EVERYTHING IS PRIMAL GERM OR NOTHING
IS: THE DEEP FIELD LOGIC OF NATURE
Iain Hamilton Grant (University of the West of England)
In Schelling’s “On the Relation between the Real and the Ideal in
dzȋͣͪͨ͢Ȍǡ eǡ it Ǥ ǯ
ǡrmer as an instance of the nature from which iǡaǯ ǯr ǫǡǡ
ǫ ǡ
ǡ
Ǥ
͟Ǥ
Why did Schelling not write a book of logic? In fact, he did, athough
there are no logics in Schelling that are not environed by “interconnected resistants” (zusammenhängende Gegenstände), as the Freiheitsschrift states 1, no systems not embedded in others, according to
the Stuttgart Seminars 2 and the lecture “On the Nature of Philosophy
A version of this paper was delivered at the second annual conference of the
ǣ , in London, Ontario, in
͟͠͞͡Ǥ and Ben Woodard for
organizing that excellent event, and, for the introduction to the present essay, to
Ǥ
1 Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ò ichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängende Gegenständeǡ ǤǤ ǤǡSämmtliche Werkeǡ ȋǤȌ Ǥ ȋ ǣ ǡ ͦͣͤ͟–ͤ͟Ȍǡ Ǥ
Ǥ Gutmann as ȋ aǣ ǡ ͧͤ͟͡ȌǤ ’s Sämmtliche Werke are hereafter referred to
parenthetically in the text as SW followed by volume numberǤ
2 Dz ǫ
man decided to create a system, there already existed one, that of the cosmos
[ ȐǤdz ǡ ͢͟͠ǡ (Ǥ) Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͥ͟͞
Ǥdz 3 Yet if logics are so embedded, what becomes of their
isolability as logic? What is logic if, in order to be one, it must
be systematic, and systematicity entails that nothing be left out?
What is it that leaves nothing out? Not the ‘universal’, if this remains
an isolably logical creature, but the universe, which does not (if there
ȌǤ
in general constitutes a long and repeated
series of the extractions of the “logic indwelling in nature” 4 Ǥ
, for example, does not simply
purport to supply an account of this or that aspect of the natural
process (ǤǤǡ ǡ ǡ Ȍǡ universal like the
5 Ǥ
of exhibition is to extract the whole from itself, ǤǤǡ
precisely the morphogenetic process involved in natural production
ǡǡ Ǥ
it is an ectype of itself, such that its ectypes are insuperably enviǤ
Dz
explain everything by sheer logical interconnection” 6 negative, in
that they start from a negation of whatever process is not thinking,
the procedure of logical extraction, the ring of nature to the bone,
Ǥǡ ǡ
starting point of an exhibition, ǤǤǡǡ
ǡ ȋ ǡ ͥ͡͡Ȍ 7, that
philosophy is Ǥ ǡǡ--thinkably
exists, it is thought after the fact as existing, and thus logically as the
Ǥ can be considered
positive to the extent that, as its very title suggests, it is nature that
ǣ ǤǤ Ǥ ȋǣ
ǡͧͧ͟͢Ȍǡͧͥ͟Ǥ
3 “All exclusive systems have in common that they are not the system and that
they are therefore something partial or subordinateǤdz ǡ ͧ͠͞ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ Dz ǡdz Ǥ Dž ǡ ȋǤȌ
ȋ ǣǡͧͧͥ͟Ȍǡ͟͟͠Ǥ
4 ǡ ͟͞͡ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ
Berlin Lectures ȋǣǡͥ͠͞͞Ȍǡͤ͟͟Ǥ
5 Dz dzȋǡ͡͞͡–ͧ͞ȌDzc dzȋ ǡ͟–ͥͦȌ On the World Soul
, (Ǥ) Ǥ ȋǣ
ǡ ȌǤ
6 Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Ǥò nͣͪͤͥȀͥͥǡȋǤȌ Ǥ ȋǣǯǡͧͥ͟͠Ȍǡ͟͢–ͣ͟Ǥ
7 Andere Deduktion paraphrased above is a concise source for Schelling’s
Ǥ
ͦ͟͞ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
ǡ Ǥ
exhibition of nature’s process from nature remains positive, as we
shall see, at the point when the copula is no longer a logical, but also
a real creature, or when the meǤ
Dz
Nature” 8 Ǥ
ǣ Dzt am I thinking when I think what exists” (SW X,
͡͞͡Ȍ Dzdz
thinking in the thinking of it, and, in so producing its downstream,
remains ope Ǥ ϐ Dz
that is again taken up in the higher, positive system” 9ǣ ǡ
that its being thought as unthinkable is additional to the insuperable
Ǥ
ǯ ϔ dependent in turn on
ϔ , those concerning matters where “only deep ignorance is
appropriate,” 10 and where this ignorance is known 11 without raising
the depths into science, but rather driving knowing to a “deeper
Ǥdz 12 What is being contested here is the positivity of what is
against a philosophy that, if premised on what is known, negates
Ǥ
ϐ ǯ ount of
Dz Ǥdz ǡ ϐ logic by
virtue of those resistants on which it connectedly depends, and that
8
ǡͣͧ͡–ͥͦǡǤ Ǥ On the World SoulǤ
9 Schelling, Groundingǡͤͣ͡Ǥ
10 SW ǡ͡͡͠Ǥ
11 Dz ȏWissenschaft] lies in the cognition [é]
of our unknowing [ȐǤdz ǡ͠͠͡ǡǤ ǤThe Ages of the
World ȋǣ ǡ ͠͞͞͞Ȍǡ ͤ͟ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
Hereafte Ǥ ǯ ation on Socrates’ acknowledgment of his ignorance, the meaning of which
Schelling gives, ǤǤǡ ͣͪͦͣȀͦͤǡ ȋǤȌ Ǥ
ȋ ǣǡͧͧ͟͡Ȍǡ͢͞͡ǣDz
ǡ Ǥǡ g ϐǤdz
Ǥ Ǥ ǯ Sokratische ȋǣ
ǡͥͣͧ͟Ȍǡͣ͟ǡ ǡͣͤ͠ǣDz-corn of our natural wisdom
must degenerate and pass into ignorance so that from this death, from this
nothingness, the life and essence of a higher knowing must germinate and be
Ǥdz
12 ǡ
ϐ ǡ ǡͤ͟͞Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͧ͟͞
ǡ Ǥ ϐ
logic contests is that it can be withdrawn from its environment, its
ǡ Ǥ ǡ
the entailment of the transcendental that whatever is must meet it on
ǡ Ǥ
een bought by, amongst other methods, the
ǣ ϐǡ
non-constitutedness the recipient of whatever it is that is said to
be given 13, violating what I shall call the Kantian axiom that “he who
wouϐ dz 14 in the interests of
Dz dz ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
result of that procedure would be that the known is not, while only
what is not known is, or that “what is” is entirely knowing-dependent
Ǥ
Second, the short-circuiting of nature that is the presupposition of
givenness demonstrates a physiocidal tendency as evident in contempo ǯǤ 15 ǡDzdz
ȋDzdzǡȌǤ
ǡ ǡ
certain readings, eliminates any ontology for which being is insepaǤ ǡ
to contest the connectedness of thought and being, but their insepaǡ ǡ ǡo Ǥ ǡ n revisiting the problem of the conceptual
constructedness of what is, rather than worrying about egress from
the transcendental to some non-conceptual reality, I have in my
Ǥ
13 Dz Ǯǯǣ
ǡ ǡ
universals, proposiǡ ǡϐ ǡǤdz
Wilfrid Sellars, Ǥ
Robert Brandom ȋǣ ǡͧͧͥ͟Ȍǡ͟͢Ǥ
14 Immanuel Kant, ǡ ȋǤ ǤȌ Ǥ Dž ȋǣ mǡͧͧ͟͡Ȍǡ͢͠͞Ǥ
15 ǡǡ ǯǤǡȋǤȌ
ȋǣǡ͠͞͞͠Ȍǡͥͥ͠ǣDz
reminder of second nature has done its work, nature can drop out of my picture
Ǥdz ϐ ǯǡ Transcendental OntoloǤ ȋǣ ǡ ͟͟͠͞Ȍǡ
“hardly ever mentions the world in his book Ǥdz ȋi) See also
ǯ ǯ ȋmǣ ǡ ͧͧ͟͢Ȍǡ Dz dz
ȏǣȀȀǤǤȀ ȀȀȀǤȐ ͥ
͟͢͠͞Ǥ
͟͟͞ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
givenness rests on a theory of the ready-made, then while its supposed virtue is the inconsistency of beginning conceptually with
what is not conceptual, thus demonstrating the essential autochtho ǡ
eǡǡǤ ǡ
example, that “some S are ,” the ontological commitment to its
environment extends only downstream, not up, so that the entire
, how it came to be, is eliminǤ
this is what Schelling had in view when he wrote that “Idealism…consists in the denial and non-acknowledgment of that negat ȏȐǤdzȋ
ǡ͟͠͠ȀǡͥȌ
ϐ ǡ 16, to
Dzǡdz
editions of On the World Soul 17ǡ ǡ Ǥ
Yet it is not reducibly so, but arises from a naturephilosophy, as is
already ǡ ǣ
how does matter come to be? Why then does a logical treatise open
ǫ
Ǥ
ǡ ǯ ϐ ǡ annot begin with the assumption of entities isolated from one another, complete and independent ab initioǡ ǡ Dz Ǯǯ
ǫdz ǣ ǡ
child of gravity and light; from the ǡǡ
ǡǤ
ϐ ǡ
ǤDz dz
connect the elements of a proposition, but to connect the ideal (the
ȌDzǤdz
Ǥ ǡ
would be at least one domain in which it failed to obtain, namely, the
Ǥ
the universe or the maximal environment of things, because if it “is”
ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ
16 Ǥ Dz
copula as a fundamental structure in Schelling’s Philosophy” at ǡ ǡ
ǣ ̹
ȋ ǡ͡͞ǡ͟͢͠͞ȌǤ
17 SW
ǡ ͣ͢͡–ͣͦ͢Ǣ Ǥ Ǥ Dz Ǥ
Higher Physics,” in Ǥ
ϐ On the World Soul ͥͧͦ͟ǡ ǡ
which On the Relation ǡͦͤ͟͞ǡͦͧ͟͞Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͟͟͟
“what is true of the copudzȋ ǡͤͤ͡Ȍǡ
production of the isolated copula—the emergence of expression—
additionally bonds that outside of which nothing is, ǤǤǡϐǡ
ϐǤ ǯǡ
folǡǤ
Second, therefore, if complete isolation is impossible, the copula
Ǥǡǡ
the saturation of all instances, as when I say “everything is matter,” if
the expression of this state of affairs is not itself counted amongst
Ǥ
its assertion, such that universalization also particularizes that
Ǥ Dzdz aust all things,
ǡǡǤ
ǡ ǯ
Ǥ ǡ
being a logical treatise, a member of the series of “exhibitions” or
Darstellungen of what he lately called, recalling the complex topology
presented by the copula, the “uni-Ǥdzȋǡ͟͟͡Ȍ ǡ
is Dzdz ǡ ǡ ϐ
Dzdz Ǥǡǡ
of locating the universal is that of the “unknown root” of the universe
Ǥeover, if it is the root of “all the forms and living phenomena of matdzȋ ǡͣͧ͡Ȍǡǡ
it were fo ǡ ǡ
always be found; but if it must always be found, the root itself, as a
ǡǤ Dzdz
is not incidental or merely descriptive, but plays a constitutive role
for Schelling’s deep-ϐ
is not cleanly divided into the sensible and the intelligible, but also
ǤǡFreedom essay’s “unground,” supplies the
surd that renders the asymmetry, entailed if there is emergence,
Ǥ
It is, accordingly, not enough to have “what is” issue from a positing, since although this is true of what issues downstream from it, to
posit the posit as source eliminates the upstream from which it is in
Ǥ Ǥǡation occurs in nature, the difference between the physical and the
ǡ ϐǡ
ǡ of the universe enfolded in
ǤǡǡDzǡdz
in the particular, or the particular is a universe in the universe, so the
ȋ͟Ȍ ȋ͠Ȍ more universal than other
͟͟͠ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
matters, since thought is, like its resistants, the universe in the uni Ǥ
Dz dz
ǡǤ
͠Ǥǥǣ
Schell ͦ͟͢͢ with the
ǡDz ǫdz
in the midst
of something else that environs ǤStuttgart Seminars,
ǡ , Dz
ever possible?” the immediate answer to which is that there already
ǤǡDz
ǡdzǣDzǫdz 18
ǡϐǡecedent to the thinking of it environs the thinking of that state of
affairs, and that this remainder is, according to the famous passage,
“irreducible” 19 or insuperable (nie aufgehendeȌǤ ǡ
ǣ ǡ ǡ
ǡ
Dz dz rd to its upǡ
is thought, so too thought, science and reason remain open to their
downstream, insofar as, while dependent on a source that is not and
cannot be thought—not merely as content, but also as regards
kind—is autonomous with respect to it, ǤǤǡ not its antecedǤ
Second, the environed character of thought indicates that it issues
from a , a place rather than a principle, or that it is not demonstrative, but dialec Ǥ 20 ǡDz
18 ǡ
ǡ ȋǤȌ
Ǥ ȋǣ ǯǡ ͧͥ͟͠Ȍǡ ͠͠͠ǡ ǡ ͟͢͡ǡ Ǥ
Ǥ Bowie as ȋǣ ambridge University
ǡͧͧ͟͢Ȍǡͥ͟͢Ǥ
19 ǡ ͤ͡͞ǡ Ǥ by Ǥ
ȋ ǣǡͧͦͤ͟Ȍǡ͢͡ǡǤǤ
Ǥ
20 Dz demonstration [] when it proceeds from premises
ǥǤ dialectical which reasons from
Ǥdz ǡ ǡ ȋǤȌ Ǥ ǡ Posterior
ǡ ȋǣ ǡͧͤ͟͞Ȍǡ͟͞͞Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͟͟͡
when I think what exists,” the thinking repositioned by Schelling’s
ǣ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
ǣ
Ǥ 21 ȋ
I am thinking when I think) is dependent on its source (what exists)
while nevertheless autonomous in respect to it, since if it were not so
ǡ Ǥ
neither represents nor repeats what exists but adds a dimension to
Ǥ ǡ ǡ
the thinking of what exists that arises in existence, is “spoken out
dz ȋ ǡ ͧͣ͡Ȁ ǡ ͥ͢Ȍǡ
ǡǤ
existence with the predicate “I am thinking it” is not the existence
that was asked afteǡ Dz dz
Ǥǡ
I am thinking, so that Schelling’s famously insuperable remainder 22,
Ǥ
Precisely because reason does not saturate what is, the thinking
the plane of being more geometricoǤȋ ǡͧͣ͡–ͧͤȀ ǡͥͣȌ m ϐ Dz dz ȋ ǡ ͤ͡͠Ȍǡ
plexity exhibited by the
Ǥ Dž -ϐ-ǡϐament that forms all forms, or the identity that is the universe, without the universe being Ǥ
ǡ Dz what
dz source of my thinking what I am
thinking to the extent that, this unprethinkable “what it is that is”
does not merely entail, but rather drives a thinking that, accordingly,
cannot be of Ǥ ǡDzis” is not merely given, since if
it were thus ready-made, it would be complete, and since something
ϐ ntation, it would be not a beginning but an end from which no issue
21 Dz ǡ ǡ aǢ Ǥ
ǡ Ǥt
is that is being (and this in the end is alone what it is concerned with), one must,
ǡ ǡ ǤTentanǤdzȋ ǡ͡͡͞Ȍ
22 Dz s, the irreducible [nie aufgehende] remainder that cannot be resolved into reason [ȐǤdz ȋ ǡ
ͤ͡͞Ȁ ǡ͢͡Ȍ
͟͟͢ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
Ǥ Schelling, we may say that something thus
ǡ Dzdz ȋibidǤǡ ͥ͟͡Ȍǡ
not even antecedent, since an antecedent is one only when there is a
Ǥ 23 stion not only of the source of thinking, but the source of existence,
Dzdz
(ibidǤǡ ͥͦ͡Ȍǡ
ǣ f production
Dz ϐdz
Ǥ
ǡ ather from what resists it, and against which ek- Ǥ
thinking of “what am I thinking when I think what exists?” and
all that this entails, does not suspend antecedence or “raise it up”
ǡ ϐ later
Ǥ ϐ downǡ ϐǡ
Ǥ
conclude that existence is thus lost to reason, since reason is, on this
ǡ Ǥ arating reason from its
environment, the latter is dependent on the former when expression
occurs, and the bond or copula consisting in dependent-yetautonomous expression, issues not from a given but from “the force
of beginning posited in the expressible,” which force, according to
the Weltalter, is again “the primordial germ [] of living naǤdzȋ ǡ͢͠͡Ȁǡ͡͞Ȍ
ǡ
works out in his long examination of the copula, which extends from
DzdzWAǡϐ
ǤǤ , “what am I think ǡdz Dzdz
putatively thinking, and its predicate is Dz Ǥdz
“what exists is what I am thinking” obtains, then according to the
analyses of the proposition in PIN and WA, the copula in the proposiȋDzdzȌǣ
23
ǡͤ͢͡Ȁ ǡͦ͟–ͧ͟ǣDz
Ǥ e dependence
without something being dependent, a result without a resultant…that is, the
Ǥdz ǡ
ǡ ǯ
the ǡ dǤ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͣ͟͟
is x in what exists is also the x Ǥǡ
x in S, and the predicate the x in ,
it follows that the identity asserted in the proposition expresses the
unity of the proposition, of each of its terms, and o Ǥ 24
ǡ
ϐǡ stion, whence the remainder, the darkness, the surd? We may also
approach the same state of affairs in the reverse manner, starting
Ǥ ǡ
so that whatever is, considered insofar as it merely is, is identity
itself 25, then since there are no instances in which identity is not
expressed—hence, “absolute identity is not the cause of the universe,
but the universe itself,” 26 neither is there one in which it exclusively
ǤDzA=Adzǣϐǡ
in the fact of expression; secondly, in the differentiation of
Ǣǡ Ǥ
of identity in the proposition entails the unity of the “three propositions” contained in it—the identity in S, the identity in , and therefore the identities in “S is ” insofar as both are identity and the
copula asserts this 27—this does not resolve identity into a logical
simple, because the copula provokes an iteration of identity without
end or issue, wherein each iteration differs from its antecedent and
ǡ Ǥ
words, identity is environed insofar as the formal differentiation its
iterations express are never summed, because the identity proposition is not extensional, that is, does not cover cases of entities that
are identical to one anotherǡ Ǥ
Hence even from the perspective of the unity lately expressed in the
ǡǤ
point, identity only is if tensed in both directions, which tensions are
Ǥ
24 ǯ
ǡ ͢͟͡Ȁ ǡ ͟͡ ǡ ͟͠͡–
͟͢ȀǡͦǤ
25 “Absolute identity has surely never ceased being identity, and everything that
is is, considered in itself…Ǥdz ǣ͟͠͞ǡǤǤDzaǡdzǤǤȋǤȌǡi Ǥ
ȋͣͪ͢͢-ͣͪͤ͢Ȍ ȋǣǡ͟͠͞͠Ȍǡͧ͟͢Ǥ
26 ǡͧ͟͠ȀDzǡdzͣ͟͢Ǥ
27 Dz iȏαȐǤϐǡǮαǯǡ ǡǮαǯǡǡϐǡ
third, ‘A and B are ǯǡǡǮǤǯdzȋ ǡ͟͢͠ȀǡͦȌ
ͤ͟͟ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
What of the universality of identity, or rather, the universe it is?
No existent expresses a universal insofar as it genuinely is one,
Ǥ ǡ —
nature—wo ǡ
Ǥ ǡ
achieved only if it cannot be conceived as separate from the “the
universe,” 28 ǤǤǡ ϐ Ǥ ce the
putatively separable domain of logic or “space of reasons” is only
Dz ȏ
éȐdzȋǡ ǣͣ͟͠Ȁ ǡͧͤ͟ǢiϐȌǡ Ǥ
of existence, the being posited of the negative is the ground of its
ǡ Ǥ ǡ
the knowing of this means that extainment, too, is a copula (a dis Ȍǡ ǡ
logic, as positively extaining the positive, the copula extends beyond
ǡ ǡ Dz dz ǡ Dz in
Ǥ”
It follows thǡDz
copula?” no domain may be given in answer that is not, insofar as it
ǡǤpositional expression of identity is the expression of a universe of
propositions, which, if expressed, manifestly differs from the proposition expressing it insofar as such a proposition occurs and does so
Ǥ ǡ Dz ǥǫ” even
ǡ osition of the
Dzdz ϐǡ
its expressive downstream, but constitutes an iteration of what I
have elsewhere called the “remains of the world,”29 or what insuperably environs expression such that an expression is only the latest
Ǥ
Dzϐ
dzǣǡǫ
28 ǡͣ͟͠ȀDzǡdzͣ͟͠Ǥ
29 Dzǣ
ǯ
,” Schelling StudienǡǤ͟ȋ͟͢͠͞Ȍǡ͡–͢͠Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͥ͟͟
͡Ǥȋ ȌNǣ
Mǫ
Schelling begins Dzdz
of the darkness of matter, which is amphibolously 30 dark both with
ǣ
ǡ ǡ
Ǥ omena of nature result
from the ǡ or raising [] of this unknown rootǤ ǡ iϐ ǡ
Ǥȋ ǡͣͧ͡Ȍ
ǡǣ Dzdz
ǡǡǡǤ
ǡ ǡ ϐiciently local as to be susceptible of isolation, matter would be singular and isolated from the universe that it could no longer, in conse ǡǤ
ǡ t Ǥ ϐ ǡ
ǡ Ǥ ǡ ϐ ǡ
before it is said to be darkness itself, raising the distinction between
exemplar and archetype, on the one hand, and between particular
ǡ Ǥ ϐǣ
ϐ ǡ ǫ
ǡ ǡ ǡ
is, relatively dark but not darkneǫ ϐes,
but is not ǡ Ǥ
If, taking the second distinction, matter is particular, whatever
ǡǤ
universal, however, in what respect is it differentiable, even on the
scale of light and dark? In what respect, that is, would it be darkness
30 For Kant, in the ȋͤ͠͞–ͦͧȀͤ͟͡–ͤ͢Ȍǡ
Ǥ
ǡ ϐ Dz
cognitive faculties are our representations connected together? Is it the underǡ ǫdzϐction achieves the proper environing of representations and the correct distribu Ǥ
ϐ ǡ ǯ ǡ ǡ
ǡ ǡǤ
ͦ͟͟ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
itself, or darkness, since its universality would entail that it also
Ǥ
hown that, for Schelling, the
universe is the only measure of a universal, although in such a claim,
Ǥ
ϐ ϐǡ
instance of the fǡ Ǥ
Yet the passage does not only particularize matter as a logical
Ǥ Dz
forms,” that is, that it is a morphogenetic universal or “the universe,
ϐ Ǥdz ȋ ǡ ͤ͡͠Ȍ 31 Schelling’s particularization of
matter as a root, precisely in the sense that it can be potentiated or
raised, of a mathematically comprehensible morphogenesis 32, is
ϐDzǤdz ǡ
ǡ
ǡ
then the link between matter and morphogenesis is lacking, leaving
the latter incomprehensible if the root remains unǤ
It is important to note, however, that Schelling’s claim is not that
this root is a “thing,” sensibly or physically located amongst other
things and merely therefore in Ǥ ǡ
function, it obtains only when the functioǤ
ǡϐ
ǡ ȋ͟Ȍ it can have none in itself, as we have seen, and
ȋ͠Ȍ Ǥ
ǡ es obtain, then as root of “all the
forms and living phenomena of nature,” it must be s ǡ
were, a higher-order exhibition than merely the existing or
31 ǡ Forms of Becomingǡ ȋǤȌ Ǥ
(Princǣ ǡ ͧ͠͞͞Ȍǣ “the universe of possible forms
ǡ ϐǡ Ǥ
ϐ
included or excluded from ϐǫdzȋͤ͢Ȍ
32 ǡ
Lorenz Oken’s mathematics of protoplasm, in -ǡȋǤȌ
Ǥ ȋǣ ǡ ͦͥ͟͢Ȍ ǯ n’s On
Growth and Form ȋǣǡͧͥ͟͟Ȍǡ
ƴ ȋǣ aȀǡ ͧͥͣ͟ȌǤ ǡ
Ƹ eux du mobile ȋǣ ǡ ͧͧ͟͡Ȍ L’enchantement
du virtuel ȋǣ Ƶ ǯǡ ͟͠͞͞ȌǤ Ƶ Dž ǡ ȋǤȌ Les sciences de la
ǯ ȋǣǡͧͧ͟͢Ȍǡǡ
in Forms of Becoming, demonstrates the ways in which this program survives in
Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͧ͟͟
Ǥ ǡ be all
forms, but rather their rootǡ Dzdz
ǤǡDzdz
form in which this all is presented is not included amongst the othǤ ǯ ϐ Dzdz ϐ
downstream non-ϐ33, since if this root is responsible for all
forms, then the forms the exhibited all assumes must themselves
ǡ Ǥ
Logically, too, the all is not-all precisely when it is posited, since the
positing additionally environs the all with a form not included thereǤ ǡ
-ϐǡ n
Ǥ
ǡ
ϐ ǡ
for which therefore matter remains insuperably dark, and the science of reason, for without knowing this root, it lacks the copula
Dz Ǥdz ǡ ϐ Dz
ǡdz ǯ ǣ
the copula connects idea to actualit ϐ ǡ
ǤǤǡ ǡ wissenschaftlicheǡ Ǥ
those of the special sciences, but precisely of the universal and
systematic science associated with the German idealists’ concept of
Ǥ
epistemic or transcendental, concerned with the conditions under
ǫ ǡ ǡ
demand that physics, the science of nature, has its ground in
the satisf ǡ
ǫ
cast into doubt by the assertion following this apparent transcenden Ǥ cting
ǡ Ǥ
knowing of matter is tied to that of the
or bond connecting the ideal and the real, or Idea and actuality
33 ǡ Forms of Becomingǡ ͦͧ–ͧ͞ǡ Dzϐ ϐǡdz
ǣ ȋ͟Ȍ
“mature” or “adult” form, since as chrysalis forming animals demonstrate, an
Ǣ ȋ͠) also dropping the geneticist
assumption of the terminus of process in individuation, since not all processes
Ǥ tter served by a focus on Ǥ(IbidǤǡ
ͧ͟͠–ͧ͡Ȍ
͟͠͞ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
(Wirklichkeit), which in turn provides t Dz ϐ dz
Ǥ
As we have seen, the root is unsummable downstream, since the
all to which it gives rise is made lo Ǥ that,
following its innumerable intermediary links 34, descends throughout
nature, is drawn out of nature in an exhibition that remains insuperably local insofar as it, being form and phenomenon, has this root in
Ǥ
ǡǡtic
explorers seeking Arctic light, the naturephilosopher must return
Ǣǡ ǡǤǤǡǡ
forms matter when generation is non-ϐǤǡǡ
ϐs, powers or “dispositional
predicates” (as he notes in the , “a
purely logical concept of matter is meaningless” 35), but is only where
morphogenetic potentials are expressed, since in being expressed,
Ǥ
Schelling therefore offers three reasons for the local character of
ǣ
ȋ͟Ȍ It is itself “synthetic,” 36 “copulative,” or generated, the “sensible and visible child dzȋ ǡͤ͡͞Ȍ;
ȋ͠Ȍ What is upstream of this root remains unknowable, because it
is “unprethinkable” without the forms that arise from it, including
the form in which it is therefore lately exhibited;
ȋ͡Ȍ Its downstream is material if it consists in additional forms,
ϐal, and this Ǥ
In what then is “knowledge of this unknown root” to consist? In
ǡ ϐ
34
ǡͥͧ͠ǡǤǤ
of Nature ȋǣǡ͢͠͞͞Ȍǡͧͧ͟ǡ lling draws attention to the innumerable “intermediary links” obtaining in all
Ǥ
not merely their number but their systematic interrelations that creates the
problem that, if they are so coherent, then these links “may be unknown to us
Ǥdz ǡ
science, which consists in their discovery, and that of speculative physics, which
exposes lacunae in the system, are not merely incomplete, but rather inϐǤ
35 ǡ ͣ͠͡ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ
ȋǣǡͧͦͦ͟Ȍǡͦͦ͟Ǥ
36 IbidǤ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͟͟͠
assume? And if this ground is itself an expression of the connection
of the idea t ǡ ǫ
Firstly, in accordance with this “synthetic concept of matter,” we
upon it, both in the sense of after the fact, or better, after what it is I
am thinking when I think what exists; and in the sense of being
Ǥ ǯysis of the “ground- dzPIN, generation “in no way
determines” what the generated is, but, since it is dependent on its
generative root, only “that the dependent can only be as a conse Ǥdz ȋ ǡ ͤ͢͡Ȁ ǡ ͦ͟Ȍ
Dz dz
Ǥ nowing of this universe will
therefore be a form generated dependently upon it, and as such, will
contribute to the matter of that universe, not in the sense that
knowledge is made of the same stuff, but in the sense that the knowing of the universe obtain Ǥ
ǡ t Ǥ
the “unknown root” presents a ϔ for the knowing of nature,
this is because it remains unknown insofar as it is insuperably upǤ ǡwever, is an ultra- ϔ , because the knowing of the
unknown root involves not only the unknowing of it because it is
irretrievably pastǡ
in the universe, but additionally, because not only could no particular satisfy unprethinkable root-being, the “seed corn of the universe” 37 Dz dz ȋ ǡ ͦͦ͡Ȍǡ
could any conditions considered as necessary in the generation of
Ǥ
the universe of all forms be exhibited, and in being exhibited, that it
be minimally one less than obtain, since the form of the exhibition of
these forms cannot be amongst them, and that it be environed upstream and down by the nie aufgehende “what” that is locally
Ǥ
͢Ǥ
ǡ
the arche kineseos ǡ Dz dz y37 IbidǤǡ͠͠͡Ȁͥͧ͟Ǥ
͟͠͠ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
pothesizes, morphogenesis across the totality of domains arises, is
properly given in the òǣ DzEverything is primal germ
Ǥdz ȋ ǡ ͦͦ͡Ȍ ǫ
According to this last claim, a totality is a totality only if it is additionally a primal germ, and, primal, not ultimate but made into
ǡϐǡ
ǡǤ
therefore mean it is not totality, but that totality too is generative,
ǡ Ǥ ǡ
Ǥ
he relation between the real and the ideal, between the matrix of natural
ǡ Ǥ
answer the “totality of domains” problem if nature consists in the
isotropic morphogenesis Schelling hypothesizes Ǥ
potentials issue, therefore the metadimensional source of dimensionality, the arche kineseos, then this is nature , whether by
itself or by some other, somehow Ǥ
nature expressed, and regardless of the medium of expression—
gravity, light, logic, art or revelation—there is always an “earlier”
ǡ Ǥ ȋ ǡ ͣ͢͟Ȁ ǡ ͧͦȌ
ϐct, ǤǤǡDz
what exists,” but also in its “autarchy,” 38
ǡǡ a ǡ Ǥ
say that there is a “nature itself,” an abstract nature without characteristics, but rather that where there are predicates, these follow a
that exǤǡ Ǥ What then would it
ǫ
Ǥ ǡ n ǡ
Ǥ
respect of its antecedent, and if what is antecedent is nature, then the
ǡ Ǥ
other words, the dimension of time does not facilitate the construction of the scientiϐ ǡ
Ǥ
Perhaps we might claim instead, then, that nature is the “enviǤdzǡǡ
38
ǡͥ͟Ȁdz ǡdzͥ͟Ǥ
s Primal Germ or Nothing Is ͟͠͡
totality would entail that it be generative, in which case what exactly
does it environ? Surely what environs is environed in turn if the
primal, the root, is not to be located once or , but
rather and ǫ ǡ ǡ ecomes one only if it is environed Ǥ ǡ
ǡ ǡ enetic root, and if the universe is a material one, it is similarly environed upstream as downstreamǤ
of all environments be? It certainly could not be spatiotemporal if
these are dimensions of morphogenesis, since the environment of all
ǡ
such meta- Ǥ ǡ nment of all env Ǥ ǡo ǡ ities (the environment of all environments; the insuperable antecedǡȌǤ
iDzǤdzȋ ǡͥ͠͞Ȍ ǡǡDzerything is primal germ” now states both that if there is emergence,
ǣ
nothing; and, if there is emergence anywhere, it is maximally non Ǥ in a
universe, but the exhibited universe is itself a morphogenetic in Ǥ
ϐ
ǡ ǡϐǣ
ǡǤ
puts the pointǣ “here is no limit to the number of natural kinds to
Ǥdz 39
is not involv ϐ ǡǡrgence of chemical matter, of gravitation and light, or of spacetime, to
ǡ ǡ
primals in the extraction of logic from nature such that nature now
includes Ǥ
ϐ
unconditioned or absolute metric of nature’s exhibition, since this
Ǥ s, as the form of “On the
dz ǡ
ǡ Ǥ
there any difference in kind between the one and the other, since
both produce their morphogenetic
39 ǡ ȋǣǡ
͠͞͞͞Ȍǡ͢͠Ǥ
͟͢͠ , ǤͣͫǤͣȋȀͤͣͧ͢Ȍ
obtaining, and both sever nature into a before and an after, both of
ǡ ǡǤ
ǡǡ ϐ ǫ ǡ
we have hinted at the topological complexity of Schelling’s thought of
the copula, to the fuller exhibition of which this essay is preparatoǤ 40 ϐ ǣϐǡ
with Schelling, that the copula in matter is not another, but only a
“stricter” one than in reaǤȋ ǡͤ͡͞Ȍ ǡnic problem of the ϐ
the extent that the division between nature and logic must always be
the effect of the understanding in nature, the “division of forces,” as
the Freiheitschrift Dzϐ Ǥdzȋǡ ǣͤ͟͡Ȁ ǡͤ͡Ȍ
Second, in the essay we have been considering, as in the First Outline, the World Soul, the , and the , but
also in the dimensional diagrams that pepper niversal Deduction,
the magnetic lines that gradually transform into the 41 of
propositions within propositions, and then into the Weltformel 42, or
the fascination with Aristotle’s ethological modelling of behaviour in
the Darstellung des rein-ra 43ǡ ǯ
is the morphology or topology of the sheerly but not merely ideal
insofar as this consists in the self-augmentation of the real, rather
than as a supersession, suspension, replacement, or merely epistemic eliminatǡDzdzǡǤ
ǡ ǡ ϐative realism on ǡϐ
Ǥ ǡ ϐinally, adds to the
catalogue of real forms, this is because nature is generalizably tran Ǥ ϐ ǡ
darkness itself, according tǤ
Ǥ ̻Ǥ Ǥ
40 See Grant, ǣ ǯ, in prepa-
Ǥ
41 For
Schelling’s account of or “reduplicative positing,” see his
ǡ ȋǤȌ Ǥ ardt (Stuttgart- ǣ mmann- ǡ ͧͦͧ͟Ȍǡ ͣͣ–ͣͤǤ ǡ ͟͞͡ǡ Ǥ Ǥ
ȋǣǡͧͧ͟͢Ȍǡͥ͟͟Ǥ
42 ǡ͟͡͠Ȁǡͦ͢Ǥ
43 ͧ͟ǡ ǡ͢͡͡–ͣͤǤ