ENCOUNTERING THE ALIEN
IN THE HEIDEGGER AFFAIR:
SOME REFLECTIONS IN
RESPONSE TO BARRY
HINDESS
Keith Ansell-Pearson
There is a pressing need to think the Heidegger affair. There are
several states of urgency, and thus the affair is not the exclusive
1
province of the political or politics. There is an urgency of thought.
A union of state and philosophy can make sense only if philosophy
promises to be unconditionally useful to the state, that is to say,
to set usefulness to the state higher than the truth. It would be
splendid of course for the state if it also had truth in its pay and
service; but the state itself well knows that it is part of the essence
2
of truth that it never accepts pay or stands in anyone’s service.
I would like to take up the issue of the relationship between theory and practice
as it manifests itself in the d’c~ff~ire Fleic~egger, and as raised by Barry Hindess in
his thoughtprovoking essay &dquo;Heidegger and the Nazis: Cautionary Tales of the
Relations Between Theory and Practice&dquo;.~ His position is that Heidegger cannot
simply be branded a Nazi philosopher since, he maintains, correctly in my
opinion, that Heidegger’s engagement with National Socialism was of a &dquo;critical
character&dquo;.4 It is, therefore, necessary to counter any simple attempt to reduce
Heidegger’s thought to a &dquo;Nazi&dquo; essence. I could not agree more. However, I
feel that Hindess does not get to the essence of the question concerning the
relationship between theory and practice in Heidegger, in particular of how
Heidegger’s erring in 1933 is the result of an identification he makes between
and the tasks of National Socialism; namely,
the tasks of science < ~issc~sch~ft)
that together both are to work towards the realization of the historical fate of
84
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85
the German ~l~ll~. Reflection on this issue has, I believe, important implications
for how we ought to conceive of the role of philosophy today in the wake of
both Heidegger’s failure and that of Marxism too (philosophy/theory must now
be stateless, nomadic, without place), and how we can best understand the
nature of Heidegger’s erring as a philosopher. Through reflection on these
two matters it is possible to continue to read Heidegger as the indispensable
and brilliant thinker he is and, at the same time, to continue, perhaps in good
&dquo;spirit&dquo;, the tasks of thinking after the time of &dquo;the end of philosophy&dquo;.
My argument centres on how we are to interpret Heidegger’s remarks
on &dquo;political science&dquo; and the politicization of science in his infamous rectoral
address of May 1933. Hindess maintains that the attack on academic freedom
made by Heidegger in the address &dquo;was not an attack on ’genuine’ freedom&dquo;
but only on freedom &dquo;in its negative form&dquo; (say as defined and exalted by
Isaiah Berlin). Heidegger’s critique is advanced &dquo;in the name of the true aim
of science, that is, the pursuit of truth&dquo;.5 It is difficult to know precisely what
is meant by the term &dquo; ’genuine’ freedom&dquo;, but I take it that, in an academic or
educational context, it would mean things like freedom of publication, freedom
to criticize the university in a responsible manner, freedom over one’s teaching,
and so on. But it was precisely this kind of freedom which was placed at
risk by Heidegger in his attempt to establish cultural unity and leadership in
Germany at this time by arguing for a union of objectives between philosophy
and the state. Here I refer to such things as Heidegger’s assumption of the
title of &dquo;Fuehrer&dquo; of the university, his redrafting of the constitution of the
university so that the rector was no longer elected by the university senate
but by the minister of culture, and granting the rector the power to appoint
and dismiss deans at whim (a policy which Heidegger tried to implement but
which was met with resistance). A telegram to Hitler from Heidegger, dated
20 May 1933, requests that the planned meeting of the executive committee
of the German University League be postponed in order to allow Heidegger
the time to guarantee that the political ideals of the new regime could be
put into practice in German universities throughout the country.~ As a result
of his actions, the university’s longstanding tradition of autonomy and selfgovernment was destroyed almost overnight. Hindess’s point underestimates
the control Heidegger sought to exert over his Freiburg colleagues, and the
university system as a whole, during his time as rector. But his oversight has
more serious aspects to it, as we shall shortly see.
Hindess tries to distance Heidegger’s academic program from the Nazis’s
crude politicization of education and science, but Heidegger’s rectoral position
on the question of political science is much more ambivalent than this. The
principal difficulty of the address is the fact that Heidegger closely links the
question of the meaning and goals of science with that of the historical destiny
of the German volk. While it is true that Heidegger expresses an opposition to
any crude politicization of science, it is also clear that he is arguing for a unity
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86
between science and state in a way which could only lead to the undermining of certain academic freedoms (namely, the independence of thought and
inquiry from the explicitly stated party political goals of the National Socialist state). Like Hitler, Heidegger equates the &dquo;being&dquo; of the National Socialist
party with that of the German state and of the German people. Science, for
Heidegger, is to play a key role in the realization of the historical vocation of
the German people. Thus, as Tom Rockmore has argued, Heidegger rejects
a vulgar or inauthentic form of political science in favour of a more authentic
understanding of the political responsibilities and obligations of science.~ The
rectoral address is clear on this point, for example, when Heidegger states:
We understand the German university as the &dquo;high&dquo; school that,
grounded in science, by means of science, educates and disciplines
the leaders and guardians of the fate of the German people. The
will to the essence of the German university is the will to science
as will to the historical mission of the German people as a people
that knows itself in its state. T’ogother, science and German fate
8
must come to power in this will to essence.8
Heidegger’s noble intention of preserving the integrity of academic inquiry from
cultural disintegration and fragmentation cannot but be severely compromised
by his identification of the essence of the university with the destiny of a
particular Volk and ethnic culture. As Charles Scott has argued, a distinguishing
feature of the address is the way in which Heidegger transforms the originary
questioning of being into a question of national identity and destiny.9 The
tensions which result from this identification are clearly evident in the address
and account for much of its ambiguous nature.
What is perhaps most tragic about Heidegger’s affair is his attempt to
spiritualize National Socialism by providing the movement with noble philosophical ambitions and intellectual leadership. 10 This intention is evident in the
very opening sentence of the rectoral address:
The assumption of the rectorate is the commitment to the spiritual
leadership of this institution of higher learning. The following of
teachers and students awakens and grows strong only from a true
and joint rootedness in the essence of the German university. This
essence, however, gains clarity, rank, and power only when first of
all and at all times the leaders are themselves led-led by that unyielding spiritual mission that forces the fate of the German people
to bear the stamp of its history. 11
A key question which emerges from a consideration of the rectoral address
is whether Heidegger’s understanding of the destiny of the German people, and
of the role of science in the actualization of that destiny, is compatible with the
ideals of actually existing National Socialism as they were being propounded at
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87
this time. In 1933-34 Heidegger was clearly operating under the delusion that
the National Socialist leadership was susceptible to intellectual guidance from
philosophers like himself. After his resignation from the rectorship in 1934,
however, he began to distance himself from real National Socialism, criticizing
it for its crude biologism, and speaking in his lectures of an &dquo;ideal&dquo; National
Socialism centred on the possibility-and necessity-of a &dquo;global encounter&dquo;
between technology and modern humanity.1z
But even this commitment to an ideal version of National Socialism is
problematic. What is perhaps most disconcerting about the whole affair is
Heidegger’s blindness to the reality of National Socialism; namely, to the fact
that even as early as 1933 it was apparent to anyone with political insight that
National Socialist ideology was rabidly anti-Semitic and intrinsically militarist
and expansionist. At the heart of National Socialism were two things which
Heidegger never subscribed to: the superiority of the Aryan race and the assertion of world dominion on the basis of this claim to superiority. Nevertheless,
in the face of its ignoble spirit and declared racial intentions, Heidegger turned
a blind eye and rallied behind the Nazi cause. A number of times Hindess
cites Heidegger’s remark on the &dquo;inner truth and greatness of National Socialism&dquo; (first made in 1935 in the Introductioaa to Metaphysics and repeated in
the 1950s without qualification), but without ever expressing any real alarm
over the disturbing nature of this statement. What is disturbing about it is the
fact that Heidegger could ever believe, especially after 1945 and the revelations about the concentration camps (already under construction in Freiburg
in 1933), that the National Socialist movement was capable of such truth and
greatness. As Richard Wolin has argued, &dquo;That the philosopher simply grossly
misjudged the essence of National Socialism itself-that it was from the very
beginning an irredeemable political deformation&dquo; never seems to have crossed
~--Ieidegger’s mind at any time during or after the war. 13 However, the fact is that
Heidegger did locate an inner truth and greatness to National Socialism. The
question then arises of how such a massive failure of political judgment was
possible on the part of one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century.
There is an urgency to think what this failure means for philosophy. Even
if it is true, as Hindess holds, that most of the facts about Heidegger’s affair
have been known for a long time, leading him to suspect that the affair has
less to do &dquo;with the discovery of new information about Heidegger than with
the popularity, especially in France and in America, of what is often called
’post-modernism’ or ’post-structuralism’ &dquo;,14 it remains the case that reflection
on Heidegger’s philosophy and his politics-especially on the relationship between the two-now transcends the moment of furore created by Victor Farias’s
Heidegger and IVc~zism.ls
A large and essential part of the dispiritedness which we feel and experience in response to revelations about Heidegger’s involvement in, and commitment to, National Socialism centres on how one of the most profound thinkers
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88
of this century could err so profoundly. As Robert Bernasconi perspicaciously
notes, with obvious distress, even if the scandal arising from Heidegger’s personal involvement with the Nazi regime will not go away, the glee to be had
by his philosophical opponents in the consequent damage to his reputation
as a great philosopher and &dquo;master thinker&dquo; is misjudged. For what the affair
exposes is the ignobility not simply of Heidegger but of philosophy:
It is not only Heidegger, both the man and his thought, who is
diminished by the whole affair, but also, and perhaps primarily,
philosophy itself. What is disturbing is not just that, forty five years,
after the end of the war, philosophers still largely conduct the debate in cliches. What is also under threat following Heidegger’s
so-called &dquo;error&dquo; is one of philosophy’s most exalted claims about
itself
It matters greatly how we approach Heidegger’s so-called &dquo;Nazism&dquo;. It is
all too easy to invite the untutored reader to play judge and jury in considering
the affair. It surely cannot be a case of the reader with morality and humanity
on his or her side sitting in judgment on the bad Nazi philosopher called &dquo;Martin
Heidegger&dquo;. If this is the result of the recent surge of books and material on the
topic, then thought is well and truly dead. As Heidegger himself tried to say
after 1945, to adopt the standpoint of good and evil, of victor and vanquished
(in the &dquo;triumph&dquo; of Western liberal democracy over the Nazi menace), means
that nothing concerning the fate of planetary technology has been, or ever will
be, resolved. Heidegger’s questioning of technology retains its importance in
spite of his own personal belief that National Socialism contained the promise
of an authentic encounter between global technology and modern humanity.
Heidegger’s failure as a philosopher consists of two things, I believe. The
first is his identification of the questioning of being with the historical tasks of a
particular ethnic and cultural group (the Germans). The second, resulting from
this, is his attempt to provide a philosophical ground to the historic-political
moment. To situate philosophy thus is, it seems to me, to compromise the radical independence of thought and its essential critical function. It is not simply
recognition of the validity of Hegel’s dictum that the owl of Minerva only flies
at dusk which makes me say this, but rather the sharing of Nietzsche’s belief
that philosophy, if it is to serve the needs of a critical spirit and engagement
with the &dquo;present&dquo;, must always be untimely. Heidegger’s failure is, at least regarding the task of &dquo;realizing&dquo; philosophy, perhaps also the tragic failure of our
century and thus has a much wider significance than simply that of the &dquo;l’~f,fcaZre
Heidegger&dquo;, as it has come to be known. ~le must acknowledge Heidegger’s
continuing presence on our thinking. But this acknowledgment contains an
obligation to the Other and others: namely, of defining the nature and extent
of Heidegger’s influence on contemporary thought and determining, and in the
recovery of his thought, the relationship between philosophy and politics.17 In
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89
examining why Heidegger became a member of the Nazi party, and why he
retained his membership with varying degrees and types of commitment until
the end of the war, the exercise should be a matter which engages us deeply
and passionately, and which, above all, should encourage us to embark upon
some urgent, if difficult and complex thinking: as Barry Hindess exemplifies
in his essay about the relationship between theory and practice. While it may
be the case that Heidegger sought to translate his project of the destruction
of metaphysics into a real and then an ideal form of National Socialism, this
does not, and cannot, mean that his endorsement of Hitler’s coming to power
in 1933 exhausts the political possibilities of his thinking.ls We must think on,
afresh and anew. But to do this effectively it remains as necessary as it ever
has been to learn with, against, and from Heidegger. As Derrida’s exercises
in deconstructive reading show us, it is always possible to read the texts of
authors against themselves: we can leave moralism to the judges amongst us.
As Joseph Margolis has expressed it, it is impossible for us as postmoderns and
postmetaphysicians to escape Heidegger’s influence and significance. It is for
this very reason that the responsibility is on us not to allow ourselves to be
&dquo;Heidegger°’s own sort of Heideggerian&dquo;.19
At the centre of F-iindess’s understanding of the questioning of Heidegger
is the concern that moralism-or humanism-not be allowed to place a closure
on his thinking. This seems to me to be crucially correct. To suggest, he argues,
that Heidegger’s antihumanism is responsible for his Nazism (as many seem to
hold), is &dquo;at best to miss the point of his arguments and, at worst, to opt for
an easy but unthinking closure of the issue&dquo;. 20 If only it was a matter, as Luc
Ferry and Alain Renaut would like it to be, of returning to good old-fashioned
(Sartrean) humanism .21 But as Margolis has recognized, what has been placed
in jeopardy by the Heideggerian revolution in thought is precisely any simple
or naive belief in classical humanist notions (such as justice, just war, political
right, philosophical legitimation, the interpretation of history as progress, and
so on).22 As another leading commentator of our times has also recognized,
all the foundational pillars of traditional metaphysics have become extremely
problematic for us in the wake of Heidegger’s &dquo;Destruktion of metaphysics&dquo;
(reason, subjectivity, will, etc.).23
Fred Dallmayr argues that Heidegger’s thinking after 1933 is best seen as
prolonged and tortuous struggle to expel the Nazi demons without returning
to philosophical orthodoxy. in this Heidegger presents an essential and crucial challenge for reflection on the fate of the philosophical and the political
today and in the next century; namely, how to forge a path beyond humanist metaphysics, which links together the frail ideologies of modernity (from
conservation to liberalism to socialism), in a way that does not lead one to
Fascism. 14 This, finally, is what I think Heidegger was with difficulty trying
to teach us after 1945. The task today must surely be one of learning from
Heidegger’s mistakes and building on the abyssal ground of his pathbreaking
a
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90
thought, thinking beyond Europe and man; that is, beyond Eurocentrism (especially Germano-centrism) and anthropocentrism. For postmoderns &dquo;the path
of homecoming&dquo; can only be found &dquo;in the encounter with the alien&dquo;,’5
Notes
1. J. F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the Jews" (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press,
1990), p. 51.
2. F. Nietzsche, "Schopenhauer as Educator" (1874) in
Untimely Meditations (Cam-
bridge, 1983), p. 191.
3. B. Hindess, "Heidegger and the Nazis: Cautionary Tales of the Relations Between
Theory and Practice", Thesis Eleven 31 (1992), pp. 115-130.
4. ibid., p. 18.
5. ibid., p. 116.
6. R. Wolin, "Recent Revelations Concerning Martin Heidegger and National Socialism",
Theory, Culture and Society 7 (1990), pp. 73-96.
7. T. Rockmore, On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1992).
8. M. Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of German University" and "The Rectorate
1933/34; Facts and Thoughts", Review of Metaphysics 38 (March 1985), p. 471.
9. C. Scott, "Heidegger’s Rector’s Address: A Loss of the Question of Ethics", Graduate
Faculty Philosophy Journal 14, 2 and 15, 1 (1991), pp. 237-265.
10. J. Derrida, Of Spirit, Heidegger and the Question, trans. G. Bennington and
R. Bowlby (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991). The question of "spirit"
and the spiritual (
Geist, geistig, geistlich
) is at the centre of Derrida’s engagement
with the "question" of Heidegger. Derrida writes:
by taking the risk of spiritualizing nazism, he [Heidegger] might have
been trying to absolve or save it by marking it with this affirmation
(spirituality, science, questioning, etc.). By the same token, this sets
apart Heidegger’s commitment and breaks an affiliation. This address
seems no longer to belong simply to the "ideological" camp in which
some appeals to obscure forces—forces which would not be spiritual,
but natural, biological, racial, according to anything but spiritual interpretation of ’earth and blood’ ". (p. 39)
...
11. M. Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University" and "The Rectorate
1933/34: Facts and Thoughts", p. 470.
12. M. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. R. Mannheim (New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1987), p. 199.
13. Wolin, p. 74.
14. ibid., p. 117.
15. English translation edited by J. Margolis and T. Rockmore (Philadelphia, Temple
University Press, 1989); see also H. Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner
Biographie (Frankfurt a.M. and New York, Campus, 1988).
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91
16. R. Bernasconi, "Habermas and Arendt on the Philosopher’s ’Error’: Tracking the
Diabolic in Heidegger", Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14, 2 and 15, 1 (1991),
pp. 3-25.
17. See J. Margolis, "Discarding and Recovering Heidegger" in T. Rockmore and J. Margolis, The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics (Temple, Philadelphia Uni-
versity Press, 192), pp. 405-423.
18. cf. S. K. White, "Heidegger and the Difficulties of a Postmodern Ethics and Politics", Political Theory 8 (February 1990), pp. 80-103 and R. Dostal, "Friendship and
Politics: Heidegger’s Failing", Political Theory 20 (August 1992), pp. 399-423.
19. ibid., p. 416.
20.
ibid., p. 125.
21. L. Ferry and A. Renaut, Heidegger and Modernity, trans. F. Philip (Chicago, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 3-4, 95-97.
22. ibid., p. 409.
23. F. Dallmayr, "Heidegger and Politics: Some Lessons" in T. Rockmore and J. Margolis
(eds), op. cit., p. 303.
24. ibid., p. 285.
25. Heidegger (1942) cited in Dallmayr, p. 307. On this last point see especially J. F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the Jews",op. cit., for a powerful insight. Lyotard holds that,
in its essential National Socialist moment (when it identifies the task of thought
geopolitically with the "destiny" of a specific people and place) Heidegger’s thinking forgets that "thought is without beginning and unfounded, that it does not have
to ’give place’ to Being, but is owed to a nameless Law" (p. 94).
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