
arguesthat
knowledge
by
is
its
additionallycharacterised
physical
co-ordination to real objectsin the
(Reichenbach
if
distance,
Hence,
1958,14)
to
then onewould
onewanted measurea
world.
haveto determinein advance,which unit of length is to be usedby definition. This unit is
definedwith referenceto a physicallygivenlength. For example,a metrewas definedat the
time of the First French Republic as one ten millionth part of one-fourth part of the
terrestrialmeridian as calculatedby Delambre and Mechain. In 1799,this standardmetre
in
in
wasreified a platinum rod encased the National Archive of Paris.So the characteristic
definition
is
the co-ordinationof a conceptto a physicalobject, in this case
of coordinative
fraction
fiat
There
is
in
but
it
is
Reichenbach,
the
terrestial
of
meridian.
an elementof
a
not
he
Using
temperature,
example,
arguesthat the scaleof
wholly conventionalist.
a second
is
is
However
indication
that
the
measurement we choose arbitrary,and a subjectivematter.
is
the
temperature
of
of a physicalobject not a subjectivematter. It measuresan objective
featureof the world. Hence the scaleis given a coordinativedefinition, that is, to measure
definition
lends
The
the temperature.
coordinative
an objective and physical meaningto
the measurements.
A statementabout the boiling point of water is no longer regarded as an
but
absolutestatement,
as a statementabout a relation between the boiling
length
(Reichenbach
1958,37)
the
water andthe
mercury
column.
of
3:10
How can the use of coordinative definitions help us in reference to time? Reichenbach
becomes
how
do
it
know
that
that two events
the
argues
useful when we ask
question,
we
have the same duration when they do not start and stop at the same time? Usually we judge
that they are of the same duration by reference to a third party, namely a clock. However
there are several concrete problems associatedwith this. The first problem is one of the
accuracy of measurement. For example, imagine I were sitting in the Grandstand at
Silverstone during the British Grand Prix. If I tried to measure the lap time of the cars with
has
hand,
have
information
I
the
my wristwatch which only
second
given
available, would
to conclude that, say, the top twelve cars were lapping at the same speed. However the
FIA's TAG Heuer timing system, which is accurate to within a thousandth of a second,
discriminate
between
determine
times
that
would
could
pole position and the cars on the
judgements
isochrony
dependent
Hence
sixth row.
about
are
on the accuracy of the
instruments
measuring
and the resolution of scale. As Newton-Smith points out, in such
cases,we are not able to say that events are isochronous. All we are able to say is that the
lengths of the measured events are indiscriminable, relative to a certain temporal scale.
Thus, in order to say that two events are the same duration, we go beyond the available
data. (Newton-Smith 1980,143-175). Bouchareine alternatively articulates the problem,
Precisionis the relationshipof measuredvalue to the value of its uncertainty.
One could say that precision is its inverse:relative uncertainty. (Bouchereine
1978,643)
The secondproblem is how do we know that the clock alwaysmeasuresthe time at regular
intervals,that is, remainsisochronic?We know experimentallythat a clock carriedon a jet
high
keep
its
taken
to
aeroplane,or
a
altitude,will not
synchronisedwith twin clock on the
(Coveney
faster
dilation.
It
ground. runs
as a result of gravitationtime
and Highfield 1990,
95) Another famousproblem concernsmeasuringrods andwhetherwe could know if they
had changedlength when transported.For everydaypurposeswe assumethat our clock is
do
is,
keeps
how
know
it
But
that
time.
good
this
metricallyadequate,
we
The third problem is the choiceof clock That is, what is the best sort of clock to
best
indicate
Both
that
tradition
the
use?
common senseand
choice of clock is a regular
Hence
the relative movementsof the earth, sun and moon were the ancient
occurrence.
standardsof time measurement.But,
3: 11
The earth [as a clock] becomesinaccuratewith the introduction of atomic
in
by
level
National
Bureau
Standards.
This
US
1948
the
clocks
of
new
of
behaviour
irregularities
in
brought
to
that
the
accuracy was able
show
earth
by
icecaps
tides,
subterranean volcanic activity and melting
about
meant that
the length of day fluctuates by milliseconds throughout the year. Sufficiently
for
its
interval
so,
value as an
of measurement to be inadequate for
technological purposes. (Dixon 1993,3)
The ideal clock would provide a reliablesequenceof isochronic events.Given that we have
for
basis
TheQcrk, what clock canwe then useto measure
to choosesomeregularityasthe
Ile Clock'sisochronic accuracy?It would involve choosing another clock. But againthe
its
infinite
In
to
problem of accuracywould arise. order avoid an
regressof clockschecking
it
Reichenbach
that
clocks,
argued
was meaninglessto askif a clock was really isochronic.
Ratherwe decidethat a clock is isochronicby convention.
The equality of successivetime intervals is not a matter of knowledge, but of
definition
...
This determination can again be made by reference to a physical
phenomenon; a physical process, such as the rotation of the earth, is taken as a
by
definition.
definitions
All
measure of uniformity
are equally admissible.
(Reichenbach 1958,116-7)
Here Reichenbachmakesa doublemove. The choiceof interval is a matter of convention:
one could equally choose the swing of a pendulum, or the emptying of a clepsydra.
Reichenbachnotes that physicsemploysthree independentmethodsfor defining the units
definition
by
definition
by
laws
definition
time.
the
of
natural clocks,
of mechanics,and
light.
By makingthis stipulation,Reichenbachintroducesthe ideaof a
the
motion of
using
definition
into
the metrication of time. The coordinativedefinition specifies
coordinative
for
basis
that a certainphysicalprocessprovidesthe
a clock. It stipulatesthat that particular
is
It
time.
measures
one
unit
process
of
also stipulatedthat all occurrencesof the chosen
is
So
to
that
there
one
processare equal
given
no a priori way to choosethe ideal
unit.
clock, and alsothe problem of empiricallyverifying the accuracyof any chosenclock, then
the only way to give the metric meaningis by stipulateddefinition. (Newton-Smith 1980,
161-164)
3:12
But is it true to say that the choice of metric is merely one of convention? There are
for
choosing a particular clock which mean the choice is not purely one of
reasons
has
fact
been
do
it
is
Firstly,
that
as
already
observed,
a matter of
not
convention.
we
in
irregular
it
is
isochronic.
Though
that
event and stipulate
choose an
some possible
be
it
is
that
to
their
a society might choose some non-isochronic event
conceivable
world,
basic unit of time, for example the reigns of monarchs. In fact, during the period of the
Ancien Regime, Virilio reports that units of length were co-ordinated to the physiology of
king
(Virilio
human
body,
body
himself.
(A
1984,37-8)
the
the
often
of the
somewhat
literal interpretation of the old Aristotelian adage, "Man is the measure of all things.")
Secondly, the choice of best clock is not made independently physical theory. The standard
by
longer
is
The
Michelson-Morley
the
no
metre
co-ordinated
earth's meridian.
for
light
"aether
that
the
experiments on
winds" showed
speed of
was constant
a round
trip, and provided a new standard for defining length, i. e. the length of a wave of atomic
have
following
definitions
is
We
A
the
radiation.
of units of measurement. metre "the
now
length crossed by light in a vacuum in 1/299,792,458 of a second." And a second is "the
duration of the 9,192,631,770periods of radiation corresponding to the transition between
from
hyperfine
fundamental
levels
in
its
(Detail
Caesium
"
133
the two
of
state.
atom
Bouchareine, 1978) As scientific theories change and technologies progress, certain
by
definitions.
definitions
in
Changes
theory are
are replaced
more precise
coordinative
by
in
changes the choice of clock.
reflected
However, redefining units of measureby co-ordinating them with some physical
difficulty.
find
is
is
it
For
example,
possible to
some ultimate standard,
process not without
free
from
is
in
Reichenbach?
Namely, that uniformity of
the
conventional
element
which
by
definition?
for
is
So
example, can we make an experiment that would
metric
posited
define the one way speed of light?
he constancy of the speed of light in one direction
being a non-trivial convention in relativity theory.) Michelson and Morley paved the way
for the speed to be measured for a round trip. Fizeau and Foucault performed experiments
to determine light's speed. However great controversy continues to surround questions of
light,
fact
it
is
to
the
one way speed of
as
whether
or merely
measuring
an empirical
determined by convention? Salmon argues that all attempts to measure c are doomed to
failure becausewhen we try to measure the one way speed, this either ends up involving a
dubious
(Salmon
have
As
1977)
trip
assumption.
we
round
measurement or some other
light
The
is
judging
the
one-way speed of
a matter of convention.
usualway of
seen above
that two events at a distance are simultaneous has involved using light signals to
3:13
here
is
However
the
that the
them:
synchrony.
assumption
synchronise
standard signal
from
back,
light
light
is
if
So
B
A
to and
signal
we
speed of
signal constant.
we send out a
for
light
for
it
is
it
it
B
the
time
took
to
travel
to
takes
to
the
time
that
the
same
as
assume
for
for
is
is
Thus
BA,
AB
time
time
taken
the
trip
to
the
trip
the
equal
which the
return.
light
how
do
know
for
is constant. Might the
But
ABA/2.
trip
the speed of
time taken
we
less
down,
do
light
its
journey
AB
the
trip
taking
time
to
than the return
of
speed
on
slow
(See
BA?
Figure 3.2) Despite the invention of several thought experiments, such as
trip
Ellis and Bowman's slow clock transport, the question is still unresolved, and the one way
defined
by
does
light
is
However,
this
speed of
convention.
not mean to say that this
still
be
found.
be
For
the
the
case, should an appropriate method of measurement
will always
time being, a degree of conventionality in scientific theory is a necessary fiat. However
Poincare's claim that certain items in science will always be defined by convention looks
tenuous.
3.7 OBSERVABLES
A significantproblem when addressingquestionsabout the nature of time is its intangible
from
differs
investigation
in
It
most other objects of scientific
ways that cause
quality.
for
in
investigator.
it
is
Firstly
the
significantproblems
unobservable, a mannerthat most
it
is
Secondly,
much more tenuouslyassociatedwith observable
other phenomenaare not.
for
have
Finally,
example,gravity.
asseveralwriters
pointed out, many of
phenomenathan,
the conceptswith which it is associatedare as equally as elusive as time itself: entropy,
has
dearth
information
in
All
this
to
created a
of empirical
all,
causation,explanation.
inform hypothesesabout its structure.The fact that time is not observableraisesquestions
There
it
to
that
exists.
are substantialproblems
about whetherwe are entitled therefore say
based
foundationalist
that
only permits corroboration
programme
upon
with the traditional
If
observationalevidence. such viewswere sustainablethey would constitute a substantial
objection;namelywe could not start to talk about the existenceof time.
However the problems causedby time being unobservablemay be a red herring,
for
Concern
about positing the existenceof
my analysis.
and not a problem at all
back
is
traced
to the philosopherand physicistErnst Mach
unobservablephenomena often
(1883), who argued that only objects of senseexperiencehave any legitimate role in
be
directly
be
is
Thus
to
that
theoretical
observed only
entity
can not
given
science.
any
instrumentalstatus.(It is important hereto note briefly that the terms "unobservable"and
3: 14
"theoretical" are by no meanssynonymouswith one another.) Mach's argumentabout the
instrumentalityof unobservablesproved a major influence on the logical positivists - and
insofar
that
their edict
statementsare only meaningful
aswe canverify them.
Van Fraassen (1980) has made a sophisticated version of the argument against
He
more
recently.
argues that there are certain unobservables which one
unobservables
legitimately
infer
because
by
"see"
indirectly
them
the way they act on material
may
we can
if
infer
So
the
objects. one may
existenceof an aeroplane one were to observea vapour
trail in the sky, because,under the right conditions, one could seethe aeroplane,perhaps
through a telescopeor with one's own eyes,if one were spatially close enough.But one
because
in
infer
the
there are no
a chamber,
may not
existenceof a micro-particle
line
be
According
the
to
this
said particle could
observed.
of
conditions under which
be
it
wrong to posit the existenceof spaceand time, as there are no
argument would
be
Van
Fraassen
they
which
can
seen.
conditions
under
arguesthereforethat one
possible
can only acceptthem aspurely theoreticalentitieson the groundsof explanatoryadequacy,
does
belief
and that this
not commit us to any
about spaceand time per se. Thusthe
acceptanceof a theory shouldmakeno ontologicalcommitmentsbeyondthe observational
level.
However it hasbeenpointed out that the reasonsfor why a thing may or may not be
highly
idiosyncratic.
P.M. Churchland,respondingto van Fraassen,givesthe
observableare
following reasonswhy certainentitieswill be unobserved.
First they may go unobserved because,relative to our sensory apparatus, they
fail to enjoy an appropriate spatial or temporal position. They may exist in the
Upper Jurassic period, for example, or they may reside in the Andrcmeda
Galaxy. Second they may go unobserved because, relative to our natural
fail
to enjoy the appropriate spatial or temporal
sensory apparatus, they
dvna7sions.
Hey may be to small or to brief, or too large, or too protracted.
Third, they may fail to enjoy the appropriate enegi, being too weak or too
discrimination.
fifth,
fail
Fourth
to
to
they
may
permit
and
powerful,
useful
have an appropriate
o,
fal
Sixth,
to
they
mas.
may
or an appropriate
"feel" the relevant fundamental farcesour sensory apparatus exploits, as with
fact
background
flux,
despite
inability
its
the
to
the
that
our
observe
neutrino
light
(Churchland
)
density
itself.
italic.
His
1989,143.
that
of
energy
exceeds
3:15
Churchland does not think that the contingenciesof human based observation are a
for
decisions
basis
be
satisfactory
making
about what can or cannot saidto exist.We shall
limitations
issue
below.
Unfortunately
to
the
return
of anthropomorphic
and observation
time does not fall under any of the reasonsgiven above.Nevertheless,there are other
human
for
believing
than
that certainentitiesexist.
reasons,other
observation,
What other criteria could be brought to bear on the ontological status of
Churchland
unobservables?
arguesthat there are certain super-empirical virtues which can
fortify a theoretical entities claim to exist. These depend on certain qualities of the theory
the entity appears in; namely its degree of simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power
(See 4.8.3). Newton-Smith (1980) also adopts a realist stance to the question of the
likens
its
he
intractability,
Despite
time.
the problem to that of the structure of
structure of
the nucleus. In order to choose between theories, he argues that it is best to posit that
explanation which explains the most about events in time.
Others have argued that the fact that we are able to manipulate these so-called
theoretical entities to produce independent results in experimental contexts supports a
(1993,162)
his
illustrate
Hacking
the
the
to
example of
electron
realist position.
uses
point.
We are able to manipulate the electron in an experimental context, and the fact that we are
leads
do
believe
this
to
that electron exists. He argues that though we might
to
that
us
able
be incorrect in our theoretical description of them, we can not be wrong about their
do
he
finds
in
(Though
Hacking
that
existence.
we
not go along with
no support for
theoretical entities which are not manipulable, as this would exclude space and time) Again
from
have
We
to
the
examples
real research add strength
realist position.
already said that
sometimes theory pre-empts reality. Harry Kroto, when modelling the putative V60 carbon
basis
his
"buckyball"
the
molecule, used a sixty-sided
of
as
model. When the actual V60
drew
it
an uncanny resemblance to its model. To summarise,
molecule was observed
for
human
foundation
differentiating ontological status
relying solely on
observation as a
difficulties.
have
We
gamut
of
creates a
already given several reasons why certain entities
by
human
eye. By placing the emphasis on observation alone,
might remain unperceived
the many varieties of evidence are ignored. Observation is only one part of scientific
activity.
Research programmes also involve,
for
example, experiments, thought
experiments, novel predictions, etc. Also the position appears to adopt a somewhat naive
failing
is
into
to
take
account the theoretical element in all
observed,
conception of what
(See
3.8)
observation.
3:16
3.7.1
HUMAN
OBSERVERS AND THEIR
PROBLEMS
Churchlandhasalreadyarguedthat the contingenciesof humanphysiologycan result in an
idiosyncraticdefinition of the observableand the unobservable.It is important though to
human
does
dismiss
Churchland
than
these
more
contingenciesof
observation.
note that
He goeson to explaintheselimits of humanobservation,in terms of theoriesabout human
its
in
Hence,
the
the
thresholds
reasons
perceive
world
and constraints.
why we
perception,
limitations
be
there
are
on our perception and observation can
certain ways and why
dismissive
by
is
in
Churchland's
to
the
approach
stark contrast
attitude Einstein.
explained.
It will be recalledthat Einstein thought it unimportant to explainwhy humansexperienced
the world as time-symmetrical.Ratherthan trying to accommodatethis phenomenological
he
dismissed
his
being
issue
it
theories,
as
an
within
worthy of
offhand
not
anomaly
fully
be
is
In
However
this
subscribedscientific
a
response not adequate. order to
address.
human
be
just
"curiosity"
any
must
of
consciousness
as susceptibleto a naturalistic
realist,
Theories
as
any
other
phenomena
observed.
about perception,cognition and
explanation,
body
in
As
theory.
the
the
of
scientific
argued
cohere
of
we
must
with
rest
consciousness
Chapter2, the fact that perceptualphenomenaare observedintrospectivelydoesnot make
them necessarilyimmune to scientific explanation.However the sort of argumentsthat
Churchlandis able to propose have only beenmade possiblewith recent advancesin our
be
in
In
Chapter
5
we shall exploring
understanding neurophysiologicaland neuroscience.
depth.
in
issue
this
more
However, there are severalother issuesthat need to be addressedhere about
fundamentaltheoriesand the limits of human observation.Theseissuesbear directly upon
issuesto do with time and observation.
3.7.2
ANTHROPIC
PRINCIPLES
The anthropic principle addsan interestingdimensionto the questionof how the fact that
first
human
by
in
It
Brandon
Carter
1973
proposed
what
observe.
was
are
effects
we
we
forms,
has
two
weak and strong.
and
1. Strong Anthropic Principle: "The universe mu¢ be such as to admit the creation of
(Carter
ii
"
1974,291-8)
observers within at some stage.
3:17
2. Weak Anthropic Principle: "Intelligent life can exist only in certain regions of a
laws.
(Hawking
"
1981,425)
universe given physical
The Strong Anthropic Principle requires us to explain laws and conditions of the Universe
in terms of life and consciousness,whereas the Weak Anthropic Principle explains life and
laws
in
terms
consciousness
of the
and conditions of the universe. As a form of
explanation, they are more akin to teleological explanation than the sort of scientific
have
form
been
by
The
in
explanation usually employed.
principles
used
one
or another
facts
"explain"
certain writers to
certain
about the universe, such as the cosmological
being
(Davies
Tipler
Barrow
Hawking
1982,
1982,
1986,
to
zero.
constant
very close
and
Barrow 1988.) For example, Barrow and Tipler in The Antlnvpic Cosmological
Principle (1980
is
low
has
be
low
is
it
that
that
the
the reason
that
to
that
argue
cosmological constant so
for human life to obtain. Hence, the cosmological constant's low value is important in
life
(Ray
is
in
Universe
1991,192). Barrow writes,
the
explaining why
possible
It is a sobering thought that the global and possibly infinite structure of the
Universe is so linked to the conditions necessaryfor the evolution of life on a
like
(Barrow
Earth.
1988,355)
planet
However, for our purposes,it is important to note one of the commentsabout the role of
the human observer,and the influenceshemay haveon observations.Carteralertsus to,
the risks and errorsin the interpretationof astronomicaland cosmologicaldata
information unless due account is taken of the biological restraints under
(Carter
information
1983,347-63)
the
which
was acquired.
This issuebecomeshighly pertinentwhen we addressthe questionof the direction of time.
3.7.3
THE DIRECTION
OF TIME AND LOCALISED CONDITIONS
OF OBSERVATION
Carter is alerting us to the possibility that our situation in the universe may have the effect
have
We
already argued that one of the main problems
of restricting what we can observe.
that a prospective unified theory of time would have to cope with is the question of
temporal asymmetry. (See Chapter 1) From the human point of view, time is usually
3:18
describedas asymmetric,and many processesin nature appearto be, in fact, irreversible.
However, in elementaryphysicsthe fundamentallaws posited are time reversalinvariant.
Much has been made of this discrepancy,and none more so (and with such tragic
by
Ludwig Boltzmann.Boltzmann made many unsuccessfulattempts
than
consequences)
his
life
direction
direction
throughout
to arguethat the
of time was the same as the
of
increasing entropy. However his arguments to prove the Second Law of Thermodynamics
fell foul of substantial criticisms by Poincare, Zermelo and Loschmidt. In an attempt to
bypass their objections and explain our experience of increasing entropy and hence the
direction of time, Boltzmann's final offer was the quiescent Universe response. Boltzmann
in his GasLectures(1896-8,447) argued that the Universe was in a quiescent state, very close
to overall thermodynamical equilibrium. If, according to his theory, the most part of the
Universe is at or very near equilibrium, how is it that we live in an area that is far from
large.
is
inhabit
is
Boltzmann's
that
the
equilibrium?
response
universe that we
extremely
This being the case,it is probable that some small areasof the universe will be in a far from
equilibrium state. Hence our experience of the world, with its apparent tendency towards
increased entropy, is explained by our being precisely in one of these far from equilibrium
That
is
increasing
is
local
the
to
pockets of
universe.
say, our experience of
entropy a purely
is
Universe
It
to
the
phenomenon, and not applicable more generally
as a whole.
not
find
far
from
in
equilibrium pocket, Boltzmann
unusual that we should
ourselves one such
for
(Boltzmann
highly
it
is
intelligent
1896-98)
For,
argues.
only possible
complex and
beings such as ourselves to evolve in far from equilibrium conditions. In order to have
be
flow
increase,
to
there
observers of entropy
needs
a constant
of energy to sustain them,
that is a far from equilibrium condition. So the existence of the observer presupposes the
conditions which they will observe. Boltzmann is using the weaker anthropic principle to
live
by
in
Universe,
explain why we
extension, why therefore we
and
such a part of the
direction
experience the
of time.
The theory of localisedtime-asymmetryis intuitively difficult to grasp.Us folk hold
the belief that past and future are fundamentallydissimilar.This is in contrastto our beliefs
distinct,
deem
be
is,
to
that
the samewhatever
about space,which we
only numerically
direction is being regarded.This has not always been the case.Aristotle's flat earth
fire
described
because
cosmology
spaceas anisotropic
always seemedto rise, whereas
(and
fall
back
Reichenbach
But
Boltzmann
to
to
the
ground.
objectstended
whosetheories
direction
branch
Boltzmann)
those
that
the
of
of
systemsrefined
argued
of time, perceived
3:19
from
function
future,
is
in
to
the past the
as moving
of
particular
systems,
a
only
and
defined
indexical
relation to a present
within that sub-system.Boltzmannwrote,
[F]or the entire universe, the two directions of time are thus impossible to
distinguish, and the same holds for space. (Boltzmann 1896-98,77)
Just as up and down are relative to an event or observer, so that what is up for the
Australian is down for the English, and so time-direction is dependentupon its own
branchsystems.However, CoveneyandHighfiieldwrite of Boltzmann'stheory,
It is an ingenious argument. Unfortunately, it is undermined becausewe never
do observe other portions of the universe possessing an inverted arrow of
bulls
time, where
grow younger and have the power to clear up demolished
Indeed
shops.
that
the
china
modem
cosmology
astronomy
and
show
...
is
be
it
in
thermodynamic
expanding and so
entire universe
can not
(Coveney
and Highfield 1990,175)
equilibrium.
Neverthelessthis examplealerts us to the dangersof generalisingabout laws of nature,
from the viewpoint of our local and particular situation. If we take on board the ideathat
local
have
far
from
to
time
evolved meetour
our conceptsof
needs,sincewe can only exist
equilibrium, theseconceptsare unlikely to yield "philosophical solutions" to more general
how
There
is
how
is
to
time-asymmetry
questions.
a need sort out
much
objective and
human
be
is
Could
it
that our views about
much a result of our peculiarly
point of view.
the anisotropicnatureof time areasscientificallyunfoundedasthose of Aristotle?
This tension betweensubjectivetime-asymmetryand objectivetime-symmeiy might
be one that can not be eradicated.The difficulties raisedby the questionof the direction of
led
have
time
certain philosophersto construe a pluri-dimensionaltheory of time. For
du
his
book,
in
The
Deleuze
Logire
Sens.
the
tackles
titbin English is
example
problem
but the French word sau can equallybe translatedas meanigor direcin. In
Logicof Sense,
this book, Deleuze proposes a two-fold account of time, representedby the concepts
Chions andAion. Drawing heavilyon Boltzmann'swork he writes,
Here we rediscoverthe opposition betweenChronos and Aion. Chronos is the
future
its
It
the
two orientated
present,which alone exists. makesof
past and
3:20
dimensions,so that one alwaysgoesfrom the past to the future but only to
follow
degree
inside
the
that the presents
one another
partial worlds or partial
infinite
in
is
Aion
the past-future,which an
subdivisionof the abstract
systems.
forever
decomposes
both
directions
itself
in
at once and
moment endlessly
be
fixed
is
in
For
Universe
the
no presentcan
a
which taken
sidesteps present.
to be the systemof all systems,or the abnormalset. (Deleuze1969,77)
Here we see the difference between Deleuze's Chronos and Aion. Chronos being the
localised time asymmetric system as perceived by the observer within a particular subfixed
in
is
is
Whereas
Aion
there
the overall and universal system which
neither
system.
between
different
levels
His
of
present nor unidirectionality.
work analysesthe relation
description. The ideal mathematical realm of Aion, like Einstein's theories, acknowledges
future.
between
difference
The
past and
actual and complex world of the observer
no
however is oriented. We shall return to this in 4.10 with reference to the work of Prigogine.
detail,
Dixon
1993)
see
or more
However to summarise,there may be specific problems associatedwith human
how
we can observethe world, such
observers,which may necessarilyplacerestrictionson
for
be
born
local
This
in
that
to
to
to
need obtain
us exist at all.
needs
conditions
as the
based
dangers
of making generalisations about time
upon our
mind and to alert us to the
possibly myopic experience.
3.8
THEORY AND OBSERVATION
We have argued that there are substantial problems with the traditional
foundationalist programme that only permits evidencebasedupon observation.If such
have
been
had
been
there
a substantialobjection to the project. I
sustainable,
would
views
have
been
in
instrumentalist
to
talk
time
an
way. In sections3.4,3.5,
only
able
about
would
3.6 and 3.7, it was arguedthat the meaningof a theoreticalterm does not dependupon
definition.
This
or
coordinative
was the traditional
observation statements,convention
be
held
that the truth of an observationstatementcould
establishedwithout
view that
referenceto theory.
However Feyerabend (1958) and others began to question the distinction between
dependent
it
observation and theory, arguing that was not theoretical statements that were
for
Rather
their
all statements were theoretical, and the
meaning.
on observation
3:21
distinction
observable-theoretical
was untenable. About the same time Quine was
formulating what was to becomeknown asthe Quine-Duhemthesiswhich questionedthe
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements,and their relation to empirical
his
in
Quine
seminalpaper Twocgnas of empiricism
shifted the emphasisaway
evidence.
from talking about individual laws.The previous orthodoxy describeda scientificlaw as a
description
falsifiable,
is
(i.
true,
of
an
observable
entity,
which
and
synthetic
e. can
universal
be deniedwithout self-contradiction),acquiringits meaningfrom observationstatements.
Quine adopted Duhem's definition of a theory as a correlativedevice grouping together
laws.
He wrote,
scientific
Our statementsabout the externalworld facethe tribunal of senseexperience
but
body.
(Quinel953,41)
individually,
only asa corporate
not
That is, a hypothesis can not be tested independently of the theoretical network that it is
part of. So any individual statement is made in the context of its embedding theory. What
has
be
known
to
to
proposed
replace
orthodox
account
of
meaning
come
as the
was
The
is
in
tharry
term
the traditional
of
mednvzg.
of
stated
nettwrk
meaning
a
not
explicitly
derive
from
in
in
is
Rather,
their
the
they
meaning part
concepts
role
play that
manner: x y.
theory.
Given that observationstatementsare formulated in the languageof sometheory,
definitions
be
then the statementsand
will
aspreciseand informative asthe theory whose
languagethey areframedin. And one only achievesprecisionin meaningfrom a coherently
is
is
Hence
theory.
the
that
structured
anti-foundationalist stance
observation
not
for
depends
what we observe always
epistemologicallypure,
upon non-observational
distinction
between
becomes
the
theoretical
theory, and
and observational statement
blurred (Hesse1966).There are no basicobservationstatementsupon which to ultimately
did
into
Earlier
theory.
take
ground a
not
account the
argumentsabout observables
theoreticalnatureof all entities.
The shift awayfrom foundationalquestionsof meaningnot only enablesus to be
it
to
theorise
the
time;
able
about
nature of unobservedentities,such as
also opensup the
be
brought
bear
for
to
on theoreticalconcepts.
new typesof evidenceto
opportunity
3:22
3.9 SHIFT TO RESEARCH PROGRAMMES
I will now go on to show how progressin the philosophy of scienceallows empirical
highly
bear
important
in
"theoretical"
An
time.
to
element
on
conceptssuch as
evidence
this has been the emphasison the overall structure of researchprogrammes,rather than
individual laws.
Both Kuhn and Lakatos regard scientific activity as being involved with something
later,
laws
just
individual
Kuhn
the
term
and theories.
uses
paradigm, or
greater than
disciplinary matrix to denote the network of activitiesinvolved. Lakatos adoptsthe term
full
designate
his
We
the
adopt
range of scientific activities.
researchprogramme to
language here. Typically a researchprogramme would include standard derivations,
(1987)
Galison
arguesthat
problems, models, methodologicalconventions and values.
there are three parts to a researchprogrammethat are partially autonomous:experiment,
observation,and theory.
Firstly, we shall describe in more detail the structure of a research programme with
by
(1989)
developing
described
is
Zahar
Lakatos.
Lakatos's
to
as
work
particular reference
for
heuristic"
in
Popper's
"rational
comparison
research
programmes,
with
a
assessing
"psychology of invention" which seems to depend on chance discovery rather than
have
development.
Lakatos
three
argues that scientific research programmes
structured
heuristic.
heuristic
The
and a positive
main components: a metaphysical core, a negative
basic
theoretical postulates of the programme. Being
the
metaphysical core comprises of
definitive of the programme, these are to be regarded by the researcher as unfalsifiable.
However, around this core there is a "protective belt" of auxiliary hypotheses, observation
it
initial
is
If
the
theory,
then
to
within
conditions.
an
anomaly
appears
statements and
these that the scientist will look as the source of the fault. The metaphysical core will admit
heuristic
is
That
is,
The
the
these
simply
assertion of
negative
guidelines.
of no alteration.
face
intact
in
the
the metaphysical core must remain
of anomalies. It is irrefutable. If the
longer
is
is
modified, then one
working within the same research
metaphysical core
no
defining
is
its
it
the
that
the
with
core
provides
programme
characteristics.
programme, as
The positive heuristic provides guidelines for developing further research within the
defines
be
have
"research
"
It
the
that
to
problems
solved and
yet
programme -a
policy.
lays the ground for new auxiliary hypotheses in the protective belt. It also tries to foresee
how
handle
to
anomalies within the theory. It only applies to the
and offer advice on
"refutable variants" of the programme, and not the metaphysical core. The belt should
3:23
provide new theories explaining previously observedphenomena and also make novel
light
from
distant
For
Einstein's
that
example,
predictions.
prediction
a
a
star would
ray
bend in the curved spacecloseto the sun was a novel prediction of his generaltheory of
basis
Eddington
relativity.
confirmedthis on the
of observationsin 1919.(Ray1991,1)
The positive heuristic provides criteria for choosing between competing research
for
judging
is
in
programmes, and also
whether a particular research progressing or regress.
Lakatos writes,
A research programme is said to be progressing as long as its theoretical
long
keeps
its
it
is,
that
growth anticipates
growth,
as
as
predicting
empirical
facts
it
is
if
lags
its
theoretical
some
novel
with
success...;
stagnating
growth
behind its empirical growth, that is, as long as it gives only post hoc
discoveries
facts
by
explanations either of chance
or of
anticipated
and
discovered in a rival programme..... If a research programme progressively
be
it
it,
'supersedes'
than
the
explains more
a rival,
and
rival can
eliminated.
(Lakatos 1978,112)
That is to say,if a researchprogrammemakesa novel prediction that is corroborated,such
as,predictingthe existenceof new planetthat is subsequentlyobserved,then it is growing.
For example,Newton's gravitationtheory receivedcorroborationwhen the existenceof the
by
fails
if
Neptune
Galle.
However
then
observed
planet
was predicted,and
a programme
to makenovel predictionswhich arecorroborated,and is constantlyhavingto makead hoc
degeneration.
its
When
then
these are symptoms of
auxiliary principles,
adjustmentsto
comparingcompetingtheorieswithin a researchprogramme,Lakatos offers three criteria
for rejectingan old theory, To, in favour of a new one, TN. Firstly, TN should offer excess
is,
improbable
impossible
that
that
content,
predict novel phenomena
are
empirical
or
be
To.
TN
Secondly,
the
within
should
able to explain the empirical content of To, if
limiting
boundary
it,
assumptionsand
anythingremainsof stating
conditions.Finally, some
been
have
have
is,
that
corroborated,
someempiricalevidenceof
of the new theory should
its success.Lakatosdoes saythat it is possiblefor a degeneratedtheory to be resurrected,
for example,the particletheory of light.
Importantly, a research programme does not fail (or succeed) when an individual
hypothesis is falsified. Rather the emphasis is on the successof the research programme
Sckntific
Reseairh
is
Lakatos's
Falsification
Medan%logy
Pny
time.
work
over
and
of
rvnnis
an
3:24
falsificationist
improve
Poppers
on the shortcomingsof
account of scientific
attempt to
be
in
Popper
It
that
that
that
recalled
claimed
all
was necessary order to refute
activity. will
is
Lakatos's
theory
accountof science more
a scientific
was a singleanomalousobservation.
by
incorrectly
Popper.
Lakatos
that
theory
than
that
argues
when a
sophisticated
offered
does
jettison
is
in
the
the
theory,
as suggested
not
whole
predicts a phenomenon, scientist
Poppers model. Indeed,this approachis unrealistic,becauseof the complexity of theories,
it is inevitablethat they will not be born perfect into the world, but will require further
development
modification and
as they mature. If every scientific theory were abandoned
for
development
be
first
the
the
time a problem emerged, prospects
would slim.
3.9.1
BOOTSTRAPPING
The emphasis on research programmes, which contain collections of related theories, as
being
opposed to emphasis
placed on a single theory enables us to employ the
bootstrapping strategy of confirmation, whereby certain hypotheses in a research
falsified
from
be
by
hypotheses.
This
type of
can
confirmed
or
evidence
other
programme
(1936
first
by
in
he
Testability
Carnap
Meaning
&
1937)
suggested
and
when
approach was
deducing
by
hypothesis
by
instances
of them
means of other
writes of confirming
hypotheses in the same theory. (Glymour 1980,123)
Bootstrappingis different from the hypothetico-deductiveaccountof confirmation
becauseit offers an accountof evidentialrelevance,that is a way of determiningwhich parts
falsifies.
bit
So it is a method of relative
of a theory a given
of evidenceconfirms or
bears
different
confirmation, acknowledgingthat any givenpieceof evidence
upon
parts of
bootstrapping
The
theory
strategyaims to side step some of the problems
a
unequally.
holism,
discussed
in
Quinean
the previous section. Glymotr
arising out of
which we
argues,
No working scientist acts as though the entire sweep of scientific theory faces
the tribunal of experience as a single undifferentiated whole..... [o]n the
business
is
the
to construct arguments that aim to
scientist's
contrary, much of
bears
that
piece
of
experiment
or
observation
on a particular
show
a particular
(Glymour
"
1980,3)
theory.
piece of
3:25
Bootstrapping strategy would not be acceptable to a radical holist, because the holist
be
bear
body
beliefs.
brought
The
that
to
the
entire
evidence
can
only
on
of our
upholds
bootstrap strategist argues otherwise, that evidence does not bear uniformly on all of
theory. Observations are relevant to some hypotheses in a theory and not to others.
Glymour (1980,133) cites the example of Kepler's theories concerning the orbits of the
by
be
Evidence
the
planets.
observation of a single planet's orbit can
produced
used to test
Kepler's first and second laws, which deal with the orbit of single planets. However
by
evidence produced
observations made of a single planet cannot be brought to bear on
Kepler's third laws which relates the features of the orbits of two moving bodies. Hence
hypotheses
to
variety of evidence can serve separate
within the same theory.
Glymour also argues that scientists may use hypotheses in theories for the
determination of the value of quantities, which have not been measured. That is, as a
testing procedure which localises confirmation. Earman and Glymour (1983)argue that the
background
is
knowledge
her
hypotheses
for
in
to
scientist able
use
and some of
arguing
hypotheses.
Whilst in practical and real terms, the strategy can be highly
and against other
how
has
been
is
illustrate
complex, an example given to
such a strategy
employed. Glymoir
(1980,112-4) works through an example from a published psychology paper which
includes the set of linear equations and their consequencesshown in Figure 3.3. The A's
be
has
been
done.
B's
Assume
this
estimated experimentally.
and
are quantities which can
What the diagram in Figure 3.4 shows is that not only are we able to calculate a value for
El from A, (Equation 1: El = A); we can also calculate a value for El using the known
for
data
facilitates
Hence
B,
A,.
in
B1,
A's
B's
E,
the
the
values
about
and
and
calculation of
because
both
And
than
more
one way.
pathsof calculationshould arrive at the sameresult,
E1, this providesus with a method of checkingthat the data is consistentwith the theory.
But, the other important featureof the bootstrapmethod of confirmation is that it allows
for
El and G1, which cannot be arrived at
us to calculate values, such as those
limitations
There
to this method. Glymcur argues that there
experimentally.
are of course
be
from
tested
are certain theoretical quantities that cannot
recognised pieces of evidence,
because there is no means of computing them from the other evidence that has been
(Glymour
There
E2
1980,143)
remain other values, such as and G2,which cannot
accrued.
be calculated, because of the structure of the theory and the set of initial data. Glymoir
hypotheses
is
for
"It
in
then,
that
theories
the
their
clear,
concludes,
scientists may use
determination of values of quantities that are not in fact measured or estimated by standard
3:26
data.
(Glymour
beyond
is,
is
That
"
1980,114)
to
the available
one able
statistical
go
data.
empirical
We now have a strategy, which allows one to compute the values, or confirm
hypotheses about unobserved, or unobservable parts of a theory. This has only been
been
have
jettisoned.
As
the
theories
once
of
significance
such
possible
strict verificationist
it opens up the possibility of using theories about observable asymmetrical processes in
time to enable us to reach conclusions about time itself, and its structure (topology and
metric.
3.9.2
COEVOLUTION OF THEORIES
A secondresearchstrategymadepossibleby a dynamic theory of theory developmentis
The
is
important
theories
co-evolution.
co-evolution of
an
aspectof the contemporary
different
hypothesis
different
levels
it
theories,
of
science
as
operating
enables
unity
at
of
description,to developby mutually correctingand informing one another.Eventually,it is
hoped that this co-evolution will result in he theories converging to the point where
development
becomes
feasible.
Co-evolution
of theories
stressesthe gradual
reduction
over a period of time. P.S.Churchlandwrites,
The logical empiricists, in focusing exclusively on the final products of a long
history of theoretical evolution, overlooked the dynamics of theoretical
This
is
in
it
is
typically
evolution.
a serious oversight, since
a theory's evolution
that the major reductive links are forged, and the major revisions-categorical
(P.
S. Churchland 1986,286)
and ontological - are wrought.
That is the logical positivists overlooked the epistemologicalsignificanceof theoretical
discuss
brief
in
here,
it
is
issue
We
that we will return to
evolution.
as
an
shall
co-evolution
in both Chapters4 and 5. Wimsatt (1976)describesco-evolution as a relation between
different levels of theory in a potentially reductive relationship. Each level informs and
developments
corrects the other, mutually suggestingmodifications,
and experiments.
Initially the two theories may be undevelopedand the higher level theory may not be
lower
level.
However as the two theories co-evolve,the aim is that they
reducibleto the
be
that
a reduction may possible.The co-evolutionary
will eventuallyconvergeto the point
becomes
approachto researchprogrammes
acceptableonce it is acceptedthat empirical
3:27
fully
do
has
into
The
this
the
theories
not arrive
matured
world.
adoption of
approach
for thoseworking within certain disciplineswho clam that their
important consequences
discipline has developedan explanatorysystemwhich can exist autonomouslyof other
levelsof explanation.They canhencearguefrom splendidisolation either that there canbe
for
is
intertheoretic
that
theories,
there
need
no grand unification of
or alternatively,
no
integration.We have alreadyarguedin Chapter2 that this is a weak position, and that one
failures
is
its
isolationist
the
the
of
phenomenologicalprogramme
position. One of
of
main
the strengthsof an anti-foundationalistapproachin the philosophy of scienceis that other
factors, apart from observation, can be brought to bear on the validity of a research
factors
from
is
One
other theories.The converseof
programme.
of these
corroboration
highlight
is
this symbiotic relationship that theories can
anomaliesin and offer new
(1981)
discusses
for
For
Hooker
the concurrent
example,
solutions
one another.
developmentsof thermodynamicsand statisticalmechanics,and how the two research
programmesinter-regulatedeachother.
First, the mathematical development of statistical mechanics has been heavily
influenced precisely by the attempt to construct a basis for the corresponding
laws.
discrepancies
it
For
the
thermodynamical properties and
example, was
between the Boltzmann entropy and thermodynamical entropy that led to the
development of the Gibbs entropies and the attempt to match mean statistical
led
development
to
the
to
thermodynamical
qualities
equilibrium values which
however,
is
itself
Conversely,
thermodynamics
theory.
of ergodic
undergoing a
injection
"back" into thermodynamics, the
process of enrichment through the
differences among them forming a basis for the solution of the Gibbs paradox.
More generally, work is now afoot to transform thermodynamics into a
(Hooker
1981,49)
theory...
generally statistical
Broadly speaking, co-evolution
between
different
take
place
can
levels of
believe
it
between
in
However
I
the
example above.
can also occur
explanation, as
different research programmes, where talk of levels of explanation is less appropriate.
For instance, in current work being undertaken on olfaction and flavour perception,
development
the
complementary
of the neurophysiological
we can witness
biological
human
and neurological mechanisms, which underlie
exploration of the
build
a commercially viable
olfaction, and the computer-engineering project to
3:28
"electronic nose." The original model for an electronic nose system,proposed by
Persaudand Dodd (1982),drew upon very early and elementaryknowledgeof the
human
for
its
inspiration.
Currently, engineering
the
olfactory pathway
workings of
knowledge,acquiredin the needto build working system,is being re-imported into
human
help
the
neurophysiologyto
model and understand workings of the
system.
The successof this interactive and complementaryrelationship has resulted in the
(See
interdisciplinary
Appendix)
teams.
of
specificestablishment
research
Importantly the outcome of a successfulco-evolution of theories is the
inter-theoretic
two
theories
via
reduction, which previously
eventualunification of
different
domains.
to
were considered rangeover quite
3.10
CONCLUSION
My aim so far has beento demonstratethat there are no sustainableprincipled arguments
have
If
pth»i
theory
time.
there
of
werewe would
againstan empirical,asopposedto a an a
hurdles,
hope
for
identified
We
to abandonall
severalpotential
a unified theory of time.
but neverthelesswe havearguedthat there has beena shift awayfrom purely philosophical
from
based
theories that receive rational support
theories of time, to empirically
The
Euclidean
priori
the
theory
time,
of
attraction of
a
geometry,
philosophy.
modelledon
has waned. Similarly there has been discontentmentwith regarding conventionalismas
Though
than
our theories of time are still
anything other
a stopgap strategy.
believe
be
by
data,
this
there
to
that
areno convincingreasons
will always
underdetermined
foundationalist
based
have
Finally
the
the case.
we
rejected
approachto ontology
upon
from
This
taking anything other than an
observational evidence.
would prevent us
instrumentaliststancetowards time. We arguedthat human observatorypowerswere too
idiosyncraticto be the sole arbiter of existence.Furthermore the instrumentalistposition
disregardedthe activities involved in real scientific research,as well as the varietiesof
be
brought
bear
its
hat
to
on problems.
evidence can
In the secondhalf, I arguedthat there hasbeena certain "relaxation" of methodin
historic
been
has
The
the philosophy of science.
and social context of researchactivity
have
decision
that
the
rational
not wholly
makingwithin
reasons
underlie
acknowledged,as
has
However
this relaxation
opened up new possibilities and
researchprogrammes.
techniques,such as co-evolution, bootstrapping and an emphasison different types of
evidence,suchasthe super-empiricalvirtues.
3:29
Perhapsit is best not to regardtheseinnovations as a relaxation,but a move to a
more complexand ultimatelyricher appreciationof scientificactivity and growth.
4: 1
CHAPTER 4
THEORETIC
INTEGRATION
Theproblemsof unity of scienceand of time are so intimately connectedthat we can
not treat one without the other.
Ilya Prigogine
Nature doesn'tconsultyou; it doesn'tgive a damnfor your wishesor whetherits laws
pleaseyou. You must acceptit asit is.
Dostoevsky.
4.1
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1, we claimed that there is, to date, no single unified theory of time.
Furthermore, important thinkers have claimed that there could never be one. However
be
priori
this
the
that
there
are no sustainable a
arguments why
we are arguing
should
heterogeneous
Some
the
the
of
objectors cite
apparently
usesof the concept within
case.
different theories. Ricoeur, for example, claims that the failure to reduce time as
is
to
theories
time,
of
cosmological
a corroboration
experienced
his
disunity
of
hypothesis. Of course, Ricoeur's claim was based upon his studies of Aristotle and
Augustine. Nevertheless, in this chapter, we examine whether there are any general
In
take
the next chapter, we will specifically
such
place.
a reduction cannot
reasons why
brain
discussion
issue
to
the
states,
of reducing mental states
with particular
address
of
time-consciousness.
The classicalaccountof unity of science,asdescribedby Putnam and Oppenheim
falls foul of many of the sameproblems facing the overall positivist project, asdiscussed
in the previous chapter. In particular, the epistemological significance of theoretical
for
be
by
It
theories
two
to
co-evolveside side,
evolution was overlooked. may necessary
informing and correcting each other, before they can become sufficiently close for a
4:2
(See
3.9.2) In this chapter, we will argue that
to
to
the
take
reduction of one
other
place.
has
had to adapt itself to accommodate the postthe classical account of unity of science
do
Nevertheless,
theory
these
of
evolution.
positivist account
accommodations
not
hypothesis.
On the contrary, it makes it more plausible.
weaken the unity of science
4.2
HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND TO THE UNITY OF SCIENCE
The unity of science has long been posited as a theoretical desideratum, by philosophers
has
been
ideal
driving
It
and scientists alike.
an
scientific activity,
unmindful
metaphysical claims about the monist or pluralist nature of reality. Historically,
of
unity
logical
is
Moritz
Schlick,
Vienna
Circle
the
the
of science associated with
work of
and
by
Neurath's
Encyclopcedia
1938
the group's
positivism.
collected a series of articles
Their
the
members, which advocated
unity of science as a general programme.
project
typified the mood of great confidence in the natural sciences that dominated the early
decades of the twentieth
being
form
in
Great
the
century.
progress was
made
of
Einstein's theory of relativity and developments in quantum theory. Moreover, not for
the first time this encouraged some scientists to believe that they were on the brink of
final
(as
"life,
theory
the
they
constructing a complete and
of
universe and everything"
)
by
fervour
The
into
the
the
the
natural
say.
stirred up
successesof
sciencesspilled over
human and social sciences.We saw in Chapter 2, this enthusiasm for positivism was not
(Heidegger
its
Husserl
In
1924a,
1936b)
the next section we will examine
critics.
without
in
Oppenheim and Putnam's 1958 paper
the classic account of the unity of science, given
Unity of Scienceas Working Hypothesis. It will be shown that the traditional account of
deduction
laws
based
identification
of
and
of terms can not
upon strict
unity of science
different
levels
between
description.
And thus
the
of
adequately capture the relationship
based
lose
"time"
these
the
their power.
on
arguments against
views
unity of
4.3
DIFFERENT
USES OF THE TERM REDUCTIONISM
We have alreadynoted that the unity of scienceis a theoretical desideratum,for scientist
4:3
it
bring
it
is
it
it
Were
with
that
achieved,
claimed
along
and philosopher alike.
would
a bag of theoretical goodies, including simplicity, coherence, internal consistency. (See
4.8.3) However, there is a disagreement as to what is meant by unity of science. The
traditional
account of unity of science sees unification
hierarchy of intertheoretic
being
as
realised through a
reductions, which would all ultimately reduce to a single,
final level of explanation. However, though the terms reduction, reductionist and
different
in
they
things.
reductionism are commonly used philosophy,
can mean many
(Stöckler 1991 and Rose 1997) There are four main issues raised by reductionism, but
this list is by no means exhaustive: ideological, methodological,
ontological
and
explanatory.
4.3.1
IDEOLOGICAL
REDUCTIONISM
One of the most enduring arguments over reductionism has been on ideological, or
finds
force
fact
The
in
theological,
the
perhaps more accurately on
grounds.
objection
that something of cultural value or meaning is reduced to some form of explanation
involving other things adjudged to have less cultural value or meaning. Hence, it is
for
like
be
love
that,
regardedas objectionable
example, something
could
explained in
terms of pheromones and other chemicals;or that thought might be nothing but "grey
(as
)
form
it.
This
John
Searle
gook"
phrase called
of reductionism was vehemently
by
in
his
(1981),
Robert
Nozick
Philosophical
Explanations
attacked
who wrote,
Reductionism is not simply a theoretical mistake; it is a moral failing.
(Nozick 1981,631)
However Nozick's objection seemsto rest on an equivocation of the meaning of the
term reduce.He associatesthe technical term with the negativeconnotations of reduce,
being
if
in
item
losing
its import or
the
as explanatory reduction resulted
explained
becoming something inferior. Of course,technical reduction implies no such changein
have
its
Indeed,
some of
supporters
arguedthat the effect of reduction
value or worth.
4:4
be
in
Dennett
Explained,
For
Consciousness
the
opposite.
example,
writes,
can
quite
When we understand - when there is no more mystery - consciousness will
be different, but there will still be beauty, and more room than ever for awe.
(Dennett 1991,25)
Nor doesreductionism imply that higher level entities are assimple to understandasthe
(As
fundamental
if
that
them.
more
entities
constitute
elementaryparticlesphysicswere
)
somehow simple. Paul Churchland writes,
A reductionist is bound to say that we are composed of simple things. But
he is not bound to say that we, or our environment, are simple things.
(Churchland 1992,134)
4.3.2
METHODOLOGICAL
REDUCTIONISM
The advocateof methodological reductionist rejectsthe useof subject specific methods
biological,
human,
the
the
of explanation, and
methodological autonomy of
and social
do
We
sciences.
not subscribeto this type of reductionism. Its underlying motivation is
that there is only one genuine scientific method, which is appropriate to all research
is
That
the method of elementary particle physics, or whatever theory is
programmes.
fundamental
being
level
the
the
claiming
status of
of explanation. Methodological
be
is
identify
Popper's
to
to
confusedwith
attempt
reductionism not
certain scientific
be
falsification
is,
to
that
methodswhich should common all enquiry,
and corroboration
hypotheses.
of
4.3.3
ONTOLOGICAL
REDUCTIONISM
Although there are still notable dissenters(notably Eccles,in Popper and Eccles1977),
like
describe
to
themselvesas materialist or
most contemporary philosophers would
4:5
different
forms
in
They
many
physicalists.
are committed to ontological unity, albeit
and without
being
a materialist
any consensus about what
provisionally,
define
ontological
we
reductionism
entails.
as the theory
However,
that, given the
by
(Lewis,
in
1971),
all phenomena
nature are covered
explanatory adequacy of physics
believes
here
laws
The
that
are no new elements,
the
ontological reductionist
of physics.
levels.
This
laws
higher
fundamental
theoretical
would
at
special principles or additional
be
in
in
explained
principle,
prohibit the positing of any phenomena which can not,
terms of physics, and then therefore require a special explanatory theory of their own,
for
further
(See
Chapter
"
elan
"mind
5
stuff.
vital, epiphenomenalism or
such as
discussion. ) Ontological
reductionism
or unification
by
two methods,
can occur
identification
identification,
An
and reduction
example of
or elimination.
reduction and
it
is
following
in
be
theory
said that:
the
gas
where
statement cited
would
temperature= mean molecularvelocity
Here an identity statementindicatesthat one single phenomenon is being describedby
for
Ockham's
Intertheoretic
razor,
where we previously
two theories.
reduction wields
had two theories seeminglydescribingdifferent phenomena,we find that they are both
describing an identical phenomenon. Ontological unification can also occur via the
is
by
(Technically
this
not strictly a
speaking,
another.
elimination of one theory
)
The
but
does
it
things
the
are
spoken
about.
of
ways
reduce
number
reduction,
from
history
the
of sciencewhere two theories of a single
examplestypically cited come
domain are in competition, an old theory and a new theory. If the old theory is
be
far
to
not worth preserving, no attempt at
wide of the mark as
considered so
despatched
dominant
is
is
in
It
theory
made.
rehabilitating that theory terms of the new
include
for
degenerated
Such
bone
the
theories
researchprogrammes.
to the
much
yard
heat
transfer and the phlogiston theory of combustion.
caloric theory of
4.3.4
EXPLANATORY
REDUCTIONISM
4:6
As we have noted, most philosophers subscribe to some version of ontological
days
the
simplicity, and
positing of "mind stuff" as well as to "physical stuff' have gone.
However, a commitment to ontological unity does not necessarily imply that there will
be a commitment
uncontroversial
to explanatory unity. As a principle,
explanatory
unity seems
levels
be
theories,
enough: all
or
of explanation, should
ultimately
fundamental
is,
in
be
to
theory,
that
reducible
one
everything
principle can
explained
by a single theory. In concrete terms, this is often couched in terms the laws of physics
being sufficient in providing a complete description and explanation of all the processes
observed in nature. For example, Weinberg (1993) describes the currently favoured
reductionist programme as an attempt to connect all laws through the physics of
(Whether
desirable
in
is
is
issue.
There
this
elementary particles.
practice
a separate
may
be pragmatic reasons why you do not wish to explain the meaning of Waiting for Godot
in terms of protons and neutrons. )
The claim that "everything is, in principle, completely describableand explicable
in terms of the physical sciences"is disputed. Warner (1994) points out that what
is
in
itself
qualifies asa physical science
contentious. Purists might only admit physics
depending
it.
However,
those
to
and
other sciences,which are reducible
on the
be
lenient,
their
contingencies of
position, other philosophers can
more
admitting
chemistry and biology, or even social sciencesto the acceptablelist, whether or not, de
facto or deprincipe, they are reducible to physics. However, as we shall seein 4.7 and
5.2.3, there are those who believe that certain disciplines are "special" and have
irreducible
to the physical sciences.
explanatory methods which are autonomous of and
For example,Thomas Nagel (1974)famously questionedwhether a scientific approach,
how
broadly
defined,
or
no matter
narrowly
was capable of generating the type of
theory that could adequately explain the relationship between our experiencesas
instantiation.
(anomalous
Similarly
Davidson
their
subjects
and
conscious
physical
("special
have
Fodor
sciences")
raisedobjectionsto explanatory unification.
monism) and
Noticeably thesemost famousof objectionshavearisenout of the so-called"mind-body"
debate.However callsfor explanatorylaws which are autonomousof the laws of physics
have
Practitioners
to
the
are not restricted
philosophy of mind.
made them acrossall
4:7
disciplinesasdiverseasbiology and sociology. This is not surprising when they are faced
between
formalise
having
to
the relationship
mental events and their physical
with
instantiation, and between society and the individual, between living entities and inert
holding
In
5.2.3
onto ontological reductionism whilst
we will examinewhether
matter.
is
rejecting explanatory reductionism a consistent and tenable position.
4.4
MICROREDUCTION
AND MACROREDUCTION
Before commencing with the discussion of the unity of science hypothesis, it is necessary
far
discussion
has
being
The
further
is
so
type
to
of reduction
written about.
clarify what
concentrated on microreduction.
Reduction can take two forms, micro (local) reduction
discussed
form
(global)
However,
the
of reduction most commonly
reduction.
or macro
in the natural sciences is microreduction.
The microreductionist
is motivated by the
belief that complex behaviours observed in nature can only be analysed and explained
by considering them in terms of their simpler constituent parts. For example, in order
in
in
temperature
to explain changes
gas, a microreductive explanation would refer to
be
It
the
the gas molecules that collectively constitute
concluded that the
gas. would
is
Inversely
temperature.
the
macroreduction
velocity
of
molecules
mean molecular
laws
in
theory
terms of their position within a
and terms of the reduced
explains the
larger theoretical framework and instances of this type of reduction can be commonly,
but not exclusively, found in the social sciences. An example of macroreduction
Durkheim's
is
kill
individual's
the
to
their
theory of suicide, which explains
propensity
but
in
individual
in
terms of the relations
terms of
motives, personal crises, etc.,
self, not
(Durkheim
of society as a whole
1897.) Similarly,
Marx is often described as an
be
he
in
terms
that
could
all social relations
understood
economic reductionist as argued
(Marx
in
In
1867)
this chapter,
the
society.
a particular
of
mode of production prevailing
be
primarily
we will
4.5
DIACHRONIC
addressing questions about microreduction.
AND SYNCHRONIC REDUCTION
4:8
At this stage,it needsto be noted that the microreduction of one theory to another
by
distinct
is
in
It
theories
argued that the microreduction of old
ways.
occurs two
important
in
Nagel
the
theories
an
role
progress
of
science.
refersto this as
newer
plays
by
incorporation.
growth
The phenomenon of a relatively autonomoustheory becoming...reducedto
feature
is
inclusive
theory
an undeniable and recurrent
of
some other more
the history of modern science.(Nagel 1961,336-7)
This process of incorporation
(1961)
by
"homogeneous
Nagel
reduction"
was termed
because it is a reduction carried out within the same field of investigation. The new
theory is said to employ approximately the same terms as the old theory. The example,
fits
is
incorporation
Nagel
this
the
model,
which
claims
falling
laws
Galileo's
of
of
(Nagel
laws
into
Here
Newtonian
1961,339)
of
mechanics.
an older and partial
objects
into
Thus,
is
incorporated
T.
To,
theory,
a newer and more general
explanation,
(Tn + bridge laws) logically entails (To)
Examples of reductions of this kind have been used asevidencefor progressin science
in so far that T,, is said to be more "fertile" than To.. The new theory explains
did,
it
is
Certain
theorists
theory
that
that
the
argue
old
and more.
everything
incumbent on T. to say why T. is subjectto certain boundary conditions which define
the limits of the domain in which T. is successful.Where a newer theory is replacingan
(1973)
has
diachronic.
have
Recently,
Nickles
this
theorists
theory,
called
older
certain
be
diachronic
reductions can truly classedasreductions at all.
questionedwhether most
This issuewill be addressedin section 4.8.2.
However, the type of reduction of particular interest for this argument is that
for
levels
between
different
example the reduction of
of theory,
which take place
chemistry to physics, or psychology to neurophysiology. Nagel called these types of
between
fields
different
"heterogeneous"
takes
place
reduction
as reduction
of
investigation, which have different terminologies.
4:9
Hence, the reduced theory may
does
"temperature"
terms
contain
such as
which
not appear in the reducing theory. The
laws governing the term temperature in classicaldynamics would be subsumed under the
laws of molecular velocity in statistical mechanics. Nagel argued that such reduction
between
disciplines
had
formalised.
been
laws
Hence,
take
that
the
could only
place
of
the reduced theory could be deduced from the reducing theory. (Nagel 1961,345-366)
As the reduction takes place between coexisting levels of explanation, we adopt Nickles
terminology,
4.6
"UNITY
"synchronic. "
OF SCIENCE AS A WORKING
HYPOTHESIS.
"
The classic account of the unity of science is given in Oppenheim and Putnam's 1958
hypothesis.
They
Unity
integration
that
the
of scienceas working
paper
argue
of scientific
knowledge should be an ideal goal of researchers, and note that there is already a trend
branches
knowledge
in
the physical sciences. The formalisation of
towards unifying
of
the relation between reduced and reducing theory, as described by Oppenheim and
Putnam, has been continuously criticised and reformulated, by both their sympathisers
and their opponents.
The Oppenheim and Putnam articulation of the unity of sciencehypothesis has
two components.Firstly, unity of scienceshould incorporate unity of language,that is,
the terms of the reduced theory are identified with the terms of its reducing theory.
Secondly, unity of scienceinvolves the unity of laws whereby the laws of one branch
for
laws
branch.
its
hypothesis
The
the
substituted
are
of reducing
unity of science
rests
base,
is
be
final
the
that
there
theoretical
on
assumption
a single
which would
or
fundamental, to which, directly, or indirectly, all other levels of theory would be
hierarchy
levels.
be
by
It
Each
theory
theoretical
reduced. posits a
would
of
reduced the
hierarchy,
it
in
fundamental
"below"
theory
the
the
until
reducing theory was reached.
The Oppenheim and Putnam formulation of the unity of sciencehypothesis requires
that reductions between theories are cumulative. The relation between theories in the
hierarchy is transitive, so that given three theories, T1, T2 and T3, if T, reducesT2 and
4: 10
T2 reducesT3 then Tl reducesT3.
In order to facilitate unity of sciencevia microreduction there must be several
distinct levels. These should be characterisedby their own terminology, and would be
levels.
levels
hierarchy
The
in
be
"natural"
the
theoretical
regardedas
number of
must
finite (no unity would be possible if the number of reductions were not finite. ) Each
level must be reducible to the level directly beneathit. Each level must be discrete,that
is, it must not share any terms or theoretical entities with its higher or lower level
neighbour. Finally, there must be a single fundamental level to which, directly, or
indirectly (that is, via other micro-reductions), every "higher" level will ultimately be
by
levels
both
To
illustrate
is
between
levels
the
what meant
reducible.
and
relationship
("the nestednessof theories"), Oppenheim and Putnam offer a provisional hierarchy of
different
level,
investigation
the
phenomena under
at each
6
Social groups
5
Multicellular
4
Cells
3
Molecules
2
Atoms
1
Elementary particles
living things
Level 6 would be reduced to level 5, and so on, until the fundamental theory was
reached. The plausibility
of such an oversimplified schema does not detract from the
Oppenheim
Putnam
illustrate.
It is not
trying
to
underlying principle which
and
are
directly
simply a question of
reducing time as experienced to theories of cosmological
be
There
time.
will
many intermediate stages.
The formal Oppenheim-Putnamdefinition of a reduction of one branch of science
to another branch of science,for example,chemistry to physics is asfollows:
Given two branchesof science,B2and B', B2is said to bereducedto B' iff,
(1)
theacceptedtheoriesof B' at a given time t are said to be 7'
4: 11
(2)
theacceptedtheoriesof BZat a given time t are said to be 72
Thengiven 2 theories,7' and 7,7' is said to be reducedto 71iff,
(1)
the vocabulary of 7' contains terms which are not included in the
T`
vocabularyof
(2)
the observationaldata explainableby 7' are explainableby T`
(3)
7' is at leastaswell systematised
7'
as
It can be seen that reduction is primarily a relation between theories, and only by
derivation is reduction a relation between terms in theories.
This formulisation is consistent with the DN (deductive nomological) model of
because
has
been
explanation
when a reduction
successfullycarried out it meets the
following two formal conditions. Firstly, the laws of the reduced theory are logically
deducible from the more basiclaws of the reducing theory, thereby achieving a smooth
be
linked
Secondly,
the
terms
the
theory
reduction.
to the terms of
of
reduced
should
the reducing theories by bridging laws that enable identity statementsto be made. A
frequently cited exampleof a successfulinter-theoretic reduction is the aforementioned
kinetic
the
theory
thermodynamics
to
theory, which produced the
of
of
reduction
identity statement that, in gas,temperature is mean molecular velocity.
Motivating the unity of science hypothesis as described by Oppenheim and
Putnam is the belief that there is a systematic relationship
between all levels of
description. All levels can ultimately be reduced to one fundamental set of laws and
terms; in other words, explanatory unification. However, Oppenheim and Putnam are
directly
for
the
that
not making
more sensational claim
we can or should
explain,
human
being
behaviour
in
the
terms of the sub atomic
example,
of one particular
her.
implying
Nor
that
they
particles
constitute
are
necessarily
that we should stop
favour
in
beliefs
desires
in
interactions
terms
talking about ourselves
talk
of
and
of
about
between quarks and neutrinos. However, as we shall see,the consequences of a unity of
have
for
(See
science approach can
revisionary repercussions
specific theories.
section
4.8.2)
4: 12
It is not absurd to suppose that psychological laws may eventually be
explained in terms of the behaviour of individual neurons in the brain; that
behaviour
the
of individual cells - including neurons - may eventually be
biochemical
behaviour
in
terms of their
explained
constitution; and that the
living
including
that
the macro-molecules
of molecules make up
cells - may
be eventually explained in terms of atomic physics. If this is achieved, then
laws
have,
been
laws
in
to
the
of atomic
principle,
psychological
will
reduced
be
hopelessly
it
impractical
to try to
physics, although
would nevertheless
derive the behaviour of a single human being directly from his constitution
in terms of elementary particles. (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958,7)
The goal of the unity of science remains very much a working hypothesis, and still
desideratum
(Frosch
1997)
However,
as
a
of
scientific
upholds
research.
publication
of Oppenheim
microreductive
Putnam's
manifesto, unity
and
since the
based
science
on a
of
has
been
have
We
strategy
subjected to much criticism and revision.
already quoted Nozick's moral objection to reductionism. However, the most candid
debate,
his
in
in
in
"neo-dualists"
Fodor
1974
the
the
critics are
mind-body
particular,
(or.,
disunity
hypothesis).
Special
In particular Fodor
the
sciences
of scienceasa working
paper
is attacking type-type identity theories.
4.7
TYPE-TYPE IDENTITY THEORY
The first point of reference for a description of type-type identity theory is usually
J. C. C. Smart's 1967 paper, "Sensations and Brain Processes." Similar positions were also
(1957)
by
(1960).
T.
be
U.
Place
H..
Feigl
Smart
that
there
and
argued
advocated
could
between
identity
types of brain and central nervous system activity, and
strict
relations
feelings.
Discussing type-type identity theory, he wrote,
types of sensations or
4: 13
All it claims is that insofar as a sensation statement is something, that
(Smart
fact
brain
is
in
1967,163)
process.
a
something
These sensations and brain processesare strictly identical in the same way that lightning
is an electrical discharge. Type-type identity theory does not require that properties of
(Sinn)
(psychological)
have
P
S
type
the
as
properties
of
type
same sense or meaning
(neurophysiological), though they have the same reference (Bedeutung.) For example,
(1)
Kim knows that exposing food to heat will make it warm.
(2)
Kim doesnot know that increasing food's mean molecular velocity will
make it warm.
However, this doesnot allow us to conclude that,
(3)
Heat * mean molecular velocity
The fact that the truth-value of a propositional attitude is determined by information
issue.
by
information,
In
the
the
that
the
clouds
subject, and not
veracity of
possessed
has
that
the
the example above we can see
substitution of co-referring values
given rise
fallacy
fallacy.
intensional
intensional
Smart
thus,
the
to the
expresses
[W]e can easily jump from 'we are not aware of X being Y' to 'we are aware
(Smart
being
'
Y.
X
1994,19)
of
not
Smart's position has some supporters. Lewis (1966) argues psychological ascriptions have
the same reference as brain ascriptions, but they need not have the same sense;what is
brain
is
Rorty
true
true of
of mental states.
states not necessarily
(1965) makes a similar
claim, neurological statements need not entail the same content as phenomenological
(1971)
Likewise,
Putnam
thing.
points
report statements, nor need they expressthe same
be,
identity
A
statement would
property
out that concepts are not properties.
4: 14
Temperature is the sameasmean molecular energy.
However, we are not able to say,
The concept of temperatureis the sameasthe concept of mean molecular energy.
Smart's theories opened the way for the eliminitivist
guarantee the translatability
of propositions
he
He
argued
could not
position.
P,
into
S
type
of type
propositions of
because the integrity of P-type propositions could not be guaranteed. Finally, P-types
do not have a causal relation with S-types. They are not two distinct events. For
food
fallacious
it
is
increase
in
to
the
to say the
example,
molecular mean velocity causes
heat up, becausemolecular mean velocity is nothing but heat. Heat is not something over
brain
Smart's
In
types
terms
theory
that
of
and above.
of unity of science,
suggested
identifiable
Hence,
types
with
of sensation.
processes were
we might say,
C fibre stimulation = having the sensationof pain
The work of Smart, Place and Feigl was innovative in its claims, but was restricted by
data
knowledge
brain.
Their
the
work exemplifies
availability of experimental
and
of
the enthusiasm of their era, when cognitive science, neurophysiology
intelligence
and the artificial
development.
in
the early stages of
research programmes were still
Nevertheless, their work establishes a philosophical
for
countering antiprecedent
reductionist arguments with empirical examples. In essence,their programme tries to
be
in
that
terms of neurophysiology.
show
explained
psychological states can
4.8
ARGUMENTS
AGAINST
UNITY
OF SCIENCE
4:15
The most enduring arguments against the unity of science hypothesis arise out of the
for
has
been
documented.
(See
debate
debate.
The
well
mind-body
mind-body problem
)
for
Szubka
Warner
1994
the
eds.,
main arguments.
example
and
4.8.1
MULTIPLE
REALISABILITY
Fodor famously voiced his objection to the unity of science hypothesis and attacked
his
identity
in
1974 paper, SpecialSciences:Disunity of scienceas working
type-type
theory
hypothesis.His argument can be summarised thus: if all sciences are to be successfully
for
kind
is
the
there
to
then
some
physics,
any natural
of
reduced science,
reduced
physical natural kind which is coextensive with the reduced natural kind. Fodor does not
because
he
is
is
The
think that this
realisability.
example
makes
possible
of multiple
from
taken
the "special" science of economics. He cites "monetary
exchange" as a
be
kind
has
kind
in
it
economics that
no physical natural
with which
can
natural
Formally,
coextensive.
S,x
P,x V P2x V Pax V.......... V Pnx
Where S is a token in the special sciences,and P are physical tokens. Multiple realisation
is, for example, where two or more tokens of cognitive type are respectively identical,
functional
have
is
the same
the cognitive tokens
that
state. Each cognitive type is
identical with some physical type, however the tokens of the physical type are not
identical. So, for the example of "monetary
is
no single physical
exchange", there
instantiation of exchange value. Exchange value can be physically instantiated in many
forms: in gold, in plastic, in paper, in beads, in salt. Fodor's criticism is an expansion of
Putnam's argument in "The Nature of Mental States" (1967) Putnam's argument was
directed against Smart, Place and Feigl. This influential
instrumental
paper was
in
brief,
for
his
decrease
identity
in
interest
In
type-type
theory.
argument was
causing a
by
kinds.
kinds
And,
that cognitive
extension,
are not coextensional with physical
4:16
cognitive generalisations are not reducible to physical generalisations, meaning there can
be no explanatory unification. In an oft-cited passage,Putnam wrote,
Consider what a brain-statetheorist has to do to make good his claims. He
has to specify a physical-chemicalstate such that any organism (not just a
(a)
is
in
if
brain
if
it
mammal)
pain and only
possesses
of a suitablephysicala
brain
(b)
its
is in that physical-chemical state. This
chemical structure: and
be
in
the
that
means
physical-chemicalstate question must a possiblestateof
brain,
brain,
brain
(octopuses
a mammalian
a reptilian
a mollusc's
are
feel
be
it
At
the
time,
mollusca, and certainly
same
pain), etc.
must not
a
(physically
brain
the
possible)
possible
state of
of any physically possible
feel
be
found,
if
be
it
Even
that
creature
can not
such a statecan
pain.
must
nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any
found
life
be
be
feeling
that
that
extraterritorial
may
will
capable of
pain
before we can even ascertainthe supposition that it may be pain. (Putnam,
1967,56)
4.8.2
RESPONSES TO THE MULTIPLE REALISABILITY OBJECTION
The upshot of both Putnam and Fodor's argumentsis that the "specialsciences"can not
be reduced to the physical sciences, as there can be no universally quantified
biconditional connectability betweenthe two. However, Causey(1977)is not convinced
by the Fodor's disunity of sciencehypothesis. Causey makes two objections. Firstly,
Fodor's argument relies on the inability to establish bridge laws (in terms of identity
between
biconditionals)
between
the natural kinds
statements
universally quantifiable
kinds
the
the
of
specialand
natural
of the physical sciences.However, Fodor offers no
be
kind
in
examples of what might
a natural
psychology. Furthermore, Fodor
believes
individuate
in
that
apparently
we will always
psychologicalstates a way which
will not correspond with physical states. Apparently, he does not subscribe to the
coevolutionary view of theory progression. Given that psychology is a relatively new
far
from
maturity,
science,
4:17
it seems a little too early for Fodor to claim that the
if
is
in
Slx
Secondly,
use will never change.
psychological predicates that are currently
in
is
in
P2x
Plx
another case,why
one case,and coextensional with
coextensional with
kind?
for
be
in
Why,
Slx
the caseof monetary
to
example,
should we consider
a natural
(S3x)
(Slx),
(S2x),
differentiate
between
gold
plastic
and paper
exchange should we not
instantiations at the special science levels. Causey subscribes to the revisionist theory of
difficulties
by
believes
He
that
the
the multiple realisability objection
raised
reduction.
detail,
rather
suggest that we should modify the special sciences to take account of such
hypothesis.
He argues that, compared with the natural
than reject the unity of science
likely
Their
theories
are more
sciences, the special sciences are relatively undeveloped.
be
fault.
to
at
In the caseof monetary exchange,Causeypoints out that exchangevalue can be
defined,
is
However,
in
the role of money culturally
expressed virtually any medium.
in
in
As
is,
the
such,
manner which
that
a certain social context.
plays a certain role
believes
is
instantiated
Causey
Fodor's
is
that
argument
unimportant.
money multiply
is unreasonableand misleading, in sofarasit focuseson this. The important factor to
focus on is the economic laws governing money, and not the many different forms
be
between
is
It
primarily a relation
recalled that the reduction
money takes. will
have
laws,
individual
Reduction,
terms within theories.
theories and their
aswe
and not
laws
derivatively
between
between
is
the
of theory, and only
argued, primarily a relation
the terms of the theory.
Further criticism of Fodor's multiple realisation objection comes from Putnam.
Putnam does not agree that the multiple realisability argument enables one to adopt a
(1993)
develops
Putnam's
Kim
argument, proposing
general anti-reductionist position.
laws
laws.
biconditional
he
"
Such
"species-specific
state that, given a certain
what
calls
described
being
be
in
iff
is
it
it
a certain mental state
as
species, organism or system, can
in a certain physical state. Formally,
Si-;
(M=Pi)
4:18
both
is
Si,
Pi,
which, relative to species or system,
specifies a physical state,
which
for
the occurrence of mental state, M. Kim argues,
necessary and sufficient
Multiple
realisation
connectibility.
is consistent
with
the
species-specific strong
(Kim, 1993,274)
Kim's position enableslocal reductionsof mental states,but not global reductions.(Only
have
)
independent
species
would enableus to
global reduction.
Multiple realisability of the mental has no anti-reductionist implications of
least
it
is consistent with, the
great significance; on the contrary,
entails, or at
local reducibility
local
of psychology,
relative to species, or physical
(Kim
1993,275)
types.
structure
Local reduction is the normal casein the sciences.The Churchlands (1990) use an
adaptation of this argument to circumvent the multiple realisability problem. They
be
if
be
that
there
there
concede
can not
global reductions of psychological events,
can
diversity
instantiations.
from
history
However,
the
a
of physical
citing examples
of
follow,
does
irreducibility
science,they argue
not
Temperature, we claimed earlier, is identical with mean molecular kinetic
for
is
But,
true
this
energy.
strictly speaking,
only
a gas,where the molecules
fashion.
free
ballistic
in
In a solid, where particles oscillate
to move
are
a
back and forth, their energy is constantly switching between a kinetic and
high-temperature
In
a potential mode. a
plasma,there are no moleculesat all
to consider, since everything has been ripped into sub-atomic parts. Here
temperature is a complex mix of various energies.And in a vacuum, where
there is no massat all, temperature consistsin the wave-length distribution
black-body curve of EM wavespassingthrough it.
the
-
4: 19
What these examples show us is that reductions can be domain
interact,
(They
"temperature,
"
they
and they all
since
all count as
specific.....
disequilibrium.
)
laws
None
the
of this moves
same
of
equilibrium
and
obey
is
irreducible
thermodynamics
an autonomous,
us to say that classical
from
forever
the ambitions of the underlying microphysical
safe
science,
(P.
P.
S.
Churchland
1990,52-3)
M.
and
story.
Fodor's multiple realisation objection may be damning for the original formulation of
have
however
just
identity
type-type
theory,
shown this only provides an
as we
does
local
for
Fodor's
Furthermore,
cover
reduction.
not
objection
global reduction and
kinds
in
the specialsciencesare not reducible
that
the
natural
claim
argument rests on
does
kinds
in
However
the
to natural
the reducing theory.
reductionist position
not of
itself rely on a theory of natural kinds. Fodor's formulation of his argument in terms of
for
his
kinds
For,
is
opponents.
given two theories, one
ammunition
offers
natural
formulised,
highly
highly
contentious and
and a second
relatively successful and
from
its
If
theories
territory.
on
explanatory
new
encroaching
under
attack
currently
former,
fails
latter
to
two
theories
to
the
then, the
reduce
where are we more
of these
likely to believe the fault lies?This scenariois, of course,analogouswith the arguments
folk
failure
Not
Churchlands,
to
to
psychology.
who cite
reduceasa reason reject
of the
least,
but
down
that there
the
such a scenariosuggests,at
eliminative path,
everyonegoes
is a casefor revising the taxonomies and theories of the specialsciencesbefore rejecting
have
is,
in
implement
That
the unity of science,we might
to
order to
unity of science.
in
different
than
those
we
currently use, order to
employ
psychological predicates
identify the physical and behavioural sciences(Causey 1977.)
4.8.3
DUPRE'S
THE DISORDER
OF THINGS
Other criticisms of the unity of sciencehypothesisfall foul of the sameproblems. Dupre
in his book the Disorder of Things:MetaphysicalFoundationsof the Disunity of Science
(1993)also brandsthose who subscribeto the unity of sciencehypothesis asessentialists,
4:20
hung up on identifying natural kinds. "It is still widely believed that science is the search
for fundamental kinds defined by real essences.
" (Dupre 1993,60) By Dupre perhaps! In
the book The Disorder of Things, he illustrates his argument with some fascinating
from
biology,
is
that
there
examples
showing
a multiplicity
living
of ways to classify
he
be
he
his
Whilst
true,
organisms.
much of what
says may
can not use
evidence to
hypothesis
hypothesis
if
does
the
the
argue against
unity of science
unity of science
not
fall
kinds.
have
Oppenheim
Putnam
the
succeed or
existence of natural
and
upon
might
levels
description
had
be
(1977,135"natural.
"
However
Causey
that
the
to
stipulated
of
7) pointed out the obvious, namely that modern science is not organised in terms of such
levels.
domains
Science
presents
a
complex
of
and theories, with very
clear-cut
array
many genera of structures. There are no "natural"
However,
the complexity
insurmountable difficulty
of the real world
levels, only theoretical ones.
does not present de principe an
for the unity of science programme. (Seefigure 4.1)
Dupre's objection to the unity of sciencehypothesis falls prey to some of the
have
discussed.
he
for
For
that
we
misunderstandings
already
example,
argues
a
but
his
the
pluralistic ontology of
sciences,
objection to the unity of scienceproject
be
by
ideological
in
That
Nagel
4.3.1.
to
to
that
seems
guided an
motivation, similar
of
is, he interprets those who arguefor the ontological priority of elementary particles as
judgement
making a value
about the superiority of physics, when comparedwith other
levels of explanation. It is true that some physicists speak asif physics were a superior
discipline, however ontological priority doesnot involve any judgement about a certain
level of descriptions value. It means only that, for the time being, element particle
lowest
fundamental
level
is
theory and therefore the most
theory available.
physics the
He also seemsto be confused about the nature of the relationship between the
levels.Dupre arguesthat there are many different causalentities at many different levels
description.
lower
levels
Hence,
of
eventsmay be determined by what is happening at
higher
level.
desire
drink
beer
For
to
a
example,our
might causeus to walk to the pub.
He arguesthat there is a complex interdependency of entities at many different levels
implausibility
but
He
that
of reductionism.
shows
argues
reductionism might explain,
behaviour
This,
be
in
can not predict the
complex
of
systems.
general, can only
4:21
higher
in
terms
the
explained
of an autonomous understanding of
phenomenon at a
level. Firstly, as we stated in 4.7, the relation between the reducing theory and the
in
Churchland
is
P.
M.
this
points
out
an amusing
reduced theory
not a causal one.
is
in
The
Rediscovery of the Mind.
He
Searle's
example.
responding a similar point
Searle's robust persistence in thinking
of mental states as ontologically
distinct from, yet causally produced by, brain states reminds me of a
in
a comparable
comparable persistence
domain.
It
in
the
appears
Introduction to Betty Crocker'sMicrowave Cooking [.... ] Before turning to the
brief
how
explanation of
such new-fangled
recipes, the authors attempt a
devices manage to produce heat in the foodstuffs we put inside them. 'The
magnetron tube converts regular electricity into microwaves... When the
[microwaves] encounter any matter containing moisture - specifically food
into
it....
The
microwaves agitate and vibrate the
- they are absorbed
friction
friction,
in
is
that
turn,
the
created;
moisture at such a great rate
food
heat
heat
'
to
the
the
cook.
and
causes
creates
The decisive failure of comprehension begins to appear halfway
last
induced
Instead
that
the
through the
of asserting
motion of the
sentence.
heat,
and gracefully ending their
moisture molecules already constitutes
heat
benightedly
discuss
if
it
the
to
continue
as
explanation there,
authors
distinct
(P.
M. Churchland 1994,14)
property.
were an ontologically
Dupre's objections to reductionism can be sometimesbewildering. He claims that,
It is surely imaginable,for instance,that people with identical physical states,
including states of the brain, might be thinking different things. (Dupre
1993,166)
I can not suggest any neurologically plausible scenario where this could be the case. Even
the staunchest of anti-reductionists subscribe to the primacy of the physical; that is,
physical identity entails mental identity.
4:22
4.9
ORTHODOXY
CHALLENGED
However, the unity of science project, basedupon type-type identity is flawed, suffering
from the same problems that inhabit the logical positivist account of reduction. The shift
from
logical positivist philosophy of science is well documented. Scriven (1962)
away
(1970)
Harre
DN
At
the
the same time, the
and
attacked
model of explanation.
independence of theory and supporting evidence was problematised. The so-called
Quine-Duhem
thesis championed epistemological holism, claiming that observation
deeply
implicated in the empirical theories they were meant to prove.
statements were
It was argued that there on no basic observation statements upon which to ultimately
(Quine
falsificationist
1953)
Lakatos
Popper's
ground a theory.
attacked
scientific progress arguing that one contradictory
research programme.
account of
falsify
observation can not
an entire
(Lakatos 1978,22)
Observation of supporting evidence was no longer regarded as a sufficient
for
be
it
In
theory.
to
a
condition
accepting
order
accepted was arguedthat a theory also
from
There
theories.
neededcorroboration
other surrounding accepted
was a shift away
from proof and refutation to strategiesof bootstrapping and coevolution. (Seesection
3.9)
4.9.1
FROM GROWTH BY INCORPORATION
TO SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
Similar shifts were taking placewith regardsto reduction and the unity of science.The
by
incorporation" was challenged. Kuhn's influential text The
"growth
model of
Structureof ScientificRevolutions,first published in 1962,attackedthe orthodox account
(Similar
had
been
in
of progress
science.
criticisms
made previously by French
for
(1934
however
Bachelard
1953),
their work was
philosophersof science, example
and
by
)
the
apparently unread
anglophone philosophical community. Kuhn's concern was
diachronic
is,
that
the replacementof an old theory with
predominantly with
reduction,
is
in
He
that
the straightforward way
theory.
argued
science not cumulative
a new
logical
the
empiricist programme. Rather than smooth, or
originally conceivedwithin
4:23
slightly bumpy, reductions of old theories to new theories, Kuhn argued that the change
that took place was of a revolutionary
nature. Furthermore,
he claimed that these
in
for
less
than scientific
changes
scientific research programmes were often made
reasons. Emphasising the cultural and sociological background in which scientific places
took place, Kuhn claimed that what occurred was the revolutionary
"paradigm" by another. There was no smooth incorporation
overthrow of one
knowledge.
Rather
of old
discontinuous.
(A similar argument is made by Toulmin 1961)
the process of change was
The ramifications of such theories have consequences that extend to synchronic as well
diachronic
as
reduction.
We have already stated the classicalformula for reduction basedupon the DN
(Nagel
1961,339) that,
model of explanation
(F. + bridge laws) logically entails (To)
When T. replacesTo, Nagel's formula establishesa set of identity relations whereby
terms in the old theory are said to be synonymous with some of the terms in the new
theory. Furthermore, rememberingOppenheim and Putnam'sstipulation that reduction
between
between
theories, and not merely
terms in theories, the key set of
takes place
be
T.
should
mapped onto sentenceswhich are consistent with, and
principles of
consequentialto the overall theoriesof T. Hence, in principle, T. can be saidto replace
To, although, in fact, there may be pragmatic reasonsfor still using the terms of the old
theory. If T. can explain all the phenomenaexplainedby T. aswell asor better than To,
is
in
its
formal
and also more powerful
overall explanatory scope,then, given that the
have
been
have
is
taken place.
also
met, a smooth reduction said to
conditions
4.9.2
FROM
DIACHRONIC
REDUCTION
TO ELIMINATION
However, whether such smooth reductions ever take placeis a contentious. Feyerabend
(1962) and later Hooker (1981) have, argued that there is not a single example in the
history of science of a diachronic reduction that conforms to the growth by
4:24
incorporation
(1979)
(1981)
have
Churchland
Hooker
model.
and
proposed what they
believe is a more realist account of what occurs when an old theory is "reduced" by a
new theory.
They claim that intertheoretic reductions are rarely smooth, and do not
laws
identity
bridge
between the two theories.
readily the tender
statements that provide
Frequently the older, reduced theory is found to be incorrect to some degree. Thus to
implement a reduction, some reconstruction and correction needs to take place before
it can be deduced from the reducing theory. (For an interesting discussion of historical
is
Churchland
Hooker
In
1979,80-86
1981)
takes
casessee
such cases,what
place not
and
deduction
but
To,
strictly a
of
of an analogue reconstruction of the older theory. In this
T
the
case
analogue,
is expressedin terms of Tn, and is isomorphic with the old theory.
Formally speaking, what takes place here is not a reduction at all as Tn only explains T,.
When the old theory requires substantial reconstruction and correction to bring it into
line with the reducing theory, this brings into question the identity between the two
have
bridge
laws
identity
longer
theories as the
relations which would
provided
are no
in tact.
In certain cases,there may be good and pragmatic reasonsfor trying to rehabilitate
the terms of an older theory into the new. For example,Feyerabend(1962)discusses
the
Theory
CM,
Special
to
the
the
exampleof
of Relativity,
reduction of classicalmechanics,
STR. Though this is not a smooth reduction, by reconstructing an analogue of CM
demonstrate
is
STR,
to
the
terms
within
of
one able
why STR can supersedeCM, and
limits.
for
CM
However,
also show why
worked within certain
example, there is no
theoretical utility in striving to accommodatechyle and morph within a theory of blood
demons
day
into
illness.
As we
theory
corpuscles,nor malevolent
a modern
of mental
false
in
in
is
inadequate
4.3.4
these
the
theory
that one
caseswhere
old
so
or
noted
between
justify
it
to
try
any attempt
and establisha correlation
cannot
and a reducing
theory. In such caseswhere the old theory is so totally off-course that we would do far
better just to eliminate it, than try to reducean implausible ontology. (Feyerabend1963)
4.9.3
SUPER-EMPIRICAL
VIRTUES
4:25
The grounds for discarding one theory in favour of another are not yet formalised, and
be
is
However,
priori
to
the
a
so.
without recourse
arguments,
empiricist
may never
forced
from
bad.
that
theories
to
time
the
the
will
sift
out
say
only
good
ultimately
(Lakatos gives several examples of research programmes that have been discarded, to be
later,
for
light.
)
in
Nevertheless,
the
theory
the absence
resurrected
example
particle
of
formal
have
been
"super
of
guidelines several
empirical virtues"
proposed: augmented
explanatory power, corroboration,
fecundity, intertheoretic
endorsement, integrity,
for
All
of these criteria offer rational support
accepting one
coherence, and simplicity.
data.
favour
briefly,
in
in
Very
I will
the
theory
absence of empirical
of another,
summarise these criteria.
Augmentedexplanatorypower - T. should have more explanatory power than To.
It should be able to explain asmuch asthe old theory and/or increasethe domain over
be
(e.
Theory
Special
the
which successfulpredictions can
made g.
relation of
of
Relativity to classicalmechanics.)
Corroboration ensures the continuing successof the theory, that is, by observations
be
fecund
its
is
if
it
A
is
to
confirming
predictions.
research programme
successful
said
in generating new research programmes, that is, suggesting possible areas of future
further.
develop
it
research to complete the theory, or to
A theory gains intertheoretic endorsementwhen there is actual or potential
disciplines.
This argument has been
compatibility with the theories of other scientific
inverted in the caseagainstfolk psychology. The Churchlands and Stich have argued
because
folk
knowledge
is
that
then it should
psychology not compatible with current
be rejected asa viable theory.
The integrity of a theory is reflected in the manner in which its shortcomings are
failings
its
domain,
If
then this
manifested.
are systematic,perhapsranging over a specific
distinct
done.
identify
if
However,
to
the theory, in
can
a
areawhere more work needs
hoc
modifications, "sellotaping " it
order to remain plausible, requires a myriad of ad
together, asit were, this would suggestthe theory was in crisis (asKuhn might put it. )
Coherencedependson the internal consistencyof a theory, namely that it should
not make contradictory claims.
4:26
Simplicity, as Putnam (1992) notes, has been an infamously elusive concept to
define. However a highly informal formulation might be: given two competing theories
if
it
is
which are equally successful,
easierto make predictions of equal successwith one
theory, rather than another, usethe simpler method.
In addition to thesesuper-empiricalcriteria, there are of courseother lessrational
for
likelihood
instead
reasons adopting one researchprogramme
of another, such as
of
funding,
belief,
fashion
theoretical
receiving
peer pressure,political climate, religious
and
(SeeKuhn 1970).
4.9.4 SUMMARY
We have been illustrating
from
logical
DN
the
the shift away
positivist
model of
further
(1971).
by
A
Salmon
He
modification
was
suggested
argued that not
explanation.
(Indeed
laws
law
)
is.
are universal generalisations.
maybe no scientific
all scientific
Salmon therefore suggestedthat the DN model should be modified to include covering
laws that are statistical and probabilistic. This may pose a problem for those who favour
its
DN
the
the neatness and completeness of
model, with
symmetry of explanation and
is,
in
However,
DN
the
model
reality, nothing more than a theoretical
prediction.
desideratum, applying
formalised
to
theories. Unfortunately,
only
complete and
be
if
de
facto
there
theories
are seldom,
ever, complete, and
scientific
may
strong
for
be
they
so.
arguments
why
never will
4.10
RENEWED INTEREST IN THE UNITY OF SCIENCE
We stated earlier that the unity of sciencehypothesis was first popularised during a
discovery
innovation,
the
when
steady onslaught of scientific
period of great
seemed
for
high
hopes
foundered
However
this
the
completability of science
period of
relentless.
latest
discoveries:
for
its
when presented with the consequencesof
example, the
superpositions of quantum physics, and the awarenessof complexity and sensitive
dependenceupon initial conditions. Similarly, difficulties arising within the theory of
4:27
has
led
be
thinkers
to
that
there
elementary particle physics
current
suggest
might
a
basic
beyond
However,
the recent popularisation
electrons.
more
ontology,
quarks and
has
led
interest
in
theories
to
of complexity, chaos and self-organisation
a resurgence of
hypothesis
(Prigogine 1980, Davies 1988). Theories of self-organising
the unity of science
developed
in the 1960's. Although their impact
systems and complexity were extensively
has
been
last
in
ten years, with the work of
the
on public consciousness
only
made
Gleich, Prigogine and Stengers, Kaufmann, Waldrup and Stewart. Philosophically the
dissipative
had
Prigogine
on
work of
systems
an extensive influence on philosopher
Gilles Deleuze; see for example his Di
(1968)
du
Logigue
and
sens
rence et repetition
(1969). Until very recently, the unavailabilty
in
Deleuze's
English and the
of
work
have
his
Anglo-American
the
to
things
that
resistance of
academy
continental
meant
all
have
largely
UK,
In
the
this
the
attention was
works
remained
channel.
unread
side of
drawn to the importance of these "new sciences" for philosophy by Popper, who saw
that Prigogine's work might offer hope to the beleaguered reductionist programme in
science. He wrote that,
Prigogine's work may be looked upon as a piece of exciting physicalist
least
first
in
it
the sensethat takes the
reduction, at
steps towards the a
higher
(Popper
1982,
structures...
physical understandingof the evolution of
174)
Prigogine (1971,12) appears to support the reductionist programme when he writes:
"The concept of stability really reconciles the unity of laws with the existence of well
defined levels of description. " Prigogine's theories offer the possibility of bridging the
do
living
between
inert
But
not agree with the thesis that
matter and
others
gap
entities.
lend
dissipative
theories of
support to the reductionist
systems and self-organisation
holistic
Davies
"synthetic
Paul
that
the
programme.
writes
rather
new sciences are
and
than analytic and reductionist. " (Davies 1988,2) Gleick agrees with Davies,
Chaos is anti-reductionist. This new sciencemakesa strong claim about the
4:28
world: namely, that when it comes to the most interesting questions,
disorder,
decay
formation
and creativity, pattern
questionsabout order and
be
life
itself,
in
the
and
whole can not
explained terms of the parts.
There are fundamental laws about complex systems, but they are
laws.
laws
kinds
They
new
of
are
of structure and organisation and scale,and
they simply vanish when you focus on the individual
constituents of a
lynch
just
the
complex system as
psychology of a
mob vanishes when you
interview the individual participants. (Gleick paraphrased in Weinberg 1993,
48)
He, and also Penrose (1989), argue that there remains to be discovered a new and radical
form of science which has principles which are over and above those of physics, and
(1991,247)
irreducible.
However,
Stöckler
as
which are ultimately
points out, many of
his
"irreducible
Davies
to
the examples of
phenomena" which
point come
uses make
from
the (lunatic) fringes of scientific activity,
for example, Sheldrake's highly
One
theory
suspects that Davies's reluctance to
contentious
of morphic resonance.
finds
by
his
beliefs.
is
One
a
spiritual
accept a reductionist weltanschauung motivated
(1995),
book
its
in
Stuart
Kaufmann
title
the
work of
manifests
whose
similar attitude
home
book
The
in
At
the
universe.
spiritual motivation:
concludes with a section entitled
"Reinventing the Sacred." It is as if certain scientist are no longer content to conquer
hell-bent
laying
is
It
the earth with their theories, and are
the
a claim on
celestial.
on
as
though they are uncomfortable with the truths about the world that science is producing
for them, and are seeking consolation. For Weinberg describes the reductionist position
like
but
because
because
impersonal...
it,
is
"chilling
that
the way the world
as
and
not
we
have
(1993,41)
"
Nevertheless,
already said, pessimism and reductionism
as we
works.
for
hand
hand.
(See
in
Other
4.3.1)
reasons
resisting reductionist theories
need not go
do
funding.
be
Weinberg
the
to
of
more
with
politics
obtaining
can
claims that certain
fundamental
dispute
is
that elementary particle physics more
than their
physicists would
funding
bodies
it
that
particular area of physics, as might mean
would judge elementary
be
funding
diversion
important.
This
to
the
more
might mean
of
particle physics
away
4:29
from their research programmes. Perhaps, in the case of Penrose, there is a certain
be
be
had
in
"New
Physics",
to
that
there
to
a
needs
rather than
mileage
claiming
unglamourously
labouring
(The
away with the old one.
cultural
context of the
popularisation of these scientific theories is not without relevance. It takes place against
late
)
background
in
New
Age
the
mysticism
a
eighties and early nineties.
of
Nevertheless implicit in many anti-reductionist positions, is the belief that
traditional reductionist theory that attempts to explain entities by reducing their
behaviour to somemore fundamental form of behaviour is inadequate.That is, the laws
in
of physics, elementary particle physics particular, are only adequateto explain the
behaviour
interactions,
of complex
and can not comprehend the
most simple of
links
how
is
here
it
Prigogine
And
that the work of
and others can suggest
structures.
be
does
for
laws
Nor
He
to
such
of
nature
explain
phenomena.
not call
new
can made.
doeshe seethe need any new principles or assumptions.
4.11
DE FACTO LIMITATIONS OF REDUCTION
It is notable that Oppenheim and Putnam titled their paper, Unity of scienceas working
hypothesis,suggesting that the goal of unity of science should guide research, rather than
being the end of research. They probably realised that there may be real and practical
limits on reductive explanation. Rose, in a recent article, explains some of those
limitations.
The world is a complicated place, full of multiple simultaneous events,
design
Science
needsto simplify, to
processes,causesand effects.
experiments
in which nature is caged,parametersheld constant and variableschangedone
for
hold
instance,
In
the
one might
at a time.
studying an enzyme reaction
derive
the
temperature
acidity of the solution constant and change
- and
describing
But if acidity and temperature
the consequences.
simple equations
happen
in
life,
indeed
"real
" the equations
changesimultaneously, as may
lose
(Rose
1997,16)
to
our ability
will not work and we
predict.
4:30
Rose touches upon an important issue. Under ideal experimental conditions, it is
is
isolate
individual
It
to
possible to observethem, measurethem
an
possible
variable.
behaviour
life"
in
"real
However,
paribus.
their
and make predictions about
ceteris
be
known
interacting,
it
there
and
situations, where
may
many
unknown variables
becomesimpossible to predict with complete accuracywhat will occur. This especially
becomesthe casewhen one is dealingwith processesthat involve very large numbers of
for
fundamental
knowledge
level,
if
it
Even
the
molecules.
complete
were available
facto
be
de
discuss
impractical
Prigogine
Glansdorff
to compute a prediction.
would
and
the relation between the fundamental level of description, and its relation to the types
biology.
in
They
of systemsstudied chemistry and
write,
Even if we could conceive computers big enough to study the molecular
dynamics of say 1023molecules in a macroscopic system, the knowledge of
their position and their velocities would be of little interest as we would
be
involving
to
never
able
repeat an experiment
the same initial state.
(Glansdorff and Prigogine 1971, xi)
It is simply not practical to describethe behaviour of thermodynamic systemsin terms
in
it
is
the
their
that
constituent
same
sometimesnot appropriate to
of
molecules,
way
human
behaviour
language
in
laws
Rather,
the
of
neurophysiology.
new
explain
are
behaviour
based
level.
at
on generalised
a particular
constructed
For instance, to predict the temperature evolution of some piece of metal it
is sufficient to solve the Fourier equation with approximate initial and
boundary conditions. The temperature at every point is an average taken
between
large
The
the predictions
agreement
over a
number of molecules.
detailed
Fourier
that
the
of
a more
equations and experiment shows
study
of the evolution
in terms of mechanical quantities
(Glansdorff and Prigogine 1971, xi)
is not required.
4:31
However, these laws are not fundamental laws, in the same way that the laws of a
final
be.
do
They
behaviour
theory
complete and
would
not explain the
of the processes
they cover, but they do have predictive efficacy. The existence of these laws does not in
any way challenge ontological unity or explanatory unity
in
as,
principle,
full
a
fundamental
in
terms
theory is available. Rather, in most cases,it is
explanation
of a
impractical and unnecessary to do so. Analysis using only fundamental laws can be
in
impossible.
These
laws
some causespractically
unwieldy, and
new non-fundamental
be
described
laws,
from
"p,
"
phenomenological
could
as
with a small
which are abstracted
the observed behaviour of the system. Putnam expressesit thus,
Complex systemsrequire a simplified characterisation which nevertheless
features
(Putnam
1975,296)
the
the
saves essential
system.
of
The positing of these non-fundamental laws has causedproblems for the reductionist,
level
higher
laws
level
description.
the
to
that
as
are approximations apposite
of
Nevertheless,once they are recognisedasapproximations or abstractions,much of the
difficulty falls away. As they are not true descriptions, but approximate descriptions,
there can be no precise bridge laws and boundary conditions to connect them to the
fundamental level. This differentiation between types of explanation adds further
inter-theoretic
be
There
to
the
complication
orthodox model of
reduction.
will
no neat
formal relations between the different levels. Nevertheless, this is in no way a
contradiction of the overall unity of science hypothesis. However, there are real
limitations to reduction, to the point that there may not be defacto reductions at all.
At the sametime, no new fundamental laws need to be posited.
Hence, the pragmaticvalue of, for instance,the thermodynamical level of description
is that it provides a theory that is able to explain the behaviour of the system. The
theory evenhasits own set of laws, albeit statisticaland non-fundamental.Which means,
for pragmatic reasons,we may have to adopt new methods to analysethese types of
system, but this does not mean that we are positing any new ontological entities or
4:32
fundamental laws, which are deprincipe irreducible.
4.12
PROVISIONAL ONTOLOGY
There is still dispute asto what is the fundamental level of explanation. Oppenheim and
Putnam suggestedit might be elementary particle physics. This may be the case,but
in
nonethelessthe theories and theoretical entities posited these researchprogrammes
The
The
to
theories are
the
theories
content of
continues change.
are still contended.
incomplete, and not yet fully matured. At the sametime, theories at "higher levels" are
In
the caseof complexity and self-organisation,thesetheories are still
also provisional.
in the early stagesof their formulation, and are much lessdevelopedand formalisedthan
both
have
interim
Given
the
nature of
researchprogrammes,we
not yet reached
physics.
formulate
bridge
limiting
laws
to
precise
a stage where we are able
and
conditions
betweenthe two. However, our current lack of information doesnot precludesuchlaws
from
future.
does
being
in
it
Nor
the
established
prevent us
speculating
and conditions
how any future reduction might be brought about. In Chapter 3, we discussedthe
different
levels
description
develop
in
in
theories,
theories
of
coevolution of
which
at
informing
and correcting one another, suggestingthat such a strategy would
parallel,
facilitate
inter-theoretic
eventually
reduction.
4.13 CONCLUSIONS
In the last chapter, we discussed the shift away from a positivistic towards an antifoundationalist
The
philosophy
account of scientific activity.
has
had
to
of science
accommodate a more realistic account of the practical and theoretical activities involved
have
demonstrated
how
In
this
the
chapter, we
within scientific research programmes.
faced
has
had
to adapt,
traditional unity of science
with the complexities of a postalso
hypothesis
having
Despite
the original unity of science
positivist philosophy of science.
to adapt, nevertheless the underlying
argument
which
motivation
remains the same. None of the
have
discussed
has
we
challenged Oppenheim
and Putnam's
4:33
fundamental claim that everything in principle is describable by the laws of physics.
They themselves were aware of the impracticalities
of actually trying
to do this.
However, certain modifications have needed to be made. Firstly, they stipulated that
ideally there should be distinct levels that are "natural. " In 4.9.3, we argued that such
levels
do
level.
defined
does
Nevertheless,
the
this
not exist at
practical
clearly
not pose
for
insurmountable
Putnam
Secondly,
Oppenheim
the
overall project.
an
problem
and
from
laws
deducible
be
logically
the
also required that the
of the reduced theory should
reducing theory.
However,
this stipulation
has had to be relaxed in order to
laws.
hypothesis
has
had
Thirdly,
the
to
statistical
accommodate
and probabilistic
also
be
locally
Fourthly,
that
terms
not
globally.
can
only
reduced
and
accommodate
certain
fundamental
different
level
is
There
types of explanation.
there are
of explanation, which
determines the boundary conditions and initial conditions of the entire system. There
is no form of behaviour that is not governed by these explanatory principles. But there
levels
form
behaviour
being
to
the
of explanation which are apposite
are also other
of
described, providing
a simplified characterisation, which nevertheless captures the
important features of that level. However they are not fundamental explanations, and
do not therefore threaten explanatory unification. Fifthly, the question of what is this
fundamental level of explanation is not yet settled. Finally,
Prigogine's work has
highlighted the practical difficulties involved in explaining and predicting the behaviour
fundamental
level.
in
the
terms
of a complex system
of
However, aswe have seen,none of thesedifficulties challengesthe essenceof the
driving
hypothesis,
it
ideal
investigation.
and remains an
still
scientific
unity of science
Moreover, we now have a unity of sciencehypothesis that may not be complete and
formalised, but which takes into account the contingenciesof scientific research,and is
thus, more resilient to the complexity of real scientific explanation.
Finally, in this chapter, we have tackled some of the general objections to
explanatory unification. In the next chapter,we will tackle specificargumentsthat claim
describe
that we cannot or should not
or explain subjective experience in objective
language.We will do this with particular referenceto time-consciousness.
5: 1
CHAPTER 5
TIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Pluiztas
ponaulapraeternarssitattnnonest.
William of Ockham
Seeksimplicityand distrustit.
Anon
5.1
INTRODUCTION
The problem of the relation between time as it appears in natural scientific theory and the
subjective experience of time still continues to perplex. For example, Paul Davies writes at
his
book,
Tine,
About
the end of
populist
Galileo,Newton and Einstein all chosetime asthe central conceptualpillar of
find
into
to
the
our own minds
physical reality, and yet, when we stare
foundations of temporal experience,it seemsto crumble away,leaving only
(Davies
1995,274)
mystery and paradox.
Newton-Smith at the end of his 1980study, TheSmawv of Tvne,concludesthe book with
the remark,
[Tlhere are depthsyet to be plumbed;in particular,the perhapsmost puzzling
between
time and consciousness,remains.
time,
the
relation
aspect of
(Newton-Smith1980,242)
Although the relationship between time and consciousness does indeed remain a puzzle,
the veil of mystery surrounding the workings of the mind-brain is beginning to draw back.
In the last three chapters we concentrated on issues concerning the study of time and the
between
in
Finally,
turn
to
this
the
time and our
chapter, we
relationship
natural sciences.
it.
Human
is
"curiosity
time-perception
and cognition
not a
of
conscious experience of
important,
if
"
It
poses an
consciousness, unworthy even of explanation.
pernicious,
5: 2
for
is
in
its
If
a
relation to other theoriesof time. there an opportunity
problem terms of
truly unified theory of time, we must be ableto show that it will be possibleto integratethe
natural scientific approachto time with modern psychologicaltheories of time-perception
and time-cognition.
The possibility of suchunification has only becomepracticablein the last coupleof
decadeswith the advancesmade in brain sciencethat has seenthe rapid developmentof
fields
the
of neurophysiologyand neuro-computationalmodelling. Over the sametime
have
had
the eclecticismto study and use the evidenceand
period, certain philosophers
information emerging from these relatively new areasof investigation to challengethe
Despite
the relative newness and
the
of
orthodox views within
philosophy
mind.
incompletenessof the theories emergingfrom these disciplines,some philosophersare
but
in
proposing powerful, novel
empirically grounded explanations of phenomena
domains where the orthodoxy was claimed that sciencecould make no impact. Timein
is
is
Chapter
It
2,
those
one of
areas.
not the aim of this
consciousness,as we saw
(nor
is
the aim of the thesisasa whole) to proposea unified theory of time. Rather,
chapter
drawing upon advancesin the brain sciencesas well as philosophy of scienceand the
has
become
I
to
a tangiblegoal.
philosophyof mind, aim showthat sucha theory
In the following chapterwe will demonstratehow recentdevelopmentsin the brain
sciences of psychology, neuroscience and neurophysiology are overhauling orthodox views
in the philosophy of mind, overcoming objections to the naturalising the explanation of the
(Some
of the arguments surrounding early attempts to reduce theories about mental
mind.
have
dealt
)
been
in
Chapter
We
4.
to
theories
will argue
physical
states
with
states
about
that whilst virtually all philosophers recognise that the mind is instantiated in physical stuff,
believe
full
is
that scientific explanation adequate or necessary to tell the
story
not yet all
is
Some
that
the
there
something special about subjective
mind-brain.
argue
about
introspection that can not be captured by scientific explanation. That is, first person
description.
be
in
Fodor will claim that we
third
captured
person
experience can not
have
already
a successful and autonomous theory of mind that works very well. We answer
their criticisms. We will then progress to the positive task. Drawing upon research on
human time-perception and time estimation, we will demonstrate that progress towards a
being
is
made.
unified theory already
5.2 ARGUMENTS
AGAINST THE NATURALISATION
OF PSYCHOLOGY
5: 3
In this chapter we will sow that questions about human time-perception and timeconsciousness are ultimately empirical questions informed by philosophy, which can only
be settled with reference to theories, observations, and evidence generated by the empirical
has
in
its
Much
sciences.
orthodox philosophy of mind
remained anomalous
staunch
has
been
Although
to
there
resistance
an empirical approach.
some progress since
Descartes posited his two substances,a sophisticated form of dualist explanation still exists.
Although
there are still a few dissenters like Eccles (1977), most contemporary
describe
like
to
themselves as materialist or physicalist, albeit in many
philosophers would
different forms and without any overall consensus about what being materialist entails.
However, for clarity of argument, we define materialism as the theory that, given the
explanatory adequacy of physics (Lewis, 1971), all mental states are physical states.
Defining materialism thus leaves open the question of the explanatory relation between the
does
the
mental and
physical, and significantly
not commit oneself to reductionism.
However, we have already argued that some sophisticated form
intertheoretic
of
integration is necessary, in order to have a naturalised and unified theory of timeconsciousness or time-perception. Non-reductive materialism is not an option available to
be
We
therefore must
able to show that everything is, in principle, completely
us.
describable and explicable in terms of the physical sciences, broadly construed to include
the emergent brain sciences. As Warner (1994) points out, what constitutes a physical
is
science contentious. Purists might only admit physics and those other sciencesthat are
depending
it.
However,
to
reducible
on the contingencies of their position, other
lenient,
biology,
philosophers are more
admitting chemistry and
or even social sciencesto
list,
defacto
deprixi,
the acceptable
whether or not,
or
5.2.1
they are reducible to physics.
THE ARGUMENT FROM LACK OF IMAGINATION
However,to reiterate,being a materialistonly acknowledgesthe primacy of the physical.It
does not commit one to physicalreductionism.Nagel questionedwhether the sciencesas
how
broadly
defined, are capableof generatingthe type of
such, no matter
narrowly or
theory that could adequatelyexplainthe relationshipbetweenour experienceas conscious
its
instantiation.
He wrote,
subjectsand physical
We at present lack the conception of a complete analysisof the subjective,
features
in
phenomenological
of mental reality terms of an objectivephysical
5: 4
basis, and there is no reason to believe such a thing is possible. (Nagel 1994,
67)
Indeed, given the relative incompletenessof the brain sciences,it seems difficult to
how
beliefs,
desires,
theories
their
conceive
of psychology,with
component elementsof
dreams,and reason,could ever be explainedin terms of the axons,ganglia,dendritesand
neurotransmitters,which arethe tools of the neurophysiologist.Nagel again,
[[J]ntil we discover a way to stand theoretically astride the boundary between
objective spatio-temporal physical reality and the subjective contents of
be
in
basic
intellectual
to
the
tools
experience, we can not claim
possession of
for
life.
This
be
needed
a comprehensive understanding of conscious
may
but
have
(1994,68)
it
without we can not
unattainable,
a general cosmology.
That is, Nagel is claiming that our current scientific theories are inadequate for the task of
between
the
the mind and its subjective experiences and their
explaining
relationship
instantiation in the brain. Similarly, McGinn (1982) doubts whether in fact we will be able
to understand mental states in terms of physical theories, despite their shared ontology.
Strawson (1994) does not think that current types of scientific theory are adequate for the
task. It is not the reducing theory that is at fault, but the theory that is being reduced. In
has
for
it
become
impasse,
this
to
response
apparent
popular
some writers to argue that a
(e.
is
theory
radically new
of the mind required g. Penrose 1994) to bridge the gap between
brain.
for
development
is
it
But
to
the
mind and
necessary
us await
not
of new theories and
techniques. The types of theories that we already possess, given time to develop and
be
brain
As
the
to
task.
this
expand, will
adequate
we shall see, even at
early stage, the
human
theories
to
sciencesare already generating potent
explain
perception and cognition.
The Churchlands(1994)have replied to Nagel's doubts about the possibility of a
It is often the case,they claim,
naturalisedunderstandingof perceptionand consciousness.
that we can not imaginehow a reductionmight be instantiated.This seemsto be especially
the casewhen we examinethe richnessof our subjectiveexperience.However, they argue,
how
let
inability
imagine
to
a reduction might take placebecome
we shouldnot
our current
being
it
The
history
has
priori
an a
argumentagainst ever
ableto take place.
of science many
examplesof suchunforeseenreductions.They write,
5: 5
For who would haveimagined,beforeJamesClark Maxwell,that the theory of
balls
chargedpith
and wobbling compassneedlescould prove adequateto
light?
(Churchland
Churchland
1994,49)
the
of
and
explainall
phenomena
Often the reduction is highly surprising,and difficult to imaginein advance.Even more so
involves
that
a partial or total reconstructionof
a successfulreduction often
considering
the old theory'staxonomywithin that of the new, reducingtheory. (SeeChapter4)
5.2.2
THE SPECIAL QUALITY
OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
The argumentsarising from Nagel'sinfamous 1974paper, Whatis it like to bea bad have
been over-rehearsedin the philosophical literature. Neverthelesshis claim that there is
be
in
introspection
that
captured
scientific
something special about subjective
can not
highly
demands
have
is
intuitive,
Nagel
that
argues
currently
we
and
response.
explanation
no reducing theory or explanation, which can successfullytackle the "mind-brain
problem." He arguesthat there is a specialquality to mental stateswhich meansthey can
forwardly
level
description.
be
Nagel claims that any
of
not
straight
reducedto another
descriptions
identify
our experienceof sensationswith physical
will not capture
attempt to
the unique and subjectivecharacterof our experience.
Every subjective phenomena is essentially connected with a single point of
it
inevitable
that an objective, physical theory will abandon
view, and seems
(1974,393
that point of view.
Nagel is not claiming that qualia are the private experience of the possessor, and hence
inarticulable in a public language.Rather that phenomenological facts can only be objective
to the extent that other people are sufficiently similar to the perceiver to share them.
Hence, when I report that: "I can smell fresh baked bread," you (assumingyou are a fully
from
human
being)
imagine
can extrapolate
your own experience and
osmotic
what I am
fresh
baked
bread.
like
have
idea
it
is
However,
You
to
smell
an
what
now experiencing.
it
when comes to small, winged, visually challenged rodents who guide themselves through
for
from
by
impossible
imagine
it
is
the air
us to
our experience
echolocation,
virtually
be
bat.
description
like
it
is
No
to
amount of physical or neurophysiological
a
will
what
like
bat's
is
is
Nagel
that
experience.
argues
what an experience
orly
allow us to share the
5: 6
know
different
from
is,
in
That
the subjectivepoint of view.
qu&ia a radically
we
available
facts
his
know
in
So,
to summarise argument,
the scientificway.
way than we
physical
(1)
Quale types are only knowable from a single and subjective
perspective.
(2)
Neurophysiological
types are knowable
from
different
many
perspectives.
(3)
Quale types * neurophysiological types.
According to Churchland,the first premiseis mistaken.(P.M. Churchland 1992,58)What
if, taking a more concrete example,neuroscientistswere to discover that the qualitative
having
is
a certain activationvector acrossthe neuronsof the n`h
experienceof seeingred
lay
is
Could
er of the occipital cortex?
we not then saythe qualitativeexperienceof seeingred
having
having
the sameas
a certain activationvector acrossthe
a qualitativeexperienceof
layer
Though
in
the
the
the
nt
of
occipital cortex?
person question might not
neuronsof
know that she is experiencinga certain activation vector. For we would not acceptthe
argument,
(1)
Janeknows that sheexperiencesred.
(2)
Jane does not know that she experiencesa certain activation vector
layer
the
the
across neuronsof
n`'
of the occipital cortex.
(3)
Red *a certainactivationvector acrossthe neuronsof the n`blayerof
the occipital cortex.
This is anotherobvious exampleof the intensionalfallacythat was discussedin Chapter4.
Nagel'sargumentfalls foul of the fallacy.
Jackson(1982)made a strongerargumentagainstthe reducibility of sensationsto
how
his
is
knowledge
descriptions.
Briefly,
that
no
matter
argument
much
we
physical
have of our sensations,and regardlessof the amount of neurophysiologicalknowledgewe
have
knowledge
have
brain
accessto
about
states,we can never
about qualia as
can
different
from
is
(This
Nagel
them.
who said,were the similarity
someoneelseexperiences
5: 7
between individuals close enough, then we could extrapolate from our experienceto
imaginewhat it is like for them.) Jacksonillustrates his point by the following thought
life
has
lived
her
is
in a monochrome
Mary
a neuroscientistwho, up until now,
experiment.
has
beenbrought to
information
Her
environment.
only accessto
about the outsideworld
her via a black andwhite televisionset.In the courseof time, she haslearnt all that there is
to know about neurophysiology.She has a particular knowledge of visual perception,
including colours.What then would happenwhen Mary is then releasedfrom the room?
Jackson'sargumentcan be characterised
thus,
(1)
Mary knows everything there is to know about brain states and their
properties.
(2)
It is not the casethat Mary knows everythingthere is to know about
sensationsand their properties.
(3)
Sensations and their properties * brain states and their properties.
(P.S.Churchland 1989,331)
Jackson'sargumentmight be rewritten thus. Imaginethat Mary is a toxicologist and knows
know
is
about the chemical structure and action of poisons,
all there
objectively to
is
interested
in
has
it
She
the effects that
particularly
especiallycyanide.
on the nervous
how
kills
it
system,especially
people.However,up to now, the only accessthat shehashad
has
from
books.
been
from
third
about cyanide'seffects
experimentson
parties and
However, one afternoon she discoversa bottle of cyanideon her laboratory bench and,
having read Jackson's article the night before, now believes that her knowledge of
lacking.
drinks
is
it. Does
In
the
toxicology now severely
name of scientific progress,she
Mary know anythingmore about the lethal effectsof cyanide?Cleadiynot.
Seriously,if we look at the formal version of the argumentwe can seethat there is
has
between
fact
in
"know.
"
Mary
increased
the
the
two
word
an equivocation
not
usesof
the stock of things known to her, only the mannerin which thesethings are known. Thus
the ChurchlandsrewriteJackson'sargument,
(1)
Mary has a mature and complete scientific theory of the
functioning
neurophysiological
of visualperception.
5: 8
(2)
It is not the casethat Mary hashad experienceof a certainactivation
layer
vector acrossthe neuronsof the n`h
of the occipital cortex.
Rewrittenin this way,it is clearthat the sequituris false,
(3)
Sensationsand their properties* brain statesand their properties.
That is, we can conclude from Jackson's example that there are many possible
kind
knowledge.
does
However
this
not commit us to saying
of
representationsof the same
fire
kinds
known.
is
In
there
the
that
that there two, or more,
a
sameway suppose
of things
in a building, to borrow and adaptan examplefrom Pylyshyn(1980.) This can be known in
burning,
by
hearing
by
feeling
by
oneself
choking on smoke,
someone
a vast variety ways:
fire
detector
fire
by
is
in
",
"Fire!
there
the
that
panel
and
checking
concluding
a
shouting
Zone 3. However theseare all different waysof knowing the samething, namely,there is a
fire in the building. There are many different waysto know a thing, but it does not mean
thereforethat more than onething is known.
in both the Nagel and Jacksonargumentsarisefrom a confusion
The weaknesses
developed
different
kinds
description.
is
It
of
a consequenceof our, asyet, under
of the
has
It
comprehensionof exactly what we are apprehendingwhen we report seeingred.
been arguedthat talk about qualia as some form of emergentand irreducible property
descriptions
future,
be
eliminatedwere we to adopt the
of a
mature neuroscience.
would
Rorty writes,
If we got into the habit of using neurological properties...then our experience would
be of things with neurological properties, not of anything else, for example, intensity.
(Rorty 1965,229)
It is an inadequate understanding of what we are experiencing that is encouraging us to
following
beyond
fault,
is
That
is
the
that
to
say
argument
necessity.
at
multiply entities
(from P.M. Churchland 1989,58),
(1)
The qualia of my sensations are directly known by me, by
introspection,aselementsof my consciousself.
5: 9
(2)
The properties of my brain states are not directly known by me, by
introspection, as elements of my conscious self.
(3)
The qualia of my sensations* the properties of my brain states.
The qualiaobjection is founded on a misapprehensionabout different ways of representing
the sameinformation. As we have shown, there are different ways of representingand
hencedescribingthe samething. Becausea sensationcan be describedfrom a subjective
point of view doesnot mean somethingdifferent, or extra, is being described.As Rorty,
have
fact
it
language
is
the
and other eliminative materialists
that
two
pointed out,
of
description are availablethat confusesmatters. There is nothing specialabout what we
describeas our subjectiveexperiences,which some future scientific description could not
be substitutedfor.
Somethings indeedare inarticulablyphenomenalin character,becausethey are
the targetsof our basic discriminatorymodalities.But that in no way makes
them immune to an illuminating intertheoretic reduction. History already
teachesus the contrary.(Churchlandand Churchland1994,49)
5.2.3
THE AUTONOMY OF FUNCTIONALIST PSYCHOLOGY
Certain supporters of functionalist psychology have argued for a special autonomous status
for psychological explanation. They claim that it is neither important nor necessary for
psychology to cohere with the rest of the scientific corpus. If this position were tenable it
have
would
significant repercussions for our theory. For ultimately the position involves
denying that questions about the mind are ultimately to be settled by reference to empirical
theories, the arguments for and against the autonomy of psychology have been rehearsed
for
(See,
many times.
example, Greenwood's The Futs
(1991b)
for
Folk
PsyoWbgy
of
a
collection of the main papers) My intention is not to re-examine the intricacies of this
debate,
for
demand
that would
complex
a thesis in itself. Rather we only aim to
demonstrate that the adoption of our position enables us propose a more coherent and
fertile research programme, in accordance with some programme laid out in Chapters 3
and 4.
5: 10
Fodor (1975), Pylyshyn (1980) and early Putnam (1967) are the main proponents of
functionalist psychology, who are claiming the autonomy of psychological explanation.
Though there are subtle differences between their positions, the main gist of their
from
brain
largely
irrelevant
is
is
information
the
collated
when we
sciences
argument that
human
have
is
It
come to ask questions about
reasoning.
argued that we already
a perfectly
human
by
for
for
inspired
Von
Neumann
the
reason,
architecture
adequate model
information
by
distinction
between
its
This
is
the
characterised
processing.
model
functional and structural levels, otherwise characterised as a software
-
hardware division.
(See Figure 5.1) Reasoning comprises two elements; the semantic level of mental
by
level.
is
is
It
the
the
representations which
controlled
rules and principles of
syntactical
between
important
it
is
in these
the causal roles
argued that
mental representations that are
know
Thus
if
types of explanation.
you wanted to
why Joan went to the pub, you would
desire
for
beer
beer.
in
belief
It
that the pub sold
explain this terms of my
a pint of
and my
be
for
know
details
intricate
would not
necessary
you to
about my neuron populations and
activation vectors in my brain. Hence the functionalist is able to make the claim that
be
drawn
An
and
psychological explanation can stand alone
aloof.
with a
analogy can
details
The
its
computer and
software.
physical
about the machine upon which the
is
irrelevant
in
to
the
software running are
user, the same way that a software programme
have
different
Sparc
Mac,
IBM
workstation, all of which
an
could run on a
clone and a
functional
level
However,
the programme remains the same.
architectural structures.
at the
The important fact to note here is that a software programme can be mult y instantiatedon
different
a
range of machines.
One can seewhy this analogy would be attractive to a functionalist, as it apparently
adds credence to the autonomy of psychology position, and supports arguments based on
Fodor's
In
4.9.1,
answered
we
some
reservations to the unity of
multiple realisability.
of
be
Fodor's
It
that
will
science project.
recalled
main objection to the reductionist
based
That
is,
the
on
multiple realisability.
programme was
although two tokens of a
be
both
be
identical,
identical
that
these
tokens
type
and
of
might
with a
cognitive
will
be
identical.
However Fodor's arguments
types
two
need not
physical
physical type, the
based
type
that
of reduction, namely
were primarily targeted at a specific
upon type-type
identity statements. We have shown that successful reduction is not contingent upon the
success of reduction thus construed. Fodor's position concerning the autonomy of
from
in
the
argument
multiple realisability.
psychology relies part upon a special version of
Fodor argues that the multiple realisability objection demonstrates that a psychological
5: 11
term is not reducibleto a single physicaldescription. Consequently,if a single cognitive
term is not uniquely identical to a physicalterm, then, accordingto the traditional central
definition
be
bridge
laws
between
levels
the
two
state
no
of
of reduction, there can
description.However,we havearguedthat the successof the unity of scienceproject does
depend
form
not
on this
of one-to-onemapping.
Unfortunately, the arguments for the autonomy of psychology do not rest solely on
bridge
laws.
Fodor also claims that we understand mental states in
the unavailability of
terms of the logical relations between mental representations, that is, the functional
form
internal
in
internal
These
themselves
they
organisation of
states.
states
and of
a
logical
be
Fodor
that
these
semantically coherent system.
argues
relations can not
reduced
to causal relations. The relations between internal states have an abstract functional
back
he
is therefore able to claim that the
Harking
to the computer analogy,
character.
largely
his
irrelevant
implementation
is
to
theory. So the use
concrete, physical
of thought
for
of the term,
example, "intelligent" does not apply exclusively to humans, or only to
life
forms. The term could also
animals with neuronal structures, or, to say, carbon-based
be used to describe the behaviour of computers, silicon-based aliens from outer space,
is
It
angels, ghosts and any other, as yet, unencountered or unimagined entities.
not
know
because
functional
hardware,
is
to
the
the
necessary
about
organisation
quite
separate.
There are severalobjectionsto the functionalist position. Firstly, we have already
arguedin 4.9.2that multiple realisabilityargumentraisedby Fodor doesnot constitutean
hypothesis,
in
the
objection against unity of science
asmost reductions the natural sciences
are relativeto a domain. Just astemperatureis multiply realisedin different theoriesin the
in
be
Intelligence
too
terms
the
taxonomy.
natural sciences,so
are
psychological
can
both
based.
direction
The
is multiply realisedin
senseof
potentially
carbon or silicon
different animals,being different for a bat, a pigeon and a human,but nevertheless,eachin
its own right can be explainedand reduced to some generalmechanismrelative to its
level
functionalist
has
influenced
Secondly,
the three
the
model which
species.
positionmay
brain,
however
interesting
in
think
the
to
about
offer an
way which
as an empiricaltheory
brain
it
in
information
in
is
Pylyshyn,
the
particular,proposedthe symbolic
of
unhelpful.
manipulationmodel of reasoningas a generaltheory of cognition, which use the sentential
kinematic
(Pylyshyn
basic
its
it
does
1980).
However,
element
structureas
as a model
not
brain
(1986,
is
Churchland
the
theories
about
correspondwell with empirical
organised.
349-400)objects that the function/structure (or software/hardwaredistinction) is relative
5: 12
level
being
described.
is
distinction,
It
to
the
of strata
a relative
and not the absolute
only
distinction that functionalist appearsto be trying to claim. Additionally, it is clearthat the
three levelsmodel is oversimplistic.Evidencefrom the brain sciencessuggestthat there are
different
levels
brain
but
just
the
three,
at which
not
many,
operates.Furthermore,
levels,
how
distinguished
do
is a matter
the
they
they
are
ascertaining number of
and what
for empiricalresearchand can not be establishedin advance. (SeeFigure 5.2) In response
to Pylyshyn'sclaim that the engineeringstructureis unimportant, she arguesthat scientists
discovering
how
brain
Therefore,
it
is
the
the
simply too
are still at
earlystagesof
operates.
decide
implementation
is
irrelevant.
to
whether andwhen structural
early
Fodor defends functionalism by claiming that "It's the only theory we've got."
Though, for the time being this may be true, this does not justify his claim for the
best
but
have
have
it
is
Others
the
theory,
available
agreedthat
autonomy of psychology.
by
(Dennett
it
indeed
instrumental
Functionalist
1987)
status
only ascribed
psychologymay
have,
best
but
be
theory we will ever
this claim can not
the
madea pri#i. Whetherit is the
doubtful.
doing
have
is
Neuroscientists
are already
also
only theory that we currently
learning,
intelligence,
memory and
and offering new, alternativeand powerful
researchon
be
for
behaviour.
defender
Yet
to
a
of the autonomyof psychologythesis,
explanations our
have
bloody-mindedly
ignore
This
these
theories
to
would
one would
new
and evidence.
involve an act of extremephilosophicalperversity,akin to the Creationistswho still believe
days,
despite
in
God
the overwhelminggeological,
that
sevencalendar
createdthe world
biological
in
Husserl,
Chapter
Like
2,
that
otherwise.
evidence
suggests
cosmological,and
this isolationistposition meansthat functionalist can not benefit from the advancesbeing
disciplines.
does
in
It
not even coherewell with other areasof psychology,
made other
nevermind the rest of the scientificcorpus.
5.2.4
SUPERVENIENCE AND ANOMALOUS MONISM
We have seen that the claims for autonomy of psychologyhave relied partially on the
be
bridge
failure
identity
theoriesmeansthat there can not
of type-type
argumentthat the
lawsto enablereduction betweenthe two levelsof description.In this next sectionwe shall
be
both
it
is
a materialist and at the sametime claim
possible to claim to
ask whether
for
depends
Such
a
events.
position
on the tenability
nomologicalautonomy psychological
is
insofar
it
Supervenience
theory
as
presented a materialist
of weak supervenience.
as
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5: 13
acknowledgesthe primacy of the physical without necessarilycommitting oneself to
has
definition
Teller
physicalreductionism.
offered a general
of supervenience,
Truths of kind S supervene upon are determined by truths of kind P iff any
kind
P also agree as to truths of kind S.
two caseswhich agree as to truths of
(Teller 1983,145)
There arethree typesof supervenience
relations:weak,strong and global.Strongand global
kind-to-kind
identical
both
to
correlation.
supervenienceare arguably
as
are committed
(Kim 1993,Teller 1983) Briefly,
S strongly superveneson P just in casenecessarilyfor each x and each property
F in S, if x has F then there is a property in P such that x has G, and necessarily
if any y has G, then it has F. (Kim 1993,65)
S globally supervenes on P just in case worlds that are indiscernible with
(Kim
P....
S-indiscernible.
1993,68)
respect to
are also
In both cases,physical properties (P) entirely determine the supervening properties (S). If
definition
we examine the
of strong supervenience, we can see that it entails that every
has
kind-to-kind
Therefore
property.
this
mental property
a coextensional physical
bridge
laws
identity
is
type-type
to
theories,
and provides
consistent with
correlation
facilitate smooth intertheoretic reduction. Weak supervenience, on the other hand, does
for
imply
the existenceof a physicalcorrelate
not
mental properties.It is consistentwith
hence
the autonomyof the superveningproperties.
multiple realisability,and
S weakly supervenes on P iff necessarily for any x&y,
in
P then x&y
same properties
if x&y
share all the
in
is
Sindiscernability
that
are all properties
(Kim,
indiscernability
P
S.
1993,58)
to
with respect
with respect to entails
Weak supervenience does not capture determination and hence is consistent with the
by
is
Davidson to justify anomalous
It
the
autonomy of psychology.
position adopted
(1980).
it
Davidson
monism.
uses to achieve two aims. Firstly, to show that psychological
his
depend
is
is,
Secondly,
that
to
that
events
on physical events,
claim
position
materialist.
5: 14
laws
deny
there
to
that
which can connect psychological and physical properties,
are any
is
it
is,
However,
that
possible to claim psychophysical
an anti-reductionist stance.
dependency without having psychophysical laws, or at least, psychophysical entailments?
Kim argues (1993,267) that the Davidson's position is untenable. One can not subscribe to
There
the
the one without subscribing to
other.
are, Kim claims, only two tenable
be
dualism,
is,
Either
to
that
one can not claim
materialist or,
anti-physicalist
positions.
is
reductionism-eliminativism, which not consistent with the autonomy of psychology.
Kim claimsit unlikely that physicalpredicateswill entail psychologicalpredicates,
for examplea physicalpredicatethat entailsbeing bored.However he doesnot acceptthe
functionalistargumentfrom multiple realisabilitythat psychologicalstatescan be realisedin
likely
is
divergent
S,
to
therefore
no one state,
many
organismsand/or physicalstructures
have a uniform physical state,P, as its correlate.Kim respondsthat multiple realisation
implies nothing about the generalimpossibility of psychophysicallaws. It only rules out
biconditional
laws
of the type,
completely
SiffP
have
is
Kim
P
argues that a supervening property can
a single physical state.
where
different supervenience bases. This position does not appear inconsistent with that of P.S.
Churchland. That is, a supervening property does not necessarily depend on particular
base, for example "goodness" does not require x to be virtuous and benevolent. Other
judgement.
the
same
qualities might entail
So,to summarise,the main tenetsof anomalousmonism can be characterised
thus:
firstly, there areno psychologicalor psychophysicallaws.All strict laws are expressedin the
interact
languageof the physical (anomalous-ness
the
of
mental); secondly,mental events
be
if
to
with physicalevents;and,thirdly, one event,c, can said causeanotherevent,e, only
(nomological
)
law
is
there a strict causal
characterof causality.
which entails c causese
Davidson definesa non-strict law as one which containsa ceteisparibusqualifier or is de
facto.Usually in the specialsciencesDavidson claims we use non-strict laws. Anomalous
into
Mental
that
causalrelationswith physicalevents.
mental eventsenter
monism claims
laws
do
involve
that govern physical events, and
the sort of general
events
not
drawn
between
between
laws
be
them
or
mental events and
can
up
consequentlyno
have
Jawlike
between
Therefore
the physicaland the
connection
no
we can
physicalevents.
have
be
far
in
It
asall events
physicalproperties,and some
materialist so
mental. claimsto
5: 15
have
has
The
events
mental properties.
mental
no effect on the causalrelations that
interconnectevents.In short: mentalityhasno causalor explanatoryrole. Kim repliesthat
if this is the casethen it is difficult to understandwhy we would then need to recognise
feature
is
doctrine
its
it
At
"a
the
virtually indiscriminable
extreme
mentality as a
of
world.
from eliminitivism." (270) Non-reductive materialismis not a plausible position, which
leavessomeform of naturalisedpsychologyasthe only viable alternative.
In this and the previous sectionson qualia and functionalist psychology,I have
discussedseveralobjectionsto a naturalisedtheory of mind. Whilst inevitably I havedone
injustices
it
to
the
the
subtletiesof
great
respective authors' arguments, was not my
intention to focus on the intricatedetailsof the debate.My aim is to show that there areno
brain
from
be
brought
the
to
conclusivereasonswhy evidence
emerging
sciencescan not
bear on argumentsin the philosophy of mind. There is no a priori argumentsthat thereis
something special about subjective experiencethat makes it irreducible. There are no
argumentsthat conclusivelysupport the autonomy of psychology.Finally one can not
be
consistently claim to
a materialist, whilst advocating the anomalous nature of
psychologicalexplanation.
5.3 NATURALISED
PSYCHOLOGY
Inevitably the evidence and theories emerging from the brain sciencesare of a provisional
nature. However, it is significant that already powerful arguments against certain positions,
described,
being
those
the
within
philosophy of mind are already
such as
articulated.
Although, given their relative immaturity, these arguments and the evidence they are based
incomplete
inconclusive.
be
Nevertheless
to
a pattern seems
upon are
and
emerging which
has been common to other areasof philosophy, namely orthodox views being replaced by
how
discussion
Chapter
In
3
the
theories.
we showed
empirically grounded
philosophical
had
from
of time and space
shifted
an a pn i approach, to one informed by the current
leading theories. It is apparent that a similar shift is occurring in the philosophy of mind
has
for
(1985)
in
Kitchener
argued
a naturalised theory of epistemology
and epistemology.
human
He
Kitchener's
in
this
calls
and
cognition.
genetic epistemology.
workis
contrast to
the orthodox approach to epistemology. This sought to construct formal rules for human
learning,
knowledge,
belief
itself
reasoning,
and
acquisition, modelling
upon the methods
formal
logic,
in
employed
probability theory and statistics. Essentially this was an a prioi
logically
it
is
be
in
that
the
to
approach
sense
prior
empirical science, and analysis can
5: 16
facts.
(Morley
and Hunt 1991) McTaggart's The Unezlity
conducted prior to any particular
line
developments
is
in
Tvne
However,
in
typical
of
of such an approach.
with other
has
developed
This
to
there
philosophy,
an alternative approach questions epistemological.
by
is
its
interdisciplinary
bringing
typified
emphasis on an
approach,
approach
evidence
from such as psychology, the brain sciences,anthropology and sociology to bear on their
theories. Kitchener's argument is that the adequacy of a particular epistemic account can
be
by
from
It
priori
a
not
established
epistemology alone.
requires corroboration
other
disciplines. His theories are informed by the work of Piaget, who defined intelligence as the
extent to which an organism is able to adapt its internal systems to cope with some
intractable elements of the environment. As an organism adapts to its environment, it
develops certain mental structures. These structures are continually modified and
in
There
"knowledge.
"
reorganised, resulting
a gradual accrual of
are three important
features of this account of epistemology. Firstly, the definition of intelligent behaviour is
be
from
to
to
can
used equally
apply
all creatures on an evolutionary scale,
molluscs
for
human
has
behaviour.
is
Intelligence
In
there
the past,
upwards.
not strictly reserved
been a tendency to dismiss apparently intelligent behaviour by other animals as
due
is
This
to the way that intelligence was defined. This leads to the
conditioning.
wholly
second point. Kitchener offers an alternative to the orthodox account of epistemology,
because
formal
its
linguistic
is
the
which,
of
emphasis on
rules and
analysis of sentences,
limited to human behaviour alone. We shall see that a similar claim is made about other
(See
it
Finally,
5.3.2)
time
animals and
consciousness.
offers an evolutionary account of the
development of minds, and those minds relationship with the world. "Knowledge would
have no validity if the structures of the mind failed to match up to the structures of
"
reality.
physical
(Rychlak 1981,671)
If
include
time-consciousness as an
we
its
then
to
epistemological structure,
we can move some way
explaining
role. That is, the
development of time-consciousness is part and parcel of our overall adaptation to and
learning about the environment. Michon has proposed such an explanation of time,
Time is the conscious experiential product of the processes that allow the
human organism to adaptively organise itself so that its behaviour remains
tuned to the sequential, (that is, order) relations in the environment. (Michon
1985,20)
5: 17
My discussion so far has concentrated on the more general issue of a naturalised
psychology and epistemology. Now we shall address more specifically the question of the
difficult
is
It
to predict what a complete and mature theory of
psychology of time.
very
look
like. However, drawing upon the research in other areas,
time-consciousness would
few
tentative suggestionsregarding what we might expect.
we can make a
5.3.1
TIME
IS NOT A SIMPLE, UNITARY
EXPERIENCE
Firstly, the term time-consciousness suggestsa unitary conscious experience. However it is
likely that this term conceals a collection of many different functions, which all together
from
Certainly
time-consciousness.
contribute to our overall experience of
recent evidence
human
be
other research programmes on
perception teaches us to
suspicious of any such
have
been
in
Similar
relinquished
assumption.
assumptions
research programmes studying
discusses
human
For
Peter
Smith
the example of
other aspects of
experience.
example,
described
have
initially
been
He
"as a relatively
that
vision.
argues
visual perception might
before
involving
images
the
triggering
straightforward matter,
of a play of uninterrupted
the mind's eye." (Smith 1989,21-2) However, this traditional and simple assumption has
been challenged by
evidence produced
out
of
pathological
psychological and
have
demonstrated
These
that vision has a far more
neurophysiologcalstudies.
studies
complex and modular cognitive substrate.What appearsin non-pathologicalcasesas a
be
is
by
indivisible
investigation
to
single and
phenomenon, revealedunder
constituted a
brain.
different
disturbance
in
Cases
the
of visual
set of specificsub-computations
parts of
describes
had
Smith
the
or abnormalitiesarewell recorded.
caseof a personwho
sustained
specificneural damage,resultingin visual agnosia.When tested,the patient was shown to
have sharpvisual acuity.He was ableto make good line by line drawingsof a face,and he
from
had
he
local
forms.
identify
to
a
good
objects
silhouettes,
proving
was able
graspof
However,the patient was unableto either recognisefacesor locations.When he looked at
himself in the mirror, he reportedseeinghis own faceeither asa set of unrelateddetails,or
face.
integrate
"global",
He
to
the two sets of information
was unable
as a
schematic
together in order to recogniseeither himself or anyoneelse.Another casecited by Smith
detailsa woman who was unableto perceivemovement.This left her unableto do many
described
fluid
from
like
herself
She
the
tea.
the
pouring
poring
a cup of
ordinary tasks,
level
in
the
the cup. These
rising
spout as solid, and reported she could not perceive
different
the
elementsthat comprisevision, and
strangepathologicalstudiesrevealsomeof
5: 18
further
brain.
in
This
is
is
the
thesis
show that vision not a single, simple operation
from
by
For
studies.
example,there are caseswhere
other
scientific
corroborated reports
(blindness
denial).
diagnosed
blind,
have
been
as
yet they claim that theycan still see
people
Interestingly,another piece of researchhas examineda group of subjectswho have been
diagnosedas blind, and furthermore report themselvesas blind. Yet, in experiments,they
have demonstratedan improbableacuity for locating objectsplacedwithin their reach,or
for correctly reporting how many objectswere held up before them to count (blindsight.)
Clearly,there is more to sight that meetsthe eye.
Work carried out in Al may also offer insights into the workings of the visual
down
for
broke
designing
Nilsson,
Raphael
In
the eye,
et aL
system.
an artificial analogue
the task of visual object recognition into several, separate computational tasks. These are,
for example, recognising the difference between light and dark, the identification of the
target object's edges, and using vertices as a way of computing the three-dimensional
factors
(Raphael
Nilsson
Other
1976,
1984)
that may play a
complex
position of an object.
familiarity,
in
and memory.
mammalian visual recognition are anticipation, context,
role
The example of vision should make us wary about time-consciousness, and approaches,
is
It
time-consciousness
to
unlikely
some single underlying process.
which seek to reduce
be
available. Even the review of time-perception and
that such a simple explanation will
have
into
take
to
account a
estimation should act as a warning that any explanation will
interactions,
their
such as arousal, attention, memory, sleep,
wide range of variables and
and motivation.
5.3.2
TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT UNIQUE TO HUMANS
Secondly,it is unlikely that time-consciousnessis unique to humans, although some
from
drawing
(1957)
have
Koehler
Whitrow,
upon evidence
suggestedas much.
authors
(1983),
Walker
concludes,
and
There is evidence that our sense of these distinctions [of past, present and
future] is one of the most important mental faculties distinguishing man from
have
believe
living
For
that all animals
creatures.
we
good reason to
all other
(Whitrow
live
in
1988,7)
man
a
continual
present.
except
5: 19
Similar claims have been made about the uniquenessof human competencies,such as
languageability, usingtools and taking medicines,only to be disproved.It is more likely to
be true that humanshave the most sophisticatedtime-consciousness
known,
in
currently
the sameway that we appearto havethe most sophisticatedform of language.Experiment
can
be
intervals
that
trained
to estimate
show
pigeons and other animals
of time with
(Friedman
1990) If we accept that other animals share some of the same
accuracy.
beings,
human
it opensup the opportunity of conductingresearchon
temporal abilitiesas
mechanisms which are perhaps simpler than our own, as a way of building up
however
humans,
is
If
that
time-consciousness
to
no such
understanding. we
claim
unique
is
path available.
5.3.3
No SINGLE MASTER CLOCK OR TIME
Thirdly, we know that temporal behaviourand rhythm can be observedat every level of
description, from the cyclic behaviour of the individual cell upwards. Nevertheless,in
bodily
be
hypotheses
to
seeking explainthis synchronicityof
processeswe should wary of
which posit some master clock or single timer which is co-ordinating it all. Such a
hypothesis is reminiscent of the old homunculi theories of consciousness,which are
seductivein their simplicity,but actuallyexplainnothing.
5.3.4
THE AMBIGUOUS NATURE OF TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS
Finally, it is clear that time-consciousness does not fall conveniently into the
traditional
categories of perception or consciousness, though whether these
have
be
brought
into
has
integrity
It
categories
any scientific
must surely
question.
been argued that these two categories (perceptual recognition and propositional
fact
discrete
in
different
types of mental events, which are
attitudes) are not
and
by
but
their own explanatory theory,
characterised
rather they are "essentially the
same kind of computational achievement." (P.M. Churchland 1992,198) Moreover
that all categories of mental events, including time-consciousness, are susceptible to
kind.
has
difference
between
Churchland
the
this
that
main
explanation of
argued
diversity
is
the
we
what
call perceptual recognition and explanatory understanding
of
information that has to be processed.Perceptual recognition, he claims, is limited to
sensory inputs, where explanatory understanding has to respond to a "wider variety
5: 20
(P.
M. Churchland 1992,198))
"(
of cognitive situations.
Churchland may have
down
distinction.
is
it
Even
to
comes
what
considered
oversimplified the
when
been
be
far
has
to
shown
more
simple senseperception, our sensory-discrimination
have
(See
been
There
initially
imagined.
Appendix,
7.2)
some
section
complex was
for
but
have
been
(See
find
5.4.1)
time,
these
unsuccessful.
attempts to
a senseorgan
Also there have been equally unsuccessful attempts to explain time in terms of
based
Zwart
For
example
argues,
sentence
cognition.
The only empirical research that is needed for the solution of a truly
fundamental
like
is
the meaningof one of our
concepts
philosophicalproblem
language.
(Zwart
in
in
into
the
term
the use of
question everyday
research
1976,11)
But aswe have seenthe simplicity of ordinary languagecan be mistakenand misleading.(I
)
further
here
is
discussion
issue
in
the
of this
appendix.
shallnot explorethis claim
asthere
is part and parcel of the domain of
Others have arguedthat human time-consciousness
declarativeknowledge,that is, high level cognition. Thereforeif we wish to understandit
we should employ the same sort of empirical methods that are applied to the
decision
making, comprehension and explanation.
understanding of problem solving,
However,we have alreadyarguedthat thesetypes of explanationthat are being avertedto
knowledge
human
the
themselves
coming under attackas empirical
about
workings of
are
human
likely
it
is
increases.
As
that what
more
with other aspectsof
cognition,
cognition
be
has become labelled as time-consciousness,
turn
to
will
out
made up of a seriesof
human
levels
body
from
the
of the
separatetiming or rhythmic mechanicsoperatingat all
know
"cognitive"
We
the
that
some
of
more
aspectsof time-consciousness
cell upwards.
humans.
to
arenot unique
Bearingthesefour points in mind, I shallnow proceedto show how we alreadyare
developingtheorieswhich explaincertainaspectsof time-consciousness.
5.4
EXPLAINING THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS
Throughout this thesis I have referred back repeatedlyto the problem of the direction of
for
for
it
it
Initially
theories
time.
psychological
of time,
appearedto posea greatproblem
appearedthat our experienceof the world as time-asymmetricalwas at variancewith the
5: 21
time reversal invariant laws of the most fundamental laws of physics. However, as we have
direction
level
in
the
time
seen,
problem of the
of
virtually every
of scientific
arises
biology
biology
in
draw
explanation, as the theories
cosmology, thermodynamics,
and
all
behaviour.
it
just
is
So
on time asymmetric
appears that time-asymmetry not
a curiosity of
but
has
be
is
If
to
consciousness,
a real scientific problem that
addressed. and when the
lower
description,
be
levels
is
it
of
problem tackled at
will
much easierto corroboratethe
human experienceof time-asymmetrywith the rest of scientificknowledge.
So, in this section,we will concentrateon anotherproblem of time-consciousness,
how
We
time-perception
time-estimation.
the advancementof
namely
and
will show
knowledgein the brain sciencesis beingbrought to bearon theseaspectsof experience.
It is clear that many philosophersformed ideas that might be included in the
historical corpusof the psychologyof time, including Aristotle in TheIics
and, of course,
Augustine and distensiuni
in his C*sions. However, the earliest true psychological
studies of time stem from 1865onwardswith the birth of the discipline of psychology
itself. Mach, alongwith Vierordt, Wundt, Exner, Benussiand Titchener askedthe question,
(1865),
for
believed
Mach
time?
what do we meanwhen we talk about a sense
of
example,
that we had a time senseorgan.
Interest in the psychologyof time declinedin the first part of the twentieth century
despite the publication of works by Guyau 1890, James 1890, Nichols 1891 and Dondes
1868. It is difficult to suggestreasons for why this should be. The work of Boltzmann and
Einstein had put questions about time firmly at the forefront of scientific research.
Meanwhile, Husserl and Heidegger were doing much the same in philosophy. Despite
by
Bergson,
Janet,
Pieron,
Piaget,
Bachelard,
research
and Fraisse, psychological questions
became
discipline
Finally,
time
to
the
as a whole.
about
marginal
sfter 1951 the sectionon
time was dropped from the influential Harnamokof Experirn7tal Ps)dx kgy (Stevens, 1951).
In 1964,Adams arguedthat we should seek to explain time in terms of a more
basic psychological mechanism. This strategy is similar to other approacheswe have met in
the natural sciences. It will be recalled that several attempts have been made to reduce
in
"more
theories
time
terms
about
of
some
psychological
other
primitive" concept such as
being
here
in
Similar
That
is, we should
entropy or causality.
claims are
made
psychology.
human
in
to
the
time
terms of a more primitive process. It is
seek
explain
experience of
hard to believe that a more basic process or mechanism could be found as time underlies
fundamental
key
It
so many
occupies a
position in cognitive
psychological concepts.
(1993)
has
For
Slife
representations of reality.
argued that time is often a
example,
5: 22
background assumption in psychologicalexplanation. It underlies the explanationsof
behaviour.
has
Indeed
Block
causality,change,processand
one psychologist
claimedthat,
"Non-temporal phenomenado not exist." In all these cases,the writers are not simple
referring to eventstaking placein space-time.They are particularly referring to time as a
is
in
differences
future.
Perhapsthe
structurethat asymmetrical, terms of the
of past and
deeply
most
rooted assumptionunderlyingpsychologicalexplanationis the primacy of the
fuels
hypothesis
the
that presentand future behaviouris dependentupon past
past,which
experience.This hypothesisis drawn upon throughout the breadth of the discipline,for
her
in
behaviour
in
tries
the
to
example, psychotherapywhere
patient
understand abnormal
terms of her familial and socialhistory. Similarlybehaviouristtheoriesof conditioning rely
behaviour
future
learnt
behaviour.
in
the
on
past controlling presentand
The reductionistapproachof Adam assumesthat time-perceptioncan be explained
in terms of one single underlyingfactor. However as I have alreadysuggested,it is more
likely that our time-consciousness
be
functionally
may madeup of severalconceptuallyand
independentprocesses.
5.4.1
THE INTERNAL CLOCK HYPOTHESIS
be
Early hypothesesabout time-consciousness
that
there
claimed
might an organof
for
have
(See,
in
the
time,
sameway that we say that we
other senseorgans.
example, Mach
1865) However, as we said in Chapter 1, our "sense" or "perception" of time is almost
description,
describe
in
the
that
a
metaphorical
same way
certainly
someone as
we might
having a "sense of decency" or being able to "perceive a problem. " As we have already
fall
is
do
"sense"
teen
the
term
to
capture mental events which
seen,
used as a catch-all
not
behaviour.
Other similar terms include
theory
of
readily under the propositional attitude
"instinct" and "intuition, " neither of which can be explained in terms of the sentential
bodily
is
If
"sense"
the
to
model.
a
organ which responds to
word
understood as referring
humans
do
have
dedicated
temporal sense organ
then
a
external stimuli,
certainly
not
inputs
in
for
the
that,
same way
which neurally codes energetic or chemical
example, the
information.
However, we are able to identify
to
olfactory
olfactory pathway responds
brain
in
located,
types
temporal
specific areas of the
of
which specific
processing are
such
hippocampus,
basal
(Edelmann
1989 and 1992) Timethe
cerebellum and
as
ganglia.
is
consciousness not a senseas commonly understood.
5: 23
There have been attempts to partially explain some features of our timelow-level
in
terms
physiologicalphenomena,such as cellular
consciousness
of particular
has
In
particular, much work
concentratedon the
oscillations and metabolic rhythms.
focuses
human
duration,
time estimation and also our
which
on
psychophysicsof
defined
Folk
to
time,
compared
chronometrically
perceptionof
as
periods.
psychologytells
flies
(time
"time
"a
that
contraction),and watchedpot
us
when you are enjoyingyourself"
be
boils"
dilation).
(time
Other
to
never
curiousphenomenaalso need
explained,such as
fact,
before
(In
by
Zung
just
the
to
alarmclock rings.
a study
somepeople'sability wakeup
and Wilson showedthat subjectswere able to wake themselveswithin ten minutes of a
)
has
field.
(1976)
in
Eisler
A
this
taken place
certain amount of overkill
stipulatedtime.
human
different
locate
112
ability to estimatetime periods on
managedto
studieson the
different scales.However, underpinningthis descriptivelevel of human time estimation is
the questionof how theseestimatescome to be made,and here the genuinelyexplanatory
followed
done.
development
has
is
being
The
the classicalpattern
of psychology
research
firstly
describing
That
is,
of scientific research.
measuringand accurately
phenomena,and
then moving on to try and explainthem.
The first and most obvious hypothesis which was proposed to explain the human
kind
The
time
to
timing
was some
mechanism.
earliest
of endogenous
ability
estimate
for
biologically
based
timing mechanism which might underlie this sense
search
a putative
(1890)
hypothesised
link
between
be
by
Munsterberg
timeto
who
a
of time appears
between
heartbeat.
In
Schaefer
Gilliland
1939,
and
posited a connection
perception and
breathing.
has
been
found.
direct
No
Other biological
time-perception and
relationship
hypothesised
have
have
been
internal
the
that
processes
as potentially underlying
clock
been electroencephalogram (EEG) alpha rhythms. (See for example, Anliler
Durenan and Edstrom 1964, Treissman et d 1984), body temperature
1963, and
(Pieron 1923,
Hoagland 1933), and D2 receptor activity in the basal ganglia (Rammsayer 1993,1994).
As a result of suchstudiesit hasbeenhypothesisedthat the body hasone or several
"
"internal
clocks, which underlie time-perception
so-called
(Hancock, 1993). Typically
has
been
internal
such an
clock
modelled as consisting of a temporal oscillator (TO) and a
The
temporal oscillator generates pulses, which are
calibrator or accumulator mechanism.
based
is
by
Time-perception
the
then counted
on the number of oscillations
accumulator.
(See
interval
"normal"
Figure
operating conditions.
enumerated within a given time
under
5.3) The concept of an internal clock based on this model has proved itself to be useful in
(Allan
human
distortions
in
1992)
temporal
perception.
explaining
Figure 5.3: A model for the temporal
pacemaker
(Treisman
et al. 1990)
BSI
Figure I. A model for the temporal pacemaker consisting of two components, a temporal
oscillator (TO) and a calibration unit (CU), is shown. The TO is made up of units connected by
interactions.
Each unit may he affected by
and inhibitory
paths that mediate excitatory
sufficiently strong sensory inputs, SI, which increase its specific arousal. The TO emits a regular
series of pulses at a characteristic oscillator frequency FF.o. These are transmitted to the CU,
which in turn emits the final output of the pacemaker, a series of pulses at the pacemaker
frequency F. This output provides timing information
to the temporal processing mechanisms.
Sensory inputs may act on the CU to increase F.
5: 24
An internal or chemical clock was first proposed as an explanation to explain
differencesbetweenthe subjectiveperception of durations of time and chronometrically
defined durations by the physiologistHudson Hoaglandin 1933.Hoagland observedthat
his wife, who was suffering from 'flu and was running a high temperatureof 104 degrees
Fahrenheit,had vastly overestimatedthe duration of his absencewhen he went out to a
knew
biological
He
that
pharmacist.
many chemicalreactionand
processesare speededup
higher
they
temperatures.He therefore conjecturedthat there was a master
when
occur at
dependent,
body
that
temperature
that
temperatureincreased,the
chemicalclock
was
so
as
(as
increase
body
"normal"
temperature),thus
number of oscillationswould
comparedwith
believing
had
defined
into
that more time
misleading the subject
elapsed than that
however
brain
identify
Hoagland
chronometrically.
could not
any area of the
where this
clock might be located.
Treismann (1963) primarily developedthe concept of an internal clock as an
did
having
Treismann
At
this
the
time,
not speculateon
model
any
explanatorymodel.
biological or neural basis.However researchin psychopharmacologyhas offered support
for the internal clock theory. For exampleit has been shown that the uses of certain
drugs
lysergic
diethylamide
(LSD),
such as
acid
psychoactive
metamphetamineand tetra
hydro cannabinol(THC, cannabis)act as agonistson time-perceptioncausinga reported
had
(i.
had
if
internal
the
e.,
overestimationof the amount of time that
passed
as
clock
speededupThe opposite antagonisticeffect has been noted when subjectshave ingested
haliperidol,
(Friedman
1990).The causeof the
tranquillisers
suchas
alcohol,
or anaesthetics
drugs
has
been
for
is
instancethat the
It
these
respectiveeffects of
contentious.
argued
drugs effect the metabolism, and thus the internal clock (in a model reminiscent of
Hoagland's original temperature modulated chemical clock.) Others have argued that these
drugs alter the effective level of the neurotransmitter dopamine (DA), and that the rate of
the internal clock is a function of the effective level of DA, increased DA levels having an
agonist effect. However, overall the source and effect of the endogenous information that
(See
for
is
still contentious.
contributes to our sense of time
example the discussion in
Friedman 1990,14-15.) However, despite the observed effects of these drugs, there is no
known neurological basis for the internal clock, though, for example, some have argued
that the clock might be located in the superchiasmatic nucleus. (Block 1990) Although
Treisman and the others may not have found an internal clock, their work has made
features
the
towards
of
phenomenological
explaining some
of time-consciousness,
progress
such as time dilation ("time flying") and time contraction ("time dragging).
5: 25
5.4.2
ZEITGEBERS
The lack of successin isolating a single variable determining the speed of a putative internal
has
led
is
to
that
there
probably no central, neural
clock
some to researchers conclude
by
had
for
is
Aschoff
Support
Aschoff.
the
this thesis provided
argued
pacemaker.
work of
(1964) that,
There is apparently no organ and no function in the body which does not
(1964,1427)
daily
exhibit a similar
rhythmicity.
However he also noted that humans, when deprived of exogenousexternal cues, or
"zekgdTn",underwent a desynchronisationof some rhythms from others. For example,
daily
light
deprived
(literally,
time-givers) such as
and temperature
when
of ze4dvs
human
(Most
day
"normal"
changes,the
sleepand temperaturecyclesalter.
noticeably,the
increasesto an averageof about 25.5hours when there is no siderealcue.) The observation
(1984)
desynchronisation
different
bodily
led
Aschoff
to suggesthat,
rhythms
of
of the
humans
have
kept
in
internal
that
than
a
number
of
oscillators
are
masterclock,
rather
one
likely
by
it
by
intrinsic
in
So
that
the
appears
changes
environment.
synch zeitrs, namely,
for
do
have
have,
in
time
the
that
a senseof
way
we
example,an olfactory sense.
we
not
Sensebeing heredefined asthe neuralcoding of stimuli impinging on the body, which uses
specific neurons that transduce energetic or chemical stimuli, and which use specific
brain.
direct
for
In
to
the
there
time.
areno
environmentalstimuli
other words,
pathways
However at an automatic (sub-cognitive)level, the body does respond to certain
forms of externalstimuli that appearinextricablyassociatedwith time. And further more,
have
important
as we
seen above, these external stimuli play an
part in regulatingthe
functions.
bodily
jetlag
is
For
the
example,
experience
unpleasant
of
caused
rhythm of
becomes
its
body
Known
the
with
environmental
out of synch
cues.
as a circadian
when
body,
internally
to
the
responding external cues
simulatesthe 24-hour
cycle or rhythm,
body
It
the
the
temperaturecycle,
sleep-wakecycle,
cycle. regulatesand synchronises
feeding patterns,as well as other hormonal and metabolic activity. (Friedman 1990)The
has
effectson cognitivetasks,perceptionand motor performance.
circadiancyclealso
However though circadiancyclesmay be useful for assessinghow much time has
large
(i.
days),
little
it
help
is
there
that
scale e.
evidence
can
explain
passedon a relatively
5: 26
time-perceptionin the rangeof minutes and seconds.However there appearsto be some
between
deprived
isolated
When
time-perception.
correlation
sleep-wakecyclesand
and
of
had
longest
had
the
zeitg n or external cues,subjectswho
the
wake-sleepcycles,also
longestsubjectiveestimateof an hours duration. (Aschoff 1985)
To briefly summarise,it is not useful to try and explain our time-perceptionin
fundamental
does
Nor
terms of some other more
process.
evidencesuggestthat there is a
by
single underlying mechanismthat could explain our time-consciousness,
whether
a
dedicated organ of time, or some from of internal clock. No neurological evidence
has
been
found.
likely
It
these
that there is no
supporting either of
mechanisms yet
seems
it
is
However
singleneural pacemaker.
clearthat rhythms, oscillationsand cyclespermeate
lives,
itself
behaviour
from
in
this
the singlecell
every aspectof our
and
manifests
regular
it
is
functioning
levels
Also
is
that
the co-ordinated
these
upwards.
clear
of
at all
necessary
behavioural
function.
Aschoff's work suggeststhat
to maintain normal
and physiological
fulfil
function
in
externalenvironmentalcues
a vital
maintainingsynchronisation.So there
is a complex explanatoryrelationshipbetweenthe externalworld, the functioning of the
body and our experienceof time. Any integratedtheory would haveto incorporateall these
factors. It begsthe question of whether it will be possibleto adopt one, singletheoretical
factors
is
in
that
the
viewpoint
capableof explaining various
affecting time-consciousness
has
led
It
one researcherto conclude,
psychologicalanalysis.
No existing model can handle the variety of experimental evidence on
(Block
1990,1)
time.
psychological
5.5
CONCLUSION
is going to be highly complicated.We have only
Any explanationof time-consciousness
examinedthe researchon one small area,namely,time-perceptionand time explanation,
and alreadywe can seethat there are many potential factors involved. A fuller accountof
have
how
time-consciousness
to
would also
cover memory, anticipationand clairvoyance,
how
temporal
we representor make models of a
world,
we orient ourselvesin time, and
the developmentof time-consciousness
throughout life. It would also have to take into
differences
language.
in
(Friedman
1990)
account
culture and
5: 27
However what is apparentis that the detail theseempiricalstudiesprovide is not irrelevant
fragmented.
being,
highly
is
For
the
time
the
to our understanding.
empirical evidence
However,asknowledgeabout eachof theseareasincreaseswe may be ableto integratethe
knowledgemore easily.However it is not obvious that at the end of the researchtherewill
be a unitary time-consciousness,
in the sameway that vision is not a single,unified sense.
Already certain naive hypotheses,such as the master clock co-ordinating all bodily
likely
being
looks
It
that the complexity of accountwill match the
rejected.
processes,are
perplexityof our phenomenologicalexperience.
Finally, an explanation of time-consciousnesswill have to connect our experience with our
both
is
It
the conscious
environment.
apparent that we are sensitive to the environment at
level.
features
do
just
By
not
such as
environment, we
mean natural
and the sub-conscious
heat
light,
but
in
also the social environment, such as work routine and time
and
changes
bigger
Ultimately
there
are
questions at stake, such as explaining our experience
pressure.
is
be
issue
in
isolation,
It
tackled
time
that
asymmetry.
apparent
such an
could not
of
and
basic
have
be
been
tackled at the most
can only
answered when some very
problems
fundamental levels of explanation. For it is clear that time-consciousness is not something
but
is
very much a product of the world. And the way to explain timeprior to the world,
is
consciousness through a truly unified approach.
6:1
CHAPTER 6
TOWARDS A UNIFIED THEORY OF TIME
Thetime is out of joint; 0 cursedspite,
That everI was born to setit right!
Hamlet
We began with the bafflement felt by St. Augustine when he tried to explain time.
He expresseda certain consternation that something which is so fundamental should
be
from
Examples
also
so abstruse.
a wide range of theories and disciplines confirm
that, to date, there is no single, unified theory of time. Indeed, aswe have seen,there
is virtually no consensus over any aspect of time. All the major questions
surrounding time remain unanswered.Is time a real property of the world, or is it a
by
imposed
the mind? What is the structure of time? Is it
structure
on the world
linear or cyclic? Finite or infinite? Dense or discrete?Does time have a direction, or is
by
time-asymmetry
our experience of
a quirk of consciousness,perhaps caused the
have
for
human
life
that
to
to exist? Is time relative or
peculiar conditions
obtain
absolute? Does time actually exist at all, or is it caused by a conspiracy of
clockmakers? Unfortunately, at the end of this thesis, these questions will remain
intention
It
to tackle any of these important issues.
unanswered. was never my
However, the fact that all of these questions still remain unanswered was my
departure point.
In Chapter 1, I showed the variety of conflicting ways that the term time is
different
found
in
differences
We
in
types
theory.
that
of
substantial
used
existed the
is
in
different
disciplines.
differences
be
These
best
time
way
conceptualised
could
illustrated by the contrast between time in three different theories: the specialtheory
be
brief,
To
in
thermodynamics
time
the special
of relativity,
and phenomenology.
theory of relativity is objective and reversible (time reversal invariant). Time in
but
is
irreversible. Finally, time in phenomenological
thermodynamics
objective
(or
is
theory
subjective
rather pre-subjective) and irreversible. Moreover, these
differences are not confined to theories, operating at different levels of description.
They also exist within the sameresearchprogramme. For example, there is a debate
in fundamental physics as to whether its laws really are time reversal invariant, or
laws
deeper
level.
there
time-asymmetrical
that
whether
are
pertain at an even
We also showed that a similar degree of disarray obtains between so called
"folk" theories about time. Though the linear form of representation appearsto be
the dominant cultural form, this is a relatively recent innovation. Previously the
6:2
dominant,
cyclical representation of time was
and there are still cultures that prefer
this form. (In the Appendix, we discussedthe inadequacy of folk theories as a basis
for scientific researchprogrammes.)
Even in philosophy, there is no consensus. In fact, particularly in philosophy,
being
discussed.
is
We cited the examples of
one wonders whether the same concept
Reichenbach, McTaggart and Heidegger, and found that they held scarcely anything
in common.
Paul Ricoeur has exploited the disarray surrounding the concept of time to
focal
for
priori
make an extraordinary a
claim, which would provide the
point
our
thesis.
We are not capable of producing a concept of time that is at once
biological,
historical
individual.
(Ricouer,
cosmological,
and
quoted in
Virilio 1991,103)
My intention was not to try and to produce a concept of time that was capable of
different
these
unifying all
elements.Rather, Ricoeur's arguments and those of others
in
dissatisfied
believed
Wood,
I
the
tradition,
working
phenomenological
such as
me.
that their arguments were informed by a myopic, muddled and positively 19`h
Century understanding of the scientific project. Hence, my aim is to show that
Ricoeur's claim will not stand up to scrutiny, and that there are no principled
arguments against the possibility of a unified theory of time. And furthermore, to
demonstrate that recent developments in the philosophy of science and the
have
philosophy of mind
made such a unified theory a plausible goal.
In the next four chapters, I analysed the major objections that stood in the
In
Chapter
2, we examined Husserl's arguments in The
theory.
way of a unified
Phenomenologyof Internal Time-Consciousness.
Husserl made several claims. Firstly,
first
hand
the claim that
or "lived" experience is not reducible to any natural
is,
description.
This assertion
that
scientific explanation,
publicly available objective
based
his
knowledge
belief
is
that
was
on
scientific
a secondary, derivative and
inauthentic type of knowledge that relies on the intentional act of the subject to
his
basis,
it.
Husserl
Using
this
constitute and validate
as
was able to make several
additional claims. Firstly, that phenomenology is the only possible foundation for
is
It
the
truths
thought,
epistemology. alone can reveal
eternal
of
and thus the only
possible philosophy. We saw that in The Phenomenology of Internal TimeConsciousness,
Husserl used this claim to disqualify all other potential candidatesfor a
philosophy of time. We challengedHusserl's claim that, phenomenology is the only
discipline appropriate for the study of experience. On the basis of his study of time-
6:3
limitations
his
human
the
temporality. We
consciousness,we showed
account of
of
his
by
his
inability
incorporate
that
to
argued
position was weakened
corroborating
from,
for
Finally,
evidence
psychology.
example,
we examined the methodological
difficulties presented by phenomenology. Due to its rejection of natural scientific
its
method, phenomenology requires
own methodology and its own grounds for
left
isolated
However,
it vulnerable and
the
this
validation.
adoption of
position
has
developed
its
the
uncorroborated, whereas
natural scientific approach
meanwhile
own sophisticated non-foundationalist and co-evolutionary strategiesfor validation.
Phenomenology, almost by fiat, finds itself unable to validate its analyses. The
hand
for
has
the
the
philosophy of science,on
other
and
most part,
abandonedthe
foundationalist
has
developed
highly
its
project of
epistemology, and
own
sophisticated methods of corroboration. Philosophy of science has moved on.
Phenomenology has not.
In Chapter 3, we examined some different a priori arguments within the
from
different
but
Husserl,
Like
philosophy of science.
a
perspective,they questioned
be
brought
bear
to
whether empirical evidence can
on questions about the structure
be
by
time,
of
or whether such matters could only
settled
convention. We also asked
justified
in saying that time exists?Or is the concept of time just a
whether we are
fiction
helps
bind
laws.
We
that
to
together
useful
certain scientific observations and
from
the fundamental sciences can be brought to bear on
argued that evidence
decline.
is
in
time,
that
the
priori
philosophical questions about
and
a
approach
Recent developments in the philosophy of science have facilitated this empirical
decades,
been
has
from
foundational
both
In
there
approach.
recent
a shift away
laws
individual
based
their
questions of meaning, and an emphasison
and
evidence
has
been
by
This
on observation.
replaced
an emphasis on research programmes,
bootstrapping, the coevolution of theories and super-empirical virtues. This has
for
bear
to
opportunities
opened up
a wider variety of evidence
on our theories, and
be
also meansa whole set of new techniquescan adopted. Importantly, for us, it gives
bring
by
tools
which to
empirical evidenceto bear on questions of time.
us a set of
In Chapter 4, we saw the limitations of the overall unity of sciencehypothesis
by
described
The
Oppenheim
Putnam.
as
and
classicalaccount of unity of science,as
describedby Putnam and Oppenheim falls foul of many of the sameproblems facing
the overall positivist project, as discussedin the previous chapter. In particular, the
epistemological significance of theoretical evolution was overlooked. We saw how
the hypothesis fell foul of the multiple realisability argument, and how Fodor has
for
disunity.
The
has
this
used
as an argument
classicalaccount of unity of science
had to adapt itself to accommodate the post-positivist account of theory evolution.
Nevertheless there are no principled arguments, which challenge the metaphysical
6:4
have
is,
it
That
the
the
arguments, which we
core, as were, of
project.
mone of
discussed, has challenged Oppenheim and Putnam's fundamental claim that
by
laws
describable
They
is
in
principle
the
themselveswere
of physics.
everything
do
impracticalities
to
this. However, certain
the
trying
of actually
aware of
flexible
be
have
We
neededto
modifications
made.
argued that a more
understanding
different
levels
description
do
have
was required, as real theories
not always
of the
of
distinct levels that are "natural. ". Oppenheim and Putnam also required that the laws
from
be
logically
deducible
theory
the reducing theory.
the
reduced
should
of
However, this stipulation has had to be relaxed in order to accommodate statistical
laws.
hypothesis
has
had
be
The
to
and probabilistic
also
relaxed to accommodatethe
fact that certain terms can only be reduced locally and not globally. Also, it has had
differences
between
different
types of explanation. There is
to recognise the
fundamental level of explanation, which determines the boundary conditions and
initial conditions of the entire system, and there is no form of behaviour that is not
by
its
But
there are also other types of explanation
explanatory
principles.
governed
form
behaviour
being
described,
providing a simplified
of
which are apposite to the
features
level.
important
the
of that
characterisation, which nevertheless captures
However they are not fundamental explanations, and do not therefore threaten
fundamental
is
We
the
also saw that the question of what
explanatory unification.
level of explanation is not yet settled. Finally, we highlighted the practical difficulties
involved in explaining and predicting the behaviour of a complex system in terms of
the fundamental level. However, aswe have seen,none of these difficulties challenges
the essenceof the unity of sciencehypothesis, and it remains an ideal still driving
hypothesis
have
investigation.
Moreover,
that
a unity of science
we now
scientific
formalised,
but
be
into
takes
which
account the contingencies
may not
complete and
is
of scientific research, and thus, more resilient to the complexity of real scientific
explanation.
In Chapter 5, we examined the specific problem of reducing theories about
brain
has
Nagel
In
theories
to
about
states. particular,
argued that there
mental states
is a special subjective quality of first hand experiencethat cannot be captured by an
have
have
description.
Fodor
Also
that
and others
claimed
a
objective
we already
successfuland autonomous theory of mind, and that this means questions about
be
mental states can
answered without reference to any empirical theory, such a
issue
We
Finally
tackled
the
time.
we
of our subjective experience of
neuroscience.
be
a naturalised psychology
answeredthose critics who claimed that there could not
do
did
by
We
this
philosophical argument alone. We
not
of time-consciousness.
demonstrated
that this
actually took an aspect of our time-consciousness and
is
by
be
It
only
explained objectively.
allowing a
subjective experience could
6:5
description
its
in
the
terms
naturalised
of
mind, explained
of
relation to its
environment, that we can truly start work on the ultimate grand unifying theory.
Although much work in this direction has begun, we have argued that it is
fragmented, partly through the limitations of our current knowledge, but more
background
inadequate
through
particularly
an
of coherent philosophical thought.
This has lead both philosophers and scientiststo attempt grand metaphysical answers
to muddled philosophical questions which threaten the progress which natural
scienceand the philosophy of sciencehave offered in the secondhalf of the twentieth
century.
7: 1
APPENDIX
THE
DEGENERATION
OF THE
"FOLK"
OLFACTORY
RESEARCH
PROGRAMME
7.1
INTRODUCTION
There has been a persisting assumption in some philosophical quarters that a distinction
be
between
kind
"ordinary"
the
can
made
our
understanding of
world and the
of
knowledge that is generated by scientific investigation. Implicit in this assumption is the
belief that "ordinary" knowledge is in some way basic or "given", and thus immune to
belief
for,
This
justified
theoretical change.
though our scientific
apparently
seems
knowledge about the world in which we live has radically altered since the time of
Aristotle's investigations, the manner in which we ordinarily observe and explain the world
has remained, for the most part, unchanged. Athenians would still explain their actions in
terms of desires and beliefs, and make observation statements that we could understand,
"
"honey
tastes
sweet.
suchas
It has been argued that the two most significant changes in epistemology this
have
deceptive
the
century
undermined
simplicity of these types of explanation and
has
become
known as Folk Psychology
Firstly,
the explanatory value of what
observation.
human
behaviour has been severely criticised, and new and
as a means of explaining
fruitful
being
potentially more
paradigms of explanation are
proposed. Secondly, in the
by,
for
important
(1966),
(1970)
Hesse
Kuhn
Feyerabend
wake of
work
example,
and
(1962), the theoretical nature of all our knowledge, including perceptual knowledge, has
been exposed, in what represents a major shift away from foundationalist epistemology.
It will be shown that the naive conception of perceptual knowledge as being
independentand untainted by theory is no longer tenable. It is as implicated within a
theoretical system as any other form of knowledge. In particular, a strict dichotomy
between descriptive and explanatorycharacterisationsis shown to be untenable by any
development
the
serious analysisof
of scientific thought. The example of olfaction
in
illustrates
this
that the adequacyof perceptualjudgementsis dependent
paper
presented
framework
the
theoretical
the
adequacyof
on
within which they are made. Indeed, an
impoverished framework will hinder the full use being made of sensory information
availableto the observer.
7: 2
7.1.1 WHY OLFACTION?
The exampleof the olfactory researchprogrammehas severaladvantagesfor the argument.
Mainly, it is unencumberedby the philosophicaltradition and weight of discussionunder
for
which,
example,the topic of visual perception currently labours. Furthermore, it is
impossible,
doubt
to
the truth of everyday
almost
psychologically and culturally,
descriptions of visual perception. The argument of the paper allows us to evaluatea
different sensorymodality, which has remainedrelatively free of the burden of historical
consideration.
The study of the chemical senses, and in particular olfaction, has received until
little
recently relatively
attention when compared with the more familiar modalities of sight
hearing.
This neglect is due to several contributory factors. (Doty,
and
1994) Firstly,
flavour
in
taste,
although
smell and
play an enriching role
our everyday experience, the
(the
have
insensitivity
less
drastic
to
condition of anosmia
partial or global
odours) may
a
dehabilitating
lives
loss
impairment
hearing.
than
the
and
effect on our
or
of sight or
Secondly, and probably as a consequenceof the former reason, there is a commonly held
humans.
Boring (1942,437)
that
the
opinion
chemical senses are unimportant to
had
if
been a dog, we would have had hefty studies on the
Helmholtz
commented that
chemical senses,instead of his three volumed tome on the physiology of vision. A similar
lack of interest led William James (1890) in his Prýxz1es of PYydWW to comment "olfaction
be
book,
in
the
touched
and
this
chemical sensesneed not
upon
as almost nothing of
known
interest
is
psychological
of them. " Even scientists with a vested interest in olfactory
have
research
concluded, "the senseof smell seems to be a non-vital or dying function in
(Nef
1993,266). Finally, unlike audition or vision, there appears to be no single
man"
important physical property that correlates with the quality of taste or odour. For example,
Schiffman (1981) concludes that no single physico-chemical property is useful for
predicting olfactory quality.
Science's concentration on vision and audition is reproduced in philosophical
writing. A cursory glance at Merleau-Ponty's chapter on "Sense Experience" in the
Phenomenology of Perception (1962) revealed not a single reference to the chemical
focus
is on vision. At the opposite end of the philosophical
Its
senses.
predominant
spectrum, as it were, the index to Patricia Chumhland's Neugiilosophy (1986) has two
7: 3
independentreferencesto olfaction, and only one to gustation,whilst having over fifty
relatedto aspectsof vision.
The argument will be in two stages. The first will expose the "theoretical"
behind
assumptions
everyday olfactory judgements. The second will expose the inadequacy
background
of this theoretical
when evaluated in light of recent systematic research. The
conclusion will be that new theoretical understanding will suggest a wholly new "unfolk"
set of perceptual categories.
Let us first sketch, albeit briefly, the main content of our folk theories about
perception, particularly the understanding of taste and smell that is manifest in everyday
language.There is difficulty for the framework of "ordinary beliefs" which is under scrutiny
has been so deeply assimilated, that it is scarcely recognised as theory at all. Indeed, its
have
insidious
is
it
is
it
that
that
to
so
several
misleading
nature
critics
argued
posit as a
be
(Wilkes,
it
has
However
1978)
theory and therefore should not
evaluated as such.
almost
become a philosophical platitude to argue that the concepts and theories of a particular
be
in
And,
that
this case, when the
made explicit within
paradigm.
paradigm can not
framework that we are trying to isolate is ensconced in the structure and content of
language,
further
is
the
problem
magnified. However, as philosophers as
ordinary, everyday
diverse as Thomas Kuhn (1970), Hans Georg Gadamer (1965) and Michel Foucault (1966)
have concurred, the emergenceof a new and competing paradigm facilitates the evaluation
have
been
(m
And,
the
this case,the consequenceof
old.
as
new
of
we
arguing, a
paradigm
has
become
deeply
recent scientific research on olfaction) can reveal what
so
assimilated
into the common parlance as to become transparent, qua theory.
7.2
THE FIVE FAMILIAR
SENSORY MODALITIES
OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
The belief that we possessfive sensorymodalities(sight,hearing,touch, taste,and smell)is
deeply entrenchedin the layperson'sscientific knowledge.In school, children are taught
they have five senses.The term "sixth sense"is well established,often used to indicate
faculties
humans
unfamiliar, or sometimesparanormal,sensory
which
may possess.It
be
seemsthat nothing could more manifestto us than the objects of our own senses.We
introspect
find
to
our own sensory experiences
need only
evidence in their support.
However, belief in these five familiar sensorymodalities is systematicallydistorting our
beliefs
The
"folk"
observation.
ordinary common senseor
about the senses,which are
language,
learn
in
in
in
represented our everyday
our culture, and what we
are significantly
7: 4
false.As with many of our folk theories,its comprehensionof the chemicalsenseshas
has
developed
in
Aristotelian
science,and
not
substantiallysince.
roots
7.2.1
THE MANY LESS FAMILIAR
SENSORY MODALITIES
OF CONTEMPORARY
SCIENCE
Contrary to everythingthat most of us (non-specialists)believe,humanshave more than
five senses.However, no claims are being made here about us having paranormal powers.
Shepherd (1988) has identified many different types of sensory receptors, each responding
familiar
different
As
to
transductory mechanisms that are
well as the
external stimuli.
light
responsive to sound,
and volatile chemicals, others are sensitive to temperature,
(See
fields,
deforming
Figure 7.1)
magnetic
oxygen, motion and
powers, such as pressure.
Already our ordinary knowledge looks like a scanty version of the fuller picture presented
to us by modern physical and biological sciences.It might be argued that the five familiar
homo
important
the
to
modalities represent
most
senses us,
sajars. However, when we
knowledge
five
knowledge,
these
those which are
evaluate our
of
sensesagainst scientific
does
folk
to
theory present an incomplete
supposedly of the most use
us, not only
knowledge of human sensory capacity, it is also a very confusedknowledge.
As has already been indicated, in the light of modern scientific knowledge, it is
increasingly apparent that we are less than familiar with those senses that we claim to
know. What folk theory might have characterised as a single sense resulting in an
has
been
(1989)
For
Peter
Smith
apparently simple sensation
refuted.
example,
cites the
he
have
been
At
example of visual perception.
one time,
says, we might
able to think of
involving
"a
the triggering of a play of
perception
as
relatively
straightforward
matter,
visual
before
images
"
However
the
mind's
eye.
uninterpreted
studies of neurophysiology and
highly
have
has
discrete
involving
that
shown
clinical cases
vision
a
complex substrate,
light
dark
the
perception of edges, of movement, of
neural computations, such as
and
and
have
localised
damage
have
Clinical
studies of patients who
sustained
neural
vertices.
identified the different contributory computations that constitute normal vision. For
inability
to perceivemovement.Here, the patientwas unableto pour herselfa
example,the
from
fluid
for
the spout as a solid, and was unableto
emanating
she saw the
cup of tea,
detectthe level in the cup rising. Another patient suffering from a different form of visual
faces,
individual's
despite
having
acutevision. He could
agnosiawas unable to recognise
forms,
knowledge
by
line
indicating
of global
and could make good
recognisesilhouettes,
line drawingsof faces.Through such clinical studies,it is known that visual perceptionis
Figure 7.1: Different
Oxygen
types of sensory receptors in vertebrates.
Taste
00
Smell
Somatosensory
Hearing
Muscle
(Shepherd 1988)
Vision
pp
°o00oQ
oý
Y
i
7: 5
by
distinct
be
dysfunctional.
However,
constituted
sub-computations,some of which may
factors
become
highly
none of these
could
apparentwithin, and are
counterintuitiveto, our
folk theory of vision.
7.2.2
"TASTE",
GUSTATION AND FLAVOUR
The chemicalsenseshave a highly complexstructurethat is not reflectedin the vocabulary
language.
knowledge
is
Scientific
and use of ordinary
of olfaction and gustation now at
is
taste
odds with our common understandingof
and smell,which muddled and mistaken.
For example,the term "taste," as it is commonly used, refers not to a single sensory
but
to several. When a person "tastes" a glassof wine, most of what she
modality
fact
by
is,
is
in
Taste
is
"smell.
"
the
that
experiences
contributed
olfactory sense,
scientifically restricted to the single modality of gustation. Taste, in this sense,only
flavour
foodstuff.
beverage
This
10%
to
the
the
contributesabout
of variance
overall
of
or
be
demonstrated
by
is
inhibited
'flu
when
olfaction
may
readily
a cold or
and the nasal
passagesare obstructed. Consequently, we observe that food loses almost all of its flavour.
What is generally called "taste" may be more accurately designated by the term "flavour. "
Overall flavour quality is constituted by several different senses:olfaction, gustation, the
described
is
trigeminal
common chemical or
sense and what
somewhat erroneously
as
"mouthfeel, " as well as temperature and sensitivity to pH (acidity and alkalinity). (See
Figures 7.2 and 7.3) What might have been perceived as a single, homogeneous sensory
least
four
different
be
broken
down
into
"taste,
"
at
experience of
can
channels of sensory
information. It is the ability to discriminate and identify these distinct components that is
by
(wine
beer)
the professional
taster. For example, the American Society of
or
used
Brewing-Chemists (ASBC) Flavour Wheel, which is used for analysing beer, has forty-four
descriptors for flavour notes. These are arranged into twelve general odour descriptors, and
descriptors,
some of which overlap with those of odour.
six or seven general gustatory
Within the gustatory classes,there is a mouthfeel subclass, a fullness of body subclass as
descriptors
that identify trigeminal qualities. (SeeFigure 7.4) The trained taster is
well as
different
for
forty-four
indicators
then able to utilise
analysing and describing the flavour
beer.
doing
her
far
is
beer
She
perceiving
within
of
a
richer conceptual understanding of
than other folk. Having been trained to discriminate these properties, they are in a much
stronger position to exploit and appreciate the sensory information which is presented to
them.
Figure 7.2: Primary branches of the trigeminal
(Silver
1987)
cavities.
oral
nerve that innervate
ophl
'sd
maxillary
mandibul
bucc:
posterior
palat
lingua
palatine
the nasal and
1990)
(Ney
flavour
in
assessment
Role
7.3:
senses
the
Figure
chemical
of
BRAIN
zco
zz
a
x
V)
Qo0
dd
ADSTRINGENT
ACID
FAT
ETHANOL
cl)
N
_j
i3
o0
}
CL.
0
ý-'
SMELL
NOSE
th
cý
cam.
PUNGCOOL UMANI
ENT
SWEET
SALTY
STARCH
WATER
BITTER
TASTE
TONGUE
PROTEIN
GAS
'O=7\
7: b
The theory-laden nature of observation statements permeates every item of
knowledge,down to the "simplest" of senseperceptions.It is not only grand theories of
flat
science,such as
earth theories,Ptolmeic astronomyand caloric theories of heat,that
are vulnerableto elimination.The exampleof the training of the professionaltastershows
the plasticity by which we can adapt to changeswithin our perceptual categories.It also
illustrateshow, through comparisonwith more sophisticatedtheories of perception,these
folk theoriesqua theoriescan be mademanifest.Their theoreticalnatureobscuredby their
familiarity. The example of the folk theory of "taste" compared with contemporary
has
framework
theoretical
the
scientific understandingof olfaction and gustation
exposed
judgements
within which our perceptual
about what are variously called sense-datum,
directly
It
qualia or rawfeelsare alwaysmade.
challengesthose philosophers,particularly
have
believe
in
be
those the phenomenologicalschool,who would
there
that
can
such a
us
thing as a pure object of conscious experience,that is noemata untainted by theory.
Though the framework may not be explicit, our observationalstatementsare already
determinedby impromptu theories.The meaning/senseof our observationsderivesfrom
this framework, and is not, as somewould argue,intrinsic to the qualitativenature of the
information
itself.
sensory
It is within this common theoreticalstructurethat we speakof the five senses,and
believethat we know what we aretalking about when we tastea pint of beer.However,as
has alreadybeen shown, our folk theories are often very wrong about those things that
have
In
to
the
the
they
seem most manifest
case of
us.
chemical senses
produced a
folk
describe
What
thus
the
theories
and
senses.
superficialawareness
understandingof
our
is
is
discrete
"taste"
What
taste
scarcely
at all.
perceivedas a
as
modality is a complex
different
senses.
combinationof several
7.3
CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON GUSTATORY RESEARCH
The exampleof "taste"will demonstratehow folk theoriesare influencedby environment
theseinfluenceshavebeeninherited by scientistsworking within
and culture.Subsequently,
have
had
the same culture and
an identifiable effect on investigation and findings. For
four
basic
Western
theories
there
that
of gustationsuggested
example,
were
categoriesof
taste, correspondingto specialisedreceptor cells in the oral cavity, and more specifically
in
This
is
tongue.
the
evident Henning'stastetetrahedron,eachcorner responding
areasof
to the four categoriesof tastes:sweet,sour, bitter and salty.The literature on gustationon
7: 7
the whole still cleaves to these four prototypical categories, however recent studies, most
notably the work of Japanese researchers, Kawamura and Kare (1987) have called into
for
Kawamura
Kare
their
question
the adoption of a fifth
usefulness.
and
argue the case
form
food
Umamis
is
taste
taste.
primary
umami
or
protein
the
most common
additive
(MSG),
but
its gustatory quality can be also noted in fish, meat,
monosodium-l-glutamate
foodstuffs.
As well as MSG, guanosine 5'mushrooms and cheese, as well as other
monophosphate and inosine 5'-monophosphate are also examples of umami stimuli. (Rolls,
1994) In the West, we have recently become familiar with MSG as a cited flavour enhancer
in the ingredient's list of many processed foods. However the use of MSG in Eastern
far
is
domestic
kitchen,
In
Japanese
MSG is as basic an
the
cooking
more commonplace.
ingredient as sucrose ("sugar") or sodium chloride ("salt"). (Downer, 1986,10) So it seems
that our theories about taste have been influenced and obscured by the learned sensitivities
historically
Western
the
of
palate, and
scientific theory has reflected our cultural mores.
Work by Bailiss and Rolls (1991) examined the viability of this fifth taste or
found
They
gustatory stimulant.
single neurons in the primary taste cortex and
had
following
orbitofrontal cortex taste areasthat
to
the
optimal responses
chemicals:
MSG (umami), glucose (sweet),sodium chloride (salty), hydrogen chloride (sour) and
hydrogen
(bitter.
)
They
quinine
chloride
concludedthat glutamate,which producesumami
tastein humans,is approximatelyaswell representedin the primary taste cortical areasas
the four familiar categories.Similar conclusionswere reached by Plata-Salamanet al,
(1992.)
The position of the four primary gustatory categories have been further
by
the proposal of a sixth gustatory primary
undermined recently
by
Sclafani
starchiness
(1987.) He claims that glucose containing oligosaccharide (Polycose) can be identified as
distinct
The
taste.
producing a
carbohydrate
proposal of new gustatory primaries suggests
is the debate concerning the existence of primary tastes is far from over. Indeed Scott and
Giza conclude,
[I]t is clear that the number of primary tastes is not settled. Other amino acids,
lipids,
for
in
proteins, nucleotides,
vitamins, or minerals may vie
primacy
The
tools
selected species or across phyla.
-
biochemical, electrophysiological,
behavioural,
anatomical,
and psychophysical
for evaluating the criteria for
becoming
discipline
has
though
the
primacy are
available,
yet to agree on what
those criteria should be. (Scott and Giza 1994,619)
7: 8
Related to the issues introduced by the positing of umami and starchiness as additional
is
demise
the
primary gustatory qualities,
gradual
of the theory which postulated specialist
for
(See
Figure 7.5) Nineteenth century
the
receptors cells
each of
primary qualities.
theories of gustation claimed there were four discrete and mutually independent receptor
(Oehrwall,
The
1891)
cells.
evidence that there were primary tastes initially came from
introspection, and received support from classical psychophysics, electrophysiological
line"
Boring's
"labelled
theory of gustation
measurements and modern psychophysics.
(1942) claimed that each primary quality had its own distinct receptor mechanism that
would transduce non-volatile chemical information to the CNS via its own dedicated
channel. (Scott and Giza, 1994) There were disagreements about the number of primary
tastes, ranging from two (Valentin, 1853) to eleven (von Halter, 1786), but from Aristotle
four
familiar
the
time
to
present
general consensusclustered around the
categories.
Scientific research, specifically the search for primary receptors, has been
determinedby an Aristotelian theory that categorisedtastesinto distinct classes.Evidence
it
suggeststhat was Aristotle's obsessionwith taxonomy as a meansof systematicenquiry
foundations
laid
for
that
the
the theory of primary tastes.
M he types of taste, just as in the case of colours, in their simplest forms are
bitter,
but
opposites, sweet and
connected with these are oily and saline; in
between come acid, pungent, astringent and sharp. Those seem to be all the
differences in taste. (Aristotle, De anima, 422a)
The hypothesisthat there are a small number of identifiable primary tasteshas structured
doubtful
is
It
the
time.
much gustatoryresearchuntil
present
whether the conceptof taste
in
by
his
heirs
Aristotle
is plausible.The theory that
the
categorisation
senseperceived
and
initiated
tastes
the searchto identify taste receptors that are uniquely
there are primary
four
tuned to the
putative primaries. However research has not corroborated this
hypothesis.Pfaffman (1941),using electronicamplifiersand filters to record the discharges
discovered
basic
single
specific
to
than
of
neurons,
axons responded more
one
gustatory
That
is,
rather than possessingspecialisedreceptors,taste cells in mammalswere
quality.
"broadly tuned," responding, in varying degrees, to several different taste stimuli.
Pfaffman's conclusion has found support in more recent researchdone by Kimura and
Beidler (1961)and Sato(1986.)
]Figure 7.5: Diagram of tongue showing areas of sensitivity
1973)
(Buss
tastes.
primary
? "'
hJ
ýIýý
l5
r
ýý
ýi
rý
_
ý}(:
ýý-:.,
""' ti
. iý.
ý"ý'
''S
__ "V
ý'yj
lIi
V'F
L..
i.
L"ý
,L
el m jý
"V
-51
"ý
":ý'
Bitter
l
jj
ý`ýý
ýi ý.
'.
to four traditional
Sour
s. -Qw
ý.
VVV
g-tit
"
L:
ram
pY.
ýO-`
Salt
_...
ýý"-0ýý?
ýL
a
", ýj
Sweet
Fig.
9.5a
Distribution
of taste sensitivity along the
tongue. (From Psychology: Man in Perspective,
by A.
Buss, JViley, New Fork, 1!97.3,,
p. 779. Reprinted by
Permission of the publisher. )
7: 9
The researchprogramme, which sought to posit a small number of primary
being
by
discovery
is
has
As
the
compromised
of
additional
classes.
gustatory qualities,
beenshown the initial schemaproposedby Henning positing four primary tasteshasbeen
hoc
have
it
looks
if
Furthermore,
Scott
Giza
to
modification.
as
stated,
subject ad
and
as
further additionscan not be ruled out. Clearly,wider investigationis driving theory andnot
the other way around.
7.4
THEORIES OF OLFACTORY CODING
The study of olfaction has followed a similar path to that of gustation. Research has again
been characterised by, firstly, attempts to identify a small number of primary odours, and
in
identification
the olfactory epithelium.
type
the
secondly,
of odour
specific receptors
However the failure of this project is more pronounced for olfaction. Whereas in gustation,
identifying
is
in
interest
in
traditional odour
primaries still seen as viable, olfaction,
work on
has
but
face
been
In
the
abandoned.
of theoretical arguments
classificatory systems
all
(1986)
from
by
Lancet
Buck and Axel
and more recent experimental evidence
proposed
(1991) suggestingthat there are between 300 to one thousand primary receptor types in the
hoped
for
(Ben-Arie
handful.
Even
epithelium, and not the
more conservative estimates
et
humans.
in
1994)
130
that
there
al.
conjecture
are approximately
olfactory receptor genes
Yet again, research in olfaction has been influenced by Aristotelian enthusiasm for
be
divided
five
into
It
Aristotle
that
classification.
will
recalled
odours
primary groups:
harsh,
is
in
influence
His
astringent and rich.
evidence in subsequent
pungent, sweet,
identify
to
that
sought
olfactory research programmes
prinary odours which were
by
Up
1960's,
Amoore was
the
type
correlated with
specific olfactory receptors.
until
work
is
his
influence
It
in
that
an oddity
over research this
still postulating seven primary odours.
field should be so tenacious. His other attempts at classification have been long dispatched
for
history
his
the
to the textbooks
theory of the primary elements:
of science, such as
fire,
wind andwater.
earth,
A successfultheory of olfaction would explain the qualitative aspectsof odour
between
is
physico-chemicalproperties and the perceived
perception,that the relationship
first
It
Lucretius
who
suggestedthat molecular shapeunderlaythe quality of
odour. was
flavour.
7: 10
[T]he liquids of honey and of milk have a pleasanttaste as they are moved
but
loathsome
in
the
the
nature of wormwood and
mouth;
contrariwise
about
flavour;
harsh
the
twists
mouth with a noisome
so that you may
centaury
up
of
bodies
that
these
which can touch our sensespleasantlyare
readily recognise
but
be
bitter
that
to
contrariwiseall
seems
madeof smooth and round atoms,
held
in
by
hooked,
connection
atoms more
and are therefore
and rough are
by
break
into
to
the
texture
to
tear
their
open
way
our sensesand
accustomed
their intrusion. (Lucretius, De rerum natura II, 398-407)
Currently, our knowledgeof the neural basisfor odour perceptionremainssketchy.But it
is conjecturedthat theseperceptsmay be mediatedby the congruencebetweenthe odour
(Laing,
have
been
There
its
1994)
molecule and
olfactory receptor.
other theories but
degenerated
these programmes
vibrational and teleactivationmodels,
approximately
twenty-fiveyearsago.
During the sixties and seventiesAmoore's stereochemicalclassificationsystem
(steric theory) was the dominant explanation of odour coding. Amoore attempted to
level
differences
how
in
odour quality are representedat the receptor
of
explain
perceived
the nervoussystem.A common approachto the odour codingproblem was the hypothesis
that odours which are judged to be similar, will have similar molecular shapesand sizes.
(Moncrieff, 1966)Hence it was believedthat correct odour classificationcould provide a
(1952
Amoore
&
1962)
to
the
code.
cracking
olfactory
postulated that there are
vital clue
floral,
pepperminty, camphoraceous, musky, putil and
seven primary odours: ethereal,
five
first
He
pungent.
primary odours were related to the shape of the
argued that the
molecules concerned. Accordingly,
Amoore
have
that
proposed
odour molecules
distinctive shapes and that the putative receptors for these molecules will have a
lock
key
theory.
to
complementary accommodating shape, sometimes referred
as a
and
Putrid and pungent odours, it was postulated, were linked to the negative and positive
(See
Figure 7.6)
charger properties of the molecules respectively.
The plausibility of such an approachdependson the developmentof successful
theories of odour classification, which would identify a set of primary odours,
hypothesised
Little
to
the
set of
agreementon such odour
receptor sites.
corresponding
doubt
is
in
there
to
odours
exist at all, the manner
as whetherprimary
categoriesexists,and
Amoore conceived. As with gustatory receptors, it seems more likely that olfactory
is,
that
responsiveto a unique odour type. Rathereach
receptorcells are not mono-osmic,
7: 11
has
cell
a optimal responseto one particular type of odour moleculeand gradedresponse
to other molecules.Theories that predicted that alike molecular structureswould have
have
been
largely
There
similar odours
unsuccessful.
are many contrary examplesof
has
discrete
been
in
significant qualitative changewhere there
only
small,
a
change the
(1982)
d-carvone,
Engen
like
stimulus.
cites the caseof the stereoisomers
which smells
1-carvone,
caraway,and
which smellslike spearmint.Conversely,other chemicalswith very
different formulaehavesimilarodours,for example,exaltoneand musk ambrette.
As with gustation, the alternative to these labelled line theories of olfactory coding
are "pattern" theories. Responding to evidence that indicates that receptors are not
dedicated to a single odour type, pattern theories assume that there are only generalist
(Gesteland
receptors, providing a xenobiotic response.
et al, 1965) Here, each generalist
broadly
is
tuned to respond to a wide range of stimuli, however it has its own
receptor
individual response spectrum determining the specificity to which it sensesparticular odour
types. The perception of different odour qualities would be then mediated by the pattern of
activation across a population of such generalist receptors. Each particular quality would
generate its own response matrix across the receptor population, termed a cross-fibre
pattern. (Erickson, 1968)
The shift awayfrom a labelledline theory, in which one receptor family type codes
decrease
has
brought
it
in interestin odour classificationsystems.As we
one odour,
with a
have seen,the successof the labelled line theory proposed by Boring relies upon two
factors. Firstly, the successfulcategorisationof olfactory stimuli into odour primaries.
Secondly the categorisationof receptor neurons into discrete family or class types
has
been
As
to
these
odour
corresponding
primary
categories.
shown in this discussion,
has
been
both
Significantly,
these
satisfactorilyachieved.
neither of
with gustation and
framework
based
folk
in
the
theoretical
olfaction,
theory that underlay much
ancient
has
floundered.
Below, the programme of odour classification is
scientific research
degenerating
be
highlighted.
analysed,and severalsymptomsof a
researchprogrammewill
7.5
THE PROBLEM OF ODOUR CLASSIFICATION
The inability to establish a set of primary odours has stinted the explanation of the
between
its
relationship
odour quality asperceivedand physico-chemicalstructure.To our
knowledge,odour is exclusivelydeterminedby molecular structure.Hence it is believed
that there is a systematicrelationshipbetweenperceivedodour and chemicalconstitution,
7: 12
and therefore a potential reduction of odour qualia.Beets (1957)wrote that the relation
betweenstructureand odour is completeand unambiguous.The detailsof that relationship
be
defined
by
wereto
empiricalinvestigation. However this hasproved a hardertask than
initially imagined. For example,Meilgaard (1991) writes that chemists have identified
hundredsof volatile and non-volatile compoundspresent in beer, but could not account
for this information in terms of flavour type andthe relativeflavour strengthof each.
The development of a feasible, if provisional, classification system has been
regarded as an essentialintermediate step towards the elucidation of the underlying
(1968)
lack
it
Harper
is
the
mechanisms.
etal.
arguethat
of a definitive odour classification
has
development
hampered
the
system
of a systematicrelationship between what is
perceivedand its physico-chemicalconstitution. For though it is a reasonableproject to
explain odour quality in terms of chemicalstructures,the qualitiesthemselvesfirst needto
be identified.
The failure to develop a successfulempirically basedodour classificationsystem
lack
different
the
the
of understanding of
reflects
contributions made by the chemical
flavour
senses to
within
traditional theory. Many of the early studies attempting
comprehensive odour classification confused olfaction and gustation. This hindered
into
the chemosensory modalities and their effect on flavour perception.
scientific enquiry
Boring (1942) suggestedthat odour classification was still at a "pre-Newtonian" stage.He
likened its stage of development to the pre-Newtonian understanding of colour where, for
defined
blood
the
example, red was
as
colour of
and green that of grass.Boring noted that
defined
in terms of an object. For example, referred to as being like the
smell was often
fish
flower.
the
smell of
or
perfume of a
Attempts to classify odours into a number of primary groups or categorieshave not
progressed significantly since Aristotle. Several factors have contributed to this, including:
(1) incomplete knowledge of the odour code, defining the complex relationship between
molecular physico-chemical properties and corresponding odour perception, similar to that
for
(2)
identifying
the multidimensionality of the stimulus and its discrete
available
colours;
hindering
isolation
the
of primary odours; (3) the lack of proper names for odours;
nature
(4) our own lack of accuracy at recognising smells; and (5) the introduction of hedonics
into
factors
be
These
discussed
in
detail
and affectivity
odour classification.
will
more
below.
It has alreadybeennoted that there has been someconfusion betweenwhat might
be describedaspure odours and trigeminalimpact on flavour. This confusion is evidentin
7: 13
from
)
b.
)
(circa
(1952.
Aristotle
Amoore
For example,
350
c. to
classification systems
Aristotle identifies seven main categories of odour: pungent, sweet, harsh, astringent, rich,
bitter, and foetid. Pungency, harshness and astringency are qualities associated with the
bitterness
Sweetness
trigeminal nerve.
and
are categories more usually identified with
(1964)
influential
Amoore's
Wright
Mitchell
that
of
gustation.
and
still sustain the
work and
have
hindrance
Some
this
trigeminal
confusion
as
category.
authors
regarded
a
pungency or
to the development of a successful odour classification system. Both Engen (1982) and
Harper et al. (1968) have argued that it is necessaryto clearly distinguish trigeminal qualities
from odour qualities before it is possible to successfully identify odour quality with its
be
hypothesised
if
It
that
physico-chemical properties. was
pure odours could
successfully
facilitate
into
the identification of
arranged
primary groups or classes,then this would
particular physico-chemical similarities within
each class, or common transduction
Similar
each
class.
mechanisms underlying
odour qualities might
corresponding receptor
have a similar chemical instantiation. In turn these might provide clues to the transduction
mechanisms underlying odour.
Since the seminalwork of Linnaeus (1756),there have been severalattemptsto
categorise odours. Figure 7.7 shows some of the most renowned attempts. However,
have
been
largely
has
interest
overall attempts at odour classification
unsuccessful, and
(1955)
in
lack
is
Sagarin
the
the
project.
commented that
waned
only consistency the
of
has
between
No
odour categories.
consensus
consistency
yet emerged as to which
descriptors
be
describe
to
the
classification system to use, or even which set of
should
used
feel
Engen
that
comments
when reviewing odour classification systems, writers
categories.
far
is
little
include
there
to
the
methods used so
as
so
obliged
all
confidence concerning
like.
look
is
There
not enough evidence to reject any theory
what a successful system would
has shifted and is now mainly concentrated on
from
following
(1991),
have
Buck
Axel
the
work
studies,
on
of
neurobiological
and
which
Attention
sounds
plausible.
which
be
for
identified
thought
to
successfully
specific genes
responsible
odour reception.
In the absence of a universally accepted system of odour classification,
flavour
professionalsrequiring standardisedodour and
systems,such as perfumers,wine,
beer and beveragemakers,and botanistshavecontinuedto developtheir own idiosyncratic
heuristic and applicationspecific systems.They employ their own distinctive vocabularies
to facilitateeffectivecommunicationbetweenspecialistswithin the samefield.
7: 14
OBJECTIVE
7.5.1
CLASSIFICATION
As detailed above, several reasons have hampered the development of a universal odour
classification system. Firstly there is no single physico-chemical continuum upon which all
be
have
Other
odour quality categories could
ordered.
sensory modalities
systematisedin
hue
this manner, such as
with colour (the Munsell System.) (See Figure 7.8) Colour is
for
ideal
full
the
the
regarded as
psychophysical model
other sensory modalities where the
depends
range of perceived colours
on the underlying physical parameter(s) of wavelength.
(However the parameter of wavelength alone is not sufficient to determine the colour
)
hues
defined
The
in
hue
has
its
Each
terms
primary
are
perceived.
of physical correlates.
(1982)
is
Green
However,
Engen
530
corresponding wavelength:
nm.
as
points out, it is
the ability to provide a single physical parameter, that allows mixing the wavelengths, so
be
in
Understanding
that any colour
the spectrum can
produced.
colour as a wavelength
it
is
However,
to
there
the problem of
and
makes possible
predict
manipulate colours.
for
devised
have
the
whether
potential
similarly
primary odours exist, as no such correlates
far
been
identified.
so
LANGUAGE
7.5.2
As has alreadybeennoted, anotherindication of the immaturity of the scienceof olfaction
is the lack of proper namesfor odours. This was noted as early as the fourteenth century
when Contarini observedthat olfaction often usesthe languageof gustation,and that there
was often confusion betweenthe two. Gustation has at least its own putative vocabulary:
for
bitter,
has
been
However,
there
odours
salty,
sweet,sour.
no standardisationaround a
particulartaxonomy,of which there arethree main types:
1
descriptive, e.g. fruity, resinous, spicy.
2
lilac.
lemon,
of
specific
materials,
e.
names
g. almonds,violet,
3
namesof odourouschemicals,e.g. menthol, coumarin,vanillin.
The developmentof a languagefor odour has also been complicatedby the development
by
food
in
lies
industry.
Their
interest
in
terminologies
the
professionals
of specialist
for
developinga languagethat encompasses
in,
the
all
qualitiespresent
example,a pint of
beer. So taste, odour, irritant impact and mouthfeel are all included in the classification
7: 15
difficulties
language
Due
to
the
standardizing
a
system.
of
of smell, perfumersoften still
by
communicate ostensivereferenceto an odour, that is, by using cardsimpregnatedwith a
by
bottles.
particularsmell or odour
It hasbeenarguedthat if therewere a standardisationof languagethen much of the
difficulties with describing odours would disappear. Not only professionally, but for the
layperson too. Successful colour recognition, like odour recognition, seems to depend on
been
has
have
in
It
the
that
people's vocabulary.
noted
study of colour recognition
people
difficulty in recognising colours if there is not a well-known and accepted name for them.
(Engen. 1982) That is, (and this is almost a platitude) our language limits what we are able
to describe. However our lack of verbal agility does not prevent the human olfactory sense
from being able to detect over ten thousand different simple (pure) odours. Our ability to
(Mair
is
to
to
them.
our ability
recognise odours superior
name
and Engen, 1976) However
by
identify
it
discriminate,
to
than
the subject is
when asked
a smell
naming rather
simply
familiar.
is
If the vocabulary
to
the
terminology
restricted
olfactory
with which she
using
incorrect
have
is
inadequate,
this
available
or unfamiliar,
will
an adverse effect on her
capacity to make a verbal identification.
(Gregson, 1963) However a well-known
does
be
categorisation system
not guaranteethat accurate responseswill always elicited. For
four
high
level
There
is
the
often
confused.
putative qualities of gustation are
a
of
example,
Often
the primary tastes are misidentified. In tests one out of seven
misrecognition.
being
(prototypical
in
"bitter"
students reported citric acid as
sour) and one twelve said that
being
hydrochloride
(prototypical
bitter)
(Wenzel,
)
has
This
been
"sour"
1954.
as
quinine
blamed on unsystematic learning of the categories, whether through incorrect association
feedback.
(Meilgaard,
lack
in
Much
1991)
time
the
or
of accurate or constructive
and effort
infant school classroom is dedicated to teaching children visual recognition skills, such as
However,
colour and shape recognition.
gustatory and olfactory recognition are not
deemed to be so important and are left to the individual to supervise their own learning.
Thus the main difficulties in olfactory (andgustatory)perceptiondo not stemfrom
but
from
lack
the subjectiveness
the
of our response
of an adequatelanguagefor olfaction
with which we are competentor agreeon. At the moment, given the impoverishedstateof
descriptions
olfactory taxonomy, many
rely on and are contaminated by personal
association,experienceand memory. It is arguedthat this problem would disappearif a
developed.
In memory testswhere peoplewere askedto identify
workablevocabularywere
likely
draw
to
colours and odours, people were more
upon an analogy to describe a
particular odour, than to give it a particular odour name.For examplethey would report
7: 16
from
book.
dusty
library
Engen
this that
concluded
that an odour was similar to that of a
impoverished.
description
is
idiosyncratic
and
of
odour
our
Finally, odour classificationhas arguably been hampered by the introduction of
hedonics into the classifying categories. This was introduced by Linnaeus in his Odores
He postulated seven odour groups or classes,which were divided into three
Medicamaztrwn.
broader categories. (See Figure 7.9) These categories reflected the affect that particular
felt
be
in
"to
induce
Some
Linnaeus
the subject.
concluded, are
odours,
smells were said to
kindly and desirable to our nerves," whilst others are "repellent to life. " (Harper et al. 1968,
20).(The alliaceous class was not placed under any of these headings.) The intermediate
is,
described
ingrati",
"aliis
that
pleasant to some and not to others.
grati aliis
as
class was
This tendency to divide the odour classesinto affective categorieswas copied up by Haller
(1763), Zwaardemaker (1895) and Boring (1928.) The affective judgement is also
labels
from
Where
in
Linnaeus'
the
some odour classes are
odour classes.
represented
linked to certain odorous substances,like musk, garlic and goats, the two unpleasant classes
(tetros)
is
induce,
described
in
that repulsion
terms of the affect they would
and nausea
are
(nauseosos.) As can be seen from Figure 7.7, this tendency is replicated in the odour
(1964),
(1916),
Mitchells
Zwaardemaker,
Wright
Henning
and
where
and
categories of
basic odour classes are described as "repulsive" or "unpleasant." The basis for these
folk
from
have
theories about the purpose of smell.
stemmed
old
affective categories may
It was believed that if something tasted or smelt "good, " then it was literally good for you.
Bad tastes and odours were thought indicative of poisonous substancesand the bad smell
flawed.
dilution
is
Firstly,
However
this
can effect whether
approach
was there to warn us.
is
is
judged
Secondly,
there
evidence that pleasantnessand
pleasant or unpleasant.
a smell
(1966)
learnt
Monciieff
to
cultural mores.
examined
categories related
unpleasantnessare
the response of babies to a range of smells, which showed that they were more tolerant of
dislike,
for
faecal
did
They
odours.
example, of
not appear to express a
odours than adults.
The affective categorisation of odours seems merely to reflect and reinforce our Western
floral
is
judged
judged
hence
as nice and excrement odour
odour
a
cultural values,
In
However
categories
of
there
natural
pleasant
or
categories.
are
no
unpleasant
unpleasant.
Senegal,the Serer Ndut tribe uses essenceof onion as a perfume, a practice that is reported
last
decade,
(Classen
In
Africa.
1994,104).
the
throughout
et al.
as common
belief
have
industry
that certain odours can alter our
out of our
made an
aromatherapists
by
faith
(self-deception),
by
have
Whether
these
the
aromas
work
reputed effects
mood.
association or possibly contain chemicals which stimulate an autonomic/physiological
7: 17
independent
both,
is
these
the
odour,
or
of
of
actual
combine
all
response,
aspects
lack
knowledge
hedonic
it
However,
these
of
reflects
about olfaction that
uncertain.
imagine
being
divided
included.
By
the
analogy,
colour classification system
categorieswere
into,
GOOD
Yellow
Green
INTERMEDIATE
Blue
Indigo
Violet
BAD
Red
Orange
(Though there is a theory which claims colour can effect mood) The introduction of
into
from
description
"unpleasant"
the
the
as
categoriesmoves
processaway
emotive
such
trying to correlate it with generalodour terms, to something more normative and less
specifiable.
Scientificinterestin developinga classificationsystemfor odour on the samelines
last
has
its
Amoore's
theory
waned.
and
as colour
steric
subsequentrefutation were the
seriousattempt to identify a smallnumber of primary odoursthat correspondedto specific
typesof receptor siteson the olfactory epithelium.As indicatedearlier,work by Buck and
Axel has underminedthe basictheoreticalpostulatesof the project, by positing between
300 to one thousandprimary receptortypesin the epithelium.
The failuresof the odour classificationprogrammesof Aristotle, Linnaeuset at to
find theoretical corroboration that would integrateit with other disciplinesadds support
for the revisionist or eliminitivist argument.As we saw with the five familiar sensory
folk
diluted
full
it
is
the
that
theories
the
not
case
modalities,
are a
version of
scientific
folk
fundamentally
is
Sometimes
theory
picture.
wrong, as with the caseof "taste" and
flavour. In such cases,reduction betweenthe old and new theory can not be justified. As
have
flavour
has
(and
been
is)
by
the
to
of
seen, science
we
a certain extent still
obscured
between
have
the
trigeminal
gustatory,olfactory and
sensesthat
confusions
prosperedon
the back of an inadequateconceptualframework. In these cases,rather than trying to
be
theory
the
the
the
theory
new,
explain and accommodate old
with
unsuccessful
should
deep
Its
should not requirethat any new theory should
cultural embeddedness
eliminated.
7: 18
have to encompassits idiosyncrasies.Similarly, theories positing primary odours have
but
for
Research
programmes seeking
two millennia,
without much success.
survived
dead-ends.
for
have
been
The
biological
theoretical
them
old
corroboration
chemicaland
theories underestimatedthe multifactorial character of olfaction, and current evidence
(1978),
be
Lakatos'
In
terms
all the
misconceived.
suggests that the programme may
degenerating
Furthermore,
a rival research
to
research
programme.
a
evidence points
for
finding
its
has
it
is
predictions.
empirical corroboration
superseded and
programme
Olfactory theory basedon Aristotelian introspectivemethodsprovided a structure
(or heuristic) for scientific investigation.That project now looks misconceived,and its
historical longevity should not grant it protected epistemologicalstatus.New scientific
failures.
historical
be
saddledwith explaining
programmesshould not
7.6
CONCLUSION
Our perceptualjudgementsare structured by an impromptu theorising which we have
described
is
is
be
Hence,
taste,
observedas a
as
what commonly
prone to error.
shown to
distorted
by
inaccuracies
However
the
of that
our observationsare
singlesensorymodality.
flavour
has
been
has
framework.
it
For
a
shown that our perceptionof
theoretical
example,
from
different
information
If
senses.
we
several
complex structure,comprisingof sensory
framework
flavour,
in
the
this
which our observationsare
alters
adopt the new theory of
hence
is
the
nature
of
what
perceived.
made,and
Much can be learnt from the olfactory casefor more generalargumentsconcerning
has
been
is
It
that
there
argued
a property of our
the ontological primacy of qualia.
does
lend
is
itself
that
to
that
our sensations
scientific
reduction,
not
subjectiveexperience
biological
in
and their propertiesarenot explicable terms of a combination of neurological,
Insofar
as the argumentsthat qualia are not reducibleto
properties.
or electrochemical
in
that
neurophysicalphenomena,the examinationof the olfactory casesuggests qualia, the
philosophicalsense,must go.
What has beenshown addsfurther credenceto the eliminitivist claim that our Folk
false
(in
that they require such
theories
this case,of senseperception) are so radically
favour
is
indicated.
in
that
total
of
a
new
explanation
elimination
substantialmodification
In this case,traditional theoriesof odour perceptionwhich endeavourto classifyodoursin
favour
have
been
in
eliminated
of a theory of odour
a small number of primary categories,
illustrates
The
based
the
example
of
odour
classification
on odour receptors.
perception
7: 19
degeneration of a research programme that had its foundations in knowledge based upon
introspective judgements. Originating in the Aristotelian predilection for descriptive
for
have
into
to
two
nigh on
millennia,
sought
group odours
a small
classificatory systems,
have
However,
the
number of primary classes.
not
putative primary categories of smell
been corroborated by scientific evidence. Instead of a small number of primary odours,
current theories suggest that there exists up to 1,000 primary olfactory receptors. A
has
been
paradigm shift
witnessed.
Interest in the traditional odour classificationprogrammehaswaned in the faceof
basic
conceptof identifying a
conflicting neurobiologicalevidence,which suggeststhat the
fundamentally
have
how
is
flawed.
We
the old
small number of primary odours
shown
theory has systematicallystructuredempiricalinvestigationinto olfaction. Amoores steric
theory tried to accommodatethe conjecturethat there were a small number of identifiable
destined
fail
His
to
primary odours.
work on anosmiawas
as the underlyingtheoriesthat
his
false.
Similarly attemptsto correlatethe putative primary odours
work were
motivated
for
have
been
with chemicalstructure
unsuccessful the samereason- there simply are not
primary odoursasoriginally conceived.
In conclusion,this study of the chemicalsenseshas shown that even our simplest
folk beliefs about ourselves,as manifestedin perceptualjudgements,are seriouslyflawed.
Researchprogrammesbasedon folk olfactory beliefs are now facing their long overdue
demisein the face of empirical evidencefrom the developing neurosciences.Although
investigationinto higher forms of cognitive activity is still in their earlystages,alreadynew
disintegration
The
theories
the
competing
are emerging challenging
old.
of the Folk
Olfactory programmedoesnot bodewell for other folk theories.
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