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The work of friendship : Blanchot, Bataille, Hegel
Richard Stamp
Ph.D. Thesis in Philosophy and Literature
University
Warwick
to
the
submitted
of
in the Department of Philosophy
September1999
0
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
1
Summary of thesis
2
Acknowledgements
4
Abbreviations
5
INTRODUCTION
8
0.1 - Blanchot, Bataille and friendship
9
0.2 - Blanchot, Bataille and Hegel
16
Notes to Introduction
23
CHAPTER 1
1.1 - 'In the name of' friendship:
27
politics or poetry?
34
1.2 - The doubling of discretion
1.21 - Effacement
1.22 - Impersonality
1.23 - Separation
40
42
49
53
Notes to Chapter 1
58
CHAPTER 2
62
2.1 - An 'impossible' friendship
2.11 - Sacrifice
2.12 - Communication
64
68
80
2.2 - The sense of complicity
85
Notes to Chapter 2
92
CHAPTER 3
97
3.1 - Koj&ve and 'the final analysis'
3.11 -From Love to Recognition
3.12 - At the End of History
99
106
116
3.2 - Bataille, sovereignty and friendship
3.21 - Sovereignty
3.22 - Impossible friendship and the work of art
123
127
137
Notes to Chapter 3
142
I
CHAPTER 4
150
4.1 -A 'strange right': literature and negativity
4.11 - The disquiet of language
4.12 - The ambiguity of literature
151
155
163
4.2 - 'Almost friendship': discretion and the work of art
4.21 - The 'friendly destiny' of presentation
4.22 - The museum, friendship and the work of art
171
174
179
Notes to Chapter 4
195
CONCLUSION
Notes to Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY
206
211
212
1. Texts by Blanchot, Bataille and Hegel
Blanchot, Maurice. Essays and fiction.
Blanchot, Maurice. Articles and uncollected texts.
Bataille, Georges.
Hegel, G. W. F.
212
212
213
214
215
2. Secondary texts on Blanchot, Bataille and Hegel
216
3. Other texts consulted
223
2
Summary of thesis
In this thesis I argue that friendship holds a unique and unusual place in the work
in
his
this
Maurice
(1907-).
It
Blanchot
the
traces
of
relation
essays
appearance
of
during the period from 1946 to 1962. Key to his work at this time, j argue, is the
he
in
1940.
(1897-1960),
The
his
Bataille
Georges
friend
met
whom
work of
influence of each writer upon the work of the other, I argue, is inseparable from
the thought of friendship which both pursue, albeit in different and apparently
friend
figures
Bataille
to
the
the
relation
as complicity, a term
conflicting ways:
determination
labyrinthine
he
in
'the
terms
of
a
quasi-ontological
presents
which
locates
friendship
in
beings';
Blanchot
terms of a movement of
and
constitution of
discretion or discontinuity which interrupts being in order for there to be relation
is
how
both
into
friendship
in
It
thinkers
their
shown
reinscribe
as such.
work
figures,
through
these
general
which allow them to articulate questions of
is
in
friendship,
for both writers,
death
'work'.
It
the
that
this
sense
and
memory,
is
'at
Central
determination
'the
their
to
this
work.
is
work' within
of
work'
G.W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, which had been introduced into French
intellectual life principally by two commentators, Alexandre Kojeve and Jean
Hyppolite. The figural differences between complicity and discretion are traced to
their respective readings of Hegel. Bataille's debt to Kojeve's interpretation forms
the starting point of this linkage between the question of friendship and the status
of the work. The pivotal role which Kojeve ascribes to the relation of mastery and
slavery - the emergence of self-consciousness as the work of recognition
[Anerkennung] - is used to draw out Hegel's genetic account of intersubjectivity
(in recognition, love, and friendship). I show that Bataille's conception of
sovereignty not only seeks to oppose this dialectic of mastery ...Hegelianly ... ; it
itself
dialectic
this
also situates
within
at the very moment which Kojeve defines
in terms of the limited aniniality of friendship and love. As a result, Bataille's
thought of friendship extends to characterise the impossibility into which this
dialectic is inevitably collapsed. Yet the question remains as to how far his
reliance upon Kojeve puts this strategy of collapse under an ever-present threat of
having to repeat those 'Hegelian' strategies which he claims to have 'undone'.
The final chapter in the thesis, therefore, sets out a characterisation.of Blanchot's
reading of Hegel. Against the grain of most Blanchot commentaries, I show that
Blanchot's reading cannot be derived solely from Kojeve. By linking the pivotal
function of terms such as 'disquiet' ['Unruhe'l and key passages from Hegel's
texts, it is argued that he draws extensively upon the commentaries and
translations of Hyppolite: this approach allows him to amplify the importance of
language in the Phenomenology of Spirit; and to identify in this text key questions
of ambiguity - such as the relation of language and negativity; the place of
in
the work of art; and the fate of art in the modem world. It is Hegel's
memory
friendship
linkage
of
with the latter which leads to his own effacement
ambiguous
between
friendship
Bataille's
relation
of
and art, and to the definition of a ýwork
in
friendship'
discretion.
the
self-effacement
of
of
3
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my gratitude to the following people: to my family for
their patience and support; to Darren Green, Ian Lyne, Simon Sparks, Andrew
Benjamin and Leslie Hill, as friends and supervisors, for encouragement and
for
Miguel
Paul
Beistegui
Davies,
to
getting me
advice; and
and
my examiners,
through the final stages.
I could not have written this thesis without the help of those named above. But
be
She
it
have
been
finishing
impossible
Karen.
will
without
starting and
would
glad finally to seethe back of it.
For Karen.
28th September 1999
4
Abbreviations
Titles are given alphabetically by abbreviation. Texts by Blanchot have a twoletter abbreviation (with the exception of his letters); Bataille's Oeuvres completes
indicated
by a single Roman numeral; and all other Hegel or secondary texts
are
are given a three-letter abbreviation. Footnotes are placed at the end of each
chapter.
* Works by Blanchot
Letters to Bataille
[All references to this correspondence are preceded by the V symbol, and given
by their catalogue number in the "Papiers Georges Bataille" at the Biblioth6que
Nationale, Paris.]
Am
"L'amitie: Pour Georges Bataille", in Les Lettres nouvelles, 29,1962
AM
LAmitie
Cl
La Communautýinavouable
ED
LEcriture du dýsastre
EI
LEntretien infini
EL
LEspace litteraire
FP
Fauxpas
FS Friendship, translated by Elizabeth Rottenberg
ic
The Infinite Conversation, translated by SusanHanson
PA
Le Pas au-delti
PF
La Part dufeu
SL
The Space ofLiterature, translated by Ann Smock
SB
The Step Not Beyond, translated by Lycette Nelson
WD
The Writing of the Disaster, translated by Ann Smock
5
The Work ofFire, translated by Charlotte Mandell
WF
Works
by Bataille
9
I-XII
Oeuvres completes, 12 volumes
All references to Bataille's collected complete works are given as a single roman
listed
below:
The
those
numeral.
relevant contents of
volumes used are
V La Somme ath6ologique, I.: Le Coupable; LExperience interieure
VI La Somme atheologique, II.: Sur Nietzsche, volonte de chance;
"L'Amitie"; "College socratique"; "Discussion sur la peche"
VII La Part Maudite, 1: La Part maudite, I. La consumation; Theorie de la
religion
VIII
La Part maudite, 11:LHistoire de Verotisme; La Souverainte;
"L'Arnour d'un etre mortel"; "Le paradox de la mort et la pyramide"
IX Laseauxou la naissancede Vart
XI Articles 1945-49: 'Tettre sur les incompatabilites de l'ecrivain"; "De
l'existentialisme a la primat de l'economie"
XII
Articles 1950-62: "Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice"; "Hegel, Phomme et
Phistoire"; "Le non-savoif"; "Le souverain"; "L'au-dela du serieux"
Hegel
by
texts
Works
and
secondary
*
BEC
Leslie Hill, Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary
GeS
Jean Hyppolite, Genýseet structure de la Phenomenologie de Vesprit de
Hegel, 2 volumes
HMC
Alexandre Kojeve, "Hegel, Marx et le christianisme", in Critique
ILH
Alexandre Koj eve, Introduction a la lecture deHegel
PhE
La Phenom6nologie de Vesprit, 2 volumes, translated by J. Hyppolite
PhG
Werke. Band 3. Phänomenologie des Geistes.
PhS
Hegel'S Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by AN. Miller
6
Y aurait-il, cachee dans VintimW de la parole, une force amie et
jaite
ditruire,
ennemie, une arme
pour construire et pour
qui
derriere
la
la
agirait
signification et non sur
signification? Faut-il
du
des
le
d6terminant,
tout
supposer un sens
sens
mots qui,
en
d6termination
d'une ind6termination ambigui
envelopperait cette
le
le
instance
en
entre oui et non?
Would there be, hidden within the intimacy of speech, a friendly
for
for
destroying,
hostile
force,
constructing and
and
an arm made
it?
behind
Must
not
upon
signification and
one
which would act
suppose a meaning of the meaning of words which, whilst
deterinining
it,
would
determination
this
envelop
with
an
between
indetermination
the yes and the no?
poised
ambiguous
'Ta littýrature et le droit a la mort"
7
Introduction
Friendship and the work: Blanchot, Bataille, Hegel
Friendship
is only given to life itseýf ))
<<
I
Maurice Blanchot
The subject matter of this thesis is not friendship. Nor does this study provide an
analysis of the philosophical history of this concept. Instead, the prime concern
here is the work offriendship in the writings of two friends, Maurice Blanchot and
Georges Bataille, and of the German philosopher, G.W. F Hegel. The significance
in
juxtaposition
lies
do
terms
two
this
the
of
phrase
of
which
not appear to be
commensurate with
one another. This incommensurability
of 'work'
and
'friendship' is particularly pronounced in the philosophical determination which
Hegel gives to 'the work' ['das Werk'] in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).
The impact of this book and the dialectical thought it presents can be traced
throughout the work of Blanchot and Bataille. It will be argued, in fact, that
Hegel's 'work'
his
body
is
the
thought
the
concept
of
and
single most
-
influential factor in the philosophical development of both writers. Alongside this
Hegelian legacy in their work there also lies a shared preoccupation with the
friendship,
'FamitiC.
Not
that either writer presents what one could
or
of
relation
8
call a coherent theory of friendship, or even undertakes a sustained engagement
with those conceptions already provided by the philosophical tradition of Plato,
Aristotle,
Cicero, Montaigne, or Kant, for example. On the contrary, both
Blanchot and Bataille seem to deploy friendship more as a figure of thought in
their work. A figure for what thought, exactly? What does friendship 'do' in their
writings? What 'work' does this relation perform there? It is this question of the
friendship
work of
which will concern the present study.
0.1 - Blanchot, Bataille and friendship
The guiding question of this thesis, however, is addressedto the enigmatic and,
in
friendship
'exemplary'
the
to
some
commentators,
way
which
is
according
presented in the work of Blanchot. With Blanchot, the first problem that arises is
inquiry.
from
his
Over
the
than
to
sixty years,
start
a period of more
early
where
forays into political journalism in the early 1930's to the publication of his most
de
(1994),
he
has
LInstant
not only produced
ma mort
recent, quasi-biographical
been
but
have
broad
in
these
their range of
as
works
of
writing,
a vast quantity
have
been
demanding
they
of their own generic
concerns as
2
limits. Blanchot has
in
and
some
subsequently
republished
narratives,
reviews
articles
written novels,
their own right, others assembled together into collections -; he has also made
into
contemporary political
interventions
debates and events - notably the
"D&claration sur le droit a Finsoumission" during the Algerian war and 'les
in
life
'public'
fail
1968.
Yet
May
to contrast
cannot
print
such a
evenements' of
deliberate
the
anonymity of a writer about whom, at the time
persistent and
with
As
been
has
biography
soon as one starts to talk about
written.
of writing, no
Blanchot, his work or his thought, there is always the silent, quasi-spectral
figure
biographical
beginning
the
appears
notice
at
whose scant
of
presence of a
L'Espace litteraire and Le Livre a venir:
9
Maurice Blanchot, novelist and critic, was bom in 1907. His life is entirely
devoted to literature and to the silence which is proper to it.
This thesis does not concern itself with a biography of Blanchot, or even speculate
on reasons why one has not yet been written.
3 Such
a task, as we will find out in
the course of this inquiry, is precarious given that it raises questions about the
relation of 'life' and 'the work' which Blanchot himself addressesonly with the
4
discretion.
Thus,, one needs to take care with this word
utmost care and
friendship, so as not to reduce it too quickly to a fixed determination or location
it
by
this
making of either a biographical resource, or the conceptual
within
work,
figure of an ethics or a PoliticS.
5 In fact, the
greatest danger lies in having already
decided where to place friendship in Blanchot's work, for upon closer inspection it
becomes clear that this word does not present an easily encapsulated or readily
thematised 'face'. Where should we turn?
This is the 'difficulty'
to which the figure of friendship testifies in Blanchot's
it
in
he
be
Indeed,
that
texts
the
claimed
some of
which
addresses
may
work.
friendship - often indirectly, rather than explicitly or thematically - are among his
is
difficult
This
to
thematisation
resistance
most pronounced
and enigmatic.
most
in those texts where friendship is allowed to ghost a commentary on the work of a
difficult
distinction
becomes
is
friend.
It
to
textual
maintain
a
with
a
writer who
friendship:
friend
it
is
the
the
the
to
naming of
and
uncertain
naming of
regard
be
friendship
from
the specific
can
separated
whether a general examination of
instantiation of a dedication, a quotation or even an allusion to the work of the
friend. Consequently, it is difficult to say whether any of these works are actually
indirect
form
insofar
friendship,
this
'on'
of
reference appears to
as
written
indicate that thematising friendship would betray this very relation.
This problem of the singularity of friendship brings us to a central problem for
in
if
friendship
Blanchot's work?
function,
What
possess
this enquiry.
any, can
Can it tell us anything about the way in which he 'works' in general? Yet as soon
friendship
friend
in
the
the
or
of
addressing
possibility
general,
as one asks about
10
there is a conflict with the very thing that this relation names and affirms: the
identifiable
is
friend.
This
friendship
this
conflict
singular occurence of this
or
throughout Blanchot's work, where it arises at every instant of judgment about a
in
his
is
Nowhere
than
treatment of
this
given work.
conflict more acute
friendship; especially if one wishes to ascribe a certain exemplarity to this
relation. But exemplary of what, exactly? Is the community of friendship
fact
'being-together'?
Does not the very attempt to
to
the
reducible
simple
of
deploy friendship as an exemplary philosophical figure both blunt the singularity
blur
former
the rigorous specificity demanded of the latter? Denis
the
and
of
Hollier voices just this suspicion with regard to Blanchot's book, La Communaute'
inavouable, and Jean-Luc Nancy's La Communaute d6soeuvree (both 1983). He
by
it
both
'neutralise'
thinkers
to
that
the
of
raising
suspects
question
community
an ontological category, and flattening out of it any existing social dynamic of
differences and conflicts:
It is true that with what Blanchot calls "friendship, " an androgynous
joining
halfway
between
the
the
this
and
sexual,
political
process
element
had already begun. In this regard, is it not to be feared that a "vague
moralism
of
reconciliation"
might
divert
from
one
Klossowski's
"
hatred,
hatred
"for
the
the
of
roots
especially
reciprocal
countering quest
6
of the political and the sexual?
Does Blanchot's treatment of friendship reduce it to an indifferent 'joining' of
beings? If it did, Hollier's complaint would be justifiable. Yet he seemsto almost
deliberately misunderstand the level of thought at which Blanchot places
friendship. It will be shown in that the relation of friendship in his work has
'moralism'
disparages
'reconciliation'.
Hollier
So
do
to
as
or
what
with
nothing
how should we read the word, friendship, in Blanchot's work?
One possible answer is provided by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in the
introduction to Quest-ce que la philosophie? (199 1). The general project of their
book as a whole is to develop the possibility of presenting philosophical problems
11
figures
figures
They
in
for
these
the
thought
as
call
general.
production of
(.conceptual characters' ['personnages conceptuels']; and the first 'conceptual
character' to which they turn is that of thefriend: 'What does friend mean, when it
becomes a conceptual character, or condition for the exercise of thought? ' 7 Their
question draws attention to the stakes of considering what it is that friendship
names when it appears in a philosophical or theoretical text. It lays open a
fundamental philosophical gesture by which the concept is raised out of and over
that which is designated as the empirical, or even 'non-philosophical'. They do
not posit this example of 'the friend' as an insight into the projected 'origin' of
how the Greek word 'philia' comes to determine the name of philosophy as such.
Instead, they turn to the work of Blanchot:
And when today Maurice Blanchot, who belongs to those rare thinkers to
in
"friend"
the
the
sense
consider
of
word
philosophy, takes up this
question internal to the conditions of thought as such, does he not again
introduce new conceptual characters into the heart of the purest Thought,
this time hardly Greek, that came from elsewhere, as if they had passed
through a catastrophewhich leads them towards new living relations raised
to the state of a priori figures [caracteres]: a detour [un detoumement], a
distress
between
friends
fatigue,
a certain
which
certain
converts
friendship itself to the thought of the concept as infinite mistrust and
patience?
This lengthy question appears at the beginning of their discussion of the
'conceptual characters'; in fact, Blanchot's 'character' of the friend appears to be
'the
'to
they
the
object
of
call
philosophy':
of
example
what
create
posited as
9 What is
inquiry
interest
here
for
is
description
this
the
of
always new concepts'.
it,
in
figure
Blanchot's
to
the
the
this
given
and
exemplarity
work,
constructive
of
force that is drawn from this figure of the friend in his work. Moreover, in an
footnote,
both
LAmitie
they
that
remark
accompanying
and LEntretien
infini
bear upon 'the relation of friendship to the possibility of thought in the modem
12
10
branch
discipline
in
Friendship
is
found
of
world'.
or
a particular
not
philosophical inquiry: it has been placed within 'the conditions of thought as
such'; and it is through friendship that Blanchot speaks to us of the very
4possibility of thought' today. The rhetorical sweep of this question leaves
unasked many more questions concerning those 'characters' that have 'come from
if'
fictional
'as
the
which qualifies the 'catastrophe' through
elsewhere'; about
have
into
living
'new
they
which
relations'; and about the task of
passed
itself
'always
philosophy
as an
new' creation of concepts. Leaving aside a more
detailed discussion of these individual questions, it must be stressedthat it is on
the basis of this description that Blanchot is claimed to be among 'those rare
thinkers' who think friendship 'today'. Are they simply claiming that that
Blanchot's 'rarity' as a thinker is to have given the concept of friendship a new
lease of life in the present, by drawing on resources that lie 'elsewhere', perhaps
how
does
friendship
Indeed,
the
tradition.
philsophical
come to be the
outside of
it,
bears
Guattari
his
'signature'?
Deleuze
phrase
concept which, as
and
From
he
it?
does
'create'
resources
what
This problem of origin returns us again to the question of how to approach
friendship in Blanchot's work. If we are not to decide in advance what friendship
it
does,
for
in
Hollier
Blanchot,
the
to
to
the
attend
pays
ways and
as
places
means
friendship
in
'place'
it
is
Indeed,
Blanchot's
the
of
or
presented.
named
which
is
infrequency,
It
is
this
peculiar
which we
work
neither constant nor accidental.
friendship
is
of
and
when
where
named, that
should call an economy, perhaps,
is
be
friendship
integral
how
become
Blanchot.
have
to
thought
to
to
with
seems
This topological specificity of this approach to the question of friendship brings us
to Blanchot's 1962 essay, "L'amitie",
12
and to his friend, Georges Bataille. A
have
Blanchot
Bataille
in
the
touched
to
references
on
upon
number commentaries
his work, and have drawn attention to the importance that this relation had for
both writers. Invariably, this kind of biographical detail servesthe same purpose: a
interpretation
from
for
the
serving
one
as
ground
an
of the other. A
citation
is
both
it
be
for
to
in
them
to
the work
common
which
of
allows
explained
concept
13
of one through reference to its meaning in the work of the other. However, this
temptation to explain the work of one through that of the other has a tendency to
13
obliterate differences that can be as fine as they are profound. Even when this
by
is
by
the
the
gesture
undermined
attribution of a mistinterpretation of one
is
lies
deeper
incompatibility,
the
temptation
to resort to the
there
other, or a
proper name of one as an authority over the work of the latter, whether one seeks
14
to support or subvert it. We are left without any sense of how Blanchot and
Bataille could maintain such contradictions between them.
It is clear that other approachesare needed.When Roger Laporte, for example,
be
if
'experience
bonds
the
the
words,
quotes
cannot
communicated
of silence,
it
into
distance,
do
those
effacement,
not change
puts
play', from Bataille's
L'Experience int&ieure, he asks: 'how could we not think of his friendship for
Blanchot, that which Blanchot bore for Bataille - the friend par excellence -, their
"infinite conversation"T
15 He
his
description
juxtapose
this
allows
of
passage
biographical fact (their friendship) with a concept taken from Blanchot's book,
L'Entretien infini. This slippage of terms between Bataille and Blanchot, in the
form of a rhetorical question, at once posits an identity between life and work, and
draws attention to this positing. Laporte himself is being discreet: he is not
identifying the work with the life, nor using the one to explicate or authorise the
idea
is
'friendship'
between
fact,
Laporte
In
that
the
that
this
posits
all
other.
Blanchot and Bataille refuses the possibility of any such identification whilst
is
for
it
Friendship,
the
it
seems,
name
what
somehow enacting at every point.
binds them and their work. Laporte's discreet juxtaposition gives us a glimpse of
how far friendship might take us in understanding the work of Bataille and
Blanchot in general. Yet how can we posit the singularity of their relation and
it?
from
Jacques
Derrida
to
thernatise
this
the
poses
generalise
or
right
reserve
question on a number of occasions:
That which binds Blanchot to Bataille is unique and "L'amitie"
says it in
fashion.
]
being
[
Without
into
to
the
singular
able
enter
an absolutely
...
14
forgetting
Blanchot
that
this
alone
singularity
without
relation,
of
absolute
nil
Bataille,
it
thus
to
solely
of
without
speak
was able
and
write
knowing,
in
we can think
comprehending, perhaps, and
any case without
6
'
what is written there.
Derrida's repeated reservations - 'without being able...'; 'without forgetting... ' are similarly sensitive to the singular form of friendship. Like Laporte's discreet
indirect
kind
through
they
juxtaposition,
are articulated
a
of
citation of Blanchot's
into
'without'.
For
Derrida,
the
take
syntax of
although we cannot
part or enter
this relation, but we can always think what it gives to be thought 'in an absolutely
singular fashion'. But how far is even this thought an act of trespass? By what
is
from
do
be
to
thought
right
we excerpt what
given
a text which speaks of a
singular relation? For Derrida, this is the question which Blanchot's "L'amitie"
it
is
it.
in
it
this
to
think
that
confrontation
allows us
asks of us; and
So why persist in reading Bataille alongside Blanchot on the question of
friendship? It is possible, of course, that any approach to this question rests too
heavily upon a problematic equivalence of biography and the work; and one
it
is
first
into
himself
is
Yet
Blanchot
to
the
a matter of
put
question.
when
which
the way in which two friends deploy the 'same' relation of friendship in their
in
is
it
important
to
the
to
way
which this
remain open
respective work,
deployment or presentation takes place. Hence, any parallels and divergences
building
in
found
be
Bataille's
to
to
work are essential
an understanding
which are
is
by
figured
Blanchot.
The
'detour'
in
this
the
relation
which
and the
of
way
'possibility of thought' which Deleuze and Guattari located in Blanchot's figure
in
from
be
is
the
this
friendship
context
which
abstracted
relation
simply
cannot
of
is
disposed
in
biography
in
his
The
this way;
not
of
problem of
work.
presented
be
friendship
to
the
the question of
needs
negotiated especially
singularity of a
friends
because
between
in
two
this
these
the
very relation
exchange
carefully
between 'work' and 'friendship' is at stake in it. This thesis sets out to follow this
it
friends
between
itself
in
the
two
their
as
manifests
or
conversation
exchange
15
death
is
"L'amitie"
For
the
Blanchot's
respective works.
written after
of
example,
Bataille in 1962, and echoes the title of Bataille's own piece, "L'Amitie",
published pseudonymously in 1940, the year in which the two first met. The first
in
drawing
be
this
thesis
pair of chapters
will
occupied with
out the different ways
in which friendship is presented in these two pieces, whose chronology brackets
the duration of their relationship. In the process, these readings will draw upon the
'VamitiC
of
relation
(1962) and "L'Amitie"
(1940) to the rest of their work: this
will involve questions about memory, fidelity, communication and transgression;
between
in
death
the
and particular
relation
and the work. The result of this dual
reading is delineation of a 'diff6rend' between Blanchot and Bataille over the
figuration of friendship in terms of either discretion and discontinuity
or
is
difference
in
fact
fundamental
This
to their work as a
continuity.
complicity and
it
into
in
for
the
taps
contrasting
ways
which they respond to the
whole
in
'the
Hegel's Phenomenology of
work' presented
philosophical concept of
Spirit.
0.2 - Blanchot, Bataille and Hegel
The second pair of chapter in this thesis relate these differences in the figuring of
friendship to their respective readings of Hegel. For both Blanchot and Bataille,
Hegel's philosophy marks the introduction of the concept of death as negativity,
is
here
heart
into
It
that the question of
thought.
the
the
of all
or
work,
fhe-work
of
ii-nl'eiU,
between
is
-an--5eFas-k-e-d)
the work - the work of art,
the
relation
what
sný-Hip-(c,,
the literary or poetic work, or even the philosophical work - and friendship for
Blanchot and for Bataille? How might one understand this phrase 'work of
friendship' in the context of their readings of Hegel? These readings must be
understood with
respect to their
in
proper sources
two
contemporary
Spirit:
Alexandre
Kojeve's
Phenomenology
famous
the
of
commentaries on
lectures from the 1930's, collected as Introduction a la lecture de Hegel (1947);
la
de
Phenomenologie
Genese
de
Vesprit
de
Hyppolite's
Jean
structure
et
and
16
Hegel (1946). 17It is well-recorded that these works introduced a very particular
'Hegel' to an entire generation of French writers and intellectuals. Along with the
work of Koyre and Wahl, Kojeve and Hyppolite privileged the Phenomenology as
their point of access to Hegel, often alongside those Frankfurt and Jena writings
it.
which prefigured
Bataille's own work in particular testifies to Kojeve's dominant influence in
French intellectual life at this time. It will be argued, in Chapter 3, that the
death
friendship
from
thought
and
only
an antagonistic relation to
relations of
are
this privleging of the work at a certain 'moment' of the Phenomenology. This
'moment' links the emergence of self-consciousness (the truth of consciousness)
to an intersubjective relation, which famously Kojeve will call the 'master-slave
dialectic', thus giving centre stage,to the concept of recognition first presented
18
therein. As we will observe,Kojeve regardsthis concept,and the 'moment' of
the master-slavewhich figures it, not simply as the schematicheart of his reading
but
Phenomenology,
the
moreover as the 'key-notion' of Hegel's entire
of
development
the
the
and
of
conceptof recognition marks
emergence
philosophy:
the human subject into an educated,social and political citizen, whose freedom
by
Kojeve
development
the
this
modem
portrays
are
state.
guaranteed
and rights
in terms of the conceptualmovementfrom love to recognition and in the structural
transformationof deathinto work (the 'work of the negative'). It is this movement
that forms the schematic heart of his narrative of History, at whose 'end' he
locatedHegel and the Phenomenolog itself - the point at which every possibility
has been realised or exhausted.Friendship is identified with 'Love' as the 'first
dialectic, and consequentlyboth are
description' of the existential-anthropogenetic
lack
by
of conflict, absenceof risk, refusal of socio-political
a
characterised
do
feelings
Man's
'desire
for
In
these
not
satisfy
short,
activity and actuality.
Recognition': mere 'love of knowing' is to be supplantedby 'actual knowing'.
it is this narrative against which Bataille sets himself in a quite unique way. In
in
his
he
Theorie
de
la
the
many
notebooks
which
worked on
religion,
one of
17
Bataille expressed the paradoxical nature of his relation to Hegel with the utmost
simplicity:
In a sense, Hegel's thinking is the direct opposite of my own, but I can
it
dialectically,
this
to
make senseof
put another way,
only
19
"Hegelianly".
In the light of the preceding discussion, one should resist the temptation to read
this remark as if the two instances of Hegel - 'Hegel's thinking' and the word
"'Hegelianly"'
intended
Kojeve's
Hegel
to
were
an
mark
opposition
of
and
-
another, more accurate or faithful reading of Hegel to which Bataille would have
independent access. Although Bataille affirms this opposition, 'in one sense', as
'direct', he also implicitly recognises the Hegelian problematic of such relations
20
of immediacy. He does not seek to bypass or overcome the possible gap between
Hegel and Kojeve's 'Hegel', instead he acknowledges that his only way of
his
in
is
force
to
this
totality
to
through this gap and
opposition
a way
articulating
to exploit it. In order to understand the sense in which Bataille seeks to oppose
Hegel "'Hegelianly"',
we must grasp the universality and totality which Bataille
finds in 'the (fundamentally Hegelian) thought' of Koj eve. In Chapter 3, therefore,
it will be a matter of allowing Kojeve's account of Hegel to unfold so that it
becomes possible to identify those structures which Bataille exploits and
friendship
in
his
of
sovereignty,
and the work of art.
characterisations
exascerbates
The question of how Blanchot reads Hegel, therefore, is vital to understanding
the exact nature of his differences with Bataille over the relation of friendship. In
the final chapter, we will be interested once again in properly differentiating the
'work of friendship' in Blanchot and Bataille, respectively. What is the Hegelian
influence on the way that Blanchot relates 'friendship' to the 'work'? Is his
in
Do
fact
Bataille's?
they
Hegel
read the same
at all compatible with
reading of
"Hegel"? In her recent survey of Blanchot's work, Annelise Schulte-Nordholdt
in
is
'very
finds
Bataille,
Blanchot
to
that
whom
one
close
a similar
argues
relativisation of
21
the Hegelian dialectic. ' This
finds
its root in the
similitude
Kojeve:
of
interpretation
18
It is Kojeve
dimension
who provides
the amplification
of the anthropological
death,
in
is
the Blanchotian
that
to
say of
of negation,
interpretation
his
is
bias
Hegel
language.
It
through
the
of
of
conception of
that Blanchot thinks human actiVity.
22
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that many accounts of Blanchot's reading of
23
Hegel have identified Kojeve (via Bataille) as its sole source. This assumption
may hold true at an anecdotal level, insofar as one might assume that Bataille
introduced
is
little
have
(there
Blanchot
Koj
to
or no reference to
would
eve's work
Hegel in his pre-1941 writings). However, this assumption does not mean that
Kojeve's influence is as determinate for Blanchot as it is for Bataille. Chapter 4 of
this thesis will therefore present a counter-argument that Blanchot and Bataille do
dependence
this
upon Kojeve and that, as a result, their respective
not share
is
different
It
Hegel
take
quite
precisely the nature of this
readings of
paths.
difference that interests us. For this reason, the account of Blanchot's relation to
Hegel will not repeat the kind of linear analysis given in Chapter 3. Instead, it will
follow a zig-zag course between different texts by Blanchot and Hegel, in order to
but
Hegel
how
Blanchot
sometimes
with,
sometimes
against,
reads
show
by
Hyppolite.
Kojeve
the
or
readings offered
oftentimes quite apartfrom
In fact, as the caveat at the beginning of "La litterature et le droit a la mort"
Blanchot's
is
his
the
characteristic
of
reading
most
explicit
explicit,
makes
distance from the claims made by Bataille:
It is understood that the remarks which follow remain quite remote from
the text of
24
The Phenomenology and do not seek to explain [e'clairer] it.
This is not the kind of comment that one finds in Bataille's Theorie de la religion.
But why this distance from Hegel's text? How should we understand Blanchot's
'illuminate'
it?
in
his
light
As
indicated
'remarks'
to
the
of
refusal
we
subsequent
in the Introduction, the fact that Blanchot draws upon the work of Hyppolite in
has
into
be
This
Kojeve
to
taken
that
that
the
to
text(s)
account.
of
means
addition
19
from which he distances himself is more likely to be Hyppolite's translation: his
'remarks' will not constitute a line-by-line commentary, such as that provided in
Genese et structure. Nonetheless, in the first half of Chapter 4,1 will contend that
"La litt6rature et le droit a la mort" bears the mark of Blanchot's familiarity with
Hyppolite's reading of Hegel; principally, in the word, 'Finquietude'; the citation
of a passage on the act of naming from the Realphilosophie; and the rendition of
the 'life of spirit' passagefrom the Phenomenology. These traces are not all of the
latter
has
indeed
The
Blanchot
that
only shows us
read Hyppolite's
same order.
translation (whereas Bataille read only Kojeve); but the former two deserve more
because
by
both
Hyppolite and Blanchot.
treatment
the
sustained
of
claims made
In each case, however, what interests us is the manner in which Blanchot
transforms or rewrites his Hegelian sources. These links require that we follow
in
it
in
double
Hegel,
Blanchot's
gesture
reading of
as commences "La
closely a
litterature et le droit a la mort": his self-distancing from 'the text' of the
Phenomenology; and his rewriting of certain Hegelian citations and themes. As we
in
itself
his
between
double
this
account of relation
gesture manifests
shall see,
literature.
language,
and
negativity,
This doubleness and the centrality of language mark out the specificity of
Blanchot's reading of Hegel. In common with Koje've and Bataille, Blanchot's
idea
death
it
is
in
Hegel
the
to
of
as
put
revolves around
work
engagement with
determinate negation. However, he approachesnegativity through the question of
language. He foregrounds the act of naming, the process of writing, the condition
in
dialogue,
lexicon
Kojevean
the
the
place
of
possibility of
of
of ambiguity, and
'Discourse', 'Desire' and 'Recognition' which Bataille adopts. What difference
does this approach make? As we will show in Chapter 3, the term 'Discourse'
does not have any linguistic specificity for Kojeve: although he refers to it as the
ideas
for
through
the operation
the
term
produced
and
of
concepts
realm
generic
discursive
he
determinate
activity without reference to
presents such
negativity,
of
the
through
their
whether
relations of speech, the
communication,
words or
Nothing
happens
in
the
naming.
even
act
of
or
very
meaning,
of
ambiguities
20
KojCvean 'Discourse', it only 'reveals' or 'reports' the actions of consciousness.
This is because Koj&ve's entire reading of Hegel revolves around the 'Action' of
the master-slave dialectic and, above all, the 'key-notion' of 'Recognition':
25
actions count, not words, in his rendition of the dialectic. Hence, when Blanchot
it
is his own
Kojeve's
to
the
refers
presentation of
act of naming as murder,
fundamental concern with language through which he reads. What will be of
interest in this chapter, therefore, is whether Blanchot simply imposes this concern
upon the Hegelian text, or whether he draws upon resources that lie within
Hyppolite's work.
Unlike Bataille, then, Blanchot does not appear to have a reading of Hegel as
fact,
Oeuvres
is
In
Bataille's
such.
whereas
compMtes peppered with references
is
directives
how
Hegel
to be read, Blanchot's only general comments on
and
on
in
his
later
fragmentary
Hegel
texts, Le pas au-delý (1973) and
reading
appear
L'ecriture du d6sastre (1980). A fragment from the latter not only appears to
does
but
answer our question,
so with a playful irony that amplifies this
importance of the negative: 'One cannot "read" Hegel, except by not reading
26
him.
It is no coincidence that these remarks on reading Hegel arrive in a form of
interruption
impersonality
(in the paradoxical
that
tends
toward
and
writing
'name' of 'le neutre'). Moreover, these fragments disavow any claim to having
'inverted'
Hegel's
however
outside
or
speculative
system,
surpassed, stepped
these terms might be construed. Indeed, to speak of Blanchot's work in terms of
gpost-speculative' or post-Hegelian thought is, in itself, non-sensical and plainly
(itself
First,
thought
as) a conception of time which,
articulates
speculative
wrong.
far from being empty and forinalistic, enfolds both the 'before' and the 'after',
both past and future, into the evanescent movement of the present. Second,
Blanchot not only acknowledges this condition of the speculative system, but
in
(non-dialectical)
his
it:
he
to
to
a
own
work
place
relation
constantly attempts
27
describes
Warminski
it.
Andrzej
'off
Instead
Hegel
to
side',
as
one
of
rewrites
dialectical
beyond
have
Blanchot
thought,
to
outside
or
stepped
steps
claiming
if
dialectic,
it
if
the
the
path
of
as
accompanying
along an
aside, as alongside
21
unforeseeable detour. It is this discreet turning which more than anything comes
to characterise the specific nature of his reading of Hegel, and which will bind it
all the more intractably to the thought of discretion at the heart of his work.
*
In the first two chapters, then, we will draw closely upon two texts which bear
the same title - Blanchot's "L'amitie"
and Bataille's "L'Amitie"
in
to
order
-
follow the different ways in which each presents us with this word 'friendship'.
Chapter I will negotiate Blanchot's meditation upon the relation of the work and
the one who writes, in which he finds already a disturbing relation of discontituity
between the 'self' and 'its' death, a relation of discretion which inforins the very
friendship
Chapter
in
In
2,
the
as
such.
possibility of
we will contrast
way
which
friendship takes place, for Bataille, within the 'sovereign operation' of sacrifice
in
different
a very
relation of complicity. In the
and communication, resulting
final pairing of chapters, we will turn to the Hegelian influence on both writers in
between
friendship
By
the
the
to
relation
articulate
and
work.
order
passing
through a reading of Kojeve's account of the 'master-slave dialectic' in Chapter
Three, we will show how Bataille's composition of sovereignty, friendship and
the work of art is founded upon his "'Hegelian" opposition' to Hegel and the
dialectical 'work'
in
Finally,
Chapter
4, we will
of philosophy.
return to
Blanchot's essaysof the late 1940's and 1950's in order to bring together the two
friendship
'work'
the
the
to
and
enquiry
preceding
and
ask, once
strands of
familiar
friendship
'work'
the
themes of the
the
more
within
of
again, about
literary language, and the origins of the work of art in 'le desoeuvrement'.
22
Notes to Introduction
1Blanchot, "L'entretien
IC,
EI,
xiii-xxiii, xx.
ix-xxvi, xxi;
infini",
2 Leslie Hill has
bibliography
far
the
so
of
most
comprehensive
recently provided
Blanchot's writings from 1931 to early 1997; see Hill, Blanchot: Extreme
Contemporary, London: Routledge, 1997,274-98.
3 Unfortunately, the
preparation of this thesis preceded the appearance of Christophe
Bident's 'biographical essay', Maurice Blanchot, partenaire invisible, Seyssel:
tditions Champ Vallon, 1998. As a result, I have only been able to consult it in a
cursory manner.
4 The
genre of biography provides an effective and problematic frame upon which to
organise the changes and developments of a writer's or a thinker's work. I have drawn
on the information presented by Leslie Hill in two separatetexts: his "Introduction" to
Carolyn Bailey Gill (ed), Maurice Blanchot: The Demand of Writing, London:
Routledge, 1996,1-20; and in an extended form, in "An Intellectual Itinerary",
Blanchot.- Extreme Contemporary, op.cit., 1-52.
A recent attempt at combining a critical study of Blanchot's intellectual development
his
been
life
'engagements'
has
Pierre Mesnard's
with an account of
and political
Maurice Blanchot. Le sujet de Vengagement,Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996, His mixture of
biographical events and textual exegesis is at best unconvincing; at worst it
has
himself
Blanchot
the
always approached the
care with with which
compromises
question of commentary and biography. I will expand upon this aspect of Blanchot's
thinking in Chapter 1, Section 1.22, and Chapter 4, Section 4.1.
5 Both
friendship
be
discerned
Blanchot
to
may
and
in the citation which
approaches
follows:
[T]he writer is present only through the voices of his texts and through those of his
friends, the few that know him (Levinas, des Rrets, Mascolo, Laporte, Derrida,... )
have
him.
is
But
those
it precisely this mode of presence-absence,under
who
read
and
the sign of friendship, which is able to give us a glimpse, beyond the details of
face
Blanchot.
Maurice
true
the
of
physiognomy,
Patrick Keehichian, "Sur les traces de Maurice Blanchot", Le Monde, 12 September
1994. This short text is excerpted from a French radio broadcast on Blanchot, which
from
Mascolo,
Derrida,
Laporte,
et al.
included contributions
6, Foreword: Collage," in Denis Hollier (ed), The College of Sociology (1937-39),
translated by Betsy Wing, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988, xviii.
Hollier's criticisms of Blanchot and Nancy echo those directed at Heidegger some forty
L&I-Strauss
de
by
Simone
Beauvoir.
Discussing
the
work
of
on the
years earlier
kinship
"'duality,
opposition,
of
alternation,
and symmetry"' -, she
elements
structural
concludes:
These phenomena would be incomprehensible if in fact human society were simply a
Mitsein or fellowship based on solidarity and friendliness. Thins become clear, on the
following
Hegel,
find
fundamental
hostility
itself
we
in
consciousness
a
if,
contrary,
23
towards every other consciousness;the subject can be posed only in being opposed he sets himself up as the essential, as opposedto the other, the inessential, the object.
See the "Introduction" to The Second Sex, translated by H. M. Parshley, London:
Jonathan Cape, 1953 [Picador, 1988], 17. Also of interest here is the way that de
Beauvoir's analysis of 'female friendships', which she finds to be fundamentally
determined by a mutual rivalry and hostility, is wholly determined by her 'following
Hegel' (and thus Kojeve's account of the dialectic of recognition): 'Their relations are
not founded on their indivi dualities, but immediately experienced in generality; and
from this arises at once an element of hostility. ' It is for this reason that she claims that
feeling
'fellow
rarely rises to genuine friendship... '; see 556-9,558.
women's
The problematic of sexual difference within classical and modem determinations of
friendship is too complex to be touched upon in this present study.
7, Ainsi done la
question", introduction to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Quest-ce
que laphilosophie?, Paris: Editions de minuit, 1991,9.
9 Quest-ce
la
que philosophie?, 10.
9 Ibid.
10Ibid., 1.
n.
II Ibid. It is would seemthat Deleuzeand Guattari would wish to evoke the name of
EmmanuelLevinas by this referenceto an 'elsewhere' (than Greek 'philia'), although
this is never made explicit. We will argue that, whilst Blanchot testifies on many
his
his
friendship
Levinas,
that
the
to
thinking of
it
also
case
with
is
occasions
friendship bearsa strong relation to that of Bataille, especiallyif this 'signature' is a
Surya
following
his
biography
Bataille,
Michel
In
the
of
includes
genealogy.
mark of
Blanchot's
Un
Moment
Bataille
the
to
publication
voulu:
on
written
inscription
friendship,
itself
book
to
this
and so, even without another
only addresses
perhaps
first
doubt
that
it is addressed of all to you.
sign, you cannot
See Surya, GeorgesBataille, la morti Voeuvre, Paris: Gallimard, 1992,673.
12 "L'amiti&"
(1962), in AM, 326-30. Several commentators have ventured
broader
in
the
this
text
this
context of
word and of
studies of
interpretations of
Blanchot. A typical example of this cursory reading is Annelise Schulte-Nordholt,
Maurice Blanchot: Vicriture comme expirience du dehors, Geneva: Librarie Droz
G.A., 1995,283-5. The only throroughgoing investigation of Blanchot's presentation of
friendship is Paul Davies' "Difficult Friendship", in Research in Phenomenology, V. 18
(1988), 149-72.
13There
Bataille
Blanchot
in
discussions
this
too
of
either
or
of
use
many
examples
are
frequency
here.
list
Perhaps
the
to
the
of such unquestioned crossgreatest
other
of
John
Gregg's
first
book,
found
be
Maurice
the
of
recent
chapter
in
references can
Blanchot and the Literature of Transgression, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994,10-17. Indeed, it is in this chapter that Gregg attempts to set up the
(via
'sacrifice')
Bataillean
"transgression"
the
which, of course, will
word
meaning of
be central to his argument about the strategic status of Blanchot's literary
'theory/practice'.
24
14Jane Gallop's "Reading Friend's Corpses"
former;
the
provides an example of
see
Chapter 1, Section 1.23, below. An example of the latter can be found in Nick Land,
The Thirstfor Annihilation, London: Routledge, 1992,61.
15Roger Laporte, "Un
cri de coq en pleme silence", in A Vextrýmepointe: Bataille et
Blanchot, Montpellier: Fata morgana, p.29. The citation is from L'Expirience
int6rieure, V, 42.
16Jacques Derrida, "Les
morts de Roland Barthes" (1980), in PsycU. Inventions de
Vautre, Paris: Gallilee, 1987,297-8.
17Alexandre Koj&ve, Introduction la lecture de Hegel, Paris: Gallimard, 1947 [1968];
ti
Jean Hyppolite, Genýse et structure de la Phýnomenologie de Vesprit de Hegel, 2
volumes, Paris: Aubier, 1946. All further references to these two books, and to Hegel's,
be
text
the
in
will
abbreviated to the Phenomenology, the Introduction, and Genýse et
structure, respectively.
18The
principal figures of this dialectic, 'der Herr' and 'der Knecht', will be translated
as 'master' and 'slave' throughout. It is acknowledged that this translation is at best
inaccurate, and at worst misleading. Miller prefers to use 'lord' and 'bondsman' in his
1977 translation, a practice that is reflected in most subsequent English language
commentaries on this passage. However, this is not at all the case in the French
tradition of Hegel interpretation in which Blanchot and Bataille must be placed. Hence,
the term 'master-slave dialectic' has been preserved in the present work because it
influence
Kojeve's
marks
on this tradition.
19VII, 615. See
also VI, 348.
20Note that the
dialectical
has
the
question of
reversibility of contradiction
an uncertain
history in Bataille's work. He had already scorned Tristan Tzara's dictum that 'the
in
his
humaine":
1929
"Figure
'It is time to
essay,
absenceof a system is still a system'
found
have
themselves at the mercy of
that
the
point out
most strikiing revolts
recently
propositions as superficial as that which gives the absence of relation as another
4
(septembre
1929),
194-200,197.
'
See
Documents,
1,
n.
vol.
relation.
Yet in his postwar texts, his fascination with the labyrinthine turns of negativity
deepens,as this form of paradox reappearsand is affirmed as such:
1. No-one is free not to belong to my absence of community. Just as the absence of
fills
depths
like
inevitable
drains
the
it
the
sole
myth:
which
a
wind
which
myth is
[comme un vent qui la vide].
2. "Night is also a sun" and the absence of myth is also a myth: the coldest, the
purest, the most true.
k
See (L) ", prendre ou a laisser" (1946), XI, 130-1,131; (2.) "L'absence de mythe"
(1947), XI, 236. The importance of these formulations will be discussed in the analysis
Section
3.21.
in
of sovereignty
21 Annelise Schulte-Nordholdt, Maurice Blanchot.- Vicriture
comme exp&ience du
dehors, Geneva: Librarie Droz G.A., 1995,45. For her general and correct reading of
Koj&ve's interpretation of Hegel, see 31-57.
22
Ibid., 44.
25
23 In
have
Blanchot
Schulte-Nordholdt,
three
to
recent
monographs
all
on
addition
attempted to give an account of this relation. By far the most nuanced and authoritative
account is given by Leslie Hill, Blanchot. Extreme Contemporary, London: Routledge,
1997,103-14. Although I have envisioned my own account to be supplementary to
Hill's, I disagree strongly with his claim that 'Blanchot's own reading of Hegel is
based
Kojeve
[
]
is
Hegel's
that
to
thesis
that
closely
on
of
whose
general
philosophy
...
death
(Ibid.,
Blanchot
little,
'
philosophy
a
of
subscribes with
if any qualification.
104.) 1 will have occasion to show that, on the contrary, Blanchot draws upon
Hyppolite's account of the PhenomenQlogy and that to fail11to take this into account
,
risks missing the depth of his reading of Hegel.
Unfortunately, the work of Gerald Bruns and John Gregg lack any sense of
philosophical finesse and critical rigour: Maurice Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosol2hy,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997; and Maurice Blanchot and the
Literature of Transgression, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994. We shall
have occasion to comment on their commentaries of Blanchot and Hegel in our final
chapter.
24PF, 295, 1; 'ýAT,302. The
n.
effects of this 'distance' will be discussed in Chapter 4,
Section 4.2, below.
25 On the interpretative
consequencesof Kojeve's schematisation of recognition, see
Section 3.1, below.
26
ED, 79; WD, 46.
27Andrzej Warminski, "Dreadful Reading",
in Readings in Interpretation. - H51derlin,
Hegel, Heidegger, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987,184.
26
Chapter I
Friendship as discretion: Blanchot's IT'amitie"
(1962)
This is thought's profound grief. That it must
accompanyfriendship into oblivion.
Maurice Blanchot
The purpose of this first chapter is to take up the general problems raised in the
Introduction, and to explore the way in which friendship is presented in this work.
In Blanchot's work, addressing friendship will always be a question of naming:
in
friendship
the
will not only address a friend, but will also,
writing
name of
first
friend,
Georges
Bataille. Evidently this
perhaps
of all, name a quite singular
involves the question of when this nomination or declaration corresponds with
friendship
'friendship',
itself
Therefore,
the
with actually naming
word
writing
interrogative
'friendship'
important
for
is
is
to
to negotiate and
approach
any
what
friendship
the
with the name of Bataille, even to the
articulate
relation of naming
be
inarticulate,
inhabiting
to
that
this
relation may appear
a region where
extent
it's presence can only be registered on a scale where subtility or discretion are the
only measure.
In this chapter, therefore, it will be argued that the figure of friendship, and its
'work', in Blanchot's writings is only accessible through its contiguity with the
appearanceof the proper name of Bataille. lt is with the simultaneous presentation
of the proper name and the problem (the propriety) of naming such a relation to it
that it becomes possible to addressthe difficulties outlined above as integral to the
presentation and nomination of friendship throughout Blanchot's work. Above all,
these first two chapters will present an extended study of this contiguity and will
ask about what is at stake in giving the name of 'friendship' together with that of
his friend. Only in this way will we be able to discern how far the naming of
friendship through the work of Bataille can be seen to reemerge throughout
Blanchot's other texts and concepts: those which do not explicitly bear the name
of Bataille, nor express any testimony to friendship. Thus, although the present
study may seek to show that 'friendship' is precisely not reducible to a matter for
biography, there is no avoiding the need to situate this reading within the general
'development' or 'itinerary' of Blanchot's work. As we have already remarked,
Blanchot rarely gives any indication of the events of his life - whether private or
it
his
that
public - and
seems
encounters with friends might exemplify the
determined discretion that he displays on any such questions. Such questions are
both essential to his own development, yet as such they resist easy encapsulation
or expression. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the magazine Le
Nouvel observateur in 1984, he responds to a questionnaire about the most
imporatant events since the magazine's first appearance. He diverts the given
time-frame through remembering his involvement in its predecessor, FranceObservateur, thus returning him to 'more ancient epochs':
For me, encounters [les rencontres] are what has mattered, where chance
becomes necessity. Meeting men, encountering places. This is my share in
biography.
Meeting Emmanuel Levinas (Strasbourg 1925). Husserl, Heidegger,
introduction to Judaism.
28
Meeting Georges Bataille and Rene Char (1940). Call to irregularity. The
limit-experience. Opposition to the occupants and the Vichy regime.
Clandestinity.
Eze-Village (1947-1957). Ten years of solitary writing. Meeting with
Robert Antelme and his friends (1958). The Algerian war, the declaration
of the 121, attempt at an international review.
With the same ones and with everyone
May 1968
M. B.
This telegraphed style presents two quite different sources of information: first, it
gives us a skeletal chronology of events through which Blanchot acknowledges
his 'debts' (both the selection of proper names and the deployment of 'weighted
terms' that resonate in his writings, such as 'irregularity', the 'limit-experience'
his
fact
'share' or
'solitary
Blanchot
the
that
should express
writing'); second,
and
(part' in the activity of biography through the idea of a 'rencontre' in which
'chance becomes [se fait] necessity'. How and why do such chance encounters
take on the force of necessity? Is it plausible, or even possible, to say that this
transformation marks the genesis of friendship - from an encounter to a
has
do
Yet
to
this
process
as
much
with the ambiguity and
perhaps
relationship?
the peculiar impersonality of the 'ideal' encounter with 'everyone and anyone' in
the events of May 1968. This would be the witness borne by Blanchot's comments
on his own 'inaccessibility':
Thank you for your letter. But forgive me for not being able to respond as
friends,
do
I
closest
not even receive my
without friendship
you wished.
3
being diminished.
In terrns of biographical fact we can draw upon the testimony of Georges Bataille
himself, when he records in an autobiographical notice that '[at] the end of 19405
29
he encounters Maurice Blanchot, to whom he is bound without delay by
A
admiration and agreement. The arena of biography, which veers between
itself
interpretation,
narration, citation and
as the primary
will always present
territory for any discourse on friendship, whether literary, political, public or
purely
'personal'.
in
its
the name of a 'life',
claim
makes
'Bio-graphy'
so
friendship takes on a value under this title. Yet it is with this claim that even the
most careful biography always casts friendship itself under the sign of a certain
depth,
the
endurance or warmth - the quantifiable
expediency:
quality - of any
friendship will have helped the attentive biographer to reveal something essential
about the life of the subject (a Bataille or a Blanchot, for example). In this case,
details
impressions
follow
the
personal
and
of Pierre Prevost; or the more
one can
breadth
Surya's
biography
Georges
Michel
Bataille,
Bataille,
of
ambitious
of
mort
loeuvre;
a
concerning
Bataille
or even Pierre Klossowski's
his
'encounter
that
with
-
seemingly
Maurice
cautious
Blanchot,
la
remark
that their
friendship could not have been more beneficial for himself, that he had recognised
in total incommunicability
exercised.
5
' However,
the condition from which a true action can thus be
Surya's approach to this friendship
gives us the most
instructive introduction to the ambiguities to be faced in any biographical account
biography
Bataille:
to
a
of a writer whose own writing always addresses
of
write
in
biographical,
but
deploy
the
through
the
to
only
question
of
order
and
or passes
be
'much
(essential)
is
Surya
it.
It
there
that
to say'
would
who warns
exhaust
'if
friendship
Blanchot,
did
Bataille
two
the
the
their
men
silence
of
on
and
about
not reduce us to conjecture.
It is an obvious fact that this encounter was
6
[a
determinant for each of them. But on what grounds
quel titre]? But it is also
Surya, the steadfast biographer, who cannot resist offering
response to Klossowski's
in
-
tentative portrayal of Blanchot as somehow Bataille's
Bataille
is
likely
'it
than
that
that
more
saviour 7
ideological
Thus, Surya's
Blanchot's
the opinion
reversal' .
should be credited with
previous warning seems to be the
insubstantiality
'obvious
fact',
the
to
of
an
rather
sign of a reluctant resignation
than its refusal. However much care or discretion the writer of biography displays,
Bataille
Blanchot
is
true
the
the
to
real
or
not so much a
such a concern present
30
misplaced desire as a mendacious distortion: it is, says Blanchot, 'to give
i
ing
as spectacle and to create a fictional character [personnage]' without any concern
for the 'delicatesses de la verit6'. 9 Furthermore, Blanchot goes on to add that this
is something that can be performed by even 'our closest friends, with the good
intention of speaking in our place and in order not to abandon us too quickly to
9 What deserves
is
in
the
way
which the very naming
our absence'.
close attention
friendship
in
(biographical)
life
both
the
subject's
of a
- as an event or encounter
into
biographical
'speculative
Surya
this
that
plays
spectacle'
can only recognise
in failing to avoid it. Yet it also retains the resources of a certain discretion that
Blanchot will draw upon when writing "L'amitie" in the event of Bataille's death
in 1962. The question of how to name friendship will in turn work as a resistance
to biographical 'spectacle'. Yet Surya's question, 'a quel titreT, always returns: in
the name of what does this refusal take place? By what 'right' or 'authority' can
Blanchot demand delicacy and discretion?
Such demands for delicacy will still challenge when reading some of the
Blanchot's
Bataille,
especially to the extent that
correspondence
with
of
remnants
this exchange of letters bears an intermittent meditation upon the conditions and
demands made by their friendship. Yet with this demand it is not merely a
details
banal
but
(as
a
secrecy),
perhaps something
question of protecting personal
demand
is
discreet.
for
The
delicate
concern or
not
still, more
a truth that
more
but
for
'truth'
'life-lik,
both
bear
the
the
a
e',
which
accuracy of
escapes
would
friends, even as it puts them into relation. This is the only level at which the
'obviousness' or facticity of such a friendship might be entertained by either of
them. As Blanchot writes to Bataille,
If it doesn't tire you out, you would do me the greatest pleasure by telling
ill
The
how
that
thought
you were
you are at present.
was extremely
me
directed
like
for
threat
against something which would
me, and
a
painful
be common to both of us [une menace dirigee contre quelque chose qui
'
0
it
difficulty.
Fun
I'autre].
bear
I
with
a
commun
nous serait
31
In a sensewriting such as this could not be more personal. Yet at the same time it
must be acknowledged that this communication takes place quite explicitly at the
level where 'la pens&e' is likened to 'une menace'. This thought is to be thought
is
The
'personal'
threat.
of as a
already passing through abstraction, the
impersonality of 'la pensee' :a thinking that addresses- even as it threatens - the
'something' that is 4in common' for them.
if I speak so indiscreetly of these things which concern you, it is only
becauseit seemsto me that they belong to me also, through friendship, but
friendship:
is
through
there,
not simply
something,
silently,
common to us
'
both.
This is the level at which their very communication would become possible.
Indeed, what emerges from these remnants is the presence of a thinking that both
is
itself
in
friendship.
immerses
It
that
thought
a
within a
engageswith, as well as
thinking of friendship.
I think of you with an anxious friendship [une amitie inquiete]. This
thought is not much at all. But it seems to me that, even where there is
it
path
more,
opens a power of proximity and a truth of
almost no
any
12
life
fatigue
of
attention that no fatigue - the
- can suppress.
I think of you quite constantly and your friendship is also this thought, this
13
transparency.
Although this does not mean that these letters reveal some hidden level of the
'life' behind the writing of the book - that the anonymous younger and older
interlocutors in Blanchot's "L'Entretien infini" might conceal the identities of
Bataille and Blanchot himself - it is clear that these letters do not simply attest to
14
their friendship at the level of the empirical or 'obvious fact'. Surya himself tries
to formulate
it in the following
for
Bataille
manner:
'the one with
whom
friendship comes to bind him with a feeling little enough different from what in
his eyes is a communitary
feeling, is the one who comes to comfort him in the
32
idea of the impossibility of all community. ' 15 Whilst Surya's claim essentially
follows the same logic as that made by Klossowski earlier, he explicitly derives
his formulation from the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. Instead of erasing and
overcoming the implied gulf between the impersonal realm of thought and the
personal/public life of the individual, the claims that both Surya and Klossowski
debt
deepen
it.
be
Nancy's
It
that
to
make simply
argued
and extend
could
Blanchot makes the substitution of 'une communaute d6soeuvree' for the name of
'friendship' plausible. Yet such an identification must also be encountered at the
level of the manner of thinking which both Nancy and Blanchot demand. This is
the sentiment expressed by Blanchot's later approach to Bataille's thinking on
his
that
community
marks
recognition of Nancy's work:
[F]riendship, with the reading in drunkenness, is the very form [la forme
d6soeuvree'
has
'communaW
Jean-Luc
Nancy
niýmej of
which
called us
16
to reflect upon without our being allowed to stop there.
It is in this refusal that the thought of friendship is immersed, thereby breaking
down any secure identification of the 'personal reading by personal friends'
through a relation to 'the anonymity of the book which is not addressedto anyone
[ne s'adresse a personne]'.
17 To
speak of the 'life' of friendship will always
involve the impersonality of a movement such as that which 'la fatigue' names
from
it
is
distinguished
'ma
but
'constantly
when
not
vie',
exceeds the limits of
life'. This process of naming is central to the particular discretion that Blanchot
friendship
invoke
in
the
when
approaching
question
of
response to the event
will
death,
in
Bataille's
this
while writing
of
response relation to a body of work that
in
itself
'written
fire
the
as
of the event'.
presents
18
It is the question of a relation that takes place through reading which therefore
kind
between
friends
these
two
of
correspondence
another
presents
who are
bibliographical
To
Blanchot's
textual
or
one.
a
approach
writings wherein
writers:
the name of Bataille seems to be concurrent with that of friendship is not to be
from
Blanchot's
is
this
but
side
of
guided
epistolary
exchange,
solely
also due to
33
Bataille's
through
that
trajectory
passed
always
own meditations pursued along a
a thought of friendship.
published in April
Most notably it is Bataille's
'T'Amitie"
essay
(first
1940, under the pseudonym 'Dianus') that draws attention to
another fon-n of exchange or relation between them when it provides both the title
and an epigraph to Blanchot's
matter of a repetition
LAmitiý.
own
However, neither is it simply a
for
it
is
titles,
always Blanchot
of
maintained presence of 'friendship'
throughout Bataille's
discerns
the
who
thinking.
In an essay
that addresses the work of Foucault, Blanchot writes of the impossible task of
'recapturing the general importance of singular works that culture totally rejects
by collecting'
as a relation
to 'works
which
thus remain
solitary,
almost
anonymous, even when one speaks of them'. In fact, it is to Bataille that Blanchot
addresses this relation to singularity,
he
his
turns
when
and addresses
closing
remarks to 'one of the most solitary [works], that to which Georges Bataille, as if
19
through friendship and play [comme par Famiti& et par jeu],, lent his name'. For
Blanchot it will be a question of pursuing a 'presentation' of friendship that eludes
the continuity of a theme and the familiarity
biographical
just
for
of a
reference,
as
B ataille (reading Un Moment voulu in 195 1) it is a question of a 'feeling of distant
friendship,
distant
of
complicity'
that presents him
with
'the paradox
of
20
Blanchot'.
1.1 - 'In the name of' friendship: politics or poetry?
To draw attention to the presence of the word 'friendship', therefore, is not an
biographical
but
the opening of a philosophical approach to
claim,
empirical or
the challenge that, for both Blanchot and Bataille, friendship makes of thought and
it
is
In
is
Bataille
to
that
thinking.
other
words,
not
claim
or was Blanchot's
as
by
is
'le
he
As
discovered
in
friend:
the Introduction,
means
no
seul ami'.
we
only
those texts which Blanchot presents 'in friendship' do not address Bataille
is
Yet
Bataille's
perhaps
what
most
singular
about
name as it appears
exclusively.
in his work (again not with any remarkable frequency, but consistently) is, as has
34
been shown, the insistence with which it is addressednot just as a friend, but in
the name of a persistent meditation upon friendship itself It is in this way that the
naming of friendship takes place as a challenge for Blanchot to think, but
furthermore this demand is engaged in response to Georges Bataille and can
therefore only originate in its taking place betweenthe two friends. Furthermore, it
is with the very ten-nsthrough which they think this relation that the constitution
'between'
the
of
will generatethe force of conflict or discordance. How does this
take place? What happens 'between' them?
In a letter dated the twenty-fourth of January, yet which does not give the year,
Blanchot writes to Bataille in a manner - common to a sizeable number of letters
from their surviving correspondance- that bespeaksboth a personal concern and a
here
in
is
in
its
It
task.
relentless engagement a philosophical
cited
almost
entirety:
I am pleased that you have seen Rene Char and that you might have
him.
intimately
To
feel
to
three
the
extent
which
all
conversed with
of us
but
in
this
proximity, placed
relation [mise en
close,
perhaps, within
differences
differences
be
thinking,
these
of
must
rapport] with certain
represented as a somewhat divergent responseto demands [des exigences]
that one should be able to explain more clearly. I don't know at all that
interest or lack of interest in regard to 'politics' is involved; this is only a
As
far
superficial.
as I'm concerned, I see
consequence and perhaps only
for
have
double
better
I
I
time,
to
than
some
what
movement clearly, see
both necessary and irreconcilable -I must always respond. The one (to
in
an extremely crude and simplifying manner) is the
express myself
[la
du
the
the
tout], within
the
of
all
parole
speech
realisation and
passion,
dialectical accomplishment; the other is essentially non-dialectical, it
itself
does
the
nor
with
unity
neither
with
all
and
not tend
concerns
towards power (to the possible). A double language responds to this
double movement, and for all language there is a double gravity: one is the
finally
that of
confrontation,
of
negation,
of
opposition,
and
speech
35
in
is
truth
in
the
the
that,
end, assertedas
reducing everything opposed and
its entirety as silent equality (whence appears political exigency); but the
first
is
before
of
all,
always
a
other
speech which speaks
all and outside
speech, without agreement, without confrontation and open to welcome
the unknown, the stranger (whence the poetic exigency). One names the
impossible.
desires
the
to
the
the
possible and
other responds
possible;
There is a constant tension between the two movements,,at once necessary
in
incompatible,
difficult
to
and
often very
sustain and truth untenable. But
bias,
one cannot, out of prejudice or
renounce the one or the other, nor the
measurelessresearch that their necessity demands of men, the necessity of
incompatible.
the
combining
Forgive me for these out of place reflections. But it seemed to me that I
(however
illconsidered)
friendship.
this
to
owed
effort of clarification
your
Perhaps your return to Paris and the possibilities for meeting thus brought
by
to
than
abstract affirmations, to this
about will allow me respond, other
friendship.
exigency of
21
This 'double movement' to which he refers is more familiar, in various forms,
throughout Blanchot's work in the 1950's and early 1960's. The essay,"Comment
decouvrir Fobscur?" (1959), presents it most succinctly: the dual proposal of
'naming the possible' and 'responding to the impossible'; the demand of politics
and that of poetry.
22 Such
a double gesture is central to Blanchot's pursuit of a
form of 'research' that works both from within and against those determinations
it
is
from
Yet
by
tradition.
the
the care and
clear
philosophical
also
already given
limiting
it
is
'movement'
that
texts
to a
these
a
matter
of
such
not
a
precision of
defiant
First
gesture,
against
philosophy
as
such.
of all, it
a
strategic ploy, or
between
impossible
is
be
'constant
the
tension'
the
this
to
that
possible
and
seems
located in accordance with a different kind of strategy: what he calls a manner of
cresearch', or more precisely 'le recherche sans mesure'. Perhaps this path of
it
has
'strategy'
for
it
is
the
order
of
a
of
no
goal
as
even
such
not
makes
research
-
36
no claim to any form of measurement or calibration. For this unavoidable
'difficulty'
demands
'incompatible'
'necessary'
to
two
yet
of responding
equally
is never settled into a concordance, nor harmonised into a unity. They are simply
(.given' as irreducible.
An irreducible difference, or even discordance, seems to result from this
is
between
state of affairs
at once a global
political responsibility which
dialectic
the
and concrete responsibility, accepting marxism as nature and
as method of truth - and literary responsibility, a responsibility which is a
response to an exigency that can only take shape [prendre forme] in and
through literature.
This discordance does not have to be set from the outset. It is a fact: it
exists as a problem, not a frivilous problem, but one to be borne with
difficulty, a problem all the more difficult in that each of its discordant
terms engagesus absolutely and in that their discordance, in a sense, also
23
engagesus.
This 'desaccord',, as a repetition of this relation between the possible and the
impossible, is an integral component for his formulation of the relations between
literary/poetic
language, political discourse and philosophical task. Thus, however
'maladroit'
crude or
formation
Blanchot claims his letter is, it is this continuity of conceptual
that appears to dominate upon reading it, almost casting aside the
difficulties
to
the
opening references
and differences between himself, Char and
Bataille -a heated argument for his two friends that took place over the very status
24
because
'Incompatibilites'
this intensity it
of
- and yet
of
also returns all the
How
heart
to present and work through
their
to
the
conflict.
of
more precisely
destroying
difference
keeps
the
that
them
very
without
such unbridgeable gulfs
incompatible'?
does
'combine
How
the
one
rigidly apart?
This is a way of articulating an 'essential' concern for Blanchot within the
broader context of his published work: to put it quite schematically, it is an
37
attempt to approach that which is irreducibly different without hypostatising this
difference, either by dividing them absolutely in order to reject one in favour of
the other, or reconciling them in order to reduce one to the other. Either possibility
would,
for
inseparability
Blanchot,
would
elide both their
incompatibility
and their
dissymmetry
designates
Blanchot
'plural
the
perverse
which
as
-a
speech' of conversation [Tentretien'].
Such is the secret sharing of all essential speechin us: naming the possible,
impossible.
Sharing which must not, however, give way
to
the
responding
to a kind of repartition: as if we had, as our choice, a speechto name and a
speech to respond, as if, finally, between possibility and impossibility,
there was a frontier, perhaps moving, but always determinable according
25
'essence'
to the
of one or the other.
Blanchot names a resistance to the ease with which the conflicts of contraries
be
to
overcome and resolved: he posits a form of 'dissymmetry and
come
irreversibility' that does not depend upon a relation of 'equality and inequality' or
26
of 'predominance and subordination' .
In other words, it is a relation of conflict
that is irreducible to the form of contradiction which is ultimately resolved into a
higher identity, a reconciliation of differences. He stresses the possibility of
thinking this 'between' of 'discord' as a 'relation of infinity' which is, however,
27
itself.
'implicated
the
movement of signification
always
as
But what relation does this letter bear to the published works that it almost
development
it
be
formulation
Is
tentative
to
to
as
an
early,
of a
seems ghost?
read
to be published in the coming years? Such questions, eminently those of the
biographical-critic,
push towards the speculated origins of a given writer's
thinking: reference to conversations, correspondance,friendships and feuds brings
biographical authority (i. e., an 'authenticity') to bear upon recalcitrant texts. This
friend.
Yet,
letter,
is
to
text
addressed
a
communication
a
at the same
a
particular
time,, it is both more and less than a confidential exchangebetween individuals, as
Blanchot makes explicit with his apology - 'Pardonnez-moi ces reflexions
38
deplac6s'. As has been pointed out, the majority of his letter to his friend seemsto
have been taken over or taken up with a displacement, a shift of emphasis: a
his
'reflections'
into
letter
has
the
taken
the
movement
of
place with
introduction
upon the 'political' and 'poetic' exigencies; a change has occurred in the rules or
in
Furthermore,
takes
this
syntax of such a communication.
place the guise of
shift
his 'debt' to Bataille's friendship - 'il m'a semble queje devais a votre amitie cet
d'eclaircissement'.
displacement:
focus
(from
Clarification
a
shift
effort ...
and
of
his personal concerns with Bataille and Char to 'des affirmations abstraites') and a
change of context (from letter-writing to the impromptu essay) are both made in
the name of friendship. They are both modes in which Blanchot explicitly writes
in responseto Bataille, to that which he owes to his friend, his friendship.
Not friendship in general, but a friendship that is with a specific other person.
This is undisputable. An inter-personal register securesthe name of friendship to
the form of the letter: it offers the security of a private, hermetic correspondance,
just
from
face-to-face
if
be
it
to
step
one
away
a
conversation as
were
valued as
'Pardonnez-moi
...
je devais...'. However, there are gaps in this register that also
informal
If
the
this
askew.
elision of a
or
pull
strictly one-to-one correspondance
letter,
is
'a
this
as much as any
votre amitie' personal address properly noted be
Bataille's
Paris,
to
to
return
cannot
come after
mapped so
conversation
Je'
is
familiar
'tu'.
It
the
and
as though, through the
exchange of
seamlessly upon
his
it
incurs,
displacement
debt
Bataille
the
to
response
could
presence of a
and
in
(or
'intimate'
be
'direct',
'personal'
any accepted
expected) sense of
or
never
these terms. What comes between them seems to be friendship itself, or rather a
thought of it that seemsto broach as much on the impersonal as personal. It is not
that friendship has lost any senseof relation or proximity, rather that any relation
friend
be
'personal'
'impersonal'
familiarity
(in the
the
that
or
called
with
could
of
friendship
through
thinking
of
must
pass
abstraction)
a
cold
as rapport
sense of a
that, embracing both 'affirmations abstraites' and 'les possibilites de rencontre', at
its
(the
'un
displaces
its
stakes
clarifies
urgency
exigence')
and
or
of
raises
once
friendship).
In
(the
of
conflict
other words, what emerges at the close
expression
39
of this letter delimits the scope of the present enquiry: it is the emergence of a
completely other demand for Blanchot, the possibility of 'repondre a cette
exigence de Famitie'.
What is the relation of this 'exigency' to those attributed to the 'political' or
4poetic'? Is friendship to be read as another name for 'responding to the
impossible'? Or is this third exigency to forin an over-arching, perhaps a more
originary demand for thinking? If so, the accession of friendship to a principle of
necessity or 'exigency' would negate any emergence of a completely new or
friendship.
between
What
thought
singular
of
relation could possibly pertain
singularity and exigency, to maintain the specificity of the former while carrying
through the necessary urgency of the latter? The force of this exigency will have
to revolve around its multiplied demands: the necessity of maintaining a certain
force
in
the
complex singularity, even against
persistent
of necessity general or the
demands of the particular and the general, that is to say within and against the
29
language and rhetoric of philosophical research itself. The depth of any paradox
is to be found in the endless conflict of demands: the possible and the impossible.
1.2 - The doubling of discretion
This section focusses on the way in which Blanchot responds to the death of
Bataille in terms of friendship. How does Blanchot write about his friend in the
does
he
keep
his
death?
To
to
the work separatefrom the
extent
what
wake of
seek
life? In which does he have the greatest investment, and how far would he see the
distinction between the life and the work as a legitimate one? Such questions are
life
to
the
with
regard
and work of Bataille, whose La
particularly compelling
Somme atheologique - conceived as his central work - mixes elements of journal,
29
treatise, aphorism, and poetry. What kind of demands are placed upon the writer
(especially one who is a friend) who writes about another whose work affirms 'the
40
practice of joy before death', a work to which one might give the title of
30
thanatography, and a life in which death is, already, 'at work'?
In the few months following the death of Georges Bataille in 1962, Blanchot
writes two very different, yet interlocking essays: the first called simply
"L'amitie";
and the other, "L'affinnation
la
de
la
I
pens&e
negative".
passion
et
will focus on the former essay, one of his most consummately constructed pieces
of writing. For reasons that I hope to make clear, it is difficult to say that
'UamitiC
is actually a text written about Bataille; in fact, it is more accurate to
"L'amitie"
Blanchot
to
that
say
comes
write
in the absence of his friend. The
difficulty of this piece was underlined with its first journal publication, when the
title was supplemented by a capitalised, underlined heading: 'POUR GEORGES
BATAILLE'.
It strikes one more as an editorial supplement, added for the sake of
dedication:
first
it
is
than
the
clarification,
as
author's own
erasedwhen the
of all,
essay is republished as the end-piece to Blanchot's collection of the same name;
it
because
seems to undermine the entire movement of this piece by
and second,
it
is
in
to
the text. Indeed,
a proper name which
affixing
scarcely mentioned
whether one actually can, or should, read this piece as a eulogy or testimony to the
life and work of Bataille is a question at the very heart of Blanchot's writing in
"L'amitie",
it
is
again in "L'affinnation
as
la
et passion". In both pieces, there is
the staging of a resistance to biography, a discretion when faced with speaking of
his deceased friend, which seems to structure the impetus and direction of
Blanchot's thinking. On the one hand, then, Blanchot eschews any claim to be
talking about Bataille; whilst on the other, Bataille's 'presence' in this piece is
"L'amitie"
begins
Blanchot
um-nistakeable.
by asking how he should begin to
in
his
line
Bataille,
the
choice
of
preposition
opening
whilst
write of
of
"L'affinnation
et la passion" accentsa reluctance to write about Bataille:
Permit me, in thinking of Georges Bataille, to think close to an absence,
be
in
his
to
than
to
everyone
should
claim
set
out
what
able
read
rather
31
books.
41
Blanchot states that his aim is to place his own thinking in proximity to, or in the
vicinity of ['aupres de] the friend who is absent. One might say, for the moment,
that the name of Bataille persists as a question in both essays. In this way, it
makes certain demands upon how Blanchot can write "L'amitiF,
how
he
or
comes to be writing in the name of friendship at all. For it is also this word,
Tarnitie', that not only links the two pieces to one another, but also to Blanchot's
in
following
Hence,
the
the way that Blanchot
work as a whole.
course of
positions himself 'close to an absence', I am particularly interested with the way
in which he does two things at the same time in "L'amitie". On the one hand, by
defend
his
friend,
divulge
in
interest
to
to
the
refusing
praise or
secrets
of
presenting some truth about him, he attempts to communicate the singularity of
this profound experience of loss; and on the other, in the enactment of this refusal,
he articulates a thinking of friendship in response to that presented by Bataille in
La Sommeatheologique.
1.21 -Effacement
So, if it is difficult to say whether Blanchot's essay is actually about Bataille, can
it
is
that
writtenfor
one say
him, or in his memory? From the beginning, this is
heading
for
'POUR
GEORGES
the
supplementary
at
clear,
even
with
of
not
all
BATAILLE% there is already a senseof conflict between the title - "Friendship" line
'this
friend'.
disparity
This
is
the
the
opening
apparent object of
and
retained
in the 1971 version. Yet Blanchot does not claim to be writing either in the mode
FamitiC,
("De
the
essay
of
for example) or in a more personal mode of a
"L'amitie":
An
to
the
to what, or to
as
address
of
ambiguity remains
reminiscence.
immediately
directed?
If
'Bataille',
is
did
this
title
the
one
answers
as
whom,
heading,
the
the
question reappears as the proper
supplementary
editor who added
by
into
is
Indeed,
the
initially
the
end
and
completely
question,
effaced.
put
name
between
death
the
friend
this
writing
on
of
relation
unique
conflictual
necessarily
friendship
discourse
is
heart
the
on
the
as
a
such
of
at
of
generality
and
42
"L'amitie". This is evident even in the way the opening line is re-written. In 1962,
Blanchot writes:
How might I consent to speak of this friend, of the man that he was?
32
When the essay is republished in LAmitie, this line will read:
How to consent to speak of
33
this friend?
The passage of time does not by itself account for the rewriting of this line. It
might be tempting to explain this difference by referring to the completion of a
work of mouming, where the particularity of the first version - marked by the
'comment
j'accepterais de parler', and
tense
personal register and conditional
of
by the temporal specificity of 'Fhomme qu'ilfut'
be
by
to
the
comes
replaced
-
in
'consenting
the
to
question of
possibility of
speak'
general. However, the
disappearance of the 'I'
levelling
into
infinitives
the
tenses
and
of verb
4comment accepter de parler... ' - are not necessarily marks of an inevitable
level
to
of generality, but perhaps an exacerbation of a tension
a
accession
between the deictic and the general already implicit within the first writing. The
infinitives
be
to
recourse
can read as a way of maintaining the opening question in
the present, to deepenthe senseof absenceto be faced in such a task.
This levelling to the infinitive is not the mark of time's removal or erasure
from the concept, as if friendship was to be apprehendedas a purely formal ideal;
it
(a
thoroughly
the
temporal
presence
of
a
marks
out
persistent
rather,
event
death) already inscribed within it. In this way, Blanchot's re-writing works to
loss
between
it's
and
unsettle any smooth progression
recollection
or
The
bears
in
to
this
thought
which
extent
memory.
an essential
reincorporation
inexorably
leads
friendship
towards a renewed affirmation
to
the
name of
relation
both
In
following
impersonality.
the
lines
text
the
versions
of
and
of oblivion
from
friend'
'his
'this
dissociate
'his
possibility
any
of
using
character',
radically
life'
All
the
'his
to
work.
explain
signs of these things are
existence'
or
obliterated.
43
Neither in order to praise him, nor in the interest of some truth. The traits
life,
his
in
his
forms
his
the
the
of
even
of
character,
episodes
of
existence,
accord with the research for which he felt himself responsible to the point
irresponsibility,
of
no witness.
belong to no-one [n'appartiennent d personne]. There is
34
Blanchot's immediate concern does not appear to be with providing a definition of
friendship, nor does it claim to tell us about, or narrate, the events of someone's
life. Instead, he thernatisesthe conditions which bring him to write this piece: it is
written neither as a homage, nor as a critique; and whilst explicitly presenting
itself as a question of writing about this friend, "L'amitie"
does not yet refer to
Bataille by name. There is only an impersonal designation of a disjunctive relation
friend'
'belonged'
'this
belongs
'no-one'.
All
that
to
to
now
where
which
of these
attributes and characteristics no longer belong to someone, to any identifiable
be
It
tempting to read this deliberated, double negation as
person.
would
ineffable
in
lay
the
truth
obscurantist, as
mark of some
whose name one could
claim to a reserved realm of silence. However, the form of this double negation A
is
Brelated to the persistent pressure of the opening question: a
neither
nor
friendship
is
henceforth
continued re-questioning of
itself, whose presentation
marked as the site of an internal conflict (neither homage, nor critique). Indeed, it
friendship
brings
it
the
that
appears
name of
with the presence of conflict, arising
from the absenceof the friend in question: these 'traits', 'forms' or 'episodes' are
does
belong
'his',
'no-one'.
Who
to
the name of 'this
they
all
all
or what
yet
friend' now name? The only 'witness', the one who could satisfy any claim to this
baggage,
biographical
is
In
'testimony',
it
this
the
absent.
absenceof any
property,
belongs solely to this 'anyone' or 'no-one' ['personne']. In this way, friendship
in
is
bound
is
impersonal
it
to
that
a
relation
up
which
already
or anonymous, and
is with this relation that that friendship comes to be affirmed and articulated
through forgetting.
44
As a result of the abrupt disappearanceof 'this friend', one might conclude
that to speak of him must involve, as a condition of its possibility, addressing
onCs remembrance 'to no-one'. But is it the case that, in so far as the first
paragraph of "L'amitie"
seeks to eradicate any possibility of speaking about this
friend, this lexicon of absence and anonymity is, in fact, an attempt to reserve,
beyond the reach of biography, the memory of a personal proximity? Whilst this
strategy would be equivalent to keeping silent, it also entails a mode of fidelity
that, by speaking in terms of 'no-one' in particular, would attempt to keep back
the indeterminacy of 'anyone'. What is to be done? To speak or keep silent? It is
here that the twin poles of refusing and accepting to speak of the friend collapse
into one another: 'It is in vain that we pretend to maintain, by our words, through
35
our writings, that which is absent.' For Blanchot, such attachment seeks to keep
the friend in hand ['maintenir'], offering him a 'living' place 'in the day', but
forgets
is
duplicity
is
in
It
this
the
the very
what
memory
of its own project.
'attraction of our memories' that there lies the trap or 'the lure' with which we, the
36
living, would hold him to our 'day'. Here, all giving of eulogies, all tributes and
implicated:
is
debt
are
what memory offers a semblance of life to
expressions of
that which disturbs the very order of the living. The attempt to give back to the
dead that 'prolonged life of a truthful appearance',by being faithful to the truth of
his memory, is only to bury him all the more completely, to have done with the
is
is
What
'what
the
thought
that
remains
painful
remains.
precisely
vaccuum. of
absent'. And yet, in writing this, there is always the possibility that by choosing
friend,
is
his
Blanchot
to
not
seeking to retain a part of this vaccuum,
speak about
for his own. A refusal to speak, which would keep guard over a dedicated silence
(in the name of friendship, possibly) still marks the author's possibility of
choosing not to respond to this absence; and more fundamentally, reveals his
living possibility over it as an expression of his own survival.
Hence, the refusal 'to speak of this friend', as the choice to withold oneself
from speaking of him, easily becomes the apparent opposite: an expression of the
hold
dead,
living
the
the
that
over
always
which enables one to speak or not
power
45
to speak, according to one's will, as if death had finally allowed one to get the
better of them. It is at this point that the paradox of speaking about the dead is
revealed in its painful inevitability. In "L'affinnation
la
Blanchot
passion",
et
repeats and extends this thought in an endeavour to avoid those 'epithets' (such as
Imysticism, 'eroticism', 'atheism') which serve as familiar co-ordinates not only
for readers of Bataille's work, but also for those who wish to account for the 'life'
they discern behind it.
Certainly, as we know, each one of us is menaced by his Golem, a crude
image,
double,
derisory
idol
the
that makes us visible
our mistaken
clay
living,
by
discretion
the
and against which,
we can protest
of our life; but
it
dead
how
perpetuates
once
us:
to prevent
it
from
making
our
disappearance, even the most silent, the moment at which, condemned to
have
to respond precipitately
appear, we
to public
interrogation
by
it
is
And
friends,
to
confessing
what we were not?
sometimes
our closest
in the good intention of speaking in our place and in order not to abandon
us too quickly
to our absence, who contribute
to this benevolent
or
beneath
from
be
travesty
this
malevolent
which,
moment onwards, we will
37
seen.
But how can one hold off the public tribunal of critics, observers, and readers?
Blanchot immediately acknowledges that one cannot: 'No, there is no way out for
38
the dead, those who die after having written'. How can a life spent writing avoid
being read in its turn, when the very condition of its reserve - 'the discretion of our
life' - has receded? Blanchot's response to his own question is not to wish that
for
into
be
to
a
withdrawal
otherwise, nor
call
some private
everything could
is
it
'most
the
that
the
the
realisation
and
even
warning
glorious
sphere; rather,
indistinguishable
'pretentious
hell'
from
in
is
the
ultimately
which 'all
posterity'
39
fairly
'figure
devils'.
Even
and
as
wretched
observer,
reader,
critic,
every
of us',
friendship fails to provide this protection for the dead, for more often that not it is
(our closest friends' who contribute to this 'travesty' by trying to speak 'in our
46
place', by trying to set the record straight and secure their friend's reputation.
Once again, it is an action born of the fear of the absenceor void which the friend,
40
now dead, represents; and one in which not saying anything also takes its place.
'We' - 'all of us', says Blanchot
in
by
this
trial
opinion, anecdote
are
complicit
-
and obituary; and hence, we are all caught within the same double bind of
speaking/not speaking of our friends. In 'Vamitie",
faced with this realisation,
Blanchot pushes himself and us - note that again it is a question of a 'we' towards a simple observation, in which he discerns a 'truth' to all mourning.
We only search [, in truthj to fill a void, we do not endure the pain of
41
grief. the affirmation of this void.
The ineluctable 'truth' of 'our' relation - which is that of the living - to the such a
in
in'
deficiency
lies
desire
'fill
'compensate
for'
['combler']
to
a
or
our
or
void
lack, to make up for such an absenceby making it present. Any pressure excerted
by this void is to be extinguished by giving it the presence in memory that it had
lost in death. Blanchot does not reject this process of mourning, but attempts to
discern the possibility of another response to the experience of 'grief
- an
becomes
'affirmation'
Hence,
the
the
naming of an
void as such.
affirmation of
the thought of this relation which is no longer (and perhaps, as we will see, never
hastily,
By
to
speak
or to reserve memory as
refusing
was) a relation of presence.
the domain of a privileged and powerful silence, what Blanchot's writing
4presents' is the thought of a relation that affirms the depth of 'this void'. But
how? Is it even possible, in so far as the act of affirming such an absencealready
in
discursive
the
movement of presence?
shares
What is affinned, then, is a refusal to stop thinking the question posed in the
how
beginning,
line.
first
From
this
to
to
the
of
question
accept
speak of
very very
this friend interrupts and postpones the possibility of the memorial measuring up,
To
'this
friendship.
demand
thought
the
being
to
the
affinn
of
void'
of
proper
or
its
impossibile
utter absenceof meaning.
recognition of
as such would require an
It is not a case of a work of remembrance that could actively retrieve some lost -
47
and hence significant
memory
for
is
it
doubts
task
Blanchot
For
that
a
which
memory.
-
could be proper at all, in the face of
'an insignificance
so
disproportionate that we do not have the memory capable of containing it and that
42
we would have to slip towards forgetting ourselves in order to bear it'. How is it
possible to affirm or 'to welcome' such a thought, he asks, when it demands that
43
we open 'ourselves' to forgetting, to 'the time of this slippage'? It is this demand
forgetting
that is affirmed with the thought of 'this void'. All speech, like every
of
hold
friend
to
the
effort
within the protection of memory, only 'veils' the
movement of forgetting that is already, always underway. This is why the
is,
for
in his words, 'unique':
Blanchot
that
affirmation
calls
that everything must be effaced, must efface itself [tout doit s'effacer] and
that we can remain faithful only by keeping watch over this movement that
itself,
in
to
which something
effaces
us that rejects all recollection
44
[souvenir] already belongs.
An unease strikes us when we read this injunction, here, in a piece of writing
whose title seemsto announce a reflection on the relation of friendship. What kind
here?
is
being
A relation with 'that which is absent' is not a
of relation
proposed
be
loss
lack
to
to be
written,
relation
can equated with a
something which, once
or
it
laid
be
to rest and simply put aside. Rather,
through
mourning; nor can
retrieved
it is the memory of a life that 'belongs to no-one' which, in so far as the past to
longer
belong
be
fixed
to
this
no
said
remains
which
absence might
once the
thought of its representation (its being written), opens us to this temporality of
4slippage'. It is in the present that we are drawn toward forgetting in a relation of
forgetting
is
it
for
that
of
affirmation
we aredrawn towards our
our
with
vigilance,
'which
finitude:
itself'
the
to
movement
effaces
a shared
puts 'us'
own relation
into relation with the discontinuity which is constitutive of the present - that is, the
death.
interruption
of
constant
By affirming this oblivion in terms of 'our' necessary relation to death,
Blanchot does not draw closer to 'this friend', for there is no lost proximity to be
48
demand
lies
in
is
friend,
to
think
If
debt
the
there
to
the
regained.
it
any senseof
absence as such, without recourse to a lost presence, by forgetting that which is
lost. This is perhaps Blanchot's own 'vain' gesture: to maintain a distance in the
sense of a reserve or discretion, a distance which vanishes with the friend. Has he
come, therefore, to bury 'this friend' in an act of forgetting which would place
him deeper than the grave, and to preserve his name more profoundly than the
tomb of mourning? There is, perhaps, a sense of protective defiance: to preserve
the singularity of his friend against all those who, already, come to exhume and
display the truth about Bataille. It could be said that a gap has been opened up
between 'this friend' and the proper name of Bataille, as if the writer sought to
he
Erom
'the
his
'name'
that
the
or
rather,
rescue
man man
was' or reputation,
to separatethe life from the literature. As we have seen,by the time that this piece
in
reappears 1971, even this reference to 'the man that he was' has been erased.
No relation, no reference seems to remain between 'this friend' and the proper
is
for
in
his
lay
Blanchot
those
unambiguous
contempt
who would
name.
claim to
an understanding of Bataille's work through a brief glimpse into his biography he writes that his sense of discretion 'does not lie on the simple refusal to reveal
45
if
it)'.
he
details
(how
be,
Yet
that
to
consider
seeks to
vulgar
would
even
private
by
him
Bataille
the
those
claims made upon
who write about
after his
undermine
death - whether they come to criticise or to eulogise, to reveal or to defend the
'real Bataille' behind the work -, what does he put in their place?
1.22 - Impersonality
Literary history presents us with the works of a writer as an 'inheritance'; and as
'what
has
into
fallen
heritage'
form
history
this
the
of
seizure
gives
of
a
such,
'the
form,
the
moment
of
complete works.
concrete
46 The
possibility of literary
history - that is, the very 'moment' when the work can be discussed as 'complete'
in
death.
to
the
takes
relation
singular
event
of
a
place
-
49
"Everything" has to be published, "everything" has to be said; as though
there was only one urgency remaining: that everything be said; as if the
dead
44
is
finally
to
to
speech: to stop
everything said" were
allow us stop a
the pitiful silence which comes from it, and to retain it within a well
circumscribed horizon that which a questionable posthumous waiting still
47
illusively mixes with our living words.
In this haste to speak - that desire to say everything, to leave nothing out, which
becomes
desperate
very quickly
a
need to say anything at all - Blanchot discerns
the efforts of literary history to incorporate that part of the work which is given as
'a dead speech', to put an end to that which already comes to us from the end.
This desire to have done with Bataille, to 'stop', to 'retain', might be read as a
reluctance to take the responsibility of asking 'how to accept to speak'. In effect, it
haunt
it.
'pitiful
the
through
that
to
to
gaps
silence' might return
aims plug
which
For when ...everything is said"', there cannot be anything left to say, and one can
in
it
knowledge
'the
When
the
thereby
that
circumscribes.
moment
remain secure
be
the
there
can
no more challenge to the work, to the
of
complete works' comes
idea of what a 'work' might become. The work has arrived at its completion; no
further work need take place.
The task of the literary historian is to 'place' Bataille: to document, sift and
it
is
into
it's
definitive
does
What
the
shape.
not seem to
weigh
work as
assembled
be required is precisely that which Blanchot identifies as the demand of this work:
to ask, beyond any simple attribution of epithets like 'scandalous', 'mystical' or
'a-theological', about the conditions of this judgement. For Blanchot, the central
detennines
is
here
hence
the
the
what
possibility
of
remembrance,
and
concern
'inheritance'
living
formulation
dead.
What
the
the
to
the
of
an
relation
of
very
happens between 'a dead speech' ['une parole morte] and 'our living words'
['nos paroles de vivants']? What is Blanchot asking us to think in this
4questionable posthumous waiting', which 'still illusively
mixes' these two
dead?
One
living
the
'illusive'
that,
through
the
this
and
might
venture
worlds,
50
mixture, Blanchot proposes to place 'our living words' as a filter between the
blind urge of the "'everything is said"' and the disturbing silence of 'a dead
speech'. What would be at stake in this claim?
What is at stake is our understanding of the work, it's origin and it's
constitution. The formulation of the 'complete works' is essentially bound to that
in
'grief
had
located
Blanchot
to
the desire to bury the
reaction
which previously
'void' under the weighty presence of 'something'. In this way, his argument
highlights a contradiction that holds up the project of the literary historian or
biographer: by completing or filling in this void left by 'that which is absent', like
the mourner who buries grief rather than endure it, the literary historian seeks to
keep up a familiar and continuous terrain (in the name of 'life', 'art', or 'history');
is
such
a
model
yet
of continuity - which
seen as either progressive or static functions only through a discrete series of punctuated events (a death, a work or
an action). The possibility of such events possessing their own patterns of
(a
invert
dying,
this model, but
or
working
acting)
would
not
simply
continuity
rather it would complicate it by insisting upon the continuity of the discontinuous.
This constitution of the event, taking place through an emphasis upon relation and
its repetition, refuses the possibility of having done with it. Blanchot gradually
leads us into a thinking which comes to mark the sense of this discretion: the
in
fact
'we'
(already,
that
always) are the process of removing,
quasi-ontological
fact
from
This
every relation of presence.
of effacement and
or effacing ouselves
distantiation comes to be thought as constitutive of 'our' relation to the present.
It is this relation which brings our attention to the reworking of a 'work of
demanded,
is
itself
have
in
that
this
as
we
essay
work
already seen,
mouming'
-a
by the particular presence of a 'void'. Like Freud's definition of a successful work
in
history
function
literary
terms
can
of an unquestioned
only
of mourning,
In
this
of
such
a
clumsy
centrality of completion
comparison,
spite
completion.
it
is
disregarded:
Blanchot
both
be
the
at
which
reads
point
conceptions
should not
derives
from
'work'
determinate
The
'the
concept
of
very
a
a
work'.
relation to
of
51
an unproblematic, singular event of death. This is not to say that the singularity of
'this friend' or 'this void' is thereby dissolved. Instead, it is maintained as a
his
is
it
is
is
here
For
for
(as
throughout
Blanchot
question.
work)
an
what at stake
from
death
(qua
its
death
originary non-coincidence of
removes
which
and
event
like
is
Freud's
It
that,
event) any possibility of a simple singularity.
not simply
melancholic, Blanchot would refuse to recognise the death of his friend, or even to
in
the
refuse
event of such an absence the name of a vital presence, which one
might call 'the mobility of life'. Such 'mobility' matters little to Blanchot. More
disturbing is the fact that even when 'the one who is close to us' was alive, his
thinking was only kept open to 'us' through 'the fissure of death', 'the
introduces
into
his
that
the
the
thinking'.
end
strangeness of
unpredictability
Blanchot goes on to explain that:
And this unforeseeable movement, always hidden within its infinite
imminence - that of dying perhaps - does not derive from the fact that the
in
it
but
from
fact
be
the
that
given advance,
never constitutes
end cannot
it
[survient],
is
happens
[arrive],
that
even when
occurs
and
an event
being
grasped: ungraspable and maintaining to
reality
capable
of
never a
48
the end within the ungraspable the one who is destined for it.
Finitude and communication are held together as 'this very relation,
as an
dead
living
it
is
between
the
the
the
words
of
and
where
only
excessive movement
the silent pressure of the dead which 'preserves' the spaceof opening for the latter
to think.
I[... ] know that, in his books, Georges Bataille seems to speak of himself
free
from
discretion
freedom
but
us
which
should
all
with an uninhibited
in
his
does
the
to
put
ourselves
right
place, nor give us
not give us
which
the power to speak in his absence. And is it certain that he speaks of
49
himself [de Soi] ?
Hence, it is 'this presence without anybody' which is always 'at stake', as the
in
Bataille's
essential
an
self-effacement
of
unsettling presence
writings
-
52
'the
his
'personal'
recurring within
existence of the
most
writings, even within
man who was able to decide to speak of it'. Just as the power of 'preservation' is
determined by that which already introduces 'unpredictability' into that thinking
that is, 'the strangenessof the end' where memory only emerges through the copresence of forgetting - so this 'enigmatic relation' pertains to the opening of 'a
lacuna' where any biography, or any claim to be speaking in the place of Bataille
only finds that it cannot locate such a place. The '1' has already become 'Who? '
1.23 - Separation
Now stripped of any unproblematic biographical subject, it is only in the third and
final section of his essay that Blanchot makes any explicit reference to a
conceptual formulation of friendship. If his opening question, 'How to consent to
has
informed
first
T,
the
two sections of this piece as a way of holding
speak of ...
open, even accentuating, the tension or pressure of marking the singularity of 'this
friend', then this pressure comes to a head in the last section of the essay. Here,
Blanchot does not so much give a definition of what friendship is, as draw us into
the space of a 'movement' in which he sketches what is at stake within one's
friend.
to
relation
a
Friendship,
this relation
without
dependence, passes through
the
does
not allow us to speak of
recognition of common strangenesswhich
into
but
friends,
to
them,
to
talk
them
to
not
make
only
a theme of
our
but
in
(or
the
movement
of
understanding
articles),
which,
conversations
familiarity,
infinite
the
they
to
even
within
greatest
reserve,
us,
speaking
distance, this fundamental separation on the basis of which that which
becomes
relation.
separates
50
When we read Blanchot's thematisation of his refusal to thematise the name of
Bataille, it also becomes evident that he has done nothing but speak around the
in
his
discreetly,
in
to
Bataille
throughout
the
an
essay,
effort
remain,
name of
53
into
friends
'a
his
theme'
distinguishes
But
thought.
vicinity of
one's
making
what
for discussion from making of them 'the movement of understanding', thereby
justifying the latter in Blanchot's eyes?This movement is designated as where our
friends speak to 'us', all the while maintaining or reserving an 'infinite distance'.
This separation-relation is always there, as a moment of reserve, amongst even the
most familiar friends; as if Blanchot was tracing out a genesis of friendship (as the
from
is
form
'being-in-relation').
'being-separate'
It
therefore
to
of
a
conversion
discerns
in
Blanchot
Does
terms
that
such a
of
separation
any
relation
at
all.
only
form of separation therefore of itself give rise to the 'becoming-relation' of 'that
is
between
friends,
How
to
a process of putting space
objects, or
which separates'?
be converted into what will essentially come to bridge that 'gap'? Here, neither
is
In
there
of
something
other words,
separation nor relation admit easy resolution.
it
'fundamental',
'this
that conditions the
whatever
makes
separation',
about
it's
become
'that
than
to
what
action
which separates'
other
process or work of
denotes; yet it does not become 'that which relates', but rather it 'becomes
is
into
its
is
itself
becomes
It
It
transformed
that
not
relation.
separation
relation'.
it
is
Blanchot
the
process
of
relation.
constitutive
adds:
opposite action: already
'That which separates:that which authentically puts into relation, the very abyss
is
held,
in
the
simplicity,
understanding always maintained
with
which
of relations
This authenticity of relation, this movement whereby
in friendly affirmation'
.51
by
is
Blanchot's
becoming-relation
is
named
qualification
a
already
separation
'discretion'.
of
and repetition
However,, in the midst of Blanchot's compact, complex formulations, surely it
is incumbent upon us to ask whether this care and discretion is not wholly
inappropriate to the reading or remembering of Bataille, the very Bataille whose
to
the
bears
the
to
self-examination
carried
of
a
extreme, a
virulence
witness
work
52
least
'loyalty'
demand
to
of all. Should not Blanchot
thinker whose work seems
feel (to quote Bataille) 'free from all discretion'? What has happened to this word
'discretion'? Does it signify anything more than the retention of a sense of
54
6propriety' and 'reserve' which Bataille's own work, as it is often claimed, derides
and destroys? How, then, should we read Blanchot's 'discretion' - as fidelity or
betrayal?
Blanchot defines discretion as 'the pure interval which, from myself to this
other who is a friend, measures everything that there is between us', which also
means, as he goes on to add, that 'discretion becomes, at a certain moment, the
fissure of death.' 53This relation is ultimately, intimately connected to the way in
which Blanchot thinks about the event of death, especially in the articulation of
memory and forgetting in mourning the death of the other. Hence, it is as much
the way that Blanchot names or presents 'friendship' that is central to his attempt
to think the emergence and sustenanceof this event or this relation in the very
happening
its
process of
or relating. And alongside this attention to the act of
inherent
the
to it, something like an
process of maintaining relation
naming, and
has
in
interruption
begun
his
to
ontology
emerge
work; or an
of ontology, an
interruption.
The
of
presence of questions concerning time, event,
ontology
identity
indicated
direction,
it
have
but
is with the doubling of
this
memory and
all
inherent
discretion
be
to
that
the
this
sense
presentation of
experience can
introduced as a central figure within his thinking as a whole: the experience of
discontinuity.
It is not surprising that discretion should be central to the presentation of
friendship. As a mode of conduct or behaviour it could be ascribed to the general
tone of this essay, a strategic tone nonethelessbearing the mark of circumspection
and discernment, even a certain prudence. However, as has been observed,
Blanchot has been quick to mark discretion down as something other than a mere
insights
to
part with personal
or secrets. Discretion pertains to
reluctance
friendship in its deployment as that movement of distancing which comes to put
into question the fonnulation of any relation, even that of familiarity or proximity,
between friends. It pertains to this co-presenceof separation and relation with the
is
in
insistent,
that
formative,
presence
transspecificity
a
of
some
way
pressure
-a
55
it,
in
to
Blanchot
at work - which
tries to mark as such order remove
rethink and
relocate it.
Here, discretion does not lie in the simple refusal to reveal private details
(how gross that would be even to consider it), but it is the interval, the pure
interval which, from myself to this other person who is a friend, measures
all that there is between us, the interruption
of being which
never
him,
knowledge
do
I
to
authorises me
or my
what
choose with
of him
(even in order to praise him),
and which,
far from
preventing
all
communication, relates us to one another in the difference and sometimes
54
the silence of speech
.
In other words, what Blanchot calls discretion is not merely the conduct of being
discreet with respect to one's friends; rather, it is a more fundamental expression
difference
from
friend
be
discrete,,
how
the
can
measured
as
of
one's
as the
he
is.
be
discretion
being
Hence,
that
there
or she
may
a relation of
singular
between friends, but it is discretion in the (mathematical) sense of discontinuity
friends
'between'
the
this
which
gives
very
possibility
of
and separation
which
55
is
into
discretion
This
to
them
that
conclude
puts
relation as such.
not
with
we
have unearthed the transcendental condition of possibility for all relations of
knowledge.
be
It
more approriate to attempt to trace the
would
communication or
in
for
discretion
becomes
'work'
Blanchot,
that names the
a
process
or
way which,
itself
it
is
it's
is
While
to
to make discrete, to
subject.
very operation which
work
distinguish and mark out what is singular, it is nevertheless discreet in this work.
56
Discretion 'works' in a movement of doubling itself.
What at first seems to be a contradiction in fact has turned upon a more
interesting problem of writing about or to the dead. Instead of talking about
Bataille, Blanchot speaks to him; instead of discussing the importance of his
flows
that
through
he
that work and re-works or re-directs it.
takes
a
word
work,
Blanchot's reticence to mourn or celebrate the death of his friend cannot be
fidelity
betrayal
dialectical
their
inversions
to
of
or
nor
a
question
reduced
-;
56
instead, it should be read as an enactment of this 'discretion', which takes place by
way of a response to Bataille's own thinking of friendship. For Blanchot, then, to
in
the name of 'friendship' does not mean simply to recount an event, a
write
meeting or encounter. On the contrary, it is precisely the effect of this manner of
accounting, or 'rapporter', for one's rapport to the friend that is under suspicion
in "L'amiti&". This is why the heading of 'FOR GEORGES BATAILLE'
cannot
be the work of the one who writes this piece: it flattens out the carefully wrought
it
is
Yet
the
this
of
condition
as
such.
not possible to
expression
of
relation
divorce the idea of ftiendship from the fact of an encounter, a shared experience:
hinges
in
from
1962
that
text
around the thought of an event or an
everything
encounter through which a relation between friends can emerge: 'that which
becomes
is,
in
It
the wake of Bataille's death that
relation'.
after all,
separates
Blanchot writes 'UamitiC,
if
it
for
he
does
him.
even
not write
or about
57
Notes to Chapter 1
1"L'amitiF,
AM, 330; FS, 292.
2, Les Rencontres",
hors
November
1984,84.
Nouvel
1045,
Le
s6r1e,
in
observateur,
3 Excerpt from
a letter to Bernard-Henri Uvy, dated 15th Spetember 1989, in BernardHenri Uvy, Les Aventures de la liberte, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1991,3 11.
4 Bataille, from
a "fragment d'une notice autobiographique", VI, 486,
5 Klossowski, 'De
<<Contre-Attaque))
a <<Ac6phale))',in Change 7.- Le groupe la rupture
(Editions de Seuil, 1970), 107, See also Pierre Prevost, Rencontre Georges Bataille,
Paris, Editions Jean Michel Place, 1987, passim; and Michel Surya, Georges Bataille,
la mort ti Voeuvre, Paris, Gallimard, 1992,378-84.
6 Surya, Georges Bataille, la
mort Li Voeuvre, op.cit., 379-80.
7 Ibid., 381.
8 Elý 301. It is in the
context of this refusal of biography that it is possible to discern a
friendship,
force
to
the
of
question
where it renders its very presentation as
preliminary
questionable - 'Where does this need to look for the true or the real [le vrai] only at the
level of anecdote and through a false picturesque come fromT
9
Ibid.
10#27 1.
11See Georges Bataille, Choix de lettres, 1917-1962,
edited by Michel Surya, Pans:
GalliMard, 1997,592,
12
#309.
13#284. The importance
of this phrase, 'une amitie inqui6te', will become clear in the
See
Blanchot's
Hegel.
the extended analysis of this reading in
of
reading
context of
Chapter 4, below.
14Compare this letter
"L'entretien
infini",
the 'conversation' which prefaces the
with
book of the same title, in EI, ix-xxvi.
15Surya, Georges Bataille, la
mortei Voeuvre, op.cit., 282.
16Clý 43,
emphasis added.
17
Ibid., 45.
18The
his
"Avant-propos"
first
from
Bataille's,
to
the
publication of Le Bleu
phrase is
du ciel, Paris: Gallimard, 1979 [Jean-JacquesPauvert, 19571,13. Here Bataille sets out
to account for the 22 year delay in the publication of his 'recit', adding that:
I am today far from the state of mind from which the book emerged; but in the end
longer
leave
I
decisive
time,
the matter to the
this
no
applying,
in its
reason,
with
judgment of myfriends.
19Blanchot, 'Voubli, la dýraison", EI, 299.
58
20 Bataille, "Silence
in
The
the
litt6rature",
XII,
173-4,
way
of
which
question
et
Bataille links 'friendship' to the name of Blanchot In his own work will be pursued in
Chapter 2.
21
#262.
22 El, 46-69. It
Blanchot's
double
that which
to
this
to
trace
movement
is possible
negates in order to know and communicate, and that which affirms the silent and the
unknown: the 'two slopes [deux versants]' of literary language, in "La litterature et le
drolt ý la mort", PF, 291-331,318-9. The questions already raised by such repetition
and transformation of vocabulary will become central to exploring the resonances
between these texts and those which name or respond to friendship.
23Taken from
documents
(written
1959-60?
)
Blanchot's
'in
around
one of
preliminary
for
Revue
internationale. Later
the
yet
never
realised
project
of
a
planned,
circulation'
September
1990,79-91,183,
Lignes,
11,
n.
a
special
of
emphasis
published in
issue
added.
24SeeBataille, "Lettre
les
de
1'6crivain", XII, 16-28. A responseto
sur
incompatibilit6s
from
de
letter'
des
",
in
Char,
"Y
Recherche
'open
a-t-11
incompatibilit6s? reprinted
an
la base et du sommet, Paris: Gallinlard, 1971,41-2. This exchange, at least, helps us to
date Blanchot's letter to around 1950-1.
25
EI, 68-9.
26 ,La
1'exigence
de
discontinuite"
pensee et
(1963), EI, 1- 11,9.
27Ibid.
28It here that Blanchot's
concern with the singularity of a friendship can be related to
is
language,
deixis.
The conflictual
internal
that
the
to
conditions of
of
a problem
requirements of the universal and the deictic utterance - one that relates to its own time
and place (through the use of demonstrative pronouns or adverbs, such as 'this friend',
for example) - will be seen to be exascerbated in Blanchot's working through of
singularity.
" La Somme athýologique comprises three individual works originally written between
1939 and 1944 - Le Coupable (1.944);LExpirience int6rieure(1943); Sur Nietzsche, la
first
in
(1945).
de
The
V,
in
two
the
third
collected
are
volume
and
chance
volontý
(Paris,
Gallimard,
both
1973).
Oeuvres
The
VI
Bataille's
compl&es
volumes
of
volume
Chapter
below.
be
discussed
in
2,
friendship
in
this
work will
role of
" The two biographies of Bataille currently available both draw upon this
life
Michel
Surya's
Georges
death
Bataille's
Bataille,
and
work:
in
preoccupation with
la mortei Voeuvre (Paris, Gallimard, 1987); and Bernd Mattheus' two-volume Georges
Bataille. Eine Thanatographie (Miinchen, Matthes und Seitz Verlag, 1984 [11,1988
[11]. For a useful discussion of these two works, which f6cusses on precisely this
des
Bataille:
(ou
Vimpossible
"Georges
Ernst,
Gilles
position
oreflets>>
question, see
biographle)", in Revue des Sciences Humaines, vol. LXXXXVIII, n. 224 (OctoberDecember 1991), pp. 105-25.
31 "L'affinnation
(1962),
la
de
EI,
300-13,300;
]a
IC,
n6gative"
pens6e
in
passion
et
202-11,202, emphasis added.
32
Am, 7.
59
" AM, 326; FS, 289.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
EI, 301; IC, 203, translation modified.
38
31
Ibid.
Ibid.
40Ibid. This question of friendship and betrayal is central to Bataille's thinking of
6complicitfriendship'.
41Am 326; FS, 289; Am, 7. The parenthesesindicate a phrasemissing from the 1971
ý
version of the text.
42
Am 326; FS, 289.
9
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45 Am
9
46
47
328; FS, 291, translationmodified.
Ibid.
Ibid.
48 Am
9
327; FS, 290, translationmodified.
49Am,9. AM, 327.
AM, 328; FS, 291, translationmodified.
AM, 329; FS, 292, translationmodified.
'2After all, it is Bataille who writes, in Le coupable 'I don't proposejustice. I bring
complicit friendship.'; 'The saint's friendship is a confidence,a faith knowing itself
betrayed. It is the friendship that man has for himself, knowing that he will die,
knowing that he can become intoxicated with dying.' Oeuvres compl&es, tome V
(Paris, GalliMard, 1973),p.278. For a criticism of Blanchot's 'strategy' of discretion,
"Reading
Friend's
Corpses",
95,1017-1022.
Gallop,
MLN,
Jane
vol.
see
53 Am,
54
328-9; FS, 291, translationmodified.
AM, 328-9; FS, 291, translationmodified.
55The doubling of the discreet/discreteis renderedwithout such immediately apparent
differencesin the French languagewhere the adjective 'discret' or 'discr&te' servesto
both
function
discontinuity
the
the
the
of
or
notion
restraint
unobtrusive
and
of
convey
be
As
its
this
Latin
traced
to
a
of
note,
point
ambiguity
can
separation.
root of
or
discr6tus, from discern6re,to separateor to perceive.Etymology aside, it is evident
that discretion enablesBlanchot to re-work friendship into more generalquestionsof
the
possibility of criticism itself
and
judgment
60
56We
in
final
in
double
the
to
this
will return
chapter, which we will relate
movement
this reading of 'UamitiC to Blanchot's practice of the 'work of an accompanying
discourse'; see Section 4.1, below.
61
Chapter 2
Friendship as complicity: Bataille's I'L'Amitie"
(1940)
My complicitftiendship. - this is all that my temperament brings
to other men.
1
Georges Bataille
The previous chapter demonstrated that, for Blanchot, to write in the name of
friendship does not mean simply to account for an empirical event, a meeting or
it
is
On
the
encounter.
contrary,
precisely the effect of this manner of accounting,
or 'rapportant', for one's relation to the friend that is under suspicion in
'T'amitiC.
This is why the editorial addition of the phrase "pour Georges
Bataille" seems to trample over the careful thinking of relation expressedtherein.
Yet it is not possible to divorce the idea of friendship from the fact of an
in
that text from 1962 hinges around
encounter, a shared experience: everything
the thought of an event or an encounter through which a relation between friends
becomes
is,
'that
It
in
the wake of
separates
relation'.
which
after
all,
can emerge:
Bataille's death that Blanchot writes "L'amitie", whether or not he writes itfor
him.
62
Blanchot defines discretion as 'the pure interval which, from myself to this
is
between
is
friend,
there
that
us; which also
other who
a
measures everything
2
fissure
death.
'
If
'discretion
becomes,
the
that
of
means
we
moment,
at a certain
have been able to conclude that this relation or encounter is intimately connected
to the way in which Blanchot thinks about the event of death, especially in the
death
in
forgetting
the
of the other, we still
articulation of memory and
mourning
do not know what manner or what concept of experience is being called for. The
in
deploys
"friendship",
Blanchot
the
term
through the
names and
very way which
it,
is
inherent
in
central to his attempt to think the
complexities and problems
in
its
this
the
this
event or
relation
very process of
emergence and sustenanceof
'happening' or 'relating'. Alongside this attention to the name, and the process of
inherent
it,
to
something like an ontology - it's interruption;
maintaining relation
interruption
has
basis
begun
better,
to
the
emerge
or
an ontology conceived on
of
in his work. Questions of time, memory and identity have all indicated this
direction, which we have found to be linked to a doubling in the word, discretion.
It is the presentation of discretion as the very condition for. the experience of
friendship that allows this it to be seepinto the heart of his work. However, before
be
figure
follow
Blanchot's
through
to
this
we
need
able to answer a
work,
we can
his
does
Bataille.
What
to
this complex and
relation
number of questions about
friendship
have
do
thinking
to
to
about
with the work of
rather elliptical approach
Georges Bataille? Is there any continuity or shared space in common between
them? Why does Blanchot insist upon bringing us back to Bataille, his friend, if
he is so keen to distance his reflections upon friendship from the grasp of the
biography and the complete works? It is because this desire is impossible to
following
back
Blanchot
by
And
this
to Bataille, we are
tracing
path,
achieve.
he
falling
diagnoses.
in
those
danger
to
problems
which
prey
of
always
This chapter accounts for the role and importance of friendship in Bataille's
La
Somme
to
texts
those
which
go
make
up
atheologique,
oeuvre, specifically
focussing in particular upon a short piece called "L'Amitie"
(published
Bataille
1940)
in
April
which
will come to characterise as the
pseudonymously
63
guiding thread of that work. Therefore, while the method of carefully working
through a single text will be similar to that employed in the first chapter insofar as
it attempts to respond to its difficulty and singularity by remaining immanent to it,
it will become clear that the singular qualities of "L'AmitiC
from Blanchot's 'UamitiC
which mark it out
introduce us to some essential, and sometimes quite
subtle, differences between Bataille and Blanchot around the problems raised by
figuring relation, by the operation of sacrifice, by the response to determinate
by
their respective relations to philosophy and
and
consequently
negativity,
tradition. These similarities and differences in thinking are not only recognised by
Blanchot in his letter to Bataille,, and negotiated in his presentation of Bataille in
"L'amitie"
"L'affinnation
and
la
de
la
et passion
pensee negative", they also run
3
throughout La Somme atheologique. Bataille's work as a whole is characterised
by a conceptual tension in which opposing terms pull against each other and their
is
internal
Nowhere
this
tension
conflict more
meanings.
and
own accepted
in
"L'Amitie".
than
apparent
2.1 - An 'impossible' friendship
The relation of "L'Amitie"
to La Somme atheologique is a complex one. Strictly
in
fact,
"L'Amitie"
speaking,
"L'AMITIE"
is not a part of this 'ensemble', although
does appear as the heading for the second part when Bataille first
4
in
it
Somme
1950;
La
'general
title'
the
and
survives,
of
atheologique
gave
Coupable.
Le
La
the
opening
section
of
as
extensively,
altered and supplemented
Somme atheologique as a whole is traversed by a great variety of themes, images
(1939-44),
the
of
composition
years
over
and
and concepts, often changing
during
degrees
Bataille's
modification
of
constant
certainly undergoing varying
his
death.
does
How
the
volumes
up
until
of
reorganisation and republication
Bataille's thinking of friendship emerge from out of these themes and the
What
between
'ensemble'?
in
"L'Amitie"
this
runs
conceptual apparatus at work
Somme
is
La
figure
the
this
texts
atheologique
comprise
the
of
which
and
other
64
communicating
thread itself, 'un fil conducteur', or what Bataille himself refers to
in Le Coupable as 'un fil d'Ariane':
Like Ariadne's thread these notes link me to my fellow beings [mes
semblables] and what is left appearsto me vain. Yet I could not read them
to any of my friends. Hence, I have the impression of writing from inside
the tomb. I would like for them to be published when I will be dead, but it
is possible that I will live for quite a while, and that publication would
happen in my lifetime. I suffer at this idea.5
The paradoxical nature of this 'thread' - which can 'link' the one who writes to
his
'semblables',
by
to
others,
only
removing him from their company - highlights
Bataille's emphatic and ecstatic formulation of communication,, which runs
through his central "concepts" of sovereignty, sacrifice and the sacred, and thus
introduces key themes such as continuity-discontinuity, completion-incompletion,
possibility-impossibility,
find
We
these "themes" and
rapture-closure.
can
"concepts" running through the movement of thought presented in "L'Amitie"
and
then throughout La Somme atheologique. They do not emerge in this short text ex
nihilo; they can be found already at work in Bataille's pre-war writings, elements
in
from
and passages
which sometimes reappear the texts which actually comprise
6
La Somme atheologique. But this antecedenceby no means diminishes the claim
being made here for the publication of "L'Amitie"
in 1940: it marks the
emergenceof a particular use of the word, 'friendship', within Bataille's work.
Thus, the object of this second chapter is to determine the place, function and
friendship
importance
Bataille's
thinking; keeping in mind not
of
within
relative
Blanchot's
difficult
"L'amitie",
but
the
rigour
of
presentation
of
only
also series
Bataille
friendship
in
LEntretien
to
How
infini.
then
and
references
of elliptical
"L'Amitie"?
Bataille's
should we approach
A number of aspects of this text need
to be explained. It forms part of a 'journal' from which Le Coupable is formed
('frorn September 1939 to the summer of 1943'). Therefore, if Bataille, in his
(1961),
d'inserer
the
to
Le
Coupable
'the
second
edition
calls
priere
narrative
65
[recit] of a paradoxical "mystical" experience' (V, 493), it would seem that
"L'Amitie"
itself can be thought of in this way. Yet we might also say that it
journal
less
Bataille
beginning
the
which
marks
continuous
of a more or
begins
This
during
the
the
maintained
with opening
second world war.
years of
phrase of Le Coupable:
The date that I begin to write (5 September 1939) is not a coincidence. I
7
but
in
beginning
because
not order to speak about them.
am
of events,
It finishes in the third part of Sur Nietzsche, "Journal: February-August
,8
1944'
.
The journal spans the period from the beginning of the war to the liberation of
France. The continuity of La Somme atheologique as a work lies in this forin of
writing.
9 It is
he
have
form
form
to
which
seems
maintained
with some assiduity
a
for dates and times are consistently noted in the original manuscripts, even if
"L'AmitiC
is published without
10
dating.
Moreover, there is no strict
between
Yet
Bataille
La
the
three
volumes.
conceives of
chronological continuity
Somme atheologique as a collective whole. This 'ensemble' is planned and
his
thought, albeit one which never
presentation
as
a
systematic
of
redrafted
"
his
form
in
before
death.
How
definitive
the
to
year
comes rest and only attains a
'somme'?
"L'Amitie"
this
should we understand
work as a whole or
is never
simply a part of this whole. Bataille does not sees it as subsumed and taken up
into Le Coupable; rather, there is the sensethat the pseudonymous text from 1940
holds a singular relation with "La Somme atheologique". In the proofs to the first
LExperience
of
edition
"L'Amitie"
following
interieure Bataille planned to include passages from
the reworked versions of "Le labyrinthe"
and "La
has
between
it
from
these
texts
the early
a
mediating
role
clearly
communication";
1930's and his work during the war. Bataille states that 'I introduced what
indirect
description
"states
had
I
as
an
of
all
of
ecstasy"
which
above
preceded
makes visible [rend sensible] the links of what
12
is
in
'
It
inner
"L'Amitie"
is
this
that
before
to
experience.
sense
not written
went
in
"L'Amitie"
Dianus,
reached.
66
but
introduction
Somme
La
to
as an
represents
atheologique,
or as a preface
something like a guiding thread through it's labyrinthine structure.
"L'Amitie"
pseudonym of
(15
April
1940)
in
journal
Mesures
the
under the
was published
13
Dianus, borrowed from J.G. Frazer's The Golden Bough. In light
of what we have learned about the form and construction of "La Somme
his
books
it
be
Bataille
that
sees
each
of
should
emphasised
ath&logique,
as a
larger
in
'ensemble'. And of
turn
composing a part of a
composite entity, each one
Somme
"parts"
La
it
times,
the
that
various
all
comprised, at
ath&logique,
seems
that "L'Amitie"
gave Bataille the greatest trouble and anxiety. Blanchot notes this
fluidity of organisation, and Bataille's unrest, in a note to LEspace litteraire:
Georges
Bataille gives the title of Somme atheologique to a
today
when
invites
his
in
he
to
these
the tranquility of
work,
read
words
part of
us not
their obvious meaning.
14
The 'whole' (La Somme ) is not whole. And "L'Amitie" cannot be a 'part' of it.
...
It represents both an end and a beginning in his work: he explains that the first
in
his
Coupable
Le
the
pages of
were written
midst of
abandonment of a project to
15
found a religion, 'at least under a paradoxical form'. "L'Amitie"
represents the
opening blow of an attempt to 'give an account, at the same time, of the error and
the value of this monstrous intention. ' Yet this account is not simply a refutation,
nor a rejection of any thought of projects or systems; rather it is presented quite
of a project' -a far more paradoxical
'from
instant
begins
is
the
to
emerge
when everything
situation which
at stake'.
differently as the very 'impossibility
The ambiguous quality that this situation attributes to "L'Amitie"
is evident in the
fact that Bataille immediately evokes its 'religious character', or rather, 'in a
in
All
is
it
this
state
all
of
affairs
what made much
paradoxical sense, sacred'.
more 'difficult'
for him 'to publish as the other books'. However, far ftom
it
is
from
being
'sacred'
the
this
text
this
that ensures
others,
quality
of
separating
the centrality of "L'Amitie"
to the structure of La Somme atheologique. The
67
former seemsto have focussed and condensedthe singular qualities which Bataille
would attribute to his work. It exemplifies what is unique to that work:
I insist [ ] on the fact that La Somme atheologique differs completely
...
from other books, and that it entirely differs from them in the same way as
"L'Amitie"
16
does.
These comments are not, however, the final, authorial judgment on the relation
between "L'Arnitie"
Somme
is
initial
La
they
and
give us an
ath6ologique: what
orientation within the various, yet unified works contained within two volumes of
his Oeuvres compMtes. This is Bataille's idea of a sacred or sovereign project. In
the reading of "L'Amitie"
draw
in
he
follows
the
which
out
way
we will
which
interarticulation
in
'the
terms
the
the
sacred, or
sovereign operation',
of
presents
for
The
this relation is
term
which allows
of sacrifice and communication.
his
friendship
thinking.
the
the
at
core
of
places
question
of
which
complicity,
2 11 -Sacrifice
In his quite remarkable book on Bataille Denis Hollier links the the appearanceof
17
"L'Amitie" to a rare 'suicidal tone' in Bataille's life and work. He supports this
left
for
is
'All
is
to
that
me
note:
statement with a contemporaneous unpublished
"8
die. Hollier then
is
feeling
'certainly
that
this
to
out
not unrelated
point
goes on
to the chosen pseudonym, so tracing the name of Dianus (linked to Janus) to the
links between Frazer's theory of primitive kingship and Bataille's concern with
is
"king
'limited
the
to
The
the
as
of
woods"
waiting
criminal
of
rule
sovereignty.
for death'. This phrase is reminiscent of the first lines to "L'Amitie":
Love gnaws away at my core and no other way out remains for me than a
19
in
is
in
I
I
the
What
death.
a
response
obscurity
which
am.
await
rapid
discussing
is
'Dianus',
let
the
Bataille,
is
that
It
or
act
of
suicide
alone
not clear
in
idea
for
it.
tone
the
Is
there
suicidal
necessarily
a
of
waiting
contemplating
68
death? If we are to read "L'Amitie"
'wrote
them and
the
as
notes of a man who
then died% then we are reading the journal of one who knows he will be
sacrificed: '
One day, I will stop becoming tragic and I will die: it is this day alone,
because I have placed myself in its harsh light in advance, which gives its
20
have
hope.
I
I
to
meaning what am.
no other
The question of whether it is 'Dianus' who 'expects' or 'awaits' sacrifice, or
it
is
'Bataille' who wishes to commit suicide, is not the main concern
whether
here. Rather, what matters is the relation to death and to dying that permeates
"L"Amitie",
indeed
SurNietzsche,
for example,
Bataille's
In
and
work.
all of
Bataille depicts the act of suicide in contradistinction to that of sacrifice. He
death,
if
is
by
desire
'summit'
it
is
driven
that
to
the
suicide
a
reach
of
argues
inevitably characterised by a 'will to act' which, by definition, misses the severity
of sacrifice.
[Suicide is] presented to me as an enterprise demanding - certainly with a
disarming pretension - that I place the concern for future time before that
21
of the present moment .
Even suicide represents a 'project' whose results and effects are planned,
is
it
be
intentional
It
before
a
resolutely
undertaken.
can
calculated and envisaged
been
(in
future)
has
lost
(in
the
This
the
what
economy of recuperating
act.
Somme
La
Bataille's
is
throughout
target
the
venom
of
constant
present)
Bataille
"sacrifice"
is
It
the
temporal
of
what
specificity
calls
part of
atheologique.
form
from
death
be
differentiated
it
to
that
any
of
capable yielding
needs
"L'Amitie"
begin
As
to
read
we
satisfaction.
in relation to La Somme
in
is
to
the
which
way(s)
sacrifice constituted
atheologique we will pay attention
and constitutive
for Bataille;
although the processes of constitution and
forces
drives
de-composition
linked
be
the
to
and
of
and
composition will always
69
destruction, not least because the forni of sacrifice would contest precisely that
'self' or 'soi' which is required for any act of 'sui-cide' to be possible.
Let us turn now to read Bataille's "L'Amitie"
for ourselves, taking care to
follow the unfolding of his 'argument' in order not to ignore what Blanchot refers
to as Bataille's invitation 'not to read these words in the tranquility of their
follows:
The
obvious meaning'.
opening paragraph runs as
I have hoped for the heavens to tear apart [la dechirure du ciel] (the
intelligible
known
foreign
the
moment when
order of
- and yet
- objects
gives way to a presencewhich is no more intelligible than it is heartfelt). I
hoped for it but the heavens did not open. There is something insoluble in
this waiting of a beast of prey huddled up and gnawed by hunger. The
absurdity: "Is it God that you wish to tear apart?" As if I really was some
beast of prey, but I am sicker still. For I laugh at my own hunger. I don't
instead.
be
I
Love
to
eat
anything:
should
eaten
gnaws away at my
want
death.
for
What I await
than
a rapid
me
core and no other way out remains
is a response in the obscurity in which I am. Perhaps, instead of being
forgotten
like
No
I
scrap!
response to this
might
a
remain
crushed,
if..
but
Whereas
do
I
void.
not
everything
remains
agitation:
exhausting
22
have God to supplicate.
This 'waiting of a beast of prey' does not simply mark the reduction of man to a
heightening
is
it
through
the
the
attaim-nent
of
animality
of
state of animality, nor
by
for
it
be
In
any narrative such as the revelation
accounted
man.
short, cannot
inescapable
burden
absurdity of existence, or potential
of an
and consequent
image.
is
It
failure
the
Rather,
this
an
comic
of the
conveys
passage
suicide.
but
help
beast
the
"sickness"
exceed
condition
a
of
starving
cannot
suicide, whose
for
his
the
because
mortal
need
sustinence or
own situation of prey precisely
for
him.
laughter
The
fact
becomes
the
mere
of
of man's
source
satisfaction despair,
bring
him
have
to
longer
to
is
and
suicide
will
enough
no
absurdity
his
for
Bataille:
far
that
been
too
not
only
sickness
exceeds
of a
ahead
still
always
70
real beast of prey, it does so through the very fact of his insufficiency. He does not
claim any ontological superiority over the animal, but the prospect of his own
destruction transforms him precisely insofar as he fails to reach this death. In this
"failure"
something like a lack of sufficiency or satisfaction -a state of
incompletion is revealed to man as essential to his being human. The authenticity
of man lies in his insufficiency or dissatisfaction.
The development of this idea of dissatisfaction during the first section of
VAmitie'
is clearly forms a response to the philosophy of Hegel. Bataille's use
of Va d&hirure'
Hyppolite.
here draws upon the standard French translation by Jean
It refers to this famous passage from the "Preface" to the
Phenomenology of Spirit:
Uesprit conquiert sa verite seulement a condition de se retrouver soidans
dechirement.
Fabsolu
meme
Spirit wins its truth only on condition of finding itself again in utter
dismembennent [Zerissenheit]
23
.
This idea of undergoing a necessary 'd6chirement', a 'tearing apart' or
'dismemberment' which Hegel called 'Zerissenheit', is the central to the process
becoming
(the
in
Spirit
is
in
of
experience of consciousness) which
engaged the
Phenomenology, and as such it functions as the figure for the operation of
determinate negation. At this point it is enough to note that Bataille, following
Alexandre Kojeve (whose lectures had had such an impact upon him during the
1930's), takes the 'dechirement' of death as his base level: a 'searing vision [une
dechirante]
the
of
unintelligible'.
vision
24 The
way in which Bataille reads and
form
his
to
this
the
comes
word
crux
of
challenge to Hegel. If the
elaborates upon
development
is
of
consciousness
experiential
so essentially linked, as
unfolding
Spirit, to the determining operation of a terminus ad quem, then the manner of
face
in
death
the
the
the
of
very
question
comportment
of
experience of
one's
-
71
death and its possibility
be
Bataille
this
claim
without
any
states
central.
must
-
ambiguity:
The sole element which introduces existence into the universe is death;
when a man representsit to himself, he ceasesto belong to rooms, to close
25
relations: he is part of the free play of worlds.
Death opens up the field of existence, and as such it exposes 'man' to the
26
possibilities of freedom. However, Bataille immediately indicates two possible
relations to death. Both possibilities address death as something unavoidable yet
4unintelligible';
and consequently, both yield a view or 'vision' of that which is
first,
death
is
In
the
table.
presented alongside or rather
supposedly unrepresen
through the 'reassuring perspective of theology', which seeks to reconcile the
living "viewer" with his disturbing vision by promising the seduction of another
'life' (salvation) In the second, there is a vision that brings him into contact with
the absenceof any 'response' whatsoever. There is no reconciliation with the fact
his
is
directly
linked
death:
'vision'
his
to
this
man's perception of
own
of
'abandonment' in a world without salvation.
What is the importance of this distinction between a theological world which
deliver
from
for
hope
to
that
the
one
any
seems only
salvation and a world
offers
be
Bataille
It
that
still retains certain
might
claimed
possibility of repose?
in
discourse
the articulation of this suspension of
theological
elements of a
beyond
love;
"vision"
itself
the
the
a
which sets
consuming effect of
solution:
intelligibility;
grasp of comprehension and
the transfortnative operation of death.
However, the rejection of all supplication, and therefore all possibility of salvation
('Whereas if.. but I do not have God to supplicate.') does not resultfrom the any
his
hope.
It
it,
it.
lack
to
produces
even
exascerbates
of
response
absenceor
For if, in the last instance, there exists some immutable satisfaction, why
have I rejected it? But I know that satisfaction does not satisfy and that
his
draws
knowing
higher
consciousness
upon
of
not
glory
anything
man's
72
than glory and dissatisfaction. [ ] Joy and love, a relaxed freedom is
...
bound within me to the hatred of satisfaction.27
Thus, the one who sees only the former thinks he or she will be satisfied (in the
future); the one who only perceives the latter knows that it never can be. Yet if the
first 'vision' is obviously a depiction of the satisfactions of theology, where does
Bataille's irrepressible dissatisaction lead him if not toward melancholia? This
hostility toward theology marks the origin of Bataille's description of what he
in
"L'Amitie",
calls,
'un anthropomorphisme dechirC, an anthropomorphism
28
has
been
'shredded'
which
or 'torn apart'. What are the conditions and
consequencesof this 'dechirement' at the heart of 'Man'?
But it is always a matter of an incomplete discovery [une d6couverte
inachevee]. When he dies, a man leaves behind him survivors condemned
to ruin what he believed, to profane that which he venerated. I teach that
the universe is such but, sure enough, those who follow me will perceive
29
my error.
Bataille will characterise this difference in terms of a profane, theological world
is
he
distance
In
to
this
and a sacred, atheological one.
way,
already setting out
himself from any charges of negative theology or atheistic nostalgia. This
distantiation can be seen in the impulse of an expectant desire for 'la dechirure du
feed
its
impulse
'dissatisfaction'.
that
to
own
ciel': an
seems carve out and
upon
But will not this fact of dissatisfaction inevitably uncover another, deeper, desire
to be satisfied, to be saved? The answer to this question takes us to the heart of
Bataille's thinking here. He continues:
Dissatisfaction is encountered in all forms. Hitler was dissatisfied on the
day that he entered into war. Such is the vulgar forrn that war represents:
demands
imagine
that
satisfaction
conquests and glory, we do not
we
imagine that satisfaction is impossible. Only beyond, we perceive that
30
in
impossible
to satisfy.
recognising
oneseýf
consists
greatness
73
The demand for satisfaction,, the demand made by every military conqueror, can
only originate in a condition of dissatisfaction. This would be the familiar pattern
of action and desire conceived as 'la volont& d'agir',
'the will
to act':
dissatisfaction would designate a lack of satisfaction which serves as the motor for
the movement of desire. Desire would be the drive to satisfaction through
effective action, conquest and possession. But where and when are we 'beyond'
this desire for satisfaction which warfare characterises?Would we thereby exist
"beyond desire" itself, outside of any sphere of activity? Let us reconstruct
Bataille's logic: to know that satisfaction 'does not satisfy"; to be 'beyond' the
circle of initial dissatisfaction and resultant satisfaction is the mediated result of a
being recognising it's own satisfaction to be impossible. A being is brought face
to face with the incompletion of its own being; and yet, at the same time, this
experience is nothing other than the recognition that it is the very impossibility of
is
satisfaction which
constitutive of this being. This difference is an ontological
he
describes
differentiated
himself
It
from the
the
through
very process
one.
which
beast of prey: by withdrawing himself from the process so as to undermine its
cohesion and to destroy it by indicating its impossibility; whilst, at the same time,
identifying with the internal 'fault' or insufficiency of its condition, thus affirming
it in its very impossibility. The condition of dis-satisfaction is not sought out in
desire
is
for
it
be
Bataille's
to
rectified or satisfied;
order
only to affirm it, to
'result'
it
of
a
or recuperation.
exascerbate without any possibility
As this argument continues, incompletion emerges from this determinate
impossibility into one that radically un-determines, or tears apart, the satisfaction
Why?
Bataille
if
death
death
truth.
that
condition
sees
ultimately
would
of a
which
in
imposition
finitude,
through
the
truth
of a mortal closure
ultimately conditions
inescapable
because
it
is
fact
death
this
being
this
only
of
as subject,
will
upon
have always been what pre-determines 'man' in terms of a historical process.
31
his
'Man' becomes nothing more than that very process of
own self-completion.
6f
'man', Bataille does not simply oppose a raw
In taking on this constitution
indeterminacy
or
immediacy
('Nature')
to this
complex
'operation'
of
74
determinations and conditioning ('Man): as far as he is concerned, no-one yet has
pushed far enough into the constitution of this process or operation.
[A]ccording to its own rule, this truth can only become true on one
condition, that I die and not only myself [moi], everything that man feels
inescapably incomplete within him. Now it is clear that if that from which
I suffer is evaded and if the uncompleted nature of things [Finacheve des
choses] ceases to ruin human self-importance, it is life itself that will
become estranged from man; and, with life, its inevitable and distant truth
(the sole truth which is tied to it and expresses it): that incompletion,
death, desire, unquenchable, are the never closed wound that belongs to the
being, without which it would not differ from a void deprived of light. 32
What is the nature of this 'research"? It is opposed, at first, to science. Science,
defined
its
is
by
force
Bataille,
the
the
necessity
of
of this
claims
completion; and
necessity for completion is what marks 'the greatness of Hegel'.
specifically,
Bataille
has in
mind
the importance of
'science'
More
in
the
Phenomenology, to which Hegel originally gave the subtitle, "Wissenschaft der
Erfahrung des Bewuptsoins", "Science of the Experience of Consciousness".
Bataille has taken on board the exemplarity of the completion of knowledge in
4science' as it is laid out by speculative philosophy. Bataille is drawing upon the
in
knowing
the Phenomenology, wherein Hegel sets out to
assumption of absolute
'help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science', to the point or 'goal' where
33
be
knowing
knowing'.
it can 'renounce its name love of
Philosophy
and
actual
it
in
for
fulfill
its
become
'Wissenschaftlich'
to
order
or
actualise
potential:
must
laying-out
less
the
than
of the necessary path of philosophy's selfnothing
for
is
longer
It
enough
no
philosophy to remain
actualisation as a whole.
[Teibe
Wissen'].
For
knowing'
the
'love
zum
movement and
of
philo-sophia,
diversity
'Experience'
knowledge
the
through
manifold
of
accumulation of
['Ehrfdhrung'] to be articulated as an interconnected whole, it needs to be thought
in terms of a system. Hegalian 'Wissenschaft' is the systematic movement which
75
can account for the complete sequenceof experienceswhich consciousnesshas to
undergo in this process of becoming 'actual knowing' ['wirkliches Wissen'].
If there is no solidity to Bataille's position
fact
he
that
wholeheartedly
-a
affirms - he even denies that any position is possible for him at all: 'it is not a
position but a movement maintaining each operation of the mind [Fesprit]
34
in
possible the interior of particular limits'. It is this opposition of stasis (being'
qua 'position') and movement ('becoming' qua 'process' or 'operation') which
forms the fundamental axis of Bataille's differentiation from Hegel and the
'philosophy of work', or from any position figured through the dialectic of
'foundation' and 'appearance'. It is this axis which proves to be vital to his 'image
stripped of existence'. Yet there are a number of problems with Bataille's reading
be
here.
has
Hegel,
First
Bataille
sketched
of
which should
out
of all,
leads
logic
him to counterpose the
the
this
misunderstood
of
completion, which
destructive dynamics of movement to the conservative stasis which he finds in
Hegel? This mistake is particularly clear in the context of his cursory depiction of
the Phenomenology, which presents nothing other than the perpetual movement of
the process of the becoming of spirit, the continual movement of the 'experience
is
in
It
this context that we should understand the word
of consciousness'.
'science' for Hegel. But what if Bataille is not saying that Hegel failed to live up
to this project? Perhaps, on the contrary, in arguing that Hegel's philosophy is
is
insisting
its
Bataille
that completion is never
than
completion,
nothing other
(as
it)
least
he
'failure'
'beginning'
that
this
the
of
and
portrays
at
quite enough,
(equal)
(or
to
that
to
necessity, perhaps
exceeds
another
something
pertains
first.
In
does
Bataille
the
this
the
of
way,
circularity
not seek to oppose
precedes)
himself to Hegel, but seems to be intent on carrying Hegel's thought further into
those domains that come to be designated as incomplete or impossible: 'laughter',
'tears', 4ecstasy', 'eroticism' and 'poetry'.
How does a being, dedicated to the path of research, end up as the waste by'unexpected
this
Bataille
does
the
residue'
of
very
process?
or
not explain
product
76
why exactly, he claims that he is only trying to describe or relate the situation as it
appears to him - 'And as the fixed question was that of being and substance,what
appears to me with the greatest vivacity, [ ] what appears to me is that, where
...
knowledge [la connaissancel sought being, it has encountered the incomplete. ' 35
Above all) Bataille's manner or mode of presentation is that of witness. Yet if
"L'Amitie"
is presented as a report or account, 'un recit', of an experience, of a
path of research, it is not an unproblematic idea of witness. This mode of writing
is at once intimate and quite personal; yet it always slips away from any
identifiable person or subject it seems to matters little whether it is 'Dianus' or
'Bataille' who writes. Indeed, the experiences which are thereby communicated
are precisely presented in such a way as to make the process of identification
in
fixed
terms
subject who would possessindivisible duration. It is
of a
untenable
this impersonal sense of writing which qualifies the 'vivacity' of experience, as
the following parenthetical observation reveals:
[this] vivacity (which, at the very moment that I write, opens "the depth of
longer
feel
difference
between
before
me and makes me no
any
worlds"
36
knowledge
"loss
of consciousness").
and ecstatic
conscious
As his tone suggestsBataille can only celebrate and revel in this 'loss', a gap rent
destruction,
dechirure
du
his
desire
for
'la
But
by
ciel'.
now, which means
open
here 'at the very moment' of writing, the "'loss of consciousness"' ceasesto be
different from 'la connnaissance' itself- the path of research continues because
there is always more to say, more to report back. What Bataille finds here is
demonstrate
in
Hegel
to
the selfsought
explicate and
almost exactly what
projection of the concept:
There is identity between the object and the subject (the object which is
known, the subject that knows) when an incomplete and incompletable
37
be
itself
incompleted,
that
its object can
admits
incompletable.
science
77
If this is, as Bataille says himself, an explicitly 'Hegelian position' - adding that
this 'proximity' hardly bothers him - how can such an identity become the crux of
the difference that he puts between Hegel's and his own figure of the 'truth' of
38
this relation? How can he square the relation of completion and incompletion
other than dialectically? The extremity to which Bataille has pushed this position
of identity - where the relation of identity, and hence difference, is to be
understood as 'incompletable' - is therefore an act of affirming knowledge and
consciousness only in so far as it can flip back over into 'ignorance', not as a
be
but
to
to be 'identified with the extreme state of conscious
overcome,
condition
knowledge', an ...ignorance of the future" (the Unwissenheit um die Zukunft that
39
Nietzsche loved)'. Yet is this inversion
enough, as Bataille seems to claim, to
dispel the 'malaise' that has plagued man in the guise of the theological
imperative of divine perfection (the idea that man, the being who defines himself
forever
is
'Pinacheve',
'Facheve')?
What
to
the
strives reach
perfection of god,
as
in
formulation
'ignorance'
'non-knowing'
this
of
or
at stake
['Unwissenheit';
'non-savoir'] with regard to the future? Bataille goes on to add, in Le Coupable:
Theology maintains the principle of a complete world, for all time, in
is
in
in
[
]
kill
God
It
to
to
the
order
perceive
place
necessary
world
every
...
40
infirmity
incompletion.
the
of its
Implicit in this argument, and this recourse to Nietzsche, is the idea that the
logical result of Hegel's thinking demands that man - in the possession of
its
himself
the
science of
own process of completion - must
achieve
philosophy as
the perfection of god, and so become 'everything'. But man's ...ignorance of the
future"',
"un-knowledge"
it,
his
is
of
revealed to Bataille as the
or rather
impossibility of this completion. This realisation takes place in the face of 'the
incompletion of worlds', a state of affairs which '<<le fond des mondes W reveals
to Bataille at the very moment of writing. Once again, the event or experience
imagination
is
before
Bataille's
is
that
which
man
only an
which captivates
78
'incident', without foundation, and as such he can be 'no more than an adequate
representation (and thus equally inadequate)' of this state of affairs.
Science, like history, is incomplete: I will die without response to essential
human
forever
ignorant
that
perspectives
will change
problems,
of results
(which would change mine as they will change those of survivors)
41
.
The depth of this denigration of man is final, absolute and unavoidable. It
force
for
Hegel
idea
the
that
the
same
of necessity
constructs
of
possesses
is
Without
the
the
theological
there
model
of
completion,
or
principle,
completion.
humanity
in
left
to
the
terms of necessity, or even
orient
within
world
anything
but
is
it
forrn
imperative
The
there
the
now within
of
may remain,
an
obligation?
disorienting
demand:
even more exhorbitant and
In this way it imposes itself upon thought that it would be necessary to
complete this world,
impossible,
but
here
lies
the
at any price,
the
incompleted: every reality [reel] breaks down, is fractured, the illusion of
an immobile
dissipe],
is
dispersed
[se
dormant
the
water seeped
stream
hear
[ecoulee],
I
the noise of the nearby waterfall
away
42
.
At this point the incessant, unfounded, but irrefutable movement of Bataille's
'truth' can only stand on its own (groundless) particularity - it makes its own way.
In this way, Bataille's path shadows that of Hegel's auto-presentation of the
function
dechirure
'la
du
it
the
of
ciel'.
concept, and as such yields a clue about
Bataille provokes the question: if his thinking of this immanent self-movement of
'truth' is governed by the ripping apart of every satisfaction, doesn't it draw its
from
its
its
the
therefore
of
seýflsatisfaction
own
very possibility
power, and
he
When
dissatisfaction?
destruction
that
this
writes
and
project of relentless
how
to
'is
torn
the
are
we
apart',
understand
act
anthropomorphism
an
conception
43
destruction
Bataille's
?
Is
thinking
to
tearing
of
merely
reducible
or
of rending
the determinate negation of a thing, a negation which would cancel yet maintain
the content of its action?
79
2.12 - Communication
In order to respond to this challenge, it is encumbent upon the reader to ask about
this movement of thought from within its relation to impossibility, to folow up on
the terms of Bataille's own formulations, and therefore also their peculiar
anomalies. As opposed to the servility of the incomplete to the completed (of man
to god), any reduction or assimilation of 'the incompletion of worlds' - that is,
inadequate
'incident'
is
the
to such task of
of man
equally adequate or
where
its
but
limits:
it
'can
own unavoidable,
representation - encounters
uninhabitable
longer
hold
itself
[ne
them
to
peut pas non plus s'y
no
44
tenir]'. This
situation or
is
it
logical
the
continuum of his research encounter at once productive - marks
intolerable
it
hope
halt
definitive
to
as shatters every
of coming
a
or a
and yet
it
is
in
Once
Bataille
that
the extreme:
again,
a
situation
affirms
completion.
An
Unwissenheit,
beloved
an ecstatic,
ignorance
thus becomes the
hope
longer
At
that
a
vain
no
obeys.
accomplished expression of a wisdom
its
"puttingits
development,
to
thought
aspires
own
point
of
an extreme
to-death" [<<mise a mort >>]:it is precipitated as if by a leap into the sphere
far
irresistable
just
instant
the
as
as
as an emotion swells
of sacrifice and,
it
bears
it
its
to
the
that
point
up
where
a
wind
wears
plenitude
of sobbing,
definitive
the
the
contradiction of minds, raging,
point where
out whistles,
holds sway.
45
No obedience is tolerated at this 'extreme point'. Only the precipitate leap into
'way-out,
it
does
but
Bataille
to
the
that
present
even
seem
not
sacrifice is offered,
had once seen in the prospect of a 'sudden death'. As this thought ascends upon
drunkenness,
it is still only
'intellectual
the coalesence of
plenitude' and ecstatic
it
is
but
W,
into
'<<
its
repeatedly
pushed
a
mort
a place of
mise
own
awaiting
'definitive
For
is
the
thought,
contradiction'
a
persistent, corrosive contradiction.
80
perpetual, violent mobility: this 'extreme point of its development' is not simply
attained, but is only accessiblethrough repetition.
I can only, I suppose,broach [toucher a] the extreme in repetition, in that I
46
am never sure of having reached it, in that I never will be sure.
It becomes clearer that Bataille's aim, if he has one, is to exhaust the possibilities
of a solution, to expend the resources of satisfaction and completion. This is the
force he attributes to repetition: it compels contradiction to 'rage' - the exacting
'point' of the extreme is nothing without its repeatability. And as repetition it
unavoidably works against its own completion.
Communication, then, is not a 'social bond, in the sensethat Jean-Luc Nancy
47
has referred to as 'the economic bond of recognition.
It touches upon a quasidistinction
in
Bataille's thinking. Communication is
already present
ontological
bond,
in
the
the exposure to an extreme
as
rending
apart
of
every
such
conceived
limit. This limit is the fundamental, unsurpassable limit of human finitude.
Bataille defines friendship in terms of such an 'abandonment' or 'solitude':
For a man, a dryness of the desert, a suspendedstate (of everything around
him) are favourable conditions for a violent detachment. Nudity shows
itself to the one enclosed by a hostile solitude. It is the hardest, the most
friendship
trial:
requires that a man be
a state of profound
relieving
by
friends,
free
friendship
is
detached
his
from
all
abandoned
close,
intimate bonds. Far beyond the shortcomings of close friends or readers, I
friends,
find
dead
in
that
can
and,
readers
a
man
advance, I am
now seek
faithful to them, innumerable, mute: stars of the heavens! my laughter, my
death
will rejoin you.
madness reveal you and my
48
If what Bataille seeks to destroy and move beyond is the homogeneous sequence
human
the
the
to
the
the
project
of
man's
ambition
accession
of
philosophical
of
Kojeve
finds
in
he
but
Hegel
that
of
god
which
cannot
reallse
perfect completion
in
comic
position
the unavoidably
which he has placed "man" is the desire to be
81
"bigger than god", or "more perfect than completion". The first section of
"L'Amitie"
therefore bears witness to the development of a comic principle of
repetition. But what is it that takes place along this scaled relationship between
disjunction and conjunction upon which Bataille's analyses seem to rely? As a
path or method of research,however errant, it still seemsto presents itself with an
aim or goal to be reached, and yet this end to which it directs itself is nothing
49
other than 'chance'.
Throughout, in every accessiblereality and in each being, it is necessaryto
find the sacrificial place, the wound. Each being is touched only at the
it
point where succumbs, a woman beneath her dress, a god at the throat of
the sacrificial animal
50
.
What does Bataille understand by this 'wound'? And should we not be suspicious
of the uneasy coyness with which the oblique reference to a woman's vagina is
by
the slit throat of an animal? Bataille states quite
metonymically reinforced
is
in
being,
be
'wound'
to
that
such a
uncovered each and every
condition
clearly
One
is
'it
this
take
to
every
accessible
reality'.
might
mean:
or situation -'in
possible to find the point of accessibility in everything that can be thought'. Yet
this is not merely a possibility for Bataille, but a demand - 'il faut' - that
has
its
fault-line
Every
takes
or
place.
event
accompanies everything which occurs
body
being
thing,
every
every
or system, every act or
means
or
or wound - which
be
because
The
sought after
one must locate the
wound must
experience.
'sacrificial place' in order to 'touch upon' this reality. That is to say: "in order for
be
it
is
(the
'point')
thought
through,
to
to
the
necessary
seek
place
something
being
What
in
thing
this
thought
that
or
gives
way
or
succumbs".
seeks,
where
its
limits;
is
is
this
with
a collision
and yet
own
not to say simply that
everything,
find
its
in
it
only
ever
would
own
whatever
reflection
came across.
such a search
On the contrary, if the throat of the sacrificed animal is the 'point at which [a god]
having
been
'touched'
that
this
the
mean
god
succumbs', would
- will give way
in
A
this
the
of
sense
perishing,
as
a
result
of
mediated
contact.
woman
or yield,
82
can be touched without any such offering - rather it is this woman who seems to
touch as the offering without being touched. But offered to whom?
There is no causal connection between these two events: touching upon a thing
being;
is
it
by
'the
It
the
their
or
and
rupture represented
point where succumbs'.
relation that attracts Bataille. The sense of 'touch' in thought does not grasp or
seize the entity through some privileged access to this 'point', but rather finds
itself in some way subjected to it.
A naked woman suddenly opens a field of delights (whilst
decently
clothed, she was no more troubling than the wall or a piece of furniture): in
this way the indefinite expanse tears itself apart and, tom, it is open to the
ravished mind which loses itself [se perdre] in it in the same way as the
body [is lost] in the nudity which gives
51
itself to it.
It is worth paying attention to the tortuous formulation of this sentence.Certainly,
the naked woman is by no means the object of this sundering, but neither does she
if
be
to
the
seem
constituted as
subject of an experience, the state of 'the ravished
is
be
be
formulation
The
to
that
the
a subject at all.
problem not
said
mind' could
deliberately
is
but
these
two
ambiguous
or
obscure,
rather that the
passages
of
focus of Bataille's attention is at the heart of this obscurity: how much can thought
its
it
limits?
be
be
its
to
subjected and what cannot
what can
accomodate within
in
its
the
mind
unexplored complicity with the erotic
object? what confronts
formulation
body?
To
Bataille's
'extreme
to
the
the
earlier
of
of
return
charge
it's
development',
thought would now think through touching, touching
point of
he
its
describes
desire
for 'its
toward
this
the
aspiration
point,
very
which
as
upon
Once
impossible
64putting-to-death"'.
the
again,
obstacle
of
an
condition
own
his
dis-orient
'the
the
impossibility
to
analysis
as
confrontation
of
savage
of
seems
its
limits.
unavoidable,
yet
unavowable
with
our mind'
The nakedness of the woman is more that which reveals, than what is revealed
-'the
becomes
in
her
her
the
visible
again
and
sight
of
unleashes my
animality
83
own incompletion within me [sa vue delivre en moi mon propre
52
inachevement]'.
This occurrence disturbs and dissolves the field of experience by opening the
more delightful and unbound field of eroticism, 'un champ
53
de delices'. As
an
experience it is nothing other than the opening up of the field of communication.
However, if it takes place as an act of communication, it is only because the
security of communicating between separate and distinct entities has been
dissolved: it is this erotic "contact"
intimacy
the
or continuity,
sense of sacred
-
that is to say, complicity - which gives rise to the fear of such dissolution in the
first place.
To the extent that existences appear perfect, completed, they remain
separated, enclosed upon themselves. They only open themselves through
the wound of the incompletion
being
But
them.
within
numerous and
of
beings
separated
communicate with one another through that which it is
incompletion,
to
possible
call
communication
54
themselves.
it
is in the
animal nudity, wound, and
of the one to the other that they take life by losing
What would it be to exceed these limits? This is the problem that is researched
and refigured throughout Bataille's work:
Even thinking (reflection) is only achieved in us within excess. What does
the truth signify, outside of the representation of excess, if we don't see
that whichexceeds
the possibility of seeing, that which it is intolerable to
is
intolerable
in
it
Douir]?
don't
If
to
take
pleasure
ecstasy,
we
see, as,
think that which exceeds the possibility of thinking
...
55
?
However, it must be pointed out that if these two passagesmerely expressed the
in
be
then
the
there
communication,
act
of
would
nothing
sense of anxiety
draws
it
is,
familiarity
As
Bataille
images
the
these
them.
to
to
upon
of
remarkable
introduce the extremity of his meditation upon incompletion into the experience of
following
individual
in
He
the
way:
argues
existences can appear
communication.
84
to be complete or whole in themselves, and yet it is always possible to discern
their desire or need for others (to share, communicate, possess, dominate or
serve); but to the extent that this is so, these individuals actually 'remain
separated' or self-sealed - communication cannot take place because while there
may be familiarity (as with polite manners) there can be no intimacy -; and
therefore the intimate nature of communication is in no way divorced from those
aspects of behaviour or conduct that are deemed to be excessive or too much - the
perfection of being can only be ruptured by the wound 'in every being' (the
impossibility of completion). This act of destruction (the sacrifice, the crime)
draws the individual being into communication with another being, which gives
rise to the ambiguity of communication itself, to 'take life by losing themselves'.
One being does not wound another, Bataille does not use the verb, 'to wound' (an
deed which would require a doer), but the wound in the one and in the other is
it
is
is
between
them, and opens them up to one another.
what shared
ontological:
'They only open themselves through the wound of the incompletion of being
but
is
being's
1'etre'],
it
in
['de
takes
the
theni':
only as
place each
wound
within
individual being. Has Bataille thus sketched out the beginnings of an ontology?
Would it not have to be a thought of such a difference that is not readily reducible
to a distinction that would be derived from an ontology (in its widest sense of
itself
in
it
'form'
the
the
and
which presents
essenceof what manifests
separating
itself)?
2.2 - The sense of complicity
Bataille's pseudonymous essay of 1940 presented 'en abyme' the central concerns
him
his
death:
Somme
La
to
that
up
until
right
the
occupy
was
work
of
death,
desire,
The
thematic
and conceptual elements of
chance,
atheologique.
it
Terotisme',
the
transgression,
through
sacrifice
and
sacred
run
communication,
"La
Somme
In
these
themes
body
into
ath6ologique",
that
work.
and
of
and
through
to
think
the
attempt
an
possibilities of
within
concepts are related
85
its
limits.
individual
What
forces
to
itself
the
experience, one which
always
into
deeper
he
is
Bataille's
throughout
this
remains constant
what
research
work
intitially
defined, borrowing
from
Blanchot in
"College
socratique", as
4experience interieure negative': an experience that can only 'affirm of itself that it
is authority (but every authority expiates itselff. 56 By calling into question the
value of every experience -a
'without
limit'
necessarily
contestation
the
-,
individual is pushed outside of "itself', outside of any subsistance of "self' or
"ego". With no limits, and without salvation, project or possibility, there is
in
in
far
it
'limitless
this
is
this
experience,
so
and only
as
authority only
contestation'.
Everything would be held, including authority itself, in the movement of a
limitless putting-into-question. There would only be authority in this
57
movement, in this putting-into-question.
Consequently, the question should be raised about the specificity of the word
friendship - as a relation between more than one such individual - with regard to
this experience defined as 'the incessant putting into question of existence by
58
itseý(' What is the relation between the discontinuous force of discretion which
figures ftiendship in Blanchot's work and Bataille's idea of friendship as
beyond
function
the
Do
they
purely grammatical
common
share
some
complicity?
friendship?
forms
'discreet'
'complicit'
If
is,
that
or
of
we
now
as
adjectival
in
how
discretion
to
to
one
relation
another,
are we
and complicity
attempt clarify
to conceive this relation?
59
However, it is quite evident from those texts forming La Somme atheologique
fundamental
in
terms
them
Bataille
of a
that
opposition that
already situates
60
'Fextreme:
du
'experience
towards
his
possible'.
sensible'
pursuit of
condenses
first
"Le
from
is
the
taken
following
The
section of
supplice", in
sequence
L'Experience int&ieure:
86
The voices of good apostles: they have an answer for everything, they
indicate, discreetly, [discretement] the path to follow, like the master of
ceremonies at a burial.
Feeling of complicity in: despair, madness, love, supplication. Inhuman,
frenzied joy of communication, because of despair, madness, love, not a
love
is
despair,
point of empty space which
madness,
and more:
not
laughter, vertigo, nausea,loss of self as far as death [perte de soi jusqu'a la
Mort].
"
What could give this possibility
of common measure, or further still an
discretion
is
deployed
latter
by
Bataille
to
the
and complicity when
authenticity,
hostile
dismissal
former
(as
form
the
of
of ceremonial mastery)? How
a
as such a
is
between
formulation
there
this
the
continuity
passage
and
of the
much
'complicit friendship' in "L'Amitie"?
At first sight, the gulf between a controlled,
frenzied,
desperate
discourse
('voices)
'feeling'
a
of answers and
of
measured
joyful communication seems to be constructed around a simple opposition of the
restricted and the general, which guides the pairings of the reasonable and the
further
Yet
there
possibilities and problems
madness.
are
excessive, or reason and
ignore
in
its
Bataillean
'economics'
turn?
to
this
might
or conceal
approach
which
Is there anything which might disturb the construction of this sequence of
oppositions?
There may be such a disturbance already embeddedwithin Bataille's approach
to the question of 'communication'. This passagedoes not express the apparent
indicating
in
the
way
complexity
a
opposition
some
such
without
of
simplicity
disjunction.
This
between
through
flows
them
them
thus
that
and
constitutes
if
illustrated
disjunction
is
further
we pay close attention
complex and productive
'final
Blanchot's
Bataille
troubling
the
presence
of
what
silence', and
to
calls
distant
feeling
friendship,
'a
to
Bataille
then
on
of
goes
characterise
as
of
which
distant complicity. ' This formulation would seem to express a dispersal and
bears
both
differential
that
terms
the
the
away
opposition:
of
an
rigidity
mixture of
87
distantiation that emerged in the reading of Blanchot's "L'amitie" is not without
relation to this action of complicity at a distance. The possibility of a scale of
complicity at the level of each and every 'point of empty space' - an all-expansive
dispersal in the name of a 'loss of self as far as death' will have to draw upon the
impossibility of any discrete measure, ratio or relation. Would this then measure
effectively the 'loss' of a discrete self or'being via the same conceptual movement
within which a 'feeling of complicity' is given its discreet distribution? Such a
discrete
heart
(geometrical)
the
conflict of
and complicit relations sits at
of any
distributive network of relations, that is to say, as the question of how the
friendship
is
to be figured.
relationality of
Here friendship, as it is informed by a thinking of complicity, might at least
in
logic
in
to
that
takes
a
presentation
generate
of
an analogous way
which
place
62
Blanchot's doubling of discretion. That is to say, an attempt to name that which
in
figuring
only
and
relation:
of relation as that which, stretching
as
a
exists
between those terms which are thereby put into relation, is yet not completely
its
has
in
In
terms
terms
of
or relata.
short, what
emerged with
accountable
Blanchot is an attempt to think a relation which remains external to its relata; a
its
leads
is
This
to two connected
terms.
that
strictly outside
own
relation
if
both
'complicity'
'discretion'
First
that
we grant
problems.
of all,
and
are
is,
how
is
far
'thing'
the
that
the
same
exact
same
attempts at naming
relation -,
it possible to maintain two conflicting versions at the same time? Furthermore, we
then have to ask whether both "acts" of naming name what they name in the same
it
is
itself
insofar
that
takes place within a conflicting
possible
as
each
act
manner,
thinking of the relation between the name and what is named? Do they perhaps
different
irreconcilable
To
'relation?
two
this
and
quite
ways
of
naming
us
give
discretion
be
or
complicity
either
can
said to accelerate the conceptual
what extent
imbricated
those
that
such
as
of
naming
processes
or
of
relation
are
slippage
into
friendship,
this
body
through
the
word
as
soaks
main
of a writer's
within
work?
88
The discordance between discretion and complicity can be seen to slide most
violently in Bataille's work, in particular his work which begin to appear with the
onset of the second world war and eventually go to make up La Somme
Ath6ologique. In Le Coupable, LExp6rience int&ieure and Sur Nietzsche they are
present in a more expansive conflict between claims for the primacy of
discontinuous or continuous figures of relation. This slippage is at the heart of his
quasi-ontological formulation of
63
being
in
..
relation... ['<<etre en rapport W].
Once again, the principal method for inquiring into this state of affairs will be
derived immanently by following the manner in which this naming takes place in
a single work - Bataille's "L'AmitiC
help
then
to
the
which
will
us
see
manner
-
which friendship runs through the La Somme atheologique as a whole. To show
how Bataille presents or names friendship is therefore invaluable for deepening
the condition of conflict inherent in Blanchot's own figuring of relations; and, as a
result, it can illuminate the nature of the debt to Bataille within the complexities
inherent to his later formulation of discretion.
How then is 'complicity'
to be read or understood in this context? Is it
inherent
in
by
Blanchot's
'discretion'? If
tone
to
that
a similar secretive
conveyed
begin
by
is
in
is
that
speculating
whoever
complicit
an
act
or
event
so, we might
thereby held by an "experience" which would exclude (or prohibit) any revelation,
it
includes
the
time
same
expression or communication at
as
or absorbs the one
it
it
in
To
a
put
another way, complicity would express an
crime.
who undergoes
both
is
the
which
necessitates
experience
reservation
of
communal
what
inaccessible
in
its
to
others,,
whilst
or
conspiring
with
others
unavailable
belong
is
through
to
this
to
this
the
and
possess
possession
principle
possession:
formation
Complicity
the
which
underlies
a
community.
of
experience
of a shared
formulated
be
the
as
communication, or putting-in-common,
would
of an
is
it
binds
to
those
that
whom
addressed: not only the common
experience
but
the
perhaps
also
shared assumption of what
experience,
an
of
assumption
is
Yet
to
whom
such a communication addressed?
constitutes experience per se.
Who are these friends? How will "friends" or accomplices be identified, and thus
89
differentiated
from those others to whom such confidences must remain
inaccessible? Are these 'others' necessarily 'enemies' to these 'friends'?
Friendship, for Bataille, is not open to us as a value, but exposes us to this sense
of communication as complicity: it is an experience which 'awakens' us to the
impossibility of ever closing off or limiting such exposure. Yet there is nothing
despairing in this impossibility of community:
The awakening to the impossible is not misfortune (no more than it is good
fortune). Beyond the rage of unleashing [dechamement] there is the calm
of the dawning where, at the conclusion of the tearing to pieces [des
dechirements] which it willed, thefriendship of manfor himseýfbegins.64
Therefore, it
would
mean not only
grasping an experience and fully
it,
but
be
held
itself,
by
to
this
to allow
comprehending
also
grasped and
event
by
be
determined
it:
de
'etre
to
oneself
complice
quelque chose' means to be party
to something; or one might say, to take or be part in what takes place: to be
complicit is to be a part (of something). Complicity is then an ambiguous
it
is
in
that
takes
through
an event
occurrence:
only ever
place
acting
collusion
under an law. To be 'in complicity' is always to be the accomplice, being in
is
in
to
relation
another who
some way the same, another accomplice, someone
is
in
There
limit
with
another,
and
so
no
numerical
who always acts collusion
on.
to those who are complicit. Hence complicity is a potentially infinite selfreplicating series of relations. Yet at the same time what this multiplication of
is
demands
that each part remain
above
all
parts within a relation of complicity
is
in
But
this
the nature of the act or event
what
relation.
silent, secret and alone
in
'in'
first
'with'
does
How
the
this
to
or
of
parts
place?
required
generate
Bataille's 'complicity' generate or figure itself as relation?
It is at this point that we must break off our reading of "L'Amitie",
in order to
formulate precisely what is at stake in this sense of complicity through its
Bataille
himself
Hegelian
to
recognition.
ambiguous relation
signals this
in
his
thinking
of sovereignty:
ambiguity
90
But: there is no extreme either without recognition - on the part of other
men (if it is not the extreme pointfor
principle
significant
of Anerkennen).
minority
Hegelian
I
to
the
referring
others: am
The possibility
(Nietzsche) is itself already in the night. Towards
65
is directed
which in the end every extreme point
In the following
of being recognised by a
chapter, therefore, we will
.
explore the way in which the
complicity of friendship, together with the concepts of death and the work, can be
traced back to Bataille's response to Kojeve's Hegel. Furthermore, insofar as we
have arrived at the work of Bataille through Blanchot, our present enquiry will be
key
lead
back
the
to
two
to the
questions,
which
will
us
with
answers
concerned
in
do
friendship
First,
how
Blanchot.
the concepts of death and the work
place of
in
['Anerkennung']
'Recognition'
Kojeve's
the
privileging of
reading of
structure
the Phenomenology? Second, in what way does Bataille's thinking of friendship
draw upon and against Koj eve's reading of Hegel?
91
Notes to Chapter 2
I Bataille, "L'Amitie"
(1940), VI, 303. When Blanchot cites this line as one of the two
epigraphs to LAmitij, he uses this 1940 text, rather than the changed 1944 version
which appearsin Le Coupable ('I bring complicit friendship. ' V, 278).
2 AM, 328-9.
3 See letter #262
cited in Chapter 1, Section 1.1.
4 Bataille's
letter
Ta
Somme
Raymond
Queneau
to
original
concerning
atUologique'
(dated 29 March 1950) outlined three volumes - 1. 'LE MOMENT SOUVERAIN'; 11.
'L'AMITIt';
111.'LA MORT' -, the contents of which would have outstripped the final
form of this series (VI, 360).
Therefore, it is worth taking time to note the reciprocal investment in this word
'friendship' within Bataille's work. For what is at stake is the enigma of this particular
reciprocity between Blanchot and Bataille 'in the name of friendship. If Bataille
least
half a year before his 'rencontre'
1940
"L'AmitiC
in
April
covertly publishes
at
latter
Blanchot,
the
and
only writes under this title after the death of his friend, it
with
be
said that these are only events that suspend a shared thinking. In one
could equally
(written
during
for
his
'aphorisms'
'Fifties)
the
the 'La Somme
many plans or
of
his
friend
beneath
Bataille
inscribes
that of 'FRIENDSHIP':
the
name of
ath&1ogique',
Somme atheologique:
1. LE MOMENT [L'Existence; La Solitude] SOUVERAIN
L'atheologie
L'Experience inteneure
Methode de meditation
Etudes [sur les moments souverains]
11.L'AMITIE
Le Coupable (appendicesen partie supprimes)
Histoire d'une soci&tesecrete
Maurice Blanchot
111.LA MORT [et la morale] DE NIETZSCHE
Comment Nietzsche est-11mort?
Sur Nietzsche
92
La Saintete du mal
Memorandum
See VI, 360-74,361. Only eight years later Bataille wonders whether to 'Join
L'Alleluiah to Coupable at t he same time as Les r6cits de Maurice Blanchot
a
title given to a planned collection of reviews (such as that cited above) published in
Critique - once again in the name of redeploying the general title of 'La Somme
atheologique'. Yet this is much more than a title given as a 'general heading' for his
work: it seemsthat at one time or another during the 1950's Bataille seemsto have seen
nearly all of his work cascading from this playful, yet privative relation to the JudeoChristian tradition; and alongside his other (unfinished) project of 'an-economics' - the
three volumes of 'La Part mauditeand the accompanying Theorie de la religion. Thus,
he
while
attempts to rewrite the preface to Le Coupable as the introduction to another
plan for the publication of these varied works, Bataille notes the task of an impossible
4project' in such plans: the '[dlevelopment of the work which has withdrawn from
work [Foeuvre qui est retrait de Foeuvre]' that seemsto name both the assembledtexts
of 'Somme ath6ologique' and those of 'La Part maudite'. (ibid., 363) Evidently, the
doubling of the 'work' as it withdraws from 'itself is inherent to this movement of a
"retrait ": Bataille seesthat the 'work' of La Somme ath6ologique or La Part maudite
development
(the
by
'becoming-work')
the
process of
repeating and
can only undergo
distancing 'Itself from its own completion, just as his numerous plans (for a 'project'
that will refuse such a name) continuously go over (or retrace) the same ground, the
same texts, the same names (Nietzsche, Hegel, Blanchot) without allowing their
relations with each other to become fixed. Throughout this time, when these conflicts
between 'work' and 'project' are regularly published in successivere-editions and new
volumes, friendship maintains a certain centrality that belles its eventual disappearance
in the above plan. Only the year before, Bataille
as a principal branch ('L'AMITIE')
had written that 'the first part of Coupable (sic.) ['L'Amitie' adapted from its 1940
(1943)]
has
less
[than
LExp6rience
int&ieure
the most
remained no
publication]
be
The
it
'(ibid.,
368)
to
extent which will
possible to speak of
p.
significant in my eyes.
developed
friendship
is
'work'
the
that
to
through
in
name of
say
an engagement
a
levels
friendship
'retreat'
this
the
multiple
might
at
involve
approaching
of
with
'work' from itself as the possibility of a 'rencontre': the point at which the 'work' must
keep going back over itself continually in order to develop against itself - the senseof a
both
But
that
traces
takes
there.
and
a
return
withdrawal
what
place
what is to
retrait as
be encountered in this continual, auto-conflictual movement? and to what extent could
this encounter be located in relation to the very different work of Blanchot?
5 V, 251-2.
6 For
labyrinthe'
(1935-6)
'Le
appears, after extensive alterations, in
example,
L'Exp&ience int6rieure under the section heading of 'Le labyrinthe (ou la composition
des &res)' (V, 97-109; see also Bataille's note, V, 421).
7
V, 245.
8 See VI, 65-182.
9 By way of supplementing Blanchot's complication of the relation between the life
and
VamitiC,
we should note that when he writes about having 'a
the work of a writer in
93
be'
Kafka,
journal
the
the
presentiment of what
in reading
of
creative experience could
he indicates other examples: Rilke, Ringer, and 'perhaps LExp6rience int6rieure and
Le Coupable, by Georges Bataille. ' As if to extend the ambiguity of this 'perhaps', he
adds: 'One of the secret laws of these works is that the more the movement is
deepened,the more it tends to approach the impersonality of abstraction. [ ] [I]t is the
...
abstract work which is closest to impassioned experience about which it only speaks
impersonally and indirectly. ' (LV, 258-9).
10See the
copious notes assembledby the editors of volumes V and VI of the Oeuvres
compl&es.
11See VI, 365
for
'revision
VII,
601.
Pierre
Pr6vost
Bataille,
that,
and
records
could
finished';
be
never
seeRencontre GeorgesBataille, op.cit., 103.
12V, 455. Also
see, on 'Dianus', VI, 369,373-4.
13The first
edition of Le Coupable (1944) was prefaced by the following words:
One named Dianus wrote these notes and died. He referred to himself (ironically? )
under the name of the guilty [le coupable]. The collection published under this title is
a complete book. A letter and the fragments of a work begun go to make up an
appendix. (V, 239.)
14
15
16
Blanchot, EL, 371.
VI, 373.
VI, 374.
17Denis Hollier, Against Architecture, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1989, p. 63.
18V, 523.
19
20
21
22
VI, 292.
Ibid.
VI, 58.
VI, 292.
23PhG, 36; PhS, §32. Note that Kojeve's translation (ILH, 540-1) differs significantly
from that of Hyppolite (PhE 1,29), and that the version given by Bataille in "Hegel, la
different
forms
(XII,
331).
In
le
there
short
arefive
of
sacrifice" varies again
mort et
this passage in Bataille's text, as indicated by Jacques Derrida, "De 1'6conomie
hegelianisme
la
Un
Ltcriture
1'&conomie
sans
reserve",
in
gen6rale.
et
restreinte a
diffirence, Paris: Editions de seuil, 1967,374, n. l. Hegel's rhetoicisation of death in
detail
be
discussed
in
in Chapter 3
translations,
this passage,and its various
will
greater
below.
4,
Chapter
and
24V19292. Bataille recalls that he attended these courses from 1933-39. He writes: 'At
this very time, through innumerable lectures, I was well up on the movement of the
burst,
left
killed
(VI,
'
416)
Kojeve's
ten
times
But
me
crushed,
over.
course
sciences.
25
V19305.
26 At points like this the parallel between Bataille and Heidegger seems glaringly
both
figure
this
the
The
similarity
awkward
mediating
of
extent
of
-given
obvious.
Koj&ve's Heideggerean reading of Hegel, and the relative superficiality of Bataille's
94
first
far
however,
than
appears
at
and
it
complex
more
is,
into
these possibilities
A
I
would merit a separatestudy of
excursion
own. prelim'inary
is sketched out by Rebecca Comay, 'Gifts Without Presents: Economies of
"Experience" in Bataille and Heidegger', in A. StoekI (ed.), Yale French Studies - On
Bataille, n.78,1990.
knowledge of Heidegger
27
28
29
VI, 292.
VI, 295.
Ibid.
30VI, 292-3,
emphasis added.
31 See further the discussion
and interpretation of Bataille's 'Hegel, Fhomine et
Phistoire' and 'Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice' (both 1955) in chapter three.
32Vlý 294,
emphasis added. The end of the same passagein Le Coupable supplements
the senseconveyed by this 'void':
without which inertia - absorbing death in death
[1a mort absorbant dans la mort], and no longer changing anything - would enclose it. '
(V, 260) Note that the verb absorber also carries the senseof 'to exhaust' and 'to take
over': we will see that the concept of 'inertia' plays an ambiguous role is Bataille's
own adoption of Hegelian/Koj&vean negation, as it bears strong links to the sacred
sphere of 'intimacy' or 'immanence
33
34
35
36
37
39
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
PhG, 14; PhS, §4.
VI, 294.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
VI, 295.
VI, 294.
V, 262.
Ibid.
Ibid.
VI, 295.
Ibid.
Ibid.
46 This
be
found
Roger
Laporte's
Bataille
Suite
the
from
to
epigraph
as
can
citation
(Paris: POL/Hachette, 1979), which also bears a dedication to Maurice Blanchot.
47
INC, 29.
48Bataille, "Solitude" (1941), the second part of "Les malheurs du temps present", in
Le Coupable, V, 299.
49
See VI, 161.
50
VI, 295.
95
51
52
Ibid.
Ibid.
53It
should be noted that, in the context of the passage,this phrase draws together the
sense of "an exquisite taste" [dilice] with the movement of an experience that both
"releases" or "unties" fdMer] and risks "delirium", "frenzy" and "madness" [dMre].
This matrix recurs throughout Bataille's writings, particularly in works like Madame
Edwarda:
The delirium of being nude possessedher: again this time, she spread her legs apart
and opened herself up [s'ouvrir: also "to cut oneself open"]; the acrid nudity of our
two bodies plunged us into the same exhaustion of the heart.
Madame Edwarda - Le mort - Histoire de Voeil, Paris: Editions 10/18,1979,39. This
be
found
discussions
Bataille's
terms
throughout
that touch upon
string of
can also
cerotisme': first of all in Ta Somme atheologique'; and then in his theories of energy
and apathy as (general) economic principles in La Part maudite and LErotisme.
54
VI, 296.
55Ibid., 16-17. See
(VI,
1)
20the
to
this
also
note
passage
56VII 286.
57
VI, 289.
58 Ibid.
59 See VIII, 633. Bataille
makes it clear exactly who lies on what side of this divide
between the continuum of complicity and the discontinuity of discretion:
Of the relation of Nietzsche to Hegel (Hegel more destructive, but discreet): one must
maintain from it the movement opposing morality and the accomplishment of man,
but it is necessary to go all the way to the end of the movement (Sade inasmuch as he
in
Kafka)
the equivocal.
of
remaining
instead
is already
We will ask about the possible meaning of Hegel's discretion, and its implications for
Blanchot after Bataille, in Chapter 4.
60
61
V, 45; 48.
V, 49.
62See Dionys Mascolo, "Parler de Blanchot", in his A la recherche d'un communisme
tditions
fourbis, 1993,409.
Paris:
depens6e,
63 V,
64
65
99.
VII, 457.
VI, 123.
96
Chapter 3
Complicity contra recognition: Bataille's 'Hegel'
Yet we already possessthis concrete concept offreedom
in theform offeeling, for example infriendship and love.
1
G.W. F. Hegel
The content of this chapter breaks with the opening investigations in which we
drew out the figures of discretion and complicity from the works of Blanchot and
Bataille respectively. In this present chapter we will draw out the relation between
Bataille's
thinking
of
complicity
and Hegel's
concept of
'recognition'
['Anerkennung'], in order to grasp the scope and context of Bataille's 'complicit
friendship'. We will continue to focus upon two concepts: death and the work, 'la
Toeuvre'.
first
In
half of this thesis, it was shown that in the work
the
mort' and
of both writers these two concepts were essential to the articulation of an
friendship,
it
orienting
of
with relation to questions concerning the
experience
forgetting,
death,
finitude
the
memory
and
of
of communication, and the
event
As
it
the
a result, was through their respective differences over the
work.
nature of
death
friendship
to
the
divergent
that
figures
the
and
work
of
we
arrived
at
relation
'complicit
discretion
and
of
friendship'. However, while we have mapped
discretion and complicity through the theme of the death of the friend and the
97
determined
between
the
have
'the
'friendship',
relation
exact
yet
not
we
work' and
senseand weight of 'la mort' and Toeuvre'. It is for this reason that we must now
turn to the philosophy of Hegel.
Bataille's reading of Hegel is wholly determined by the work of Kojeve. In the
first half of this chapter, we will show how KOJevc, in his lectures and other
philosophical texts both before and after the war, presents Hegel as the thinker of
in
Then,
the second half, when we return to Bataille's thinking of
recognition.
friendship as complicity, we will be able to see more clearly how this figure of
impossibility and dissatisfaction arises from Bataille's exploitation of gaps and
fissures produced by Kojeve's privileging of recognition. The structure of this
does
friendship
thinking
argument
not rest upon a contrary
of
on the part of
Kqj eve, for he does not make friendship an explicit object of discussion. However,
friendship is assigned a place in his account of an earlier stage in the development
light
'Love'-,
Hegel's
thinking
this
and
placement shedsconsiderable
of
upon its
friendship
is
in
brief,
Bataille's
In
presented and thematised
role
work as a whole.
in the progression of spirit, together with the concepts of love and the family, as
the social relation of feeling, as a particular 'aufgehoben' moment of the concept.
Friendship appears only within the context of (familial) love, or at most as the
it
is
incorporated
the
restricted community of an elite, and so
and
manifestation of
human
historical
development.
in
the
social,
and political
course of
surpassed
By beginning with Kojeve in this way, it becomes possible to observe how
Bataille's opposition to Hegel - the distancing of his thinking of sovereignty from
the slavery
of
intersubjectivity
the master-slave dialectic,
without
and the attempt to
rethink
subjects, outside of recognition, as a relation of
hinges
in
KqJ
concepts
which
upon
are
radically
overdetermined
eve's
complicity 'Recognition,
'Love,
death,
'
fact
The
the
the
that
of
concepts
and
work.
reading:
Kojeve's reading of Hegel is problematic, therefore, does not immediately
invalidate it, nor those interpretations (such as Bataille's) which follow from it.
Instead of condemning Bataille's reading of Hegel on the basis of his undeniable
98
reliance upon Kojeve, we will use the latter to lay open the basis and context of
Bataille's claims about death,,work, complicity and friendship. This will allow the
relation of Bataille's thinking of friendship to Kojeve's account of Hegelian selfconsciousness to appear through the conceptual limits that the former inherits
from the latter. Most important, these limits will include both those which Bataille
has identified and exploited, and those which may have passed unnoticed into his
own work. As Bataille himself recognised, one can neither pass over nor pass
beneath Hegel's work; one cannot oppose it without confronting it, and coming up
2
in
its
linked
against the way
which
concepts and categories are
and stratified. We
will see that this realisation comes to Bataille only because of the particular path
traced out by Kojeve's reading of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology, and
the schematic importance of the relation of recognition which he finds there. So
by granting Kojeve's 'Hegel' its due, whilst taking care to mark out the limits and
interpretation,
in
be
this
we will
a position to trace Bataille's
problems of
treatment of the negativity in the work, which lies at the heart of his own theories
'sovereign
be
In
the
the
operation'.
particular, we will
sacred, and
of expenditure,
his
friendship
between
thinking
to
trace
the
of
and the presentation of
relation
able
Koj evean 'Recognition'.
3.1 - Kojeve and 'the final analysis'
In this section, we will
examine critically
Kojeve's
presentation of the
development of 'Recognition' [Anerkennung], and the place of this concept in his
The
first
Hegelian
philosophy
as
a
whole.
concept
of
recognition
reading of
Jena
in
Hegel's
philosophy,
appears
3 but it
its
formulation
most
reaches
complete
in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology - initially, but not definitively, in the relation
For
Kojeve,
however,
figure
is
this
the
the
slave.
master-slave
and
master
of
Both
the
concept
of
recognition.
relation and concept are
with
synonymous
interchangeable. Indeed, this levelling-off of conceptual and structural differences
is characteristic of Kojeve's reading as a whole - he does not hesitate to identify
99
'self-consciousness'
4animality'.
reading
idea
life'
'natural
'Man';
the
the
with
of
with
concept of
and
Nowhere is this tendency more apparent, nor more crucial for his
in
general,
Unselbstdndigkeit
than
in
his
account
of
"A.
Selbstdndigkcit
des SelbstbewuBtseins: Herrschaft und Knechtschaft",
part of the fourth chapter ("IV.
forms the second division
und
the first
Wahrheit der GewiBheit seiner selbst"), which
("B. SELBSTBEWUSSTSEfN")of the Phenomenology.
(We shall abbreviate it according to the designated sections as B-IV-A. ) Kojeve
will
refer to this section, without
Master-Slave dialectic';
apparent discrimination,
sometimes as 'the
at other times as 'the dialectic of Recognition';
and even
4
'dialectic
Self-consciousness'.
What is at stake in this levelling?
as the
of
In accordancewith the general structure of the Phenomenology, the relation of
figures
in
the experience of consciousness. The
master and slave
a moment
moment when, through the fear of death and work, the slave gains 'his own mind',
his own 'sense of himself or 'direction' ['eigene Sinn']. This moment brings the
it
itself:
belongs
in
for
be
'that
to
to
the fact that it
realisation
consciousness
and
5 This
is properly consciousness only when it is seý(Iconsciousness.
generative
relation in turn comprises the moments of mortal risk, the life and death struggle,
fear in the face of the 'absolute master' (death), labour ['die Arbeit'] and the
formation of the work ['das Werk']. However, it is far from clear that this relation
is recognition. Hegel explicitly states, at the beginning of B-IV-A,
that this
'movement' by which self-consciousnesscomes to be what it is as such is called
6recognition'.
Self-consciousness is in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it is in
itself
for
[Mr
Anderes];
is,
for
it
is
that
ein
an
other
only
as
and
recognised
6
[als Anerkanntes].
In this way, self-consciousness is truly what it is only insofar as it has been
by
As
is
this
self-consciousness(es).
other
such,
such
as
relation
recognised
individual
is
born
in
it's
through
and
every
relation to
necessarily reciprocal:
by
way of a primary senseof community or
others; consciousness of self arrives
100
shared existence. Hence, 'recognition'
is the name for the 'process' or
,movement' by which this mutual development of seýflconsciousnessand intersubjectivity takes place as such.
The detailed exposition [Auseinanderlegung] of the concept of this
its
in
duplication [Verdopplung] will present us with the
spiritual unity
7
process [Bewegung] of recognition.
This 'exposition' is a laying open of the relation(s) of doubling which are inherent
to this 'spiritual unity' in its concept; these relations between the 'one' and the
'other' unfold the 'movement' of recognition; yet all this is done for 'our' benefit
['stellt
dar],
it
is
the
to
this
text.
readers
us
uns...
philosophical
of
only
presented
This problem arises from the fundamental, structural distinction of what happens
'for consciousness' [ffir es'] in the course of it's manifold experiences, and what
takes place 'for us' [fzWruns'], or 'in itself [ffir sich'], ftom the vantage-point of
in
'Moment'
the context of
the
this
place of
particular experience or
apprehending
the pure formal movement of a becoming. 'Ours' is an understanding denied to
the consciousness undergoing this experience: the understanding of how what
happens takes place, which goes on 'for us, as it were, behind the back of
8
(§§178-85),
Hegel
'
What
then, takes
recognition
about
writes
consciousness.
doubling
is
figured
(self-)consciousness
back'
if
'behind
the
the
whose
of
place as
in the master-slave relation (§§186-96). This phenomenological distinction
between what appears and the appearing as such is decisive for the movement of
the Phenomenology. What is the status of this distinction for Koj eve?
At the end of the Introduction,
Koj eve provides a third appendix, "Structure de
la Phenomenologie de FEsprit", in which he gives his sole account of this dual
9 On Kojeve's reading too, these 'dialectical articulations'
structure.
are of central
distinction
'fUr
'ffir
is
this
Phenomenology;
the
to
of
es'
yet
and
uns'
importance
formalised in such a way that it will have distorted this reading of the right from
the beginning.
For Kojeve
this text is phenomenological
because it
is a
'description of human existence':
101
Man being called in the Phenomenology - "Consciousness" (Bewusstsein),
Hegel indicates that it is a matter of a phenomenological description, in
saying that it describes the attitude in question such as it exists "for
0
1
consciousnessitself' (ffir das Bewusstsein selbst).
This text is so called because it sets out to describe this existence such as it
appears 'to the very one who lives it'. For 'phenomenological', read 'empirical'.
Kojeve points out, however, that it is also that case that 'Hegel himself writes the
Phenomenology after having thought'. To have thought before writing this
'description' is, therefore, to have 'known the totality of human existence'; to
possess ...absolute knowing"', the wisdom to see the fragmentary and partial
11
nature of any 'given, partial or historically conditioned attitude'. For Kojeve,
then, those moments 'for us' ['a nous'] are written 'from the point of view of
"absolute knowing", which is the point of view of Hegel himself, [ ] this "us"
...
12
being Hegel himself and the reader who comprehendshim'. The Phenomenology
it's
both
less
than
title proclaims it to be: it is split between the
more and
what
is
'a
point of view' of
philosophical or scientific analysis', which comprehends the
truth of that which only appears to be true in 'phenomenological description'.
What was a phenomenological distinction, immanent to the fluid movement of
into
has
becomes
intransigent
bifurcation
calcified
an
consciousness' experience,
be
'coincidence'
true
to
the
phenomenology
science,
reunited
and
as
of empirical
in
final
"Das
description
Wissen"
(C-(DD)the
chapter,
absolute
and
analysis
of
Vill).
The 'dialectic of Recognition' therefore exposes the entire logical schema of
Hegelian
knowing.
absolute
Indeed, the orbit with
which
this concept
is
divide
Kojeve's
that
to
work
so
expansive
philosophical
we
need
circumscribes
love
From
further
First:
An
two
to
stages.
recognition.
analysis
our analysis into
'Recognition'
the
presentation of
of
philosophy:
as the 'key notion' of Hegel's entire
first, an account of the initial
importance of 'Love'
as the
death;
figure
to
the
the
transformation
and
second,
relation
of
of
anthropogenetic
102
death into the teleological function of the work in the master-slave dialectic.
Second: From the end of History. A demonstration of the way in which this
relation of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity
forms the possibility
of
community: the political and historical centrality of recognition allows Kojeve to
read Hegel as the philosopher of the 'end of History', and to think the present as
the time when all work has been completed and 'Man' is a 'satisfied Citizen'.
Kojeve bases the development of Hegel's Phenomenology upon this transition
from the dialectic of 'Love' to that of 'Recognition', so it is by no means an
exaggeration to state that the whole of his reading of Hegel is founded in this
movement from the former (as a relation of the possibility of death) to the latter
(as the 'labour of the negative'). Kojeve's narrative of this transition will inscribe
in
its
from
family
from
to
of
a series
oppositions
progressive movement
state,
private to public relations, from the erotic to the political, from particular to
individuality.
universal
This sequence is historical, then, only in a schematic
fashion: it sets out to show how the entire movement of the Phenomenology rests
in
in
'Recognition,
to
the
turn requires
accession self-consciousness
which
upon
that 'Love' remains at the level of the mere self-feeling, excluded from the final,
totalising perspective of the 'End of History'.
Kojeve"s not immodest claim for this schematisation of recognition is that the
human
Phenomenology
the
the
to
reveals
us
of
entirety
movement of
existence
follows
in
fact
from
Kojeve's
history.
This
necessarily
grasp of the 'fitir
and
idea
distinction:
Hegel
Phenomenology
'after
the
the
that
writes
es'/'ftir uns'
having thought' to its conclusion every particular, 'historically
conditioned'
himself
if
Hegel
this
outside or 'after' history as such.
act placed
perspective; as
Hence, the present in which Hegel writes this book is nothing other than the end,
finally presented in and for itself in the final chapter: Hegel himself is revealed to
be 'the self-consciousness of the Wiseman possessing absolute Knowing'. 13
Without doubt, this is a fundamentally ambiguous, not to say problematic, 'end'.
In the final stage of Kojeve's anthropological and historical dialectic there is
done,
be
(that
is,
'History'
to
human
the
totality
everything
more
as
of
nothing
103
have
been
have
been
possibilities) will
accomplished, every possibility will
realised and thus exhausted. It is no accident that Kojeve's most persistent
rhetorical trait is a phrase of conclusion and summation: Kojeve's Hegel is one
who's writing takes place, always already 'having thought' of everything, 'in the
final analysis', 'en demiere analyse'.
Kojeve's reading of the progression of spirit as the development of 'Man'
through 'History' aims to encapsulate in this way both the Phenomenology and
Hegel's work as a whole. For him, the former consists in the presentation of the
human.
birth
'anthropogenesis',
Hegelian
the
the
process of
generation and
of
'Geist' is resolutely human, appearing through the development of Kojeve's
THomme'. In the second appendix to the Introduction, "L'idee de la mort dans la
philosophie de Hegel", we can find Kojeve definition of Hegelian philosophy:
Hegel's
"dialectical"
analysis, a philosophy
atheism).
or anthropological
philosophy
in
final
the
is,
death
(or
what amounts to the same thing: of
of
14
It is clear from this parenthetical qualification that Kojeve focusses upon death
with the goal of expunging any theological or ...divine... content from Hegel's
is
by
God
'Geist'.
In
Phenomenology,
'Man':
the
supplanted
concept of
Hegelian Spirit is therefore really not a "divine" Spirit (for there are no
is
in
it
human
it
is
is
Discourse
this
that
sense
gods):
a
which
mortal
immanent to the natural World and which has for a "support" a natural
being, limited in its existence by spaceand
15
time.
For Koj eve, everything here revolves around the question of 'Man': his lectures
have the express aim of (re-)organising every element and every 'Moment' of
Hegel's text under the heading of anthropogenesis. In this way, the 'Spirit' that is
'human' cannot be transcendent (at least not in the sensethat Kojeve understands
the absolute transcendence of the divine) for it is rooted in the relation to death
is
'limited'
to
that,
this
say
given
which
spatio-temporal existence,
and mortality;
104
the human exists as a being in the world. Whence there arises Kojeve's reliance
upon the central, yet ultimately paradoxical distinction between human and
animal: the formation of the historical and political existence of 'Man'
is
presented in opposition to all other natural or animal life, yet at every moment this
its
is
in
latter
founded
to
the
ontologically constitutive
process
as
relation
be
back
Kojeve's
Hegel
...
Every
traced
to
aspect
of
can
substratum, or support"'.
this formulation of the animal-human dualism, and in the analysis which follows,
function
dualism.
this
the
the
and
effects of
we will examine
'Man' is defined as an individual, and is understoodas a discursive,dialectical
be
'inanimate
For
Koj
thing'
eve,every animal,plant, or
can regardedas
existence.
interchangeable
['<<
W],
fully
"example...
'simple
with any other
exemplaire
a
it
being,
belongs.
A
human
...
to
the
natural" species' which
on the
member of
16
its
kind"',
W.
is
...
Rather
hand,
'<<
son
unique
unique
en
genre
always
of
other
than characterisingevery strata of life, this dialectical movement of universality
(differentiating itself into particulars to be reassembledin the singular) is
in
human
individuality
Anthropogenesis
in
the
alone.
consists
growth of
embodied
the dialectical movementby which suchsingularity comesto reveal itself to itself.
For Kojeve, 'Man' thus appearsin and as 'Discourse', a term which he uses to
language,
is
but
in
human
thought
the
and
which
encapsulate entire operation of
fact given no linguistic specificity. In other words, this discursive existenceis
it
is
'universalising
this ability to
the
than
negation';
movementof
nothing other
being
its
(which
'innate'
'natural'
KojeVe
from
the
or
particularity of
equates
pass
identity
'preserving
'animality'),
the
sublimating'
and
whilst
of this
with
... to the appearanceof 'Man' as a 'free andhistorical Individual'. Indeed,
464nature
,
is
because
'Man'
himself
Kojeve
this
possible
movement
only
makes
clear,
qua
as
'Discourse' is spatially and temporally determined by the "'support... of his
'natural' being: his individuality is the result of the 'conserving (universalising)
17
individual,
'
The
(particular).
himself
therefore, only
taken
as given
negation of
is,
demise
its
through
that
the
this
the
to
only
animality;
of
relation
with
appears
death.
own
105
Death is for 'Man' in the sense that death is in him as the (transformative)
'end' of the natural, animal being which is his material existence, his 'body', and
thus can be known by him as such. As the universal motor of all dialectical
becoming, death becomes synonymous with the very processes of discursive
thought: what Hegel calls the 'subject', or 'being-for-itself
[Tarsiclisein'],
is
18
des
Negativen']. In his
nothing other than this 'labour of the negative' ['Arbeit
own way, Kojeve erects his anthropologised 'ontological difference' over Hegel's
pivotal
distinction
death
the
of
of
'natural life'
and the negativity
of
'consciousness',, drawing heavily upon Heidegger's separation of the existential
death
is
from
'Dasein'
towards
that
to
the mere "'perishing...
orientedness
proper
19
['Verenden'] or ...demise... ['Ableben'l of something that lives. He emphasises
the necessary, structural, and existential relation of death and thought: death is no
longer just the demise of a particular being - it is universal, determinate negativity:
the pure possibility of change, action and transformation. In the form of the
death
is
longer
'ffir
delivered
'Man'
from
the
of
sich'
no
an event
negativity
upon
is
from
it
his 'immanent law' of 'auto-suppression', in the sense
outside or
above;
that this movement does not come through the intervention of an other; rather it is
'his death, that is to say something which is proper to him and belongs to him
[lui
be
known of
exclusively
appartient en propre], and which consequently can
20
him, willed or denied by him.
Now the originary 'magic power' of determinate
negativity, death is the property of 'Man': it belongs to him alone and constitutes
what is proper to his being.
3.11 - From Love to Recognition
In the Introduction and "Hegel, Marx et le christianisme", Kojeve portrays Hegel
his
having
through
'discovered'
the
of
recognition
work on another
concept
as
dialectic: 'Recognition' is introduced as a substitute for Tove. ' What Kojeve sees
in Hegel's analysis of love is an initial attempt to account for the development and
21
love
by extension in
birth of 'Man'. Hence, in Hegel's 1797-8 fragment on
and
,
106
all those writings from this period which treat of the systematic relations of
love'
'dialectic
identifies
Koj&ve
the
of
as the process
religion, morality and spirit,
through which 'Man' differentiates himself qua 'Individual'
from all other life,
in
He
his
'given-Being'.
that
this text
the
claims
especially
animality of
own
Hegel had thought 'for a moment' that he had found 'the specifically human
it
in
'
Man's
that
was 'analysing the amorous relation that
content of
existence, and
he described,for thefirst time, the Dialectic of this existence, which distinguishes
22
it from purely natural existence.' It is the identification of 'Love' as a 'first'
description of this existential dialectic which seals the fate of friendship in his
if
is
Phenomenology.
But
there to this
the
what specificity,
any,
explication of
it
love,
for
Koj
At
level
Hegel
this
or
eve?
of
would seem that any
generality,
word
term could serve this same function: if it is a case of analysing a 'specifically
human' feeling or emotion, would not envy, hatred or revenge expose this
differentiation
humanjust
the
as well?
of
essential, structural
So what is it about the concept of love that, according to Kojeve, destines it
23
for this work? First, he reads this fragment on love as Hegel's first 'sketch' for a
love
in
'Man',
the
so
making
pivotal
concept
a
phenomenological analysis of
development of Hegel's thinking. Indeed, the fragment on love first presents the
interarticulation of finitude and the infinite, the thinking of difference in unity,
intersubjectivity
inseparability
the
and self-consciousness; all of
of
aswell as
in
Phenomenology;
be
the
the
to
of
spirit
absolute
progress
central
and
which will
in
B-IV-A:
is
introduced
to
the
accession
self-consciousness
with
which
[T]his absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent
in
freedom
their
opposition,
enjoy
perfect
and
self-consciousnesses which,
independence: I that is We and We that is L24
Hegelian 'spirit' - as that which is both subject (or Tilrsichsein') and substance
(or 'Ansichsein') at the same time - cannot be grasped as such without this
in
between
turn,
selves,
who
are,
of
a
plurality
conscious of
unifying relation
themselves only through their differences from one another. Hyppolite echoes this
107
definition as well as Kojeve's observation when he remarks that this doubling,
which Hegel will locate at the heart of the movement of recognition, can already
be seen in 'the dialectic of love':
Love is this miracle by which what is two becomes one, yet without
in
is
duality.
Love
the
ending up
what overflows
complete suppression of
the categories of objectivity and actualises [realise effectivement] the
25
life
in
essenceof
maintaining difference in union.
Spirit emerges as this dynamic movement of differentiation in unity 'for the first
time' in Hegel's 'sketch' or 'outline' of the 'amorous relation. ' Both Koieve and
Hyppolite present love as the origin for Hegel's concept of spirit, because it is
love
the
that the question of community as 'being-together'
relationality of
with
['Gemeinwesen'] is introduced. It is with the ftagment on love that Hegel's
thinking of dialectic comes to be manifested as an experience of dialogue and
26
interaction between subjects For both interpreters, then, the movement of
.
dialectical experience figured in terms of intersubjectivity is a movement towards
the fusion of differences through the formation of a greater unity. From love as the
in
lovers
two
separate
actualised the conception and birth of the child, to
union of
the confrontational structure of the master-slave relation in the Phenomenology,
the growth of self-consciousnessis manifested as a relation of inter-subjectivity in
from
diversity,
identification
through differentiation.
which union emerges
Second, there is the matter of what love qua feeling does in this text, for
Hegel's presentation of love immediately distances itself from the problem of
feelings.
from
feeling
Love
is
defined
many
other
particular
among
one
selecting
['Gefiihl']
'feeling'
the
as
it
itself
life
touches
upon
of
as
as an organic whole,
through its own infinitely mediated essence. Hence, it is not a question of an
but
itself
living
life
love
feeling,
in
thinking
this case is
of
as
a
whole:
exemplary
into
feelings
life
the
be
of
many
a
spectrum
particular
which
of
part
might
not
divided; rather, it is to be thought as life feeling itself to be alive, as a unified
'in
Hegel
love
finds
itself,
life
Thus,
writes:
as a redoubling [eine
whole.
108
Verdoppelung] of itself, and self-same unity. [ ] In love the separatestill remains,
...
yet not as separate, [but] as unified; and the living touches the living [das
Lebendige fiffilt das Lebendige]. 27 This feeling of life as a living whole is as
irreducible to the causal laws of reason ['Vemunft']
is
it
to the oppositions of
as
the understanding ['Verstand'].
Kojeve is interested in Hegel's concept of love only insofar as its dialectical
dialectical
is
'specifically
the
that
uncovers
structure already
structure of
which
human'. He extracts Hegel's first 'existential dialectic' of the 'Individual'
as a
finite
from
whole
unified, yet radically
a single passageof the 1797-8 fragment:
It being given that Love is a feeling (Geftihl) of the living (Lebendigen),
the Lovers can only distinguish themselves Ifrom one anotherl inasmuch
is
inasmuch
fthat
they
to
as
are mortal,
say
asl they think this possibility
{andj
of separation,
not to the extent that something would be really
be
being
(Sein)
the
possible reunion with a given
separated,where
would
a
is
(Wirkliches).
fraw
in
There
the Lovers
real-entity
no
or givenj matter
jas Loversj, they are a living for spiritual, for at this time Hegel identified
Life and Spiritj
Whole; fthatj the Lovers have an independence-or-
autonomy (Selbstdndigkeit), fal proper-or-autonomous (eigenes) vital28
f
die
[sie
k6nnen
thisl
they
can
principle,
simply means:
sterben].
The 'Lovers' are in this sense 'properly' mortal ['sterblich'].
Their individual
differentiation ['sich... unterscheiden'] consists in the thought of death as their
in
['Trennung'];
death
the
separation
other
words,
very
of
possibility
possible
forms their 'ownmost life-principle'
['eigenes Lebensprinzip'] and relates them
beings.
As
Hegel
in
to
this passage,
the
mortal
other
as
makes
clear
earlier
one
is
death
is
this
the
to
to
think
movement
ability
as a possible event
central
what
for oneself and for the other: 'True union, love proper exists only between living
beings who are alike in power [Macht] and thus in every sense living beings forin
is
dead
for
[gegeneinander
[fareinanderl;
the
respect
no
either
one
other
another
29
Tote]. ' The possibility of separation is not the arrival of death, but the relation of
109
the living to the horizon which it forms. Hence, what takes place in this passage,
for Kojeve, is the fundamental anthropogenetic distinction between the kind of
death faced by human beings as the horizon of possibility,
and the 'end' which
befalls every other form of 'purely natural existence. ' 30He formalises this passage
in the following
in
his
her
being
in
first,
this
way:
or
union exists
particular
each
6exclusive unicity';
universal
thought
yet this difference is only revealed to them through the
of death, hence their only relation
is one between
'two
"separated" beings, essentially autonomous or different, ' each constituted by the
negativity
of their finitude,
and as such each is 'attributed
an absolute (=
by
the other; ultimately then, the whole or 'Totality'
universal) value'
which they
can form together qua mortal beings is precisely their synthesis in a separate
individual
parents.
-a
in
its
child who exists
own right, unique and distinct from its
31
If the fragment on love uncovers the 'existential
dialectic'
of 'Man',
it is
because the union of the lovers in the birth of the child reveals this 'primordial
death
by
role' played
as the dialectical
movement
is
love
'striving
one of
of
translates the verb 'aufheben')
lovers, 'this possibility
mortal
(Sterbliche)
movement of the 'Aufhebung'.
to dialectically
(as
Kojeve
suppress'
this mortal separation or differentiation
[taken] as pure (blosse) possibility,
itself,
to make it immortal
The
of the
and to reunite the
[unsterblich
zu machen].
32
'
Separation is both produced and overcome through the living power of death qua
negativity:
is
it
'thanks to death' that each lover has a separate, and
not only
therefore free and independent, existence; but it is again 'on account of mortality'
that love can be realised through its act, the 'dialectical "re-union... of their
33
in
The
the
child.
process of reproduction as the synthesis of
separated existences
two fundamentally
is
beings
thus circumscribed by the desire for the
separated
4re-union' of the lovers; a "'manifestation...
of the desire on the part of each lover
to be desired in his or her own right; and in this way to overcome the mortal
34 This
limitations, which give rise to this desire, through the life of the child
.
literally
'anthropogenetic';
it
is
is
in
yet
precisely
marking this place
process quite
110
for
birth
love
'Man'
the
that the analysis of
a
of
serves as a mere placeholder
of
'Recognition'.
more authentic and comprehensive phenomenological analysis of
Love presents 'only a secondary "manifestation" of
35
Man'. The impulse
or
desire which it manifests is limited in both scope and ambition. As we have
desire
Kojeve's
as the relation of pure
already remarked,
presentation of
'FUrsichsein' originates in his reading of 'Desire' ['Begierde'] in B-IV-A. Hence,
living
beings'
is
between
individual
'feeling
this
subjects,
of
as a relation
qualified
beginning,
desirefor
love
determined,
from
In
the
as
and
recognition.
retrospect,
will
have turned out to be unsatisfactory for Hegel's
analysis of the
interdependence of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity precisely because, as
'Geftihl[e] des Lebendigen', they are ultimately restricted by a residual animality
is
Love
'natural
given-being'.
refigured, retroactively, under the matrix of
or
is
it
now simply 'amorous Recognition':
recognition:
(Human) Love is also a desire for Recognition: the lover wants to be loved,
that is to say recognised as an absolute or universal value in his or her very
distinguishes
it
from
Love
thus realises
the
all
others.
which
particularity,
(to a certain extent) Individuality, and this is why it can give (to a certain
36
Satisfaction.
extent)
The relation of 'Love' becomes a partial and insufficient determination of a more
'total, universal dialectic. As desire, it is not aimed at the other as an object (for
but
desire:
'given-being'
the
or
something),
rather
someone
at
another
of
example,
love is not a desire for an other, but a desire for the reciprocated desire of an other
In
Kojeve
loved
in
be
loves
in
this
to
the
way,
return.
preserves
order
sense
one
doubling,
in
Hegel's
'Love'
which
was
or
expressed
of
reciprocity
a
relation
as
of
living',
but
it
is
feeling
love
'a
longer
definition
the
this
now
of
as
no
of
original
'feeling' for it has been drawn up into a more universal economy of relations.
'Recognition' is the second birth of the human individual, but it is the origin
is
in
'Aufhebung'
love.
human
Man'.
It
Yet
it
is
the
is
'specifically
of
of what
III
exactly at this point, when love becomes 'amorous Recognition', that the concept
of love begins to oscillate between the orbit of political
historical
and
'Recognition' and the gravity of its adherence to the level of 'natural, givenBeing'; between what is 'specifically human' and what remains within the sphere
of animality. Even when it is recast as both lovers' desire to be recognised as 'an
it
',
in
his
her
remains at some
absolute or universal value
or
very particularit Y
from
from
'wirklich'
'Recognition',
the
the
to
remove
realm proper
existence of
'Man' in the political, historical and social realm of action, conflict and work.
Struggle and Work [le Travail] (born of the Desire for Recognition proper)
human
(Wirklichkeit)
a
specifically
alone produce
objective-reality
(a
technological and social, that is historical, World); the objective-reality of
Love is purely natural (sexual act, birth of the child): its human content
always remains purely
37
internal-or-intimate (innerlich).
Love remains a 'purely natural' actualisation of the human insofar as this relation
does not appear to place any value on action, and therefore its content is
intimacy.
in
its
into
This
the
own
relation exteriorises nothing, neither
withdrawn
'Work'.
'Struggle'
in
Merely
the
the
productivity of
uncovering the
nor
risk of
for
do
longer
'specifically
human',
lovers
death
is
the
no
not appear
possibility of
to have to face this possibility through their own actions. The actuality of 'Love'
is necessarily and inseparably connected to the 'given-being' of animal life; yet, at
the same time, it is still a 'specifically human phenomenon', if only insofar as it is
determined by the more universal 'schema' of the desire for recognition. Hence, at
first,, love is a point of ambiguity, as it appears to be neither simply natural nor
both.
but
human,
an uneasy combination of
wholly
If Kojeve presents 'Recognition' as the 'Aufhebung' of love, then no such
deeper
latter
the
than
the
the
yet
problem
runs
remain;
should
ambiguity about
determination
For
of
a
more
to
universal
concept.
need
suppress a subordinate
Kojeve presents 'Recognition'
'key-notion',
Hegel's
as
the matrix of his
for
The
this
that of the
of
concept
stands
movement
philosophy as a whole,
112
concept as such. As a result, 'Recognition' becomes simply another name for
'Aufhebung' (and vice versa). So what happens to the concept of love? Kojeve
defines it by the absence of separation from animality, the lack of deten-ninate
negation, the refusal of action - everything that recognition is not. In other words,
the relation of love is inactive and unsatisfactory becauseit lacks 'the seriousness,
38
the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative'. Indeed, by drawing
upon love and recognition in order to discuss the dialectical processes of the
Phenomenology as a whole, Kojeve is attentive to Hegel's own contrast of the
positivity of 'Liebe' and the negativity of 'Arbeit'. This distinction is, of course,
figured by Hegel in ternis of the practice of thought and, especially, in the
systernaticity of philosophy:
To help [mitzuarbeiten] bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to
the goal where it can cast off [ablegen] its name of Love of Knowing and
be actual Knowing - this is what I have set myself to do.39
This transition from 'philo-sophia' to 'actual' or 'absolute Wissen' is familiar to
from
"L'Amitie"
Bataille's
us already
as well as Kojeve's account of the
development from love to recognition. Koj eve invokes the seriousness and rigour,
the systematicity and actualisation of scientific knowing against the 'feeling' of
the living
whole.
But
how
is this distinction
incorporated within
the
Phenomenology? Hegel does not present an explicit comparision of the two
love
implicit
Kojeve
so
must
concepts - recognition and
reconstruct
an
critique
-,
40
basis
his
latter
He
the
the
on
of
reading.
of
writes:
In the Phenomenology, what Hegel (implicitly) criticises Love for is, on
the one hand, its "private" character (one can only be loved by very few
be
one
can
universally recognised), and on the other hand,
whilst
people,
its "lack of seriousness," given the absenceof the Risk of life (this Risk
is
a truly objective realisation of the specifically human content
alone
41
distinguishes
Man
from
the animal).
essentially
which
113
Two criticisms determine 'Love'
'human
incomplete
of
actualisation
as an
reality'. First, the lack of truly universal recognition: love does not satisfy the
fundamental desire to be recognised as 'an absolute or universal value' by each
and every other such individual. Second, the "'lack of seriousness... of this
relation marks the absenceof conflict: the very existence of the individual is not
put at risk, and so does not have to do anything to prove its worth. As a result,
those who are in love do not recognise 'Action' or 'the Work' [TOeuvre']
as
'absolute values', but only the mere fact of the other's 'given-Being'; what is
is,
is
Kojeve,
'precisely
human
in
Man'
truly
the
says
what
valued
not
aniniality
42
of his 'given-Being, ' or the natural, living identity of the body ['der Leib']. Love
['das Liebe'] is irreducibly 'leiblich':
it is 'bodily'
it
is
'physical';
and
not
belongs
in
Kojeve's
the
revised
understanding
word,
and
so
spiritual
of
solely to
the family, to blood relations and to natural 'given-Being'. Hence, this twin lack
draws
to
the
together love,
politico-historical schema of recognition
with regard
the family and friendship.
Friendship may not be implicated directly in the 'natural' determinations of
the sexual act, gestation and birth, but it is identified as an impoverished extension
love
from
determination.
By
the
this
closing
off
relation
of
action, and therefore
of
from any 'truly active (= negating) comportment', Kojeve finds that it 'remains
inoperative.
'
ineffective
Furthermore, this situation
or
essentially passive, even
does not change, for this relation is restricted by the fact that it does not manifest
itself through the negativity of action: 'it remains eternally limited by the static
limits of the being to which it is related.' As a result, friendship is as far as this
form of intersubjectivity can reach.
This is why love, at the very most, can found a human Family on a limited
(hardly
by
base
"circle
offriends')
enlarged
a
natural
in
the course
which,
43
by
history,
evolves
growing smaller.
of
In fact, not only do love and friendship remain separatefrom 'specifically human,
by
'eternally
limited'
remaining
activity and work
to the recognition of a
114
particular loved one, or 'at the very most, [that ofl the necessarily restricted group'
of friends; they also run counter to human evolution conceived as the universal
idea
by
love
history.
does
Kojeve
But
the
progress of
of
mean
what precisely
evolving through 'shrinking' or 'contracting' ['en se r&tr6cissant']? The phrase
conveys two senseswhich Kojeve has already set in play: a group of friends may
but
individual
diminish
in
(or
'dwindle')
time;
grow smaller,
number
over
an
can
also 'grow narrow', in the sense of a diminishing mental acuity or scope of
interest. So friendship is introduced as a relation of entropy, an irreversible
dissolution:
in
it
does
it
Koj6ve's
is
movement of
schema
not, and cannot, work:
be
as
an
unproductive,
purposeless
remainder
of
energy
which
cannot
cast
44
in
reabsorbed the operation of a teleological structure or system. This much is
index
from
Kojeve
'purely
'restricted'
tenns
the
which
employs:
natural',
of
clear
'limited',
or
'passive', 'inoperative'. Kojeve finds justification in opposition to
Goethe's dictum that one loves someone for what they are, rather than for what
they do.
[T]his is why one can love a dead man, for the man who truly would do
if
dead;
it
is
love
be
he
as
were
also
why
can
already
one
an
nothing would
it:
being
let
"recognise"
to
able
us recall that there never
animal, without
has been a duel between a man and an animal,, - or a woman; let us recall
devote
himself
it
is
"unworthy
love:
to
to
that
man"
of
entirely
also
45
legends of Hercules, of Samson, etc.
These three examples illuminate the dialectical insufficiency
love
of
and
friendship, which Kojeve must demonstrate in order to stage the necessity and
first
'
In
love
Recognition.
is
his
'key-notion
the
place,
of
revealed
universality of
it
is
for
longer
be
this
to
relation:
necessarily
a
no
reciprocal
reason that
actually
fact,
in
dead.
In
love
they
to
even
when
are
contrast
someone
universal
can
one
in
being
is
love
'as
to
to
the
which
one
relates
a
relation
another
other
recognition,
if he were already dead', the position of inactive consumption which defines the
dialectic
'the
Master
is
in
Kojeve's
the
of
reading
of
recognition:
actually
master
115
humanly dead in the Struggle: he no longer acts, properly speaking, since he
46
remains idle [oisifl; he lives therefore as if he were dead'. To love someone is
merely to love them in their given, natural being; not to recognise them as a
Iradically mortal' human being; and therefore, they are as good as dead already.
Second, and as a result, it is equally possible to love an animaL for there is
is
impossible
for
it
be
between
human
there
to
nothing at stake
and animal, yet
recognition for precisely this reason. There may indeed be death and servitude, but
this is not manifested in a struggle to the death 'for pure prestige': there is no
'duel between man and animal.
47 Finally,
is
inclusion
from
his
as
clear
of
4womaW as an afterthought, Kojeve also locates the turn from love to recognition,
from natural to human, in terms of sexual differentiation: 'the animal desires the
female (sexuality), the man desires the desire of the woman
48
(eroticism). ' Love
its
lover
falls
back
into
fall
desire,
because
the
always
short of
own
will always
itself
inoperativity,
limit
to the merely particular
to
content
passivity and
individuality of an other (the loved one), or a small group of others (the family or
friends), instead of struggling and working for the 'universal recognition of the
is
its
'
love
The
the concept of afeeling,
particularity.
concept of
absolute value of
the stage at which the concept is manifested as mere feeling, limited by this
"'support"' of natural 'given-Being' and thus restricted and "'mediated"' within
the 'total' or universal revelation of 'human reality' through 'the labour of the
negative'.
3.12 - At the End of History
It is with Kojeve's presentation of 'the concept of Recognition', in the masterhistorical
'Man'
dialectic,
the
to
the
that
switches
emphasis
re-birth of
slave
through risking his own life in the 'struggle for pure prestige'. The ontological
is
in
Kojeve's
his
'annotated
this
prime
reason
rebirth
placing
of
primordality
translation' of the master-slave dialectic 'in place of
introduction
to his
an
development
He
the
Hegel.
traces
'being-inof
self-consciousness
as
of
reading
116
and-for-itself
through this narrative: from the initial struggle between two
separate self-consciousnesses,the outcome of which proves one to be the victor,
the other the vanquished; through the institution of this relation as one of mastery
finally,
be
failure
the
to
to the
the
and slavery, and
satisfied; and
of
master
emergence of the slave as the productive being whose work mediates his
recognition by others. In the present analysis, the events of this narrative are less
important than the concepts that they introduce and set to work: recognition, risk,
struggle, and the work.
With the concept of recognition, the 'faculty' of desire is thus divided by an
axiological turn, for it is at this stage that Kojeve turns to the question of value.
Kojeve's phenomenological and anthropological reduction of desire determines
intentional
in
the
accomplishment of an
satisfaction as
act relation to the desired
object: the object of desire is sought, or desired, as the instance of a value.
According to Koj&ve's dualism, therefore, the value sought in any given act of
desire will be either that of a particular 'natural or animal' life (that is, its
in
that
the
this particularity
or
of
autonomous
present
preservation),
universality
(that is, its recognition). This axiological turn gives content to the schema of
desire, for animal or natural desire, 'in thefinal analysis', is always determined by
'the desire to conserve its life' - the instinct for self-survival which manifests the
6supremevalue for the animal', its own 'animal life' -; whilst that desire which is
in
is
finds
...
human
that
only
a
value
satisfaction
non-natural"', which
exclusively
'exceeds the given reality' of
49
the former.
Animal desire is the necessary, but not the sufficient condition of selfdesire
human
has
bifurcation
become
The
and
animal
of
a matter
consciousness.
for
human
dominion
desire
the
the
the
other,
over
one
of
manifests
of power and
itself only to the extent that it manages to 'prevail over [Vemporter sur]' its
50
holds
Although
Kojeve
former.
'human
in
that
the
reality'
necessary condition
'within
biological
is
into
as
such
only
a
reality,
existence and maintained
comes
demonstrate
is
is
'Man'
his
fundamental
key
to
his
life',
that
able
point
an animal
117
difference from this animality by showing himself to be ready to sacrifice his own
life for the sake of the 'pure prestige' of being recognised. In order to manifest
itself as self-consciousness,the (human) desire for recognition must triumph over
the desire for preservation of its (animal) life, and dominate this life, by risking
it's own death. As a consequence, the ...origin"'
of self-consciousness is
inextricable from the idea of a struggle between similar, competing desires, each
death
life'
in
'struggle
'(animal)
their
to
the
to
a
willing
with a view to
risk
51
"recognition... as properly human. In order to be recognised as the value which it
takes itself to be (as an individual human subject), this desire requires the presence
of another similar desire. What makes human desire 'specifically human' is the
fact that it wants for the other subject to desire the value that it takes itself to be: it
desires recognition.
To desire the desire of another is therefore, in the final analysis, to desire
that the value that I am or that I "represent" to be the value desired by this
his
for
him
for
him
"recognise"
I
I
to
my value as
value, want
other: want
52
to "recognise" me as an autonomous value.
On the one hand, self-consciousness is born of the power to say 'F, which is, at
first, the empty form of the sheer motivity of desire qua negativity (as pure
Ffirsichsein); yet on the other hand, it only truly emerges with the desire to be
between
desiring
distinction
'F.
The
a
consciousness
recognised as such an
(which reveals the object and itself) and a passive 'contemplation' (which is
division
become
has
its
in
the
ontological
of properly
object)
merely absorbed
53
for
'desire
human 'desire for recognition' from the animal
preservation.' In the
for
desire'
limited
idea
'desire
love,
to
the
this
was
sexual,
of
a
relation of
biological, and natural process by which a self-consciousnessis bom; as the desire
for recognition, however, this reflective relation marks a second, historical 'birth'
into the struggles of a wider social and political world. All things 'human' finally
in
're-birth'
desire:
this
thoroughly
this
universal,
other
second,
come through
118
In other words, every human, anthropogenetic Desire, generator of Selfdesire
for
function
is,
in
human
the
the
of
consciousness, of
end, a
reality,
"recognition. ,54
If the 'desire for recognition', akin to the dialectic of love, is a 'desire of desire',
this means that it names the necessarily reciprocal nature of inter-subjectivity, the
mutual relatednesswhich is constitutive for all social intercourse and community.
Yet what Kojeve underlines in this transition from love to recognition is the
in
dimension
love,
Like
this
change
of relatedness.
recognition entails two distinct
fundamentally
beings
desire,
is
desire
this
the
yet
similar
with
same
yet now
not
directed at the love of the other for the being that one is; it is the desire for one's
be
being
to
those
actions
recognised as
of a
possessing 'autonomous value'. Like
love, recognition involves two beings, each of whom have this same desire; yet in
the case of recognition, this common desire can only bring conflict, for in order to
have
being
his
to
the
the
actions of
other a
would
surrender
recognise
own
satisfaction. Hence, each being enters this relation holding recognition to be its
is
in
'go
to
the
all
way pursuit of its satisfaction,
absolute value, so each prepared
if needs be to force the other, on pain of death, to recognise him as this value.
Recognition is a relation of reciprocity as much as a relation to death. A
human being is what it is only insofar as it can satisfy its desire to be recognised
is,
insofar
'at
least
individual;
free,
human
that
two' such subjects
only
as
as a
in
for
the
the sake of 'pure
same
aim,
pursuit
of
or
actively confront one another
its
life'
is
'ready
'to
imperil
Thus,
to
or,
risk
conversely,
each
subject
prestige'.
55
that of the other' in order to prove itself to be such a subject. What Kojeve calls
'human reality' is posited in its essential difference from 'animal-life'
through
desire and action; yet this desire must transcend the general form of desire (the
'desire for preservation') in order to be recognised by a like being as such a
distinct and autonomous value; and it can only exceed this sphere by risking it, to
its
life.
Kojeve
draws
takes
the
this
that
of
precedence
over
value
own
value
show
dialectical
the
the
the
the
relationship
of
slave
master
and
co-originary
out of
119
status offinitude, conflict, and community. All three elements are bound together
in the figure of the 'struggle to the death for the sake of recognition'. KOjeve adds
repeatedly, in what is almost a mantra, that 'there would never have been human
beings on the earth' without either the 'struggle to the death for pure prestige'; or
without the originary fact of a 'radical mortality'; or if they hadn't evolved from
'within a herd'. Sheer numbers, however, are not sufficient for the appearanceof a
truly social being:
[I]n order that the herd become a society, the multiplicity of beings alone
is not enough; again it is necessarythat the Desires of each every member
herd
focus
the
of
on [porter sur] - or can focus on - the Desires of the other
is
is
human
human
If
members.
reality
a social reality, society only
as an
56
desiring
Desires
Desires.
of
mutually
one
as
another
ensemble
In this brief passage,Kojeve proceeds straight from the bifurcation of animal and
human desire, or the herd and the society, to deducing the essenceof community
from the master-slave relation. As many commentators have noted, and objected,
Kojeve's emphasis upon conflict in the figure of the life and death struggle results
57
The transition from 'Love' to 'Recognition' in
in 'the first political community'
.
Hegel's writings marks the arrival of a truly social, political and historical
dimension to his work. Let us briefly recount the events of this narrative, for it is
here that the possibility of Bataille's ...Hegelian... critique of Hegel arises.
Hegel's earlier writings on love and religion are still too bound up with the
'purely
biological
the
sexual
reproduction
sphere
of
natural'
and
particularity of
friendship.
family
Such
kinds
limitations
the
the
the
privacy
of
and
of
necessity disclose
dialectic
interrelation
human
the
the
structure
may
anthropogenetic
of
of
through the basic finitude of individuality and intersubjectivity, but they do not
for
desire
fact,
the
In
the
to
recognition.
universality
of
progressive
measure up
they are retro-gressive, or entropic, in relation to the historical evolution of the
humanity of 'Man; as the inverse proportion of waste, passivity and inoperativity
limited
from
'remains
the
teleological
as
such;
and
which
eternally'
which
120
determination of the 'Work' must separateitself. But as limited fonns of human
interrelation they are caught up within this movement. Love is universalised
through the need to 'account for the phenomena of history and of historical man':
on the one hand, this is a simple matter of substitution or replacement - 'it is
love
by
limited
dialectic
to
the
necessary
an universal
of
replace
and passive
dialectic of action'; yet, on the other, it is precisely this value of negativity as
has
determined Kojeve's depiction of this 'first amorous dialectic' as
action which
58
its reverse ("'natural ...) side. As if there were a separatedialectic of history and
lesser
dialectic;
if
form
the movement of negativity
a
greater
and
a
of
as
animality,
as such could be either stronger or weaker.
This matrix of the activity-passivity of the negative and of death is inextricable
from the political fate of friendship in Kojeve's work. The emphasis upon the
4virile negativity'
of doing, acting and working condemns 'Famitie'
to the
idleness, incompletion and unsatisfaction of simple, non-dynamic being; for this
dialectical
doing',
'not
that
negativity, entails
or
originary status of activity, qua
cnot acting, or 'not working' are already determined, even made possible by this
drew
is
lesson
Kojeve
from
This
the master-slave
the
very
which
prior operation.
dialectic: the master's domination of the slave ensured that his own relation to
things and to the world was mediated by the labour of the latter; hence, although
he is not part of the process by which the world of 'human reality' is produced, all
the same he 'lives in a historical, technological world, humanised by work'. His
idleness does not contribute to this process, but the fact of his mere existence
does.
There is no denying that processes of history
and politics
in the
Phenomenology are bound up with relations of conflict, violence and passion. But
Kojeve's thesis runs a peculiar course through these moments because of the way
it frames these moments within his own historical narrative. Indeed, this tendency
is inseparable from his expresspedagogical intentions in the lectures. His aim is to
121
read Hegel as a contemporary by bringing this work to bear upon the present in
which he himself is writing.
Indeed, Individuality can be full realised, the desire for Recognition can be
completely satisfied, only in and by the universal and homogeneous State.
[ ] And this recognition is truly universal, for, by definition, the State
...
[genre]
(even in its past,
human
the
the
encapsulates
whole of
species
through the total historical tradition that this State perpetuates in the
present, and in its future, sincefrom now on thefuture [Favenir] no longer
59
differsfrom the present in which Man is alreadyfully satisfied).
This does, however, pose an immediate problem. How can this reading of Hegel
have had such a massive impact upon even those, such as Bataille, who found
themselves in radical opposition to its presentation of philosophy as a totalising,
As
have
in
'Work"?
we
shown
our preceding analyses, Kojeve's
systematic
irreducibly
double
'explication'
Hegel
possesses
avowedly propagandist
of
an
thread: it is radical as an attempt to bring Hegel to bear upon the movements and
it
is
in
the
the pusuit of this
equally violent
problems of
contemporary world; yet
task, as Kojeve obliterates complex and subtle details of the Phenomenology. In
from
love
friendship
the
to
movement
and
of
schematic
our close reading
his
have
traced
the
reading of Hegel. As a
conceptual core of
recognition, we
in
'works'
draw
is
Hegel
this
that
the
what
reading of
conclusion
result, we can
the way that a few motifs or figures are brought into a dynamic and
'problems'
(political
action, historical
confrontational relation with contemporary
State
technological
and totalitarianism, philosophical nihilism).
progress,
and
Koj&ve's philosophical response to the contemporary is his thesis of 'the end of
History',
have
thesis
metaphysical
and
structure,
ontological
as
we
whose
a
formed
in
the
the
which
and
oppositions
movement
paradoxes
rooted
shown, was
from love to recognition. From this perspective, it is now possible to connect and
historical
Bataille
terrain
the
upon
which
and
political
places
conceptual,
survey
its
import
for
friendship,
to
the 'sovereign
understand
the relation of
and
122
operation' which he opposes ( ...Hegelianly"') to the work of philosophy, to the
thought of philosophy as 'work'.
3.2 - Bataille, sovereignty and friendship
We have read Bataille's 'complicit friendship' as a guiding thread
fil
'un
d'Ariane' - through the complex interconnections of concepts and themes which
'sovereign
together
the
the
gathered
are
under
rubric of
operation'. Under the
heading of La Somme ath6ologique, his work subsequent to "L'Amitie"
extends
those themes of sacrifice, incompletion, contestation, and eroticism, into a kind of
labyrinthine,
interrelations
he
continuous
system whose
steadfastly opposes to
discontinuous
he
discourse.
to
the
refers
as
what
systematisation of philosophical
In this chapter, the conceptual terrain of this 'operation' has been traced back to
Kojeve's reading of Hegel: death as the 'labour of the negative; the dialectical
'suppression' of feeling and animality into the dialectic of recognition; and the
[Tachevement]
completion
and 'end' of human historical existence in terms of
'the Work'. In the wake of this reading of Hegel Bataille's question is simple.
What happens to 'us' - this 'we' in whose name the completion of philosophy
takes place - at the end of history? how are we, today, to think this 'we', now that
(we' are at the end, today? what has happened to the force of negativity of which
this 'end', this 'work', is the ultimate result?
In retrospect, then, we can now see that Bataille, in writing "L'Amitie",
had
into
Koj
insert
himself
'dialectic
begun
terrain
the
to
of
conceptual
eve's
of
already
Recognition' as a way of contesting and inverting it. And it is perhaps a fortuitous
form
by
first
Bataille,
the
the
this
that
opening
will
section
which
of
piece
chance
in
journal
had
the
Somme
La
that
appears
same
originally
atheologique,
volume of
'annotated
B-IV-A.
translation'
Kojeve's
of
quasi-introductory
published
The
inversion.
least,
It
itself
is,
this
friendship
to
of
expression
an
offers
at
naming of
be read as a sign of clandestine alliance or 'secret society'. Yet the significance of
123
Bataille's "L'AmitiO'
4;
projects'
from
his
those
lay
in
distancing
thinking
earlier
also
founding a 'religious
which were concerned with
community'
(Acephale, the College). Bataille turns instead towards a more dispersed form of
thinking community or "'being-in-relation"'.
Hence, the figure of a 'complicit
friendship' comes to express 'the idea of negative community': a relation to others
oriented by solitude, abandonment and absence-a 'community of those who have
60
no community'. The word 'Famitie' becomes unfamiliar in Bataille's hands, as
if the accustomed proximity of friends had given way to reveal the possibility of a
relation of dislocation across vast distances:
[A] state of profound friendship requires that a man be abandoned by all
his friends, free friendship is detached from close, intimate bonds. Far
beyond the shortcomings of close friends or readers, I now seek friends,
readers that a dead man can find and.,in advance, I am faithfal to them,
61
innumerable, mute: stars of the heavens!
Friendship now appears under the sign of an experience marked by 'the
impossible' or 'the extreme'. In this way, the activity of writing is increasingly
traversed by the question of communication and of a 'literary community', as with
the following comment on Proust and poetry in LExperience int6rieure:
I would add friendship, for his way of forgetting, of suffering, a feeling of
sovereign complicity.
62
Yet this 'feeling' is far from unambiguous, for complicity necessarily expressesa
hostility
If
community.
of
much
as
any
relation
as
one simply reads
relation of
Bataille as positing Proust and Nietzsche against Hegel; poetry contra philosophy;
the ecstatic loss of self in opposition to the labours of the philosopher -, one must
then ignore the necessary complexity of Bataille's relation to Kojeve-Hegel and
in
is
This
the
the
encountered
precisely
problem
second chapter,
philosophy.
Bataille
where
contested 'completion'
by 'incompletion',
'satisfaction'
by
'dissatisfaction'. To grant authority to one over the other is to ignore the origins of
124
these concepts within Koj&ve's dialectic of 'a-nthropogenesis',which, as we have
seen, takes place through the oppositions and reversals of detenninate negativity.
This relation proves to be far from unambiguous. Bataille does not understand his
inversion of Hegel as a clear-cut reversal or opposition: he opposes Hegel, as he
says, "'Hegelianly"'.
In a very important sense, then, opposition does not go far
enough: his intention is take Kojeve's reading further than it allows itself to go.
What his thinking of friendship allows for is a way of giving expression to, or
figuring, this 'operation' and 'method' of his own thinking.
If friendship indeed serves a strategic role in Bataille's 'inversion', it is a
it
for
is
inseparable
'strategy',
from
this contestation of authority and
paradoxical
of the teleological operation of value. Yet friendship is consistently presented in
the name of a 'demand' and a 'rigour':
What chance demands of men:
63
friendship.
I have proposed: the friendship of man for himself, the effacement of ego
in the evidence of pride, a "desert" where solitude gains access to the
"innumerable",, and the greatestpossible rigour in the exercise of
64
life.
This presentation of friendship contests the very possibility of akpperativestrategy
by selecting 'chance' as it's only viable goal or value, insofar as 'chance' is, at the
same time, equally non-viable, the absence of every goal and sustainable value.
However, to return to the figure of complicity, if the name of friendship
fact
being
the
the accomplice of someone (in a crime, for
of
necessarily posits
is
by
this
oriented
relation
an equally necessary sense of being
example),
complicit
A
'complicit
other,
or
an
others.
against
friendship' may leave
(or
first,
but
it
identity
but
the
the
number)
of
cannot
presuppose the
unspecified
if
'sovereign
latter.
Moreover,
is
the
the contestation of
complicity'
existence of
Kojevean
directed
the
'the
against
values
as
of
work'
every value,
and
'Recognition', then in the name of what is Bataille a friend or accomplice? That is
his
friendship
is
Bataille
'for the impossible that is
that
proclaims
to say, when
125
man', or that it responds to the 'demand' of chance, does not the teleology and
authority which he contests return, with all the more force for being unrecognised
assuch?
In the discussion which follows, therefore, we will turn to Bataille's post-war
writings in order to trace the extent of the strategic relation between his
his
invert
'work
friendship'
to
the
the
exceed or
presentation of
efforts
of
and
Hegelian 'philosophy
of work'.
Bataille's
use of the word
'complicity'
in
friendship:
inseparability
bivalency
his
thinking
the
accentuates a certain
of
of
fhendship and conflict, of friendship and hostility, articulates another sense of
ccomplicity' - an irreducible relation of involvement in that from which one has
inversion
If
the
of
movement
excess and
always
removed onself, and rejected.
if
it
his
to
the
system
overflows
or
overturns,
very
which
remains vulnerable
because
"Hegelianly"',
Bataille
Hegel
'only
to
not
makes
it
sense...
is
opposition
'unity
doctrine
Hegelian
the
of a simple
of opposites';
philosophy as
understands
but rather because he locates the possibility of systematic philosophy, after
Kojeve, in relation to the 'struggle for recognition' between master and slave. In
fact, his adherence to Kojeve's schematic of self-consciousness provides the
building block for all thought: the dialectic of the master and the slave 'is, so to
in
it
[la
thinking,
thought not
the
all
since
angulaire]
of
pierre
speak,
comer-stone
but
finds
things,
the
of
explication of
only
65
itself.
Self-consciousness thus
insofar
it
for
is
Bataille
there
that
thought
the
as
reference
point
of
central
remains
finds the 'explication' of its own operations, alongside that of 'things': thought
thinks itself only insofar as it thinks it's relation to what opposesit. His relation to
Kojeve-Hegel fastens and builds upon these co-ordinates, aswell as the fissures
it
is
in
dualism;
by
Kojeve's
this
that
and
way
one can
up
opened
and paradoxes
discern another sense of Bataillean 'complicity'. It is no longer possible to praise
for
being
'Hegelian'
for
being
'antiBataille
or
steadfastly
resolutely
or condemn
Hegelian'. As Jacques Derrida has remarked, this relation to Hegel is 'hardly
definable', save as 'a complicity without reserve that accompanies the Hegelian
66
discourse, "takes it seriously" all the way to its conclusion'. Is it possible to hear
126
in this use of 'complicity' an echo of Bataille's assertion that he 'opposes Hegel
"Hegelianly"'? His attention to sacrifice is an attempt to shorteircuit the Hegelian
'Aufhebung' by returning it outside the economy of sense into an 'expenditure
without return'; just as his thinking of sacred communication undermines
Kojeve's rigid ontological opposition of human activity (the transcendence of
consciousness) and animal passivity or inoperativity (the immanence of material
life) by scrambling and reorganising the heirarchical distribution of power and
labyrinthine
necessity upon a
network of composition and decomposition. As a
for
dialectical
birth
Bataille,
the
result,
of 'Man', 'History', 'State' and 'System' is
inextricably bound up with the suppression of that originary turbulence which is
unproductive or inoperative negativity. Drawing upon Kojeve's emphasis on the
finitude of 'human reality' and his critique of the inoperativity of 'Life', Bataille
gives the name sovereignty to this experience of extreme instability. And nowhere
is this ambiguity of restriction and excess more acute than in the figure of
friendship. It finds expression in Bataille's formulation of 'the work of friendship'
is an integral part of the presentation of this inversion of Hegel and philosophy: it
is the 'hinge' that articulates this inversion as a consciousnessof being complicit
67
in it and against, in the same movement. Thus, having already located the word
'friendship'
at
the
falcrum
of
the
relation
between
'sacrifice'
and
Lcommunication', it is now possible to set out the way in which Bataille's use of
this word deepens and exascerbates those ambiguities which emerged ftom.
Kojeve's reading of Hegel.
3.21 - Sovereignty
Sovereignty is not a relation of mastery. In fact, as Bataille repeats on many
is
NOTHING.
'
'Sovereignty
in
Part
La
maudite:
occasions
68
Although his own
4personal interpretation' of the master-slave dialectic in "Hegel, Mornme et
Phistoire" refers throughout to 'the related form [la forme voisine] of the
determinations
draws
figure
the
this
ontological
upon
of
sovereign', and although
127
j
'daransetzen']
['mettre
'putting
the
inoperativity aswell as
en
eu';
at
stake'
act of
which constitute the appearing of mastery, Bataille insists upon a profound and
69
radical difference from the figure of the master. In Derrida's well known and
exact phrase, sovereignty is 'at once more and less a mastery than mastery, [it] is
70
completely other. ' But how does this absolute differentiation take place? how is
it presented? how far is it viable? and how does it relate to Bataille's thinking of
friendship? To answer these questions we need to understand what is 'at stake' in
Bataille's proximity to Hegel's 'philosophy of work'.
In "Hegel, Phomme et Phistoire", Bataille follows in the steps of Kojeve: his
je
Hegel
'les
to
the
thought,
explicitly addresses state of contemporary
approach
de la pensee actuelle'.
His
diagnosis of a distortion
wrought by the
'misunderstanding' of Hegel's representation of 'Man and human Spirit' is,
however, more ambiguous than Kojeve's pedagogic and propagandist intentions,
distortion
implications
the
more complex. This 'meconnaissance'
of such
and
'la
the
relation of
pensee actuelle' to the representation of
which characterises
'FEsprit humain' is, on the one hand, a measure of the degree to which Hegel's
thinking 'imposes itself as the horizon of the historical and philosophical present.
But, on the other hand, since the prevailing relation to this horizon has 'perverted
[fausses] the play of current thinking', 'we' have become 'complacent', even
ýrevelling in it' ['ou' nous nous complaisons]. Hence, every attempt to think in
ignorance of this horizon, or to sidestep ('perhaps deceitfully') it when speaking
'our'
the
the
of
perversion
of
own thinking.
reach
of man, merely extends
71
This
horizon is nothing other than the completion of 'Man' at the 'end of history,, and
the contemporary 'meconnaissance' is not simply a 'misrecognition'
of this
'event', but a failure to recognise it at all:
The event is all the more grave [lourd] because no-one on either side is
[sens]
is
face".
Its
it
it
"in
look
the
to
meaning
recognisable
and
at
is
ready
[malaise]
holds
Yet
today
unease
a great
sway over the
never recognised.
72
world .
128
As a result, insofar as this 'event' is what Kojeve's 'demiere analyse' expressesin
'difficult'
a
both
is
'discouraging'
Introduction
the
a contributing
and
manner,
factor to this state of 'misunderstanding', non-recognition and 'malaise', but also
the only way of exposing them as such. This work, for Bataille, provides the only
possible diagnosis of the contemporary condition, insofar as it allows the one who
it
in
long
look
his
'end'
"'in
face"'.
As
Kojeve
to
this
the
reads
explains
note at
the end of his Introduction, 'the end of human Time or of History' is nothing more
less
than 'the definitive annihilation of Man in the proper senseof the term or
or
free
historical
is
in
'Action
Individual':
'ends'
the
the strong senseof
of
and
what
the term', the negativity which defined every social, political and historical act of
human becoming as such; and as a result, in marking the fact that 'Man dies as
is,
'work'
'end'
that
the
this
the
as
auto-transformative power of
marks
such' -,
73
disappearance of wars, 'bloody revolutions' and even philosophy. If Bataille's
thinking of sovereignty remains close to, or 'complicit with', Kojevean mastery 'le souverain' and 'le MaRre' are, after all, related or 'neighbouring' ['voisine']
terms -, it is with this very proximity and familiarity that he aims to uncover
for
future
'event'.
'possibilities'
this
thinking
the
of
alternate
Bataille's essay begins by carefully shadowing the moments of Kojeve's
dialectic,
'explication'
the
albeit through the substitution
master-slave
narrative
of
be
Sovereignty
for
'le
Maitre'.
to
'le
too
proves
nothing without the
of
souverain'
recognition of others:
Now every man is initially sovereign, but this sovereignty is strictly that of
the wild animal. If he didn't battle to the death against his fellow beings, it
74
in
being
hadn't
his
be
if
recognised,
existed.
sovereignty, not
as
would
This shadowing is double-edged, for right from the beginning it is a case of
following how 'the attitude of the Master implies sovereignty', just as the idea of a
is
does
'express
'the
to
that
needs'
of
animal
said
not
pursue
satisfaction
conflict
75Furthermore, Bataille
key
this
recapitulation
at
a
number
pauses
of
sovereignty'.
division
he
draws
internal
First,
to
the
of sovereignty within the
attention
points.
129
initial
The
becomes
this
that
the
master.
a master of slaves,
moment
master
'absolutely sovereign' part of his being is 'limited'; wielding power over others
attributes 'the value and the form of a useful activity' to the struggle between selfis
diverted
'always
towards ends
though
this
consciousnesses, even
activity
in
l'utilite]
fins
direction
[detourn6e
des
depassant
[sens]
the
exceeding utility
vers
is
be
It
that
to
the
the
prestige'.
of
sovereignty ceases
with
advent of
master
purely
impotent and without end, for his actions introduce 'an increasing power' ['un
76
is
be
by
This
a sovereign.
a vital moment
pouvoir croissant'] which can
wielded
for Bataille. The figure of the master departs from the avowedly religious 'logic'
logic
the
sacrificial
of sovereign as victim ('Dianus').
of sacrifice and expenditure,
Principally, this departure marks the ascent of the 'enterprises of war' as the
impotence
Fimpuissance
'from
['de
'the
to
power'
au pouvoir'], and as
passage
time [loisir] to refuse the ritual putting to death', or sacrifice, by substituting
77
be
in
his
Henceforth,
place.
subordinate to
sovereignty will
another victim
increase
The
the
of
power.
moment of
growth
such
actions which maintain and
instant
'degradation
thus
the
the
of sovereignty':
at which a
sparks
enslavement
king pursues recognition 'for what he does, for his power [puissance], sets him
for
'Man'
desire
'pure
from
the
and
sets
upon the path of effective
prestige',
apart
79
'Action' and the productive negativity of the 'Aufhebung'
.
In this way, Bataille
Koj
dualism
transition
the
that
the
narrative
eve's
of
underpinned
rigid
complicates
from master to slave. His uncovering of a pre-exisiting 'logic' of sacrifice does
from
'supposition'
it,
but,
invalidate
a
simple
shared,
as we will see,proceeds
not
but unspoken, by Kojeve: the fact that 'Man can have lived moments of the
Master and of the Slave in one and the same individual (or in each individual). ý79
Before going further into the repercussions of this 'supposition', we will turn to
the figure of the slave in Bataille's recapitulation.
As with his repetition of mastery, Bataille's presentation of the reversal of the
'work'
['travail']
begins
dialectic
the
to
of
relation
question
master-slave
and the
is
'Knecht'
Hegel's
'moments.
be
this
to
acknowledged
of
sequence
slave within
do
he
is
'the
free
insofar
figure
to
what
pleases'
man who not
of
the general
as all
130
of his actions 'belong
to others',
masters consumption.
80 Yet Bataille
to the reduction
of the vanquished
'work'
his
insofar as
discerns 'a properly
in slavery'.
human existence anterior
This anteriority
81 What is the
fact that 'work had to precede slavery'
.
for
his
thing
the
prepares
derives from the
status of this anteriority?
Bataille recognises that the logical 'schema' of recognition cannot be countered by
a barrage of historical,
ethnological
data; indeed, he himself
duly
grants
is
former
it
latter.
Instead,
to
the
the
precedence
a matter of a priori
over
fundamental
has
different
been
that
obscured or obliterated
necessity, a
structure
by Kojeve's narrative, but which Bataille is able to draw out of concealment
have
because
Bataille
to
this
arrived at a 'logical
of
obliteration.
claims
precisely
inner
...
Hegel's
than
that
of
exteriorised"
construction' still more primordial
drama' between master and slave, and which the latter, therefore, must presuppose
in order to take place at all.
Man as such dwelled alongside death and worked [ ]. The distance from
...
the formed object to the one who produced it without immediately
it
itself,
in
formed
in
forming
it
it),
(destroying
this
way
and,
consuming
domination
have
been
interdicts
to
the
the
prior
of the
effect of
could
Master, purely religious interdicts. It is possible that Man became such,
in
by
following
from
(himself)
than
the
those
animal,
other paths
separated
92
Hegel's description.
Moments,, concepts and figures are recognisable from this 'drama', but they have
been re-distributed and enacted along different 'paths'. This possibility of 'other
his
important
Bataille
himself
to
as
a
whole:
work
aspect
sets
paths' elucidates an
the task of thinking a counter-history of human activity and development, for the
'work'
'consumption'
is
the
this
of
and
relation
of
counter-origin
specificity of
Bataille's
to
post-war writings on political economy, religion, and
all of
central
break
from
intention
is
historical
Bataille's
to
the
However,
away
not
art.
horizon
forms
Instead,
he
the
of
meaning.
economy
and
movement which
itself
in
how
break
this
to
only
originate
can
movement
such
show
a
endeavours
131
with what existed prior to it, and hence outside the totalising perspective of
Koi6ve's 'demiere analyse'.
Hence, it would appear that the basic thrust in his writings against the coherent
totality of the economy of meaning ['sens'] is inseparable from the attempt to
reach a position, or an 'origin', more primordial or more 'primitive'
than the
schema of recognition, from which to contest it. In this way, the distribution of
labour between master and slave is traced back to a temporal division of the
in
'one
individual.
'each'
What
the
the
sacred and
profane
and
same' or rather
Bataille calls ...profane time... is the time of work, securing the satisfaction of
'animal needs' (hunger, shelter) and accumulating the 'resources' to be destroyed
in the 'massive consumptions' (festivals, celebrations) that characterise "'sacred
time"'.
'Asa result, 'the 'Hegelian master-slave dialectic relates to this 'classical
its
'renversement':
opposition' as
the Master is what he is not and is not what he is, he cannot have the
[for]
he
inserts
"sacred
time",
the movement of profane time
of
autonomy
84
(in which one acts with a view to a result) right into sacred existence.
The figure of the master forms the main object of Bataille's contestation of
Kojeve's account of self-consciousness, for with it 'instability of History' is
introduced. 'His very being introduces, because he lasts, an element contrary to
85
Against this impersonal, momentary
the instantaneity of "sacred time"'.
in
longer
future
'in
the
counts,
which resources are
no
which
existence liquidated, in which the victim is destroyed, annihilated, where it is only a matter
death"
[<<
"towards
la
death",
in
(in
"sovereignly
being
pour
mort
)>]
of
destruction)'
annihilation and
86
is
desire
the
the
to
posited
as
mastery
accrue
-,
death
by
it
transforming
to
precisely
over
gain power
personal power, ultimately
into a power. It is by replacing the momentary, mortal opening of sacred
'instantaneity', that it finds its 'glory'
in the rewards of a victorious battle,
be
'more
those
than
to
of sacrifices which expend
solid'
rewards which prove
in
first,
'being-for-self
form
is,
from
desire
the
'Man'
the
pure
of
without return.
132
for recognition; he acts 'with a view to' ['en vue de'] a result or an end; that is,
recognition as an 'absolute value' of individuality. This determination is only
reinforced, with more successful results, in the 'work' of the slave.
However, it is important to realise that at no time does Bataille claim to have
changed 'anything essential' in the historical dialectic of 'Man'. In fact, he
stresses the fact that nothing fundamental has been altered. The recourse to the
sacred-profane opposition, and to sovereignty in the practice of sacrifice simply
points to 'Man's possibility to negate animality in himself without acting'. He
is
in
that
states
nothing
added this recapitulation which would dispute the 'central
87
perspectives' to be found in Hegel; that is, in Kojeve's Introduction. To do
so
would be merely to contribute to the prevalent 'misunderstanding', and to fail to
full
implications
the
recognise
of Hegel's thinking: the perspective of 'the end of
history' should be seen, writes Bataille, 'as any truth, as an established
89
truth. '
Furthermore, it is clear that Bataille's preoccupation with the sacred is not simply
for
an expression of nostalgia
some prelapsarian, primitive world, nor a call for
the abandonment of, or withdrawal from the modem world. On the contrary, if we
he
force
to
the
singular
are understand
of what
calls sovereignty, Bataille insists
that we must follow the historical dialectic of 'Man' to its ultimate conclusions.
The essential condition [of this end] is clear, it is simply the passage of
into
homogeneous
by
the
the
society;
cessation
of
play
which these
men
different
in
human
turn
and
realised
another,
modalities.
men opposed one
[ ] Human history will ceasewhen Man will ceaseto change, and in this
...
89
from
himself.
differ
to
way
The possibility of historical change and human becoming ('Man') has come to its
'fundamental'.
But
happens
in
is
Bataille
This
as
what
affirms
when,
what
end.
the accomplishment of universal recognition, this process of change and becoming
(the dialectic of recognition) has been accomplished? He acknowledges that these
doubt
'strange',
'brutal'
in
history',
'the
their
are
without
even
end of
words,
formulation,, but they must be given their 'precise meaning': '[i]t means that
133
90
henceforth nothing new will take place [rien de nouveau n'aura lieu]. ' Nothing
4new' will happen: no change, no conflict; and hence no more differentiation,
nothing that will surprise 'us' - except, perhaps, for this very fact: that 'we' are no
longer that which made 'us' what 'we' are. This is the 'reversal' of the very
movement which brought us to this point, and thus the 'misunderstanding' against
which he writes is not only the failure to recognise this reversal, it is also its result.
If the master-slave dialectic sounds the death-knell for man's 'sacred
existence', it is equally the case that its sole, inevitable conclusion is the death of
'Man as such'. It presents the teleological orientation of human action towards
'satisfaction'9 and the subordination of passivity and inoperativity. Sovereignty is
obliterated by the desire to be recognised for what one does, rather than for what
one is; a shift that echoes Kojeve's account of the transition from 'Love' to
'Recognition'. Such teleology is, of course, the originary metaphorisation of
(natural or biological) death into the operation of ('human') negativity, wherein
death is put to work as the economic circulation of meaning and value. Finally, the
'seriousness' of this 'work', as the historical movement of universalising negation,
is figured by the development and completion of 'Man' as the 'Work' [TOeuvre']
becoming,
'Individual'
the
this
autononomous
of
within the context of the
homogeneous state. For Bataille, there is no question that this situation defines the
present:
The culture susceptible of bringing about the fundamental homogeneity
incarnate
in
it
diverse
those
the
of
who
reciprocal comprehension
and
ways
is technological culture. [ ] It is not a question of a scale of superior
...
[mepris]
disinterested
is
It
of
mistrust
values.
systematic
nor
of
a
a
values,
brings
together
that
men
which
and of suppressing
reinforcing
question of
91
what separatesthem.
In short, according to Bataille's re-reading of the master-slave dialectic, this idea
has
in
necessarily
were
sacrifice
and
contiguous,
which work
of an existence
'birth'
by
Kojeve's
'satisfied
the
been
'dialectically
second
of
suppressed'
already
134
Citizen'. Bataille's conception of sovereignty, therefore, does not question the
teleological and axiological deployment of the negativity of death after the fact,
but rather at its very source. Human sovereignty is the contestation of every
6project' or 'work' only insofar as it contests their origi .n in the negative as such.
Consequently, if all human productive activity, together with the entire economy
of meaning in which it is inscribed as 'work', originally springs from the selfmediating power of the negative, Bataille seeks out that 'part' of this operation of
in
has
been
fully
invested
this economy. What remains?
negativity which
not
Moreover, how can it remain at the 'end'?
What remains of a devastating movement in which there is nothing that
humanity thinks which does not pass into dust and which does not fall into
has
hidden
dissatisfaction and he has
Kojeve
Hegel's
ruins:
underlined
successfully highlighted the fact that the Wise-man names satisfaction, a
92
but
definitive.
voluntary frustration certainly,
absolute and
Nothing remains. This 'hidden dissatisfaction' which, in "L'Amitie",
is identified
irruption
death
is
by
is
Phenomenology,
the
the
of a
revealed
which
with
irreducible and prior to the 'work' of philosophy. For Bataille, this represents a
crelease':
Nowadays, perhaps, Man is on the point of being released [au moment
d'etre ldche] by the movement which had borne him forward; perhaps he is
93
already released.
One must note here not only the temporal markers in this passage,but the senses
let
loose,
(to
let
loosen,
fly;
'lacher'
to
to
to
the
unleash;
release,
slacken;
verb
of
leave, drop, give up; to break, give way, fail). The associatednouns, 'la lachete'
(cowardice, lowness; weakness) and 'le ldchage' (desertion, abandonment), should
for
in
in
The
kept
this
be
the
of
man
passage.
sovereignty
arrives
mind
only
also
freedom
is
loss,
that
that
this
a
abandonment
or
weakening:
not
of
of a
experience
breaking
failing
but
the
that
apart
of subjectivity, a weakening of
of
or
subject,
135
power rather than an empowennent. Sovereignty is this weakening of the 'work of
94
the negative', the loosening and giving way of negativity; yet only in the sense
that it is nothing outside of this negativity, for it is nothing other than the death of
'Man as such'.
This is precisely why it is possible to sense [sentir], as never before, what
Man is: this force of Negativity, an instant suspending the course of the
world, reflecting it because an instant breaks it, but only reflecting ap,
it.
[impuissance]
break
If it seemed to him really to
to
powerlessness
break, he would only reflect an illusion, for he does not break it. In truth,
Man only reflects the world by receiving death. At this moment, he is
sovereign, but sovereignty escapeshim (he also knows that, if he held on
to it [la maintenait], it would cease to be what it is ). He says what the
...
is,
but
his
disturb
[qui
the
speech
world
cannot
silence which spreads out
s'etend]. And he knows something only to the extent that the meaning [le
95
knowledge
he
has
him.
the
that
sens] of
evades
If the sovereignty of a being is located in terms of this expenditure ['depense'] of
he
(or
'a
negate)
or
result,
must
act
without
view to'
without
return
negativity
important
has
in
In
this
a very
sense,
no effect or
a value or goal.
satisfaction
is
longer
if
It
it
'Sovereignty
no
pure sovereignty
can change nothing.
result.
96
do
is.
'
Sovereignty
Unable
'change
to
to
that
can
nothing.
which
wishes change
it;
indeed,
in
is'
transfonning
the
world
capable
of
around
not
other words,
what
'la
['das
Kojeve
Leben']
desiring
to
transform
vie-animale'
called
what
or
not
'etre-donnee' ['das Sein] - the sovereign being cannot escape the sense of
['Unruhe']
'inquietude'
which chacterises the subject of desire (qua
'Fiirsichsein'), for he is never satisfied. Yet this inability to change or develop is
from
liberating
his
the
man
of
subservience
opening of a possibility
presented as
identity
between
Bataille
the
Work'.
'the
negativity and
necessary
to
contests
death
does
the
to
to
the
as
source of power and
not
relate
sovereign
work:
in
"L'Amitie",
insists
instead,
he
do...
';
'to
as
already
possibility
the sovereign
136
relation to death qua nudity or 'extreme-limit' precisely strips such activity of all
sense. While Kojeve's presentation of mastery - in the form of the eventual
4mastery' of the slave through the process of work is predicated upon 'the labour
of the negative', wherein death has become the very production of meaning and
value as such, sovereignty relates to death as the absence of sense. For Bataille,
this is the true standpoint of Kojeve's 'dermere analyse': the realisation that, if
every possibility has been brought about through the universalising movement of
work, nothing else remains to be done.
3.22 - Impossible ftien dship and the work of art
The relation between friendship and sovereignty lies in the fundamental role of
in
Bataille's
communication
NOTHING'
Sovereignty
being.
'is
concept of sovereign
precisely in the sense that it presupposes communication which, in
turn, presupposes the sacrifice of sovereignty. In this way, the feeling of
inseparable
from
is
that originary sense of the sharing of existence
sovereignty
had
first
in
'labyrinthine
LExperience
Bataille
int6rieure,
the
sketched
as
which
beings',
'<<
W.
the
or
sense
of
rapport
complicit
etre
en
of
composition
Sovereignty is shared: 'any subject maintaining sovereign value in opposition to
the subordination of the object possesseshis share in [en partage] this value with
97 The thought of sovereignty is bound up with the very possibility of
all men.
is
in
that
the
the
notion
expenditure
of
or sacrifice
same way
community
inseparable from that of communication. Friendship is thus 'for the impossible' in
the sense that, if this shared 'value' of sovereignty exists only insofar as it is
is
into
that
there
any
certainty
sovereignty can exist.
never
question,
put
risked or
The existence of sovereignty is its own impossibility.
it is important to recognise that Bataille's engagementwith Koj6ve' Hegel is
"Hegel,
Fhomme
le
la
I'histoire".
"Hegel,
limited
to
and
sacrifice"
et
et
mort
not
These two articles are contemporary with a book on the origins of prehistoric art.
137
In Lascaux, ou la naissance de Vart (1955), Bataille locates the relation of
sovereignty and friendship at the moment of the first production of a work of art,
which he defines as the true beginning of 'Man'. Bataille writes from the same
quasi-sociological and anthropological perspective which characterises the two
Hegel papers, as well as the broader economic project of La Part maudite. When
he states that his inquiry poses the question of the 'general sensethat the work of
art has for humanity', he insists that this is not a matter of choice or chance: 'the
imposed
itself
it
is
question
a matter of the most ancient art, of the
upon me since
birth of art, and not just one among many other of its developments'; which
by
means,
extension, that the question of art does not present itself as just one
98 Bataille's
branches
inquiry
into
human
history.
of
among many other possible
task in this book, therefore, is directly connected to his critique of Kojeve's
is
in
Hegel.
His
'to
task
the
of
reading
stated
underline'
point
anthropogenetic
time or 'moment of history' at which 'the "man of Lascaux" definitely and for the
first time, [ ] resembled us, that evidently this was our resemblant [notre
...
99 This
begins
is
being
'making
this
the
point at which
moment
a
semblable]'.
is
first
it
birth
'the
the
of
which
marks
appearing of man's
art'
work of art:
dawning
human
'the
Bataille
the
that
of
species', and
calls
sovereignty; an event
the point at which 'the day is born of the night'.
100However, this does
not mean
that 'the "man of Lascaux... ever intended or desired to make a work of art. In
fact, this is perhaps the most important aspect of this event and 'our' relation to it:
it is the fact that this being - whom Bataille acknowledges is not, strictly speaking,
being
is
things
'man'
who
who
makes
as
a
works,
and
a
at all - resembles us
'creative
Bataille's
is
to
It
to
this
use
virtue'
phrase
or
creativity,
productive.
'bears
being
this
witness'.
which
' 01Hence, if Lascaux,
la
de
Vart
is
ou naissance
do
is
less
it
if
'show
to
than
this
nothing
aims
at what
event, and what
named after
formation
bound
humanity',
intimately
to
the
then
of
the
was
art
of
work
point
is
'birth
in
'event'
the
of art' - solely a matter of our
this means that the
question in
(of
the
work.
ourselves)
recognition
138
What are the consequencesof Bataille's method? Tascaux' is an event of
recognition insofar as we apprehend ourselves in 'the "man of Lascaux... : he is
our 'resemblant', the one who echoes our own self-mediation of 'Recognition'
through the work. Yet this recognition of similarity is not the relation described
and analysed by Kojeve. Instead, 'our' communication with 'the "man of
Lascaux... takes place, for him, within the 'distant posterity' that we are in relation
to his time. What 'we' receive from him, says Bataille, is 'what, in the depths of
the earth,, leads us astray and transfigures us': what we receive from his work is
'the vision of the most distant'; and whose 'message', whilst demanding of us 'the
being
in
its
is
'aggravated
[
]
by an
nonetheless
contemplation of
entirety',
...
102
inhuman strangeness'. In this case, then, resemblance is that which is the most
distorts
'inhuman',
Resemblance
to
and resistant all understanding.
strange, even
but
in
We
the
this
work.
can sense
similarity,
our
our own relation of recognition
desire for an origin is thwarted by a prior setting-into-work of everything which
in
faced
'are'.
We
the
with a contradiction: we can recognise a simlarity
are
we
'work', yet this relation is removed from the recognisably human. It is in order to
Bataille
how
that
this
with
us
can
still
communicate
senseof resemblance
explain
introduces the relation between friendship and art:
If we go into the cave at Lascaux, a strong feeling grips us which we do
first
human
display
in
ftont
have
the
the
remnants
of
where
cases
of
not
fossils or their stone instruments are exhibited. This is the same feeling of
presence -
burning
presence - that masterpieces of every epoch
of clear and
beauty
human
it
No
the
of
works addresses
seems,
matter what
give us.
friendship, the pleasure of friendship. Is not beauty what we love? Is not
friendship the passion, the always repeated interrogation to which beauty
is the sole response?
103
Bataille is making two different claims on the basis of this 'strong feeling': first,
he affirms that it is this 'feeling', rather than any particular 'interest', which
he
defines
it
'this
feeling
Lascaux;
the
second,
to
and
as
of
paintings at
attracts us
139
104
Most
in
defines
'the
the
turn,
art'.
of
work
presence' which,
essence of
important of all, however, is the underlying relation between art and friendship in
the form of the beautiful. Beauty in the work, contrary to whatever it may appear
to, 'addresses' the senseof friendship first and foremost. The feeling of presence
and the pleasure of friendship: this is what this first dawning of the work of art
gives to us. It is not, therefore, a matter of our understanding of these works. In
fact, Bataille freely acknowledges that the 'poverty' and 'inexactitude' of our
knowledge is the reason why this feeling of friendship is so important in this case.
Let us acknowledge it: the responsethat Lascaux gives us, at first, remains
obscure in us, obscure, only half-intelligible.
It is the most ancient
it
first,
depths
from
lit
the
the
times
which comes are
of
up
response,
and
do
light
dawn.
know
by
faltering
What
the
of the men who will
of
we
only
leave behind them only these ungraspable shadows, isolated from every
background? Almost nothing. Except that these shadows are beautiful, as
105
beautiful to our eyes as the most beautiful paintings in our museums.
The principal difference between these works and the paintings in museums, for
Bataille, is that 'we know the date, the artist's name, the subject, the purpose' of
106
The only relation open to us when faced with these ancient works of
the latter.
We
is
may recognise certain elements or
art one of unitelfigibility and obscurity.
figures, but what we cannot discern is the exact nature of their relations and
information
for
it
is
that our understanding
However,
want of
not simply
setting.
finds itself blunted. What remains in these works after such a vast passageof time
6a
is profound, yet enigmatic communication':
The paintings before us are miraculous, they communicate a strong and
intimate emotion to us. Yet they are all
107
the more unintelligible for that.
For Bataille, there is no doubt that they communicate: they give something to 'us',
be
but
loss
'we'
know
in
to
to
cannot
at
our presence; yet
a
response
as if
by
it
is.
We
what we can only call their
are moved and affected
precisely what
140
beauty, even if what they are said to portray or relate (a hunt or a journey, for
example) may leave us indifferent. Hence, it is this very beauty, devoid of context
yet radiant, 'leaves us painfully
108 However, if
we ask what
suspended.
Cenigmatic communication' and 'unintelligibility'
have to do with friendship; or
why Bataille turns to this relation when 'the beauty of human works' is alreaedy
mediated through the memory of the museum; if we ask these questions of
Bataille's texts, it is impossible to find any answers. The entire force of this
between
friendship and 'the essenceof the work of art' revolves around
relation
ýLev
the terms 'feeling' and 'presence', which are left at the level of evidence, or
obviousness. They are simply posited or assumed. It is this experience of
suspension which holds this evidence together: the opening of a sense of
uncertainty and the refusal of mastery. We will return to this senseof suspension
in the next chapter, when we turn to examine Blanchot's writing on the museum
and the work of art.
What we have uncovered in this chapter is the key moment of Bataille's
Hegel:
'pro'
Kojeve's
to
reading of
whether
or 'contra',
adherence and opposition
rv I
Ll<
I)
Bataille shares with Kojeve a thought of the immanence of community and selfidentity through the act of sacrifice. Both the struggle for recognition and
'complicit ftiendship' posit a relation with a 'resemblant, and therefore ground
the very thought of relation in an original and fundamental senseof similarity and
final
beings.
between
In
then,
the
we will return to the work of
chapter,
continuity
Blanchot in order to determine whether - and in what way(s) - the thought of
ýe-S-
friendship and discretion in his work draws upon his reading of Hegel and his
presentation 01 LnCWOFY,
OJL
UIA.
e(-t---. " r?-)'(Ar)
( (AJ
k)-;
Qr
'
141
Notes to Chapter 3
Hegel, Elements o?f the Philosophy of Right, translated by H. B. Nisbet and edited by
Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, §7, Addition.
2 It
has
Bataille
Jacques
Derrida's
is above all
allowed the true complexity of
work on
this relation to Hegel been recognised. As such his essay, "De Feconomie restreinte d
Peconomie g6nerale, Un hegelianisme sans reserve" (1967), forms the background for
the entire discussion of Bataille in Section 3.2, below.
3 Kojeve
noted the vital linkage between death and recognition in Hegel's Jena writings
in ILH, 518, n. 1; see also Henry S. Harris, "The Concept of Recognition in Hegel's
Jena Manuscripts", in John O'Niell (ed), Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition.Texts and Commentaries, Albany: SUNY Press, 1996,233-52.
4 Instead
of giving its full title throughout this chapter, we will use the abbreviated
form of B-IV-A. For a clear, tabulated account of the complex overall structure of this
Stewart,
"The
Architectonic
Hegel's
Phenomenology
Spirit",
Jon
work, see
of
of
in
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LV, n.4, December 1995; see also
Heidegger's more succinct account of these divisions in Hegel's Phenomenology of
Spirit, translated by P. Emad and K. Maly, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1988, §5a.
5 PG, 154; PS, §196. For
a useful and authoritative account of the centrality of this
transition, both in the Phenomenology and for post-Kantian thought as a whole, see
Jean Hyppolite, GSI, 139-50. 'Kantian idealism would be summed up well by this
formula [ ]: "Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness."' (139)
...
PG, 145; PS, §l78.
PG, 145-6; PS, §178.
SeePG, 79-80,80; PS, §87.
SeeILH, 576-97.
10ILH, 576.
11Ibid.
12
13
14
15
16
ILH, 576.
ILH, 577.
ILH, 539.
Ibid.
ILH, 506.
17ILH, 5 10,
For
Hegel's
triad of universal, particular and singular, see
emphasis added.
Werke, VIII, § 163-5; also § 13, on the example of the universality of 'fruit' with respect
It
'the
the
philosophy.
is interesting to note that,
to
unity and systematisation of
it
be
does
this
Kojeve
to
to
example,
can
not
refer
explicitly
said
perform the
although
'In
he
Phenomenology:
latest
function
birth
to
the
the
philosophy
ascribes
which
very
have
that
the
the
preceded it, and must include their
time
all
systems
result of
is
of
142
principles'. Andrew Benjamin gives an alternate reading of this presentation of
singularity - indeed, one marked by the influence of both Bataille and Blanchot - in The
Plural Event: Descartes, Hegel, Heidegger, London: Routledge, 1993,97-111.
18PG, 24; PS, § 19. SeeHegel's distinction
of the death of 'a natural life' and the death
which belongs to consciousness in the "Einleitung", PG, 74; PS, §80; and also the
famous definition of the 'life of spirit' in the "Vorrede", PG, 36; PS, §32. It is the latter
forms
focal
the
which
point of Kojeve's existential analyses of human finitude, in
"L'ld&e de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel", ILH, 529-575. As a result, it is taken
up by Bataille in "Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice", and by Blanchot in "La litterature et le
droit a la mort".
19See Martin Heidegger, Being
and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1962, Part 1, Division Two, Section 1, §§46-53; H. 241,
247.
20ILH, 515. In the light
fundamental
the
of
status of Hegelian negativity, Kojýve never
pauses to ask how it is that the event of death becomes such a 'property' or 'labour';
nor does he inquire into the possibility of this transformation in thinking itself. These
are questions which Bataille addressesvia the question of sacrifice; see Section 2.11.
21 The dates for this fragment first
in
November
1797,
version
written
and second
in
by
1798
Nohl,
Hegels
Theologisch
provided
of
written
autumn-winter
are
editor
Jugendschriften, Ttibingen, 1907. Kojeve dates it, inaccurately, at 1795 (see ILH, 512).
We have used the text of 'Die Leibe, ' published under the editorial title of '[Entwiirfe
(1797/98),
in
Schriften,
Religion
Liebe]'
Hegel,
Werke
I.
Fri7he
E.
und
z7ber
Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel (eds.), Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1971,244-50;
translated by T. M. Knox and R. Korner, in Hegel, On Christianity: Early Theological
Writings, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1948,302-8.
22ILH, 513,
emphasis added.
23 There is
a noticeable absence of any scholarly contextualisation from Kojeve's
friendship
love
in Hegel's early writings. For example, by
and, especially,
account of
his
in
'Freundschaft'
the
work on the positivity and destiny of
centrality of
sidestepping
Christianity - presumably in order to maintain the purity of an atheist Hegel -, Kojeve
development
Hegel's
fails
this
to
either to the work of H61derlin or
phase of
relate
also
to the productive collision between neo-platonism and Kantian philosophy which both
friends absorbed whilst at the Ttibingen seminary. For a brief but informative outline of
the importance of this atmosphere to both thinkers, see Thomas Pfau's "Critical
Introduction" to Friedrich H61derlin: Essays and Letters on Theory, edited and
translated by Thomas Pfau, Albany: SUNY Press, 1988,1-29; and on the philosophical
Hegel,
for
in
H61derlin
7-11.
friendship
the
see
and
young
particular,
importance of
We will return to this question of the relation between Hegel's early work and his
friend H61derlin when we turn to Blanchot's reading of the former; see Chapter 4,
Sections 4.12 and 4.22, below..
24
25
PG, 145; PS, 110.
GSI, 158.
26 Kojeve and Hyppolite both emphasise this figuration of the dialectic in Hegel, in
his
Although
than
different
contemporary, Jean
more circumspect
their
ways.
143
Hyppolite places great weight upon the experience of dialectic as the relation of
intersubjectivity in the Phenomenology:
Experience is dialectical, but this dialectic manifests itself through the plurality and
relation of particular self-consciousnesses,that is, of particular perspectives.
"Dialectique et dialogue dans la PhenomMologie de Vesprit" (1956/7), in Figures de la
tcrits
1931-1968,2 volumes, Paris: P.U. F., 1971 [Quadrige,
pensie philosophique.
1991], 1,209-12,211.
27 Werke, 1,246; Early Theological Writings, 304-5.
28Cited in ILH, 512-3. Koj6ve
cites effectively the samepassagein HMC, 349-50. The
from
Werke, 1,246-7,249; Early
passage in question is excerpted and composed
Theological Writings, 305-6,307-8. In translating this passage from Kojeve's
translation of Hegel, I have tried to maintain the style of the foriner: the Gennan terms
I
1,
Kojeve's own addition; whilst my
thus
marked
are
in parenthesis, and all phrases
...
by
brackets.
throughout
square
own additions and omissions are signalled
29 Werke, 1,245-6; Early Theological Writings, 304.
30ILH, 513.
31SeeHMC, 349;
and ILH, 515.
32 Werke, 1,247; Early Theological Writings, 305-6;
cited ILH, 513.
33ILH, 515.
34The lineage
of Hegel's discourse on love from Plato's famous myth of the origin of
(1
by
('eros',
Symposium
89d1
92a)
is
'philia')
in
the
not
acknowledged
relations
sexual
Kojeve, for his reading sets Hegel's 'atheism' firmly against any reliance upon what he
for
Christian
Platonic
theology;
the
see
example, ILH, 536-9.
origins of
seesas
35
36
37
ILHI 5 14, n. 1.
Ibid.
Ibid.
38PG, 24; PS, §19. Hyppolite's
lacking
Kojeve's
the
whilst
violence
of
interpretation,
between
difference
Hegel's
'youthful
the
works'
same
reading, identifies essentially
and the Phenomenology:
Love does not insist enough upon the tragic character of separation, it lacks "the
force, patience and the work of the negative". This is why the encounter of selfis
consciousnesses manifested in this work as the conflict of self-consciousnessesto
love
less
is
Desire
that
than that of the virile
themselves
of
recognised.
make
by
desiring
desiring
consciousness.
consciousness another
recognition of one
See GSI, 158. Both interpreters of Hegel identify love as a lack of 'travail, ' as an
determines
'virile'
the
or
which
negativity
relation of active, productive
absence of
recognition.
39
PG, 14; PS, §5.
40Three 'moments' turn out to be central to this reading of Hegel's implicit criticisms
dialectic
(B-IV-A),
Phenomenology:
the
love
in
the
which of course
master-slave
of
forins the schematic heart of Kojeve's 'explication'; the relation of 'imposture'
144
['Betrug'] between the (Romantic) intellectual and the work (C-(AA)-V-C-a); and the
(C-(BB)[',
Sittlichkeit']
between
family
in
the
clash
and authority
ethical community
VI-A).
41Ibid. Kojeve
distinct
by
his
telescoping
and separatemoments
often supports
analysis
love
direct
in
Phenomenology.
himself
Koieve
the
that
critique
of
of
no
exists
grants
the Phenomenology. So instead, he relates the concept of recognition to that of love by
implicitly juxtaposing the master-slave dialectic alongside the tragic conflict of familial
love (Antigone) and city-state politics (Creon) which Hegel analyses in the section on
Sittlichkeit. See PG, 327-54; PS, 267-289. For Koj&ve's analysis of this section, see
ILH, 98-105.
42
ILH, 5 14, n. 1.
43HMC, 350-1,
emphasis added.
44 Chambers Concise Dictionary [Cambridge: Chambers
and Cambridge University
Press, 1988] gives the following definition:
)
but
(phys.
lost for
entropy,
n. a measure of unavailable energy, energy still existing
doing
because
it exists as the internal motion of molecules: a
purpose of
work
disorder
heat
the
of a system: a measure of
content, regarded as increased
measure of
in a reversible changeby the ratio of heat taken in to absolute temperature. [Gr. Ev, in,
]
'transformation
to
turning,
represent
content'.
,upoiril,
intended
This use of a concept not only foreign to Hegel, but also unacknowledged by Kojeve,
plays only a descriptive role at this point, and does not seek to engage with its broader
and more complex importance in the physical sciences. For a comprehensive and
accessible account of the central role of entropy in the history of modem science, see
Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with
Nature, London: Flamingo/Harper Collins, 1984.
45
Ibid.
46ILH, 518, 1. See
n.
also the opening lines of Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer, Paris:
Obelisk Press, 1934 [London: Grafton Books, 19,65,91: '1 am living at the Villa
Borghese. There is not a crumb of dirt anywhere, nor a chair misplaced. We are all
friendship
dead.
'
Bataille's
thought
as complicity takes this 'living
of
alone and we are
as if dead' to the extreme; see in particular the reference to Blanchot which follows his
'But
himself
dead.
(VIII,
Blanchot
'
645**)
Miller
this
is
passagein
comments on
47Kojeve
fictional
bear
discount
in
Heinrich
Kleist's
'On
the
would
automatically
von
the Marionette Theatre' (1810), collected in Heinrich von Kleist, Charles Baudelaire
by
Essays
Dolls,
Maria
Rilke,
Ivor Parry, Han-nondsworth:
Rainer
translated
on
and
Penguin, 1.994,1-12. However, it is interesting to note the the way in which his account
figure
duel
between
Kojeve
for
the
man
and
animal
mirrors
of
struggle
pure
of a
is
It
unambiguously presented in terms of mastery, recognition and the
prestige.
6seriousness' of a duel or struggle. As a result, Kleist's duelling bear requires us to ask
by
Koj&ve
'seriousness,
bear's
'
the
means
what
insofar
as
seriousness is
exactly
described as the ascent of grace over thought, which is by definition given or natural,
highest
'grace
knowledge
time
the
the
spiritual
in
same
sense:
itself
returns
at
when
yet
has as it were gone through an infinity. ' (Ibid., 12.) This deeply Romantic conception
for
Kojeve's
deep
dualism;
problems
metaphysical
and once again, this theme
causes
145
will recur in Bataille's writings on the 'friendship of man and animal'; see the
discussion of Lascaux, in Section 3.22, below.
48HMC, 350. The
in
is,
the previous chapter, central to
saw
concept of eroticism
as we
Bataille's concerns, and to a large extent determines the role of the figure of woman in
his work as a whole. A number of commentators have contrasted Bataille's erotisme
by
Kojevean
"'Recognition"
'Reconnaisance':
Guerlac,
Suzanne
a woman! ', in
and
see
Allan Stoekl (ed), On Bataille. Yale French Studies, 78 (1990), 90-105; and Allan
Stoekl, 'Recognition in Madame Edwarda, ' in Carolyn Bailey Gill (ed), Bataille:
Writing the Sacred, London: Routledge, 1996,77-90. However, both essays fall to
love
from
distinction
to recognition in Koj&ve's
this
the
transition
to
relate
interpretation of Hegel. For a more sophisticated account of the relation of Hegelian
recognition and 'erotic domination, ' see also JessicaBenjamin, 'Master and Slave: The
Bonds of Love, ' in John O'Neill (ed), Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition.Texts and Commentary, Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1996,209-222.
49
50
51
52
ILH, 14.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
53For Kojýve, there
is a persistent linkage between 'simple' animal being and merely
theoretical thought, a combination which reaches its most explicit formulation in the
figure of the 'Intellectual' or the 'Romantic'.
54
55
56
Ibid.
Ibid.
ILH, 13.
57Paul Redding, "Hermeneutic
or Metaphysical Hegelianism? Koj&ve's Dilemma", in
The Owl ofMinerva, v. 22, n.2, Spring 1991,178.
58
59
60
HMC, 351.
ILH, 508, emphasis added.
V, 483.
61V, 299. Discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2,
above.
62V, 172.
63
64
V, 446.
V, 426-7.
65Bataille, "Le
(1953),
VIII,
la
la
504-20; 508.
de
mort et pyramide"
paradoxe
66Jacques Derrida, "De 1'6conomie restreinte a 1'economie generale. Un hegelianisme
I
de
Editions
Seuil,
la
dififýrence,
Paris:
1967,3
Ltcriture
7
1.
et
in
sans reserve",
67On the figure of the hinge, I refer in particular to Roger Laporte's comment that 'the
hinge' ['la brisure'] offers itself as 'a single word for designating difference and
Grammatology,
letter
Of
from
Jacques
Derrida,
by
translated
cited
in
a
articulation';
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press,
146
1976,65. The way in which Derrida goes on to develop this comment is, indeed, the
'hinge-point' of his thought writing:
Spacing as writing is the becoming-absent and the becoming-unconscious of the
subject. [ ...] Within the horizontality of spacing [ ...] it is not even necessary to say
that spacing cuts, drops, and causesto drop within the unconscious: the unconscious
is nothing without this cadence and before this caesura. This signification is formed
only within the hollow of diff6rance: of discontinuity and of discretion, of the
diversion and the reserve of what does not appear. [ ] The hinge marks the
...
impossibility that a sign, the unity of a signifier and a signified, be produced within
the plenitude of a present and an absolute presence.
(Ibid., 69, emphasis added.) Note that central to Derrida's argument at this point also is
Jakobson's account of how the opposition of oral speech ('physical continuity') and
written speech ('discrete constituents') in communication theory is resolved into the
linguistic analysis of the 'granular structure' of language through 'quantal description.
68 VIII, 300.
69 ,Hegel, I'liornme
I'histoire"
(1956),
XII, 349-69,350; and see also Bataille's
et
false
(V,
150).
the
the
of
non-work
of
mastery slave versus
sovereign
comparison of
70
71
72
73
ERG, 376.
XII, 349.
XII, 364.
ILH, 435, n. 1.
74XII, 35 1. Jean-Luc Nancy
(and
that
to) communication - which
the
exposure
of
notes
he designates, after Bataille, by the word 'partage' - only goes by way of 'the Hegelian
desire for recognition'. Yet he adds that the 'operativity' of recognition is, nonetheless,
knowing:
knowing
knowledge,
by
fact
'there
that
the
without
is
and without
preceded
"consciousness", that I am first exposedto the other, and exposed to the exposure of the
by
Community,
Peter Connor,
The
Inoperative
See
Nancy,
'
translated
edited and
other.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991,3 1. It is this precedence accorded to
finite
'non-savoir'
to
the
existence which this present analysis of
of
shared exposure
a
describe.
to
sovereignty seeks
75Ibid.,
emphasis added.
76Ibid., 352.
77
Ibid.
78 Ibid., 353.
79 Ibid., 357.
90Ibid., 354.
81Ibid., 356,
emphasis added.
82Ibid., 357.
83
84
Ibid.
Ibid.
147
85Ibid. It is therefore
Bataille
figure
the
the
criticises, as
slave
such
which
of
as
not
some commentators seem to think.
86Ibid. For the
friendship,
focussing
the
on
relation of sovereignty and
purposes of
we
will eschew a more detailed analysis of Bataille's theory of sacrifice which he presents
in the companion piece to this essay, "Hegel, la mort et le sacrifice" (1955), XII, 32645.
87
XII) 358.
88Ibid. 363.
9
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid., 360.
91 Ibid. The
proximity of Bataille's contestation of 'work' and a certain disdain for
technology is in evidence here, as it is in his repeated use of machinic or mechanical
describe
to
the operation of the Hegelian system. It is possible to link this
metaphors
trait to a reliance upon anthropology and naturalism in his presentation of sacrifice or
transgression, and hence to a certain irreducible nostalgia. To my mind, Geoffrey
Bennington has already broached this problem in his analysis of a 'logic of the
frontier', a 'becoming-economical' at the heart of Bataille's thought of the gift; see his
"Introduction to Economics, 1: Because the world is round", in Carolyn Bailey Gill
(ed), Bataille: Writing the Sacred, London: Routledge, 1995,46-57. However, this
linkage is by no means consistent or unambiguous, as we will discover in Bataille's
discussion of the sovereignty of art; see Section 3.22.
92
XII, 362.
93
Ibid. 369.
ý
94The
has
borrowed
from
by
been
Paul
'weakening
the
negative'
recent work
of
phrase
Davies, It is being used here, however, to introduce the minimal level of shared
'project' between Bataille and Blanchot - 'the work of friendship'.
95
96
Ibid.
XII, 354-5.
97Bataille, "La Souveraint6",
in La Part maudite: III, VIII, 285.
98Bataille, Lascaux,
de
Vart
(1955),
la
7-101,9.
IX,
ou
naissance
99 Ix, 11.
100Ibid.
101Ibid.
102IX, 12,
emphasis added.
103IX, 13.
104
105
Ibid.
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
IX, 14.
148
Chapter 4
The discretion of literature: Blanchot and Hegel
Discretion - reserve - is the place of literature.
Maurice Blanchot
Our inquiry into Blanchot's conception of friendship has brought us to ask about
his relation to Hegel. In the first two chapters, we found that Blanchot and Bataille
discretion
in
friendship
terms
of
and complicity: two contiguous yet
present
incompatible figures for a relation thought on the basis of either discontinuity or
Bataille's
In
the
third
work revealed that
continuity.
chapter, a closer analysis of
his formulation of 'complicit
friendship' articulated a strategic inversion of
Kojeve's dialectic of Recognition. By presenting this relation in terms of
incompletion and impossibility, Bataille uses it as a figure for his counter-reading
death
in
Phenomenology.
link
between
This
'setting
the
to
the
of
work'
of
friendship and Hegel's 'work'
leads us to ask whether there is a similar
final
In
Blanchot.
in
this
then,
the
chapter,
work
of
we need to
correspondence
his
'discretion'
Bataille's
thought
to
the
of
use of
relation of
ascertain whether
tcomplicity' is simply paraphrastic or whether - as our analyses in chapters one
in
these
two
indicated
terms
the
two
using
proximity
apparent
as synonyms
and
for ftiendship, indicates the presence of a more complex 'diff6rend'.
150
As we have argued in the Introduction, the influence of Hyppolite's translation
in
fact
fundamental
is
Phenomenology,
the
and commentary of
often overlooked,
to Blanchot's own readings of Hegel. This perspective provides the context for the
following argument: the place of Blanchot's thinking of friendship within his
work as a whole cannot be divorced from his reading of Hegel; and that this
(.place' is determined precisely in relation to the work of art. This argument will
be staged in two sections. In the first section, Blanchot's reading of Hegel will be
defined in the relation between the negative, language, and literature in "La
litterature et le droit d la mort"; and the figure of friendship will be indicated
within his formulation of ambiguity insofar as it sets in place a thinking of
discretion. We will be concerned with how this word, as the gesture or the figure
friendship,
designate
to
the 'place of literature'. The second section
of
can come
shows how, in texts ftorn LEspace litteraire and LAmitie,
Blanchot follows
Hegel indirectly by placing friendship in relation to the reception of works of art
from the past and the concomitant appearanceof these works 'as such'. It will be
argued that, throughout Blanchot's conception of the relation between of the fate
double
discern
the
the
work as such, we can
movement of discretion,
of art and
in
to
the
grasp
sense which Blanchot's own essays can be
which will allow us
defined as a work oOr iendship.
4.1 -A 'strange right': literature and negativity
The interplay of negativity, language and literature underpins Blanchot's inquiry
in "La litterature et le droit a la mort", the first piece in which his engagement
ý
interplay
is
his
Indeed,
becomes
by
this
Hegel
to
triggered
work.
central
with
two citations from Hegel. The first passageis the famous description of 'the life of
Phenomenology:
Preface
from
to
the
the
spirit'
151
But the life of spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself
it
[ertrdgt]
life
by
devastation,
but
that
the
and
endures
untouched
rather
maintains itself [sich erhdlt]
2
in it.
The second passage comes from the Jena Realphilosophie of 1803-4, one of the
early attempts to construct a philosophical 'system', in which Hegel uses the
illustrate
function
Adam
to
the
example of
essential
of naming as a defining
in
human
intelligence:
operation of negativity
The first act, by which Adam established his lordship over the animals, is
this, that he gave them a name, i. e., he negated them as beings [seyende],
and made them ideal for themselves [ffir sich
3
ideelen].
For Hegel's philosophy, the importance of the conceptual work expressedin these
two passagescannot be understated: it is the work of aufheben, the operationof
in
destroys
the same
and preserves or maintains
negativity which uproots or
in
is
What
this
concerns us
section the significance of these two passages
moment.
for Blanchot. What 'work' do they perform in his inquiry into the relation between
literature and negativity? What does it give us to understand about the general
his
by
literature
Hegel?
The
to
negativity
rethinking of
way of
relation
nature of
informs
in
language
Blanchot's
literary
the words of
work
as
whole;
a
and
Frangoise Collin, the negative provides the 'ultimate' and 'inaugural' theme of his
work.
4 In turn, by
in
'literature'
this relation to Hegel's 'work of the
placing
begins
'work'_,
lines
Blanchot
to
the
the
along
also
refigure
of
negative',
desoeuvrement and discreti-o-n.
First of all,, a remark about the structure of Blanchot's essay. It originally
"Le
de
in
1'esprit"
"La
titles,
two
separate
with
r&gne
parts
animal
and
appeared
litterature et le droit a la mort".
5 These two
parts constitute a single work; the
6
latter is described as 'la suite et la fin' of the former. There is no sign of this
division when the essay is reprinted, italicised throughout, at the end of La Part
du feu (1949). Even in this form, however, the original division remains, for the
152
two 'halves' of the essaytreat of two distinct topics in quite different ways. In "Le
regne animal de Fesprit", Blanchot explores the contradictions Of the writer and
the act of writing by running through and rearranging a series of 'moments'
selected from the Phenomenology: the spiritual-animal kingdom; the dependence
indepedence
and
of self-consiousness; freedom of self-consciousness (stoicism,
scepticism, and unhappy consciousness); and absolute freedom (the Terror of the
French Revolution). These moments are recognisable, but their senseand order of
dialectical unfolding are manipulated in accordancewith Blanchot's focus on the
literary work as 'the work par excellence. 7 Why this privilege of the (Hegelian)
it
justifiable?
is
in
Is
It
this
that
to
the second part he
as
work
a work of art?
end
develops an account of the relation of literature to language in general. This
account seeks to describe this exemplarity of the literary work on the basis of an
irreducible ambiguity which is conceived as the most minimal, incipient state of
language. This doubling of senseis at work in the simplest act of naming, as the
operation of the most basic and primeval component of language.
In this way, the second half sketches out the paradoxical condition for the
first.
in
in
half
This
the
that
the
means
effect
second
contradictions analysed
cuts
back beneath those categories (such as 'work', 'writing', and 'experience') whose
paradoxes are unfolded in the first half, by refashioning 'literature' as a form of
desoeuvrement
into
(as
the
yet unnamed) movement of
as that 'space'
research
is
in
half
'work'
It
this
the
appears as such.
second
of the essay that
within which
in
look
his
for
Blanchot's
Hegel;
rewriting
of
particular,
appropriation of
we will
the two passages from Hegel which figure the work of negativity within the
development of consciousnessand spirit. Of these two passagesonly the Jena text
is formulated by Hegel in explicitly linguistic terms. However, Blanchot takes
both the 'life of spirit' and Adamic naming as figures for the most basic structure
form
literature
into
he
language;
the
the relation
as
research
situates
of
and
of
between language and negativity. In this way, these Hegel citations form the
bridge
halves
Blanchot's
the
two
thematic
which
unites
of
essay.
conceptual and
(Indeed, we shall see that they are interwoven in a decisive passageon literature as
153
a form of 'recherche'. ) The 'life of spirit' passage,prior to the second half, is first
cited as a kind of conclusion, at the end of "Le regne animal de 1'esprit":
Literature glimpses itself in revolution, it justifies itself in it, and if it has
been called the Terror, it is because it's ideal is indeed this historical
bears
"life
death and maintains itself within
the
moment,
moment when
death itself' in order to obtain from it the possibility and the truth of
speech. Here is [C'est la] the "question" which seeks to accomplish itself
8
in literature and which is its being.
Up to this point, Blanchot has followed the relation of 'writer', 'literature', and
'world' through a series of irreconcilable contradictions, which culminate and
in
coalesce the moment when literature 'sees itself in the 'historical moment' of
absolute
9
freedom, 'the Terror'. Thus, the 'passage from
nothing to everything'
which characterisesrevolutionary activity is mirrored by the writer, whose literary
"
0
The citation of
activity proceeds 'without pause and almost without mediation.
the 'life of spirit' figures this moment of reflection; and so it is used to gather up
the preceding movement of contradictions, and to maximise their contradictory
force. The question of literature is inverted. 'C'est U la <<question)) qui cherche a
la
&tre.
'
dans
litterature
The
'about'
et
qui
est
son
question
asked
s'accomplir
literature becomes what literature 'is about. In "Le regne animal de 1'esprit" this
final enigmatic line formed a solitary new paragraph, as if it stood apart from the
in
'there'
['la'],
body
the
text,
the
this
question's arrival,
pointing out
main
of
'moment'
identification.
How
ideal
should we understand this tentative
of
("question... which does not appear to ask anything? Does it announce the arrival
On
the
truth
the
of
or
preceding
result
contradictions?
perhaps,
of something new,
in
its
lies
'being'
...
literature.
his
It is
this
the contrary,
question...
caution about
less a new shape or result of previous contradictions than a stumbling block that
it
first
for
'la'
the
time:
literature
the
marks
point
as such,
exposes
- at which
literature has become a question that concerns itself with its own origin, with 'the
truth
the
of speech'.
and
possibility
154
Blanchot does not present this correlation between the 'right to death' and the
'life of spirit' as an interpretation of the Phenomenology. So what does this
following
it
itself.
In
here?
literature
Hegel
do
It
the
to
citation of
sections,
shows
draws
be
draws
that
this
will
our attention to the
argued
upon and
correlation
question of language in the Hegelian text. It is because this question is already
present within the very structure of the Phenomenology that Blanchot, in the
his
language:
'language
is
'life
the
the life
course of
essay, can rewrite
of spirit' as
11
which bears death and maintains itse4f within it. ' In this gradual rewriting of
famous
the
perhaps
most
passage from Hegel, Blanchot not only inscribes the
determinate
operation of
negation at the centre of his analysis of language and
literature; but more importantly, he places literature at the heart of our experience
first
In
in
then,
this
the
section,
of negativity.
we will examine
way
which
Blanchot rewrites Hegel around the question of language by exploiting the
fundamental and unstable sense of 'disquiet' (which Hyppolite identifies as the
dialectical
he
Hegel's
In
this
scepticism).
motor of
way,
opens up the relation of
language, memory and negativity in the passage from Hegel's Realphilosophie.
Then, in the second section, we will see how his treatment of this passage about
Adamic language opens onto the 'ultimate ambiguity' of literary language.
4.11 - The disquiet of language
Recall that it is an inversion by which the 'question of literature' turns into its very
'being' that allows Blanchot to present literature as the relation to an origin. The
less
is
in
than
that
of
meaning
and
communicability
nothing
origin in question
focus
in
from
This
the writer's experience of writing to the
shift
general.
in
is
fixed
language
lines
the
opening
of the essays
ontological condition of
droit
le
la
it
litterature
in
"La
half
the
et
a
mort"
as
appears
original
second
Critique:
155
Literature
is bound to language. Language is at once comforting
and
disquieting. When we speak, we make ourselves masters of things with an
is
immediately
I
that
this
she
available
ease
satisfies us. say:
woman, and
to me, I push her away, bring her close, she is everything that I desire her
to be, she becomes the place of the most surprising transformations
and
actions: speech is the ease and security of life. We cannot do anything with
a nameless object.
12
Blanchot announces here the main theme for the second half of this essay: the
is
lies
heart
fois
language.
'Langage
la
the
essential ambiguity which
at
of
est a
rassurant et inquietant. ' It is the simultaneity of 'comfort' and 'unease' that
defines our relation to language, and so informs the literature that is 'bound' to it.
But what is it 'in' language that comforts us? And what is it that disquiets us? Is it
the same thing? The final sentencesignals a latent anxiety which returns to haunt
Blanchot's inquiry: 'D'un objet sans nom, nous ne savons rien faire. ' This
'disquiet' in the face of the 'nameless' arises from the very aspect of language
'comfort'
'savoir
faire':
which provides our unconcerned
and
The word gives me the being, but it gives it to me deprived of being. It is
the absence of this being, its nothing [neant], that which remains of it
is
fact
is
it
lost
being,
it
has
that
that
to
the
sole
not. From this
when
say
is
to
speak a strange right.
point of view,
13
Hence, the 'lack' ['d6faut'] of any immediate relation between words and things
does not represent a lacuna in the operations of speech. On the contrary, this
'fault' or 'gap' is the origin of all its 'ease and security'. Our mastery and our
fact
it
'sole
is
the
the
this
the
that
root:
power
negative;
same
of
not'.
unease share
For Blanchot, it is this constitutive 'nothing' that makes the act of speaking a
4strange right.
in unfolding this constitutive relation of language and the negative he draws
himself ever closer to Hegel, who conceives of language as the expressive
156
inner
the
medium of universality, or
conceptual
external existence of an
intelligence. Hegel's first attempt to work out a speculative account of the
development of spirit, the Jena Realphilosophie (1803-4), begins with language,
'die SpMehe'. Language is conceived as the first stage of this development: the
transition from the 'dumb signification' which characterises (merely empirical)
'imagination' to the first 'existence of consciousness' which emerges through
14
memory and the production of names. For Hegel, all thought begins with the
first
insofar
it
in
Consciousness
name.
exists
as exists a nomenclature. Hence his
is
Adam's
'first
the
to
the
giving
example:
of names
act', the original
animals
15
mark of man's relation to himself and to the world. This conception of language
as the initial form of negativity in name-giving memory, or 'Geddchtnis', is one
16
that Hegel allies to 'the Mnemosyne of the ancients', the mother of the muses.
He sets himself against the idea that the intellectual operation of memory is
intuition
identified
the
to
recollection
and
maintenance
a
reducible
of sensible
as
'something past'. On the contrary, the 'true meaning' of this memory lies in the
irreversible
it
transformation on the content of every
that
way
performs an
intuition,
it
making
'thought'
something
into a 'matter-of-memory' ['GeddchtnipSache'], into
17
['gedanken'l.
All thought begins with this 'thinking
in
because
that
takes
everything
place
consciousness comes
memory' of names
in
in
dap
denken.
['It
'Es
Namen,
'
'Aufhebung'.
this
ist
wir
is names that we
after
18
think. '] In this way, Hegel's concern is not with the origin of language, but with
the origin that language is for thought. What is the significance of this origin in
the Phenomenology?
The figure of Adam passesftom Hegel to Blanchot via Hyppolite, who uses it
to link the most basic characterisation of language in the Phenomenology - what
Hegel calls 'Beschreiben', a 'description' that is 'a superficial extraction of the
later
introduction
ftom
in
the
the
the
with
sensible'
of
art
and
poetry
universal
19
"RELIGION" chapter. Although Blanchot's citation is not an exact transcription
ftom Geneseet structure, the discussion here is important for an understanding of
his approach to Hegel in "La litterature et le droit a la mort". On the one hand,
157
Hyppolite (unlike Kojeve, for example) accords language a properly originative
role in the Phenomenology. He states that the presupposition of communicability
in the opening dialectic of sense-certainty is the reason why Hegel 'returns [to it]
ceaselessly throughout the course of this work': it is the very 'fact that things can
be said' that bears within it 'the sign' of the concept, the identity of nature and
20
in
he
fact
On
hand,
'human
Logos.
the
that such a
the
the
spirit
other
underlines
is
is
just
but
the
that,
presupposition
a preliminary position:
word already,
not yet
the concept; it is still 'merely a sign' which remains external to the concept. In
short, he reaffirms Hegel's dictum that language is 'das Dasein des Geistes', 'the
(external) existence of spirit'; a phrase which, for Hyppolite, defines the 'function'
21
is
language
'accompanies
developments'
This
the
this
that
of
principal
of
work.
also how Hegel defines the activity of the poet in (implicit) contrast to the work of
22
the philosopher. It is to illustrate this point that Hyppolite explicitly ties this
language
beginning
to
the
thought
of
of poetry:
most primitive and external
Like the poet, particularly the epic poet, who by speaking things gives
them the stamp of universality and the form of thought, so in naming
things we raise them from the sensible to thought. In the first philosophy
is
[
],
lay
Hegel
this
things,
memory of
which at
great stressupon
of spirit ...
the same time a memory of words, the Mnemosyne of the Ancients. Purely
intuition
is
"In
being
is
the
the
overcome.
name,.
empirical
sensible
it
ideal.
first
by
becomes
The
Adam
act
which
something
suppressed...
is
in
domination
he
his
the
that
animals
over
which
gave them
constituted
23
,,
ideal
being
for
them
them
themselves.
and
making
as
a name, negating
The significance of Adam's 'first act' is that the name can give things only 'the
form
is
It
'the
thought'.
this
of
or
superficiality of the
of
universality'
stamp
defines
language
in
to
the
that
terms
concept
respect
with
word
spoken or written
is
Hyppolite,
Adamic
For
figure
the
the
'already'/'not
poet
yet".
of the
of an
Phenomenology: it is 'particularly
the epic poet' whose naming can 'raise'
['clever'] a thing from sensuousintuition into simple thought. When he appears in
158
"'Kunstreligion",
the 'epic poet' or 'bard' ['der Sdnger'] presents the transition
from the 'living'
to the 'spiritual'
is
he
'individual
insofar
the
as
work of art
and
or the subject of the world, in whom this world 'is produced and
actual spirit',
24
borne'.
In this
way, the ...pathos... of the poet-subjeýct marks the existence of the
cearliest language' ['die erste Sprache],
the first and most primitive
form of
linguistic representation: 'the epic as such' 25 The production of the epic is not an
.
immediate
feeling
interiorisation
for
nature,
of words'
consciousness
the work
of
mediation
and
spiritual
which requires distance and the passing of time, This work too is
carried out under poetry's
'memory
but
'the
Mnemosyne of the ancients':
muse,
aswell as 'of things'
[Besinnung]
and
a
which
gradually
it is this
triggers
'the awakening
of
developed
inwardness,
the
26 What links Adam
[Erinnerung]
immediate
of
previously
remembrance
essence'.
is
(the
is
It
the
their receptivity to Mnemosyne
epic poet
muse of) memory.
and
that makes them both figures of a double beginning: the first language, and
language as thefirst 'existence of spirit'.
So how should we characterise the relation of language and dialectic in the
27
Phenomenology? Unlike the Science of Logic, Hegel does not aim to begin from
Realphilosophie,
language
is
the
not
a state of presuppositionlessness; and unlike
development.
in
Hegel
to
consciousness'
a specific moment
purposely
consigned
begins in medias res: the first chapter begins with the slipperiness of the words
'this', 'here', 'now'. Thus, the Phenomenology presupposes the existence of (a
dialectic
language
lies
language.
The
in
thus
this
and
of
relation
complex)
(The
fact
is
that
and
mediation.
neither
communicability
given
presupposition of
is
)
in
One
their
the
text
mark
of
ubiquity.
a
can step
explanation
any explicit
dialectic
little
history.
the
language
step
outside
of
can
as
one
of
as
of
outside
Hence, language permeates the historical development of consciousness in the
Phenomenology, whether in the fonn of the speculative proposition or the epic
immediacy,
Hegel
language
its
beginning
the
By
of
allows
with
very
poem.
fact
language;
fact
is
the
there
the
that
of communicability - to
givenness is
in
It
immersion
this
mediation.
very givenness of
own
our
confront us with
159
language that is expressed in the 'already'/'not yet'. The dialectic of sensecertainty enacts this immanence in language, which is what he means by saying
that language itself is always 'more truthful' than consciousness' unthinking use
28
['vorstellen'],
'represent'
In
form,
to
this
of words.
consciousnessclaims
naYve
here and now, this particular being ('I say: this woman'), without realising that
29
it
is
'expresses' ['aussprechen] every time
what
a pure, empty universal . Its
is
by
between
to
truth
the
claim
unmediated
gap
undone
what it 'means'
30
['meinen'] and what it says. The truth of language, for Hegel, lies in this
mediation: by exposing the meaning invested in it, language always alters it. In
the Hegelian text, the ensuing contradictions are not deficiencies of language, but
from
it.
What 'we' need to grasp, Hegel
consciousness' misconceptions of
result
is
'divine
language,
the
claims, what consciousnesscannot:
nature' of
which lies
in 'directly reversing the meaning of what is said [die Meinung unmittelbar zu
it
into
letting
thus
of
making
something
else,
and
not
what is meant
verkehren],
31
instability
is
language
in
This
Hegel's
into
text as a
at
all'.
of
pivotal
words
get
first,
it
is
for
language
through
two
that the self-certain
whole
reasons:
only
itself
by
is,
be
that
express
and
recognised
others
subject can
as such
selfit
is
because
'finds
through its use of language
a voice'; and second,
consciousess
that consciousnessruns up against its own errors, this process illuminates, for the
first time, the state of internal contradiction in which consciousnessexists 'for us'
incessant
'we',
this
transfiguration
the
the
grasp
reversal
readers,
who
can
and
as
truth of language. Thus, Hegel relies upon this 'divine nature' - which, by his own
definition, is an unwieldy component to rely upon - to introduce 'us' to the
inversion.
dialectical
movement of
The structural ambiguity of meaning and expression, which is in the 'nature'
inversion
in
dialectical
Phenomenology.
In
language,
the
theform
the
of
sets
of
Introduction, this process of repeated inversion is described as 'a thoroughgoing
32At
finds
its
knowing,
is
that
consciousness
of
what most
every stage
scepticism'.
'real' and most familiar becomes 'un-real' and un-familiar; its experience is a
Hegel
becoming
without
respite.
calls the movement of
state of constant unrest, a
160
this negativity, which constitutes the subject as such, 'die Unruhe' (translated
equally well as 'unrest', 'unease, 'disquiet', or 'restlessness'). The transition by
which consciousness always exceeds its own limits, spoiling its 'own limited
satisfaction', is not without pain and struggle; it does not freely welcome such
traumatic disturbance, even preferring to remain in a state of quiescence and
untruth.
Yet consciousnesscan find no peace [keine Ruhe]. If it wishes to remain in
a state of unthinking inertia, then thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and
its own unrest [Unruhe] disturbs its inertia. 33
At the heart of this scepticism, 'Unruhe' forms the pivot for Hegels account of the
distinction between death as the event which ends all natural life and as that which
is proper to consciousness. It describes this effort and effect of thinking; what
Hegel calls 'the work of the negative'. Hence, when we read that it is
it
is
important
['seine
Unruhe'],
for
to
that,
unrest
remember
consciousness'
is
its
less
death;
this
than
experience nothing
own
consciousness,
and if it must
impersonal
force
its
dialectical
'its
then
this
resist
of
own
unfolding,
own unrest'
"Sense-Certainty",
In
to
as
such
natural consciousness may
can only appear
us.
learn from its experience, but it is 'always forgetting it and starting the movement
34
difference
in
between
'
This
lies
therefore,
the
all over again.
perspective,
forgetful 'inertia' of natural consciousness,and the 'Unrahe' of phenomenological
in
in
lives
its
recollection;
short, natural consciousness
a state of oblivion, whilst
4own unrest' is already the work of this recollective consciousness as yet
unrecognised within it. The impersonal restlessness of this memory is what
dispossesses and disorients natural consciousness, forcing it to outstrip its own
itself.
disequilibrium
Yet
is only
things
this
and
of
sense of
conception of
discernable 'behind the back' of consciousness.It is 'our' perspective on events,
is
by
detennined
In
text,
the
this
this sense,
which
of
remembering.
our reading
the double perspective of 'Rir es' and 'ftir uns' is determined by memory. Only
from 'our' perspective can the 'subject' of the Phenomenology be seen to be
161
35
by
its
oriented
own disorientation. If such disorientation pushes consciousness
from moment to moment, it is always driven towards recollecting its orientation in
the whole, in the identity of concept and object which is the 'goal' of absolute
knowing.
It is the movement of 'Unruhe' that prompts this recollective structure, insofar
it
forms
the movement by which the subject undergoes the dissolution of its
as
'identity' in order, ultimately, to find it again in its other. Once again, it is Jean
Hyppolite, perhaps more than any other commentator, who is at pains to place this
'Unruhe' at the heart of the Hegelian conception of dialectic:
The epithet that returns most often in the Hegelian dialectic is unruhig.
This life is restlessness,restlessnessof the Self which loses itself and finds
itself again in its alterity; yet it is never coincidence with itself, for it is
in
be
itself;
it
itself
in
determination,
to
always other order
always posits
a
and always negates itself in order to be itself, because this determination,
is
its
first
negation. This is the being of man "who is never
as such, already
he
is,
is
he
is
and
always
what
what
not".
36
This 'life' is the 'life of spirit'. To say that one must think 'spirit' as 'subject'
in
interpretation
'Unruhe'.
If
Hyppolite's
that
think
terms
one
must
means
of
of
Hegel possessesa 'key' of any kind, it lies in 'Finqui&tude'. At the beginning of
his translation of the Phenomenology, he notes that 'the dialectic of human
disquiet is perhaps one of the fundamental intuitions of Hegelianism; and again
in Genese et structure, he states that this 'unruhig' subject forms the 'point of
departure of Hegelian speculation' from the earliest attempts at a systematic
37
kind
is
being
What
here?
Jena.
Recall that Kojeve
of
claim
made
philosophy at
'key
Hegelianism,
final
'satisfaction
'Recognition'
the
the
notion'
of
as
posits
of
39
Like Kojeve, Hyppolite emphasises the sense of
Desire' and 'end of History'.
historical
development
inherent
the
to
of spirit; the negativity of a
violent conflict
itself;
'coincidence
that
with
is never
subject
and the central importance of
intersubjectivity and community in the Phenomenology. But instead of lifting out
162
immanent
foregrounds
'moment'
Hyppolite
the
for
to stand
the whole,
one
locates
He
in
Introduction.
had
the
Hegel
the
text
structure of
outlined
which
instability
is
'It
this
dialectical
heart
this
the
unrest at
unrest or
of
of experience:
39
natural consciousness which is the dialectic of experience.' In this way, he
recognises that if spirit is to be conceived as subject, then the Hegelian epithet of
ýL'unruhig' cannot describe an attribute of a self, as if were a matter of adding to
some pre-constituted personality or identity. Instead, the restlessnessof the subject
is 'existential' in the sense of an infinite, impersonal movement that passes
through all the 'moments' of the text, whether it (the subject) appears as
40
'world-spirit,.
That
consciousness,,self-consciousness, community, a society, or
is
is
in
'subject'
'unruhig'
it
from
'is'
the
that
this
which
sense
nothing apart
becoming,
in
its
historical
forms,
of
all
ceaselessmovement
of
and cultural
which
eventually joins all of them together as a recollected whole.
If the act of naming marks the co-belonging of memory and language at the
if
defined
is
by the senseof disquiet experienced
thinking
thought,
origins of
and
in the uprooting and abandonment of meaning, then it is interesting that Hyppolite
figure
instance
locates
Hegel's
the
the
explicitly
of
poet as
of this origin. In the
following
section, then, we will
how
Hyppolite's
these
elements
of
show
exposition - Adamic naming; the epic poet; Tinquietude' - both inform and are
transfonned by Blanchot's presentation of literature and literary language in "La
litterature et le droit a la mort".
I
4.12 - The ambiguity of literature
After this detour through Genese et structure, it is possible to read Blanchot's
description of language in terms of Tinquietude' in its proper context
41
In fact,
.
Blanchot uses this word in "La litterature et le droit a la mort" to describe not only
language in general, but also to denote an 'authentic' or 'essential' experience of
literature. In this way, Tinquietude' yields an important clue about the nature of
163
the relation to Hegel in his work as a whole. In spite of his 'distance' from
Hegel's text, he borrows from it what is (for Hyppolite, at least) a 'fundamental'
concept, and diverts it in another direction. So what does Tinquietude' mean for
Blanchot? Hyppolite defines it as the structuring movement of, and therefore 'our'
perspective on, the becoming of consciousness.Blanchot seizes upon this relation
of disquiet and the negative in order to describe the constitution of literature:
[L]iterary language is made of disquiet, it is also made of contradictions.
Its position is hardly stable and hardly solid
42
.
Literature has a precarious state of existence. Indeed, for Blanchot, it is a wonder
that it exists at all, as the title of an earlier work testifies - "Comment la litt6rature
43
fragility
is
',
linked
impersonality.
This
Just as
to
est-elle possible?
a sense of
Hyppolite discerns that Hegel's restless scepticism carries out an existential
intensification of experience only 'for us, and not for the consciousness that
it,
locates
inquietude
level
is
Blanchot
too
that
so
at a
undergoes
constitutive of
literary experience as such. But what kind of 'experience' is this?
It is to this end that the two Hegel passagesare Juxtaposed with references to
44
Hblderlin and Mallarme. At first, the two poets appear to function as mediators
insofar
Hegelian
as they are said to bear witness to 'la merveille
of
concepts
inquietante' concealed within the Adamic act of naming.
45 Yet they
are much
'poetic'
discourse,
for
'literary'
it
is
than
this
examples of a philosophical
more
or
testimony that makes them representatives of 'all those for whom poetry has the
essence of poetry
46
for its theme'. In the determination
of this 'essence' the
identity of literature (as well as its relation to philosophy) is under negotiation.
Literature has been placed at the heart of our experience of negativity in a way
that prefigures Blanchot's later claim, in LEspace
fitt&aire
(1955), that
MallarmCs 'Hegelian vocabulary would merit no attention if it were not animated
47
[
]
by an authentic experience, ... that of the power of the negative. ' Like
6essence', the word 'authentic' here causes the relation between literature and
balance.
in
If
Blanchot
borrows
from
hang
Hegel
in
defining
the
to
philosophy
164
language in terms of ';unrest' and 'contradiction', these terms also pass by way of
the poets' experience of poetry. It is only after positing poetry as an investigation
into its own 'essence' that Blanchot introduces the passageabout Adamic naming
from the Realphilosophie. Indeed, one question that arises from this presentation
is why Hegel, in this passage, is described as the 'friend and fellow-spirit'
of
1461derlin. (Blanchot locates this relation 'here', 'en cela'. ) This reference to
HdIderlin gives him a certain purchase upon Hegel's text, enabling him to rewrite
this passage from that 'point of view' to which both H61derlin and Mallarme are
said to bear witness. Let us read the passagein context:
From this point of view, to speak is a strange right. Hegel, in a text from
before The Phenomenology, here the friend and fellow spirit [prochain] of
H61derlinYwrote: "The first act,,by which Adam made himself master of
the animals, was to impose a name on them, that is to say that he negated
them in their existence (as existents)." Hegel means that from this instant,
the cat ceasedto be a uniquely real cat, in order to become an idea as well.
The meaning of speech demands, therefore, as a prelude to every word, to
immense
hecatomb,
flood,
a preliminary
plunging all
all speech, a sort of
beings,
into
God
had
but
had
to
created
sea.
man
creation
a complete
is
in this way that they take on a meaning for him, and
It
them.
annihilate
he creates them in his turn on the basis of this death in which they have
disappeared; only that, in place of beings [Wes] and, as we say, existents
[existants], there was only being [Fetre], and man was condemned not to
be able to approach anything and live anything save through the meaning
48
that he had to create.
It is no exaggeration to say that the entire secondhalf of "La litterature et le droit a
la mort" unfolds from this passage. A number of aspects, therefore, are worth
in
description
is
biblical
language
taken
the
The
theme
allegory
up
of
of
noting.
deluge
The
in
'un
from
the
pr6alable'.
process
of
signification
out of
arising
'Aufhebung'
bloc.
imagined
is
The
a
priori
en
and
repetitions of
naming
of
165
apnonty and totality - 'prelude', 'preliminary', 'on the basis of;
gevery', 'complete sea', 'immense'
'all creation',
language
the
as
an
originary
of
sense
convey
-
fact: the very fact that there is language. In another essay from the same year
Blanchot states that it is the 'example of poets like Mallarme and H61derlin' that
gives us access to 'the originalfact
interlocutor
from
language',
which each
of
49
and every act of communication takes its 'sense and existence' .
This 'original
fact' also echoes the senseof impersonal necessity expressedby 'Mnemosyne' in
Hegel's example. Blanchot makes this sense explicit in the schema of Genesis:
'God had created beings, but man had to annihilate them. ' The act of destructionis
double
imperative
the
creation
of our being finite. When he refers to a
'hecatomb% a sacrifice of huge proportions, it is as if what language gives man, in
the wake of this necessary and prior oblivion, is already dead, sacrificed to the
50
had
'that
he
'sense'
If
the
to
to
create'.
words
give
us
access
of things,
meaning
it is only on the condition of the prior absenceof every determinate 'thing', for the
involve
Hegel
the
the passing of the thing
name, as
shows us, must
existence of
into meaninglessness.It is the moment of sheer universality, originary yet empty.
For Hegel, let us recall, the memory of names has nothing to do with indicating
'past-ness' of an intuition or with resuscitating a past present as something 'initself. The 'true meaning' of 'Gedachtnis' is simultaneously that of a thinking
both
In
their
this
empty, mechanical repetition.
sense,
constitutive of names and
is
flood
Adam's
'first
that
the
act'
portray
a
moment
primordial
and
allegories dual
determination
in
Blanchot
this
seizes
upon
measure.
as a
and prodigal
equal
logical
into
Hegel's
the sphere of
necessity,
argument, with all
way of extending
literature.
Indeed, it is by repeating and deepening Hegelian negativity that Blanchot
begins to displace the terms of Hegel's original argument. This fundamental
determination of memory draws together language and finitude, binding the act of
dying
Blanchot
the
fact
to
the
one
and
same
movement.
suggests
of
speaking and
language
interrelation
fundamental
and mortality announces itself in
that the
of
dialogue
and conversation. If an intimation of
the movement of exchange, such as
166
death lies at the origin of all communication, binding together speaker and listener
as well as words and things, then any apriority of language must lie in this
articulation of discontinuity. Death is what comes 'between us as the distance that
separates us'; yet at the same time it is that which 'prevents us ftom being
51
it
separated', for contains within itself 'the condition of all understanding'. The
condition of finitude is nothing other than this constitutive separation of beings: it
is the interval which irrevocably separatesand individuates beings, whilst in that
it
very separation also makes possible every form of interpersonal relation and
interaction. (In this respect, recall that Hegel's most famous figure for the power
of mediation is the act of 'looking the negative in the face'. ) Thus, death is 'in'
language as the communicability of communication, as the spacing of all relation.
In our opening chapter, we noted this kind of formulation in "L'amitie",
when
Blanchot defines discretion as the 'pure interval' which measuresout the distance
'between' friends: 'this fundamental separation on the basis of which what
52
becomes
What
friend's
death
brings
the
the
relation.
separates
ultimate event of
is of course the effacement of this communicating distance. Between these two
deaths Blanchot locates the paradox of giving expressive form to the fundamental
condition for expression, of communicating 'communicability',
or of speaking
about that 'on the basis of which' something like speech can take place. What we
formulae
is
limit
is,
in
that
the
or
of expression communication approach such
the limit of sense which is its condition and origin. He repeatedly states that
being
but
dies
spoken,
rather that speech always signals the
nothing
as a result of
'possibility of this destruction'. The idea that death lies embeddedwithin the word
is
'a
because
to
that
persistent
such
event;
speech
an
and
we
our
allusion
means
from
'death
such
a
vast
reservoir
of
memory,
so
we
when
speak
speak
always
53
fact
is
language
is
itself
The
that
there
in
a sign; every act of speech,
speaks' us.
finite
being
indication
the
to
warning;
every
name,
a
an
and
allusion
of the one
an
is
hears
that
these words.
which
named,
and
everyone
of
who
who speaks, of
'Possibility'; 'allusion'; 'sign': it is not a personal or direct threat of death that
disturbs us when we speak. What 'disquiets' us in language is rather its
167
indirection. Even in the "Preface", when Hegel looks the negative 'in the face', it
is not a matter of an uninediated face-to-face relation. One cannot 'look the
negative in the face' nor 'tarry with it' any more than one can hold death at an
arm's length. This most famous figure of speech in the Phenomenology installs a
discourse on mediation by rhetoricizing death. The originariness of our relation to
death must be articulated in the element of language, even as this relation is itseýf
this originary element. Death becomes a rhetorical figure or trope with the same
it
locates
that
stroke
at the origin of all figuration and troping. In this case, it is the
trope of prosopopoeia that loans to the negative a 'face' into which we can 'look'
['ins Angesicht schaut'], as well as a certain presence 'by' which we can 'tarry' or
54
'dwell' ['bei ihm. verweilt'].
What is abstract and inanimate is thus given human
characteristics. This ventriloquism opens a subtle rhetorical gap into which the
negative is able to slip and to slip away, for in the name absenceand unreality are
transforined into being and presence: 'This tarrying is the magic power which
55
turns it (back) into being [die es in das Sein umkehrt]. ' Hegel knows that the
[Umgekehrt]
it
'the
reversal
ambiguity of
remains whether one calls
negative',
4magical power', 'death', 'deterininate negation', or 'unreality'. In short, one only
in
lending
'face':
it,
it
'it'
'want'
to
name
another
whatever
we may
give
succeeds
is still just another (human) mask, just another substitute presence for what is not
there. The negative remains inextricably bound to the inversions of language.
Hegel introduces the theme of negativity through prosopopo'eia.Only through
this figuration can death 'speak', can it 'face' or show itself to us as the
(possibility' of destruction. But what can it say? What can it show us? It says and
death
is
it
is
For
be
thing:
that
no
not
something
can
an
shows precisely nothing.
it
is
from
'nothing'
for
this
that speech and
yet
precisely
consciousness;
object
first
determining
If
the
task
the originary relation of
spring.
of
consciousness
language and negativity itself requires words, metaphors, and figures, then these
tropes (by which it turns to gaze upon itself) form an inextinguishable remainder
(for which there is no word) which will always confront us at the reflexive limit of
language. Speculative thinking
lives off
this remainder within
linguistic
168
death.
Hyppolite
to
'life'
lives
this
the
through
reflexivity:
relation
on
of spirit
displays such a rhetorical turn when he refers to the limitation of language as the
Csign' of 'the human Logos: the relation of sign to concept is that of the word to
'the Word'. Thus, Hegel cultivates and incorporates the aporia of language as the
power of the sign. This is the 'speculative spirit' or 'divine nature' of language
intimates
the essential reversibility of 'being' and 'nothing'. If nothingness
which
is always 'of something' - that is, if it takes on a determinate meaning in the
interaction between speakers,sign, and referent - then the word is also more than
is
'something'
With
to
the
a sign referring
absent.
word, meaning present. To posit
is
in
(to
to
speak)
suspend,
something
advance, everything except the movement
of positing as such. For Hegel, it follows that every sign is posited as a meaning
56
is
itself
inversion
'the
Speculative
process of meaningfulness'.
marks every
and
instance of language as the process of pure subjective presentation itself With the
birth of meaning, this movement of inversion never ends.
This is the lesson that Blanchot draws from Hegel. If he states that literary
language is made of 'unease' and 'contradictions,
it is because the infinite
is
language,
is
the
the
all
of
negative,
which
at
root
of
exposed most
restlessness
literary
incessant
in
How?
Is
the
this
to
reversibility of
our relation
work.
acutely
the negative what he has in mind when he locates the 'disquieting marvel' in the
'essence
H61derlin
Mallarme
Is
the
to
this
and
of poetry'
which
are
act of naming?
said to bear witness? What is clear is that an answer to these questions is no longer
identity.
in
itself
Literature
ten-ns
of a substantial essence or a stable
possible
impersonal
in
be
defined
terms
to
an
anonymous,
of
existence which
comes
is
determinations:
Indeed,
Blanchot
it
when
ambiguity.
states
precedes any such
that literature 'is language turning [se fait] into ambiguity' that we realise quite
57
how far his reading of Hegel has taken us. Whereas Bataille sought to repeat and
invert KojeVe's dialectic of Recognition in order to collapse it back into a
Blanchot's
'moment',
is
force
discarded
technique
to
the
of
repetition
previously
Hegelian
text
to
the
stutter and open onto another
of
movement
entire structural
direction. It is by understanding the interplay between memory, language and
169
Blanchot
in
that
Hegel's
dialectic
terms
carves out
negativity within
of ambiguity
language's
'divine
for
literature.
Thus,
the
and
a place
relation of negativity
is
both
is
in
the
form
'ultimate
the
nature'
ambiguity' which
repeated
of an
literature
'unstable
the
exposed to an
opening of meaning and
point' at which
'8
'indiscriminate change of meaning and of sign.
This exposure occurs, and
it
is
Hence
determinate
for
the
not simply
remains, as
signification.
condition
any
(or
between
being
decide
two
to
more) conflicting meanings:
a matter of
unable
is
not reducible to a polysemy that would operate according to the
ambiguity
Serge
laws
Instead,
Doubrovsky
a
system.
as
of
given symbolical
structural
is
in
'it
the
that
sense
announcesthe very
observes,
ambiguity
existential
correctly
59
being of man'. For Blanchot, ambiguity describes the condition of man haunted
by the effort to remember what is was that disappearedin order for language - his
'admirable power' - to appear.
60
in
language.
Ambiguity is the source of the 'infinite disquiet' that man finds
When one asks after what has been lost 'in the beginning' in order for there to be
'torment'
the
touches
upon
communication and understanding, one
of all
language: this is the necessary 'lack' which makes language what it is, and which
haunts us because we 'cannot even name it' without turning it into 'something'
61
(else). But in that case, how is it possible to name 'ambiguity'? Blanchot
instability,
'a
it
in
'an
terms
to
point
of
yet
unstable point' or
of
repeatedly refers
this solution only appearsto throw up yet more problems, becuaseto describe this
'unstable point' as 'something present in the work' risks fixing ambiguity as a
determinate
'presence'.
However,
this senseof ambiguity within the
substantial or
is
form,
the
Regardless
the
subject-matter
of
work,
ambiguity
content, or
of
work
the fact that there is 'something present in the work' which, without being
dependent upon any of its qualities or characteristics, is always 'at work' altering
instability'
'point
This
its
transforming
of
values.
and
represents a relentless
between
'distress'
'hope',
between
and
positive
values,
and
negative
oscillation
'disintegration' and 'construction':
170
Would there be, hidden within the intimacy of speech, a friendly and
hostile force, an arm made for constructing and for destroying, which
Must
behind
one suppose a
it?
would act
signification and not upon
des
du
[un
the
mots] which, whilst
meaning of
sens sens
meaning of words
determining it, would envelop this determination with an ambiguous
indetermination poised between the yes and the no [en instance entre le oui
et le non]
If 'instability'
62
?
is what accompanies meaning in the word, at once protecting its
it
to the ever-imminent possibility of a
exact signification and yet exposing
does
it
change of meaning and value, what meaning or value
possess? It is
'meaning
has
been
this
the
the elusive
of
meaning
precisely
of words' which
'object' of Blanchot's questions since he introduced the 'disquieting marvel' of
designates
Ambiguity
naming.
a reserve of excess meaning, 'a meaning of the
introduces
the possibility
meaning of words' which
determination
of
only
alongside its negation in 'indetermination': 'a friendly and hostile force'; 'an arm
made for constructing and for destroying'; 'poised between the yes and the no'.
Ambiguity represents the simultaneous opening and suspension of meaning, and
in this it gestures towards what Blanchot will later think under the heading of 'le
but
by
discretion
'work'
in
the
only
way of
of
which will concern us the
neutre',
final section of this chapter.
4.2 - 'Almost friendship':
discretion and the work of art
In the previous section we have shown why Blanchot's treatment of Hegel is not
dialectic.
inversion
Indeed,
it
is
Bataille's
the
Kojeve
of
as
at times
as reliant upon
difficult to see whether Blanchot actually has what one could call a 'reading' of
Hegel. If it is possible to trace 'Hegelian' concepts, figures or motifs within his
la
le
droit
litterature
in
"La
these
a
mort",
where
many
of
et
elements
work - as
in
is
they
that
first
the
to
for
time
the
recognition
are
subject
it
a certain
appear
-
171
displacement, or rewriting. By the same token, however, these 'borrowings' from
the Phenomenology (and from Hyppolite's commentary in particular) demonstrate
how deeply Blanchot's own thinking is immersed in the language of Hegel's
dialectic. In fact,, this immersion seems to deepen even as his explicit distance
from Hegel is extended during the 1950's and early 1960's
- essays which will
comprise LEspace litteraire and Le Livre a veni.r, as well as appearing in
L'Entretien infini and LAmitie. It is to this subsequent work that we will now
in
how
to
return
order
show
extensive this process of rewriting Hegel becomes,
and to unravel further the link between friendship, discretion and the work of art.
So far we have intimated that H61derlin's influence upon Blanchot is, in some
way, central to this process. It will be argued here that Blanchot's reading of
63
Hegel is best described as 'H61derlinian'. It is no coincidence that he returns
time and again to H61derlin as the figure of 'literary'
discretion. Indeed, if
Blanchot's appropriation of Hegel is accompaniedby a figuration of Hblderlin, we
in
his
discussion
Hyppolite
that
already sketches such a parallel
may note
of
"Kunstreligion": 'The gods, the poet H61derlin said, acquire not existence but self-
64
fact
fact,
far
from
'
In
the
this
that
them.
man
names
parallel
consciousness
runs
deeper,for Hyppolite goes on to arguethat if Hegel's dialectic of religion as art
'looks to recover the spiritual senseof Hellenic fantasy and myths', it is because
his interest in 'the religious sense of ancient tragedy' must be traced to the
influence of H61derlin, 'his co-disciple and
65
friend'.
Consequently,
when
Hyppolite points to the continuity between Hegel's examples of Adam's naming
(the
'names
in
the
terms of
the
the
and
epic
poet
one
who
gods')
of
animals
'Mnemosyne', one has to acknowledge an implicit reference to H61derlin's hymn
is
by
This
Blanchot's
'here',
in
that
the
that
title.
reference
echoed
comment
of
Realphilosophie, Hegel is H61derlin's 'friend andjellow spirit'. What, if anything,
do these remarks by Hyppolite and Blanchot tell us about the way in which either
if
Indeed,
is
have
Hegel
the
the
this
to
question
on
of
artwork?
echo
one reads
have
dig
deeper
into
than
to
the
emblematic
significance
we
will
anything more
172
way that Blanchot treats the Hegelian text, and in particular the narrative of the
pastness of art that it presents.
The epic poet is, of course, an integral moment of Hegel's dialectic of religion
as art. This linkage of art and religion dominates his thesis on the artwork as 'a
66
thing of the past' ['ein Vergangenes'] in Aesthetics In this section, however, our
.
attention will be drawn by a passage from the Phenomenology in which Hegel
places a speculative figure of the museum, a muse-like figure of 'Er-innerung', at
the centre of this relation. It is this memorialisation of art in the museum that
draws Blanchot
into
"Kunstreligion";
but it interests us above all because, by indirectly calling
a subtle rewriting
of
the dialectic
presented in
in
the
to
the
mediating role of
attention
museum our present relation to works of
deploys
friendship
from
Hegel
the
past,
an
art
enigmatic confluence of
and the
work of art. So where does friendship lie in Hegel's dialectical ordinance of art,
is
lies
firmly
The
It
religion, and philosophy?
answer simple.
on the side of the
recollected and memorialised 'pastness' of the work of art; it's spirituality is
bound up with the externality of representation. Does Blanchot pick up on this
Although
for
itself
by
dialectic?
Hegel's
Blanchot, this
not analysed
aspect of
friendship
be
from
Hegel's
traced
text through
can
confluence of art and
Blanchot's account of the museum in relation to the modem fate of the work of
art. In this way, the memorial figure of the museum allows us to open up the
discretion
in
friendship,
Blanchot's
between
the
work
oeuvre. What
and
relation
in
is
been
have
towards
the
the
course
of
preceding
an
working
chapters
we
figure
friendship.
The
the
this
centrality
and
repetition
of
of
of
understanding
'work' of friendship qua discretion passesby way of this confluence of memory,
death and the fate of art which Blanchot finds in Hegel.
173
4.21 - The friendly destiny' ofpresentation
The theme and scope of this final section are given by a lengthy passagefrom the
Phenomenology which, written well in advance of his lectures on aesthetics,
addressesprecisely this relation with the work of art as 'a thing of the past'. The
passage in question holds a pivotal place in the dialectic of religion: it gathers
together and unifies the moments which lead up to the appearing of "The
Revealed Religion" (Christianity) and the subsequent accession to "ABSOLUTE
KNOWING" (and the advent of philosophy). Placed at the beginning of "Revealed
Religion", this passagegives an account of the dissolution and re-incorporation of
"Religion in the Form of Art" through the moments of the 'abstract', the 'living',
it
In
'spiritual'
this
the
works of art.
way, addressesour relation to art as a
and
insofar
'a
is
be
the
the
thing
to
past'
art
of
as
end of
shown
relation with
inextricably bound up with the end of this form of religion. We will cite the
in
in
keep
track of the principal questions which concern
three
parts,
order
passage
us.
In the condition of right, therefore, the ethical world and the religion of
that world are submerged and lost in the comic consciousness, and the
is
loss.
has
lost
both
knowledge
It
this
the
total
of
consciousness
unhappy
the worth it attached to its immediate personality and the worth attached to
its personality as mediated, as thought [gedachten]. Trust in the eternal
laws of the gods has vanished, and the oracles, which pronounced on
particular questions, are dumb. The statues are now only cadavers
[Leichname] from which the living soul has flown, just as the hymns are
belief
has
The
from
tables of the gods provide no
which
gone.
words
in
drink,
his
festivals
food
longer
and
and
and
games
man
no
spiritual
joyful
his
divine.
The
the
the
consciousness
of
unity
with
works
recovers
lack
for
has
its
the
the
the
the
power
now
of
spirit,
spirit
gained
muse
of
from
itself
[
]
the
crushing
of
gods
and
of
men.
certainty
...
174
At this point, Hegel's recapitulation becomes a matter for 'us', 'now'. But when is
this 'now'? It is after the realisation of this 'total loss' of the artwork which can no
longer 'live' nor replenish us with any spiritual sustenance. Hegel locates this
moment 'in dem Rechtszustande%in the world of merely abstract right and
individualism which comes after the 'ethical world' ['Sittlichkeit']
of the Greeks,
and which represents its descent into unhappy consciousness. Yet the 'we' that
identifies these structural moments of the text as 'for us'
'we',
the
the
readers
of
-
Phenomenology - is not figured by the 'grief and longing' of this forrn of self67Hence,
falls
from
the
the grace of spirit consciousness.
when
work of art
away
from the muse, Mnemosyne, who originally gives the epic poet his voice it is not
without
the possibility
'higher
depth)
(or
a
of
mode'
a greater
of self-
consciousness.But what becomes of these works of art?
[ ] Now they have become what they are for us - beautiful fruit already
...
from
destiny
has
friendly
the
tree,
picked
which a
offered us [ein
freundliches Schicksal reichte sie uns dar], as a young girl might present
[prdsentiert] us with fruit. It cannot give us the actual life in which they
existed, not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements which
constituted their substance,not the climate which gave them their peculiar
character, nor the cycle of the changing seasonsthat governed the process
destiny
[gibt]
So
does
their world to us along
their
of
growth.
not restore
it
Art,
the
works of antique
gives not the spring and summer of the
with
blossomed
life
in
but
they
and ripened,
which
only the shrouded
ethical
[die
Erinnerung]
Our
that
of
actuality.
eingehiillte
act of
recollection
divine
is
them
therefore
not
act
worship through which our
an
of
en oying
its
fulfilled
it
is
to
truth;
come
might
perfect,
rather,
an
consciousness
drops
dust
the
of
of
rain
or
wiping-off
some
specks of
external activity from these fruits, so to speak - one which erects an intricate scaffolding of
the dead elements of their outward existence [auBerlichen Existenz], the
language, the historical circumstances, etc., in place of the inner elements
inspired
life
And
them.
the
environed,
engendered
and
which
ethical
all
of
175
this we do, not in order to enter into their very life but only to possess an
idea of them in our imagination [in sich vorzustellen]. [ ]
...
With every passing moment and every additional historical fact, we get further
away from the 'life' of such works. We remain outside them, whilst the sole path
of access at our disposal - memory and imagination - only conceals their 'actual
world' with a complex structure of 'dead elements'. Such 'external activity'
includes every form of historical and linguistic representation; everything that
be
may
put 'in place of ['an die Stelle'] or 'stand for' the 'inner elements' of its
'life'
'truth'.
knowledge
This
originally creative
and
we have of works of art from
the past is precisely the death of these works, whatever our intentions or
techniques: they are always already dead in our living relation to them, and
'shrouded')
forgotten
(or
through the very act of recollection. But things
already
for
is
be
done.
Hegel.
There
to
are never so melancholic
still work
The opposition between 'Vorstellung' - the external existence of language inspiration
inner
['begeistenden'l
fruition
the
and
and
of the work of art governs
this entire passage, even as it comes to be inverted. The figures of a 'friendly
destiny' and the young girl at first correlate with the externality of representation;
'friendliness'
lead
'gathering'
this
to
the
the
will
very superficiality of
or
yet
csumming up' ['zusammenfaBen'] of the artwork into a higher mode. It is the
in
first
for
the
time,
these
appear their own right simply as
works,
moment when
back
future,
back
is
'now'
This
to
turns
the
the
to
the
passage
where
of
art.
works
and to 'us':
[ ] But, just as the girl who offers us the plucked fruits is more than the
...
Nature which directly provides them - the Nature diversified into their
light,
because
tree,
the
and
so
on air,
she sums
conditions and elements,
in
in
higher
her
[zusammenfaBt]
the
this
mode,
a
gleam of
selfup
all
in
them;
the
which
she
gesture
with
offers
so, too, the
and
conscious eye
[darbietet]
is
destiny
those
that
the
us
with
presents
works of art
spirit of
life
for
it
is
that
the
the
the
than
of
actual
world
and
nation,
ethical
more
176
interiorisation and recollection [die Er-innerung] in us of the spirit which
in them was still only outwardly manifested; it is the spirit of the tragic
destiny which gathers all those individual gods and attributes of the
itself
is
itself
into
into
that
the
conscious of
spirit
substance
one pantheon,
as spirit [als Geist selbst
68
bewuBten Geist].
This 'But... ' marks the moment of inversion. That which is limited to Vorstellung,
to the external representation of works, turns out to be 'more' in relation to these
inspiration
life
from
'inner'
than
the
they
took
their
works
which
and sustenance.
But 'more' what, precisely? In offering us what is external, this 'destiny' stands as
the repetition and re-incorporation of what was expressedin the works of art; and
longer
being
limited
to
these
works are no
a
as a result,
a particular expression of
an immediate 'life' or 'world". They are brought together in a new relation: they
is
internally
into
that
mediated and conscious of
a single spirit
now
are gathered
itself as such. In short, the work is 'more' itself. it is offered to 'us' as a work, as
is
from
far
It
But
this
revelation
of
essence.
change
a
simple
something mediated.
is just that mediated relation is, by definition, more than the immediate. The
'friendly destiny' is this 'gesture of offering' ['der darreichenden Gebdrde'], this
held
for
in
is
'presented'
the
the
or
as
such,
which
work
out
process of mediation
first time.
We can break down this lengthy passage, then, into three distinct moments:
the forgetful dissolution or 'total loss' of spirit; external representation in
imagination; and interiorising recollection of presentation. These three moments
'friendly
destiny'
development
this
the
whose eventual recollection,
of
constitute
into
'pantheon'
divine
a single
substance
marks the
gathering and unifying of
'tragic' self-consciousness of spirit as spirit. So how are we read the epithetic
first
destiny
'tragic'
'freundlich',
this
which
qualifies
of self-conscious
addition,
is
How
this gesture at once more superficial and more profound than the
spirit?
is
between
What
'friendly
the
life
to
the
this
rise
work?
gave
relation
which
actual
destiny'
it
legitimate
friendship?
Is
'freundlich'
to
translate
even
and
as
177
69
?
4
Answering these questions requires care since with Hegel it is never
-triendly'
a matter of a random juxtaposition of the ethical and the aesthetic. Art and religion
are fundamentally interwoven in the form of the work: the 'aesthetic' here can
only bear an ethical content in the shape of a 'universal work' ['das allgemeine
Werk'
70
].
Hegel writes: 'If we ask which is the actual spirit that has the
consciousness of its absolute essencein the religion of art, we find that it is the
71
ethical or the true spirit'
Just as this spirit likewise finds its true expression only
.
in the work of art,, so the externalisation of the ethical exposes it to the same
dissolution.
process of
There are two principal issues at stake here. First, there is the link between the
appearance of this 'friendly
destiny' and the 'loss of art', that moment when art
becomes a 'thing of the past' for us. How can Hegel's epithet help us understand
the nature of this 'loss'?
Second, this figure brings with
72This 'destiny',
memory of the museum.
it the institutional
then, would be the self-consciousnessof
the death of art. But why might such self-consciousnessbe 'fteundlich'? Does it
stand for some kind of recollective love or devotion? One thinks of the 'gallery of
images' at the end of the Phenomenology, where Hegel retrospectively places 'Erinnerung' at the heart of the self-presentation of spirit, a 'slow-moving succession'
['Aufeinanderfolge']
of shapeswhose presentation grants us our perspective ('Mr
73
figures
)).
How
linked?
It is this
these
the
the
are
museum and
uns
of
gallery
presentation of the work of art over time that connects the loss of art and the
museum. Indeed, it might be pointed out that the museum is what Hegel means by
'a hiendlY destiny": the museum conceived as a liberal accomodation and
prodigious accumulation of works of art, or artifacts, divorced from their 'living
lost
'something
Such
fate
is
to
to
another
and
one
us
save
as
world',
past'.
a
indeed both 'friendly' - gracious; genial - and 'tragic'. Hence, it is not simply a
Hegel
by
'afriendly
destiny',
but a question of
what
meant
matter of uncovering
figure
feeds
idea
how
between
the
friendship
this
off
of
a
relation
exploring
and
the presentation of the work of art.
178
4.22 - The museum, friendship and the work of art
The concept of 'the work', or rather the concept as 'the work of the negative', in
the Phenomenology (and the Realphilosophie) installs the question of the work of
art deep within
74
The figures of
the structure of Hegel's speculative thought.
Adam and the epic poet both figures stand for the first, external existence of spirit.
They are both linked to the 'earliest' form of language, the act of naming; and so
both represent the work of representation and productive
'Mnemosyne'.
the
sign
under
of
memory carried out
It is in the figure of 'friendly
destiny', as the
presentative gesture which gives us the work of art as such, that a relation between
the work, memory and friendship is revealed in Hegel. As we discovered in
Chapter 3, the relation of friendship has a transitional role both as a moment
within
the dialectic of spirit and with respect to the development of Hegel's
later
For
Hegel, friendship and love represent the fully
the
philosophy as a whole.
freedom
it
is
in
the 'form'
articulated and actual concept of
as
expressed
of
feeling:
they are the sign that we 'already possess' this fTeedom, albeit in a less
realised
75
form. It is by
'Recognition'
of
reversing this diminuition
friendship
limited
form
of
as a
that Bataille exploits and underinines Kojeve's
'Hegelianism'.
Yet he can do this only by drawing upon Hegel's earliest work on love and
religion,
which
portray
friendship
as an essential aspect in the birth
of the Christian Religion",
Christianity.
In "The Positivity
communion
Supper
is
Last
the gesture of a 'voluntary
the
of
Freundschaft freiwillig']
between men and their god
of
for example, the
friendship'
76 In these
['der
texts, love and
.
friendship are purely positive insofar as they represent the spontaneousexpression
judgment,
duty
feeling,
the
and reflective
and ultimately
overriding of moral
of
form the principle of human community which possessesthe dialectical power of
77 This becomes Bataille's 'general' dialectic
the
unification.
and
of
absorption
6sovereign operation'. Moreover, we can see that Hegel identifies friendship with
into
the
the unification of
gods
a pantheon and the absorption of these pantheons
179
as modalities of the same divine love. is it to this movement of gathering and
offering -a
differences
interiorisation
that
the
collective
of merely external
-
epithet 'friendly' refers? Perhaps. Almost certainly. If anything, it is in the figure
of 'friendly destiny' that something in the order of this relation of friendship and
religion still remains in the Phenomenology.
The status of the Phenomenology of Spirit itself is open to dispute. It occupies
a place at once apart from and at the heart of Hegel's work as a whole. Bataille
its
'only
beginning
to
to
was right
refer
project as
a
and hence a definitive failure',
for although it was first conceived as the first volume of a 'System of Science',
and in spite of plans for editing the text, Hegel was never able to reintegrate it into
78
his later philosophical system. This ambiguous status is never more apparent
than at the end of the text, when the final chapter, "ABSOLUTEKNOWING",opens
lines
from
Schiller's poem, "Die Freundschaft": 'aus dem Kelche
these
onto
79
dieses Geisterreiches / schdumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit. ' What should we make
its
from
"Friendship"
These
this
citation and
placement?
words
are given a
of
for
in
Phenomenology,
they appearprecisely at the moment
the
position
privileged
is
dialectic
the
entire
of spirit
recollected and unfolded as its own absolute.
when
Furthermore, Hegel famously alters Schiller's verse by replacing the concept of
divine Being as an eternal, transcendent alterity ('Freundlos'; 'kein Gleiches')
final
line,
ihm
die
'Schdumt
temporal
the
the
self-mediation
of
spirit:
with
Unendlichkeit', is rewritten to show that the infinity of spirit is a product of time,
80
That which, in Schiller,, is 'friendless' and
'schdumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit'.
'without equal' (save 'eternity'), is no longer 'lifeless and alone' for Hegel:
history
identity
historical
is
becomes
This
and
absolute.
nothing
absolute spirit
less than the 'goal' of the Phenomenology: 'absolute knowing, or spirit that knows
81
itself as spirit'. Even if Hegel's 'friendly destiny' indicates a certain refusal of
friendship on his part, this perverse quotation throws up two further problems.
First, it uncovers a residual ambiguity in the relation of philosophy (qua the
knowing')
literature.
'scientific
Second,
it
to
poetry
and
prosaic presentation of
180
binds the idea of friendship into the relation of memory ['Erinnerung']
and
representation.
If there is a relation between the poet's muse, 'Mnemosyne', the 'friendly
destiny' of the museum, and the concept of friendship in general, it lies with
destiny
is
It
'friendliness'
the
the
of art, the very benevolence of
memory.
of
very
the gesture of presentation that defines 'our' relation to the works of art from the
past as 'more than' that of the culture which produced them. They are present as
such for the first time in human memory. In this way, the museum lies at the heart
of Hegel's conception of the modernity of art. Blanchot takes up this question of
the museum in three essays published between 1950 and 1957: "Naissance de
Fart" (1955), "Le musCe, Fart et le temps" (1950-1), and "Le mal du musCe"
(1957) are collected together at the beginning of LAmitie. The collection ends
with a coda - "L'amitie"
(the 1962 essay with fori-ned the focus of our first
is
book
by
is
bracketed
It
Blanchot's
by
that
the
chapter).
not
accident
structure of
questions of art and of friendship. But what, if anything, links the fate of art to
'the death of the friend' in this collection?
The first essay in the book, "Naissance de Fart", is a review of Bataille's
Lascaux, ou la naissance de Vart. Blanchot introduces his discussion of the book
by repeating the following passage,to which we referred in the previous chapter:
If we go into the cave at Lascaux, a strong feeling grips us which we do
display
first
in
front
have
the
the
the
where
cases
remnants of
of
not
human fossils or their stone instruments are exhibited. It is the same
feeling of presence - of clear and burning presence - that masterpieces of
82
every epoch give us.
Blanchot asks why we have this 'feeling of presence': do these first works of art
be
for
He
to
'first
the
to
we
always
seem
searching?
whom
goes on
man'
reveal us
for
be
is
'this
bound
the
the
that
origin'
cannot
need
to show
satisfied
why
reason
83
fundamental
in
to
fact
that
a
the
relation
absence of an origin.
us
puts
art
up with
181
He does not, however, continue to quote Bataille's
immediate linking
of this
feeling of presence to friendship as the passionate 'interrogation'
of the work: 'the
beauty of human works addresses friendship, the pleasure of
84
friendship'.
Why
does Blanchot erase, or at least elide, these lines about our love of beauty? A clue
would seem to lie in the way that he refers to another mention of friendship in
Bataille's book. When Bataille posits the evident yet unverifiable link between the
Cprocession' of animal figures on the cave walls and 'some magical intention... a
but
enigmatic communication',
profound,
he gives this relation, too, the name of
85
'friendship'
Blanchot in turn refers to this 'mysterious relation' as a 'relation of
.
interest, of conspiracy, of complicity and almost friendship [presque d'amitie]'. 86
Almost friendship. Recall that Bataille attributes a direct relation between
friendship and the work of art: friendship is nothing less than the 'feeling' of
'clear and burning presence' through which the beauty of the work of art
distances
his
from
identification
Blanchot
text
this
addressesus.
not only
own
of
friendship with the immediacy of presence, he withdraws it ('almost)
from
Bataille's. The relation of friendship and the work of art is indirect, in a manner
that echoesthe senseof discretion defined in 'Vamitie".
The question of friendship arises in this group of three essays on two counts:
they are assembled as the first texts in a work called LAmitiý; and insofar as this
from
is
half-withdrawn
Blanchot's
Bataille.
Yet
commentary
opening
of
relation
book
is
Bataille's
they
a thoroughgoing negotiation with
what
all share with
Hegel's dialectic of art. In the original version of "Le mal du musee", for example,
Blanchot states that his review of Malraux's Le Musee imagýinaire is simply a
debt
Hegel:
its
to
way of addressing unacknowledged
There appears to me no doubt that Malraux's endeavour takes place within
the Hegelian perspective, via the ambiguous search for all that art wants to
be for itself
is
like
Museum
the
and of which
the impersonal
Hence
this
consciousness.
yet
unreal
and
research
realised
a
consciousness,,
182
is not carried by Malraux's own force alone, but by everything today
87
which still seemsto open our times to Hegel.
When Blanchot writes (of) 'Malraux', therefore, there can be 'no doubt' that he
in
his
le
'the
in
"Le
Fart
he
terms
temps",
reads
of
work, as
musee,
et
writes
88
movements of a thought whose principles are belong to Hegel'. Why bother with
going through Malraux to get to Hegel? It is undoubtedly Malraux's position of
influence upon contemporary French culture - he had served as a minister of state
in General de Gaulle's post-war government - which makes him the locus of
99
Blanchot's analysis. However, 'this research' into the sense and place of the
museum is no more a question of Malraux's work representing a collective will or
identity,
is
intentions.
his
'own'
Instead, Blanchot
than
a matter of
national
it
is
by
[
]
'carried
that
the
this
today
work
states
possibility of
everything
which
...
still seemsto open our times to Hegel'. The contemporaneity of Hegel is linked to
this comparision of the museum with 'an impersonal consciousness', and not to an
individual personality or a collective identity. How should we understand this
cconsciousness5?Is it the force of history, or 'the End of History'? Is he referring
to technology, perhaps?What is at stake in this senseof impersonality?
Blanchot's reference to the contemporaneity of Hegel's thought does not entail
that his own work is 'Hegelian', or 'anti-Hegelian' for that matter. On the
determines
he
thought
the art of
to
trace
the
which
movement of
contrary,
sets out
cour times', and which returns 'each one of us' (including Malraux) to Hegelian
(principles'. This 'thought' is the dialectic by which the total impoverishment of
its
is
in
'essence'.
laid
bare
"Le
Tt
the
true
unveiling of
musee,
art coincides with
Fart et le temps":
When one indicates that today, for the first time, art has somehow doubly
itself,
"for
first
have
the
the
time"
words
an obvious authority:
unveiled
they indicate that a conclusion has been reached, and this conclusion, even
if it does not shut down time, nonethelesspermits the observer who speaks
90
first
time to speak of time as an enclosed truth.
in the name of this
183
That which defines the position of art 'today' is this uninterrogated determination
from
historical
is
'our
the
every other epoch as
of
set apart
epoch'
closure:
art of
'the radiating world of "the first time"' 91When we speak 'in the name of such an
.
event - whether it is ...the first time... or 'the End of History' - we give ourselves a
position of authority on the basis of what is 'obvious' or '(self-)evident'.
Blanchot
idea
the
that the work of art appears as such,
that
readily grants
we can all grasp
'for the first time', only when it becomes, in Hegel's words, 'ein Vergangenes', 'a
thing of the past'
92It is that
.
in
history
longer
fulfills
when art no
moment
a divine
it
longer
function;
'for
worldly
when
no
means
service or even
us', today, what it
had meant to our predecessors.This is the senseof 'our epoch' which Hegel sets
figure
destiny'.
is
in
'friendly
For
Blanchot,
the
this
too,
the evidence
of
out
brought forth by the modem work of art, cut off from its religious vocation, cut
off from the world, and prey to the demands of ideology and the market alike. But
it cannot be admitted without questioning its very evidence.
Blanchot's central question is deceptively simple: why is it that, 'at the very
form
history',
the
tends
to
take
the
of
moment when
absolute
at the very moment
it's
disappearance,
for
first
[une
in
'art
time
the
appears
as
a
search
recherche]
of
93
is
which something essential at stake'? What can this state of affairs tell us about
the nature of the work of art? And where does this nature or 'essence' lie?
And where - other than in the divine, other than in the world - will the
in
it
find
[s'appuyer]
the
take
root
space which
might
and reserve
work
itself? This is also the question which awakens the work to the experience
in
has
become
its
its
the
if,
research
of
as
art
whose
essence
origin,
of
it
find
hoped
henceforth
[souci],
its
its
[appui]
to
support
and
concern
94
reserve.
Such questions admit of no straightforward answers to such questions, for if it is a
has
before
(for
first
it
is
the
time'),
what
never
existed
matter of understanding
just as much a matter of grasping what has always existed behind the work, as it
it
in
finds
its
'reserve'.
'space'
Like
is,
"'question"'
the
the
which
that
of
were;
184
literature in "La litt&rature et le droit a la mort", the question of the work of art
becomes the very mode in which the work 'is'. The 'search' for what comes
before it, and gives birth to it, defines the very existence of the work of art. Does
this form of ontological displacement avoid the question by folding art back into
itself? The idea that art is concerned with its own 'essence' certainly prompts such
suspicions. But it is worth noting the caution with which Blanchot defines this
'experience of its origin': it is 'as if the work had 'hoped' to place itself, or
'reserve' itself in this reflexive movement of 'research'. When he goes on to
describe the ontological condition of the work of art, in LEspace litteraire, in
terms of 'etre en souci de I'art', he does not mean that art is only concerned with
itself, but rather that the work 'is in a condition of concern' about what makes it a
95Why is the
its
'work'?
a
work
concerned
with
own
status
as
work.
At the heart of his writings during the 1950's is a deepening of the
interrogation of the concept of 'the work' which characterised La Part du jeu. It
draws on his claim,, in "La litterature et le droit a la mort", that the writer or the
'works'just
artist
like everyone else, only 'to an eminent degree', insofar as what
96
he produces is 'the work par excellence'
The Rip-side of this statement is
.
inescapability
history.
be
If we wish to think of the artist as one
the
to
of
revealed
be
it
the
the case that
ephemeral,
also
must
who works against contingency and
this effort of memory lies at the heart of all 'human work [which] has the same
97
power of becoming historical'. In these three essayson art, Blanchot assertsthat
the artist does not exist beyond his work, and that if the one who dedicates himself
to art belongs to it in some way, it is only insofar as art belongs to itseýf alone. In
this way, he counters Malraux's persistent privileging of the artist as the very
is
by
doer
by
Instead,
the
the
the
the
the
artist
produced
work,
creator.
model of
doing. The concept of the work cannot escape it's Hegelian determination. It is
'8tre
de
Fart',
in
'disquiet'
hear
the
this
then,
to
en
phrase,
souci
an
echo
of
vital,
le
la
droit
The
becoming
litterature
in
"La
et
a
mort".
restless
of art
analysed
to
be
the
to
communicates
us:
museum
what
appears
185
Art is no longer to be found in the "perfection"
it
is
of a work;
nowhere,
it
because
be
it
is
if
has
to
Museum
this
the
seems
and
meaning,
44
nowhere"
conveys.
whose
disquiet
[Finquietude]
and powerful
negation
it
99
What has happened in order for art to be 'nowhere' ['nulle part']? What happens
to this 'disquiet and powerful negation' when it is mediated by the 'meaning'
['sens'] of the museum? To answer these questions we need to follow Blanchot's
dialectic
Hegel's
re-writing of
of art.
When he treats of Malraux'sconception of the 'imaginary Museum', Blanchot
follows it's 'analogy' with Hegel's narrative of the fate of art qua religion.
Although a relation to Hegel's historical thesis on art is not yet made explicit in
the analyses of the literary work in La Part du feu, it was already implicit in the
introduced
droit
la
he
(in
litterature
le
Hegel
"La
'a
that
et
a mort") as man
way
it,
he
had
highest
idea
form
how
that
the
one
can
since
saw
of
art
of
art can
who
become religion and religion art'.
99We
can acknowledge Hegel's claim that art
first appears in the form of religion; or rather, that art is religion. But what does
this identity entail? The meaning and function of work of art lies in the service of
the 'invisible realities around which the community perpetuates
1
00
itself.
For
Hegel, this relation was consummated by the Greeks, and is denied to us, for we
from
if
them
the meaning of a community.
these
works we uproot
can only grasp
However, Blanchot points out that a different conception of the 'life of the work'
is already in place within it. This is the abstract 'life of spirit': the 'admirable
death
in
to
that
transformation
puts
work
a movement of
power' of change and
dissolution and resurrection. In other words,, it is the work of the epic poet who
from
is
he
Even
is
because
them.
the
separated
when
art
already
gods
names
irreducibly
bound
it
is
(selfitself,
'only
to
still
a process of
religion, and not yet
)estrangement which already 'puts it closest to its own truth (without art knowing
101
it) '.
The process of estrangement does not represent the end for art, therefore,
for this relation to exteriority is an 'essential' part of the presentation of the work
186
of art from its very beginnings: it is simply not yet recognised as such. But the
question remains: does art become impoverished or deficient to the extent that it is
Conly itself', removed from its religious function?
If the manifestationof the work of art as such is inseparablefrom that of the
museum, it is becausethe impoverishmentof art is also the unveiling of itself to
itself in its totality: art is 'reducedto itself [ ] it abandonseverything that it was
...
102
it
itself
it
has
been'.
if
Therefore,
to
the museumis
not and extends
everything
the site of art's memory, it is a fundamentallyambiguousone: on the one hand, it
into
together
gathers
artworks
an 'eternal present', giving them the 'meaning' and
'direction' ['sens'] of historical spirit in its self-presence(in the form of the
History of Art); yet on the other hand, it also affirms an incessantreworking of art
103
it
as a whole, giving over to a movementof transformationand becoming. As a
result, this site of memory is not simply a place in which one encountersworks of
art from every age and epoch.Instead,it is in the fundamentalnature of this site
that it both conserveand transform art as a whole in a movementof repetition and
becoming. It is for precisely this reason that the museum is the site of the
impoverishmentand the innovation of modem art, often vilified in equal measure
for destroyingart and for shoringit up againstsuchdestruction.
This doubleness is perhaps the most important characteristic of the museum. It
(absolute)
freedom
image
for
the
the
of the work of art, the
stands as
new
'absence' of any 'world' or 'history'; and at the same time, it also constitutes art
104
history'.
birth
Indeed,
for
"Le
'gives
the
to
entire
a
premise
mal
as a whole and
du musee" is the idea that the historical development of techniques of
has
CD-Rom
from
to
the
the
the
postcard
raised
museum
reproduction - ranging
105
This is Malrauxýs 'musee imaginaire': the sum
to the level of 'a new category'.
total of such reproductions of works of art, which Blanchot describes as being
106
'prodigious
irreversible
This
by
and
generosity'.
an
endlessly enriched
for
Blanchot,
both
lamentation
'destiny'
the
renders
museum,
technological
of
and
'gives
basis
for
'a
technology
the
inappropriate,
art'
us
on
of
power of
celebration
187
domination that frightens some people, excites others, but cannot be halted by
107
justication
finds
its
in
'
Yet
hostility
'imaginary
to
the
anyone.
a
museum'
suspicion of technology which Blanchot traces back to the Plato's disdain for the
image and the written word. 'It is not a question of printing, but of writing. '108In
an argument that prefigures Derrida's work on this question, Blanchot shows that
writing,
like the machine, is mistrusted as that which merely 'repeats' or
cprolongs'. It is this 'mistrust' which reappears as a fear for 'the destruction of
intimately
bound
if
'the
the
that
the
art':
regret
only
work was
up with
nonrepeatable essence of being', it would lie beyond the technological reach of
109In
is
insofar
this
a sense,
mistrust well-placed,
reproductions.
as the 'imaginary
th
have
in
does
'real'
degree
It
'art'
the
not
represents
museum'
any
place.
n
of
is
'this
space which
not one, a locality without location [un milieu
abstraction:
'
10
sanslieu], a world outsidethe world'. Yet, for Blanchot, regardlessof whether
this disorientationof art is to be fearedor celebrated,the new technologiesof the
because
be
force
demand
they
to
thought
us to ask againwhat constitutes
museum
a work of art, what makesa work a work.
What the technological advent of the 'imaginary museum' brings with it - the
dissolution of the 'original, organic link between work and painter; the possible
disappearance of the 'artist' himself into an 'anonymous, impersonal power of
"creation"' - is the possibility of recognising that the work of art is already
11
'
What it calls into question
haunted by this lack of place and absenceof origin.
is precisely that relation of 'presence' which Bataille ascribed to the 'feeling' of
friendship through which great works of art address us; and the very sense of
4presentation' which Hegel inscribed into the 'friendly destiny' of the museum.
Although both Bataille and Hegel recognise that this 'presence' of art is a matter
'our'
from
the
that
the past cannot overcome
access
works
of
art
of memory, and
like
both
'the
thinkers
lacunae,
nevertheless
project
what
sometbing
nonsuch
being',
between
the
relation
of
of
presence
man and work
repeatable essence
'in
been
its
'living'
have
the
work'
as
which would
world or meaning. Our
the
is
these
to
of
art,
and
our
conception
works
of
work
of
art
as such,
relation
188
forever fixed as a relation to the absenceof something that was present. But what
if this very 'essence' of the work were already, at its very core, subject to the force
"for
if
What
the
thefirst time"',
this
of repetition?
work as such,
appearanceof
was not possible except on the basis of an 'again'?
This is the question posed by technology. For Blanchot, it is at the very
moment when the museum finally removes itseýf from any senseof being a 'place'
in the world, when it becomes 'imaginary', that we can no longer fall back upon
the lost presence of an origin. It exposes 'our illusion:
'the deceptive belief that
is
is
it
there
there
what
as was whereas, at most, it is there as a "having-been": an
112
It is by becoming this absent 'place' of a 'locality without
illusion ofpresence. '
location' that the museum reveals the extent to which such an absence already
constitutes the work as such.
The work is its own absence:because of this it is in perpetual becoming,
113
finished,
done
never
always
and undone [toujours faite et defaite].
This means in fact that the museum does not show us anything 'new', but rather
in
fundamental
belonging
this
to
puts us
relation
and enigmatic
of absence and
heart
final
in
In
litteraire,
LEspace
the
the
every
repetition at
of
work.
chapter of
which he continues his commentary on Malraux, Blanchot defines the work of art
as 'always new "now"', a definition whose tension between the temporality of
('always')
...
(
...
)
that
the
and
of
eternity
ephemeral now
articulates the relation
between the work and repetition. But what is this paradoxical force of repetition
'at work' in the work?
The work is always new "now" [<<maintenant >>],it renews this "now" that
it seems to initiate, to render more contemporary [actuefl, and finally it is
is
lost
in
terrifyingly
that
the night of time,
ancient,
which
very ancient,
being the origin that always precedesus and which is always given before
is
it
the
approach of what allows us to withdraw: thing of the
since
us,
189
du
[chose
in
different
from
Hegel's
pass&, en un autre
past,
saying
a
sense
sens que ne
114
le dit Hegel].
The work of art is a 'thing of the past' in the sensethat it belongs to an origin that
'always precedes us', a power of beginning which cannot itself begin becauseit is
this movement of incessant beginning-again. Blanchot calls this abject power of
repetition - which is 'at work' in the work anew each time, and yet is 'terrifyingly
115
'le
Teternel
ancient' recommencement'. We may
ressassementeternel' or
recall that he usedthe sameterm to describethe way in which literature, in asking
the questionof its origin, opensup languageto an 'inquietude infinie', the restless
ambiguity that forms its own negativity: 'un ressassementinterminable de
116
paroles'. The negativity exemplified in the act of naming and the work of art
it
in
fact,
begins to unravel in the work at very moment it 'begins'. The
unravels;
is
the
work of
negative already stampedwith the mark of a beginning-again,a
begins
repetition which never
and thus never ends.
Like Bataille's sovereignty, Blanchot's 'ressassement' speaks of a weakening
in Hegel's 'admirable power' of negativity. Its work is 'unworked' ['deoeuvree']
in being exposed to its own 'inexhaustible depths' in repetitoon: it is not the
determination and mastery of our own death that faces us in the work, but the
117
'dark, um-nasterablepowerlessness of death as a beginning-again. '
Blanchot
does not blindly repeat Hegel's dialectic of art, nor does he blindly oppose it. It is
in
instead
that
the
the
passage cited above,
worth noting
original version of
of
is
'in
different
from
Hegel's
thing
the
that
the
of
past
a
saying
work of art a
sense
le
dit
Hegel'],
he
du
'chose
['en
que
ne
autre
sens
writes:
passe, comme
saying'
un
118
dit Hegel. '
The turning that takes place in this spaceof time, which is the period
is
So
happens
by
these
to the 'friendly
subtle
yet
profound.
what
essays,
spanned
destiny' from the Phenomenology, or to the 'passion' of friendship from Lascaux?
Blanchot's depiction of the museum as a profoundly ambiguous site - the destitute
is
from
abstracted; one which supposedly shelters
which every world
non-place
from
the
time,
to
them
to an endless
vagaries
of
only
subject
works
and conserves
190
becoming
destiny'
introduces
the
in
'friendly
discreet
the
of
museum.
a
change
-
This is 'le mal du musee' of Blanchot's title: the 'self-consciousness of spirit as
spirit' becomes indissociable from the sheer 'will to spectacle' of art.
] 19The
work
is suspendedin a uncertain movement where 'everything recurs to infinity because
nothing has really taken place there': the imaginary museum shelters such works,
insofar as it echoesa senseof eternity - 'Fetemel, peut-&re' - and yet never allows
the work to reveal itself in its entirety. It is as if Hegel's narrative of the
dissolution of art had become frozen at the very point when it oscillated between
the positive and negative values of its 'friendly destiny'. Hence, it is not certain in
is
destiny
in
'friendly',
friendship
the
art
nor
what
what sense
of
way
can be
by
Unlike
Bataille
Hegel,
Blanchot
the
work
of
art.
and
addressed
withdraws
friendship from any relation of presence with the work. Yet in the movement of
is
fundamental
its
there
the
the
to
revealed
relation of
work
withdrawal
own
formulates
in
Blanchot
This
'reserve'
terms
the
the
of
origin.
is
what
of
or
absence
'discretion' of art and literature. In other words, he withdraws or reserves the
nu
by
it
friendship
'work'
the
the
thing
revealing
of
of
very
which
makes
relation
discretion
interval';
interruption
being';
'the
'the
pure
of
possible as a relation:
'this fundamental separation on whose basis that which separates becomes
relation'. Furthermore,, this movement of withdrawal is nothing other than
discretion; and its revelation as such in the 'absence' of the work marks the 'work'
from
friendship
both
Bataille
discretion.
By
the
texts
of
all
presence
of
effacing
of
it,
discreetly,
he
Hegel,
as this very relation of effacement.
reinscribes
and
The discreet relationship between friendship and the work of art brings us full
discretion
in
doubling
back
to
the
which
of
emerged
our reading of
same
circle
'Vamitie".
Indeed, in the year after Bataille's death, Blanchot encodes these two
in
literary
in
this
the
friendship
the
the
art
case,
work
of
work
and
strands of
following definition of discretion:
Discretion is not merely a courtesy, a social comportment, a psychological
like
intimately
to
the
who
one
would
speak
about
address of
ruse, or
191
himself without declaring himself. Discretion - reserve - is the place of
120
literature.
Discretion in this case is ambiguous and uncertain, 'unruhig' even. This very
gesture of withdrawal, by which he displaces discretion from what is 'merely' a
matter of 'comportment', begs the question: does not Blanchot posit the value of
the (universal) concept over and above the (accidental) biographical conditions of
the work? Or, inversely, does it not remain bound to an intentional act of a
leave
to
such
a
writer's
subject,
as
choice
something out of the work? In short, we
either risk discretion falling back into a calculable effect of a writing subject, or, if
we resist this, we simply repeat the philosophical gesture par excellence. Yet, as
in
first
discretion
is
double:
introduces
it
is
the
the
we argued
chapter,
separation
constitutive of the relation to the other; it is never completely identical with itself,
for it opens itseýf up as a fundamental discontinuity in being without being able to
121
identifies
itself
in
itself
Peter
Banki
this reserve of
or calculate
advance.
reserve
discretion - the discretion of discretion, as it were - in terms of uncertainty: 'It is
discretion
that
not certain
confirm
122
discretion
'
Thus,
the
word
can no more
exists.
the impersonal, nameless 'place'
literature
it
than
of
can assure the
integrity of personal silence, or even the essence of friendship, for that matter. It
because
discretion
be
the
this
that
status of
of
ambiguity within
precisely
would
the work can still take place in relation to an absent origin. Discretion is 'of the
is
in
for
it
the work
that
which
necessary
order
or
reservoir,
reserve,
names
work':
to maintain and present itself-, yet discretion itself, as this reserve, must always
its
'work'.
in
itself
the
own
movement of
efface
*
192
One may conclude that Blanchot simply repeats Hegel, whether unwittingly or
not. He finds the dialectical reversibility of language, or the presentative figure of
'friendly destiny' in the relation of the work of art to its origin in 'eternal
recommencement'. Even the 'perhaps' which marks this relation of 'the eternal' is
far
Schiller's
from
'eternity' as 'seine
Hegel's
temporalising
never
rewriting of
Unendlichkeit'. But it is not the same relation. The change in the 'pastness' of art,
from 'as Hegel said' to 'a different sense from Hegel's', is like Blanchot's
'distance' from the Phenomenology: it responds to the possibility of rethinking the
thought of mediating negativity in the work in terms of an always prior relation of
'un-working' or 'desoeuvrement'. If something happens from Hegel to Blanchot,
it is this location of 'an always other possibility' which disperses the work. It is
the idea of a turning (away from Hegel) which is never certain, and a work that is
123Blanchot has
interlocutors
just
discuss
a pair of
such a turning
never completed.
in "Sur un changement d'epoque" (1960), when one asks the other: "'Do you
accept this certainty: that we are at a turning [un tournant]?... The other replies:
If it is a certainty, it is not a turning. The fact of belonging at this moment
in which a change of epoch (if there is such) is underway also affects the
determine
it,
both
knowledge
that
to
rendering
would wish
certain
in
less
We
uncertainty
appropriate.
are
never
able to circle
certainty and
discreet
[nous
the
than
at such a moment:
contourner]
around ourselves
124
force of the turning lies first in this fact. ,
The force of the turning is 'discreet' precisely becauseit is not certain, and never
'ourselves'.
Blanchot's
to
total
work continually addresses
presence
our
affords us
this experience of maintaining a relation with that which is impossible to
being
['contoumee'].
'got
Resisting
around'
melancholic
experience, and resists
he
declamation,
maintains a rigorous, perhaps
nostalgia as much as apocalyptic
belligerent affirmation of impossibility in the face of all attempts to finally have
done with questions. This is the work of discretion. Whereas Bataille deploys the
impossible
for
is
the
'friendship
that
man' as a reversal within
concept of
193
Kojeve's dialectic of Recognition, Blanchot moulds his thinking of friendship to
an experience of the work which, above all, is marked by a writer's sense of
discretion and self-effacement before the work, but only insofar as it remains
without any point of stability. In the effects of Blanchot's writing of discretion,
the thought of friendship can be seen to remain, discreetly and restlessly, at every
point in his work.
194
Notes to Chapter 4
I Blanchot, "Le
rire des dieux" (1963), AM, 192-207,194.
2PhG, 36; PhS, §32.
3 G.W. F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke. Band 6 Jenaer Systementwiirfe 1, K. Dilsing
and
H. Kimmerle (eds.), Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1975,288; First Philosophy of Spirit
(1803-4), translated by H. S. Harris and T.M. Knox (eds.), 221-2.
4 Frangoise Collin, Maurice Blanchot
et la question de Vecriture, Paris, Gallimard,
1971,18.
5 "La
regne animale de Fesprit" was first published in Critique, 18, November 1947,
387-405. This title is taken from JeanHyppolite's translation of "Das geistige Tierreich
der
die
Sache
from
Betrug
the "REASON"chapter (C-AA-V-C-a). "La
und
oder
selbst",
litt6rature et le droit d la mort" was published in Critique, 20, January 1948,30-47;
taking its title from Hblderlin's unfinished tragedy "Empedokles": 'Denn sterben will
ja ich. Mein Recht ist difl. ' ['For death is what I seek. It is my right. '] See Hblderlin,
Poems and Fragments, Third Edition, translated and edited by Michael Hamburger,
London, Anvil Press, 1994,346.
There is no significant variation between these original versions and the single text that
dufeu,
discussion
La
Part
the
so
appearsin
in this chapter will refer to the latter. Here,
the second half begins with the line, 'La literature est liee au langage.' (PF, 311)
6 See "La litterature le droit la
Critique,
3
0, n. 1.
et
op.
cit.,
a mort", in
7 PF, 305; WF, 314.
8 PF, 311; WF, 322.
9 PF9 311; WF, 321. In
an authoritative essay on "La litterature et le droit a la mort",
Rodolphe Gasch6 correctly refers to these contradictions as 'positively irreconcilable'.
See "The felicities of paradox: Blanchot and the null-space of literature", in Carolyn
Bailey Gill (ed.), Maurice Blanchot: The Demand of Writing, London, Routledge,
1996,34-69,45. As Gasche points out, Blanchot's equation of literature and the Terror
in fact refers to Jean Paulhan's Les Fleurs de Tarbes ou la Terreur dans les Lettres
(1941). A review of Paulhan's book had already provided Blanchot with the
la
litterature
"
for
Journal
des
dýbats,
"Comment
25
to
est-il
possible?
write
opportunity
November 1941 (1) and 2 December 1941 (11);reprinted in FP, 92-101.
PF, 308; VVT,318, emphasis added.
PF, 324; VVT, 336. This tendency to read as language and writing what Hegel calls
between
language,
the
relation
about
consciousness
spirit raises important questions
depth
The
these
Phenomenology.
in
the
of
problems - which concerns
thought
and
between
Phenomenology
Hegel's
the
less
the
than
and
relation
philosophical
nothing
6system' - far exceeds the scope of this study, and represent an important yet
There
Hegel
English
two
are
currently
scholarship.
only
of
understudied aspect
language studies which treat of the question of language in Hegel: Daniel J. Cook,
Language in the Philosophy ofHegel, The Hague, Mouton, 1973; and John McCumber,
The Company of Words-' Hegel, Language, and Systematic Philosophy, Evanston IL,
have
been
Both
1993.
Press,
University
works
consulted in the writing of
Northwestern
195
this chapter, and we will have occasion to refer to them in subsequentnotes when they
shed light on questions raised by Blanchot's reading of Hegel.
12PF, 311-2; WF, 322.
13PF, 312; WF, 322.
14 Gesammelte Werke. Band 6 Jenaer Systementwfirfie1,285-7; First Philoso hy
T
of
Spirit, 220-1. This basic schema of 'Phantasie' and 'Gedlichtnis' at the origin of names
reappears in the Encyclopedia. The important difference, however, is that this schema
is stratified in the Jena text: imagination alone is 'mute', external and contingent; it is
only with memory that consciousnessfirst takes on its own existence. On this relation
between imagination and memory in the development of Hegel's theory of language,
see Cristophe Bouton, "L'6pitaphe et le tombeau: imagination et ralson dans la
Psychologie de Hegel", in Philosophie, n. 52, I decembre 1996,54-76; esp. 62-7.
15The
is
book
to
the
of
reference, course,
of Genesis(2: 19):
And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl
of the air and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and
whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.
This figure of Adam's 'first act' seemsto have had a particular resonance for Hegel. It
least
1807
(180
in
1); and the Jenaer
Differenzschrift
two
texts:
the
other, preappears at
Realphilosophie of 1805-6. Indeed, Blanchot's phrase about the 'strange right' of
from
latter:
'Adam gave a name to all things.
to
this
the
reference
speech seems echo
This is the sovereign right of Spirit, its primal taking-possession of all nature'; cited in
Bruns, Maurice Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosophy, op.cit., 285-6, n. 12, emphasis
added.
It should be noted that Hegels turn to Genesis and Adam also may refer to Kant's
his
he
book
Rousseau
that
treats
of
in
short essay, "Conjectures on
when
corrective of
the Beginning of Human History". See Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, translated
by H. B. Nisbet and edited by Hans Reiss, Cambridge University Press, 1991,221-34.
Kant steadfastly refuses to speculate on the question of the origins of language,
doing,
instead
free
for
Rousseau
to
and
choosing
so
give
rein to the more
reprimanding
(221-2).
(My
imagination
'fictions'
the
thanks to Simon
of
restrained, conjectural
Sparks for this reference.)
16Hegel, Gesammelte Werke. Band 6- Jenaer Systementwfirfe1,287; First Philosophy
Theatetus:
Socrates
Hegel
(1803-4),
1.
22
Spirit
to
the
referring
is
appeals to 'the gift
of
faithful
discourse
Memory',
(19td).
the
Muses'
the
as
guardian
of
mother,
of
Elsewhere, Plato has Socrates explain that the invocation of Mnemosyne properly
Euthydemus,
description
275c,
Critias,
recollection;
see
and
and
of
acts
precedes all
108d.
17
Ibid.
18Hegel, Werke.X Enzyklopddie der philosophischen Wissenschaften111,Frankfurt am
Main, Suhrkamp, 1970, §462 & Zusatz; Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, translated by
William Wallace and A. V. Miller, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971. Note that
'die Geddchtnis' is rooted in the past participle of the verb 'to think', 'gedanken'.
19GeS, 1,227, emphasis added. Hyppolite is discussing the first section of "REASON",
"Observation of Nature" (C-AA-A-a).
196
20
GeS, 1,228.
21For
example, PhG, 478; PhS, §652. Hegel gives this formulation a number Of times
in the section on 'Culture'. In his translation, Hyppolite renders 'Dasein' as 'jtre-lii'.
His comment occurs in PhE, 11,184, n. 84.
22This dialectical
progression from poetic word to philosophical concept, from poetry
to prose, is fundamental to Hegel's response to the Romantics. We shall return to this
below.
PhenomenQlogy
Section
4.22,
the
relation of philosophy and poetry in
in
23GeS, 1,227-8. On
becomes
the
two
this
comparing
versions of
passage,it
clear that
Blanchot does not take it straight from the pages of this book. Hyppolite's translation
attempts to follow Hegel's text word for word, whereas Blanchot is not so encumbered
by scholarly concerns: he renders 'Herrschafft' as '1a maitrise', instead of Va
domination'; 'geben' as 'imposer', rather than 'donner'. (Indeed, these two changes
)
final
lesfaisant
Kojevean
Finally,
he
'et
the
indicate a
vocabulary.
cuts out
sub-clause,
idjels pour soi', and replaces it with a final clause which reflects the Levinasian
distinction between 'existence' and 'existents', which he will reintroduce towards the
his
(see
PF, 324-5; WF, 336-7).
end of
essay
So why has the instance of Adamic naming in Hyppolite's text been neglected hitherto
in commentaries of "La litt6rature et le droit ý la mort"? Is it down to these differences
in translation? No. In fact, Blanchot's source for this citation has caused some
confusion among commentators; not least among those who have tended to regard
Kojeve as his sole Hegelian source. This tendency overlooks the fact that what interests
Blanchot here is the focus on naming as a primordial manifestation of the negative. As
we have already argued, this is not even a theme in Kojeve's interpretation. In my
by
have
Blanchot
two
aided this confusion:
view,
comments
I. Blanchot attributes this citation to 'Essays collected together under the name of
System of 1803-1804', but does not indicate whether this text is a translation or a
German edition. In fact, it does not appear to have existed under this title in either
language... Blanchot simply seemsto have made it up!
2. In the same footnote, he adds that Koj&ve has 'shown in a remarkable way how for
Hegel comprehension was equivalent to murder' (PF, 3 12, n. 1). This contiguity of
has
found
impression
Blanchot
that
this passage in the
the
references gives
Introduction; but Koj&ve does not refer either to this passage or to the figure of
Adam at any point in his lectures. In any event, Blanchot does not actually make
this connection: the equivalence of comprehension and murder is traced to
Kojeve's 'interpretation of a passagefrom the Phenomenology', and not the Jena
text (ibid. ).
This latter point is crucial. Gerald Bruns, for example, picks up on this reference to
Koj&ve in order to link Blanchot's comments to a discussion in the Introduction (5534). He compounds his own confusion by failing to notice that, at this point, Koj&ve is
(the
Phenomenology
Blanchot
in
his
text
to
to
the
which
refers
referring
actually
not
(and
his
function
but
theme
the
of
anthropogenetic
non-linguistic)
is reprising
of
note),
death in the 1803-4 Realphilosophie. See Maurice Blanchot: The Refusal of
Philosophy, op.cit., 297, n. 15. So what is this 'passage from the Phenomenology'? it
from
Preface
'life
be
the
Kojeve's
the
to
passage
spirit'
of
which
is
central
can only
197
lecture, "L'id&e de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel". See ILH, esp. 540-55; and
3,
Section
in
Chapter
3.1,
Hegel
his
discussion
of
above.
see also my
of
interpretation
But why should we turn to Hyppolite? If he translates the passagein question from the
1932 Hoffmeister edition - vol. XIX, Hegels Jenenser Realphilosophie I- is it not
possible that Blanchot too cites this edition? This possibility could account for strong
differences in their translations, but it cannot account for the fact that he still refers to
this text as the 'System of 1803-1804'. In fact, it is far more likely that Blanchot is
citing Hyppolite's translation from memory, or even adapting it to his own needs, as he
does on more than one occasion. On this aspect of Blanchot's 'scholarship', see Leslie
Hill's comments on his audacious 'rewriting' of two lines from H61derlin, in BEC, 9 1.
24PhGý53 1; PhS, §729. The
epic poet that Hegel has in mind, of course, is Homer.
25
Ibid.
26 Ibid., translation
modified. Hyppolite translates 'die Besinnung' ['contemplation';
creflection] as 'Veveil de la conscience' (PhE, 11,243).
27 According to Daniel J. Cook (whose
debt
Hyppolite),
to
the
work acknowledges a
but
language
dialectic
"CONSCIOUSNESS",
theme
the
and
of
relation of
is not only
main
Hegel's
Phenomenology
He
the
that
the
major
change
also of
as a whole.
argues
in
thinking from the Realphilosophie to the Phenomenology lies in this place of language:
it is no longer confined to an explicit level in the development of consciousness(that is,
Adam's 'first act'), but has become immanent to the very process of this development.
Thus, in the latter, the 'linguistic dimension of experience extends to all levels of
Hegel,
42.
Cook's
Cook,
Language
Philosophy
in
the
op.
cit.,
of
consciousness'; see
deliberately
disregards
be
McCumber,
John
the
that
who
contrasted
with
of
view may
Phenomenology on the grounds that the 'peculiar characteristics' of its dialectic result
from the conflictual. context of communication (the fifir es' and the fifir uns') which it
falls
1807
Hegel's
In
text
this
the
outside
way
philosophical
presuppose.
must
'System'; seeMcCumber, The Company of Words, op.cit., 148-54.
28
29
PhGý 85; PhS, §97.
Ibid.
30PhG, 87; PhS,§ 102.
31 PhG, 92; PhS, §110. Hegel's formulation of 'divine nature' prefigures his general
language,
'speculative
in
Logic
in
Science
the
the
spirit'
of
on
manifested
of
comments
the inherent 'speculative meaning' of certain words with opposed meanings - such as
'Aujheben'. See Hegel's Science of Logic, translated by AN. Miller, Atlantic
Highlands, Humanities Press, 1969,32; and also the "Remark: The Expression 'To
Sublate"', 106-8.
32PhG, 72; PhS, §78. This scepticism is 'thoroughgoing' or 'self-accomplishing' ['sich
does
does
it
in
that
the
external
obey
an
not
authority,
nor
sense
it
vollbringende'l
follow the internal authority of personal conviction.
33PhG, 75; PhS, §80.
34PhG, 90; PhS, § 109, emphasis added.
198
35 Heidegger
his
this
commentary on this passage. He
in
emphatically
makes
point
notes that this movement is not something that can be attributed to consciousness'after
the event':
Consciousness is in itself the disquiet of the auto-distinction between natural
knowledge and real knowing. The movement of historical process resides [beruht] in
this restlessness of consciousness, from which it also receives its orientation
[Richtung]. Consciousness is not moved after the event [nachtrdglich]; it is not
possible to show its orientation at the start.
See "i-legels Begriff der Erfahrung" (1942-3), in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe.
Band 5. Holzwege, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klosten-nann, 1977,158-9. (1 have
consulted Wolfgang Brokineier's French translation, in Chemins qui ne mýnent nulle
part, Paris, Gallimard, 1962,194. )
36
GeS, 1,145.
37 PhE, 1,71,
n. 14; and GeS, 1,147. Hyppolite cites Hegel's formulation of the
'annihilation restlessnessof the infinite' from his Jena Logic (ibid., n. 3). One might
also choose to cite further passagesfrom the Phenomenology, such as the description of
the 'sheer restlessness of life and absolute distinction' (PhG, 45; PhS, §46); and see
also the Encyclopedia (111,§378) and the Science of Logic (see SL, 106,545). More
recently, Jean-Luc Nancy has highlighted this word in Hegel's work; see Hegel.
L'inqui6tude du n6gatif, Paris, Hachette, 1997, passim.
38 The
experience of unrest, like everything else in Kojeve's account (including
language and speech), is subsumed by the anthropogenetic structure of 'desire for
Recognition' and the repose of the 'end of history'. The only occasion on which Koj&ve
refers to the experience of Tinqui6tude' during his lectures is in his opening definition
of desire and recognition: the negativity of 'Desire' disturbs man's 'passive ease
[qui&ude]' by forcing his consciousnessback upon itself, making him 'un-easy [inhim
into
driving
his
'lack'
it;
11.
ILH,
to
action
of
recognition,
and
satisfy
at
see
qui6t]'
39 ,Dialectique
(1956-7),
dans
la
de
1'esprit"
dialogue
PUnom6nologie
et
in Hyppolite,
Figures de la pens6e philosophique. Ecrits 1931-1968, two volumes, Paris, P.U. F.,
1971,1,209-12,210.
40Jean-Luc Nancy
makes this point in Hegel, Linqui&ude du nýgatif, op.cIt., 5-11.
41 Although he does
least
in
its
function
this
one
previous
word
at
essay
use
in "La
litt6rature et le droit a la mort" is unprecedented. The precious occasion is "Le
he
describes
(1946),
d'Aytre"
the constitutive absence of relation
which
in
paradoxe
between word and thing as the foundation for the 'poetic future' within every word: 'an
figure
is
in
transistion,
[of
unrest,
passage,
every
allusion, act of
which
images]
order
discussion
is
litterature
in
"La
'
The
this
to
that
trajectory.
parallel
of
context
an infinite
69.
66-78ý
See
PF,
la
le
droit
a mort".
et
Literary 'unrest' in Blanchot resurfaces in Jean-Philippe Mirauxis recent introductory
tditions
de
la
littirature,
Qui6tude
inqui6tude
Paris,
Blanchot.
Maurice
et
monograph:
Nathan, 1998. Yet Miraux does not treat of this word in any depth, nor does he trace it
back to Hyppolite's rendition of Hegel. He simply uses it to set the parameters of
Blanchot's conceptual vocabulary. I am arguing that, at the very least, Blanchot's
description
Hyppolite's
impact
Hegelian
the
the
this
of
marks
of
word
repeated use of
199
'dialectic of human unrest'. Let us note that in "De I'angoisse au langage" (1943),
Blanchot had linked the writer's experience of language to 'anguish' and 'anxiety'. But
little,
'I'inquietude'?
Very
from
'I'angoisse'
denoted
to
by
this
perhaps.
what is
change
Except that in Faux pas Blanchot's treatment of a similar set of themes is less
developed, more rigid in its oppositions, and furthermore, there is no recognition of
See
9-23,
fact,
FP,
12.
In
implicitly
Hegelian
the use of
themes
esp.
and concepts.
using
'I'angoisse' (as well as 'la rýalitj humaine') throughout Faux pas can be traced to
Henri Corbin's 1937 translations of Heidegger. On the context of these terms, see
Leslie Hill, BEC, 78.
42PF, 315; WF, 325.
43See
note 12, above.
44For
droit
la
dis:
'le
'Je
a
example,
mort' and
cettefemme! '; see PF, 312,316; WF,
322,327. On the H61derlinian origin of the title of this essay, see note 12, above. The
Mallarm6an reference, which Blanchot also repeats in full, is Ue dis.- unefleur!
from "Crise de vers", in Mallarme, Oeuvres completes, Paris, Gallimard-Pleiade, 1945,
368. For further examples of this echoing of Mallarm6, see Jean-Philippe Miraux,
Maurice Blanchot. Qui6tude et inquietude de la littirature, op.cit., 16. My own
discussion in this chapter will focus upon the relation between Hegel and H61derlin in
Blanchot's work.
45PF, 312; WF, 322. The
between
these three proper names in Blanchot's work
relation
later
du
disastre,
it
Some
in
LEcriture
thirty
complicated.
years
is as consistent as is
Blanchot sets out the task of the writer in terms of a necessaryrecognition of the lexical
'horizon' demarcatedby philosophy:
To write in ignorance and rejection of the philosophical horizon, punctuated,
delimit
horizon,
dispersed
by
this
the
words which
is necessarily to
assembled or
write with facile complacency (the literature of elegance and good taste). H61derlin,
Mallarme, and many others, do not allow us this.
See ED, 160; WD, 103. What H61derlin and Mallarm& do not allow 'us' is the ease of
knowing
it,
horizon
this
without taking into account the
without
writing within
language in which one writes - even in opposing 'philosophy', 'system' or 'Hegel'
(who is an unnamed yet implied presencehere). It is just such a 'philosophical horizon'
that Gerald Bruns runs the risk of ignoring in his overdetermination of the word
'refusal'; see Maurice Blanchot: The Refusal of Philosophy, passim. See also note 4,
above.
46PF, 312; AT, 322.
47EL, 136-7; SL, 109.
48PF, 312-3; AT, 322-3.
49 ,La
254,
Blanchot's
PF,
249-62;
This
(1947),
de
Pascal"
emphasis.
original
in
main
'fact' is manifested in the work of poets becauseit is in 'its poetic claim' that language
caffirms itself as an absolute'; it is 'spoken [se parle] without anyone who speaks it or
'
In
in
this
depending
the
the
this
least
who
speaks.
way,
one
argument
upon
without
at
le
droit
A
la
litt6rature
in
"La
that
et
mort".
essay is strictly identical with
50 Strictly speaking, for the ancient Greeks, a public sacrifice of a hundred oxen. See
OED: 'hecatomb' [Gr. hekatombi, f, hekaton hundred, bous ox]. Here Blanchot touches
200
book,
in
Va
in
this
the
he
does
the
times
collected
sense
essays
upon, as
of
a number of
in
for
du
to
the
feu':
literally,
that
order
maintain
sacrificed
whole;
part
part which is
forest
burnt
fire-break,
the
an
of
is
which
area
example,
clear in an
in
cutting of a
attempt to limit the progress of an advancing fire. The phrase, 'faire la part du jeu',
means 'to make a deliberate sacrifice', 'to cut one's losses'. It bears the double senseof
figure,
destruction
is
to
perhaps, of the speculative
a
preserve; another
whose purpose
ambiguity that Hegel cherishes in the word, Aujhebung. It articulates the same senseof
litterature
in
le
droit
"La
'both-and'l'neither-nor'
et
a
a la mort" as the
which recurs
foreshadowed
in
literature;
the two epigraphs from H61derlin
ultimate ambiguity of
and
and Heraclitus.
51
PF, 313; AT, 323.
52AM, 328. Seethe discussion this
essayin Chapter 1, Section 1.23, above.
of
53PF, 313; WF, 323,
emphasis added.
54PhG, 36; PhS, §32. SeeOED:
prosopopoeia n. M16. [L f. Gk prospopoiia representation in human form, f.
face,
figure
]
I
Rhet.
+
person
make.
aA
poiein
of speech in which an
prosopon
imaginary or absent person is represented as something speaking or acting; the
introduction of a pretended speaker.M 16. bA figure of speechin which an inanimate
human
A
thing
transf.
L16.2
or
given
characteristics.
person
is
personified
or abstract
19.
thing
E
the
quality.
of
a
as
embodiment
or
The fundamental role of prosopopeia in Hegel's "Preface" has been drawn to our
in
Second
Hamacher,
by
Hamacher.
See
"The
Inversion",
Werner
of
attention
Premises.- Essays on Philosophy and Literaturefrom Kant to Celan, translated by Peter
Fenves, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1996,340.
55Ibid., translation
bears
'umkehren'
Note
the sense of return
that
the
verb
modified.
('to turn back or retrace one's steps') as well as inversion ('to reverse or overturn'; 'to
turn inside out or upside down').
56 See Werner Hamacher's
extended analysis of this characteristic in "The Second of
Inversion", op.cit., 341.
57PFý328; WF, 341.
58PF, 329; VVT,342.
59See Serge Doubrovsky, "Critique
(ed.
),
Les
Chemins
in
Georges
Poulet
et existence",
Aditions
(10/18),
1968,143-57;
149-50.
de
la
Paris,
Union
g6nerale
critique,
actuels
He goes on to add: 'The experience of language therefore does not translate a
it
This
is
this
experience:
is the essential point that
very
experience.
metaphysical
Blanchot's meditation takes up and goes over again and again.' (Ibid. ) As I have
for
be
found
'metaphysical
in
Jean
the
terms
this
to
experience'
are
argued,
already
Hyppolite's 'transcendental' reading of the Phenomenology.
60PFý 316; WF, 327.
61PF9316; WF, 326-7.
62PFý 330; WF, 343.
201
63This
development
by
he
the
is
Paul
Davies'
which,
argues,
characterisation of
phrase
Blanchot during the 1950's begins to 'step away' from his focus on the work (which
for
la
droit
towards
define
le
the
litterature
"La
example)
mort",
idea of the
would
a
et
in
litt&aire
LEspace
dýsoeuvrement,
as presented
oeuvre solely within
and
L'Entretien infini. See "The work and the absenceof the work", in C. Bailey Gill (ed.),
Maurice Blanchot.- The Demand of Writing, op.cit., 91-107,94. However, Davies does
its
the
phrase, and
approximative prefix: the
not make clear exactly what is at stake in
discussion in this chapter is intended to offer a possible elucidation of this phrase.
64
GeS, 11,532.
65 Ibid., 512,
emphasis added. Even if Hegel becomes sceptical about the possibility
and desirability of any such 'recovery', the traces of this reflection on the aesthetic
development
imprinted
the
sense of religion are
on
of Hegelian thought as a whole.
However, it is worth noting that H61derlin had already disavowed such a project before
his friend's arrival in Jena. We will discuss the nature of this relationship with respect
to the end of "Kunstreligion", in Section 4.2, below.
66 Hegel, Werke. Band 13. Vorlesungen fiber die isthetik I, Frankfurt
am Main,
Suhrkamp, 1970,25.
67PhG, 549; PhS, §754.
69PhG, 547-8; PhS, §753.
69Jean-Luc Nancy
destiny'
in
de
"Portrait
interpretation
Hegel's
'friendly
offers an
of
Fart en Jeune fille", in Nancy, Le Poids d'une pensee, Les editions Le Griffon d'argile /
Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, 1991,33-63. Whilst he postpones what he says
friendship
be
lengthy
'a
the
on
motif
of
commentary'
in Hegel,
very
would otherwise
he does give a brief account of the meaning of this adverb which helps to bring our own
inquiry into relief Hegel's phrase evokes 'an obliging, cordial sympathy' (ibid., 55).
Citing Hyppolite's translation - 'un destin amical nous les a offertes, comme unejeune
fille pr6sente cesfruits' (PhE, 11,261) - he notes that fireundlich' does not necessarily
bear the sense of 'amical', or 'friendly', but signifies 'aimable' or 'gracieux',
'amiable', 'genial', or 'gracious'.
70PhG, 325; PhS, §439.
71PhG, 512; PhS, §700.
72Jean-Luc Nancy draws
he
defines
Hegel's figure
to
this
when
identification
attention
[museal]
"museumish"
interiority
'the
the
or archeological exteriority to which art
of
as
is dedicated'. See "Portrait de Fart en jeune fille", op.cit., 50.
73PhG, 590-1; PhS, §808.
74Jacques Taminaux gives a careful examination of the relation of art and speculation
in his essay, "Speculation and Difference", in Taminaux, Poetics, Speculation, and
Judgment. The Shadow of the Work ofArtfrom Kant to Phenomenology, translated and
York
New
Press,
State
University
1993,41-54.
Gendre,
Albany:
by
Michael
of
edited
75Hegel, Elements oýf the Philosophy of Right, translated by H. B. Nisbet and edited by
Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, §7, Addition.
202
76Hegel, "Der Positivitat der
Werke.
Band
(1795-6),
1.
Frahe
Religion"
in
christlichen
Schriften, edited Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1971,128-9.
77 For
in
Hegel's
friendship
this
early writings on
role of
a partial examination of
Christianity, see H. S. Harris, Hegel's Development.- Towards the Sunlight, 1770-1801,
Oxford:
Clarendon
1972,413-14.
Press,
,
78 Bataille, "L'Amitie",
VI, 294; see Chapter 2, Section 2.1, above. Jean-Luc Nancy
Fart
in
de
'written
"Portrait
discussion
its
text'
en jeune fille",
presents a
status as a
of
is
Hegel
39-40.
Michael
Inwood
many
more
representative
of
op.cit.,
scholars,
however, when he states that the Phenomenology is 'a rich, if chaotic, work', valuable
does
for
'material'
See
for
that
the
the
which
not
appear
elsewhere.
entry
only
Phenomenology of Spirit, in Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell,
1992,216-19,219.
79PhG, 591. Miller's translation
gives: 'from the chalice of this realm of spirits / foams
forth for him his own infinitude. ' (PhS, §808.)
80 See William Desmond's
account of this alteration, in Beyond Hegel and Dialectic. Speculation, Cult, and Comedy, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992,789. Although I have drawn on his book in my own comments here, 1 have drawn quite
different conclusions regarding the reducibility of the friendship to a thinking of the
he
reduces all relation of alterity to the self-mediation of an 'erotic
absolute: where
further
be
I
that
thus
and
all
ambiguity
contradiction can
absolute', remain unconvinced
' silenced'.
81PhG) 591; PS, §808. The
dem
des
/
Kelch
'Aus
Seelenreiches
reads:
ganzen
original
Schdumt ihm - die Unendlichkeit. ' "Die Freundschaft" (1782), in Friedrich Schiller,
Werke. Band I. Gedichte 1776-1799, edited by J. Peterson and F. Befflner, Weimar:
Hermann 136hlausNachfolger, 1943,110-11. Hegel's free adaptation of Schiller here
from
lines
H61derlin.
Blanchot's
of
appropriation
compares with
82Bataille, Lascaux,
Vart
(1.955),
de
IX,
13.
la
ou naissance
83Blanchot, "La
de
Fart",
AM,
10.
naissance
84Bataille, IX, 13. See the discussion of this passage in Chapter 3, Section 3.22,
above.
85IX, 14.
86 AM, 11; FS, 3. Note that Elizabeth Rottenberg translates 'et presque d'amitie' as
'and even of friendship'.
87" Le
52,
April
1957,696.
Nouvelle
du
revuefranCaise,
musee", in
mal
88"Le
21-51,26.
AM,
le
Fart
temps",
et
musee,
89On 27 July 1958 Malraux takes up the position of Minister of State, charged with the
in
French
the government of de Gaulle's Fifth
I influence and expansion of
culture',
de
Gaulle's
'assumption'
is
that
It
Republic. is worth noting
it
of power in 1958, and in
Algeria,
Blanchot's
triggers
the
his
which
in
conflict
of
own return
escalation
particular
"Le
(1958),
One
directed
piece,
refus"
such
reprinted in L'Amiti6,
writing.
to politically
bears the affirmation:
203
At a certain moment, in the face of public events, we know that we must refuse. [ ]
...
Those who refuse and who are linked by the force of refusal, they know that they are
still not together.
In default of a political community - any sense of which had been removed by this
quasi-dictatorial seizure of power - Blanchot locates a sense of solidarity and unity in
the irreducibility of shared refusal; what he calls 'the friendship of this certain,
unshakeable, rigorous No. ' (AM, 130.) The issues of Blanchot's politics will need to be
addressed in a separate study; nevertheless they press through the conception of
friendship in the works under discussion.
90
91
AM, 26.
AM, 26-7.
92See G.W. F. Hegel, Werke. Band 13. Vorlesungen Oer die Asthetik 1, Frankfurt
am
Main, Suhrkamp, 1970,25.
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
EL, 292.
EL, 311.
ELý 313.
PF, 305.
AM, 4 1.
AM, 50.
PF, 295.
100AMý 25.
101AM, 33.
102
103
104
105
106
AM, 27.
AM, 39.
AM, 45.
AM, 52.
Ibid.
107AM, 52. Blanchot's relation to technology presents another point of difference with
Bataille, for whom 'technological culture' remains within the confines of Koj&ve's
4universal, homogeneous State'. Blanchot sets himself against this Heideggerean
tendency to reduce technology to a geo-political value alone. In one of his preparatory
texts for the failed project of a Revue internationale - on the recent 'conquest of space'
he
writes:
Certainly, technology is dangerous, but less dangerous than "spirits of place". There
the
be
to
paganism in which anti-Christianism
against
perhaps,
said,
is something
Heideggerean
paganism,
takes
a
poetic
paganism
of enrootedness.
cover
voluntarily
Truth is nomad.
lignes,
definitions
la
de
"Textes
Blanchot,
See
<<Revue internationale W'
preparatoires,
(196 1), in Lignes, n. 11, September 1990,179-91,189.
204
108
AM, 53.
109AM, 56. At this
his
"La
Blanchot
B&e
de
to
LAmW6,
in
refers
own
essay,
point
Lascaux", originally published in 1958, in which counters Plato's Phaedrus with the
book)
by
fact
(represented
is
'impersonal
knowledge'
the
that
in
idea
essential to the
development of truth 'in the world of everyone'. It is this very impersonality which, he
claims, 'is tied to the development of technology in all its forms and it makes speech,
writing, a technics'. See "La Bete de Lascaux" (1958), reprinted in Ren6 Char. Cahier
de I'Herne, Paris: tditions de I'Herne, n. 15,1971,71-7; esp. 71-2.
110AM, 59.
III AM, 56.
112
113
114
115
116
117
AM, 60.
AM, 48.
ELý 305.
AM, 44; 6 1.
PF, 320.
AM, 5 1.
118 Blanchot, 'Vart, la litterature
1'experience
(1)",
in
Les
Te=s
originelle
et
modernes, 79, May 1952,1921-5 1; 1947, emphasis added.
119
AM, 56.
120Blanchot, "Le fire des dieux" (1963), AM, 192-207,194.
121At this
begins
H61derlin
to
the
address
path
inquiry
importance
of
of
point, another
becomes
It
'reserve'
Blanchot's
the
the
work
of
art.
soon
on
of
clear that the
work
in
full extent of this topic far exceeds the remit of this present study. It is worth noting,
however briefly, that he describes the poet's exemplarity in terms of discretion. In a
du
feu,
Part
H61derlin,
La
the
publication
a
year
after
of
written
short article on
Blanchot himself asks why we identify the name of 1161derlinwith the 'essence of
does
his
Why
be
H61derlin
'Why
to
today?
to
to
us
voice
seem
so
present
us
is
poetry':
the poetic voice par excellenceT He grants that these questions cannot be answered
by
facts
life.
for
Indeed,
the
the
they
of
poet's
are
illuminated
satisfactorily, nor
Blanchot, it is the biographical fact of H61derlin's mental collapse, his 'madness', that
hand,
because,
'the
deceptive
the
one
it
was
on
reserve, the extreme
precisely
proves
limit of discretion which overflowed the work and transformed it into a pile of
hand,
'this
had
the
same
madness
which
other
shrouded
scribbled papers'; whilst, on
Hblderlin in silence was also what revealed him' and made his name known, even at
the expense of the work. See Blanchot, "H61derlin", in L'Observateur, n. 17,3 August
1950, emphasis added.
122Peter Banki, "o La discr6tion la reserve est le lieu de la litterature W', in Ralentir
discretion
'the
discretion'
45.
His
hiver
1997,41-6;
7,
of
account
of
is close
travau , n.
1.
Chapter
this
to my own in
chapter and
123
PF, 330.
124Blanchot, "Sur un changement d'epoque: l'exigence du retour", in EI, 394; IC, 264.
205
Conclusion
The discretion of the work
It is as if he had said to him, saying it in such afriendly manner:
friendship withdrawsfrom us [I'amitie se retire de nous].
Maurice Blanchot 1
At the beginning of this study, we posed the central problem of how to read
friendship in Blanchot's work We asked: how and where does it 'take place' in
Blanchot? Is there a 'place' at all for friendship in his work? Or is friendship, by
definition, excluded from all 'work', belonging instead to that which originally
it?
the
time
the
the
yet
same
work,
and
at
already
ruins
space
of
opens
In the reading which followed, unfolding in four distinct stages - two on
Blanchot, two on Bataille -, we have proposed that in order to respond to the full
implications of this problem it is necessaryto go by way of Bataille's thinking of
friendship and complicity; and also, therefore, by way of his relation to a certain
Hegel. This detour has been decisive for the orientation of our reading of Blanchot
in general, insofar as it has allowed us not only to see that fundamental differences
things,
the
the
between
them
other
status
amongst
of
work of
concerning,
remain
integral
differences
in
to
the
these
they
that
but
to
are
ways
which
observe
also
art;
206
figure the relation of friendship
-
demand
the
for
discretion
as
as
complicity;
or
as
discontinuity or as the desire for a continuum. However, it was also made clear at
the beginning that this detour through Bataille (and Hegel), although necessary,
does not end with him (or them), nor puts an end to Blanchot's thinking 'in
proximity' to him.
Indeed, as we have seen throughout this enquiry, the problem of ftiendship
directions
directions:
in
which one might call 'political', such
already points
other
as the 'friendship of a rigorous No' with which Blanchot makes an intervention
into the quasi-militaristic events of October 1958, or the affirmation of the
2
impersonal
'events'
'fraternally anonymous and
movement' of the
of May '68;
but also other directions indicating the importance of his relationship to other
thinkers, such as Emmanuel Levinas. Indeed, only the relation to Levinas seemsto
have had such a great, eventually perhaps even greater, impact on the
development of Blanchot's work. At the end of "Pour Famitie" (1993), an essay
by
Dionys
Mascolo,
Blanchot
of
work
and
which
which prefaces a collection
dedicates 'To all my friends, known and unknown, near and distant', it is Levinas
to whom he turns, 'le seul ami - ah, ami lointain - que je tutoie et qui me
3
tutoie'.
As a guide to this other direction, it is possible to cite another essay which
Blanchot addressesto Levinas, "Notre compagnon clandestiný' (1980), in which
he writes of their friendship as passing by way of an encounter with philosophy:
Philosophy would be our companion always, day and night, whether by
losing its name, becoming literature, knowledge, unknowledge [nonfriend
itself,
by
our
clandestine
whom we respected absenting
savoir], or
loved -, and which did not allow us to be bound to it, even whilst
forewarning us that there was nothing awakened in us, vigilant to the point
its
due
difficult
friendship.
to
Philosophy
not
was
which
or
of sleep,
4
friendship. But philosophy is precisely not an allegory.
5
difficult
friendship',
The friendship of philosophy, 'its
pennits 'us' neither to
done
have
to
to
with reading and thinking in its wake. This
bind ourselves it nor
207
if
in
rings strangely with our preceding examinations, one recalls that Blanchot's
discretion in the naming of friendship articulates the discontinuity which first
4puts into relation' by spacing and interrupting. It is at this point, when
'discretion' as such comes to figure friendship at the heart of Blanchot's thinking,
that TamitiC returns to the question of philosophical discourse, a discourse which
calways loses itself at a certain moment: it is, perhaps, nothing but an inexorable
6
itSelf.,
losing
loss
By locating this 'certain moment' of
way of
and of
'inexorable' loss (of itself) as the definitive moment of philosophy, Blanchot
brings this essential powerlessness- it is 'sans droit [ ] un possible sans pouvoir'
...
into
he
had
in
'discreet
force
the
traced
the
the
relation
with
movement
which
of
turning': what philosophy 'supposes' or 'demands' [exige'],
before all else, is
'the effacement of the one who would support it or, at least, a change in the
position
of the philosophical
subject'.
7 Yet
'effacement',
aswell as the
'impersonality' to which it attests, is never sufficient. For both philosopher and
Blanchot,
'very
writer, who are, says
close', any such anonymity must remain
'suspect'; otherwise, it soon ceasesto be anything other than 'a game to conceal
the name and finally to exploit it [le faire valoir].
8
' It is
possible to hear this dual-
in
discretion.
'demand'
Blanchot's
terms
thinking
of
of
edged
Consequently, further work in those directions indicated above, particularly
in
during
late
Blanchot's
to
the
the
which
writing, already
way
paying attention
1950's and early 1960's, but specifically after 1962, begins to move away from
Bataille and further towards Levinas and philosophy, would be necessary. What
how
far
here
is
Blanchot's
do
friendship
have
to
thinking
to
show
of
attempted
we
demand
for
in
he
himself
the
thought as such.
the
sets out
which
way
saturates
Thus, in having limited the scope of this study, both to the relation with Bataille
follow
how
figure
have
been
to
the
the
texts,
to
able
we
of
relation of
specific
and
incompatibility, the double relation of the possible and the impossible, brings with
it a thinking of friendship that is in no way reducible to either an 'inter-personal'
friendship,
Instead,
Blanchot
'intercalls
using a phrase
subjective' relation.
or
borrowed from Levinas, a 'rapport sans rapport': a relation without being related
208
to anything ultimate, only taking place as the 'pure interval' that separatesfinite
beings; and yet also a relation of indirection, or without horizon, which always
introduces the third person ('impersonality') precisely as this interruption.
What we have brought forth from Blanchot's work, then, is the way in which
friendship never allows one to read it with ease (either as an ethical, political
concept, or even as an emblematic, exemplary figure). It is not bound to any fixed
'itself.
Blanchot's presentation of fiiendship in terms of
that
value or end, even
of
discretion is difficult to read precisely because it affirms, and communicates, the
impossibility
of thought coming to rest at any such value, 'sufficiency'
or
(meaning'. The always singular experience of friendship does not suit it to any
theoretical or practical 'purpose' or 'end'; it is not assigned a 'place' as such by
Blanchot, but instead it is presented in terms of what demands to be thought
outside of any final value and meaning. It is in this sensethat Blanchot refers to
friendship as a relation which is inseparable from the the movement of discretion
(in dying, for example). Discretion names that form of relation in which thinking
interrupts
('Finquietude'),
firms
it
that
thus withdrawing
and
which
unsettles
af
itself from the satisfaction of a reconciling 'presence' asmuch as from the abyssal
'nothing'.
Yet
'work'
this
the
the
time,
at
same
effect
or
supremacy of
of
discretion is always subject to itself- it is never certain - and never can be if it is to
discreet.
remain
Therein lies the true difficulty of friendship, for it is part of the nature of
Blanchot's writing that it is always tempting to read 'J'amitie' as simply another
desoeuvrement,
'le
the
'le
even
or
originary
namelessness
of
way of naming
latter
the
to
thereby
as unproblematic conditions of possibility
read
neutre'; and
for experience in general. This reading must be resisted. Such a movement of
identification
Blanchot
fail
the
to
caution
with
which
read
names
would
friendship: it would be to make it the centre of one's thinking, or the essential
being
'thinking'
'work'
for
the
or
altered and
work, without such
condition
however,
it
is
At
time,
the
by
displaced
same
also clear that the
this experience.
209
very difficulty of friendship is intimately bound up with Blanchot's thinking of
the latter, insofar as this conflictual movement of withdrawing and manifesting
&acts' or 'works' discreetly: the 'neutre' is, always and already, to be thought as an
unpresentable movement of reserve. To think this relation of discretion is always,
therefore, to run a risk, to expose oneself to the 'demand of friendship'. What is at
formulation
in
Blanchot's
therefore,
stake,
of this other 'demand', 'the demand of
friendship', is precisely this double movement between the 'naming the possible'
impossible',
between
'responding
demand'
'political
to
the
the
and
and the 'poetic
demand'.
It is true, therefore, that Blanchot never explains what friendship means to
him. This meaning nevertheless infon-ns his work as a whole. Friendship is
4present' in these texts only through this thought of discretion. Equally, discretion
is never allowed to become a concept in his work. It is performed there as that
As
the
makes
work
a
work.
a result, we can say that, through
movement which
this double movement of discretion,, friendship is a part of 'the reserve' of
literature; it is there in 'the demand of discontinuity; it is there in the conflicting
demands of 'naming the possible' and 'responding to the impossible'; it is there in
'the discreet force of the turning'. This jý'does not mean that ftiendship somehow
Blanchot
the
to
poses about the work of
questions which
provides an answer all of
from
borrow
"L'amitie"':
'it
To
literature,
to
the
the
phrase
a
other.
or
relation
art,,
is
Friendship
to
be
that'.
to
meant
not
answer anything
consider
even
crass,
would
in Blanchot's work. It only provides a way of holding open these questions and of
be
demands
We
to
thought
them.
that
to
within
still
which
maintaining a relation
intractability
it
brings
the
friendship
that
of
affirming
with a way
of
might venture
'in
tension;
thought
their
of
maintaining
a
way
contradictions without absolving
demand
friendship
The
lies
in
this
the
between
the
of
no'.
and
yes
suspense
demand
between
the
the
the
is
(which
of
naming
balance
possible
slippage)
a
also
impossible.
the
to
and of responding
210
Notes to Conclusion
I PA, 117.
2 See "Le
130-1;
CI,
55.
(1958),
AM,
and
refus"
3, Pour Famitie", in Dionys Mascolo, A la
d'un
de
recherche
communisme
pensie,
Paris: fourbis, 1993,5-16,16.
4, Notre
compagnon clandestine", in Frangois Laruelle, Textes pour Emmanuel
Levinas, Paris: tditions Jean-Michel Place, 1980,79-87,80.
5 Paul Davies has
how
between
Blanchot and Levinas, in
to
this
shown us
read
passage
"Difficult Friendship", Research in Phenomenology, v. 18 (1988), 149-72,170.
6, Le 'discours
philosophique"", in Larc, 46 (1971), 1-4,4.
7 Ibid., 1.
8 Ibid.
211
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