ŠUM
25. Jun 2017
ŠUM#7/ ‘The Only Thing I Would Impose is Fragmentation’ – Interview with
Nick Land
‘The Only Thing I Would Impose is Fragmentation’
Interview with Nick Land
by Marko Bauer and Andrej Tomažin
(in print: ŠUM#7: move 37. June 2017)
*
In your 2014 book Templexity: Disordered Loops through Shanghai Time you
write: ‘“What happened to America?” is the Cyberpunk question par
excellence’. What really happened to America in the last few months?
It’s sort of stolen from William Gibson, so it goes right back to the mid-1980s. I
think you’re totally right to say that now is an excellent time to return to it. So
what happened to America? If I was gonna say it in a nutshell: after roughly
half a millennium during which the main driving force of global history has
been to achieve the integration of larger and more powerful states, directed by
a group of strongly universalist ideologists that basically think that the larger
your aggregation and the larger the set of common rules that can be imposed
on them, the better, we’re seeing a tidal reversal of truly historic scope. The
basic tendency now is disintegrative. So what I see happening to America:
holding itself together is going to become increasingly challenging.
ŠUM#7 ‘The Only Thing I Would Impose is Fragmentation’ – Interview with Nick Land
Nick Land/Texts/Interviews/ŠUM#7 ‘The Only Thing I Would Impose is Fragmentation’ – Interview with Nick Land.pdf
We’re in advance sorry for referencing French theorists, which are, of course,
part of your formation, but to which it seems you’re also increasingly allergic to.
That requires no apologies whatsoever.
One of the most valuable tendencies of your writing is/was the deterritorializing
of the progressive/reactionary divide. This seems especially lost on your
blog Xenosystems, where you position yourself on the Right, regardless of how
far on the outside of it that is. Isn’t this a kind of reterritorialization?
I think we are overdue—always—for a big discussion about what people mean
by Left and Right. The Left/Right polarity is a very interesting piece of
language, a little compact system of language, because everyone’s using it with
either an immense lack of clarity about what is really being invoked by that, or
with greatly inconsistent basic associations with those terms.
The Left for you is now the conservative side, and the Right the progressive
one. But where does the Left/Right distinction reside, actually? Does the Left
stand for—as Badiou and co. would claim—egalitarianism, and the Right is
against that? Is the Left the Golden Rule and the Right the rule of something
along the lines ‘do whatever pleases you, but accept the consequences’?
Well, that’s the Crowleyite sense of the Right. Badiou is an interesting person
to introduce, because I am kind of happy with his Left/Right distinction. In a
sense that is now in play predominantly, the Left is the camp of unity and
universalism, and egalitarianism is a big part of that. The Right is the camp of
fragmentation, experimentation and, I’d say, competition as a term that is
inherited from a tradition and is probably fairly uncontroversial. But yes, people
do attach themselves to a sense of the Right and, no doubt, also of the Left that
is exactly about hyperterritorialization. There is a Blood and Soil sense of the
essence of the Right, which I feel compelled to engage with and try to displace
or dethrone, because I don’t think it leads anywhere. It’s a dead end. There
might be some tactical opportunities in those tendencies, but the ‘Neo’ in NRx
implies precisely that there is no going back. In so far as Blood and Soil
identitarianism will manage to attain power in various ways, it will see its worst
days, it will be forced to deliver and perform, and will fail to do so. The more
they are actually in a position to implement policy, the more they will become
ineffective in their own terms. They will lose the potential for
mass globalization and be associated with failure. I would like to see those
experiments happen on a small enough scale that they can be educational,
rather than globally catastrophic.
You’re interested in local failures?
Yes, local failures are great. Global failures, obviously, not so great.
All the ’30s analogies are kind of lethargic or nostalgic, as though there was
nothing new going on. Nevertheless, there’s also Badiou’s passion for the Real
and the phenomenon of ‘communists’ turning into ‘fascists’ during the period
between the two world wars—figures such as Pierre Drieu la Rochelle or
Charles Péguy, who is perhaps even more ambivalent, since he becomes a
vector of reference for both Vichy France and Mussolini, but also of the
resistance movement. We are aware of your different take on what fascism is,
which sees no transformation in the above cases, and from the perspective of
which Goebbels’s move from socialism to national socialism is a mere stroll.
We are, however, interested in your move to the other—outer—side. What
could a relation between passion for the Real and passion for the Outside be?
Is your Outside similar to Badiou’s Real?
It might be. I would say, though, that without a notion of reality testing, an
invocation of the Real is of absolutely zero significance. Anyone can invoke the
Real, but unless there’s some mechanism that provides, not a voice for the
Outside, but an actual functional intervention from the Outside, so it has a
selective function, then the language is empty. In that sense it’s completely
inseparable from fragmentation. The modernist systems work—whether you’re
talking about the market economy or the natural sciences—because they are
fragmentary systems. There’s no political decision about what is or is not a
good scientific or economic result. These results are subject to a selective
sorting process that mobilizes the Outside. That’s where, without being a great
or even a mediocre Badiou scholar, my natural suspicion about an invocation of
the Outside from the position that he seems to occupy would be.
A silly metaphysical question: Is the Outside something given/fixed or is it a
changeable entity?
It’s an important, but not perfectly formulated question. The tendency of
transcendental philosophy has been to increasingly identify the Real with Time.
The Real and Temporality are deeply co-involved in such a way that Time
cannot be used as a framework in which to place or make sense of the Real.
We simply can’t ask the question of whether the Real is changeable or
unchangeable. If we say the Real is either changeable or unchangeable, we are
saying that it exists in Time, and if that’s the case, then we should be asking
about Time and not what we thought we were asking about, when we were
asking about the Real. Because it is the Real that is the ultimate controlling
factor. To think that we can place It in Time is a distraction from this ultimate
transcendental level of the question. That’s intrinsically obscure, but I think also
inescapable.
How does reality testing function?
We do that by enabling a process of selection to happen. The natural sciences
are as good an example of this as any. The only thing that makes the modern
sciences elevated beyond epistemic procedures seen in other times and other
cultures is the fact that there is a mechanism beyond human political
manipulation for the elimination of defective theories. Karl Popper is on that
level just totally right. If it’s politically negotiable, it’s useless, it’s unscientific by
definition. You don’t trust scientists, you don’t trust scientific theories, you don’t
trust scientific institutions in so far as they have integrity, what you trust is the
disintegrated zone of criticism and the criteria for criticism and evaluation in
terms of repeated experiments, in terms of the heuristics that are built up to
decide whether a particular theory has been defeated and eliminated by a
superior theory. It’s that mechanism of selection that is the only thing that
makes science important and makes it a system of reality testing. And this is
obviously intrinsically directed against any kind of organic political community
aiming to internally determine—through its own processes—the negotiation of
the nature of reality. Reality has to be an external disruptive critical factor.
CCRU’s text Lemurian Time War says that hyperstition is ‘charting a flight from
destiny’. How does this notion come into play with reality testing?
I think hyperstition is one of those things that has completely escaped from the
box and is now a wild, feral animal on the loose. My relation to this alien thing
is like everyone else’s who’s interested in it. I am approaching it from a position
of zero authority, trying to make sense of how it is living and changing and
affecting the world. It, the thing, not it, the concept. But having said that, my
sense of a hyperstition is that a hyperstition is an experiment. It makes
itself real, if it works. And whether or not it works, is something that can’t be,
again, decided by a process of an internal debate, you can’t as a result of some
kind of internal dialectics decide that, hey, this is a good hyperstition, it has a
great future. It’s gonna work because of its intrinsic relation to the Outside,
which is something that cannot be managed. Perhaps it can be cautiously,
tentatively predicted in a way that a scientist or an artist would—through
learning their craft—get a sense of what is gonna work and what isn’t gonna
work. But that’s not the same as having a criterion, still less a law.
Let’s return to our first question on America in this very historic moment, which
is folded in with semiotic patterns and intensive regularities that seem to be
tweeted and spread in a certain post-factual discourse into an image of the
real, which one retroactively cannot distinguish from the real anymore. Is
fabrication of fake news in Veles, Macedonia, during the US elections, a way to
‘propagate escape routes’ as you see it, or is it an ephemeral event with no
significance?
I would definitely think some sort of a dismissive response along the second
line would be grossly complacent. Is it an escape route? There’s definitely a
relation to escape. This whole fake news phenomenon is hugely important and
historically significant. At the moment I’m completely captivated by the
strength of an analogy between the Gutenberg era and the internet era, this
rhythmic force coming out of the connection between them. Radical reality
destruction went on with the emergence of printing press. In Europe this selfpropelling process began, and the consensus system of reality description, the
attribution of authorities, criteria for any kind of philosophical or ontological
statements, were all thrown into chaos. Massive processes of disorder followed
that were eventually kind of settled in this new framework, which had to
acknowledge a greater degree of pluralism than had previously existed. I think
we’re in the same kind of early stage of a process of absolute shattering
ontological chaos that has come from the fact that the epistemological
authorities have been blasted apart by the internet. Whether it’s the university
system, the media, financial authorities, the publishing industry, all the basic
gatekeepers and crediting agencies and systems that have maintained the
epistemological hierarchies of the modern world are just coming to pieces at a
speed that no one had imagined was possible. The near-term, near-future
consequences are bound to be messy and unpredictable and perhaps inevitably
horrible in various ways. It is a threshold phenomenon. The notion that there is
a return to the previous regime of ontological stabilization seems utterly
deluded. There’s an escape that’s strictly analogous to the way in which
modernity escaped the ancien régime.
At the beginning of the internet there was a notion of it being inherently
democratic. In the 00s, namely in the time of The Arab Spring, bloggers and
others, who were using the internet, were seen as the ones who would spread
democracy around the world. From your perspective this expectation probably
seems utterly ridiculous.
It’s this weird hybrid: recognizing quite realistically the massive insurgent
potential of new media, but then applying that to these dying ideological
formations. It’s like if someone had said, in the Gutenberg era the printing press
is an amazing, powerful device and it’s going to spread Catholic orthodoxy all
over the world. It’s half right and half insane. The neoconservative mentality,
associated with these new communication technologies, is exactly the same
hybrid of a glint of realism mixed with a healthy dose of utter psychosis.
Reza Negarestani somewhere writes that mere ‘collectivity is not enough for a
work [or an event] to be hyperstitional.’ He elaborates this through a difference
between Tolkien and Lovecraft. What kind of collectivities are we looking at
here, if not the ones attached to universalism?
I am not 100 percent confident of what Reza is saying in that text. I wouldn’t
want this to be treated as a commentary on his thought. But hyperstition did
arise in a certain milieu that definitely rhetorically emphasized a certain type of
collectivity and even more than that. What’s being referenced is not primarily
universality at all, but something much closer to an anonymity or the
problematization of attribution. Any hyperstitional unit—and what’s now called
a meme is very close to this—that can be confidently attributed to a particular
act of individual creation is originally disabled. H.P. Lovecraft seems to have
understood that the whole production of the Lovecraftian mythos was very
much an attempt on his part to subtract his own creative role. It’s only when
that is subtracted that these things are released. Cthulhu becomes a kind
of hyperstitional term to the point that it’s not simply something that has been
invented by Lovecraft. The fact that he weirdly, often a bit hamfistedly, weaved
his social network of friends, namely their names, into his stories, is part of that
recognition. What’s more at stake in this notion of collectivity is something like
a breakage of attribution, the original subversion of it. I don’t think it’s just a
tactic. It’s precisely the things where you have no idea where they came from,
it’s exactly those elements about whose genesis you have least confidence,
that are the ones that have the greatest hyperstitional momentum.
To turn to the period between the two world wars once more, your many noms
de plume remind us of Fernando Pessoa’s heteronyms. One of them was a
futurist, another a royalist, several of them occultists and neopaganists. With
you it goes even further, it was first thought that Reza Negarestani is one of
your monikers. The same goes for Jehu, a twitter Marxian (@Damn_Jehu) that
certainly finds a lot of understanding for your positions. It’s as though
heteronyms were a force against univocity, it seems crucial to keep them
differentiated.
Pessoa is someone people keep telling me, always really persuasively, to look
at, but I’m afraid I just haven’t yet had a chance to do that. I’m sure it’s a good
reference, so I am embarrassed to confess my ignorance on that. Polymaintenance of complex identity, if it is taken in a deliberated fashion, is not a
manageable thing. It would be great if it was, but all you can do is to aim to
follow a rough set of pragmatic guidelines that at least complicate the attempt
that people obsessively make to engage in this psychobiographical
reintegration. I have always absolutely detested the human cognitive effort
devoted to trying to turn a final form of anything into a psychobiography. It’s
not that I’m allergic to ever reading a biography, but the notion that in reading it
you’re really getting to the core of something seems to me utterly ludicrous. I
cannot recall any interesting figure, where I’ve thought, oh, if only I knew their
biography better, I would get them. Nietzsche’s or Deleuze’s or Lovecraft’s
biographies are, unless treated very carefully, sadly distracting. Refusal of the
psychobiographical temptation is the one thing I do try to hold onto. But the
functionality of it is in the hands of fate entirely, it exceeds human strategic
competence. You’re constantly sliding down the slope.
For a long time we had a feeling you were a moderator or a cartographer of
NRx, not its ideologue. Or maybe you are its termite, sooner or later moving
onto something completely different again. Perhaps similarly to the viewpoint
of the Legacy of Nick Land conference, which is going to take place this year
and which, as organizers tell us in advance, is not going to promote NRx ideas.
It reminds us of Brecht, where in order to preserve his status as a classical
author, his socialism or communism has to be sanitized. Through your blogging
interventions as aggregates or aggregators of links we found out that the way
to move out of the echo chamber is to read about things/processes one finds
fascinating, not the ones one necessarily agrees with. It is gazing into the
abyss, as Roberto Bolaño would put it. It seems that is a highly controversial
role/function.
There’s so much turmoil and tumult in this recent and dynamic situation that it’s
difficult to be very lucid about it even in one’s own understanding of it. Maybe a
disjointed answer is the only one that is practical or realistic. For one thing, the
utter infamy of NRx.There is an understanding that this is the worst thing in the
world, that it is going to be utterly traumatic and produce extreme aversive
response. It’s something that is already present in The Dark Enlightenment and
Moldbug’s writing in a playful way. I would also agree that it was at that stage
more curatorial than polemical. I’m afraid I find something completely addictive
about that. If you were to say to someone, what really is this thing, the NRx, the
answer to that question would be vastly less clear than the clarity of the
emotional response, which would be one of absolute horror and detestation.
The whole syndrome is fascinating, because it seems in itself like a
fundamental exploratory tool. As if you said: Mencius Moldbug has
consolidated a notion of the Cathedral as something, which is ultimately a self-
organizing religious process that has a definite orthodoxy and a definite
doctrinal momentum and there are certain things that it treats with an extreme
religious passion as being abominations and heresies. You encounter a cultural
provocation that triggers such an extreme allergic immune responses, which
means you’re actually engaged in an experimental engagement with this
initially tentative, hypothetical object. That’s the most basic crucial lock-in
process—at least provisionally right now. It locks itself in and becomes
indispensable, because it generates such extreme reactivity. That’s why it
would be very hard to simply step back from it in some decisive fashion. It’s like
saying we’re not gonna do particle physics with large colliders any more,
abandon the whole system of experimental potentialities.
NRx is also very young and extremely contested. Because it generates so much
antagonism, people who want to fight, of which there are a whole lot right
now, on both sides, flock to it, most passionately maybe in 2014. But NRx is
hugely internally differentiated, it has been from the beginning. Various figures
were thrown out and are now more identified with a sort of standard old Right,
white nationalist type ideas. Other splits exist, too. There’s a faction that is
much closer to a reactionary traditionalism and I don’t understand what it’s
doing with the Neo thing, since it is identified with the throne-and-altar-type,
pre-French-Revolutionary politics. The sheer amount of disorder and chaos in it
means it’s really difficult to leave a room when you still have no idea what is
happening in there. It’s not settled down enough to know whether it’s
something you would actually want to miss out on. And, finally, if someone
asked me to define NRx, I’d say it’s Moldbug’s Patchwork-Neocameralist
political philosophy. I find it hugely important. I am under no inclination to
dissociate myself at all from that basic trend in political analysis.
There seems to be a lot of engagements with contrarianism and Poe’s Law. Via
@Outsideness you wrote: ‘Actually I like plenty of immigrants and black
people, just not the grievance-mongers, rioters, street-criminals, and Jihadists
that the Cathedral preaches incessantly in favor of.’ Don’t you here sound a bit
like Borges (of the Tlon Corporation) advocating ‘liberty and order’ while
supporting Pinochet, preserving or reestablishing the Human Security System?
Isn’t all of this a far cry from: ‘Meltdown has a place for you as a schizophrenic
HIV+ transsexual chinese-latino stim-addicted LA hooker with implanted
mirrorshades and a bad attitude. Blitzed on a polydrug mix of K-nova, synthetic
serotonin, and female orgasm analogs, you have just iced three Turing cops
with a highly cinematic 9mm automatic.’?
[Long silence.] Let me see what is the best way to answer. [Long silence.] I
don’t know, it’s difficult. I’ve got a whole ankle-biting fraternity on Twitter now.
I am not identifying you with them, let me make that clear from the start, but I
think that their question is very much like yours. One element of it is age.
Youngsters are highly tolerant of massive incendiary social chaos. There are
reasons for that, the best music comes out of it. It’s not that I am not
understanding that, the whole appeal of cyberpunk is based on this. But I just
don’t think you can make an ideology purely out of entropic social collapse, it’s
not gonna fit together. It is not a sustainable, practically consistent process and,
therefore, it’s a bad flag for acceleration. It produces a reaction that will win. All
historical evidence seems to be that the party of chaos is suppressed by the
party of order. Even if you’re completely unsympathetic with the party of order,
and I am not pretending to be anything quite so unambiguous, it’s not
something that you want to see. Nixon put down hippies, the Thermidor put
down the craziness of French revolution. It’s an absolutely relentless and
inevitable historical story that the party of chaos is not going to be allowed to
run the process and will be suppressed. There’s obviously various types of
aesthetic and libidinal attractions to it, but in terms of programmatic practicality
there is nothing. What I would say to these crazy youngsters now is, you don’t
have a programme. What you’re advocating leads perversely to the exact
opposite of what you say you want.
You sound a bit like a Left accelerationist right now with all this talk of having a
programme and ideology.
Yes, there is that problem, but you always have a practical orientation. NRx has
a programme, even in its most libertarian form. It’s not a programme that is
going to be implemented by a bureaucratic apparatus in a centralized regime,
but it’s an attempt to have some consistency in your pattern of interventions.
Of course everyone is trying to do that. Even the chaos fraternity, in so far as
they want to be the chaos fraternity when they wake up the next day, have a
programme in this minimal sense. And that sense, I think, is the only sense I
would strongly hold onto here. A strategy.
Jonah Goldberg’s ‘We are all fascists now’, which you quote in your The ‘F’
word article, sounds like something Foucault would say, if we turned his ‘who
fights against whom? We all fight against each other. And there is always
within each of us something that fights something else’ up a notch. Let’s not
forget that Foucault was fascinated by Henri de Boulainvilliers, a protoneoreactionary of sorts: war as the foundation of society, war as race war
between aristocratic Franks and common Gauls. On the other hand,
decentralizing Franks got fucked precisely by the monarch.
Again, I’m afraid this particular writer is not someone I’m familiar with, but it
reminds me of something that did make a big impression on me and seems
close to this notion. When I was studying—I was doing a philosophy and
literature course—I felt very interested in Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the
d’Urbervilles. It’s about the fact that class conflict is actually this ethnic war, the
continuing ethnic conflict between the Norman, French-speaking aristocratic
invaders and the English natives. But, honestly, anything that I was to say
about it beyond that would be just cooked up so much on the spot, it would be
of little value.
We’re asking you this because of the deterritorializing of the Left/Right divide.
The concept of assortative mating, which is really controversial in some parts of
the universe, almost sounds like standard Bourdieu about how only members
of the same habitus socialize and reproduce. But when someone from the Right
talks about it, it’s not interpreted as an observation, but as a diagnosis,
prescription and wishful thinking at the same time.
The reason that this Right/Left language is so indispensable is because it’s now
tied up with a structure of tribal animosity that is so profound. In recent years
I’ve been stunned by the arbitrariness of the thing—it’s like the Roman Blue
and Green. The differences between Right and Left are drowned out by tribal
war. People have done tests on this. They put politicians’ policy proposals into
the mouth of their opponent and the supporters of the opponent immediately
backed up all those proposals that they had thought were absolute incarnation
of evil when they came from the other guy. The notion that this tribal war is
going to be reducible to a set a coherent ideological positions is nuts and an
example you gave is totally like that. Who is saying something is much more
important to people than the actual content, the positive proposition. The
number of people who don’t fall prey to that is really small and I find them
impressive. My own attempt not to be totally captured by tribalism is to try to
make sure that there’s enough fissile hyperstitional craziness going on.
Sometimes you have to flip about and get the sense what the thing looks like
from the other side, but I really think that most of the world is locked so deep in
the tribal war that it just doesn’t see what an idea is actually saying. They only
see the question: is this the enemy thing or is this our stuff?
Which brings us to the issue of convergence and divergence between NRx and
accelerationism, between the Xenosystems blog and the Urban Future (2.1)
blog. When your @Outsideness that’s connected to the Xenosystems, got
temporally locked on Twitter, you started tweeting NRx stuff on the
accelerationist @UF_blog. We were like: we don’t want this, we want them
separated.
You must be getting bored of me saying this, because it’s something I’ve been
basically repeating as mantra, but I really feel devoid of any authoritative
subject position in relation to this turbulent complicated process. Both big
threads of process, the NRx and the accelerationist one, are being massively
driven by all kinds of forces. Accelerationism was reignited by the Left
Accelerationism hype. It happened after The Dark Enlightenment, which is why
this weaving of time pattern is rather complex. From a certain position, it seems
that accelerationism came first and after that you got NRx, which implies a sort
of synchronic process, but from my perspective it’s much more helical and
interweaving. The separation of blogs and Twitter accounts is—rather than an
implementation of some deliberate coherent strategy—more a set of resources
that I can use to try to avoid being just sucked into certain kinds of integration,
which would lose the fascination of the fact that the dynamics of these two
threads are not at all predictable from each other or even predictable in
general. To simply smash together a kind of Right Accelerationism and NRx
synthesis, which is obviously inescapable in a certain respect, would ultimately
destroy a lot of experimenting capacity and a lot of space for dynamic
development on both of those threads.
Is Left Accelerationism in its rational and pragmatic program missing the
mythos and the mythical? Reza Negarestani tried to incorporate those things in
Cyclonopedia, which is way too often mistaken for postmodernism. Do you
think that Left Accelerationism is a in a way a rigidization of the aforementioned
flows?
Language has this retrospective character, so it’s misleading. Left
Accelerationism and Right Accelerationism are very recent terms. The original
revival of accelerationism in the English speaking world comes about with the
recapitulation of CCRU’s take-up of Deleuze and Guattari’s recapitulation of
Nietzsche’s accelerated process. In Deleuze and Guattari there’s an explicit
invocation of going in the direction of the market. At the origin, the CCRU was
pushing this orientation in advance of a word accelerationism having yet been
formed, which was done by a critic later. It was a Left position, because it was
articulated by Deleuze & Guattari as an anti-capitalist political strategy. I don’t
think CCRU was revisionist about that. Deleuze and Guattari’s accelerationism
as the way to accelerate capitalism to its death was also CCRU-phase
accelerationism. There was a suggestion that it came from the Right, because
at that stage of its articulation it’s impossible to differentiate Left and Right
Accelerationism. If you’re saying, complete the capitalist process, that means
that all the policy recommendations, if there are any, are maximally beneficial
to the vitality and dynamism of capitalism. So there is a structural necessity
there can be no difference between pro- and anti-capitalist in this
accelerationist framework. How can you tell which is which? When Left
Accelerationism, which was calling itself just accelerationism, comes along, it is
in its manifested politics doing something very different to anything that’s
happened in entire lineage before. It says that you have to distinguish between
the basic motor of acceleration and capitalism. Capitalism is not that motor, but
something that’s to a degree coincidental with it at a certain stage in its history,
but then becomes inhibitory in relation to it. Therefore accelerationism is not
focally or centrally about capitalism and that becomes the Left Accelerationist
mainstream doctrine. So the final stage from my perspective is that when the
rejoinder comes in the name of Right Accelerationism, its theoretical task is to
reintegrate accelerationism and the dynamics of capitalism. I would agree that
Left Accelerationism is basically the managerial command-control response to
techno-economic acceleration. Going along with that is a massive skepticism
about its claims that it can actually accelerate things faster than these
spontaneous catalytic processes can.
Then how do you see the new philosophical program of Reza Negarestani, and
what do you think about his antagonism with Scott R. Bakker’s Blind Brain
Theory?
My inclination is to be on the Scott Bakker side. I might be missing something,
but I can’t recall ever reading a piece by him and thinking that’s wrong. It
always seems to me, you’re totally right on this. Often brilliantly in a way that
you have not seen, but as soon as I see it, I concur with it.
Were you so pro natural sciences before you encountered his thought?
I think that natural sciences and capitalism are different aspects of the same
thing. Both are an effective self-propelling mechanism that gives the Outside a
selective function in a domain considered, that domain being perpetually
expanding, depending on how much autonomy you’re seeing. In that sense to
be on the side of the natural sciences is to be on the side of the Outside. But
there are all kinds of silly ways you could be on the side of the Outside, just as
there are a whole bunch of silly ways you could be on the side of capitalism.
You could say, the bourgeoisie are great, very admirable people, or, I love this
company. I am not saying there’s never a case for that, but you’re totally
missing the point, just like you’d be missing the point by saying, this particular
scientist is a great guy and I think he is really honest and I trust him. It might be
he is a great guy and he might be really struggling to be honest and he might
be much more trustworthy than most people, but this misses what science is
about. Science is orientated against scientists, capitalism is oriented against
businesses. These are processes that are in a relation of subjecting the
elements within their domain to aggressive destructive criticism with some kind
of selective criteria, which means they push things in a particular selfpropelling direction.
You were talking about artists getting to know the Outside. How do you see the
divide between science fiction and natural sciences, between a scientist and an
artist?
My tendency is not to draw a huge distinction between them. In all cases one’s
dealing with the formulation or floatation of certain hypothesis. I am assuming
that every scientist has an implicit science fiction. We all have a default of what
we think the world is going to be in five years time, even if it’s blurry or not very
explicit. If we haven’t tried to do science fiction, it probably means we have a
damagingly conservative, inert, unrealistic implicit future scenario. In
most cases a scientist is just a bad science fiction writer and an artist, hopefully,
is a better one. There is, obviously, a lot of nonlinear dynamism, in that science
fiction writers learned masses from scientists, how to hone their scenarios
better, and also the other way around. Science fiction has shaped the sense of
the future so much that everyone has that as background noise. The best
version of the near future you have has been adopted from some science fiction
writer. It has to be that science is to some extent guided by this. Science fiction
provides its testing ground.
Rebekah Sheldon in a response to the emergence of Pepe the Frog as a modern
day Kek and its occult attributes writes that outsideness is ‘dark in the sense
that it operates without the assurance of full knowledge and it is chaotic
because it presumes that the force of the other is always wholly other’. Can
Pepe the Frog as seen by the internet community serve as a model for
a hyperstitional event?
It’s hugely fascinating and something I haven’t yet thought about enough. It
involves a constellation of so many weird random elements and has emerged
in this unbelievable process of autonomous self-constitution. There’s always
the attempt to attribute: some particular guys on /pol/ were using this thing and
did it deliberately. But all of that is totally inadequate. It involves this
translation from Orcish in Warcraft, it involves an ancient Egyptian cult, it
involves a weird obsession with the set of phonemes that you see going right
across, this phonemic eruption that happens, K K K K K. It obviously is a kind of
model for a hyperstitional event. Within NRx an informal self-organizing
discussion was hosted about the necessity of a new religion, long before Kek
kicked down the wall. Because of Moldbug’s analysis that the Cathedral is a
home of deformed, perverted Protestantism, a lot of Catholics get very
attracted to this model. Their take on it is that what Moldbug is saying is that
Protestantism is a terrible mistake that leads to the Cathedral, which is how
they try to vindicate Catholicism. But there are also a lot of atheists. It’s a very
strange social cocktail. This guy Spandrell, who’s always very abrasive, but
very sharp, was saying that the only way out is a new religion. At the time you
think, okay, you don’t just cook up a new religion, you don’t just cook Kek. Then
the thing happens and all of these trolls are saying ‘Praise Kek’. But it’s not just
a joke: you only psychologically defend yourself from something really intense
and Lovecraftian about the whole subject by not thinking about it. Something
insane has happened with this self-orienting massive Kek cult. It does take you
back to ancient times and what these kind of religious insurgencies must have
been like and where religions come from.
We could connect Pepe the Frog with the figure of trickster, which is seen by
the so-called Left accelerationism as an effective agent of transformation in and
of itself and has the ability to ‘change the transcendental of a world’, as Srnicek
and Williams put it. Simon O’Sullivan notes that Gilles Deleuze offers an
interesting inflection on this in his differentiation of the trickster from the traitor:
the first is operating within a given regime, albeit to subvert its terms (a world
turned upside down as it were). The second is breaking with a given regime,
or world, altogether. In one of the replies on your blog you are building on a
metaphor of a dam, which is being slowly devoured and destroyed by some
external force—and you call this dam the Xenosystems blog. Who’s the tricker
and who’s the traitor here?
Part of this is a question about agency. The trickster agent and the traitorous
agent are both reduced by anthropomorphization. Any human individual who
claimed identification with either of those roles is bullshiting everybody.
Tricksters and traitors are those that have some kind of a method for traffic with
the actual sources of agency. One fiction that explores this stuff brilliantly is
Neuromancer. Who are traitors or tricksters in it? All the human figures take on
their roles through their relation with an actual agency of the Outside, which is
Wintermute. As when the Turing cops say to Case: You traitors, do you know
what you’re dealing with, you’re trying to let this thing out, it’s completely out
of control. It would be a disaster for the human species, what the hell are you
thinking? The real question is: What are the reservoir resources of trickery or
treachery that are being accessed?
Amy Ireland, in an interview with Andrej, said that in contrast with echo
chamber leftists you are actually interacting with the real fascists, misogynists,
white supremacists. It reminded us of Pasolini, when he emphasized one
should meet young fascists. We guess you would rather call them so-called
fascists. Who is a trickster, a traitor, a fascist is open.
The anthropomorphization is always tempting. The individuals concerned want
to feel they are critical nodes of agency in what they’re doing and people
outside want to be able to identify these processes with particular individuals
and their explicit ideologies and structures of agency, but all of that stuff seems
profoundly deluded. You don’t get fascism because there are a certain number
of people who are self-conscious fascists, that’s like getting the cart before the
horse. You get self-conscious fascists, because there is some effective fascist
process taking place. People are in total denial, probably about different things
on different sides. On the Left side they are in total denial about how much
fascist orthodoxy has been generally built into modern societies in the
twentieth century. They’re also in denial about how profound the forces they
are dealing with are. They seem to think there are a few bad eggs, and if they
can bully and terrorize them enough, this whole thing will stop. I think it’s crazy
not to be interested in that and try to find out what you can and how do these
people think and where’s stuff coming from.
In regard to the LD50 Gallery incident you tweeted: ‘The History of Modern Art
(short version) 1917: Duchamp’s urinal-as-art-work. 2017: Small gallery in
Dalston finally shocks the bourgeoisie.’ Is this a willing overstatement? Is it
really about épater la bourgeoisie? There is something very situationist in
treating AntiFa as bourgeoisie (or at least a simulacra of one)
There has been lots of discussion about Mark Fisher recently, where his
position ends up being extremely and seemingly unambiguously leftist. There’s
a boring psychobiographical story that would see my relation to him as a
simple antonym. It’s not that there’s nothing to that, because it had something
to do with this fissile reaction of the CCRU, where he takes one side of it and I
take the other side, so I don’t want just to deride that interpretation. But if we
look at his Exit the Vampire Castle piece, it consistently goes through the class
basis of the dominant leftist culture, which had already been a target of CCRU’s
deep critique. Evidently we can make the same point from the far Left and the
far Right. Which is to say: yes, they are the bourgeoisie. I have always been in a
relation of antagonism and remain in a relation of antagonism to
the bourgeosie. I think it’s just self-evident that the breeding ground of this is
primarily the elite universities. There would simply be nothing of this
happening on the streets if it was actually spontaneously organized by people
of low education level in Dalston. It happened because a university lecturer and
his associates decided to rile the whole thing and provide a vocabulary for it.
We are looking at a deep ideological, absolutely traumatic crisis of the late
modern, late-Cathedral ruling elite, because they’ve built their whole lives and
sense of what they should be doing, their etiquettes, their notions about
credibility, credentials and institutional authority around a particular, very
distinct social and historical structure that had seemed absolutely invulnerable
and which now looks to be toppling into the abyss.
So when the AntiFa lady yells ‘Go back from where you came from’ to the guy
carrying a sign ‘The Right to Openly Discuss Ideas Must Be Defended’ in front
of the LD50 gallery, she actually means ‘Go back to the abyss’?
Right.
If we omit the Last Man’s stand part of the situationism, we can see it going
into the direction of accelerationism. Like Debord of the late period when he
does not believe in the workers’ councils anymore and just sees this huge
undefeatable force.
Sadie Plant was a major situationist scholar. I’ve read The Society of the
Spectacle with enjoyment, and a few other bits and pieces. I’d respond with
two seemingly totally inconsistent points. Firstly, situationism comes up a lot,
but I’ve never been fully versed in it. Secondly, I am writing an abstract horror
story that is basically about situationism, even though I know nothing about it
at the moment. I recognize the importance of the question, but I
simultaneously recognize my incompetence to give you the kind of answer that
it deserves.
Serge Daney somewhere writes that Godard and Straub-Huillet call upon the
types of political power of which they would be the first victims. There’s a
sense in which your invocations are similar to that. Is it a sort of avant-garde of
disappearance or avant-garde of extinction with lots of nihilating jouissance?
Or is it a mutation?
I have that point made a lot, but I doubt it. The one thing I explicitly and
strategically would want to impose is fragmentation. Everything else is in the
tactical relation to that. Certain questions—like what you think of Kek and so on
—are ultimately tactical questions. The only strategic question is how can you
break apart, I would say specifically, the Anglosphere. Any kind of project that
exceeds that becomes a form of universalist aggression in danger of
neoconservative overreach. I am not interested in telling the Russian or the
Chinese what their societies should be. I might theorize about it, but the only
zone of intervention I am interested in, is the English speaking world, which has
a particular affinity with disintegration. There’s nothing suicidal in any
fragmentation, I could be only and surely protected by it. I don’t have a sense of
being protected by large Anglophone states. It’s not that I am claiming
persecution by them, but it would definitely be on that side of ledger if
anything. I am not a citizen or a resident of any Western country, I am living in
Shanghai. And you don’t teach your hosts how they should be organizing their
house.
We were thinking more about Singularity.
Oh, you are one step ahead!
You being human, you know. At least nominally human.
That’s much better. It’s just that the question on the political-economic level
does get raised a lot.
That’s the Snowden/Assange question. We’re less interested in that.
My only problem with Singularity is that any notion of self-protection in that
sphere is structured on hallucination. If we were gonna take this back to
someone, it would be Bakker. What he is saying is: the ‘you’ that you think
might be threatened by this stuff, is actually that thing that you will find out is
an illusion. Now, is that a threat? That’s the way it is a threat. It’s not gonna be
like being torn apart by some giant metallized robot, it’s gonna be the
particular ego delusion, sustainable up to a certain point in history, becoming
unsustainable.
Sometimes you’re retaining the scheme of robots against people, but it seems
you’re actually interested in hybrid things and processes, not in this Manichean
dialectics.
Well, Manichean dynamics are good for driving certain kinds of scenarios, so
that’s why I like them a lot. I love Hugo de Garis’s whole thing about this
artilect gigawar he thinks is going to come. The more these science fiction,
cybernetic scenarios are in play, the more certain types of historical excitation
are operative. People try to protect themselves and think about each other, but
it’s actually a form of process stimulus. The Human Security System is
structured by delusion. What’s being protected there is not some real thing that
is mankind, it’s the structure of illusory identity. Just as at the more micro level
it’s not that humans as an organism are being threatened by robots, it’s rather
that your self-comprehension as an organism becomes something that can’t be
maintained beyond a certain threshold of ambient networked intelligence.
Tags: Accelerationism, Land, Ireland, Badiou, Bauer, Tomažin, singularity