Visionary Television: World on a Wire and Artemis 81
Author(s): Mark Fisher
Source: Film Quarterly , Vol. 64, No. 2 (Winter 2010), pp. 58-63
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/fq.2010.64.2.58
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(1979), it is Fassbinder’s deviation from certain generic conventions that gives World on a Wire a particular charge—especially in the wake of Star Wars (1977) and The Matrix. While
both those films are defined by their special effects, there are
no visual effects to speak of in World on a Wire. The most conspicuous “effect” is the startling Radiophonic Workshop-like
squiggles and spurts of electronic music, which break into
Fassbinder’s stylized naturalism like a crack in reality itself.
In his Postmodernist Fiction (Routledge, 1987), the literary theorist Brian McHale makes a distinction between fictions organized around epistemological problems—what can
I know about this world?—and those oriented toward ontological problems—what status does this world have? McHale
treats Dick’s fiction, and that of Thomas Pynchon and Jorge
Luis Borges, as typical of the ontological turn, and World on
a Wire clearly belongs to this mode too. McHale draws upon
Douglas Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden
Braid (1979), and its concept of a “strange loop.” A strange
loop occurs when an ontological hierarchy is set up—worlds
are nested within worlds—but then disrupted. What should
be at an ontologically “inferior” level suddenly appears one
level up (a fictional character interacts with its author, say);
or what should be at an ontologically “superior” level appears
one level down (an author finds himself in the fictional world
he thought he was creating). Escher’s images—not for nothing referenced in Christopher Nolan’s Inception (2010)—
exemplify the paradoxical spaces of the strange loop.
In World on a Wire, the strange loop is created by Einstein,
the identity unit in Simulacron that those in the Institute for
Cybernetics and Future Science use to communicate directly
with in the simulated world. In order to perform this liaising
function, Einstein naturally has to be aware that he is a simulation. But this knowledge inevitably produces the desire to
climb up to the “real” world—a desire, it is implied, that can
never be satisfied. One of the enigmas that Vollmer leaves
behind is a sketch alluding to Zeno’s paradoxes—and I
couldn’t help but be reminded here of Slavoj Žižek’s remarks
on Zeno in Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan
through Popular Culture (MIT Press, 1992). For Žižek, the
paradoxical idea that desired objects must remain at a constant distance away from the subject, never getting closer, is
crucial in the psychoanalytic theory of the drive: “the drive’s
ultimate aim is simply to reproduce itself as drive, to return
to its circular path . . . The real source of enjoyment is the repetitive nature of this closed circuit” (5).
The ontological terror on which World on a Wire turns
—is our own world a simulation?—is now very familiar, via
the many Dick adaptations and their imitators. But, despite
not actually being an adaptation of a Dick fiction, World on a
Wire has more in common with the wry mordancy of Dick’s
work than many official Dick adaptations, not least in the
way that it shows each of its three nested worlds as being
equally drab. We actually see very little of the world “below”
(the world inside the Simulacron) and almost nothing of the
world “above” (the world one level up from what we first took
to be reality). The world below we see only in snatched
glimpses of hotel lobbies and inside a lorry driver’s cab. But it
is the revelation—or non-revelation—of the world above at
the climax of the film that is most startling. Instead of some
Gnostic transfiguration, we find ourselves in what looks like
a meeting room in some ultra-banal office block. At first, the
electronic blinds are down, momentarily holding open the
possibility that there will be some marvelous—or at least
strange—world to be seen once they are up. But when they
do eventually rise, we see only the same grey skies and cityscape. Stiller—whose name now assumes a special significance—has attained his official goal (climbing up to the
“world above”), but he has not “moved.” The Zenonian condition remains, in the form of an ontological anxiety that—in
a pre-echo of the torment that destroys Mal in Inception—is
as insatiable as drive: once Stiller’s faith in his initial lifeworld
is shattered, there is no possibility of fully believing in any reality. Like the object posited by the psychoanalytic drive, the
“real world” forever remains tantalizingly out of reach.
The differences between the three worlds is not accessible at the level of experience (of either the characters or
the audience), and it is as if Fassbinder, rather than being
bored by science-fiction themes, produces in World on a
Wire something that perfectly fits Darko Suvin’s definition in
Metamorphoses of Science Fiction (Yale University Press,
1979) of the genre as the art of “cognitive estrangement.”
Stiller’s mounting awareness of the simulated nature of the
world that everyone around him takes for reality forces a cognitive estrangement so intense that it constitutes a psychotic
break. The content of his experience is the same in every
respect; but, because everything he senses is now cognitively
reclassified as a simulation, he is no longer able to live.
Platonism meets materialism here. At one point, Stiller
berates his bemused colleagues with the Platonic concept
that they are not drinking a cup of coffee, but “the idea of a
cup of coffee.” As the ending of World on a Wire confirms,
there’s no difference—or at least no difference one can experience—between being, as Stiller puts it, “a few electronic
circuits” and having a physical body. In both cases, consciousness—and all the supposed richness of what phenomenologically orientated philosophers call “qualia,” the texture of our
sensual experience—turns out to be dependent upon hardware, whether biological or cybernetic.
Fi L M Q UArterLY
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59
World on a Wire exists in broadly the same moment as
Jean Baudrillard’s reflections on simulation in his 1976 book
Symbolic Exchange and Death. There, Baudrillard distinguishes between three “orders of simulation”—the first, mechanical copies of objects in the world; the second, the
artifacts of industrial mass production; the third, the feedback
systems of cybernetics. For Baudrillard, the opinion poll constitutes a special example of this “third order of simulacra,”
since such polls do not neutrally reflect the world but actively
intervene in it—or rather, they make the question of whether
they affect the world or not unanswerable. They form a
strange loop. It’s therefore fitting that World on a Wire’s Simulacron is a market-research experiment of sorts; or, at least,
that’s what it partly becomes. Simulacron is officially a state
initiative, and the endearingly quaint anxieties about the encroachment of corporate interests into the project that constitutes World on a Wire’s major subplot place it very much
in the West Germany of the 1970s. In the documentary
Fassbinder’s “World on a Wire”: Looking Ahead to Today, it is
noted that one of the advantages of shooting in Paris was that
the city already had shopping malls, a development that had
not yet made its way to West Germany. Dick’s fiction came
out of an American context where it was assumed that commerce would absorb everything, and when simulation technology re-emerges in the Dick-influenced cyberpunk cinema
of Blade Runner (1982), Videodrome (1983), and Total Recall
(1990), it is as a commercial application, controlled and
developed by corporations. Fredric Jameson argues in The
Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System (Indiana University Press, 1992) that the corporate takeover of this technology is an important narrative in a film like
Videodrome, one of whose preoccupations, he argues, is “the
tendential international monopolization of the media and
the various local culture industries” (26).
This naturally brings us to the question of the institutions
which funded and broadcast World on a Wire and Artemis 81
—Westdeutscher Rundfunk in West Germany and the BBC.
Although it is still notionally a state-funded public service
broadcaster, the BBC has long since succumbed to a populism which has acted in concert with business values and
practices to create conditions in which the broadcast of a film
like Artemis 81 is now unimaginable. The three-hour film felt
challenging at the time, but in retrospect its commissioning
and broadcast is even more astonishing.
Artemis 81 feels like it belongs to a Britain that was
European in a way that the country never quite was. That’s
partly because the production was originally intended to be a
co-production with Danish television, so that Rudkin built
Danish themes and locations into the plot. These remained,
even after the collaboration with the Danes collapsed. But
the Scandinavian motifs are more than a matter of logistics
and instrumentality. They reflect something in Rudkin’s
sensibility—his passion for Dreyer and Bergman and for “the
dark, cold, bleak legends of the North,” as Michael Moorcock
memorably described the Scandinavian myths in The Final
Programme (1973). Rudkin’s Scandinavia—positioned by
Artemis 81 as Britain’s dark North European twin—was, unapologetically, a fantasmatic space: a Scandinavia of the
mind, like Hamlet’s Elsinore, one of the many intertextual
references that Rudkin embeds into the script. But to say it is
fantasmatic and mythic is not to say that it is false: Rudkin’s
intuition, deeply antithetical to the prevailing empiricist
ideas in Britain, was that it is workaday mundanity, the world
of idle chat and trivial curiosity, which is the most pernicious
realm of delusion, trapping us in the worst versions of ourselves. This was the message of Rudkin’s best-known work for
television, Penda’s Fen, originally broadcast in 1973 as part of
the BBC’s Play for Today series, and directed by Alan Clarke.
“The vision of Albion in Penda’s Fen,” Rob Young writes in
his Electric Eden: Unearthing Britain’s Visionary Music
(Faber and Faber, 2010), “ends far from the comfortable
Middle England complacency of its beginning: the country
is embraced, by its oldest pagan spirit as well as by its younger
radicals, as a chaotic, revolutionary, mongrel nation. The pattern under the plough, the occult history of Albion—the
British Dreamtime—lies waiting to be discovered by anyone
with the right mental equipment” (416–17).
This idea that an alternative, oneiric national imaginary
is accessible to “anyone with the right mental equipment”
means that Rudkin cannot be positioned as the kind of elitist
snob from which neoliberal populism has claimed to liberate
us. Rudkin’s work in Artemis 81 was in fact the exact opposite
of snobbery. It is the expensively educated agents of neoliberalism who have disdain for the mass audience, arguing that
“ordinary people” do not want the kind of challenging drama
that Rudkin wrote. Now, in the much-vaunted era of “choice,”
those “ordinary people” have no chance to experience this
kind of challenging and visionary work on television. The
potency of a production like Artemis 81 was intensified by
the fact that it was broadcast at a time when Britain only
had three television channels. People found themselves
entranced and baffled by something that they would not have
“chosen” to watch but which absorbed them when they
stumbled upon it.
Genuine experimentalism has to risk failure, and Artemis
81’s ambition was without doubt overreaching. Writing about
Artemis 81 on his own website (www.davidrudkin.com/html/
tv/artemis.html), Rudkin is well aware of this: “I can see why
Fi L M Q UArterLY
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