It's a pleasure to introduce Ray Brassier. Basically I should say that this is part of a work in progress progress and something that only recently started working on and it's it's made in a chapter of a book on Heidegger and Deleuze specifically reviews on temporal individuation and unfortunately because it's a work in progress there are it's
unfinished it's an unfinished chapter as opposed to a polished paper and you will immediately notice to glaring lacunae in the in the structure of the paper I One, when I talk about the third synthesis of time in Deleuze, I haven't been able to, I will quickly kind of talk about its link to death, but it's a very kind of brief and unsatisfactory discussion because I haven't had time to work it through properly. and the relationship between death, individuation, and the affirmation of recurrence in De Laus, which is also part of the subtitle of this paper. That's also something that you will note is conspicuous by its fairly shoddy and schematic treatment. But anyway, so in his 1924 lecture, The Concept of Time, which has been called the Urform of Being and Time,
Heidegger begins with the question, what is time? and shows how it gradually transforms itself into the question, who is time? Time cannot be grasped by means of the question of essence which inquires into the what of things, das was The traditional understanding of whatness or essence operates on the basis of a prior hypothesization of time as presence and usia, understood as vorhandenheit or presence at hand though Heidegger is not yet using these terms in 1924, predetermines the philosophical conceptualization of time. So the question, what is time, prejudges the very nature of the phenomenon about which it inquires by reducing it to the status of a specific way of being in time, being present.
But time is precisely that which is never merely present. Its way of being cannot be grasped on the basis of being present. So we cannot simply assume that time's way of being is that of intratemporal entities. And to understand how time is and how its way of being differs from that of intratemporal entities, we must first understand how we originally come to grasp the various senses of temporal being, how temporal things are. And for Heidegger this entails grasping the intimate relation between those varieties of temporal being and our own being as that within which temporal phenomena are encountered. So for Heidegger, the inquiry into how time is necessitates an inquiry into the way of being of that entity
on whose basis we originally come to access the varieties of temporal being. And that being is, of course, our own, Dasein. Its defining characteristics, according to Heidegger, are temporal specificity, or what he calls yavallikite and I apologise for my pronunciation and minnes or yamainikite temporal specificity and minnes but nevertheless for Heidegger Dasein is necessarily always mine and this is a quote from the 24 lecture the specificity of the I am is constitutive for Dasein just as primarily as it is being in the world Dasein is therefore also my Dasein. It is in each case its own and is specific as its own." But if the temporal
specificity of Dasein is in each case mine, this is to say that each of us is time and that time as such is in each case mine. And this is indeed precisely the conclusion Heidegger draws towards the close of his lecture. This is a quote again the question what is time became the question who is time more closely are we ourselves time or closer still am I my time for Heidegger at this juncture to ask am I my time is to ask am I my Dasein and as we know this isn't to inquire into the propriety of Dasein's being as defined in terms of its ultimate and most extreme possibility, death.
Dasein becomes properly individuated insofar as it appropriates death as its own. And already in this 1924 lecture, it is Dasein's appropriation of death as its own most extreme possibility, what Heidegger calls its running ahead of itself towards its own past, which authentically individuates Dasein and thereby singularises its time. The appropriation of death allows the past to be seized out of the future. In Being in Time, of course, this running ahead will be characterized in terms of the resolute anticipation exhibited in Dasein's Being Toward Death. yet for all the significant nuances Heidegger will subsequently add in being in time, this intimate link between individuating death and temporal singularization
remains the defining feature of Dasein's finite transcendence so for the early Heidegger at least, death provides Dasein's and therefore time's ultimate principle of individuation and the key question in this regard would seem to be whether death and time can be said to be mine authentically or inauthentically. Yet, though the concept of time prefigures the core of Heidegger's celebrated magnum opus in charting this movement from time's what to its who, it is clearly distinguished from being in time by its explicit disavow of any attempt to frame an inquiry back beyond time
into its connection with other categories. That's Heidegger's own expression. And insofar as it abjures any explicit thematization of the relation between Dasein's time and the temporal character of being in general, Heidegger will even go so far as to claim that the inquiry conducted in concept of time is not strictly philosophical in tenor. It is the attempt to articulate the relation between sign and Dasein, and more specifically the connection between Dasein's temporal self-understanding and the temporal understanding of being in general that distinguishes the project undertaking being in time from its germinal prefiguration in this 1924 lecture. So in being in time, famously, the three structural moments of Dasein's being in the world
constitute the originary ecstases of temporalisation. Time is nothing but the process of Dasein's self-temporalising in the threefold unity of being already, being alongside, and being towards. And in Heidegger's own words, and this is a quote from Being in Time, the phenomena of the toward, the to, the alongside, make temporality visible as the ecstatic on, pure and simple. Temporality is the primordial outside of itself, in and for itself. end quote. Now this last formulation is particularly significant because it neatly encapsulates
what will turn out to be the key difficulty for fundamental ontology. Recall that the existential analytic of Dasein outlining the ecstatic-horizonal structure of finite transcendence was to be developed into an account of the relation between the individuated temporality or zeitlichkeit of Dasein, the time which is in each case mine, and the temporality or temporality of being in general. And being in general, we tentatively assume, cannot simply be coextensive with Dasein, which is in each case mine. It must harbor some pre-individual dimension. And indeed, Theodore Kiesel has pointed out that this pre-individual dimension of being
had been an abiding concern of Heidegger's throughout the decade preceding being in time, and hence long before his so-called turn of the 1930s. And Kiesel cites this evidence, Heidegger's recurrent use of the impersonal pronoun it in sentences such as it-worlds, which were an attempt to evoke the pre-theoretical and pre-worldly event of being, qua primal something, the ur et vas. but if that sense temporality is it is heidegger's own expression the primordial ecstatic on in and for itself a formulation that makes it sound remarkably like the idealist absolute does this not imply that the only time is das signs time my time in this regard a particularly cryptic passage from the
concept of time already seems to prefigure this tendency to render on to logical time entirely subservient to existential temporality and Heidegger writes their court Dasein is time time is temporal Dasein is not time but temporality the fundamental assertion that time is temporal is therefore the most authentic determination and it is not a tautology because the being of temporality signifies non-identical actuality. Insofar as time is in each case mine, there are many times. Time itself is meaningless. Time is temporal." So from Heidegger's point of view here, at least in this 1924 lecture, the notion
of time itself would be meaningless precisely insofar as it would be tantamount to no one's time and confronted with the difficulty of articulating the distinction between temporality as we experience it and time in general the temptation to which Heidegger himself seems to have succumbed while elaborating the project of fundamental ontology however audaciously he may have struggled with it before and after is simply to deny the ontological autonomy of time itself and to reduce it to our temporality to see how this may have come about, let us quickly recapitulate Heidegger's account of Dasein's threefold ecstasis in Being and Time. First, as ahead of itself, Dasein is becoming its
own most possibility. Existentiality is grounded in futurity. Dasein is always already coming toward itself. Secondly, but in becoming that possibility or going forward, Dasein is a returning to and a reappropriation of what it already was, its facticity. By going out towards its own most possibility in resolute anticipatoriness, Dasein returns to its always already having been, thereby authentically taking over its intrinsic finitude. And lastly, by becoming what it already is, Dasein gains access to entities in the Augenblink.
This is Heidegger's own expression, the Augenblink, the moment of authentic and presenting or making present. Now, as we know, Heidegger distinguishes the temporality of existence, what he calls a zeitlichkeit des Dasein from the temporality of being temporalität des Sein and the project of being in time famously falters precisely at the point where it becomes necessary to explain the precise character of their connection this was reserved for the projected but never written third division nevertheless Heidegger provides a glimpse of how he envisaged the nature of this connection in his 1927 lecture course, Basic Problems of Phenomenology.
There, Heidegger maintains that Dasein as finite transcendence is not beyond, but rather a stepping beyond. And in Heidegger's own words again, quote, transcendere means to step over. The transcendence, the transcendence, the transcendent, is that which oversteps as such and not that towards which I step over. Dasein itself oversteps in its being and thus is exactly not imminent. So Dasein's temporal ecstasis is a transcending, a stepping beyond. But every such removal or displacement possesses a determinate orientation, a whither, as that towards which Dasein steps over.
and if that towards which does and steps over it we can tentatively assume would be being which Heidegger also calls the transcendence pure and simple as we shall see it is precisely this distinction which becomes problematic the temporality of being is the extematic correlate implied by Dasein's ecstatic transcendence that's the expression Heidegger uses in basic problems of phenomenology and Heidegger is careful to distinguish this relation between ecstasis and extema which he takes to be constitutive of ontological transcendence from what he takes to be the merely ontic reciprocity between
noesis and noema as correlated through the transcendence of intentionality intentional transcendence whose trajectory goes from imminent consciousness to transcend an object is according to Heidegger merely a derivative mode of this more originally temporal transcendence the extematic horizontal whither is precisely not an objective correlate for Dasein's transcendence because it cannot be described as something which is yet Heidegger also insists that ecstasis does not thereby become a transport towards nothing. And quote, this is Heidegger again from Basic Problems. Rather, as removal to, and thus because of the ecstatic nature of each of them, the three ecstases each have
a horizon which is prescribed by the mode of the removal, the carrying away, which belongs to the ecstasis itself. Each ecstasis as removal to has at the same time within itself and belonging to it a pre-delineation of the formal structure of the where-to of the removal. End quote. So, the extematic horizon for temporal ecstasis is not to be understood as a circular visual limit, but as that with which transcendence encompasses and delimits the bounds of its own stepping beyond. and consequently the ontological horizon cannot be located in subjectivity or in time or in space.
It is not. It is nothing which is. Moreover, if, as Heidegger clearly seems to suggest, the ontological horizon belongs to the ecstasis as a stepping beyond, then this surely implies that it has been somehow generated or produced in and through ecstatic transcendence. Transcendence and indeed the whole thrust of Heidegger's project in being in time seems to be devoted to showing how the structure of Transcendence bringing together the unity of the temporal ecstasis than in what he calls the Exstematic unity of their horizons reveals a productivity specific To ecstatic temporality and from which being in the world results To interpret this ontological product productivity of something which is simply beyond or independent of Dasein's
stepping beyond we return the temporality of being into a transcendental objective correlate for dasaigne's ecstatic transcendence and thus to hypothesize the temporality proper to being as something which is transcendental over and above dasaigne's move movement of transcendence but this would be to compromise the latter specifically ontological which is to say unobjectifiable to However, this refusal to reify the distinction between extasis and extema confronts Heidegger with a dilemma. How to conceive of the difference between extasis and extema without objectifying the latter, but without collapsing it into the former?
To hypothesize the extematic correlate proper to the temporal understanding of being in general would be to compromise their rigorously ontological status. But to characterize them as entirely constituted through ecstasis would be to effectively subordinate sign to dasein. So fundamental ontology claimed to have outstripped metaphysical subjectivism, but now finds itself confronted by the choice between objective or subjective idealism. The structure of temporal transcendence seems to harbor some sort of intrinsic, originary differentiation between a subjective and an objective pole, yet this differentiation proves inordinately difficult to configure on the basis of Heidegger's own phenomenological premises
without relapsing into the very distinctions between transcendence and the transcendent, or noesis and noema, which Heidegger claimed to have overcome. And no doubt this difficulty had something to do with Heidegger's abandonment of the project of fundamental ontology. But why does the latter seem to unravel precisely at that point where the existential analytic outlining Dasein's ecstatic structure of transcendence was to be surpassed towards an account of the temporality proper to being in general? Heidegger's retrieval of the ontological problematic was to be effected via critical radicalization
of transcendental philosophy. The fundamental question is not just of being, but of our access to being. How do we originally access the being of phenomena? Dasein is in the world, but also not just something in the world. And herein lies the rub. Where Kantian transcendentalism cultivated suspicion of unmediated access to phenomena, transcendental phenomenology countered with the revelation that the mediation is immediate, unmediated. That which is accessed is mediated, but the access as such is not, whether it be intentionality or finite transcendence. And finite transcendence for Heidegger is the condition of possibility
for all access to the being of phenomena. Indeed, according to Heidegger, the condition of possibility for those merely metaphysical conditions of possibility identified by the tradition. But this condition of conditions is necessarily unconditioned. It is, in Heidegger's own words, the ecstaticon in and for itself. Recognizing the taint of idealist subjectivism in this latter, Heidegger went on to seek an even more originary access to the primordial happening, an ever more radical means of unearthing the conditions for conditions, erideness, the fourfold, etc. But the phenomenological radicalization of transcendentalism initiated by Heidegger finds itself excavating deeper and deeper
into the primordial, uncovering the conditions for the conditions of the conditions. Yet the deeper it digs towards the pre-originary, the more impoverished its resources become and the greater it's removed from things themselves. Heidegger and his successors end up striving for the pre-reflexive through increasingly reflexive means, exacerbating abstraction until it becomes reduced to applying its own exorbitant vacuity. And this meta-transcendental problematic reaches some sort of apogie in Derrida, who introduces both a healthy measure of scepticism and a fatal dose of irony into the proceedings by revealing how the immediacy of access was always already contaminated by mediation or difference.
Once the problematic of access and of the access to access has reached its ironic denouement in this terminally self-enclosed spiral of reflexivity, it is no surprise to see the very notion of a world indifferent to our access to it dismissed as unintelligible. But if the idea of a world independent of our access to it seems unintelligible, then perhaps the fault lies more in our notion of intelligibility than in the world. And one cannot but be struck by the ironic spectacle of the later Heidegger trying to uncover the roots of the primal phenomenon, the ur et vas, in old Greek words. Phenomenology begins with the things themselves and ends up pouring over words, nothing but words.
And perhaps this is the inevitable denouement of the philosophy of access. This is the context in which the question of the status of Deleuze's own critical appropriation of the transcendental legacy in difference in repetition becomes particularly urgent. Like being in time, difference in repetition seeks to overhaul Kantian transcendentalism on behalf of an ontology of temporal difference. But it circumvents the problematic of access by firmly situating temporal syntheses in things rather than any peculiarly human relation to things. but as we shall see this audacious move threatens to clash with Deleuze's equally innovative rehabilitation
of the thesis of ontological university according to which being is said in one and the same sense of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities that's Deleuze's own definition of the thesis of university and difference in repetition. Being is said in one and the same sense of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities, even though those differences or modalities differ from each other. And in fact, though this thesis is commonly cited as evidence of Deleuze's allegiance to Spinezist monism, it actually belies the way in which Deleuze continues to reserve a special, indeed privileged
role for a special kind of being an exceptional modality of individuation that of the psyche and this despite the laws is apparent circumvention of the problematic of access it is not enough rights the laws and difference in repetition to see that consciousness is consciousness of something it is the double of this something and each thing is consciousness because it possesses a double albeit very distant and very foreign to it. End quote. This elementary function of psychic doubling is performed by larval selves whose passive syntheses of habit contract temporal differences from elementary instances of spatial repetition.
Though Deleuze's theory of passive synthesis renders a larval form of psychic individuation ontologically ubiquitous at the spatial temporal level, thereby rehabilitating a peculiar variety of panpsychism. It is in the human psyche that individuation becomes fully potentiated as the differentiator of difference. Deleuze atomizes consciousness, disintegrating it into a multiplicity of larval cells and makes of it something in the world, as opposed to a transcendental condition of access to it. But having done so, he then goes on to make that thing the privileged locus for an apocalyptic individuation,
whereby, in a striking inversion of Heidegger, the future subverts the past and death becomes the subject of a time that splits the self. For Deleuze, time, like death, is ultimately no one's. Okay, difference in repetition can be usefully summarized as a particularly audacious rewriting of Kant's first critique in the light of Bergson's Matter and Memory. But it perverts Kantianism just as it subverts Bergsonism. Deleuze perverts Kant by subjecting representation to a critique which annuls the mediating role
of conceptual understanding vis-à-vis reason and sensibility. Thus, in difference in repetition, the tripartite structure of the first critique undergoes a bizarre involution which folds the transcendental dialectic directly into the transcendental aesthetic. The role of the transcendental analytic is supplanted by an account of spatiotemporal individuation which provides the sufficient reason for a non-conceptual synthesis of reason and sensibility. With the unifying function of the understanding suspended, the aesthetic manifold need no longer be subjected to conceptual subsumption. It now incarnates the dialectical structures of ideal multiplicity.
Individuation becomes the synthesis of reason and sensibility. We shall consider Deleuze's theory of individuation in more detail below. But first, it is important to see how this renegotiation of the platonic Kantian dyad, aesthetic dialectic or sensible ideal, is given an additional twist by Deleuze's subversion of the Bergsonian dichotomy, matter-memory or space-time, recoded in the conjunction of difference and repetition in the book's title. each term harbors a double aspect depending on whether it is viewed from the side of representation or grasped in and for itself the representational characteristics of difference are identity in the concept, opposition in the predicate
resemblance in perception and analogy in judgment but difference in itself as exhibited in the idea is univocal, dialectical problematic and virtual Similarly, from the viewpoint of representation, repetition is bare, material, quantitative, and reproductive. But viewed for itself, it is disguised, spiritual, intensive, and productive. The interaction between each of these four aspects is intricate. It cannot be reduced to some Manichean opposition between temporal heterogeneity and spatial homogeneity, virtuality and actuality ideas as virtual multiplicities are at once expressed by intensive repetitions
and enveloped by them but at the same time they are actualized as species and parts through the same process whereby intensive quantity is explicated as extensive quality so though inspired by Bergson, Deleuze is not content to reiterate Bergsonian dualism, such as that between quantity and quality, difference in degree and difference in kind, or to resolve the dichotomy by simply reabsorbing the former into the latter, as a facile spiritualist monism is wont to do. In a decisive critique of Bergson on this very point, Deleuze argues that it is pointless to try to object to mechanism by insisting on the irreducibility of life to
extensity or of quality to quantity the difference between difference in degree and difference in kind is not reducible to either court says Deleuze between the two are all the degrees of difference under both lies the whole nature of difference the intensive and indeed for Deleuze it is the intensive nature of difference which binds virtual and actual the ideal and the sensible and provides the catalyst for individuation to those will develop this theory of intensive individuation this theory of individuation heavily indebted to the work of Gilbert Simon don along three series that of space that of time and
that of the psyche but difference will only attack attain its maximal intensification in psychic individuation. Thus, it is the latter which provides the key to the transvaluation of the transcendental proposed by Deleuze and difference in repetition. If this transvaluation allows him to circumvent the Kantian question of representational access, as well as the Heideggerian question of existential access, without relapsing into a metaphysical dogmatism shored up by an appeal to intellectual intuition, it is only insofar as psychic individuation whose paradigm is provided by the third synthesis of time marks the point of intersection at which the dialectic of ideas and the aesthetic of
intensities or ideality and sensibility ultimately converge in a double genesis of thought and being so let's briefly recapitulate those as a code of the three series of individuation spatial temporal and psychic spatial individuation is not characterized by a movement from abstract universal to particular through the gradual specification of of genera and the continuous division of parts but rather via discontinuous ruptures and abrupt transitions in a metastable system this pre-individual field must comprise at
least two heterogeneous orders of intensive differences and those defines intensities as differences of differences or unequalizable quantities when the disparity in potential between series crosses a critical threshold of disequilibrium it causes a sudden exchange of information between series it affects a coupling between terms of the series and allows them to enter into relations of mutually reinforcing internal resonance so this synthesis of space involves an asymmetrical dynamism whereby an undifferentiated and Deleuze writes undifferentiated with a C here but fully differentiated T a it's there's a actual differentiation or the differentiation of actual species and
parts occurs on the basis of an entire virtual space or an intensive space and which is what completely differentiated or it incarnates these ideal multiplicities these differential structures which are remain purely virtual but it's on the basis of its own is the casal that the cat catalysis of individuation that space or extensity becomes apprehended in terms of volume sections individual individual qualities etc so temporal individuation is
similarly complex its elements are the three synthesis of time the first is the contraction of the present in the passive synthesis of habit habit is the contraction of a difference between two bare repetitions contemplated by a passive self and bare or spatial repetition is only possible or thinkable to those seems to mean here on the basis of a synthesis which contracts difference from mere repetition parties extra parts I would he the kind of repetition as difference without a concept thus it is represented or contracted by a passive self which is itself neither representative nor
represented and this contraction of difference from repetition constitutes the sub representational depth without which bare repetition would be impossible so in Deleuze's account of the genesis of time habit engenders the living present as the time and space of conservation necessary for representation. But the paradox of this present, says Deleuze, is that it constitutes the present in a time which is itself unconstituted. Thus, another time is necessary wherein the first can pass.
For if the past had to wait for a new present in order to become past, then it would prove just as impossible for the old past to recede as for the new one to arrive. Thus the present would never pass if it were not already passed at the same time as it is present. So there is a paradoxical contemporaneity between the past and the present which it was. Moreover, if each past is contemporary with the present which it was, then all of the past must coexist with the new present relative to which it is now past where habit is the foundation of the experience of time memory or the subsistence of the
pure past within every present provides the ground for that foundation so following bergson de laus calls the synthesis of memory the transcendental synthesis of time as a whole whereas the present and the future are merely intra temporal dimensions but the notion of time as a whole remains problematic from the viewpoint of a philosophy that claims have overturned representation time cannot be subsumed under the identity of the one so though the second synthesis is ground of representation that remains irreducible to the present it continues to be relative to what it grounds. The difference between past and present remains subordinated to the identity of a pure past
and to a relation of resemblance between that past and the present which it grounds. Thus, according to Deleuze, the second synthesis has merely introduced movement into consciousness rather than time into thought. It has not yet prized the difference which grounds representation free from the strictures of representation. And it is this splitting of passing time into an empirical present and a pure past that needs to be accounted for. The second synthesis explains how the passing of time presupposes an a priori split between the passing present and the past that was never present, or between the empirical and present and the a priori past.
But what is required is something that will ensure the synthesis of these two, that will ensure the synthesis of foundation and ground, or past and present. And this is the function of the third synthesis for Deleuze. Deleuze ties it to the Kantian paradox of inner sense. Kant discovers time as the transcendental difference between thinking and being. It is the condition of possibility for their correlation. The relation between the determination of thought, exemplified in the I think, and the indeterminacy of existence, exemplified in the I am,
the two terms of the Cartesian cogito, is only possible if we assume a third thing, Time as the form under which the indeterminate is determinable. But the form of the determinable is that of the passive self. For Kant, time as the form of inner sense introduces a split between the active or transcendental I and the passive or merely empirical self. But for Deleuze, affectivity as such is already grounded in the passive synthesis of contemplation, contraction, and the active synthesis of representation, which already presuppose the passive, sub-representational synthesis of contraction and memory.
consequently as far as the low is concerned that can be no active self identical I corresponding to the passive self as the lowest puts it this is a quote the death of God does not leave the identity of the eye intact but installs and interiorizes within it an essential dissimilarity a demarcation in in the place of the mark or seal of God. End quote. This demarcation is effected by what Deleuze will call the pure and empty form of time, which splits the I and correlates it with a merely passive self,
or a purely passive self. So what is this third synthesis? What is this pure and empty form of time? and this is the point any one who's read the financial this is a the point where things become very even more kind of opaque and very difficult to grasp nevertheless it's possible to make sense of it if we bear in mind the strictures that the laws has set for himself in his prior critique of representation and his commitment to to you know vocal to university the third synthesis is invoked in order to synthesize duration as an intensive or virtual whole either pure past with the present as its most contracted
point and this is the famous Bergsonian account of duration with the Bergsonian corn where you have the the present which is the point of the intersection between matter and memory or between space and time as merely the most contracted form of a continuum of duration of virtual duration which is the whole of time or the whole memory of the past and that which to lose and just a complicated account where all this the layers of it has there are different layers different
degrees of contraction and decontraction which correspond to different layers different rhythms and frequencies of duration of temporal differentiation so if the the certain system is invoked in order to synthesize duration as an intensive or virtual whole I the whole of time with the present the contraction of the living present then this is a synthesis between unequal portions it is the relation between the whole of time in memory and its most contracted point at the intersection with space. So the virtual past and the actual present coexist as two odd unequal
halves between which there can be no common measure. And the role of the Sert-Thins is indissociable from the problem of actualization in other words a problem actualization is about finding a common measure for these two odd unequal halves the virtual and the actual the two halves of the of the of the object the problem of actualization is how does the pure a priority of the virtual pasts which is always already to come, because it's always already there before any present is contracted. How does this past become converted into an actual present which is necessarily later than it?
What is required is an ordination of time which will distribute a before, a during and an after in a static synthesis. and that's Deleuze's own expression, a static synthesis, the simultaneity of a static synthesis. The ordination of time entails separating its pure form from its chronologically sequenced empirical contents. And hence, it's this ordination which, in Deleuze's peculiar expression, throws time out of joint. This is, to those famously credits Kant, the Kantian discovery of time as the transcendental form of determination,
as the prizing free of time, the prizing free of the pure and empty form of time from its subordination to space, to cardinal measure, to the measure of movement. The traditional definition of time being, famous Aristotelian definition being time is the measure of movement. And movement is measured by cardinal sequences which measure periodic movement. So time's joints are these cardinal points which measure periodic movement. So these three series are the first series of the present,
this cardinal order is the first series of the present, the second series of the past, the third series of the future, and an indefinite succession. So long as time is jointed or subordinated to the number of movement, all we have are nested successions of repetition, each of which remains external to the other. There is no common measure between the first, the second, the third. The function of the third sentence is to distribute this unequal series without subordinating them to a measure of movement or a successive series of repetitions. And paradoxically, this can only occur through a break, or what those will call a caesura, which distributes the series independently of the measure of succession.
so it is this caesura this crack, this splitting which orders a series in a fixed and static structure that is no longer bound to the dynamic determinations of time's empirical content and here there is I think a real relationship to Heidegger's own account of temporalization and what's striking what Harry calls the ecstatic on in and for itself time is that which is always disjointed which is outside of itself and can't so it can't be spatially represented is necessarily static so it
contradicts our ordinary intuitions about the way in which time is necessarily sequentially articulated as if time is a matter of moving from the future through a present into a past okay now this okay this there's no point in pretending I mean this marks the the crisis in the paper where there's there's a chunk missing where I connect where to do those relates this account of the pure and empty form of time to to
the death drive in a discussion of Freud and also links it to an account of the ultimate constituents of psychic individuation I eat okay and this is the missing chunk the fatally missing chunk of the paper but I'll try to kind of go bond to what the philosophical basically I'll try to brief at least sketch the movement of the movement that needs to be kind of articulated in this missing the point the third synthesis psychics and
individual occurs to do the third synthesis of time then Deleuze links this to the problematic of recurrence the the affirmation of returnal recurrence which is what differentiates the structure of time or temporalizes time and the point is that psychic it seems that in delicious account description of relationship between this death and psychic individuation is that the third synthesis becomes the differentiator of difference at the level at an ontological level. In other words, it has all of the spatial and the temporal orders
supervene on this ultimately individuating psychic instance. And this, I think, complicates Deleuze's commitment, Deleuze's account of the relationship between his critique of representation and his account of university the relationship between if the laws is seen as a spin is this then he simply recording the difference between substance attribute and modes in terms of the distinction between temporal differentiation ideas as virtual singularities and
intensive individuations and Deleuze famously wants to flatten substance onto the modes and have the attributes which is to say the the intent the ideas the dialectical ideas the problematic singularities become the the locus for individuating difference in being and he introduced a tripartite expression between sense designated and expressors. Being is said in a single sense, but that of which it is said differs. The expressors of this sense differ in each instance. If psychic
individuation is the affirmation of recurrence and if this is the locus for the access to the realm of pre-individual singularities and impersonal individuations which it clearly is in Deleuze's account of difference of eternal recurrence then Deleuze becomes involved in a bizarre parody of Hegelianism where consciousness psychic individuation marks the region wherein time or being is folded back in on itself so the problem is as I see is that what those ends up doing is transcendental access is ontologically internalized in a philosophy of purely actual rather than possible experience
and this seems to be the meaning of the largest transcendental empiricism a If transcendental access is ontologically internalized, and Deleuze is a kind of psychic individuation, then this internalization happens through an account of the genesis of actual rather than merely possible experience. And indeed Deleuze explicitly identifies this moment of access with a moment of transcendence. It is the transcendent use of the faculties provoked by the encounter with individuating intensity. and as the unthinkable proper to thought or the imperceptible property perception which gives birth to thinking in thoughts I the heart of the in the third the crucial chapter in
the image of thought chapter which is the core of the boot because it mirrors the two halves of the book into one another the the transcendental aesthetic in a transcendental dialectic to lose is it's a theory it's a transcendental theory for the genesis of thought but it occurs in the in the middle of the week in other words he doesn't begin with an account of how thinking accesses the world he shows how on the basis of occurrences of thinking in the world which is the the the psychic contractions affected by the by these larval selves there's a concatenation
there are these nested series of individuation which eventually give rise to a genesis of thinking of what we call thinking philosophical thinking ontological thinking within the bones within reality within the world So thinking like feeling for Deleuze is also the result of a gratuitous provocation. But here we are confronted with the most puzzling, or not to say problematic aspect of Deleuze's project, Indifference and Repetition. For this double genesis of thinking and being, which is articulated in his theory of the disjunctive use of the faculties. of the faculties the double genesis of thinking and being in the encounter with the cog a tandem or I'll use that as a safer for all the other transcendental
objects that are proper to the to the faculty the unthinkable the provokes thoughts the immemorial that provokes memory the imperceptible that provokes perception these transcendental provocations unfold divergent lines of actualization in the real according to arbitrarily conventional conventional distinctions between the form and function of faculties on one hand and regions or senses of being on the other for what has de leuze's on yoking of difference from the fourfold shackles of representation achieved if these diverging channels of actualization for ontological differentiation
remain tethered to what can't would have called a merely rapsodic catalogue of faculty of distinction on one hand and an equally rapsodic enumeration of the different senses of being on the other Kant famously criticises Aristotle and his scholastic predecessors, saying that they haven't deduced the list of categories properly. They've merely enumerated them using pre-existing conventions. the point is the point is to show how these that you know if category if being is going to be categorically differentiated and the point is to show
that these differentiations are necessary a priori they're not merely arbitrarily generated on the basis of empirical distinctions but if being is said in a single sense of everything that is but everything that is differs what is the status of this model difference in everything that is either difference between the claims of faculties the difference between thinking and feeling and memory and perception to those seems to want to use Bergson to synthesize Spinoza and can't famously Spinoza cannot deduce the number and nature of the attributes or categories. While Kant deduces the categories,
but only by yoking them to representation. But the Bergsonian method of intuition seems to offer a way of identifying the real nature of differentiation by characterising differences in nature in terms of these divergent tendencies of actualisation. and it's crucial in Bergson there are real differences between the psychic and the material between space and time between culture and nature and different kinds of nature under under the problem with Bergson's method of intuition is that it seems to be a very flimsy basis for enumerating for identifying the real
distinctions in being thus for the laws the key to grasping ontological differentiation the real differences in being lies in seizing the differences in actualization but here despite his own critique of the Bergsonian dualism of concept and intuition or difference of degree and difference in kind he is forced once more to rely on what is merely given or merely given differences between nature, culture, psyche, etc. And I think that this key kind of, this moment of equivocation
or this fragility in Deleuze's execution of the Transcendental Project points to is actually the result of the decisive role of psychic individuation because if if in the individual provides a sufficient reason for actualization and actualization these divergent lines of actualization tells us what kind of differences there are in the world and if it is psychic individuation that is the ultimate determinant for actualization then in spite of all these precautions in spite of the fact that the Lord seems to for all delicious critique of good sense and common sense and representation
he is once more merely relying on a kind of empirical instances empirical discriminations to identify these these ontological differences these divergent actualizations Thank you.