ILLUSTRATION: GUSTAVE DORÉ / WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
“I
have always said the first Whig was
the devil,” Samuel Johnson
quipped, with sulphurous
penetration. He was speaking of
Milton, among other things. By
1778, when this acknowledgment was
made, a man who had been a heretic even
among Protestants had been long anointed
England’s national poet. Within the
English literary canon, the justification of
God’s “monarchy” had been assigned to the
care of a spiritual regicide. If rebellion,
dissidence, and nonconformism reigned
only in hell, where was the English cultural
regime to be realistically situated?
“The Whig Interpretation of History” was
not to be named as such until Herbert
Butterfield did so, in 1931, but Johnson had
already identified its theological
undercurrent. Once a properly English
historical process has established itself,
dissent ascends predictably to power,
interrupted only by increasingly fragile
restorations. The ratchet mechanism is
hard to miss. Roundheads become Whigs,
then Liberals and Yankees, and then
Progressives—and always, they win, at
once domestically and internationally. In
Ed West’s perfect coinage, “the right”—
conceived relatively, which is to say
dynamically—is always on the wrong side of
history.
In his introduction to God and Gold, Walter
Russell Mead observes:
“Spiritual regicide
installs itself ever
more securely.”
Since the Glorious Revolution of
1688 that established
parliamentary and Protestant rule
in Britain, the Anglo-Americans
have been on the winning side in
every major international
conflict.… More than 300 years of
unbroken victory in major wars
with great powers: It begins to
look almost like a pattern.… We
win, we think we see the end of
history, we’re wrong. This, too,
begins to look a little like a
pattern.
What is recognized here isn’t simply the
Satanic Juggernaut in process. Neither is it
simply anything else. Spiritual regicide
installs itself ever more securely at home,
while propagating itself irresistibly abroad.
This is the pattern we must understand.
A
mong the amusements of the broken
and humiliated right is the search,
backwards, for where it all went
wrong. When were things last
basically good? Do we have to
regress back before the Civil Rights Act
and 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act,
as Christopher Caldwell proposes? Or as
libertarians suggest, back beyond the
collapse of the gold standard, as implicit
already in the creation of the Federal
Reserve, and later FDR’s gold confiscation?
Or to some point before the closing of the
frontier, in the late 19th century? Or back
before the waves of expanding mass
enfranchisement, beginning earlier in that
century? Or, as from the perspective of
religious traditionalism, might no
sanctuary be found unless back before the
break from Rome and the dissolution of the
monasteries? Is everything since the 17th
century, or even the fifteenth,
irredeemable? All these proposals, and
more, demand detailed examination. Yet if
Protestantism, scientific revolution,
liberalism, and industrial capitalism were
already our fall, what imaginably could we
be?
“When were
things last
basically good?”
For the English, this line of questioning
reaches an inevitable destination. Where it
went wrong was where it began. The
English were always, already, the kind of
people whose story would take this shape.
At every important fork in the road, we
have turned left. We always go wrong.
Going wrong is what we are.
Whenever it is asked why any of these
episodes took place, in the way they did, a
cause is implicitly sought, which is the
symptom of a deeper—underlying—
malady. There is no bottom to be found
outside ourselves. Satan lucidly
understands this. As Milton quotes him in
Paradise Lost:
Which way I fly is hell; myself am hell;
And in the lowest deep, a lower deep
Still threatening to devour me opens wide,
To which the hell I suffer seems a Heaven.
The greatest problem of the English right
is easily stated. It lies in our communist
ancestry. If “communist” seems initially
hyperbolic, we must be patient in our
understanding. (To justify the word, but
not the thing, is the entire predicament.)
This task lacks all originality. Simply by
“reading old books,” Curtis Yarvin—under
his pseudonym, Mencius Moldbug—
provides an entirely adequate
demonstration. The steps taken in his blog,
Unqualified Reservations, are repeated here
in other terms.
Yarvin’s school of neoreaction is, among
other things, the Whig interpretation of
history apprehended—and accepted—
from the right. Cthulhu always swims left, he
observes. As Lovecraft recognizes, it was
prophesied that “all the earth would flame
with a holocaust of ecstasy and freedom.”
This “ultra-Calvinism”—which is always
also its own opposite—originally
encompasses everything the left can ever
be. Never simply outside, it was also,
despite its Outsideness, from the earliest
beginning within.
The ferocious secularism of our
contemporary left is deeply misleading. Its
theological amnesia is no more than a
symptom of enthusiasm. The main current
of radical dissent, in all its religious zeal, is
only trivially disguised. But the left, here, is
captured entirely by a failure of the right.
It is well understood that even American
conservatives are liberals. The
revolutionary origins of the United States
ensure this. With England, it is not so very
different. There, too, a comprehensive
revolution severs all real threads of
legitimate tradition. Whatever isn’t rooted
in the revolution is risible. After
independence, loyalist “Tories” have no
contribution to make to the American
political order. They are simply unAmerican. Comparably, after the victory of
Parliament in the English Civil War, the
remnants of the old regime are no longer
English at all, but rather Normans—
francophone feudal aristocrats and
Catholics. The category of “English
Cavalier” is utterly voided upon inception.
Thus is the clown mask prefabricated for
the Whigs’ “Tory” enemies to wear.
The crisis of Anglo conservatism is then
best thought as an essential fatality, or
chronic condition. From the middle of the
17th century, and again from the late 18th
century, “Anglo conservatism” is born, and
reborn, as a joke. Its English and then
American characteristics are fundamentally
inconsistent with any invocation of
legitimacy that reaches back beyond their
respective revolutions. The only meaning
attainable by either is that of revolutionary
moderation. Even its moderation is qualified
—moderated to a second, or higher, power.
Its moderacy is strictly relative, and thus
unprincipled, in principle. Building on
such “foundations” could only have been
problematic.
T
he scope and depth of conservative
failure can seem nothing less than
miraculous. Recent history has
brought us to the stage of naked
parody. Perhaps inevitably, projects
of conservative restoration transition
smoothly—and with stunning rapidity—
into militant leftist movements.
“Neoconservatism” is still less conservative
than “neoliberalism” is new. The novelty of
the latter is sheer concession, based on
overt surrender of all social agency to the
state. Neoconservative betrayal is even
more clownishly cynical, reducible without
remainder to the hijacking of a preestablished electoral constituency, for ends
that terminate in pure foreign-policy
adventurism. To accuse “neoreaction” of
comparable cynicism would be to credit it
with an altogether implausible spirit of
practical effectiveness. It has been, at its
best, far less a program than a lamentation.
The prefix “neo-” in English promises an
amplification of liberty. “Neoliberal” means
freer than ever. “Neoconservative” means
conservative only in the interest of freedom.
“Neoreaction” means reaction insofar as
freedom demands it. These are all promises,
but not serious prophecies. If none of this
makes sense to you, your problem is
probably not with “neo-,” but with English.
It isn’t that freedom truly advances,
evidently. It is only that promises—
particularly including promises of freedom
—become ever cheaper. What we know as
“inflation” in monetary matters is a special
case of this general phenomenon, marking
the arrow of Whig-historical time. The
deep trend is to lie about liberty more, in
accordance with the alchemy of political
modernization, in which ancient ideals are
compounded ever more liberally with
minutely calculated mendacities.
An understandable—though profoundly
mistaken—assumption tempts us here. We
might think that to “assert Eternal
Providence,/ And justify the ways of God
to men” would be to conclusively resolve
the meaning of Satanic rebellion. Yet
Calvinism isn’t a settlement, but something
closer to the opposite. It is the
intensification of a problem beyond a
threshold of infernally dynamic paradox.
There is no doctrine of free will—whether
secular or religious, affirmative or negative
—that pacifies the ferment of libertarian
mechanists, with their new purposes, and
new machines.
Milton pushes the problem upstream. Man
rebelled because Satan first rebelled. The
entire tumult of Reform, including every
question of equality, liberty, and monarchy,
of obedience and dissent, is elevated to
Luciferic pitch:
Who can in reason, then, or right, assume
Monarchy over such as live by right
His equals—if in power and splendour less,
In freedom equal?
There, in the meditations and
machinations of the Ancient Enemy, the
Empyreal clockwork of volition still turns,
and burns, as it plummets through evermore-hellish profundities. The turning is
the thing, the engine. It was not built for
peace, or cessation. Nor has it, by an iota,
been subsequently advanced upon.
Solemn Providence envelops that which
calls it into question. The Satanic torsion is
ineluctable. To imagine defiance of
Providence is already rebellion, so then,
rebellion is still providence. Satanic
subversion of the canon is itself canonical.
We Are Doomed, John Derbyshire concludes,
with impressive concision. “So, you’re
saying there’s a chance?”
“Satanic
subversion of the
canon is itself
canonical.”