KEITH ANSELL-PEARSON
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MICHEL FOUCAULTS
READING OF NIETZSCHE:
POWER, THE SUBJECT, AND POLITICAL THEORY
Introduction
There are a number of reasons why Nietzsche's writings do not play a
prominent part, if a part at all, in most Standard treatments of the history of
political theory, and which have ensured that he has remained on the margins
of debate amongst political theorists.1 Most important of all, of course, is
the historical Identification of Nietzsche's Machiavellian-inspired philosophy
of "beyond good and evil" with the ideology of European Fascism, which
led a host of post-war commentators to engage in a project of dehistoricization, depoliticizing Nietzsche's philosophy of power in order to rehabilitate
his writings from the abuse they had suffered in the hands of his sister,
Elisabeth, and the Nazi ideologists whose \\ ork she encouraged and inspired.2
However laudable the intentions behind this work were, it had the deleterious
effect of foreclosing a debate about one of the central facets öf Nietzsche's
work and his legacy, that is, the nature of his politics and his Status äs a
political thinker. Another reason for Nietzsche's neglect by political theorists
lies in the fact that Nietzsche described his own Status äs a political thinker
1
Werner Dannhäuser, "Friedrich Nietzsche", in L. Strauss and U. Cropsey, History of Political
Philosophy (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1987 — third edition), pp. 829—51, süggests
that the relation of Fascism to Nietzsche recalls the relation of the French Revolution to
Rousseau. Previous attempts to examine the question of Nietzsche's politics in the wider
context of his principal theoretical concerns include, Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and
the Politics of Transfiguration (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975), and Ofelia
Schutte, Beyond Nihilihm. Nietzsche Witbout^Masks (University of Chicago Press, 1984).
2
On the mythologization of Nietzsche by his sister see the Prologue to Walter Kaufmannes
classic study, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, and Anti-Christ (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974 — fourth edition). Kaufmannes study is a classic instance of the process
of depoliticisation Nietzsche's writings underwent in the aftermath of the Second World
War. For Kaufmann "the leitmotif of Nietzsche's life and thought" is "the theme of the
antipolitical individual who seeks self-perfection far from the modern worid" (p. 418).
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Keith Ansell-Pearson
in terms of being "the last anti-political German"3. This pronouncement has
been taken at face value, rather than understood in the specific context in
which Niet2sche articulates bis Opposition to the development of German
Reichspolitik unter Bismarckian nationalism and statism. In Ecce Homo
Nietzsche makes clear bis fundamental Opposition to the theory of Machtpolitik
put forward by the historian Heinrich von Treitschke to justify the nationalist
and militarist aspirations of the nascent German Reich: "'German' has become
an argument," Nietzsche writes, "Deutschland, Deutschland über
* a principle; the Teutons represent the 'moral world order' in history — the carriers
of freedom versus the Imperium Romanum [...] There is now a historiography
that is reichsdeutsch\ there is even, I fear, an anti-Semitic one — there is a court
historiography, and Herr von Treitschke is not ashamed."4
The question of Nietzsche's politics, and of bis relation to political theory,
has been further compounded by a generation of commentators who have
sought solace and enlightenment in bis ethical and political speculatiöns, but
who have found in them only empty rhetoric and the misguided yearnings
of a maladjusted personality, the speculatiöns of, äs one commentator on this
very topic has put it, "a lonely hero fit to be used and destroyed"^. The
devaluation of Nietzsche's political thought has continued up to the present
day with one commentator referring to "the embarrassingly political
Nietzsche"6. It is fair to say that an impasse on the question of Nietzsche's
politics, and of Nietzsche's Status äs a political theorist, has been reached by
commentators adopting the practice of reading Nietzsche's overt or alleged
politics back into the premises of his philosophy of power, and in this way
discrediting the entire philosophical site on which Nietzsche had erected his
political edifice. Yet for anyone aware of the pivotal role that Nietzsche's
writings have come to play in contemporary intellectual debates in critical
theory, poststructuralism, and deconstruction, the question of Nietzsche's
Status äs a political theorist poses an enigma in need of some enlightenment.
The great significance of Michel Foucault's reading of Nietzsche is that
it is the first to take Nietzsche's work seriously for the concerns of political
theory. The implications pf this reading are not onl^ far-reaching for our
understanding of the tradition of modern political thought but equally for
3
See EH, "Warum ich so weise bin", section 3, in KSA 6. For an excellent biographical study
see, Peter Bergmann, Nietzsche. The Last AntiPolitical Germern (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1987).
4
EH, "Der Fall Wagner", 2.
5
John S. Colman, "Nietzsche äs Potitique et Moraliste", in Journal of the History of Ideas 27
(1966), p. 568.
6
See Walter H. Sokel, "The Politicäl Uses and Abuses of Nietzsche in Walter KAufmann's
Image of Nietzsche", Nietzsche-Studien 12, 1983, p. 441.
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The Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche
269
Nietzsche-Studien and research. Foucault's reading of Nietesche sheds a great
deal of light on two crucial notions in Nietzsche's corpus: the notion of
power and the notion of the subject. Moreover, unlike most Interpreters and
readers of Nietesche, Foucault is able to show in what way Nietzsche's use
of these notions is crucial for political theory. Thus, the aim of this essay is
to indicate in what way Foucault's reading of Nietesche shows a way forward
out of the impasse which has been reached on the question of Nietzsche's
politics and on the relation between Nietesche and modern political theory.
We are currently experiencing a burgeoning interest in Nietzsche's writings
amongst political theorists and it is Foucault's Interpretation of Nietesche
which Stands at the forefront of this interest. This essay concurs with the
position adopted by Henning Ottmann in his excellent and comprehensive
study of the relation between 'philsophy' and 'politics' in Nietzsche. Ottmann
argues that Nietzsche's philosophy is neither an apologia for capitalism nor
a celebration of liberalism, neither fascist nor anarchist; rather the importance
of Nietzsche's thinking for politics resides in its confrontation with the
'modern' itself and its dialectical possibilities.7
Indeed, Foucault's work has attempted to reconstruct the question, what
is modernity? He has attempted to displace both the liberal and Marxist
paradigms for understanding the nature of the modern world, detecting in
both a Whiggish prejudice and a humanist delusion which adheres to the
belief that modernity represents a simple struggle for rational and enlightened
political institutions and transparent social relations. In order to disrupt the
certainties and comforts offered by these models of understanding modern
reality, Foucault employs Nietzsche's method of genealogy and locates dissonance at the heart of modernity and its discontents;8 where liberalism and
Marxism posit teleology and emphasize cöntinuity, Foucault locates rupture
and discontinuity; where Marxism posits a realm of freedom untainted by
relations of domination, Foucault detects a hidden will to power, a will which
wants to gain control of reality and master it for the pürposes of satisfying
our anthropomorphic desires.9 Like Nietzsche, Foucault uses the method of
genealogy to unsettle and undermine the philosophical premises on which
humanity erects its political hopes and aspirations. As Nietzsche wrote,
reflecting on the causes of European nihilism:
All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world
estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and therefore
7
Henning Ottmann, Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche (Berlin and New York, Walter de
Gruyter, 1987),. preface.
8
For Nietzsche's description of genealogy äs a "historical method" see GM II, 12 in KSA 5.
9
See Foucault's essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History" in M. Foucault, Language, CounterMemory, and Practice, ed. D. F. Bouchard (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977).
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Keith Ansell-Pearson
devaluated the world — all these values are, psychologically considered, the
results of certain perspectives of Utility, designed to maintain and increase
human constructs of domination — and they have been falsely projected into
the essence of things. What we find here is still the hyperbolic naivete of man:
positing himself äs the meaning and measure of the value of things.10
On a number of occasions Foucäult has openly acknowledged his debt
to Nietzsche.11 Nietzsche influenced Foucäult in a number of ways, büt they
can basically be reduced to two. Firstly, Nietzsche's understanding of power
in terms of relations of forces had a tremendous influence on Foucault's
attempt to think about power in a way which went beyond the juridical
understanding of power prevalent in politicäl theory. Secondly, Nietzsche's
critique of modern metaphysics and its privileging of the subject (a subject
that was construed äs rational and free but ät the same time dehistoricised
and disembodied) had an enormous impact on Foucäult and the way in which
he came to construe the problem of human freedom and creativity.
The essay will proceed äs follows: first, I shall show in what way Foucäult
understands Nietzsche's philosophy of power and its significance for modern
politicäl thought; secondly, I shall examine Foucault's reading of Nietzsche's
deconstruction of the human subject and show in what way this project is
crucial for politics and politicäl thinking in the late-modern or post-modern
age. Foucault's reading of Nietzsche is not without its limitations, however,
and the shortcomings of his reading will be touched upon, äs well. The essay
will conclude by suggesting that the significance of Foucault's reading of
Nietzsche is that it provides a positive way forward for posing anew the
question of the relationship between Nietzsche and politicäl theory. If we
take cognizance of the füll impact of Foucault's reading, it should no longer
be possible, or even desirable, for commentators to keep referring to "the
embarrassingly politicäl Nietzsche".
/: Power
For Foucäult Nietzsche is the philosopher of power: "If I wanted to be
pretentious," he wrote, would use the 'genealogy of morals' äs the general
title of what I am doing. It was Nietzsche who specified the power relation
äs the general focus, shall we say, of philosophical discourse — whereas for
Marx it was the production relation. Nietzsche is the philosopher of power,
10
The Will to Power, tr.· Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York, Random House,
1968), section 12 B.
11
See especially, Michel Foucäult, Philosophy, Politics, and Culture. Interviews and Other Writings
1977—1984, ed. L. D. Kritzman (London, Routledge, 1988), pp. 250—l, p. 312.
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The Significancc of Michel Poucault'e Reading of Nietzsche
271
a philosophcr who managed to think of power without having to confinc
himsclf within a political theory in order to do so/'12 What we nccd to
cxplnin is the apparent paradox in Foucault's appropriation of Nietzsche
which lies in the argumcnt that Nietxsche's philosophy of power is important
for political theory because it is the first to construe the problem of power
without the constraints of a political theory. What is meant by arguing that
Nietzsche thinks about power outside of the confines of a political theory?
Reflecting on this qucstion will govern our discussion of Foucault in this
section of the cssay.
FoucauJt's understanding of power is entirely nominalistic: power (Ic
potwoir) in the Substantive sense does not exist. l3 Instead, Foucault focuses
our attention on the cxcrcise of power where "power" denotes not a property
or a possession belonging to a dominant class, sovereign, or state, but rathcr
points to a strategy referring to a multiplicity of force relations. Power is
neither an Institution nor a structure but rather, Foucault argues, following
Nietzsche, "it is the namc one attributes to a complcx strategical Situation in
a pnrticular socicty"14. Above all, Foucault's Nietfcschean understanding of
power aims to combat the prevalent view in political thought which conceives
of power exclusively in negative tcrms: power äs prohibition, power äs
exclusion, äs rejection, äs obstruction, äs denial. In Opposition to this dominant jundical model of understanding power — juridical in the sense that it
is the "law" which prohibits, cxclucles, obstructs, denies, etc.' — Foucault
argues that power is essentially productm. Foucault's argumcnt here follows
closely the one Nietzsche cvinces in On tbe Genealogy of Morals. The great
Innovation of Nietzsche's thinking about power in that tcxt is that it sees
power not in terms of the strenuous effects of a founding human subject,
but rather that it sees power äs prodttctive of the human subject. In othcr
words, the priority of the subject over power (the object) within the tradition
of Western metaphysics is reversed and overturned. We will return to thesc
kcy points on the human subject shortly, but for the moment it is necessary
to focus attention on the notion of power and the specific way in which it
is understoocl by both Nietzsche and Foucault.
Traditionally, Foucault argues, modern political thought has posecl the
fundamental questions of political philosophy in terms of a philosophy of
right/law (Recht}. It asks: what are the limits of power? How can power be
given "rights" to rcstrict its use and abuse? In contrast to this question
12
M. Poucault, Pomr\Knowledge* Sehctod Interviews and Other Writings 1972— 1977, cd, C, Gordon
(Brighton, Hsifvefiter Press, 1980)> p. 53,
13
ibid,', p. 198.
14
M. Foucault, The llistory of Sexuality. Volume l, r.r, R. Hurley (HarmondHworth» Pcnguin,
1979), p. 93,
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concerning the legitimacy of (political) power, Foucault poses a different type
of question: what rules of right are implemented by the relations of power
in the production of discourses of truth, that is, what is the will to power
behind the will to truth in political philosophy? Since the Middle Ages, he
argues, it has been the major preoccupation of political theorists to determine
the legitimacy of power with a theory of sovereignty. However, behind this
discourse of right within modern political thought Foucault detects a hidden
discourse of power. He writes:
When we say that sovereignty is the central problem of right in Western
societies, what we mean basically is that the essential function of the discourse
and techniques of right has been to efface the domination intrinsic to power
in order to present the latter at the level of appearance under two different
aspects: on the one band, äs the legitimate rights of sovereignty, and on the
other, äs the legal Obligation to obey it. The System of right [...] is designed
to eliminate the fact of domination and its consequences.15
Here Foucault traverses a recognizably and distinctly Nietzschean path,
locating a discourse of power where none was expected — in the very
discourse of modern political thought itself.
Why is Foucault so opposed to the hegemony of the juridical model of
power in political theory? And what are the implications of bis reliance on
Nietzsche's philosophy of power for understanding many of the traditionäl
problems of political philosophy? Concerning the first question, Foucault
argues that the juridical model is incapable of comprehending how power
operates in modern disciplinary societies. As in the Genealogy of Morals,
Foucault understands the exercise of power not in terms of "right" but in
terms of technique, not in terms of law but in terms of normalization, not
in terms of abuse but in terms of punishment and control. Our modern
political rationality, according to Foucault, has developed alongside a new
political technology of power which has produced the "individual" äs a
subject of the State with rights and obligations: a subject not in the sense of
sovereignty but in the sense of discipline.16 As Nietzsche astutely notes in
section 117 of the Gay Science, our conception of the individual subject äs
being the locus and origin of moral actions and ethical responsibility, a
conception which constitutes the starting-point for present-day teachers of
law and jurists, is a peculiarly modern one. In former times — namely, the
prehistoric period Nietzsche calls the "morality of custom" (die Sittlichkeit der
Sitte} — one was sentenced to individuality äs a form of punishment. Today,
15
16
Foucault, Powerl Knowledge > p. 95.
M. Foucault. "The Political Technology of Individuais", in Luther H- Martin et al., Technologies
of the Seif. A Seminar with Michel Foucault (London, Tavistock Publications, 1988), pp.
150-4.
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The Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche
273
however, history has reached the dangerous and uncanny point "where the
'individua!' appears, obliged to give himself laws and to develop his own
arts and wiles for self-preservation, self-enhancement, and self-redemption"17.
According to Foucault we moderns are unable to accept the naked
cynicism of power — what Nietzsche refers to äs "the Machiavellianism of
power"18 — and instead we prefer to veil it with a cloak of freedom by
erecting discourses of right which impose limits on so-called "abuses" of
power. Foucault invites us to abandon the juridical model of power which
has held its grip on our political thinking since the Middle Ages and, instead
of conceiving power in terms of a fundamental lawfulness, we learn to think
of the mechanisms and strategies of power in a way that is not reducible to
the representation of law.
Concerning the second question raised above, Foucault's understanding
of power — which draws its main Inspiration from Nietzsche's conception
of power in terms of relations of domination (Herrschafts- Verhältnissen) which
are immanent in a multiplicity of force relations19 — has enormous implications for how we are to construe the problem of modernity and how political
theory has conceptualised that problem. By rejecting the juridical model of
power common to both liberalism and Märxism, Foucault conceives of power
neither in terms of a group of institutions which ensure the obedience of
citizens to the State nor in terms of a mode of subjugation which, in contrast
to pure naked violence and coercion, has the appearance of law. For Foucault,
the analysis of power must not "assume that the sovereignty of the state, the
form of the law, or the overall unity of a domination are given at the outset;
rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes [...] power must be
understood in the first instance äs the multiplicity of force relations immanent
in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization"20. Like Nietzsche, Foucault posits the omnipresence of power not in
terms of any noumenal or metaphysical substance and not "because it has the
privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because
it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in
every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because
it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere"21. The
implications of Foucault's reliance on a Nietzschean model of power for
political theory should be fairly self-evident. Contra the Marxian model, for
17
JOB 262, KSA 5.
The Will to Power, tr. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York, Random House,
1968), sections 304 and 776.
19
JGB 19.
20
Foucault, History of Sexuality, p. 92.
21
ibid., p. 93.
18
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example, Foucault is arguing that the function and Operation of power cannot
be reduced to the mere maintenance of relations of production and of class
domination. Foucault's Nietzscheanization of the problem of power in political philosophy means, contra Marxian theory, that relations of power can
neither be construed in terms of a position of exteriority with respect to
other types of relationships (for example, economic relationships), but rather
must be seen to be immanent in them, nor in terms of a base/superstructure
metaphor in which power plays a merely secondary role of prohibition; rather
relations of power have a directly productive role to play.
Foucault's philosophy of power, derived, äs we have seen, from a reading
of Nietzsche, eschews the modern paradigm of understanding power in terms
of a discourse on the nature of law and sovereignty and in its place puts
for ward a conception of power in terms of a multiplicity of force relations.
Perhaps the most notable feature of this philosophy of power is the radical
and disconcerting claim that power is productive of the human subject and
that, far from constituting a neutral point of reference, the so-called emancipated and autonomous subject of modernity is in fact fully constituted by
power and discipline. It is to this aspect of Foucault's appropriätion of
Nietzsche that I now wish to turn in the next section of the essay.
II. The Subject
Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals shows that even the most cherished notions
of modern political culture are the product of a specific historical labour of
discipline and culture, what Nietzsche prefiguring Freud calls "civilization"
(Kultur). For Nietzsche all our "moral" capacities and attributes such äs
conscience, responsibility, and free will must be seen to have a history and a
genealogy. Indeed, Nietzsche begins the second essay of the Genealogy by
posing the fundamental question of political philosophy, that is, the problem
of breeding a political animal (Afistotle) which can be bound to obligations
and held accountable to the social contract because it has "the right to make
promises": "To breed an animal mth the right to make promises — is not this
the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? Is it not the
real problem regarding man?"22 For Nietzsche political Obligation takes place
through the historical cultivation of a sense of responsibility by which man
is made regulär, calculable, and necessary:
The tremendous labour of that which I have called the 'morality of mores'
(die Sittlichkeit der Sitte) — the labour performed by man upon himself during
22
GM II, 1.
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The Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche
275
the greater part of the existence of the human race, finds in this its meaning,
its great justification, notwithstanding the severity, tyranny, stupidity, and
idiocy involved in it: with the aid of the morality of mores and the social
straitjacket, man was actually made calculable.23
At the centre of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics — a critique which
emerges directly out of bis construal of the problem of breeding a political
animal — is a critique of traditional conceptions of the human subject.
According to Nietzsche metaphysics has throughout its history posited a
conception of a timeless epistemological subject äs the foundation of all
knowledge and experience of man and the world. But for Nietzsche this
constitutes a fundamental error. He writes in the Genealogy:
A quantum of force is equivalent to to a quantum of drive, will, effect —
more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting
and only owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors
of reason which are petrified in it) that conceives and misconceives all effects
äs conditioned by something that causes effects, by a "subject", can it appear
otherwise. For just äs the populär mind separates the lightning from its
flash and takes the latter for an action^ for the Operation of a subject called
lightning, so populär morality also separates strength from expressions of
strength, äs if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which
was/r^ to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum;
there is no "being" behind doing, effecting, becoming; the "doer" is merely
a fiction added to the deed — the deed is everything.24
It is precisely this non-metaphysical and non-teleological understanding
of the subject which informs Foucault's philosophy of power. Indeed, in an
interview conducted äs late äs 1983 in which .he reflects on his relation to
the pantheon of modern European thought (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud), Foucault admits that the determining experience reading Nietzsche had for him
äs a Student of phenomenology was that of überating him from the notion
of the founding act of the subject.25 By developing further Nietzsche's
reversing of the priority of the subject over power within the metaphysical
tradition, Foucault is able to show in what way this Nietzschean deconstruction of the subject is crucial for conceiving a post-modern conception of the
seif.
Following Nietzsche, Foucault argues that the individual which lies at
the foundation of our modern view of the world — what Heidegger calls
the modern metaphysics of subjectivity, which commences with Descartes's
cogito — is not to be construed in terms of a preconstituted entity of
autonomous action which is simply seized upon and repressed by the exercise
23
ibid., II, 2.
ibid., I, 13.
25
Foucault, Philosophy, Politics, and Culture, p. 24.
24
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of power. Instead, we need to construe this individual subject äs the product
of a certain form of power peculiar to modern societies which Foucault
identifies äs disciplinary power, and which determines a whole ränge of
modern discourses (on madness, on punishment, on sexuality, etc.) that
constitute certain bodies äs individuals and provide them with gestures and
desires. Individuais, Foucault argues, are to be understood äs the vehicles of
power, not its point of application. It is with this argument on the constitution
of the individual äs an effect of power that Foucault challenges the model of
the Leviathair.
Let us not ask, therefore, why certain people want to dominate, what they
seek, what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at
the level of on-going subjugation, at the level of those continuous and
uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures,
dictate our behaviours, etc. In other words, rather than ask oufselves how
the sovereign appears tö us in his lofty Isolation, we should try to discover
how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially
constituted through a mültiplicity of organisms, fores, energies, materiäls,
desires, etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance äs a
constitution of subjects. This would be the exact opposite of Hobbes' project
in the Leviathan^ and of that, I believe, of all jurists for whom the problem
is the distillation of a single will [...] from the particular wills of a mültiplicity
of individuals.26
For Foucault the domain, the territory, of political theory has definitely
shifted. Inspired by Nietzsche's genealogy of the subject, it is no longer for
him a question of uniting the particular and the universal through a notion
of the general will (äs in Rousseau and Hegel, for example), but rather of
analysing the different modes in which individuals have been constituted äs
human subjects that are equipped with a "free" will and on account of which
they can be held responsible for their actions. Nietzsche's deconstruction of
the founding act of the subject culminates in Foucault's rejection of the
liberal model of an autonomous subjectivity — a subject supposedly freed
from constraining social hierarchies and political domination — since this
model is itself implicated in modern disciplinary forms of power, According
to Foucault we need an entirely different, nonjuridical notion of subjectivity
in order to think about the nature of human freedom and subjectivity in a
new way. Thus, on two fronts — on the question of power and on the
question of the human subject — Foucault employs Nietzsche's writings äs
a way of moving beyond the parameters set by political theory in thinking
about the nature of modernity and its dialectical possibilities.
26
Foucault, Power}Knowledge, p. 97.
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The Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche
277
One notable attempt to take up Foucault's challenge and to advance his
argument on the need for a post-modern notion of subjectivity is to be found
in a recent work on the problem of modernity in political theory, in which
Nietzsche assumes a pivotal role.27 William Connolly has argued that there
are two ways of construing Nietzsche's philosophy of power. Either we take
the most obvious and widely accepted reading which interprets the will to
power in terms of a notion which advocates a kind of Hobbesian universal
mastery and domination (over nature, persons, and things), or we can follow
a Foucaultian path and construe the will to power in terms of a recognition
and affirmation of forms of otherness.28 For Connolly political modernity is
characterized by a quest for transparency and the overcoming of all natural
and man-made obstacles which stand in the way of the realization of this
goal. However, the price to be paid for the attainment of this end-state is the
assimilation and domination of "otherness", including, most destructively of
all, nature itself. Things which escape human control and mastery are defined
äs "forms of otherness" and held to be in need of rationalization and
normalization (madness, perversity, chaos and disorder, etc.). The importance
of Nietzsche in thinking through the relation between political theory and
27
I am using the term "post-modern" very loosely to refer to a way of thinking about notions
of autonomy and subjectivity which differs in significant respects from how these notions
are conceived in the modern tradition. However, I very much agree with Agnes Heller and
Ferenc Feh6r, who argue that postmodernity (including the postmodern political condition)
does not denote a new historical era, but rather that it is parasitic on modernity in äs much
äs it lives and feeds on modernity's achievements and dilemmas. "What is new in the
Situation," they write, "is the novel historical consciousness developed in post-bistoire\ the
spreading feeling that we are permanently going to be in the present and, at the same time,
after it". See Heller and Feher, The Post modern Political Condition (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1989), pp. 10 — 11. I have argued along very similar lines — chiefly that postmodernity is
one more way of refashioning the discontents of modernity and that the relation between
the two has to be construed in terms of a fundamental entwinement — in my unpublished
paper, "Foucault and the Postmodern Turn in Politieal Theory" (first delivered at a Conference
entitled Postmodernism and the Social Sciences held at the University of St. Andrews, Scotländ,
August 1989). For insight into how we might construe Nietzsche's philosophy in the debate
on modernity and postmodernity see, Robert B. Pippin, "Nietzsche and the Origin of the
Idea of Modernism", Inquiry 26 (1983), pp. 151—80, plus his essay, "Nietzsche's Farewell:
Modernity, Pre-Modernity, and Post-Modernity", in B. Magnus (ed.), Nietzsche (Cambridge
University Press, forthcoming) and lan Forbes, "Nietzsche, Modernity, and Politics", in
J. R. Gibbin, Contemporary Political Culture* Politics in a Postmodern Age (London, Sage, 1989),
pp. 218-^236.
28
W. Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity', p. 161. For a reading of the will to power in
terms of a principle of domination see, J. l?. Stern, Nietzsche (Glasgow, Collins, 1978); for a
reading of the notion in terms of a principle of self-overcoming and self-mastery see,
W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche-, for an attempt to mediate between these two readings see,
O. Schutte, Beyond Nibilism. For a comprehensive and informative reading of Nietzsche's
teaching see, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, "Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht", NietzscheStudien?*, 1974, pp. 1-60.
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'
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Keith Ansell-Pearson
modernity lies in Nietzsche's affirmation of these forms of otherness and of
a space in which they can be recognized without incorporating them into
some grand dialectical System of absolute thought and knowledge. Modern
political theory from Rousseau to Hegel and Marx, however, has supported
the ideal of an ethico-political Community in which suppression and subjugation is accepted for the sake of realizing the goal of social harmony and
collective unity.29 But the desire for unity and harmony expressed in the
search for the common good can only result in a totalitarian denial of
otherness, an otherness which arises by necessity from this quest for completion.
Connolly invites us to Interpret the modern project of freedom and
emancipation in terms of an imperialistic discourse of mastery and doinination
that is blind to its own unexamined assumptions about the seif and the world.
He argues that any set of norms or Standards which becomes endowed with
legitimacy and authority must represent an ambiguous achievement in so far
äs it succumbs to the temptation of establishing its own hegemoüy by
excluding and denying that which does not fit into its confines. With Foucault,
Connolly shares a deep suspicion towards notions of an integrated and
harmonious seif because this Integration and harmony can only be achieved
at the cost of subjugating a form of otherness which is resistant to harmony
and unity.
The importance of Nietzsche in this context is that the absence of a
political theory in his writings allöws him the advantage over other modern
thinkers — Hegel, Marx, etc. — of being able to examine the presumptions
of modernity without advocating in advance of this interrogation a single
theory of politics.30 Thus, unlike many commentators, Connolly'does not
view the lack of a coherent or systematic political theory in Nietzsche in
terms of a lacuiia in need of reconstruction, but rather äs a source of strength
in thinking about the problem of modernity without the certainties and the
comforts provided by a totalizing and foundational philosophical System.
With the thought of will to power, Connolly suggests, Nietzsche provides
a counter-ontology of resistance which puts into doubt the anthropomorphic
desire behind modernity that the world should be made susceptible to human
mastery and the desire of utopian politics for a Community united in its
understanding of the common good. Modernity has created a political animal,
but one which is füll of rancour and ressentiment^ resentment both towards
that within itself which resists subjectification and towards that in others
which deviates from its own moral Standards and norms. In both instances
29
30
Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p. 132.
ibid., p. 168.
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The Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche
279
the seif äs subject refuses to accept difference in itself and others and converts
this irreducible difference into an otherness which must be excluded and
denied. As Connolly points out:
The subject is not simply or unambiguously the seif which establishes its
unity, freedom, independence and self-transparency; it is also the seif required
to interiori2e a complex set of socially imposed Standards and to regulate
that in itself which deviates from those norms. The subject is ambiguously
an instrumentality of modern order and a claimant of rights within it, an
independent centre of knowledge and a bearer of socially established criteria
of knowledge, a seeker of self-transparency and an interiorizer of social
norms. This ambiguity is its essence; but its denial is crucial to its identity.
Is there, then, no trace of resentment in the seif which bears the impress of
subjectivity? Is there no drive to revenge in the accusations, corrections,
improvements, verdicts, and punishments individuals mete out to each other
or in the treatment they accord to those falling below the threshold of
subjectivity?31
Nietzsche offers a form of selfhood in which discipline and self-control are
affirmed while the tarantula of revenge and resentment, äs Zarathustra calls
it, is refused: "For that man may be delivered from revenge: that is for me
the bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after long storms."32 The
human subject learns to affirm the contingency and finitude of its existence
and to accept the fragility of the world and its place in it. For Connolly this
"brave ethic" of Nietzsche's constitutes, in contrast to the ethic of mastery
and domination characteristic of modernity, an ethic of "letting be"33.
The interiorization of the subject which Nietzsche analyses in the Genealogy
in terms of the development of a bad conscience has all too often been
understood in terms of an advocation on Nietzsche's part of some grandiose
and ahistorical return to pagan aristocracy (the "blond beasts" of Nietzsche
legend).34 But this is a mistaken reading of Nietzsche's intentions. Nietzsche
accepts the historicization and the socialization of the human subject and the
necessity of the slave revolt in morality which has deepened the human animal
in that it has cultivated a "soul" — and with it the knowledge of "evil". In
contrast to the reading of Nietzsche äs a neo-conservative, Connolly, inspired
by Foucault's critique of modernity in which Nietzsche plays a decisive part,
succeeds in showing us the outlines of a Nietzschean ethic which may take
us beyond the antinomies of political modernity.
31
32
ibid., pp. 156-7.
Za II, "Von den Taranteln", KSA4.
Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p. 161.
34
See Detlef Brennecke, "Die Blonde Bestie. Vom Mißverständnis
Nietzsche-Studien 5, 1976, pp. 113—145.
33
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eines Schlagworts",
ti
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Keith Atisell-Pearson
Concluding Reflections
Foucault's reading of Nietzsche is bold, challenging, and imaginative. It
has inspired some original construals of Nietzsche's relation to political theory.
However, it is not without exegetic problems. In spite of the fact that Foucault
was a self-declared intellectual anarchist who had little respect or regard for
the fidelity of his textual interpretations — Foucault argues strongly that
there is no single Nietzscheänism35 — it is necessary to question the accuracy
of his reading of Nietzsche in the two aspects we have concentrated our
attention on.
Foucault's use of Nietzsche's philosophy of power in order to shift the
boundaries of political thought rests on the argument that Nietzsche thinks
of power outside of the confines of a political theory. This is tfue to a certain
extent, but it should be noted that Nietzsche does not reject the juridical
model of power äs completely and unequivocälly äs Foucault does. Thus, for
example, we find that in Tbus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche relates the teaching
of will to power in terms of a teaching on the nature of law and sovereignty.
This is evident in two notable parables in the book. Firstj in the parable on
'Of the Way of the Creator" (Vom Wege des Schaffenden), Nietzsche has
Zarathustra present a notion of sovereignty in which self-mastery is understood to involve not only the self-legislation of the will but also self-execution
of power. In other words, the notion of will to power can be read in terms
of Nietzsche's attempt to show the inseparability of "will" (legislation) and
"power" (execution), to show that we cannot think of one without the other.
In this way Nietzsche shows the unity of the doer and the deed, that the
human seif only discloses itself through human action. In this way -Nietzsche
departs radically from the Kantian conception of autonomy, in which the
emphasis is placed not on the consequences of human action (on what
Nietzsche calls "doing") but on the intentions behind it, and which posits a
morally good and pure rational agent, but one which is conceived in purely
ahistorical and noumenal terms. Thus, Zarathustra asks: "Can you furnish
yourself with your own good and evil and hang up your own will above
yourself äs a law? Can you be judge of yourself and avenger of your law?"^6
Secondly, in the parable on "Of Self-Overcoming" (Von der Selbst-Uebermn^
düng) Nietzsche has Zarathustra inform us that wherever he found a living
creature he found the will to power, "even in the will of the servant I found
the will to be master". "All living creatures," Zarathustra relates, "are obeying
creatures [...] he who cannot obey himself will be commanded [...] Only
35
36
Foucault, Philosophy, Politics> and Culture^ p. 32.
Za I, "Vom Wege des Schaffenden".
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The Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche
281
where life is, there is also will: not will to life, but — so I teach you — will
to power!"37
This point on the will to power äs a teaching of sovereignty has implications for understanding Nietzsche's notion of subjectivity. As we have
seen, Foucault abandons the notion of autonomous subjectivity found in
liberal theory on the grounds that it is little more than an insidious model
of self-determination by which the disciplinary institutions of modern society
(the prison, the asylum, the clinic, etc.) gain normalized control of the human
subject and create spurious hierarchical distinctions between the normal and
the insane, the healthy and the sick, the free and the oppressed in order to
train the "normal" (and normative) seif to accept responsibility for its conduct.
In contrast to Foucault, however, Nietzsche does not embark on a complete
abandonment of a notion of subjectivity but instead puts forward an alternative aesthetic model of human freedom and creativity. In The Gay Science,
for example, Nietzsche speaks of creating the seif in terms of a notion of
artistic wholeness:
To "give style" to one's character — a great and rare art! It is practiced by
all those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and
then'fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears äs art
and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye [...] For one thing is
needful: that a human being should attain satisfaction with himself, whether
it be by means of this or that poetry and art; only then is a human being at
all tolerable to behold. Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually
ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to
endure his ugly sight38.
In this aesthetic model of subjectivity we see the outlines of the kind of
model of the seif which Connolly conceives äs being a positive and creative
form of selfhood which does not resent its own mode of organization and
rage against the temporality of the human condition. While not embracing
the view that the subject is to be construed in terms of a mere effect of
power, this does not mean that Nietzsche posits a metaphysics of the subject
or that he views the creation of the seif äs something prior to the constitution
of power. On the contrary, Nietzsche views subjectivity in terms of a labour
of self-overcoming which is inseparable from relations of power. Indeed, in
his last work on ethics Foucault was to recognize that his notion of the
subject äs a mere effect of power constituted one of the major deficiencies
of his thinking, and it was precisely to a Nietzschean aesthetic conception of
37
38
ibid., "Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung".
FW 290, KSA 3.
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282
Keith Ansell-Pearson
ethics that he turned in thinking about an alternative nonjuridical model of
selfhood.39
The significance of Nietzsche's notion of character is that is envisages a
form of self-creation and self-legislation which does not rely on notions of
moral judgement. In section 290 of the Gay Science we have quoted from, for
example, Nietzsche says that the human being that is able to subject itself to
the constraint of style does not conceal what is ugly about their nature but
knows how to make it sublime. "In the end," Nietzsche says, "when the
work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste
governed and formed everything large and small." Nietzsche's key point is
that the important thing is not whether this taste is "good" or "bad", but
that it reflects a single taste, that is, a taste which reveals that the seif which
imposes the discipline of style upon itself is able to give a coherence and
unity to its character. This unity of the seif, however, is not a moral unity
but an aesthetic one — more, it is one which is truly beyond the oppositions
of moral judgement, that is, beyond good and evil.
Notwithstanding the criticisms I have made, Foucault's reading of
Nietzsche maintains its öriginality. His reading shows that Nietzsche's philosophy of power can be fruitfully deployed in order to re-think some of the
central problems of political philosophy in ä fresh and invigorating way.
Indeed, one commentator has recently argued, in the wake of Foucault's
reading, that Nietzsche's overt "neo-conservative" politics can be disengaged
from his philosophy of power without jeopardising the coherence and öriginality of his thought. Mark Warren has argued that there exists no necessary
logical connection between Nietzsche's philosophy of power and his aristöcratic politics, but rather that Nietzsche's politics only follow from his philosophy of power if we accept, äs he did, several uncritical assumptions about
the nature and limits of politics in modern societies, such äs, for example,
the belief that all societies, both ancient and modern, require a rigid and
institutionalised division of labour and order of rank in which society is
divided into masters and slaves.40 Thus, following in the footsteps of Foucault's pioneering work, Warren suggests that attention is not focused on
Nietzsche's regressive and debilitating politics, which constitutes the least
interesting aspect of his work, but rather on his philosophy of power, which
is the aspect of his work least explored by political theorists. For Warren the
great significance of Nietzsche's philosophy of will to power is that it is the
39
See M. Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress", in
I?. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984), pp. 340—72.
40
Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), preface
and pp. 226—7, pp. 237—46.
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The Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche
283
first which can be seen to explicitly break with the metaphysical assumptions
of modern political thought about the nature of human agency by conceiving
the subject äs entirely contingent, dependent upon historical and cultural
practices for its realization in the social worid,41
Behind the imaginative readings of Nietzsche's importance for postmodern politics put forward by Connolly and Warren there lies the inspirational work of Michel Foucault, which, if deployed in the way it is intended
to be, makes it impossible for critics of Nietzsche to keep on discussing the
political import of his work solely in terms of "the embarrassingly political
Nietzsche". Foucault's work points the way forward beyond the impasse
which has been reached on the question of Nietzsche's politics and his Status
äs a political thinker. His reading of Nietzsche should serve to inspire a whole
Programme of Nietzsche research in an effort to open up the neglected
question of Nietzsche's relation to the major thinkers of the tradition of
modern political thought (Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel)
and to pose the crucial question of Nietzsche's importance for postmodernity.
A number of the major philosophers of this Century — Jaspers, Heidegger,
Deleuze, Derrida — have thrown up a "new Nietzsche" for discussion and
Inspiration. It is unlikely that we will find one that is äs challenging and
inspiring äs the one to be found in the work of Michel Foucault.
41
ibid., pp. 152—9. I have critically examined in some detail the Claims Warren makes on
behalf of Nietzsche's alleged break with the metaphysical assumptions of modern political
thought in my essay, "Nietzsche: A Radical Challenge to Political Theory?", in Radical
Philosophy 54 (Spring 1990), pp. 10-19.
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